{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  x86/alternatives: Exclude text poking against change_page_attr()  From time to time, the following BUG can be observed in the x86 alternatives patching code [0]:    \u003e kernel BUG at arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:2576!   \u003e Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI   \u003e CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 355 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 7.1.3-1-default #1 PREEMPT(full) openSUSE Tumbleweed  8c1795b03ec64f997e57a8ad38b1161e3b98da64   \u003e Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS unknown 02/02/2022   \u003e RIP: 0010:__text_poke+0x2aa/0x450   \u003e Call Trace:   \u003e  \u003cTASK\u003e   \u003e  smp_text_poke_batch_finish+0x2a7/0x320   \u003e  __static_call_transform+0xb7/0x220   \u003e  arch_static_call_transform+0x5b/0xb0   \u003e  __static_call_init+0xe9/0x270   \u003e  static_call_module_notify+0x11f/0x150   \u003e  notifier_call_chain+0x61/0xe0   \u003e  blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust+0x63/0xc0   \u003e  load_module+0x1c92/0x20c0   \u003e  init_module_from_file+0xd8/0x140   \u003e  idempotent_init_module+0x100/0x2f0   \u003e  __x64_sys_finit_module+0x71/0xe0   \u003e  do_syscall_64+0xe1/0x610   \u003e  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e  which matches the following BUG_ON() in alternative.c:  \t/* \t * If something went wrong, crash and burn since recovery paths are not \t * implemented. \t */ \tBUG_ON(!pages[0] || (cross_page_boundary \u0026\u0026 !pages[1]));  This can happen if vmalloc_to_page() fails, for any reason. Such can happen if text poking races with CPA, which can possibly result in the collapsing of page tables (or breaking of PMD hugepages). It is not a problem for most users of vmalloc_to_page() (they solely own the vmalloc'd range) but, when CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_EXECMEM_ROX=y, various modules own a single execmem vmalloc range, and can call set_memory_*() in parallel on it. This can happen to race against __text_poke and cause havoc in vmalloc_to_page().  Fix it by excluding against CPA using the init_mm mmap read lock.  [ dhansen: Fix up SoB ordering. The actual code flow here was: \t   Pedro=\u003eLorenzo=\u003eMike=\u003eMe which is reflected in the SoB chain \t   now. I *believe* Mike simply picked up Lorenzo's update to \t   Pedro's post from the Link ]",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-97942",
  "modified": "2026-09-26T04:47:40.569967842Z",
  "published": "2026-09-25T11:17:21.633Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-97942"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-97942"
  ]
}