{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:13",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.12.117-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.3.3-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  libceph: bound mon_command ack decode to front len  handle_command_ack() bounds the decode with msg-\u003efront_alloc_len, the size of the reply buffer, instead of msg-\u003efront.iov_len, the number of bytes the monitor sent.  mon_alloc_msg() routes every CEPH_MSG_MON_COMMAND_ACK to get_generic_reply(), which returns the preallocated -\u003ereply of whichever generic request carries the same tid, so the buffer keeps its fixed size however short the reply is.  An ack with hdr.front_len below sizeof(struct ceph_mon_request_header) + sizeof(u32), including 0, still passes ceph_decode_need(), and ceph_decode_32() returns four bytes that were never received: uninitialized slab memory, stale bytes of an earlier message, or bytes the peer planted by sending a reply that lands in the same buffer and is then rejected.  The read stays within the allocation, so KASAN does not flag it.  req-\u003eresult reaches userspace through ceph_monc_do_statfs(), ceph_monc_get_version() and ceph_monc_blocklist_add(); rbd hands it back from write() on /sys/bus/rbd/add_single_major, and rbd_get_client() passes it to ERR_PTR() unchecked, which faults:    rbd: failed to get latest osdmap: -186318427   BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfffe9ca034   Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI   RIP: 0010:do_rbd_add (drivers/block/rbd.c:7105)   Call Trace:    ...    kernfs_fop_write_iter (fs/kernfs/file.c:345)    vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:595 fs/read_write.c:687)    ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:739)    do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84)    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)   Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception  Use msg-\u003efront.iov_len, matching handle_subscribe_ack(), handle_statfs_reply(), handle_get_version_reply() and handle_auth_reply(). A well-formed ack has front.iov_len \u003e= 22 and is unaffected; a short one takes the existing bad: path.  This applies commit d3c32939fa0e (\"libceph: bound get_version reply decode to front len\") to the last decode-side use of front_alloc_len in this file.",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-99296",
  "modified": "2026-11-17T04:47:42.640704808Z",
  "published": "2026-11-16T10:17:02.660Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-99296"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-99296"
  ]
}