{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:13",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.12.117-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.3.4-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  ceph: fix integer overflow in the snap trace bounds check  ceph_update_snap_trace() bounds the two encoded snapid arrays that follow a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm with sizeof(u64) * (num_snaps + num_prior_parent_snaps).  Both counts come straight off the wire as __le32, so the addition is evaluated in unsigned int and wraps before sizeof(u64) promotes it to size_t: an MDS sending num_snaps = 1 and num_prior_parent_snaps = 0xffffffff makes the sum zero and the check degenerates to ceph_decode_need(\u0026p, e, 0, bad), which always passes. dup_array() then reads num_snaps * 8 bytes past the end of the message front, which ceph_msg_new2() allocates at exactly front_len bytes.  An unsolicited CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_SNAP reaches this from a malicious or compromised MDS with no client-side action, as do the snaptraces carried in an MDS reply and in a cap import.  Compute the length with size_add()/size_mul() so it saturates at SIZE_MAX instead of wrapping, in the style fs/ceph/mdsmap.c already uses for num_export_targets.    BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dup_array (include/linux/unaligned.h:28 fs/ceph/snap.c:500)   Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880102a16c8 by task kworker/1:2/129   Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn   Call Trace:    dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120)    print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:482)    kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)    dup_array (include/linux/unaligned.h:28 fs/ceph/snap.c:500)    ceph_update_snap_trace (fs/ceph/snap.c:836)    ceph_handle_snap (fs/ceph/snap.c:1155)    mds_dispatch (fs/ceph/mds_client.c:7234)    ceph_con_process_message (net/ceph/messenger.c:1424)    ceph_con_v1_try_read (net/ceph/messenger_v1.c:1430)    ceph_con_workfn (net/ceph/messenger.c:1576)    process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3396)    worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3479 kernel/workqueue.c:3560)    kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)    ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)    ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)   ...   The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of    allocated 72-byte region [ffff8880102a1680, ffff8880102a16c8)",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-99304",
  "modified": "2026-11-17T04:47:50.748021206Z",
  "published": "2026-11-16T10:17:04.763Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-99304"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-99304"
  ]
}