{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.3.3-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  vfio/nvgrace-gpu: Use a core-only open_device in fallback mode  When the ACPI memory properties are missing or the C2C link is down, the device is exposed through nvgrace_gpu_pci_core_ops.  That table opens through nvgrace_gpu_open_device() but closes through vfio_pci_core_close_device(), so open and close are not symmetric.  nvgrace_gpu_open_device() registers nvdev-\u003eusemem for poison handling unconditionally.  In fallback mode usemem.memlength is zero, and register_pfn_address_space() inserts a node covering [0, ULONG_MAX]. Nothing removes it: a second open fails with -EBUSY, and once the device is unbound the node outlives the nvdev that contains it.  The next open after a rebind reports:    BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in interval_tree_iter_first+0x209/0x310   Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800894aa30 by task nvgrace_repro/203   Call Trace:    \u003cTASK\u003e    dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80    print_report+0x153/0x4c6    kasan_report+0xe4/0x1a0    interval_tree_iter_first+0x209/0x310    register_pfn_address_space+0x97/0x100    nvgrace_gpu_open_device+0x21c/0x730    vfio_df_open+0x213/0x520    vfio_df_ioctl_bind_iommufd+0x3e8/0x6e0    vfio_device_fops_unl_ioctl+0x782/0x1570    __x64_sys_ioctl+0x13c/0x1c0    do_syscall_64+0x106/0x630    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f    \u003c/TASK\u003e    Allocated by task 188:    ...    _vfio_alloc_device+0x3a/0x500    nvgrace_gpu_probe+0xcb/0x660    local_pci_probe+0xcf/0x170    ...    Freed by task 188:    ...    kfree+0x20d/0x600    device_release+0xcf/0x250    kobject_put+0x152/0x2f0    pci_device_remove+0xb0/0x1c0    device_release_driver_internal+0x38d/0x540    unbind_store+0xde/0x100    ...  Give the fallback table its own open_device that only calls vfio_pci_core_enable() and vfio_pci_core_finish_enable(), the counterpart of vfio_pci_core_close_device().  Fallback mode then never touches the nvgrace memory regions, as Alex suggested.  This should be safe because the fallback table uses the vfio-pci core read, write and mmap handlers, so nothing there uses the state nvgrace_gpu_open_device() sets up.  The one visible difference is that a fallback open no longer fails when BAR0 cannot be mapped, which matches vfio-pci.",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-99450",
  "modified": "2026-11-20T04:47:26.219381574Z",
  "published": "2026-11-19T15:17:58.833Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-99450"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-99450"
  ]
}