{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.1.190-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:13",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.12.113-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.2.9-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  bpf, sockmap: Reject max_entries \u003e INT_MAX in sock_map_alloc  sock_map_alloc() only rejects max_entries == 0 and otherwise allows any u32 value.  sock_map_free() then walks the sks[] array with a signed int iterator:  \tint i; \tfor (i = 0; i \u003c stab-\u003emap.max_entries; i++) \t\tstruct sock **psk = \u0026stab-\u003esks[i];  When a SOCKMAP is created with max_entries = 0xffffffff (UINT_MAX), the allocation of 32 GiB can succeed on large-memory hosts.  During free the counter reaches 0x80000000, wraps to INT_MIN, is sign-extended by movslq and turned into a ~16 GiB negative offset from stab-\u003esks, pointing far below the allocation.  The faulting access is an xchg() write in sock_map_free().  Without KASAN, the same out-of-bounds write can fault on an unmapped vmalloc page or corrupt an unrelated allocation if that vmalloc address is populated. On a KASAN kernel with CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC=y, the shadow check for that address hits an unmapped shadow page and oopses first:    BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffff521b59c5a00   RIP: 0010:kasan_check_range+0x107/0x190   Call Trace:    sock_map_free+0x93/0x190    map_create+0x68d/0xb30    __sys_bpf+0x21e/0x2e70  Vmcore confirmed stab-\u003emap.max_entries == 0xffffffff, stab-\u003esks == 0xffffc911ace2d000, and the faulting address sks + (s64)INT_MIN * 8 exactly at 0xffffc90dace2d000.  The same buggy path is reached on the normal close()/bpf_map_free_deferred() path whenever such a map is destroyed.  sock_map_alloc() used to bound its allocation size through bpf_map_charge_init(), but the bound was dropped when rlimit-based memory accounting was removed.  Reject max_entries \u003e INT_MAX at creation time so the signed iterator in sock_map_free() never sees a value that would overflow.  Triggered by syzkaller and reproduced on both a 6.6-based KASAN kernel and the upstream v7.3-rc2 kernel.",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-98588",
  "modified": "2026-10-19T04:47:38.303630018Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-98588"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-98588"
  ]
}