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# Carbon Leakage Review

**Consultation Paper 2**

November 2024

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## Executive Summary

This paper is the second consultation paper issued by Australia’s Carbon Leakage Review (the Review), following a first paper and consultation process in November to December 2023. It details the Review’s analysis to date on potential future carbon leakage risks (including materiality of such risk for individual commodities); assesses different possible policy approaches to address leakage risks; and addresses feasibility and potential impacts of border carbon adjustments.

The paper sets out preliminary findings to inform further stakeholder input ahead of the Review’s recommendations to government by the end of 2024. The Review’s preliminary findings have not yet been considered by government and do not reflect government policy on the matters being reviewed.

The Review’s work is guided by the following principles.

First, the overall goal is a policy framework that promotes economically efficient low and zero emissions industrial production as a contribution to climate change objectives. A durable market-based system to incentivise investments in low and zero emissions industries is important to this.

Consequently, the Review focuses on carbon leakage solely in terms of shifts in industrial production due to differences in climate change policy between countries. Other objectives such as supply chain security and regional economic prosperity are the domain of other policy spheres and initiatives.

The Review aims to identify durable policy approaches, recognising that carbon leakage risk may change over time.

Second, the Review places emphasis on the global transition to a low or zero emissions industry sector and Australia’s opportunity to become a major producer and exporter of clean energy and industrial commodities in a net zero world economy. Policy frameworks that provide market premiums for low emissions products, including for traded goods, can contribute to this goal.

In this context, addressing carbon leakage means helping create the preconditions for investment in new low emissions industrial structures in the most suitable locations, rather than shielding existing high emissions processes from change.

Third, the Review places importance on the international rules-based trading system and on maintaining open and liberal trade relationships, especially in the region. Australia’s economic prosperity has been enhanced by open trade, and strong trade relations will be vital to achieve net zero emissions in Australia and globally.

In this regard, the Review seeks to identify ways in which any potential future measures to address carbon leakage, including any potential border carbon adjustment, respect international trade rules and obligations, facilitate trade that is consistent with climate change policy objectives, and could be collaboratively implemented with Australia’s trade partners. The Review also seeks to identify opportunities to support progress in multilateral and plurilateral forums.

The Review has focused on assessing carbon leakage risk and the suitability of policies in the Australian context. Consistent with its terms of reference and the views of stakeholders from the initial consultation, the Review has also explored and considered in some detail the key issues relating to policy design and implementation of a possible carbon border adjustment, particularly related to feasibility. However, no policy decisions have been taken and detailed design would need to be considered and consulted on should government decide to pursue a border carbon adjustment. Should government decide to pursue a border carbon adjustment, the principles and criteria set out by the Review provide a point of reference for any future policy adjustments.

The Review actively welcomes engagement both from Australian and international stakeholders in response to the preliminary findings and on any other matters canvassed in this paper.

**Leakage under existing policies**

**2.1 Safeguard Mechanism settings**

**Preliminary findings for consultation**

Current Safeguard Mechanism settings are effective at mitigating carbon leakage risk in the short- to medium-term. But settings for some sectors may need to be augmented with additional measures over time. Reduced baseline decline rates for Trade Exposed Baseline Adjusted (TEBA) facilities constrain the contribution of Safeguard Mechanism sectors to Australia’s overall emissions reduction efforts.

The Safeguard Mechanism provides incentives for Australian industrial producers to reduce the emissions intensity of production. It covers around 220 of Australia’s largest industrial facilities, which together account for around 30% of annual national emissions.

The Safeguard Mechanism includes several elements to mitigate risks of carbon leakage, including the ability to emit up to the production adjusted baseline, access to lower baseline reductions if facilities qualify as TEBA facilities, a cost containment measure and access to funding under the Powering the Regions Fund.

These settings are likely to be sufficient to prevent carbon leakage risk over the short-term. However, over time, default baseline declines could see risks of leakage become more significant for some sectors. Meanwhile, reduced baseline decline rates under TEBA arrangements constrain sectors’ contribution to Australia’s overall emissions reduction effort.

Consequently, additional measures may be needed.

**2.2 Public investment**

**Preliminary findings for consultation**

Public investment to help reduce emissions intensity can help address the risk of carbon leakage in specific cases and is particularly relevant for export-oriented industries. A range of such programs exist in Australia.

While fulfilling a range of functions, public investment would not be sufficient as a systematic and fiscally sustainable standalone solution for commodities with high carbon leakage risk.

Well-designed public investment can help the emergence of zero emissions export industries. They can also help reduce emissions intensity of production in industries that compete with imports.

In feedback received from the first consultation period, stakeholders highlighted three specific roles for well-calibrated public investment to support industry’s transition to net zero and mitigate carbon leakage risks. These are accelerating innovation, supporting low emissions production and enabling infrastructure for decarbonisation. Stakeholders also identified Australia’s fiscal limitations as a mid-sized economy and the need for finite public funds to be effectively targeted and efficiently delivered.

The government’s Future Made in Australia National Interest Framework outlines the government’s approach to unlocking private investment at scale in industries that are in the public interest. This includes a Net Zero Transformation Stream which will be used to identify sectors assessed to have grounds for sustained comparative advantage in a net zero global economy, and public investment is needed for the sector to make a significant contribution to emissions reduction at an efficient cost. It also includes an Economic Resilience and Security Stream for sectors where some level of domestic capability is necessary or efficient to deliver adequate economic resilience and security, and the private sector would not invest in this capability in the absence of public investment.

Several of the programs announced in the 2024-25 Budget as part of Future Made in Australia, and previously announced programs such as the Powering the Regions Fund, include public investment targeted at sectors at risk of carbon leakage. These programs will help selected Australian industrial facilities reduce emissions intensity of domestic production, and thereby can make contributions to alleviating carbon leakage risk, in particular for green export-oriented industries.

However, public investment does not address differences in climate policy stringency across countries, which is the root cause of carbon leakage, in a systematic way. This reduces the capacity for public investment programs to address carbon leakage risks comprehensively or in a predictable way. Public investment also has greater fiscal implications than regulatory policy approaches.

In the design of public investment programs, it is important to ensure they provide the long-term certainty required for investment decisions and can be removed or phased out when their support is no longer needed.

The Review sees public investment as having a beneficial role as part of a portfolio of potential options to address leakage, particularly for green export industries. However, it may not be sufficient as a sustainable standalone solution for commodities with high carbon leakage risk.

The Review recognises that relevant public investment is an active area of policy implementation and development, however additional public investment programs specifically to address carbon leakage concerns may not be warranted.

**2.6 Findings of leakage by commodity**

**Preliminary findings for consultation**

The following commodities are found to be subject to potentially material carbon leakage risk over time: cement, clinker and lime; ammonia and derivatives; steel; and glass.

Carbon leakage risks for cement, clinker and lime are more pronounced than for other commodity groups and may warrant additional policies to be introduced at an earlier stage than other groups.

Further, potential carbon leakage risks for aluminium and alumina, refined petroleum, and pulp and paper, are recommended for particular consideration as part of the 2026-27 Safeguard Mechanism Review on the suitability of arrangements for emissions-intensive trade-exposed activities.

The Review has assessed leakage risks in 2030 for all 73 trade-exposed commodities under the Safeguard Mechanism across 37 commodity groups.

Leakage risk for trade-exposed commodities under the Safeguard Mechanism was assessed using a range of indicators, as well as bespoke econometric analysis for each commodity to quantify trade leakage risk and a proxy for investment leakage risk for broad industry categories. This is combined with commodity-specific qualitative analysis including stakeholder input.

This analysis, presented in **Chapter 2** with further details in the Annex, shows that the risk of carbon leakage is likely to evolve for some specific commodities. The degree and source of that risk varies.

Clinker, cement and lime are commodities where the Review finds a combination of high risks across multiple indicators and high estimates of trade and investment leakage, which aligns with information shared by industry. These commodities will need additional policy measures, with earlier action warranted given the more pronounced nature of the leakage assessment findings.

A second group of commodities – ammonia and derivatives, steel and glass – are also considered worthy of additional policies to address leakage, but with less impetus for earlier action than the first group. This commodity group exhibits moderate to high risks on multiple indicators, and trade and investment leakage findings that are material or close to it.

Alumina, aluminium, refined petroleum, and pulp and paper form a third group which are not considered at risk based on current analysis, but where risks have the potential to become material. This group is characterised by mixed evidence in relation to leakage risk indicators and analysis of trade and investment leakage.

**Border Carbon Adjustment**

**Preliminary findings for consultation**

A border carbon adjustment applied to imports could be an appropriate policy measure for selected Safeguard-covered commodities with high carbon leakage risk from imports. It could provide a robust underpinning of the Safeguard Mechanism for commodities where carbon leakage risk is material, and efficiently support industrial decarbonisation.

Implementation could be phased and could involve the removal or phase out of TEBA provisions for facilities producing commodities where a border carbon adjustment is introduced.

A border carbon adjustment that provides rebates for exports would be inconsistent with Australia’s emissions reduction targets and could raise considerable international trade law concerns. For these reasons a border carbon adjustment for exports is unlikely to be appropriate for Australia or achieve the relevant policy objectives. Well-designed border carbon adjustments in other countries would provide market premiums to Australian low emissions export commodities.

Any border carbon adjustment would need to mirror domestic emissions policy settings for imports to provide a level playing field and be designed to minimise administrative burdens. It would need to be consistent with Australia’s longstanding support of an open, rules-based trading system and its international trade law obligations. Australia could advance relevant work with plurilateral initiatives and support trade partner countries with implementation.

A border carbon adjustment mechanism could be used to equalise the effective carbon reduction efforts between Australia and foreign jurisdictions.

Many stakeholders have argued in favour of a border carbon adjustment. The Review has closely considered suitability and feasibility of a border carbon adjustment and finds that it could be an appropriate measure for selected commodities, subject to considerations set out below.

The Review has found that a border carbon adjustment that applies a rebate on export is not suitable for Australia.

Rebating emissions obligations to exports would effectively exempt production for export from emissions reductions obligations, running counter to overall policy objectives towards net zero and increasing the required emissions reductions elsewhere in the economy. Further, a border carbon adjustment for exports could raise considerable international trade law concerns.

The Review has found that some export-oriented sectors are subject to carbon leakage risk. In some cases, public investments will help competitiveness of green production in international markets. Longer term, export sectors stand to benefit from increased climate ambition worldwide, including carbon pricing matched with border carbon adjustments in other countries. In this respect, Australia has opportunities to amplify multilateral and plurilateral engagement to encourage premiums for low emissions goods.

A border carbon adjustment for selected commodities imported to Australia could be designed to provide a level playing field regarding emissions reduction policy, and to facilitate trade of low emissions commodities. Perspectives from Australia’s trade partners would be important in the detailed design of a border carbon adjustment.

In this paper, unless otherwise stated, the term ‘border carbon adjustment’ will be used to refer to an import-based border carbon adjustment mechanism.

**3.4 Sectoral application**

**Preliminary findings for consultation**

Cement and clinker would be suitable for initial consideration for a border carbon adjustment. Lime would also be suitable for early consideration, however production coverage under the Safeguard Mechanism is only partial and would need to be carefully considered to align with the international trade law principle of non-discrimination between domestic products and imports.

Based on current analysis, ammonia and derivatives, and steel, as well as glass would be worth further policy consideration and could be candidates for a border carbon adjustment later.

A border carbon adjustment would most suitably be implemented in a phased approach, starting with commodities at relatively high risk of carbon leakage and for which implementation is likely to be simplest.

Should a border carbon adjustment be pursued, coverage of commodities could be expanded over time where the suitability criteria are met, as experiences accrue and reliable emissions monitoring is expanded. Further stakeholder consultation would need to be undertaken before the addition of other commodities.

The Review’s consideration of the suitability of a border carbon adjustment has been informed by a commodity-by-commodity analysis, with regard to:

* the extent of carbon leakage risk facing the sector without additional policies
* the practical feasibility of a border carbon adjustment for the sector, accounting for sector-specific considerations (e.g. simplicity or complexity of calculating embedded emissions, traceability of commodities through supply chains, etc.)
* the share of domestic production subject to Safeguard obligations
* other existing policies that may affect carbon leakage risk assessment or the suitability of a border carbon adjustment.

Using the criteria above, the Review’s preliminary assessment is that cement and clinker would be suitable for initial consideration for a border carbon adjustment. Clinker, an energy and emissions intensive key ingredient in cement, has a high ratio of carbon costs to product price and imports are readily substitutable for domestic production. Supply chains are not complex, which facilitates monitoring and reporting of emissions intensity of imports. The assessment is similar for cement.

For both cement and clinker production, a border carbon adjustment may enhance prospects for investment in future low emissions production capacity located wherever cost structures are most competitive. In some circumstances, it could encourage substitution to lower emissions alternatives.

Lime production shares similar features and would in principle be suitable for early consideration. However, Australia’s lime production is only partially covered under the Safeguard Mechanism (74%), requiring further investigation of whether and how a border carbon adjustment could apply. Where domestic policy coverage is not near-universal, application of a border carbon adjustment faces additional complexity.

The Review finds ammonia and derivatives, steel and glass are worth further consideration and could be candidates for a border carbon adjustment later.

Ammonia and derivatives carry material carbon leakage risks, including with regard to investment in zero emissions production capacity. A border carbon adjustment for the ammonia group of products could help create durable preconditions for the emergence of a green ammonia industry in Australia.

Carbon leakage risks are present in the steel sector. However, steel is a complex commodity with respect to production methods, supply chains, and product diversity. Any border carbon adjustment would need to draw on emerging international experiences and potentially the implementation of border carbon adjustments on other commodities.

The preliminary findings are not intended to rule in or out changes to the relevant list of commodities based on further consultation and analysis.

**3.5 Design considerations**

**Preliminary findings for consultation**

A border carbon adjustment would need to mirror key provisions of the Safeguard Mechanism. Should a border carbon adjustment be pursued, a border carbon liability could be applied to emissions in exceedance of the Safeguard Mechanism baselines and to the extent that the assessed effective carbon price paid in the originating country is lower than in Australia. This assessment would be based on explicit emissions prices only.

The basis for emissions assessment should be the same as the Safeguard Mechanism, covering only scope 1 emissions and all relevant greenhouse gases.

Further consideration would be needed before a border carbon adjustment is applied to a commodity with less than 100% Safeguard Mechanism coverage of domestic production.

A border carbon adjustment for a particular sector would remove the policy basis for TEBA provisions for that sector.

A border carbon adjustment may generate revenue. Stakeholders have suggested that in addition to offsetting the costs of implementation of the policy, funds could also be provided to programs to support implementation and industrial decarbonisation objectives in trade partner developing countries.

Should the government decide to pursue a border carbon adjustment, detailed design and implementation would need to be considered and consulted on. Consultation would need to encompass both domestic stakeholders and trading partner countries.

The key principle underpinning an appropriately designed border carbon adjustment is to mirror domestic policy settings for imported goods. This means that any design decisions should be referrable to the Safeguard Mechanism’s design.

As such, the scope of emissions captured by a border carbon adjustment should be scope 1 only, as grid connected electricity generators do not have emissions reduction obligations under the Safeguard Mechanism.

**Compliance**

Should a border carbon adjustment be pursued, border carbon adjustment liabilities should be defined to be comparable to the obligations on domestic producers.

To achieve this design objective, carbon adjustment liabilities should apply only to emissions that exceed the relevant Safeguard Mechanism baseline at the time of import. Any imports which have an emissions intensity below that baseline should not carry a border carbon adjustment liability. Under this design, importers, like domestic producers, would have to pay for or offset any emissions in exceedance of the baseline.

Similarly, any carbon costs already incurred in the country of production should be deducted from the liability. This means if a producer has paid a carbon cost in the originating country which is higher than the calculated carbon cost applied by the border carbon adjustment, they would not face a liability. This assessment of overseas carbon costs should be based on explicit emissions prices only (after accounting for any free allocations). Other emissions reduction policies, to the extent that they are effective at reducing the emissions intensity of goods, would be accounted for by reducing the total emissions subject to a border carbon adjustment liability.

**Revenue**

A border carbon adjustment would result in revenue collected by government if it partially or fully adopts a fee model instead of, or as well as an Australian Carbon Credit Unit (ACCU) surrender model. The amount of revenue is difficult to predict. However, it is likely that the amount of border revenue will be small relative to the overall value of imported products.

If there is border carbon adjustment revenue, it is relevant that the costs of implementing the program need to be funded. Additional funding could go to support other policy priorities, including decarbonisation programs.

As part of the Review’s engagement, both domestic and international stakeholders have raised that in conjunction with the introduction of a border carbon adjustment, funding for technical assistance and capacity building programs to assist developing countries could be increased, in particular to establish systems for monitoring, verification and reporting emissions intensity of production. It could also support programs to support clean industry transition in developing countries to advance shared climate objectives.

**Safeguard TEBA arrangements**

Under the Safeguard Mechanism, trade-exposed baseline adjusted (TEBA) arrangements reduce baseline decline rates under the Safeguard Mechanism where there is a significant impact on revenue (EBIT for manufacturing facilities). A border carbon adjustment for a particular sector would ensure that imports would receive equivalent policy treatment as domestic production. For import competing sectors, as the underlying challenge of carbon leakage would be fully addressed, it would become feasible to remove or phase out TEBA for those sectors.

TEBA is only available for facilities that meet a threshold impact of carbon costs. A border carbon adjustment reduces cost disadvantage to domestic Safeguard producers relative to imports that may arise from differences in climate change policy and facilitates pass-through of carbon costs in product markets. This would significantly decrease TEBA eligibility across facilities. If facilities have a higher cost base because they remain more carbon intensive than their competitors, then supporting such a facility would need to be for reasons other than differential climate policy.

Retaining or phasing out TEBA with a border carbon adjustment would create complexity in determining the relevant border carbon adjustment liability. Given the intention to equalise costs across domestic production and imports, any TEBA allocation would need to be reflected in the liability calculation. This calculation would be particularly complex if different facilities producing a commodity received different adjustments under TEBA.

The retention of TEBA with a border carbon adjustment could raise international trade law concerns, particularly regarding the principle of non-discrimination.

**Administrative considerations**

**Preliminary findings for consultation**

Should a border carbon adjustment be pursued, frameworks relating to reporting and verification of emissions should minimise administrative burden, including through streamlined reporting processes that maintain confidentiality for producers; effective yet efficient emissions verification; and suitable emissions intensity default values.

These frameworks should align with existing and future international standards when possible, including supporting the development of frameworks for emissions monitoring and industrial decarbonisation for Australia’s trade partners.

Submissions to the Review’s first consultation paper and subsequent consultations emphasised that a border carbon adjustment should have as low an administrative burden as possible and not act as a barrier to trade. This includes simplified and digitised procedures which can support trade and enable interoperability with emerging environment and climate trade standards and verification schemes, such as the Guarantee of Origin and its equivalents overseas.

In international consultations in the region, the importance of pragmatic, low cost procedures for emissions monitoring, reporting and verification for any border carbon adjustment was consistently highlighted. International consultations also emphasised the importance of preserving confidentiality of proprietary production data.

While specific design and implementation decisions relating to a border carbon adjustment mechanism would occur after a government decision on whether to implement a border carbon adjustment, the Review has considered key issues relating to administration as part of its overall feasibility assessment.

A confidential, efficient and effective framework for reporting and verifying emissions will be an important first step in the implementation of any border carbon adjustment.

Given the differences in emissions accounting systems internationally, it would also be important to establish suitable emissions intensity default values. Emissions default values should prioritise accuracy while still maintaining incentives to report actual emissions values. Interoperability with other countries’ existing and future standards will also be an important consideration. This would support development of common frameworks for emissions monitoring and industrial decarbonisation policies with Australia’s trade and strategic partners, bilaterally and multilaterally.

In principle, importers could acquit the liability by paying a fee or surrendering ACCUs. It would also be theoretically possible to provide importers the choice of a fee or surrendering ACCUs.

**Modelling a border carbon adjustment for Australia**

**Preliminary findings for consultation**

The Review used a variety of analytical tools to assess the potential impacts of border carbon adjustments on prices and output.

None of this analysis found material impacts on the macroeconomy.

Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) modelling of a potential border carbon adjustment on cement, clinker, lime, steel, ammonia and ammonia derivatives shows no material impact on aggregate economic activity and negligible changes to imports and exports when compared to current policy settings.

Input-Output analysis indicates that the impact of a border carbon adjustment on downstream activity, such as construction, would be very limited.

The analysis suggests that the maximum price impacts on goods, such as wind farms, house construction and crops like wheat, would also be very small.

Indicative modelling of a border carbon adjustment was undertaken using an integrated modelling framework that combines sectoral, domestic and global models. Modelling presents an economic assessment of potential policies designed to address carbon leakage. The modelling is focused on a border carbon adjustment in combination with current settings under the Safeguard Mechanism, and a comparison with the option to remove TEBA for sectors covered by a border carbon adjustment. This modelling complements the economic analysis of a border carbon adjustment (see **Section 3.3**).

Modelling has focused on cement, clinker, lime, steel, ammonia and ammonia derivatives to demonstrate the possible economic effects of a border carbon adjustment on multiple sectors. The Review’s preliminary assessment is that these sectors may be suitable for consideration for a border carbon adjustment (see **Section 3.4**). One set of scenarios applies a border carbon adjustment on cement, clinker and lime only, and a second set of scenarios applies the adjustment to all sectors.

Climate policy modelling is highly complex. There are many data sources and assumptions that are used throughout this process. This modelling is illustrative of possible scenarios that could emerge, but each scenario represents only one possible outcome. Therefore, the economic outcomes of these scenarios should not be viewed as predictions or forecasts, but as an illustrative description of a possible future outcome given a potential carbon leakage policy.

**Mandatory emissions product standards**

**Preliminary findings for consultation**

While mandatory emissions product standards can be suitable for other policy objectives, they are not likely to be an effective policy intervention to address carbon leakage risk.

A mandatory emissions product standard could operate similarly to a border carbon adjustment, with similar emissions verification requirements and compliance costs, but without the flexibility that a border carbon adjustment mechanism could offer, and without affecting carbon leakage risks for products that meet a minimum standard. Noting that the Safeguard Mechanism only covers bulk commodities, it could be designed to restrict entry of products into the Australia market above some standard. It could have adverse consequences for importers and risk detrimental supply chain problems if there was insufficient supply of a commodity below the product standard to meet demand.

As a tool to address carbon leakage risk, submissions to the Review’s first consultation paper expressed concern about, and only very limited support for, mandatory emissions product standards for commodities covered by the Safeguard Mechanism. In particular, submissions expressed concern that a mandatory emissions product standard would be a blunt tool to address carbon leakage, with a high possibility of unintended and detrimental consequences.

While mandatory emissions product standards can be effective interventions to achieve other climate objectives, the Review has not identified any instances in which they would be an effective policy instrument to address carbon leakage risk.

**Multilateral and plurilateral initiatives**

**Preliminary findings for consultation**

Given Australia’s strong stake in the international rules-based system, policy responses to address carbon leakage risks should advance and support the international system.

Enhanced global climate action would reduce carbon leakage, but divergences in ambition and policy approaches will persist in the medium-term.

An internationally agreed solution to address carbon leakage risk developed through multilateral and plurilateral initiatives would be ideal, but is uncertain and would take time to develop. Possible long-term international solutions will not replace the near- and medium-term need for domestic policy action.

Multilateral and plurilateral initiatives could support the implementation of border carbon adjustments through the development of interoperable standards and approaches, for example, the development of agreed default emissions intensities or standards to measure embedded emissions.

Australia’s active engagement in these initiatives would support the development of best practice policy to address carbon leakage. Enhanced engagement is an opportunity for Australia to contribute positively to international policy development.

An Australian policy response to address carbon leakage risk should support and advance Australia’s broader interests in the international system. Australia is an active participant in existing international discussions on carbon leakage.

Enhanced global climate action would be the most desirable way to reduce the risk of carbon leakage from a climate and trade perspective. But divergence in ambition and approaches will persist for some time.

A multilateral or plurilateral solution to address carbon leakage would be ideal, for example an internationally agreed approach for border carbon adjustments. Whilst some international initiatives focused on carbon leakage are prospective, consensus or broad-based agreement on any international solution will take time to develop and will not replace the need for domestic policy action in the short- to medium-term.

Multilateral and plurilateral initiatives could play a more immediate role to support the implementation of border carbon adjustments by contributing to the development of commonly accepted and interoperable approaches. An Australian border carbon adjustment framework could draw on such internationally agreed approaches where and when they arise. For example, efforts underway internationally could support the development of common emissions accounting standards or agreed default emissions intensities that could contribute to more harmonious approaches to border carbon adjustments.

There is value in deepening collaboration with like-minded trade and climate partners. Existing initiatives focused on carbon leakage are at an early stage. Australia’s participation could contribute to positive international policy innovation in a manner that supports the international system and the development of interoperable policy approaches. This could occur in initiatives like the Climate Club, the Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches, at the UNFCCC or WTO, or in regional or other groupings.

## Introduction

This consultation paper shares the Review’s preliminary findings on carbon leakage risks and potential additional policy options to address identified leakage risk. It also discusses the feasibility of these policy options. The paper seeks feedback on proposed findings and directions.

The paper has been informed by analysis and modelling undertaken as part of the Review, and by stakeholder feedback on the Review’s first consultation paper.

Feedback on this consultation paper will inform the Review’s final recommendations to the government.

### Carbon leakage in the context of the net zero transition

Australia has a legislated national target of reducing emissions by 43% below 2005 levels by 2030 and to net zero by 2050. The most recent *Annual Climate Change Statement 2023* describes a range of policies already introduced to achieve this, including Rewiring the Nation, the Capacity Investment Scheme, the National Reconstruction Fund, Hydrogen Headstart and the reformed Safeguard Mechanism. To establish pathways for Australia’s transition to net zero, the government is also developing a Net Zero Plan and an emissions reduction target for 2035, [[1]](#footnote-2) both of which will be underpinned by six sectoral decarbonisation plans, for which analysis and consultation are underway.[[2]](#footnote-3)

The transition will also present opportunities and challenges for individual countries. Australia has an ambition to become a renewable energy superpower.[[3]](#footnote-4) By harnessing our potential comparative advantages (including low-cost firmed renewable energy, abundant land, and critical mineral and resource endowments), Australia could become a significant future exporter of low emissions energy and commodities. This would deliver significant economic benefits while supporting the global transition to net zero.

Industry has a central role in driving Australia’s transition to net zero and realising our potential as a renewable energy superpower. Climate policies will also play a vital role in:

* providing the right incentives for industry to transition to low and zero emissions production, especially through investment
* creating market premiums for low emission commodities
* supporting international trade of clean, energy-intensive commodities.

Climate change ambition is increasing globally. Over 140 countries have made net zero commitments,[[4]](#footnote-5) including countries that are destinations for 97% of Australia’s exports.[[5]](#footnote-6) The majority of countries have emissions targets for 2030 in place and are expected to communicate strengthened ambition for 2035. In aggregate, a gap remains between stated ambition and the effect of climate policies, however the prevalence and effectiveness of climate change policies has been rising.[[6]](#footnote-7) As part of a multitude of policy approaches, carbon pricing is on the rise. As of April 2024, 24% of global greenhouse gas emissions were covered by a price signal, through 75 different emissions trading schemes or carbon taxes.[[7]](#footnote-8)

At the same time, differences remain in the ambition, effectiveness and coverage of climate policies, including between Australia’s policies and those of trading partners. Such differences create a risk of carbon leakage, which in turn can hamper the effectiveness and efficiency of policy aimed at providing incentives to decarbonise industries producing tradable goods.

As a trading nation, Australia’s international partnerships will be essential to our transition. Our economic prosperity will be underscored by maintaining a free, fair, open and rules-based international trading system. Internationally compatible approaches to emissions measurement and policy will be fundamental to a robust green international trading system.

The Review is particularly cognisant of the need to carefully identify the conditions under which carbon leakage policies should apply to particular industries. As carbon leakage risks change over time, the need for a policy response to carbon leakage risk may materialise in the future. However, carbon leakage policies now and in future should be implemented only where a material leakage risk is identified and where such policies will both support climate policy objectives and be compatible with rules-based trade principles.

The Review is focused on durable policy settings, including establishing the criteria for any future policy action in a manner that can preserve Australia’s climate and trade policy objectives.

### What is carbon leakage?

Carbon leakage refers to shifts in the production of emissions-intensive trade-exposed commodities from countries with more ambitious emissions reduction policies to those with weaker (or no) emissions reduction policies, due only to differences in policy stringency across countries.

Following this definition, changes in production that occur due to other factors, such as differences in production costs or differences in emissions intensity under equal climate policy treatment, are not carbon leakage.

Carbon leakage can occur via two channels:

* *Trade channel:* domestic climate policies can lead to increased domestic production costs, creating a cost advantage for traded products from jurisdictions with no or less stringent climate policies.
* *Investment channel:* current or expected future policy differences can lead new investments to shift towards countries with less stringent policies.

Carbon leakage could hinder the achievement of global net zero emissions. A high amount of carbon leakage over time would see emissions reduction in a country with more stringent climate policies being offset or exceeded by emissions increases overseas due to shifts in production. It could also undermine the economic, social and political foundations needed for sustained, effective and ambitious climate policy.

Emissions reductions policies that apply to traded, emissions intensive commodities are typically accompanied by dedicated measures to prevent or minimise leakage.

Policies to address leakage risk give firms greater confidence to invest in low and zero emissions technologies and can pave the way for stronger domestic emissions reductions and investment in clean production capacity.

### About the Review

The Review originates from the reforms to Australia’s Safeguard Mechanism, which came into effect on 1 July 2023. During the reform process, stakeholder feedback was received on additional policies to address carbon leakage risks over the long-term. As part of the final reform package for the Safeguard Mechanism, the government announced measures to address leakage and a commitment to undertake the Review.[[8]](#footnote-9)

The Review’s scope includes an assessment of carbon leakage risks, current and potential policy options to address carbon leakage, and assessment of the feasibility of different policy options including a potential Australian border carbon adjustment (BCA) mechanism, particularly for steel and cement.[[9]](#footnote-10)

The Review is being undertaken by the Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water (the Department) and led by Professor Frank Jotzo. The Review’s preliminary findings have not yet been considered by government and do not reflect government policy on the matters being reviewed. Following consultation on the basis of this paper, the Review will make recommendations to the government by the end of 2024. The government will consider the findings of the Review following the completion of the final report.

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Description automatically generated

Figure 1: Timeline for the Review.

### Engagement to date

The Review has been consulting with a range of stakeholders including industry and international trade partners, as well as NGOs and think tanks, research experts, and the broader community. In response to the first consultation paper released in November 2023, the Review received 77 submissions from businesses, industry associations, academics, unions and private individuals.[[10]](#footnote-11) Feedback was also received in meetings with stakeholders and in a webinar.

The Review has engaged with international partners, including government, industry and other stakeholders. The Review has directly engaged with stakeholders in Canada, China, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States and Vietnam. The Review has also engaged with international organisations including the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the International Energy Agency (IEA). We welcome submissions to the Review from all international and domestic stakeholders.

**How to make a submission**

This paper provides the Review’s analysis and preliminary findings for consultation. Feedback is welcomed on the preliminary findings set out in this consultation paper, and any other matter raised in the paper.

Submissions to this consultation paper can be made via the Department’s Consultation Hub and by clicking the ’Make a Submission’ button. Submissions will be published online after the consultation closes. However, stakeholders may request that their submission is kept confidential and not published. The Department will also publish information on the outcome of the consultation on the Consultation Hub. This consultation will close on 3 December 2024.

## Leakage under existing policies

### The Safeguard Mechanism

**Preliminary findings for consultation**

Current Safeguard Mechanism settings are effective at mitigating carbon leakage risk in the short- to medium-term. But settings for some sectors may need to be augmented with additional measures over time. Reduced baseline decline rates for Trade Exposed Baseline Adjusted (TEBA) facilities constrain the contribution of Safeguard Mechanism sectors to Australia’s overall emissions reduction efforts.

The Safeguard Mechanism provides incentives for Australian industrial producers to reduce the emissions intensity of their production over time. It covers around 220 of Australia’s largest industrial facilities, accounting for around 30% of annual national emissions.

The Safeguard Mechanism sets annual limits, or baselines, on emissions from each facility. Baselines are set on a production-adjusted basis, meaning they vary as production volumes rise or fall. From 1 July 2023, baselines decline on a trajectory consistent with Australia’s 2030 emission reduction target and net zero by 2050 target. Baselines will generally decline by 4.9% per year between 2023‑24 and 2029-30.

Safeguard facilities automatically receive Safeguard Mechanism Credits (SMCs) when their emissions are below their baseline. SMCs can be sold to other Safeguard facilities to meet Safeguard obligations or held for future use.

Facilities are required to keep emissions to their baselines or to cover excess emissions through the surrender of SMCs or Australian Carbon Credit Units (ACCUs). Emissions up to the baseline do not attract any compliance costs.

The Safeguard Mechanism includes several elements to mitigate risks of carbon leakage.

* Facilities can emit up to their baseline level. This is equivalent to the role that free allowances play under emissions trading schemes. The production-adjusted nature of baselines flexibly allows for changes in production and emissions.
* Facilities that are trade-exposed and experience particular cost impacts – also referred to as TEBA facilities – can have their baseline decline rates reduced, from the default 4.9% down to a minimum of 2% for non-manufacturing sectors or 1% for manufacturing sectors.
* A cost-containment measure enables eligible facilities to purchase ACCUs from the government at a price of $75 in 2023-24, increasing with CPI plus 2% per year. This provides certainty to facilities on maximum compliance costs.
* Federal funding to assist Safeguard facilities to reduce their emissions. This includes various funding streams under the Powering the Regions Fund, including the Safeguard Transformation Stream ($600 million) and Critical Inputs to Clean Energy Industry Stream ($400 million).

A key question for the Review is whether these policy settings will be sufficient to prevent or minimise leakage risk over the long-term, and whether and what form of additional or alternative policy approaches may be required for specific commodities. The Review has undertaken extensive analysis on these questions, as detailed below.

Stakeholder feedback has indicated that existing settings may be sufficient to prevent carbon leakage risk over the short-term, but as baselines decline and compliance costs rise, leakage risks may become more significant and existing settings may not be sufficient to address them.

*ACSI considers that the Safeguard Mechanism on its own is insufficient to respond to the risks of carbon leakage. A suite of policy levers, which operate in support of Australian climate policy goals, is required to fully address the risk of carbon leakage in the long-term.*

**–** **Australian Chamber of Superannuation Investors**

*There are a range of significant costs associated with meeting Safeguard Mechanism emission reduction requirements … Over the medium- to long-term, the relative competitive disadvantage and reduced profitability outlook will likely result in a lack of capital investment and/or closure of higher cost facilities.* **– Australian Steel Institute**

*The current provisions under the Safeguard Mechanism do not adequately mitigate carbon leakage … TEBA arrangements will need to be supplemented to provide long-term certainty for covered facilities to maintain viability and underpin the confidence to invest in new low carbon production. –* **Cement Industry Federation**

*An ideal carbon leakage policy achieves lower emissions in Australia and preserves the economic viability of exposed industries by ensuring they remain competitive in a global market …**It is unlikely that the Safeguard Mechanism alone could address Australia’s carbon leakage concerns and still maintain the allocated emissions budget to the mechanism.*

– **Fortescue**

For these reasons, there is benefit in consideration of additional policy measures for the medium- to longer-term.

### Public investment

**Preliminary findings for consultation**

Public investment to help reduce emissions intensity can help address the risk of carbon leakage in specific cases and is particularly relevant for export-oriented industries. A range of such programs exist in Australia.

While fulfilling a range of functions, public investment would not be sufficient as a systematic and fiscally sustainable standalone solution for commodities with high carbon leakage risk.

The government’s Future Made in Australia National Interest Framework outlines the government’s approach to unlocking private investment at scale in industries that are in the public interest. This includes a Net Zero Transformation Stream which will be used to identify sectors assessed to have grounds for sustained comparative advantage in a net zero global economy, and public investment is needed for the sector to make a significant contribution to emissions reduction at an efficient cost. It also includes an Economic Resilience and Security Stream for sectors where some level of domestic capability is necessary or efficient to deliver adequate economic resilience and security, and the private sector would not invest in this capability in the absence of public investment.[[11]](#footnote-12)

Several of the programs announced in the 2024-25 Budget as part of Future Made in Australia, and previously announced programs such as the Powering the Regions Fund, include public investment targeted at sectors at risk of carbon leakage. These programs will help reduce emissions intensity of domestic production, and thereby can make contributions to alleviating carbon leakage risk, in particular for green export-oriented industries.[[12]](#footnote-13)

Roles of government investment in supporting the net zero transition include:

* *Accelerating innovation and cost reductions of low emissions technologies:* Public investment helps address market failures that would otherwise prevent sufficient investment in research and development, piloting and early commercial deployment of nascent low emission technologies. It helps defray and derisk the high capital costs for pilots and early-stage deployments, which in turn drive technologies along their learning curves and brings costs down.
* *Supporting low emissions production:* Public investment can help bring forward low emissions production whilst green premiums exist, and markets do not price negative externalities from emissions. In these cases, public investment in the form of production or tax credits, such as those announced under Future Made in Australia, can help bridge the green premium gap that would otherwise discourage private investment in low emissions production. This support would be time-limited and phased down as green premium gaps reduce.

In feedback received from the first consultation period, stakeholders highlighted three specific roles for well-calibrated public investment to support industry’s transition to net zero and mitigate carbon leakage risks. These are accelerating innovation, supporting low emissions production, and enabling infrastructure for decarbonisation. Stakeholders also identified Australia’s fiscal limitations as a mid-sized economy and need for finite public funds to be effectively targeted and efficiently delivered.

Some stakeholders also noted potential synergies between public investment and other policies such as a border carbon adjustment. For example, pass through of carbon costs enabled by a border carbon adjustment supports growth of new low emissions industries, while reducing the need for financial support by government.

*The prompt development and implementation of an Australian CBAM is therefore essential, irrespective of public investment and/or product standards deployed concurrently.*

– **Australian Workers Union**

*Targeted public funding should be considered as a critical component of Australia’s decarbonisation policy alongside CBAM.* – **Boral**

Well-designed public investment can help the emergence of zero emissions export industries. They can also help reduce emissions intensity of production in industries that compete with imports. This can help reduce exposure to carbon leakage risk. However, public investment does not address differences in climate policy stringency across countries, which is the root cause of carbon leakage, in a systematic way. This reduces the capacity for public investment programs to address carbon leakage risks comprehensively or in a predictable way. Public investment also has greater fiscal implications than regulatory policy approaches.

To fully address carbon leakage risks, public investment programs would need to cover a multitude of investments in many facilities. It would require continuous monitoring and assessment of exposure. Even so, government programs would not be able to identify and cover every instance of carbon leakage risk and the investment response would inevitably be uneven.

In the design of public investment programs, it is important to ensure they provide the long-term certainty required for investment decisions, but can also be removed when their support is no longer needed or the benefits of public investments no longer outweigh the costs including shifting risk from private investors to the public.

As such, public investment can have beneficial role as part of a portfolio of potential options to address leakage, particularly to support emerging low and zero emissions export industries. However, public investment programs may not be sufficient as a sustainable solution for commodities with high carbon leakage risk. Many stakeholders expressed similar views in their submissions.

**Box 1 – New measures to support industry decarbonisation in the 2024-25 Budget**

The 2024-25 Budget invests $22.7 billion over the next decade to support the Future Made in Australia agenda.[[13]](#footnote-14) It includes several new measures to support production and grow markets for low emissions goods, which will also help mitigate leakage risks. These include:

* An estimated $6.7 billion over the medium term to provide a $2 incentive per kilogram of renewable hydrogen produced between 2027-2028 to 2039-2040 for a Hydrogen Production Tax Incentive, to support the growth of a competitive hydrogen industry and Australia’s decarbonisation.
* $1.3 billion expansion over the decade for an additional round of the Hydrogen Headstart program, to bridge the green premium for early-mover renewable hydrogen projects.
* $1.5 billion over seven years to the Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA), to supercharge ARENA’s core investments in renewable energy and related technologies.
* $1.7 billion over the decade to establish the Future Made in Australia Innovation Fund, to be administered by the Australian Renewable Energy Agency, to support innovation, commercialisation, pilot and demonstration projects and early-stage deployments in priority sectors.
* An estimated $7 billion over the decade for a Critical Minerals Production Tax Incentive, to support downstream refining and processing of Australia’s 31 critical minerals, including many which will play an important role in decarbonisation.
* $32.3 million over the forward estimates to fast track the initial phase of the Guarantee of Origin Scheme to measure and certify emissions intensity across the supply chain of key products, support the expansion of the program to green metals and low carbon liquid fuels, and consult on additional incentives to support production in these industries.

These measures build on existing public investment programs and investments to help industry shift to low emissions production, including:

* Powering the Regions Fund
* Australian Renewable Energy Agency
* Clean Energy Finance Corporation
* Hydrogen Headstart and the Regional Hydrogen Hubs Program
* National Reconstruction Fund Corporation
* Northern Australia Infrastructure Fund
* Rewiring the Nation
* Capacity Investment Scheme.

### Assessing carbon leakage risks

The Review assesses leakage risks for all 73 trade-exposed commodities under the Safeguard Mechanism Rule.[[14]](#footnote-15) To streamline the analysis, these commodities are grouped into 37 commodity categories.[[15]](#footnote-16) Some trade-exposed commodities are not yet produced and traded at commercial scale in Australia and are not assessed due to insufficient data. These commodities include liquid and gaseous hydrogen, primary iron, lithium hydroxide, renewable aviation kerosene and renewable diesel.

Imports and exports of these commodities were worth A$417 billion in 2023, making up 42% of the value of total Australian trade in all goods in that year.

Table 1 below shows value of trade for goods covered by a Safeguard production variable grouped into categories. This identifies whether a category is associated with a high value of trade and the value of trade in exports and imports.

**Table 1: Australian trade of Safeguard Mechanism-covered goods in 2023[[16]](#footnote-17)**

| Category | Import  (A$ million) | Export  (A$ million) | Import share of total trade (%) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Alumina | 44 | 7,543 | 1 |
| Aluminium | 202 | 4,723 | 4 |
| Ammonia | 134 | 166 | 45 |
| Ammonium nitrate | 174 | 25 | 87 |
| Ammonium phosphate | 836 | 252 | 77 |
| Basic non-ferrous metal | 106 | 851 | 11 |
| Bauxite | 2 | 1,499 | 0 |
| Cement | 198 | 4 | 98 |
| Clinker | 350 | 0 | 100 |
| Coal | 309 | 93,707 | 0 |
| Crude oil | 7,400 | 10,756 | 41 |
| Ethane and LPG | 308 | 1,961 | 14 |
| Ethanol and dried distillers grain | 83 | 664 | 11 |
| Ferro-manganese | 11 | - | 100 |
| Flat glass | 407 | - | 100 |
| Flat steel | 384 | 281 | 58 |
| Glass containers | 155 | 33 | 82 |
| Iron ore | 190 | 122,397 | 0 |
| Lime | 84 | - | 100 |
| Lithium | 25 | 18,416 | 0 |
| LNG | 1 | 68,005 | 0 |
| Long steel | 1,247 | 102 | 93 |
| Magnesia | 13 | - | 100 |
| Manganese ore | 21 | 1 | 98 |
| Nickel | 15 | 582 | 2 |
| Other metal ore | 716 | 10,871 | 6 |
| Other refined petroleum products | 50,236 | 3,924 | 93 |
| Polyethylene | 660 | - | 100 |
| Crude steel | 81 | 1,148 | 7 |
| Pulp and paper | 955 | 797 | 55 |
| Silicomanganese | 6 | - | 100 |
| Silicon | 59 | 139 | 30 |
| Sodium cyanide | 5 | 4 | 53 |
| Synthetic rutile | 110 | 589 | 16 |
| Titanium dioxide | 3 | 1 | 68 |
| Treated steel flat products | 596 | 435 | 58 |
| Urea | 1,768 | 3 | 100 |

Leakage risks and estimates are assessed using 6 key indicators:

* ***Carbon costs as a share of commodity prices*:** Carbon costs are estimated based on emission reduction obligations under the Safeguard Mechanism in 2030 (consistent with Australia’s current Nationally Determined Contribution). This obligation reflects the reduction of emissions intensities from 2022 baseline levels to levels corresponding to 2030 baselines (with estimated effects of TEBA settings factored in).[[17]](#footnote-18) This is multiplied by the projected ACCU price in 2030 (consistent with Australia’s emissions projections), which serves as a proxy for the marginal cost of abatement, including onsite abatement where used.[[18]](#footnote-19) Prices of commodities are drawn from multiple sources, and in most cases inferred from data on trade volumes and values between 2019 and 2023 inclusive. The unit prices of these commodities can vary significantly, accordingly results of computations are presented as ranges rather than point estimates. Carbon costs as a share of commodity prices is given by the equation below (see the Annex for further details).
* ***Imports/exports relative to Safeguard production*:** This assesses the extent to which trade matters for Australian commodities and whether trade exposure exists mainly in domestic or export markets. The indicator is a ratio calculated as the volume of imports or exports in 2022 divided by the volume of Safeguard Mechanism-covered domestic production. The ratios are presented as ranges because some underlying Safeguard data is confidential.
* ***Sensitivity of imports/exports to price changes*:** Trade-price elasticities are estimated for each commodity to understand the sensitivity of imports and exports to price changes. They give a broad indication of how susceptible commodities may be to trade leakage. For example, an elasticity of -0.5 implies a 1% increase in price has been,on average, associated with a 0.5% reduction in imports or exports. These estimates are derived from econometric analysis of Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) data. See Annex for further details including a discussion of confidence interval and robustness checks.
* ***Share of production covered by the Safeguard Mechanism*:** The proportion of domestic production covered by the Safeguard Mechanism varies across commodities. As production data is not available for some commodities, Safeguard-covered emissions as a percentage of total emissions from all National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Scheme (NGER) facilities producing that commodity are calculated as a proxy for this. The ratio indicates what share of production is potentially subject to leakage risk. It is also a factor in assessment of feasibility of carbon leakage policy instruments.
* ***Changes in Safeguard production:***This indicator provides an estimate of trade leakage, drawing on elements of the first three risk indicators described above. Changes in Safeguard production are estimated based on the equation below, which links the percentage change of prices to quantities via an econometrically estimated elasticity. Import or export changes are assumed to proportionally change (increase or reduce) domestic production, and rounded to the nearest per cent given the range of plausible values for key parameters discussed above. Further details on the assessment approach are provided **Section 2.4**.
* ***Emissions to industry group profits******ratio***: This indicator provides insight into investment leakage risk on the assumption that inability to pass carbon costs through to customers, or deeper cuts to profit margins, could lead to investment moving offshore to jurisdictions where carbon costs are low or zero. Facility-level carbon emissions were integrated with firm-level data on profits from the ABS. This analysis and its results are discussed further in **Section 2.5** below.

### Assessing trade leakage risk

Building on the leakage risk indicators, the Review illustratively estimates the potential shifts in Safeguard-covered production due to differences in carbon costs as they might be observed in 2030 for each commodity. This approach generates approximate order of magnitude estimates of potential leakage in trade. They are not intended to be forecasts or projections of leakage.

The approach considers two production entities - a representative Australian producer and a representative foreign producer - as proxies for domestic and overseas producers in the aggregate. It is recognised that this approach may under or overestimate trade leakage, compared to a fuller approach that captures multiple domestic and foreign producers with a broad range of emissions intensities and cost profiles.

Trade leakage is estimated for each commodity, based on a scenario of maximum carbon cost differences between Australian and foreign producers. Under this scenario, it is assumed that foreign producers face no carbon price, and therefore no carbon costs, in 2030.

Carbon costs for Australian producers are based on emission reduction obligations under the Safeguard Mechanism. This obligation is calculated based on the difference between emissions intensity levels in 2022 and estimated baselines in 2030 (with estimated TEBA effects factored in). This is then multiplied by the projected ACCU price in 2030 (consistent with Australia’s emissions projections) to estimate a carbon cost.[[19]](#footnote-20)

Emissions intensities of Australian and foreign commodities are assumed to be equal, and no declines in emissions intensity are assumed between 2022 and 2030.[[20]](#footnote-21)

Where the Safeguard Mechanism covers more than one commodity along a supply chain, there is potential for carbon costs for input commodities to affect carbon costs for intermediate or final commodities. Carbon costs of input commodities (e.g. ammonia, crude steel, bauxite) are taken into account in estimating carbon costs for ammonia derivatives, long and flat steel, and alumina and aluminium.

As shown in the relevant equation in **Section 2.3**, estimates of trade leakage are then calculated by linking changes in relative prices of Australian and foreign commodities to changes in volumes of imports or exports (and thus production) using econometrically estimated trade-price elasticities.

The volume of emissions that would relocate from Australia to overseas due to trade leakage has also been illustratively estimated.

Leakage through commodities that are downstream of Safeguard boundaries (downstream leakage) has been raised as a potential issue for some sectors. Some industry stakeholders noted that data collection was underway to understand the full range of downstream commodities produced from Safeguard commodities, for example building materials which are principally made from steel. Quantitative analysis focuses on commodities directly covered by the Safeguard Mechanism, where trade leakage risks are expected to be more significant. The Review has however assessed at a macroeconomic level the downstream impacts from a border carbon adjustment. This suggests that downstream trade leakage risk is present in principle but very limited in materiality. See **Chapter 4** for further details.

**2.4.1 Results of trade leakage risk assessment**

Results for leakage risk indicators and trade leakage estimates are presented numerically in Table 2 for import-competing commodities in domestic markets, and Table 3 for commodities competing in export markets. To support interpretation, they are also presented graphically in Figures 2, 3 and 4. Results for investment leakage risks based on the ratio of emissions to industry group profits are presented separately in **Section 2.5**.

These results and charts provide insights into general patterns of trade leakage risk, as well as specific commodities that are potentially more vulnerable to leakage based on different indicators.

In domestic markets, commodities are concentrated in the ranges of 0-5% for estimated carbon costs as a share of price, and 0-0.2 for imports relative to Safeguard production (Figure 2a). Commodities with estimated risk levels that exceed these ranges include urea, ammonium phosphate, polyethylene, long steel, clinker, cement, lime, crude steel, treated flat steel, pulp and paper, glass containers, refined petroleum, crude oil, and ethane and LPG. Among these, clinker and lime stand out as commodities with particular material risk levels on the basis of both indicators.

In export markets, risk levels are also concentrated in terms of carbon costs as a share of price, with most commodities between 0-5% (Figure 2b). However, risk levels are more dispersed in relation to export trade leakage exposure, including a significant group of commodities where exports relative to Safeguard production are over 0.6.

Significant proportions of imported and exported commodities appear sensitive to price changes (Figure 3). Around 46% of imported commodities have trade-price elasticities with an absolute value greater than 1, while in export markets, the proportion is around 35%.

Figure 4 summarises the estimated level of trade leakage for all commodities in domestic and export markets, which takes into consideration risk levels for the indicators in Figures 2 and 3. Trade leakage due to imports is highest for clinker, urea and lime with declines in Safeguard production of over 5%. Estimated trade leakage risk is less pronounced for commodities in export markets, with only crude and treated flat steel products reaching similar levels.

**Section 2.6** brings together the results summarised here, together with analysis of investment leakage and qualitative considerations from stakeholders and other sources, to provide findings on the adequacy of existing policies in addressing leakage risks for each commodity.

The emissions shift associated with the total shifts in production from Australian to foreign producers under the scenario in Tables 2 and 3 is estimated to be around 1.6 million tonnes CO2-e per year, equivalent to 0.3% of Australia’s total emissions in 2023.[[21]](#footnote-22)

**Table 2: Carbon leakage risk and estimates (trade leakage) – domestic market**


|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Commodities | Indicative 2030 carbon cost as % of price | Imports relative to Safeguard production[[22]](#footnote-23) | Sensitivity of imports to price changes[[23]](#footnote-24) | % of emissions covered by Safeguard | Illustrative estimate of reduction in Safeguard production[[24]](#footnote-25) |
| Steel: Crude steel[[25]](#footnote-26) | 5-10% | 0-0.2 | -3.9 | 100% | 1% |
| Steel: Long steel products | 0-1% | 0.4-0.6 | -0.6 | 94% | 0% |
| Steel: Flat steel products | 1-3% | 0-0.2 | -0.5 | 100% | 0% |
| Steel: Treated steel flat products | 3-5% | 0.4-0.6 | N/A | 59% | N/A |
| Cement production: Cement | 5-10% | 0-0.2 | -2.5 | 100% | 2% |
| Cement production: Clinker | 20-30% | 0.8-1.0 | -0.8 | 100% | 26% |
| Cement production: Lime | 5-10% | 0.4-0.6 | -3.0 | 74% | 7% |
| Chemicals: Ammonia | 1-3% | 0-0.2 | -3.5 | 100% | 0% |
| Chemicals: Ammonium nitrate | 1-3% | 0-0.2 | -1.0 | 100% | 0% |
| Chemicals: Ammonium phosphate | 0-1% | 2.0-2.2 | -0.3 | 100% | 1% |
| Chemicals: Urea | 1-3% | 1.2-1.4 | -1.7 | 100% | 7% |
| Alumina and aluminium: Aluminium | 1-3% | 0-0.2 | -4.5 | 100% | 0% |
| Alumina and aluminium: Alumina | 1-3% | 0-0.2 | -0.6 | 100% | 0% |
| Alumina and aluminium: Bauxite | 0-1% | 0-0.2 | -2.8 | 75% | 0% |
| Glass: Flat glass | 0-1% | 0-0.2 | -1.3 | 100% | 0% |
| Glass: Glass containers | 0-1% | 0.2-0.4 | -8.5 | 44% | 1% |
| Pulp and paper | 1-3% | 0.4-0.6 | -0.8 | 52% | 0% |
| Polyethylene | 0-1% | 1.0-1.2 | -0.5 | 100% | 0% |
| Energy: LNG | 1-3% | 0-0.2 | -0.3 | 96% | 0% |
| Energy: Ethane and LPG | 0-1% | 0.2-0.4 | -4.4 | 98% | 0% |
| Energy: Other refined petroleum | 0-1% | 3.0-3.2 | -0.3 | 97% | 0% |
| Energy: Crude oil | 0-1% | 0.8-1.0 | -0.6 | 96% | 0% |
| Energy: Coal | 0-1% | 0-0.2 | -1.1 | 95% | 0% |
| Iron ore | 0-1% | 0-0.2 | N/A | 93% | N/A |
| Basic non-ferrous metal | 0-1% | 0-0.2 | N/A | 90% | N/A |
| Nickel | 1-3% | 0-0.2 | N/A | 87% | N/A |
| Magnesia | 3-5% | 0-0.2 | -2.2 | 100% | 1% |
| Manganese products: Manganese ore | 3-5% | 0-0.2 | -1.5 | 73% | 0% |
| Manganese products: Ferromanganese | 1-3% | 0-0.2 | -0.2 | 100% | 0% |
| Manganese products: Silicomanganese | 1-3% | 0-0.2 | N/A | 100% | N/A |
| Lithium ore | 0-1% | 0-0.2 | -0.5 | 53% | 0% |
| Synthetic rutile | 0-1% | 0-0.2 | -0.2 | 100% | 0% |
| Titanium dioxide | 0-1% | 0-0.2 | -1.2 | 100% | 0% |
| Other metal ore | 0-1% | 0-0.2 | -0.4 | 70% | 0% |
| Silicon | 0-1% | 0-0.2 | -0.7 | 100% | 0% |
| Sodium cyanide | 0-1% | 0-0.2 | -5.2 | 92% | 0% |
| Ethanol and dried distillers grain | 0-1% | 0-0.2 | -1.4 | 100% | 0% |

**Table 3: Carbon leakage risk and estimates (trade leakage) – export markets**


|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Commodities | Indicative 2030 carbon cost as % of price | Exports relative to Safeguard production[[26]](#footnote-27) | Sensitivity of exports to price changes[[27]](#footnote-28) | % of emissions covered by Safeguard | Illustrative estimate of reduction in Safeguard production[[28]](#footnote-29) |
| Steel: Crude steel | 5-10% | 0.2-0.4 | -3.6 | 100% | 7% |
| Steel: Long steel products | 0-1% | 0-0.2 | -0.4 | 94% | 0% |
| Steel: Flat steel products | 1-3% | 0-0.2 | -0.4 | 100% | 0% |
| Steel: Treated steel flat products | 3-5% | 0.4-0.6 | -3.4 | 59% | 10% |
| Cement production: Cement | 5-10% | 0-0.2 | -0.6 | 100% | 0% |
| Cement production: Clinker | 20-30% | 0-0.2 | N/A | 100% | N/A |
| Cement production: Lime | 5-10% | 0-0.2 | -2.6 | 74% | 0% |
| Chemicals: Ammonia | 1-3% | 0-0.2 | -3.4 | 100% | 1% |
| Chemicals: Ammonium nitrate | 1-3% | 0-0.2 | -11.0 | 100% | 0% |
| Chemicals: Ammonium phosphate | 0-1% | 0.6-0.8 | N/A | 100% | N/A |
| Chemicals: Urea | 1-3% | 0-0.2 | -1.1 | 100% | 0% |
| Alumina and aluminium: Aluminium | 1-3% | 0.8-1.0 | N/A | 100% | N/A |
| Alumina and aluminium: Alumina | 1-3% | 0.8-1.0 | -0.3 | 100% | 0% |
| Alumina and aluminium: Bauxite | 0-1% | 0.4-0.6 | -0.8 | 75% | 0% |
| Glass: Flat glass | 0-1% | 0-0.2 | N/A | 100% | N/A |
| Glass: Glass containers | 0-1% | 0-0.2 | -1.6 | 44% | 0% |
| Pulp and paper | 1-3% | 0.8-1.0 | -1.5 | 52% | 2% |
| Polyethylene | 0-1% | 0-0.2 | -1.4 | 100% | 0% |
| Energy: LNG | 1-3% | 0.8-1.0 | -0.6 | 96% | 1% |
| Energy: Ethane and LPG | 0-1% | 0.4-0.6 | -0.8 | 98% | 0% |
| Energy: Other refined petroleum | 0-1% | 0.2-0.4 | -1.0 | 97% | 0% |
| Energy: Crude oil | 0-1% | 1.0\* | N/A | 96% | N/A |
| Energy: Coal | 0-1% | 0.6-0.8 | N/A | 95% | N/A |
| Iron ore | 0-1% | 1.0\* | N/A | 93% | N/A |
| Basic non-ferrous metal | 0-1% | 0.4-0.6 | N/A | 90% | N/A |
| Nickel | 1-3% | 0.2-0.4 | N/A | 87% | N/A |
| Magnesia | 3-5% | 0-0.2 | N/A | 100% | N/A |
| Manganese products: Manganese ore | 3-5% | 0-0.2 | N/A | 73% | N/A |
| Manganese products: Ferromanganese | 1-3% | 0.8-1.0 | -0.01 | 100% | 0% |
| Manganese products: Silicomanganese | 1-3% | 0.8-1.0 | N/A | 100% | N/A |
| Lithium ore | 0-1% | 1.0\* | -1.2 | 53% | 0% |
| Synthetic rutile | 0-1% | 0.2-0.4 | -1.2 | 100% | 0% |
| Titanium dioxide | 0-1% | 0-0.2 | N/A | 100% | N/A |
| Other metal ore | 0-1% | 0-0.2 | N/A | 70% | N/A |
| Silicon | 0-1% | 0.8-1.0 | -0.2 | 100% | 0% |
| Sodium cyanide | 0-1% | 0-0.2 | N/A | 92% | N/A |
| Ethanol and dried distillers grain | 0-1% | 0.2-0.4 | -0.6 | 100% | 0% |




**Figure 2(a): ‘Carbon cost as per cent of price’ compared to ‘Imports relative to Safeguard production’.[[29]](#footnote-30)**

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**Figure 2(b): ‘Carbon cost as per cent of price’ compared to ‘Exports relative to Safeguard production’.[[30]](#footnote-31)**

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**Figure 3: Trade elasticity illustrating the sensitivity of imports and exports to price changes.**



**Figure 4: Estimated change in production as a percentage of Safeguard-covered production.**

### Assessing investment leakage risk

Differences in emissions reduction policies can give rise to carbon leakage risks in investment. Changes in investment decisions also occur for reasons other than differences in climate policy. Investment decisions are influenced by features including costs of capital and labour, access to skilled labour and operational costs. In addition, investment also often turns on more intangible issues like market conditions, company strategies and business sentiment.[[31]](#footnote-32) In considering investment leakage risk, the Review relies on stakeholder engagement complemented by an assessment of investment leakage risk based on average emissions-to-profits ratios for industry groupings.

Stakeholders identified carbon leakage risk in the investment channel as important.

*In considering the definition of carbon leakage, all parts of the Australian aluminium industry are highly exposed to both trade and investment leakage.* - **Australian Aluminium Council**

*… it is crucial that the significant risk of investment leakage associated with uneven international climate policies is considered alongside the direct carbon leakage risks.* - **Boral**

*Robust and scalable policy instruments that provide some certainty over the investment horizon can assist in unlocking opportunities for decarbonisation investment and take advantage of Australia’s competitiveness in low carbon production.* - **KPMG**

The emissions-to-profits ratio is a typical measure of emissions intensity used in emissions-intensive trade-exposed metrics, such as those of the OECD, IMF, the European Union (EU) and others.[[32]](#footnote-33) This measure of exposure to leakage is usually given as ratio of carbon costs (emissions, prices) to profits (for example gross value added). Industries or firms with a smaller profit margin and large emissions are identified by the metric as having a potential carbon leakage risk. We characterise this as investment leakage risk as it sheds light on the relative attractiveness of the industry for new investment based on its capacity to pass carbon costs through to consumers without loss of profit margin, as well as the potential profits available within an industry or firm for reinvestment in additional production or abatement to earn future revenue.

In contrast to the trade leakage estimate, the investment leakage indicator brings a focus on the emission intensity of profit rather than of production. This allows us to identify activities with lower carbon costs as share of the final unit price but higher carbon cost as a share of profits (i.e. after production costs).

The Review’s analysis uses firm-level information developed through the integration of NGER Scheme data and Business Longitudinal Analysis Data Environment (BLADE) economic activity datasets provided by the ABS.

Figure 5 below represents an average by industry grouping based on firms with emissions above 100,000 tonnes CO₂-e. This data covers 5 years of financial reporting by firms from 2017-18 to 2021-22. It is based on aggregated firm emissions. Emissions are presented as a share of the firms’ profits. An average is taken, as in any given year, profits can shift due to forces beyond the firm’s control, such as variations in commodity prices, input costs or interest rates.

The presentation of results of the Review's analysis is constrained by ABS rules that require data aggregation to prevent possible release of identifying data. The data are presented in industry groupings to ensure that each data point presented in Figure 5 includes information for a minimum of 10 firms that represent industries with similar averages and represent logical groupings of industry sectors.

The industry grouping most subject to potential investment leakage according to Figure 5 is the ‘Glass, Cement, Lime, and Pulp and Paper Manufacturing’ industry group, followed by ‘Petroleum Refining, Grain Mill Product, and Chemicals and Fertilisers Manufacturing’.

Within industry groupings, the absolute mean deviation (plus or minus from the industry average presented by the bar graph) is illustrative of individual firm deviations from the average. Deviation from the average is highly variable, particularly in the manufacturing sectors represented. The absolute mean deviation is largest in the ‘Petroleum Refining, Grain Mill Product Manufacturing, and Chemicals and Fertilisers’ industry grouping, followed by the ‘Glass, Cement, Lime, and Pulp and Paper Manufacturing’ industry group.

The results indicate that industries with high emissions and smaller profit margins are more at risk of investment leakage compared with industries with smaller emissions and higher profit margins.

**Figure 5: Measure of investment leakage risk estimated as the ratio of Safeguard Mechanism-covered facility emissions to profits.**

Figure 5 note: Data is industry group average for 2017-18 to 2021-22. The ‘Metals Manufacturing and Aluminium Production’ includes alumina production, aluminium smelting, bauxite mining, basic ferrous and non-ferrous metal manufacturing, iron and steel manufacturing, and other metals such as lead, copper, silver and zinc smelting and refining.[[33]](#footnote-34)

### Findings of leakage by commodity

**Preliminary findings for consultation**

The following commodities are found to be subject to potentially material carbon leakage risk over time: cement, clinker and lime; ammonia and derivatives; steel; and glass.

Carbon leakage risks for cement, clinker and lime are more pronounced than for other commodity groups and may warrant additional policies to be introduced at an earlier stage than other groups.

Further, potential carbon leakage risks for aluminium and alumina, refined petroleum, and pulp and paper, are recommended for particular consideration as part of the 2026-27 Safeguard Mechanism Review on the suitability of arrangements for emissions-intensive trade-exposed activities.

Table 4 integrates and summarises key findings from the preceding assessments in 3 areas: emissions intensity and trade-related risk indicators (see **Section 2.4**); estimates and analysis of trade and investment leakage risk (see **Sections 2.4 and 2.5**); and stakeholder feedback and other relevant considerations (see commodity-level discussions in **Section 2.6**).

For each of these areas, a judgment on the overall level of leakage risk under existing policies is presented, drawing on quantitative analysis of trade and investment leakage as well as qualitative information from stakeholder feedback and other sources. Red indicates areas where risks are considered material overall, and therefore a pronounced need to consider additional policies. Orange indicates areas where risks are, on balance, approaching levels that could be considered material. Green indicates areas where risks of leakage are considered low or where the evidence is mixed, and therefore less or no need to consider additional policies.

A summary of the underlying sectoral analysis and findings for each commodity group is also provided after this table.

**Table 4: Summary of leakage assessment findings**

| **Commodities** | **Emissions intensity and trade-related leakage risk factors** | **Assessed trade and investment leakage risk** | **Other factors, including from stakeholder feedback** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Additional leakage policies warranted, with earlier implementation pursued** | | | |
| Clinker | High risk levels evident for both carbon costs as a share of product price and import exposure. | Trade leakage estimate is the highest of all commodities. Profit analysis also suggests clinker is among the sectors most vulnerable to investment leakage. | Industry stakeholders note high levels of risks of leakage in absence of longer-term solutions such as a border carbon adjustment. |
| Cement | High levels of risk for multiple indicators, including carbon costs as a share of product price and import sensitivity to price changes. | Estimates of trade leakage are approaching material levels. Investment leakage analysis suggests cement is among the highest risk sectors. | Industry stakeholders note high risks of leakage in absence of longer-term solutions such as a border carbon adjustment. |
| Lime | Lime displays high risk levels on all risk factors. | Trade leakage estimates are high. Investment leakage analysis suggests lime is among the sectors most vulnerable to investment leakage. | Industry stakeholders note risks of leakage in absence of a longer-term solution such as a border carbon adjustment. Uneven coverage of lime production by Safeguard creates domestic leakage risks. |
| **Additional leakage policies potentially warranted** | | | |
| Ammonia and derivatives | Risks of leakage are material overall for import-facing urea production, and approach material levels for ammonia in export markets. | Profit analysis places ammonia and derivatives in the industry group ranked second most vulnerable to investment leakage. Trade leakage risk is high for urea. | Industry stakeholders note risks of leakage in absence of longer-term solutions such as a border carbon adjustment. |
| Steel | Overall, risks of leakage are material for crude and treated flat steel especially in export markets, and approaching material levels for flat and long steel in domestic and export markets. | Trade leakage risks are generally modest for most commodities but could reach material levels for crude and treated flat steel in export markets. Steel is in the sectoral group ranked third most vulnerable to investment leakage, based on profit analysis. | Industry stakeholders note risks of leakage in absence of longer-term solutions such as a border carbon adjustment, but also stress the need for careful design due to complexities of the sector. Green metals are a strategic priority under Australia’s renewable energy superpower objectives. |
| Glass | Risks of leakage are material for import-facing production for glass containers and potentially material for flat glass. | Estimated trade leakage is low for both types of glass. However, based on profit analysis, glass is among the sectors most vulnerable to investment leakage. | Industry stakeholders note the risks of investment leakage, in absence of longer-term solutions such as a border carbon adjustment. Uneven coverage of the sector by Safeguard also creates domestic leakage risks. |
| **Consider need for additional policies again in 2026-27 Safeguard Review** | | | |
| Alumina and aluminium | Risk levels across risk factors are mixed. For both commodities, carbon costs as a share of product prices are modest, export exposure is high and price sensitivities are uncertain. | Trade leakage risk in export markets is low for alumina and could not be estimated for aluminium due to uncertain price sensitivity. Based on profit analysis, alumina and aluminium are in the sectoral group ranked third most vulnerable to investment leakage. | Industry stakeholders note existing TEBA measures are yet to be tested, and highlighted other policy options that matter for competitiveness. Green metals are a strategic priority for support for Australia’s renewable energy superpower objectives. |
| Refined petroleum | Risk levels appear modest in domestic markets. Carbon costs form a relatively small share of product price. | Estimates of trade leakage risk are low. Based on profit analysis, refined petroleum is in the industry group with the second highest risk of investment leakage. | Addressing leakage could support a transition to low emissions fuel production. Any additional policies must consider interactions with existing fuel security policies. |
| Pulp and Paper | Overall, carbon leakage risk levels are material in export markets and approach material levels in domestic markets. | Estimated trade leakage risk is low. Based on profit analysis, pulp and paper is among the sectors most susceptible to investment leakage. | Industry stakeholders pointed to the merits of additional policies to mitigate leakage, and also noted other policy areas that affect production. |
| **Retain existing policies at this stage** | | | |
| All other commodities | In general, most other commodities exhibit modest levels of leakage risk factors, and/or low estimates of trade leakage risk. Profit analysis suggests resource sector commodities face much lower risks of investment leakage compared to commodities in manufacturing sectors. | | |

**CEMENT AND CLINKER**

In 2020-21, Australia produced around 10 million tonnes of cement and 5 million tonnes of clinker.[[34]](#footnote-35)

Domestic producers primarily compete with imports from Southeast and East Asia. Imports relative to Safeguard production are currently between 0.8-1.0 for clinker and 0-0.2 for cement. Cement imports appear price sensitive (elasticity of -2.5). Clinker imports are presented as less sensitive (elasticity of -0.8). This is likely to be an underestimate, based on industry feedback and because estimates are based on the time period before the COVID pandemic. Exports of cement and clinker are negligible.

Clinker and cement production are emissions intensive. Average Australian emissions intensities are 0.71 tonnes CO2-e/tonne of cement and 0.84 tonnes CO2-e/tonne of clinker.[[35]](#footnote-36) Around 60% of total emissions (scope 1 and 2) from integrated clinker and cement production are process emissions from the conversion of limestone and other inputs into clinker, while 30% is from use of kiln fuels.[[36]](#footnote-37)

Emissions are high relative to the value of commodities. Carbon costs in 2030 are estimated to be between 5-10% and 20-30% of cement and clinker prices respectively. Reliable data on emissions intensity of foreign produced commodities is limited but suggests clinker imports may be more emissions intensive than domestic clinker.

Decarbonisation of cement production is possible through efficiency improvements, clinker substitution in cement production and alternative kiln fuels. Carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) will be key to achieving step change reductions in process emissions, but most domestic stakeholders do not see this being commercially viable in the near term. Overall decarbonisation will also involve some product substitution towards alternatives to concrete.

Estimates of potential leakage for cement and clinker were found to be amongst the highest for all commodities, with reduced Safeguard production of up to 26% for clinker and 2% for cement, in a maximum carbon cost difference scenario.

Engagement with industry also highlighted risks of investment leakage, due to investor concerns in the absence of stronger measures to address leakage. The risks, if unaddressed, could deter investment in onsite abatement. Analysis of profits finds cement to be among the sectors most at risk of investment leakage (see **Section 2.5**).

Given these results, there is a clear basis for considering further policies to mitigate leakage for cement and clinker production. Earlier action on additional policies is worth considering given the more pronounced nature of the leakage risks for cement and clinker.

**LIME**

Australia produced 1.5 million tonnes of lime in 2021-22, around three quarters of which is covered by the Safeguard Mechanism.[[37]](#footnote-38) Imports are equivalent to between 0.4-0.6 of Safeguard production, with Southeast Asia being the main source of imports. Lime imports are very sensitive to price changes (elasticity of -3). Australia exports negligible volumes of lime.

Lime production is emissions intensive. Average lime emissions intensity in Australia is 1.13 tonnes CO2-e/tonne.[[38]](#footnote-39) The Review found little data on foreign lime emissions intensities, but in general, emissions intensity ranges from 1.02-1.33 tonnes CO2-e/tonne depending on kiln and fuel types.[[39]](#footnote-40) The sources and shares of emissions from each source are very similar to clinker, with process emissions from calcination of limestone into lime and kiln fuels being the main sources. Options to decarbonise rely mainly on alternative kiln fuels and CCUS. Emissions are high relative to the value of lime, with 2030 carbon costs estimated at between 5-10% of price.

Under a maximum carbon cost difference scenario, estimated declines in Safeguard production due to carbon costs are around 7%.

Industry observations about the risks of investment leakage for cement and clinker were also applicable to lime. These views were shared by domestic producers within and outside of the Safeguard Mechanism. Analysis of profits finds lime to be among the sectors most vulnerable to investment leakage (see **Section 2.5**).

Given these results, there is a basis for considering further policies to mitigate leakage for lime production. Earlier action on additional policies is worth considering given the more pronounced nature of the leakage risks for lime.

**AMMONIA AND DERIVATIVES**

Ammonia and key derivatives – ammonium nitrate, ammonium phosphate, urea and sodium cyanide – are used to produce fertilisers, explosives and in other industrial applications.

Australia produces around 1.8 million tonnes of ammonia and 1.9 million tonnes of ammonium nitrate.[[40]](#footnote-41) Urea was produced up until the end of 2022 but is not currently produced domestically. However, a new 2.3 million tonne/year facility in the Pilbara is due to commence in 2027.[[41]](#footnote-42)

Australia has potential comparative advantages in the production of low emissions ammonia and derivatives in a net zero world, due to the potential to produce cost-competitive renewable hydrogen, a key feedstock for ammonia. Low emissions ammonia is also strategically important as a potential carrier for future Australian exports of renewable hydrogen. The government has identified renewable hydrogen as an initial priority sector under its Future Made in Australia agenda.[[42]](#footnote-43) Green ammonia is expected to fetch price premiums in some international markets.

In domestic markets, urea and ammonium phosphate appear most exposed to import competition (imports equivalent to 1.2-1.4 and 2.0-2.2 times the volume of production under Safeguard respectively) while ammonia (0-0.2), ammonium nitrate (0-0.2) and sodium cyanide (0-0.2) appear less exposed.[[43]](#footnote-44) Sodium cyanide, ammonia, urea and ammonium nitrate imports are sensitive to price changes (elasticities of -5.2, -3.5, -1.7 and -1.0 respectively) but other derivatives appear less so.

Ammonia (0-0.2) and ammonium phosphate (0.6-0.8) are relatively more trade-exposed in export markets than ammonium nitrate (0-0.2), sodium cyanide (0-0.2) and urea (0-0.2).[[44]](#footnote-45) Exports of ammonium nitrate, ammonia and urea all appear sensitive to price changes (elasticities of -11, -3.4 and -1.1 respectively).

Conventional production of ammonia is emissions-intensive, due to process emissions from the use of gas feedstock to produce hydrogen, and fossil fuels to produce heat. Derivative products use ammonia as a feedstock and generate additional process and thermal emissions in their production.

Carbon costs in 2030 as a share of prices is estimated to be between 1-3% for urea, ammonia and ammonium nitrate, and between 0-1% for ammonium phosphate and sodium cyanide. Carbon costs have less impact on prices than costs for other inputs such as gas.[[45]](#footnote-46)

The urea assessment is based on an expected new facility in 2030, which is likely to be more representative of the sector at that time, but inherently involves additional uncertain assumptions.

There are various pathways to decarbonise ammonia supply chains. They include renewable hydrogen to replace the steam methane reforming step in ammonia production, and electrification of heat processes.[[46]](#footnote-47) Low emissions ammonia production could reduce emissions intensity from the current global average of 2.4 tonnes CO2-e/tonne to 0.2 tonnes CO2-e/tonne. At some Australian ammonium nitrate facilities, tertiary catalysts are being installed that can reduce onsite emissions by nearly half.[[47]](#footnote-48)

In domestic markets, under a maximum carbon cost difference scenario, potential declines in Safeguard production are modest at below 1% across all commodities, except urea where the estimated decline is significant at 7%.[[48]](#footnote-49) Leakage risks in export markets are similarly low, ranging from 0-1% across all commodities.

Industry consultations indicate ammonia and derivatives are seen as vulnerable to leakage in domestic and export markets through trade and investment channels. The Review’s analysis of profits finds conventional ammonia and derivatives are among the group of industries with the second highest level of investment leakage risk (see **Section 2.5**). Stakeholders noted that production has high fixed operating costs, requiring facilities to operate at full capacity. Even small leakage results could therefore have material impacts on facilities.

Industry did not see existing policies as sufficient to address leakage in these products in the longer term.

Many also viewed a border carbon adjustment as a valuable tool that could support investment in a transition to low emissions production in Australia.

Green ammonia could be used as a carrier of renewable hydrogen, or in industrial applications in markets willing to pay a green premium in the near term, either due to industry decarbonisation commitments or the presence of carbon border adjustments or similar policies.

The market dynamics for green or low emissions ammonia are favourable with global demand for green ammonia expected to grow as the world transitions to net zero. The market size of green ammonia is expected grow from US$0.3b to around US$60b in 2030s.[[49]](#footnote-50) Major global players are already locking in offtake agreements for their production of green or low emissions ammonia products.[[50]](#footnote-51) This suggests the emergence of a premium on green products in some markets, especially where policies foster the use of green commodities.

Given these results, there is a basis for considering further policies to mitigate leakage for ammonia and derivatives production.

**STEEL**

Australia produced 5.4 million tonnes of steel in 2023.[[51]](#footnote-52) Domestic facilities produce different types of steel: primary flat steel, primary treated flat steel, primary crude and long steel, and secondary long steel.[[52]](#footnote-53) Australia is seen as having comparative advantages in the production of green iron, and potentially steel, in a net zero world, due to the potential to produce cost-competitive renewable hydrogen. Green metals have been identified as a sector aligned with the Net Zero Transformation Stream of the National Interest Framework under the Government’s Future Made in Australia agenda. Demand for green steel has begun to emerge and is expected to grow over time, driven by the global transition to net zero.[[53]](#footnote-54)

Australian steel faces competition from imports and exports. In 2022-23, around a third of domestic consumption was met through imports, while a quarter of domestic steel was exported.[[54]](#footnote-55) Between 2018 and 2022, East Asian countries were the key source of imports for flat and long steel, while imports of crude steel came from a variety of countries in the Middle East, Central and South Asia.[[55]](#footnote-56) Countries in East Asia and North America were the main suppliers in Australia’s top export markets. Imports appear highly sensitive to price changes for crude steel (elasticity of -3.9) but less sensitive for flat and long steel (-0.5 and -0.6). For exports, trade sensitivities are similarly high for crude and treated flat steel (-3.6 and -3.4) and lower for flat and long steel (-0.4).

Emissions intensities of Australian primary steel are currently around 2.07 tonnes CO2-e/tonne for flat steel and 2.17 tonnes CO2-e/tonne for long steel.[[56]](#footnote-57) Most steel emissions from the primary route are scope 1 emissions from the conversion of iron ore into iron (process emissions) and fuel combustion for heat. Emissions are material relative to value for most types of steel, with 2030 carbon costs estimated to be 5-10% of prices for crude steel, 3-5% for treated flat steel, 1-3% for flat steel and 0-1% for long steel.

For primary steel production, the most prospective decarbonisation pathway involves replacing the current blast furnace and basic oxygen furnace process with a renewable hydrogen-based direct reduced iron and electric arc furnace process, or variants of this. This could reduce scope 1 emissions by up to 90% but is not yet commercially viable and in the early stages of deployment globally.[[57]](#footnote-58)

In domestic markets, potential leakage appears to be modest, with declines in Safeguard production for Australian steel of less than 1% for crude, flat and long steel types based on 2030 carbon costs under a maximum carbon cost difference scenario. Against exports, estimated declines in Safeguard production under the same scenario were material for crude (7%) and treated flat steel (10%), and below 1% for flat and long steel.

However, industry views leakage as a risk in the medium-term as Safeguard baselines decline. Analysis of profits finds steel to be among a group of industries with material levels of investment leakage risk (see **Section 2.5**).

Consultation also identified that a border carbon adjustment could support investment in low emissions production in Australia. Demand for green steel is expected to grow, including in markets willing to pay a green premium in the near term, either due to industry decarbonisation commitments or the presence of carbon border adjustments or similar policies.

Indirect leakage through downstream commodities was also highlighted as a concern, given imports are estimated to make up half of Australia’s true total steel consumption.[[58]](#footnote-59) Finally, it was also noted that facilities needed to operate at or close to capacity to cover high fixed costs. Overall, these considerations suggest that even small amounts of leakage could have material impacts on facility viability. Estimates could also be understated as they do not account for downstream leakage.

Given these results, there is a basis for considering further policies to mitigate leakage for steel production.

**GLASS**

Facilities covered under the Safeguard Mechanism produce flat glass and glass containers.

Both types of glass are exposed to imports, which are equivalent to 0-0.2 times the volume of Safeguard production for flat glass and 0.2-0.4 times for glass containers.

Imports appear price sensitive, with elasticities of -1.3 for flat glass and -8.5 for glass containers. Exports of glass containers are also price sensitive (-1.6). Carbon costs in 2030 are estimated at 0-1% compared to price for flat glass and glass containers.[[59]](#footnote-60)

Under a maximum carbon cost difference scenario and based on 2030 carbon costs, production is estimated to decline by less than 1% for flat glass and 1% for glass containers due to import competition. On the export side, production is estimated to decline by less than 1% for glass containers under the same scenario.

Industry consultation suggests leakage risks are a concern. This could discourage investment in existing and new production, including for decarbonisation. The Review’s analysis of profits also finds glass to be among the group of sectors most vulnerable to investment leakage risk.

Given these results, there is a basis for considering further policies to mitigate leakage for glass production.

**ALUMINA AND ALUMINIUM**

Australia produces around 20 million tonnes of alumina and 1.5 million tonnes of aluminium per year.[[60]](#footnote-61) Alumina refineries and aluminium smelters under the Safeguard Mechanism cover all domestic production. Australia has potential comparative advantages in the production of green alumina and potentially aluminium in a net zero world, due its bauxite resources, established production base and the potential for low cost, firmed renewable energy. Aluminium is important for the net zero transition, is in demand from strategic international partners, and leverages Australia’s geological resource endowments. It forms part of the green metals priority area identified as aligned with the Future Made in Australia National Interest Framework and listed on the government’s Strategic Materials List.[[61]](#footnote-62) Similar to steel, demand for low emissions aluminium is expected to grow as the world transitions to net zero, and green premiums, while nascent, are beginning to emerge.[[62]](#footnote-63)

Alumina and aluminium are trade-exposed in export markets. Exports relative to Safeguard production are between 0.8-1.0 for both alumina and aluminium. Imports relative to Safeguard production are small for both commodities, though Australia does import significant amounts of processed aluminium products that are downstream of current Safeguard boundaries. In export markets, Australia competes with alumina producers from Asia and aluminium producers from North America, Asia, the Middle East and Russia. Alumina exports are modestly price sensitive (elasticity of -0.3). An elasticity estimate for aluminium has not been established.

Average Australian alumina emissions (scope 1) is 0.5 tonnes CO2-e/tonne.[[63]](#footnote-64) Decarbonisation of alumina production relies on early-stage technologies to switch from use of gas or coal to electrification or renewable hydrogen, and access to low cost, firmed renewable electricity. Average Australian aluminium emissions (scope 1) is 1.9 tonnes CO2-e/tonne, below the global average of around 2.4 tonnes CO2-e/tonne.[[64]](#footnote-65) Scope 1 emissions can be reduced by replacing carbon anodes with emerging inert anode technology. 2030 carbon costs are estimated at between 1-3% of prices for both commodities.

Based on 2030 carbon constraints, under a maximum carbon cost difference scenario, production is estimated to decline by less than 1% for alumina. An estimate for aluminium is not available, due to uncertainty regarding its trade sensitivity.

Industry consultation confirmed that leakage risks are mainly related to exports and noted potential for indirect leakage risk for downstream aluminium products from import competition. It was also noted that leakage impacts affecting the viability of one part of the supply chain could also affect other parts, due to vertical integration. The Review’s analysis of profits finds the aluminium sector to be among a group of sectors facing material risks of investment leakage.

Industry considered it too soon to judge the effectiveness of current policy in addressing leakage but noted that public investment and other policies beyond the Safeguard Mechanism were likely to be more suitable than a border carbon adjustment for export leakage. As green markets that allow consumers to preference green products mature, demand for low emissions alumina and aluminium is set to rise.

While not at risk over the short-term, further monitoring of risk levels is required, and it is proposed that the carbon leakage risk of alumina and aluminium is particularly considered in the 2026-27 review of Safeguard Mechanism settings.

**REFINED PETROLEUM**

Assessing leakage risks for this commodity is complex due to various factors. Refined petroleum, as defined under the Safeguard Mechanism, combines over 17 different refinery products, each with their own price structures and market dynamics. There are also a range of existing government measures to support fuel production and ensure fuel security, which interact with the emissions intensity and production of refineries. For this analysis, the production variable was disaggregated into two groups of commodities: ethane and LPG; and (other) refined petroleum products.

Refiners covered under the Safeguard Mechanism account for all domestic production. The sector is highly exposed to import competition, with 80% of the domestic market served by imports, mainly from East Asian countries.[[65]](#footnote-66) Energy intensive refining forms a relatively small share of product prices, with carbon costs in 2030 estimated to range from 0-1% of prices. Import sensitivity to prices was estimated as significant for ethane and LPG (-4.4) but modest for other refined petroleum products (-0.3). Under a maximum carbon cost difference scenario, estimated declines in production are below 1% for these commodities.

Exports of refined petroleum relative to Safeguard production are between 0.2-0.4, with exports sensitive to price changes (elasticity of -1). Overall, trade leakage is estimated to be below 1%.

Investment leakage risks were highlighted in industry feedback, due to reduced capacity to invest in refinery assets. Analysis of profits finds petroleum refining to be among a group of sectors with the second highest level of investment leakage risk (see **Section 2.5**). Existing policies were considered insufficient to mitigate leakage risks in the longer run. A border carbon adjustment was seen as potentially useful if designed appropriately. Industry also emphasised the need to consider a holistic set of policy measures to help refineries pivot to the production of low emission fuels (e.g., renewable diesel and sustainable aviation fuels), and noted that the broader emissions reduction impact of this would far outweigh the direct impact of decarbonising production facilities. Low carbon liquid fuels is a priority area under the Future Made in Australia agenda. The government has committed $18.5 million over four years from 2024-25 to develop a certification scheme for low-carbon liquid fuels for the transport sector, including sustainable aviation fuels and renewable diesel, by expanding the Guarantee of Origin scheme.

While not at risk over the short-term, further monitoring of risk levels is required and it is proposed that the carbon leakage risk of refined petroleum is particularly considered in the 2026-27 review of Safeguard Mechanism settings.

**PULP AND PAPER**

Facilities covered under the Safeguard Mechanism produce pulp, packaging paper, tissue paper and newsprint.[[66]](#footnote-67) The sector is highly trade-exposed. Imports are equivalent to 0.4-0.6 times the amount of Safeguard production for all commodity types. Exports relative to Safeguard production are between 0.8-1.0. Exports are more sensitive to price changes (elasticity of -1.5) compared to imports (-0.8).[[67]](#footnote-68)

Decarbonisation for pulp production relies on alternatives to heating fuels, either by electrifying heating processes or switching to lower emission fuels. Industry feedback suggests this could be difficult in regional locations where enabling infrastructure is lacking.

Carbon costs in 2030 are estimated to between 1-3% of prices. Under a maximum carbon cost difference scenario, Safeguard production is estimated to decline by less than 1% due to import leakage and 2% due to export leakage. The Review’s analysis of profits finds pulp and paper to be among a group of industries most susceptible to investment leakage (see **Section 2.5**).

Industry recognised the potential merits of a portfolio of additional policies to address leakage, but also noted other non-leakage policies (e.g. forestry policies affecting access to timber inputs) as significant influences on production decisions.

Based on some risk indicators approaching material levels and potentially high susceptibility to investment leakage risks (see **Section 2.5**), the Review proposes that the carbon leakage risk of pulp and paper be particularly considered in the 2026-27 review of Safeguard Mechanism settings.

**MAGNESIA**

Magnesia is used in a wide variety of industrial applications, including fertilisers, steel production and electric vehicle (EV) batteries, and is included on the government’s Critical Minerals List.[[68]](#footnote-69)

Imports are equal to 0-0.2 times the volume of Safeguard production and are price sensitive (elasticity of -2.2). Australia appears to export some magnesia, but limited data is available on export volumes. China is the largest producer of magnesia, accounting for two thirds of global production in 2023.[[69]](#footnote-70)

Magnesia production is emissions intensive. Around 70% of emissions are process emissions from calcination of magnesite and 25% is from the use of fuels for calcination. Decarbonisation relies on CCUS for process emissions and electrification of the calcination process, but neither are considered viable in the near term. 2030 carbon costs are estimated to be between 3-5% of price. Safeguard production is estimated to decline by 1% due to import competition.

Based on the Review’s analysis, existing policies currently appear sufficient to address leakage risks.

**POLYETHYLENE**

Ethane and other petroleum products are used as feedstocks to produce ethylene, which is then further processed into polyethylene. Polyethylene can be made into a wide range of plastic products. Safeguard facilities produce around 205,000 tonnes of polyethylene annually,[[70]](#footnote-71) although future production levels are uncertain based on recent industry announcements.

Polyethylene is trade-exposed in domestic markets, with imports equivalent to 1.0-1.2 times the volume of domestic production. Exports are negligible. Imports are modestly price sensitive (elasticity of -0.5). Carbon costs in 2030 are estimated to be between 0-1% of prices. Under a maximum carbon cost difference scenario, Safeguard production is estimated to decline by less than 1% based on 2030 carbon constraints.

The Review notes that other supply chain factors beyond the Safeguard Mechanism may have a significant influence on future production decisions. In relation to rising energy prices, the government has implemented several measures as part of the Energy Price Relief Plan, including a temporary wholesale gas price cap which has been superseded by the Gas Market Code. The Gas Market Code is designed to facilitate a well-functioning domestic wholesale gas market with adequate gas supply at reasonable prices and on reasonable terms.

Based on the analysis, the Review is not proposing additional policies for plastics at this time.

**LNG**

Domestic gas production in 2022-23 was around 164 billion cubic metres, with around 68% of this exported as LNG (82 million tonnes). Australia was among the top 3 global exporters of LNG in 2023.[[71]](#footnote-72)

Around 80% of Australia’s LNG is supplied under long-term contracts, and exports are moderately sensitive to price changes (elasticity of -0.6).[[72]](#footnote-73) Carbon costs in 2030 are estimated to be between 1-3% of prices and resulting declines in Safeguard production from export leakage under a maximum carbon cost difference scenario are estimated to be 1%. Analysis of profits finds LNG to be among the groups of industries with relatively lower risks of investment leakage (see **Section 2.5**).

While Australia’s gas industry has been significantly export-focused to date, the Future Gas Strategy identified that there is potential to use LNG import terminals in the future.[[73]](#footnote-74)

Based on the Review’s analysis, existing policies currently appear adequate to address leakage risks.

**ETHANOL AND DRIED DISTILLERS GRAIN[[74]](#footnote-75)**

Leakage risks primarily arise from trade exposure in export markets, given exports relative to Safeguard production are between 0.2-0.4. Exports are moderately sensitive to price changes (elasticity of -0.6). Imports are equivalent to 0-0.2 times the volume of Safeguard production and sensitive to price changes (elasticity of -1.4).

Carbon costs in 2030 are estimated to be between 0-1% of prices. The estimated declines in Safeguard production under the maximum carbon cost difference scenario are less than 1% from import exposure and export exposure. Analysis of profits suggests grain product manufacturing is among a group of sectors that is second most susceptible to investment leakage.

Based on the Review’s analysis, existing policies currently appear adequate to address leakage risks.

**MANGANESE ORE**

Manganese ore is processed into various manganese products. Over 90% of manganese is used in steel as an alloying agent, but there are growing uses in batteries and EVs.[[75]](#footnote-76) Manganese is included on the Critical Minerals List, based on its use in technologies of economic and security importance, Australia’s resource potential, demand from strategic international partners, and vulnerability to supply chain disruption.

Carbon costs in 2030 are estimated to be between 3-5% of prices. Australia appears to export manganese ore, but data on export volumes is limited. Estimates of export sensitivity to prices has not been established, and therefore production leakage could not be estimated. Imports are small, equivalent to 0-0.2 times the volume of production, but are sensitive to prices (elasticity of -1.5). Estimated Safeguard production leakage due to import competition is less than 1%.

Based on the Review’s analysis, existing policies currently appear adequate to address leakage risks.

**SILICON**

Silicon is used in a variety of applications, including manufacture of products important for the net zero transition such as aluminium, silicon chips and solar panels. Silicon is listed on the Critical Minerals List, reflecting its importance to strategic technologies, Australia’s geological resources, demand from strategic partners and vulnerability to supply chain disruption. The 2024-25 Budget included funding to study solar PV value chain opportunities from developing a green polysilicon industry in Australia.[[76]](#footnote-77)

Leakage risks are mainly relevant in export markets, with exports relative to Safeguard production of between 0.8-1.0. Carbon costs are estimated at between 0-1% of prices. Exports are not sensitive to price changes (elasticity of -0.2) and production is estimated to decline by less than 1% from export competition.

In domestic markets, imports are equivalent to 0-0.2 times the volume of production and are moderately sensitive to price changes (elasticity of -0.7). Overall, under a maximum carbon cost difference scenario, estimated decline in production based on 2030 carbon costs is less than 1%.

On balance, based on the Review’s analysis, existing policies currently appear adequate to address leakage risks.

**BAUXITE**

Globally, Australia is a major producer of bauxite, and was the second largest exporter in 2023.[[77]](#footnote-78)

Exports relative to Safeguard production are between 0.4-0.6 and the remainder is domestically refined into alumina. Exports are somewhat sensitive to price changes (elasticity of -0.8). Bauxite production is less emissions-intensive relative to other parts of the aluminium value chain, and 2030 carbon costs are estimated to be between 0-1% of prices. Under a maximum carbon cost difference scenario, production is estimated to decline by less than 1%.

Industry stakeholders have noted that the vertically integrated nature of the aluminium sector means any leakage risks affecting alumina refineries could also impact the bauxite facilities that supply them.

On balance, based on the Review’s analysis, existing policies currently appear adequate to address leakage risks.

**SYNTHETIC RUTILE AND TITANIUM DIOXIDE**

Synthetic rutile is produced by upgrading mineral ilmenite in a kiln and is a feedstock for titanium dioxide production. Titanium dioxide is used in the manufacture of paint and other products and is listed on the Critical Minerals List. Minerals are included in this list based on their importance to technologies of economic and security significance, Australia’s resource potential, demand from strategic international partners and vulnerability to supply chain disruptions.

Exports relative to production are between 0.2-0.4, and exports are sensitive to price changes (elasticity of -1.2). Exports of titanium dioxide are negligible.

Imports of synthetic rutile are equivalent to 0-0.2 times the volume of production but price sensitivity is low (-0.2). Imports of titanium dioxide are negligible.

Coal use as a reductant and for heating accounts for the bulk of emissions in synthetic rutile production. Clean hydrogen could replace the use of coal but is not expected to be viable in the near-term, which could result in increased leakage risks over time. Carbon costs in 2030 are estimated to be between 0-1% of the value of these commodities. Under a maximum carbon cost difference scenario, declines in production for all commodities are estimated to be less than 1%.

Based on the Review’s analysis, existing policies currently appear adequate to address leakage risks.

**FERRO AND SILICOMANGANESE ALLOY**

Ferro and silicomanganese are used as an alloying element in steel. Ferro and silicomanganese imports are equivalent to 0-0.2 times the volume of Safeguard production. Exports are significantly more trade-exposed, at 0.8-1.0 times the volume of production. Trade sensitivity for ferromanganese is low for imports (-0.18) and exports (-0.01). Trade sensitivity for silicomanganese could not be estimated.

Australian production appears to have relatively low emissions intensity, as electric arc furnaces powered by hydroelectricity are used for smelting.[[78]](#footnote-79) Carbon costs in 2030 are estimated to be modest at 1-3% of prices. Trade leakage is estimated to be less than 1% due to import competition and less than 1% in export markets for ferromanganese. Leakage is not estimated for silicomanganese as trade sensitivities could not be established.

On balance, based on the Review’s analysis, existing policies currently appear adequate to address leakage risks.

**LITHIUM HYDROXIDE AND LITHIUM ORE**

Lithium hydroxide is used in the production of lithium ion batteries. It is produced by refining spodumene, a lithium mineral, into lithium hydroxide. Australia was the world’s largest producer of spodumene in 2021, supplying over 50% of global demand.[[79]](#footnote-80) Lithium is listed on the government’s Critical Minerals List, and it is estimated that Australia could represent 15% of global lithium hydroxide production by 2029.[[80]](#footnote-81) The government has identified critical minerals processing as aligned with the Economic Resilience and Security Stream of the National Interest Framework under its Future Made in Australia agenda.[[81]](#footnote-82)

The first domestic production of lithium hydroxide recently commenced, primarily for export.[[82]](#footnote-83) Given this, leakage risks are not quantitatively assessed for lithium hydroxide at this time.

Lithium ore exports are sensitive to prices (elasticity of -1.2).[[83]](#footnote-84) Carbon costs in 2030 are estimated to be between 0-1%, reflecting the high prices for lithium ore. As such, under the maximum carbon cost difference scenario, declines in production are estimated to be less than 1%.

Based on the Review’s analysis, existing policies currently appear adequate to address leakage risks.

**COAL**

Australia is the world’s largest exporter of metallurgical coal and second largest exporter of thermal coal. Nearly all metallurgical coal production is exported, while around 75-80% of thermal coal production is exported.[[84]](#footnote-85)

Estimates of export sensitivity to prices are uncertain, and therefore trade leakage has not been estimated**.** Carbon costs in 2030 as a share of price are estimated to be low, at between 0-1% of price. Analysis of profits finds coal mining to be at lower risk of investment leakage relative to other industries, particularly manufacturing (see **Section 2.5**).

Based on the Review’s analysis, existing policies currently appear adequate to address leakage risks.

**OTHER METAL ORES[[85]](#footnote-86)**

This covers the mining and onsite processing of ores that contain one or more metals that are not already covered by other Safeguard production variables.[[86]](#footnote-87)

Trade-exposure appears low, with imports and exports both equivalent to 0-0.2 times the volume of production. The sensitivity of imports to price changes was estimated to be -0.4, but a sensitivity for exports could not be estimated. Carbon costs in 2030 are estimated to be low, at between 0-1% of prices. Under a maximum carbon cost difference scenario, estimated declines in production from import competition are negligible. Export-related leakage has not been estimated as trade sensitivity could not be established**.** Analysis of profits suggests metal ores are in the group of industries with the lowest level of investment leakage risk (see **Section 2.5**).

There is some uncertainty regarding this analysis, as the broadly defined nature of this commodity under the Safeguard Mechanism means that the types and volumes of relevant metal ores produced can vary from year to year. Based on the Review’s analysis, existing policies currently appear adequate to address leakage risks.

**CRUDE OIL**

Australia produced 291,000 barrels a day of crude oil in 2022-23. Crude oil and condensates are trade-exposed in domestic and export markets. Around 98% of production was exported, and imports were equivalent to almost 60% of production in 2022-23.[[87]](#footnote-88) Imports of crude oil are somewhat sensitive to price changes (elasticity of -0.6), but a price sensitivity could not be established for exports.

The carbon cost as a share of price is estimated to be between 0-1%. Estimated trade leakage is below 1% and is considered small in the context of other factors driving production. For example, crude oil and condensate production in Australia is estimated to have fallen by 10% in 2023 due to oil fields in the Carnarvon Basin approaching their end of life.[[88]](#footnote-89) Analysis of profits suggests oil and gas sectors are at lower risks of investment leakage compared to other sectors, particularly manufacturing industries.

Based on the Review’s analysis, existing policies currently appear adequate to address leakage risks

**IRON ORE**

Australia is the world’s largest producer and exporter of iron ore.[[89]](#footnote-90) Iron ore is primarily export-exposed. Virtually all production is exported, though estimates of export trade sensitivity have not been established.

Carbon costs in 2030 are estimated to be between 0-1% of prices, but trade leakage is not estimated given uncertainty over the trade sensitivity. Analysis of profits finds that iron ore is among the group of sectors least at risk of investment leakage, out of all industries assessed (see **Section 2.5**).

Based on the Review’s analysis, existing policies currently appear adequate to address leakage risks.

**NICKEL[[90]](#footnote-91)**

Nickel is used in the production of stainless steel, and increasingly in EV batteries and other clean energy technologies. It is included on the Critical Minerals List based on its use in technologies of economic and security importance, Australia’s geological resources and vulnerability to supply chain disruptions. Analysis focuses on refined nickel products rather than nickel ore which is covered by the run-of-mine metal ores Safeguard Mechanism production variable.

Australia has been a major global producer of nickel and was the third largest exporter in 2022.[[91]](#footnote-92) Exports of refined nickel products relative to Safeguard production are between 0.2-0.4, but an estimate of export sensitivity has not yet been established.

Carbon costs are estimated to be between 1-3% of prices. Declines in production have not been estimated due to uncertainty about the trade-price sensitivity. Excess international nickel supply and lower prices are more significant risks for Australian production.[[92]](#footnote-93) Analysis of profits finds nickel to be in the group of industries with the lowest level of investment leakage risk compared to other industries, particularly manufacturing.

Based on the Review’s analysis, existing policies currently appear adequate to address leakage risks.

**BASIC NON-FERROUS METALS**

This category includes lead bullion and refined lead, zinc in fume and copper anode. These commodities are primarily export-competing, with exports relative to Safeguard production between 0.4-0.6. Imports relative to Safeguard production are between 0-0.2. Australia was the largest exporter of zinc and fourth largest exporter of copper in 2022.[[93]](#footnote-94) Copper and zinc are included in the Strategic Materials List, on the basis of their importance to technologies critical to the net zero transition, Australia’s resource potential, and demand from strategic international partners.

Export sensitivity to price changes could not be estimated. Carbon costs in 2030 are estimated to be between 0-1% of prices. Production declines from export leakage could not be established due to uncertainty about trade-price sensitivity. Based on profit analysis, basic non-ferrous metals were among the group of industries with the third highest level of investment leakage risk (see **Section 2.5**).

Industry feedback highlighted several factors beyond climate policy that are important for competitiveness, including: fiscal settings; permitting processes; enabling infrastructure; a strong supporting services sector; and a skilled workforce.

On balance, based on the Review’s analysis, existing policies currently appear adequate to address leakage risks.

## Border carbon adjustment

### Principles and objectives

**Preliminary findings for consultation**

A border carbon adjustment applied to imports could be an appropriate policy measure for selected Safeguard-covered commodities with high carbon leakage risk from imports. It could provide a robust underpinning of the Safeguard Mechanism for commodities where carbon leakage risk is material, and efficiently support industrial decarbonisation.

Implementation could be phased and could involve the removal or phase out of TEBA provisions for commodities where a border carbon adjustment is introduced.

A border carbon adjustment that provides rebates for exports would be inconsistent with Australia’s emissions reduction targets and could raise considerable international trade law concerns. For these reasons a border carbon adjustment for exports is unlikely to be appropriate for Australia or achieve the relevant policy objectives. Well-designed border carbon adjustments in other countries would provide market premiums to Australian low emissions export commodities.

Any border carbon adjustment would need to mirror domestic emissions policy settings to imports to provide a level playing field and be designed to minimise administrative burdens. It would need to be consistent with Australia’s longstanding support of an open, rules-based trading system and its international trade law obligations. Australia could advance relevant work with plurilateral initiatives and support trade partner countries with implementation.

A border carbon adjustment mechanism could be used to equalise the effective carbon reduction efforts between Australia and foreign jurisdictions.

The policy objective of a border carbon adjustment is to achieve climate policy parity between domestically and internationally produced goods, thereby avoiding carbon leakage while providing full incentives to decarbonise production practices and invest in low emissions facilities. A border carbon adjustment allows pass through of carbon costs which allows low and zero emissions products to achieve a market price premium. It also alleviates the need to support domestic emissions-intensive producers to compete with producers that do not face carbon costs.

Should government decide to pursue a border carbon adjustment, the design of an Australian border carbon adjustment should take into account Australia’s obligations under international trade law. Any measure would need to reflect the key trade law principle of non-discrimination by ensuring that any obligations arising from a border carbon adjustment treated imported and locally produced commodities equally and ensured equal treatment between Australia’s trade partners. These requirements are actively considered in the treatment of specific issues through the Review.

Where suitable, a border carbon adjustment is a policy option that could be a long-term solution to carbon leakage. The adjustment recognises both actual emissions intensity and costs already paid on embedded emissions, and thereby automatically adapts to changes over time in domestic and trading partners’ climate policy.

A border carbon adjustment is usually conceptualised, and typically designed, to be based on the difference in explicit carbon costs between jurisdictions. The principle of equal treatment of domestic producers and imports implies mirroring of domestic policy settings to imports, as far as practicable.

In the Australian context of the Safeguard Mechanism, this would mean that only imports that are higher emissions intensity than the relevant Australian baseline and that face a lower effective carbon cost would be liable for a border carbon adjustment (see **Section** **3.5.2** and the Appendix).

A border carbon adjustment can enable increased domestic climate ambition with reduced fiscal outlay by providing a level playing field for domestic industry relative to overseas producers.

The implementation of a border carbon adjustment would be complex, and it may be appropriate to phase its application to different commodities. The feasibility of a border carbon adjustment depends on factors including reliable international emissions reporting, compliance and administrative arrangements, and consistency with international trade rules and obligations.

The Review has also considered key issues relating to policy design and implementation of possible carbon border adjustment, particularly related to feasibility (see below). Detailed design would need to be considered and consulted on, should government decide to pursue a border carbon adjustment.

Stakeholders from trade-exposed industrial sectors by and large supported an Australian border carbon adjustment.

*A CBAM would be a significant reform and require careful design, international collaboration and domestic policy evolution. … it could be a major and increasingly important element of an effective Australian climate policy suite.* – **Ai Group**

*MA supports efforts to carefully design a CBAM for trade-exposed manufacturing industries that have liabilities under the Safeguard Mechanism.* **– Manufacturing Australia**

*[A] CBAM stands alone in its capacity to address carbon leakage in a direct manner proportionate to emissions pricing imposed by the Safeguard Mechanism.***– Australian Workers Union**

Some stakeholders expressed concern about an Australian border carbon adjustment, including the potential for broader trade consequences and the cost impact on downstream users. The Review has carefully considered these concerns and addresses them throughout this chapter.

*By raising the cost of imported products in the domestic market, a CBAM reduces the pressure on businesses to innovate and invest in technology to increase production efficiency and lower emissions. –* **Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry**

**Box 2 - International examples of border carbon adjustments**

The EU was the first jurisdiction to implement a border carbon adjustment. Implementation commenced in 2023 with a transitional phase requiring only reporting, until 2026 when charges will be levied. The EU CBAM will initially cover aluminium, cement, electricity, fertilisers, hydrogen, iron and steel. It will include scope 1 and scope 2 emissions (consistent with the coverage of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS)).

The UK Government has committed to introducing a border carbon adjustment starting in 2027, covering aluminium, cement, ceramics, fertiliser, glass, hydrogen, iron and steel. It will cover scope 1, scope 2 and select precursor product emissions, consistent with the UK ETS.[[94]](#footnote-95)

The Canadian Government has consulted on the introduction of a border carbon adjustment.[[95]](#footnote-96) In April 2024, the US announced it would establish a White House Climate and Trade Taskforce to, among other things, develop policies to effectively address carbon leakage.[[96]](#footnote-97) The US announcement follows introduction of legislative proposals in Congress that could facilitate the introduction of a border carbon adjustment in the future. Other countries are at the early stages of their own carbon leakage reviews.

### Export border carbon adjustment

A border carbon adjustment could in theory apply to both imports and exports, though neither the EU nor UK will include exports in their border carbon adjustment policies. An export border carbon adjustment would provide a rebate for carbon costs for goods that are exported. It could be calculated based on the actual domestic carbon costs incurred during production, or a benchmark such as ‘carbon efficient domestic production’ or ‘average global emissions intensity’, compared to the assessed carbon compliance cost for production at the destination. An export border carbon adjustment would increase domestic producers’ competitiveness in overseas markets.

The Review has identified potential carbon leakage risk in some export sectors. The export leakage risk is assessed to be most material in relation to steel, ammonia, alumina and aluminium.

Rebating carbon costs incurred under the Safeguard Mechanism for exports would effectively exempt production that is exported from emissions reduction obligations. This would be counter to national emissions reductions and net zero objectives.

An export border carbon adjustment would tend to result in less emissions reductions, and possibly increases in emissions, in export-oriented industries. It would consequently increase the emissions reduction requirement on other sectors of the economy, including industries that predominantly supply the domestic market.

Australian industries are predominantly export oriented, so the effects of an export border carbon adjustment could be large. Emissions from facilities in sectors that export at least 20% of their production comprised approximately 73% of Safeguard emissions in 2021-22.

Importantly, an export border carbon adjustment could also raise considerable international trade law concerns and would need to be considered in the context of Australia’s ongoing commitment to an open trading system and international trade law obligations. Although such a measure has not been tested in international trade law dispute settlement proceedings, many commentators have argued such a measure would be inconsistent with international trade law.[[97]](#footnote-98) Given the challenges such a system poses for Australia’s climate objectives and the trade law considerations, an export border carbon adjustment is considered unsuitable and infeasible.

Given the challenges facing an export border carbon adjustment, the Review has considered what policy options would be appropriate for sectors facing export leakage risk. Some of these sectors are included in Future Made in Australia announcements (see **Section 2.2**). It has not been possible to specifically assess the impact that these programs may have on carbon leakage risks. However, as a matter of principle, public investment should offset some carbon leakage risk by supporting investment in low and zero emissions options.

Over time, export sectors will benefit most from a faster global energy transition and the further growth of markets that provide a premium for low emissions goods. This premium could be achieved through other countries implementing carbon pricing complemented by border carbon adjustments. Australian exports of green commodities can also benefit from other countries’ policy approaches, such as mandatory product standards for imports (e.g. emissions standards for hydrogen and hydrogen derived products) and a more general shift to production systems which make low emissions production the norm.

Australia has opportunities to amplify engagement with multilateral and plurilateral forums to facilitate growth in markets which offer a premium for low emission goods (see **Chapter 6**).

An export border carbon adjustment which rebates Safeguard Mechanism costs could pose fundamental challenges for Australia’s climate objectives and would raise considerable international trade law concerns. Consequently, the Review assesses export border carbon adjustment as unsuitable for Australia.

For the remainder of this paper the term ‘border carbon adjustment’ will be used to refer only to an import-based border carbon adjustment mechanism.

### Economic effects of a border carbon adjustment

A border carbon adjustment, properly designed and implemented, provides equivalent policy treatment for embedded emissions for production within the implementing country and imports.

As a result, the risk of carbon leakage – relocation purely because of policy differences – is fully addressed. A border carbon adjustment can mean greater confidence for investment in low or zero emissions production, including both improvements to existing facilities and new investments. This is because the risk of being undercut by high emissions imports that do not face emissions costs is removed.

The objective of a border carbon adjustment should be to create a level playing field between domestic and foreign producers. The objective should not be protection of domestic industries. Overseas producers may be able to produce specific commodities at equal or lower emissions intensity more cheaply or be able to compete successfully on the basis of lower production costs that outweigh carbon costs on higher emissions. Although it is not the primary purpose, a border carbon adjustment would create incentives for producers in other countries to monitor emissions of production and potentially to invest in low emissions facilities to enhance export competitiveness.

If a border carbon adjustment is implemented, it reduces the need to allocate a particular share of emissions allowances to limit the exposure to carbon leakage risk. In the context of Australia’s Safeguard Mechanism, a border carbon adjustment would in principle allow removal of TEBA provisions and more rapid baseline reduction rates in the future would also be possible.

*Carbon cost pass through*

A border carbon adjustment allows companies to reflect the costs of complying with emissions constraints in their product prices, which is not possible when domestic companies compete in tradable commodity markets with imports that are not subject to climate policy measures. This carbon cost pass through allows producers of clean products to obtain a market premium for their products. Low emissions production benefits from product price uplift while paying lower or no carbon costs, which supports investment in decarbonisation.

Relative prices will change. Low emissions commodities will tend to become cheaper relative to high emissions commodities, creating incentives for downstream industries and end users to substitute towards lower emissions options. In construction, for example, this will tend to result in greater use of low emissions alternatives and greater material efficiency in the use of high emissions products.

The same effect applies to exports if other countries introduce border carbon adjustments, which would facilitate a market premium for low emissions products in that country. This improves competitiveness of low emissions production in exporting countries including Australia.

The effects of a border carbon adjustment mechanism would be largely confined to the specific industrial sectors where it would be implemented, and even in those sectors the effects would generally be gradual and limited. The low level of projected carbon costs relative to product prices for most of the products reviewed in **Chapter 2** indicates this. In the long-term, impacts on market prices are limited by the production costs of low or zero emissions processes and alternatives. In either time horizon, effects on the economy overall would be small, while serving the broader national policy objectives of net zero emissions and investment in zero emissions industries.

These economic effects are illustrated quantitatively in modelling, using an integrated modelling framework combining sectoral, domestic and global models (see **Chapter 4**). The modelling shows the introduction of border carbon adjustments for selected commodities will have: no material impact on Australia’s macroeconomy; minor changes in trade flows; and some changes in the source countries of specific exports to Australia, which are minor relative to overall trade.

*Resource shuffling*

Border carbon adjustments create incentives for imports to be sourced from lower emissions facilities. Where this results in the shifting of trade patterns, with pre-existing cleaner production directed towards jurisdictions that have a border carbon adjustment in place, and no change in overseas investment or operation towards cleaner production, this is termed ‘resource shuffling’. Resource shuffling is likely to be greater in easily substitutable commodities or production pathways and for commodities where there are relatively large differences in emissions intensity of production between different facilities in exporting countries. Resource shuffling may occur both between facilities within an exporting country, or between exporting countries.

It is not possible to estimate the likely extent of resource shuffling that might occur in exports to Australia as a result of a border carbon adjustment, because of lack of comprehensive and reliable data for facility-specific emissions intensities overseas, and lack of data about opportunity for and costs of redirecting imported commodities in specific supply chains.

Resource shuffling would be expected to be less pronounced over time as baselines in the Safeguard Mechanism decline and to the extent that emissions policy ambition rises in exporting countries.

**Box 3 - Resource shuffling example**

There are two facilities producing a commodity overseas. One facility was built recently and has integrated technology to reduce energy loss and emissions. It produces the commodity at an emissions intensity of 0.75 tonnes CO2-e/tonne. The second facility is older and produces the commodity at an emissions intensity of 0.90 tonnes CO2-e/tonne. Both facilities export the commodity to Australia.

Australia introduces a border carbon adjustment that references the average emissions intensity baseline of Australian commodity producers (0.80 tonnes CO2-e/tonne). In response, only the new, modern facility exports to Australia.

Over time, emissions intensity baselines under the Safeguard Mechanism for the commodity reduce to 0.6 tonnes CO2-e/tonne. All things being equal, the new facility is likely to continue to send more commodity from than the higher emissions facility but, in the absence of further investment in emission reduction technology, would face a border carbon adjustment liability.

### Sectoral application

**Preliminary findings for consultation**

Cement and clinker would be suitable for initial consideration for a border carbon adjustment. Lime would also be suitable for early consideration, however production coverage under the Safeguard Mechanism is only partial and would need to be carefully considered to align with the international trade law principle of non-discrimination between domestic products and imports.

Based on current analysis, ammonia and derivatives, and steel, as well as glass would be worth further policy consideration and could be candidates for a border carbon adjustment later.

A border carbon adjustment would most suitably be implemented in a phased approach, starting with commodities at relatively high risk of carbon leakage and for which implementation is likely to be simplest.

Should a border carbon adjustment be pursued, coverage of commodities could be expanded over time where the suitability criteria are met, as experiences accrue and reliable emissions monitoring is expanded. Further stakeholder consultation would need to be undertaken before the addition of other commodities.

The Review’s consideration of the suitability of a border carbon adjustment has been informed by a commodity-by-commodity analysis, with regard to:

* the extent of carbon leakage risk facing the sector without additional policies
* the practical feasibility of a border carbon adjustment for the sector, accounting for sector-specific considerations (e.g. simplicity or complexity of calculating embedded emissions, traceability of commodities through supply chains, etc.)
* the share of domestic production subject to Safeguard obligations
* other existing policies that may affect carbon leakage risk assessment or the suitability of a border carbon adjustment.

Stakeholders typically supported a commodity-specific and staged approach to implementation, prioritising commodities with simple supply chains and manufacturing processes, such as cement and lime, compared to more complex commodities such as steel.

The Review has assessed the commodities that analysis showed as subject to carbon leakage risk in **Chapter 2**. **Chapter 2** also includes a commodity-by-commodity discussion relating to commodity complexity, domestic Safeguard coverage and other key domestic considerations.

The Review’s findings are set out in the next section and summarised in Table 5 below.

**3.4.1 Commodities recommended for border carbon adjustment consideration**

*Cement, clinker, and lime*

Estimates of potential trade leakage due to imports for cement, clinker and lime were found to be amongst the highest for all commodities, and these sectors may be subject to high risk of investment leakage (see **Chapter 2**).

These commodities are relatively homogenous and supply chains are typically not complex.

They have effective proxy measurements for emissions that may facilitate emission measurement and verification for the purposes of a border carbon adjustment.

A border carbon adjustment for cement, clinker and lime would address carbon leakage risk for the long-term and could potentially help facilitate private investments in lower emissions production facilities in Australia.

Traceability of goods may present an issue in limited circumstances as these commodities are relatively homogenous. Further development of international climate accounting systems in response to international carbon leakage measures would minimise this issue.

A particular complexity exists for lime domestic production, as the Safeguard Mechanism covers only around three quarters of total Australian production. This may present a barrier to implementing a border carbon adjustment mechanism for lime (see **Section 3.4.2**).

*Ammonia and derivatives*

Ammonia and related products are overall assessed as having moderate leakage risk through the trade channel, except urea where the risk is assessed as high. Investment leakage risk may be pronounced with regard to emerging low and zero emissions production routes that will compete with traditional high emissions production.

Ammonia and derivatives are relatively homogenous products. Ammonia and its downstream products can be produced from low or zero emissions hydrogen, and ammonia as an energy carrier is a transportation pathway for renewable hydrogen. Australia’s renewable energy export strategy is in significant part predicated on production of renewable hydrogen, with production of ammonia and related products a key use for renewable hydrogen.

A border carbon adjustment for the ammonia group of products could help create durable preconditions for the emergence of a green ammonia industry in Australia, by creating a market premium for low emissions products and applying an equivalent emissions liability on imports of emissions intensive (grey) product.

There is considerable work being undertaken on international standards and verification schemes for ammonia.

The government is working through the IEA and the International Partnership for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells in the Economy on developing a mutual recognition framework for hydrogen as part of the [COP28 Declaration of Intent](https://www.cop28.com/en/cop28-uae-declaration-on-hydrogen-and-derivatives). This work is intended to identify core design elements for hydrogen certification schemes.

This would be complementary to support for green ammonia and other derivatives of green hydrogen through the Future Made in Australia policy, aimed to support the growth a new green ammonia market segment, alongside the decarbonisation of conventional ammonia.

*Steel*

In domestic markets, estimates for potential trade leakage for steel appears to be modest while export leakage risk appears more material, especially for crude and treated flat steel. Industry views investment leakage as a material risk in the medium-term as Safeguard baselines decline.

Industry stakeholders also highlighted the risk of indirect leakage through downstream commodities, given imports are estimated to make up half of Australia’s true total steel consumption.

Steel is characterised by complex and varied production structures, involving low and high emissions production processes, and trade and substitutability of intermediate products. Australia both exports and imports steel. Accounting for embedded emissions in imports would likely pose particular challenges. These complexities have been highlighted by industry stakeholders with several submissions urging caution on introducing a border carbon adjustment without careful consideration of how to navigate such complexities.

*A CBAM for steel needs to be carefully designed and introduced cautiously. Any CBAM involves many complex and untested design choices. The choices for steel are particularly complex because steelmaking uses a large variety of processes that create a wide range of products. The risk of doing irreversible damage is very high – a poorly designed CBAM would make iron and steelmaking in Australia unviable.* - **Bluescope**

In the Review’s assessment, a border carbon adjustment for steel may be appropriate in the medium-term. However, this would need careful weighing up and would benefit from experiences with the implementation of the EU CBAM on steel, and the design and implementation of any Australian border carbon adjustment on other commodities.

There are several international standards and verification schemes being developed.[[98]](#footnote-99) Further development of international standards and verification schemes for emissions measurement would be beneficial before a border carbon adjustment was implemented.

*Glass*

In domestic markets, potential import leakage risk appears to be modest for glass containers and flat glass. Analysis also shows that investment leakage is a high risk for glass manufacturers.

Industry consultation suggests leakage risks are a concern, including with regard to investment in low emissions facilities.

A border carbon adjustment may be appropriate for glass production at a future stage, subject to further consideration.

Coverage by the Safeguard Mechanism comprises one facility each for flat and container glass, representing all flat glass and less than half of all glass container production. The partial coverage of the glass container industry may present a barrier to implementing a border carbon adjustment and would need to be carefully considered (see **Section 3.4.2)**.

**Table 5: Feasibility Assessment for border carbon adjustment**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Commodities** | **Commodity specific considerations** | **Domestic Safeguard coverage** | **Other domestic considerations** | **International considerations** |
| **Candidate for earlier BCA based on elevated carbon leakage risk** | | | | |
| Clinker | Relatively homogenous. | 100% | None. | Relatively good emissions data and proxies.  Supply chains are generally not complex, although traceability may be an issue. |
| Cement | Relatively homogenous. | 100% | None. | Relatively good emissions data and proxies.  Supply chains are generally not complex, although traceability may be an issue. |
| Lime | Relatively homogenous. | 74% | None. | Relatively good emissions data and proxies.  Supply chains are generally not complex, although traceability may be an issue. |
| **Potential future candidate for BCA based on carbon leakage risk** | | | | |
| Ammonia and derivatives | Relatively homogenous. | 100% | Possible interactions with government investment programs. | International standards and verification schemes being developed.  Traceability an issue, but there are synergies with GO work. |
| Steel | Primary and secondary production methods that entail different emissions intensities.  Multiple types of steel products. | 100% | Potential for downstream leakage risk through a diverse range of products. | International standards being developed.  Traceability an issue, possibly exacerbated by complexity of supply chains. |
| Glass | Some complexity in product differentiation, although relatively homogenous production processes. | 100% flat | Relatively small volume of production may make alternative policy interventions more proportionate. | Limited work towards international standards. |
| 44% container |

**3.4.2 Safeguard Mechanism thresholds**

The Safeguard Mechanism applies to facilities that emit more than 100,000 tonnes CO2-e in a year.

To align with the international trade law principle of non-discrimination between domestic products and imports, the Safeguard Mechanism’s coverage of domestic production needs to be carefully considered when assessing what imports could be covered by a border carbon adjustment. Particular consideration would be needed for commodities where the Safeguard Mechanism coverage does not cover all domestic production, such as glass and lime.

The Review’s calculation of domestic production coverage for import-exposed commodities is set out in Table 2.

One design option for these commodities would be to consider reducing the Safeguard Mechanism threshold for domestic coverage from the existing annual threshold of scope 1 emissions of 100,000 tonnes CO2-e to a level that covers all production for commodities with a border carbon adjustment. There would be separate implications of any reduction in the Safeguard Mechanism threshold which would need to be carefully considered.

Another design option would be to require importers to certify that imported products had come from a facility emitting more than 100,000 tonnes CO2-e a year. There are challenges with implementing such a requirement, such as independent verification in location, international trade law considerations, and the risk that it would cause resource shuffling and changes to business arrangements solely for the purpose of meeting these requirements, without associated emissions reductions.

### Design considerations

**Preliminary findings for consultation**

A border carbon adjustment would need to mirror key provisions of the Safeguard Mechanism. Should a border carbon adjustment be pursued, a border carbon liability could be applied to emissions in exceedance of the Safeguard Mechanism baselines and to the extent that the assessed effective carbon price paid in the originating country is lower than in Australia. This assessment would be based on explicit emissions prices only.

The basis for emissions assessment should be the same as the Safeguard Mechanism, covering only scope 1 emissions and all relevant greenhouse gases.

Further consideration would be needed before a border carbon adjustment is applied to a commodity with less than 100% Safeguard Mechanism coverage of domestic production.

A border carbon adjustment for a particular sector would remove the policy basis for TEBA provisions for that sector.

A border carbon adjustment may generate revenue. Stakeholders have suggested that in addition to offsetting the costs of implementation of the policy, funds could also be provided to programs to support implementation and industrial decarbonisation objectives in trade partner developing countries.

Should the government decide to pursue a border carbon adjustment, detailed design and implementation would need to be considered and consulted on. Consultation would need to encompass both domestic stakeholders and trading partner countries.

The key principle of a border carbon adjustment is to mirror domestic policy settings for imported goods. As such, the provisions of the Safeguard Mechanism would be the starting point for designing the core elements of a border carbon adjustment, including emissions covered and calculating a liability.

Engagement with domestic stakeholders and international partners has affirmed the importance of the compliance of any measure with international law, particularly WTO law. International partners encouraged Australia to consider a design, if it pursued a border carbon adjustment, that was non-discriminatory, had low transaction and compliance costs, and supported an open and fair trading system.

Several specific issues were raised, including the importance of protecting confidentiality of trade secrets for importers, ensuring small and medium enterprises could comply and ensuring that any measure was applied fairly to domestic and foreign producers. These issues and other ideas raised by partners have been carefully considered in developing this Consultation Paper and should be further considered and consulted on, should the government decide to pursue a border carbon adjustment.

*Based on our experience, we acknowledge the potential for carbon border adjustments to reduce carbon leakage, however full regional coordination would be needed for a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) to be effective, particularly given the role that Australia plays in the regional supply chain and price sensitivity of customers for some Australian exports, including alumina and aluminium. -* ***Rio Tinto***

**3.5.1 Emissions scope**

To align with the Safeguard Mechanism, a border carbon adjustment would apply to imports based on the scope 1 emissions from the manufacture of products, for all greenhouse gas emissions covered by the Safeguard Mechanism. Scope 2 and 3 emissions would not be included as these emissions are not covered by the Safeguard Mechanism.[[99]](#footnote-100) In comparison, both the EU CBAM and proposed UK CBAM include scope 2 emissions because the electricity sector is covered by their respective emissions trading schemes.

For commodities where intermediate inputs are also covered by the Safeguard Mechanism, such as clinker into cement or ammonia into ammonium nitrate, the extent of emissions included in a border carbon adjustment would be equivalent to the coverage under the Safeguard Mechanism.

Transport emissions from shipping commodities to Australia would not be included. Transport emissions outside of site boundaries are not included under the Safeguard Mechanism. In addition, international transport emissions are difficult to account for and attribute to specific products shipped. Work is being undertaken by the International Maritime Organisation on a multilateral approach to levying greenhouse gas emissions from international shipping.[[100]](#footnote-101)

**3.5.2 Calculating the border carbon adjustment**

Should government decide to pursue a border carbon adjustment, to mirror the Safeguard Mechanism, an Australian border carbon adjustment should only apply a liability on emissions above the applicable Safeguard Mechanism production variable baseline, and deducting any carbon costs already incurred in the producing jurisdiction.[[101]](#footnote-102)

Safeguard Mechanism baselines effectively provide a portion of ‘free allocation’ of the right to emit to covered facilities, which would be mirrored on imports.

The Safeguard Mechanism baseline emission intensity per commodity (production variable) is set out in the Safeguard Mechanism Rules.[[102]](#footnote-103) Baselines are currently transitioning from facility-specific emissions intensity baselines to industry average defaults by 2030.

Baselines for the border carbon adjustment would have to account for the different domestic baseline arrangements, including any adjustments if TEBA was phased out rather than removed immediately, and different arrangements for any new entrants.

For further consideration of issues relating to the calculation of a potential border carbon adjustment should government decide to pursue a border carbon adjustment, see the Appendix.

**3.5.3 Revenue from a border carbon adjustment**

A border carbon adjustment may result in revenue collected by government if it partially or fully adopts a fee model instead of, or as well as an ACCU surrender model. The amount of revenue is difficult to predict because of lack of specific data on emissions intensities of imports and because a border carbon adjustment may result in importation from lower emissions facilities (see **Section 3.3**) and because future emissions credit prices and differences to effective prices paid in exporting countries are unknown.

However, it is likely that the amount of border revenue will be small relative to the overall value of imported products, just as the financial emissions obligation under the Safeguard Mechanism is small relative to the value of Australian production of these commodities.

With regard to any border carbon adjustment revenue, the government would need to fund the costs of implementing the program. Additional funding could go to support other policy priorities, including decarbonisation programs.

As part of the Review’s engagement, both domestic and international stakeholders have raised that in conjunction with the introduction of a BCA, funding for technical assistance and capacity building programs to assist developing countries could be increased, in particular to establish systems for monitoring, verification and reporting emissions intensity of production. It could also support programs to support clean industry transition in developing countries to advance shared climate objectives.

**3.5.4 Safeguard TEBA arrangements**

Facilities covered by the Safeguard Mechanism can apply to become TEBA facilities if they meet a particular cost impact metric based on Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (for manufacturing sectors) or revenue (for non-manufacturing sectors). The facility must demonstrate the cost impact, including engaging an independent auditor, before they become eligible.

Because a border carbon adjustment for a particular commodity would ensure that imports would receive equivalent policy treatment as domestic production, this would remove the policy basis for TEBA for producers of that commodity. TEBA allocation could therefore be removed or phased out. This is in line with the EU approach of phasing in the CBAM alongside the phase out of free allocations under the ETS.

Furthermore, if a border carbon adjustment is introduced, then the number of facilities that qualify for TEBA should lower significantly since a border carbon adjustment allows pass through of carbon costs.

Some industry submissions proposed that TEBA arrangements should be retained, even with the introduction of a border carbon adjustment, to provide an ultimate back stop to prevent leakage risk for any facility still facing particularly high costs.

If the facilities have a higher cost base because they remain more carbon intensive than their competitors, the only remaining basis for supporting such a facility would be reasons other than differential climate policy. Such a policy would therefore be best delivered through an approach outside the Safeguard Mechanism’s TEBA arrangements.

Retaining or phasing out TEBA with a border carbon adjustment would create complexity in determining the relevant border carbon adjustment liability. Given the intention to equalise costs across domestic production and imports, any TEBA allocation would need to be reflected in the liability calculation. This calculation would be particularly complex if different facilities producing a commodity received different adjustments under TEBA.

The retention of TEBA with a border carbon adjustment raises international trade law concerns, particularly regarding the principle of non-discrimination.

Retaining TEBA for sectors with a border carbon adjustment would also continue the limits on emissions reduction contribution from those sectors.

Overall, the Review sees merit in the potential to remove or phase out TEBA for sectors where a border carbon adjustment is introduced. Implementation of the TEBA removal could take a phased approach, in line with or following introduction of a border carbon adjustment.

## Modelling a border carbon adjustment for Australia

|  |
| --- |
| **Preliminary findings for consultation**  The Review used a variety of analytical tools to assess the potential impacts of border carbon adjustments on prices and output.  None of this analysis found material impacts on the macroeconomy.  Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) modelling of a potential border carbon adjustment on cement, clinker, lime, steel, ammonia and ammonia derivatives shows no material impact on aggregate economic activity and negligible changes to imports and exports when compared to current policy settings.  Input-Output analysis indicates that the impact of a border carbon adjustment on downstream activity, such as construction, would be very limited.  The analysis suggests that the maximum price impacts on goods, such as wind farms, house construction and crops like wheat, would also be very small. |

Indicative modelling of a border carbon adjustment was undertaken using an integrated modelling framework that combines sectoral, domestic and global models. Modelling presents an economic assessment of potential policies designed to address carbon leakage. The modelling is focused on a border carbon adjustment in combination with current settings under the Safeguard Mechanism, and a comparison with the option to remove TEBA for sectors covered by a border carbon adjustment. This modelling complements the economic analysis of a border carbon adjustment (see **Section 3.3**).

Modelling has focused on cement, clinker, lime, steel, ammonia and ammonia derivatives to demonstrate the possible economic effects of a border carbon adjustment on multiple sectors. The Review’s preliminary assessment is that these sectors may be suitable for consideration of a border carbon adjustment (see **Section 3.4**). One set of scenarios applies a border carbon adjustment on cement, clinker and lime only, and a second set of scenarios applies the adjustment to all sectors.

Climate policy modelling is highly complex. There are many data sources and assumptions that are used throughout this process. This modelling is illustrative of possible scenarios that could emerge, but each scenario represents only one possible outcome. Therefore, the economic outcomes of these scenarios should not be viewed as predictions or forecasts, but as an illustrative description of a possible future outcome given a potential carbon leakage policy.

Details of the modelling approach and scenarios are contained within the Annex.

### Potential border carbon adjustment scenario options

Two policy options for introducing a potential border carbon adjustment within Australia have been explored to examine how they may address carbon leakage risk in the Australian economy.

Scenario one models the introduction of a border carbon adjustment for imports of steel, cement, clinker, lime, and ammonia including derivatives, with current Safeguard Mechanism arrangements. This option has a minimal impact on the Australian economy.

Scenario two models the option of introducing a border carbon adjustment for imports of steel, cement, clinker, lime, and ammonia including derivatives, in combination with removing TEBA for these sectors. Total Safeguard emissions reductions are held constant to ensure comparability of economic effects.

**4.1.1 Modelling the border carbon adjustment liability**

The modelling uses a stylised representation of how a border carbon adjustment would be implemented. While in practice any border carbon adjustment would be based on facility-level emissions intensity for different producers of goods imported to Australia, the CGE modelling is undertaken at an industry level. This necessarily assumes that there is a representative Safeguard firm in an industry and that its behaviour is identical to that of the rest of the industry. In many industries, Safeguard firms do represent the bulk (or all) of the economic activity.

As discussed in **Section 3.3**, facility-level emissions intensity data is not available for most trading partners. The global CGE model, GTEM, uses industry-level data for each country from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database. This database does not have capability to represent intra-country variation or variation at a facility level. Emissions intensity is represented using GTAP data for each trading partner at the country-level, where available for each sector. Differences between trading partners are illustrated through different assumptions about the effective carbon price applied.

An effective carbon price for Australia is calculated by scaling the projected future ACCU price by the proportion of emissions reductions under the Safeguard Mechanism. This scaling is also applied to international trading partners to account for the effective discount from baselines.[[103]](#footnote-104) These scenarios do not represent forecasts, but are instead illustrative model estimates based on a specific set of assumptions. As such, they are intended to help support an understanding of various potential carbon border adjustment scenarios.

### Potential macroeconomic impacts

The modelled scenarios explored in the Review provide several insights into the potential impact of different options and approaches to implementing a potential border carbon adjustment for selected sectors.

The modelling shows no impact on aggregate economic activity and negligible changes to imports and exports when compared to current policy settings (Table 6). The small increase in Australia’s net CO2-e emissions is due to production remaining in Australia.

**Table 6: Summary of potential macroeconomic impacts in 2030 (% deviation from current policy)**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Scenario 1 – combined sectors | Scenario 2 – combined sectors | Scenario 1 – cement only | Scenario 2 – cement only |
| Real GDP | ˜ | -0.002% | ~ | ˜ |
| Real exports | -0.003% | 0.007% | ~ | 0.001% |
| Real imports | -0.004% | ˜ | ~ | 0.002% |
| CO2-e net emissions | 0.001% | 0.006% | ~ | 0.001% |

Note: ~ The value is smaller than 0.001% and is considered to be zero

The absence of meaningful aggregate economic effects is explained by several factors:

* The cement, steel and ammonia sectors make up a small proportion of Australia’s economic output (total gross value add is less than 1% of GDP in 2021-22[[104]](#footnote-105)). Only a small proportion of Australia’s overall imports are covered by a border carbon adjustment for these sectors in these scenarios (slightly more than 3% of total import value[[105]](#footnote-106)).
* The border carbon adjustment liabilities are expected to be small because some imported goods are subject to emissions reductions requirements in the source country.
* The border carbon adjustment would be reduced to account for the effective price on carbon paid overseas.

The longer-run macroeconomic impact of a border carbon adjustment will depend on future changes in difference in carbon prices between Australia and its trading partners. However, the impact is expected to remain limited given the relatively small share of the sectors potentially covered in total Australian production and imports. Further, any liabilities created from a border carbon adjustment are likely to shrink as more countries strengthen their climate policies.

### Potential industry impacts

Introducing a border carbon adjustment without any adjustments to TEBA is expected to increase output by a very small amount relative to current policy settings, as it redistributes demand towards domestic producers. With TEBA removal (scenario two) the results indicate a small reduction in output reflecting the greater emissions reduction efforts by these sectors in response. This is balanced by small increases in output by other sectors throughout the economy.

Downstream sectors using covered imports as inputs to production may see a small increase in input costs, as the border carbon adjustment raises the price of imported goods, and consequently a moderate contraction in output.

**Table 7: Production output in 2030, by industry (% deviation from current policy)**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Scenario 1 – combined sectors | Scenario 2 – combined sectors | Scenario 1 – cement only | Scenario 2 – cement only |
| Iron and steel​ | 0.029% | -0.578% | -0.001% | 0.014% |
| Basic chemicals​ | 0.056% | 0.034% | ˜ | 0.009% |
| Petrol​ | ˜ | ˜ | ˜ | 0.002% |
| Manufacturing​ | -0.004% | -0.022% | ˜ | -0.003% |
| Cement and lime​ | 0.021% | -0.177% | 0.022% | -0.209% |
| Basic non-ferrous metals​ | -0.002% | 0.072% | ˜ | 0.010% |
| Construction | ˜ | -0.016% | ˜ | -0.005% |
| Crops and livestock | -0.002% | -0.009% | ˜ | -0.002% |
| Combined other sectors | ˜ | -0.004% | ˜ | ˜ |

Note: ~ means the value is smaller than 0.001% and is considered to be zero.

Overall, the impact of a border carbon adjustment on Australian commodity import volumes is broadly consistent across scenarios (with the exception of steel) and is associated with both the size of the adjustment liability rate and its carbon reduction ambition relative to other countries. The effects of the border carbon adjustment are largest for cement, clinker and lime. The size of the effect is similar in both scenarios. Comparison of the cement-only and combined sectors scenarios illustrates some very minor cross-commodity impacts.

**Table 8: Industry import volumes in 2030, by commodity (% deviation from current policy)**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Scenario 1 – combined sectors | Scenario 2 – combined sectors | Scenario 1 – cement only | Scenario 2 – cement only |
| Iron and steel​ | -0.106% | 0.106% | ˜ | -0.017% |
| Basic chemicals​ | -0.155% | -0.170% | ˜ | -0.004% |
| Petrol​ | ˜ | -0.004% | ˜ | 0.001% |
| Manufacturing​ | 0.003% | 0.009% | ˜ | 0.003% |
| Cement and lime​ | -0.458% | 0.005% | -0.462% | 0.140% |
| Basic non-ferrous metals​ | ˜ | -0.031% | ˜ | -0.004% |
| Construction | 0.004% | 0.014% | ˜ | 0.019% |
| Crops and livestock | 0.001% | -0.008% | ˜ | 0.002% |
| Combined other sectors | 0.001% | -0.002% | ˜ | 0.003% |

Note: ~ means the value is smaller than 0.001% and is considered to be zero.

### Potential effects on Australia’s trade partners

The estimated macroeconomic effect of a border carbon adjustment on Australia’s trading partners is negligible.

The modelling indicates that trade flows shift for covered commodities to some extent between countries. The aggregate impact on trade is negligible in the cement-only scenario, with only very minor effects in the combined sector scenario. The modelling indicates no measurable impact on overall economic activity in trading partners. Small changes in trade with Australia are reflected in reallocation of production and trade.

**Table 9: Real import volumes in 2030, aggregated by region (% deviation from current policy)**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Regional average | Scenario 1 – combined sectors | Scenario 2 – combined sectors | Scenario 1 – cement only | Scenario 2 – cement only |
| North East Asia | 0.021% | 0.019% | 0.001% | 0.004% |
| Rest of the World | -0.021% | -0.011% | ˜ | 0.003% |
| South and Southeast Asia | -0.024% | -0.022% | -0.006% | -0.009% |

Note: ~ means the value is smaller than 0.001% and is considered to be zero.

### Impacts of a border carbon adjustment on downstream industry and final commodity prices

Should any border carbon adjustment mechanism be pursued, impacts on downstream commodities or final goods that contain substantial amounts of intermediate inputs would need to be considered. Stakeholders have raised concerns that these final goods are also at risk of carbon leakage, if they are not also covered by a border carbon adjustment based on production variables. This would only occur if the primary commodity was covered by a border carbon adjustment, thus facilitating carbon cost pass through to products in Australia.

For example, in the steel sector the Safeguard Mechanism specifies production variables such as flat and long steel, but does not include production variables for further processed commodities such as pipes, mesh and fabricated sheet steel. If there was a border carbon adjustment on steel, then fabricators that make these commodities domestically would face increased costs due to cost pass through but would not receive the benefit of a border carbon adjustment unless imports of similar manufactured goods (such as pipes, etc. in this example) were also covered.

A decision whether to implement a border carbon adjustment to downstream and processed products would require further analysis, as well as analysis about compatibility with WTO rules.


**4.5.1 Potential downstream impact assessment – at industry level**

Downstream impacts on other sectors can be considered through Input-Output model assessment, which provides information on the contribution of the imported goods to the existing economy, as well as linkages between sectors. The model can be used to identify sectors that could be the most exposed to price uplift because of a border carbon adjustment on imports of cement, steel and ammonia and therefore would most likely adjust pricing in response.

Figure 6 shows the percentage of production that is associated with imports of Safeguard commodities, including the contribution of cement, steel and ammonia. The production processes for each sector also take in a variety of inputs sourced from other industry sectors (that is, the indirect contribution of imports to economic activity), in addition to direct imports of covered goods. This captures flow on effects of price effects from intermediary products as well as direct imports.

Imports of cement, steel and ammonia constituted 2.7% of total goods imported in 2021-22 (up from 1.9% in 2020-21).[[106]](#footnote-107) These imports were associated (directly and indirectly) with 0.18% of GDP, equivalent to A$4.2 billion in value added.

Figure 6 shows that for the construction services industry, imports of steel, cement and ammonia through both direct and indirect channels accounted for 1.26% of the sector’s industry value added, equivalent to A$1.1 billion in 2021-22.



**Figure 6: Contribution of imports of cement, steel and ammonia as a percentage of total industry production value for FY2021-22.[[107]](#footnote-108)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Box 4 - Potential downstream impact assessment – by example goods**  A border carbon adjustment allows carbon costs to be reflected in product prices, because both domestic producers and imports are covered by carbon liabilities. Without it, domestic producers are constrained in their ability to reflect their carbon costs in product prices.[[108]](#footnote-109)  This price uplift on competing imports is what provides a market premium to low emissions producers and can make production of low emissions goods commercially viable even if production costs were higher. It could also encourage substitution in demand to alternative products that are low or zero emissions in production and thus experience lower or no price uplift.  For example, a carbon border adjustment on cement and precursor products would tend to result in somewhat higher cement and concrete prices, as high emissions products would reflect their carbon costs in market prices. This would provide market opportunities for low emissions cement and concrete, and make it more attractive to use alternative materials.  The effect on product prices is noted in several submissions received in response to the Review’s first consultation paper, both with regard to the housing sector[[109]](#footnote-110) and to infrastructure projects including in energy supply.[[110]](#footnote-111)  However, the magnitude of potential price impacts is small, and is likely to be readily absorbed in the economy and in overall cost structures of specifically impacted sectors.[[111]](#footnote-112)  Table 10 shows the price uplift enabled by a potential border carbon adjustment for cement, steel and ammonia-based fertilisers based on the sectoral analysis in **Chapter 2**, and assuming full carbon cost pass through to consumers. While these are the carbon costs per commodity, the contribution to final cost of goods is therefore significantly smaller (as shown in Table 11).  **Table 10: Price uplift potential for selected commodities if covered by a potential border carbon adjustment in 2030**   |  |  | | --- | --- | | Commodity | Carbon cost as a share of product prices, per year[[112]](#footnote-113) | | Concrete | 0.1 to 0.2% | | Flat steel | 0.1 to 0.4% | | Ammonium nitrate fertiliser | 0.1 to 0.4% |     The materiality of price uplift on downstream sectors was assessed using typical prices for housing, wheat (fertiliser), and wind farm construction. These estimates indicate a theoretical price impact of below 0.1% per year (see **Table 11**). These examples assume full cost pass through from the producers to the final goods. They also do not factor in a shift to lower emissions production practices, such as cement using a higher share of supplementary cementitious materials. They also assume no substitution from Safeguard-covered commodities to lower emissions alternatives – for example, increased use of wood in housing construction.  Actual direct price impacts are likely lower that those estimated due to the simplified assumptions used in the analysis.  **Table 11: Example price uplift for downstream commodities based on covered inputs**   |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | | Commodity | Estimated covered inputs | Total carbon cost as a share of total price, per year[[113]](#footnote-114) | | Residential house (floor area 230 m2)[[114]](#footnote-115) | 42 m3 concrete  2.5 tonnes steel | 0.00 - 0.01% of an average $473,000 construction price | | Wind farm construction  (110 MW)[[115]](#footnote-116) | 20,900 m3 concrete  13,200 tonnes steel | 0.01 - 0.03% of an indicative $215 million 100 MW wind farm price | | Wheat (tonne)[[116]](#footnote-117) | 0.116 tonnes ammonium nitrate fertiliser | 0.04 - 0.11% of an average $435 tonne of wheat | |

## Mandatory emissions product standards

**Preliminary findings for consultation**

While mandatory emissions product standards can be suitable for other policy objectives, they are not likely to be an effective policy intervention to address carbon leakage risk.

Mandatory emissions product standards are a form of mandatory product standards or regulations that would set an upper limit on the emissions intensity of products, including imported products, that can be sold in the Australian market.

In its simplest form, a mandatory emissions product standard would make it unlawful for products that do not meet an emissions intensity standard to be sold in Australia. This would include imposing a fine or other legal penalties for goods that exceed the standard and are still sold in Australia.

A mandatory emissions product standard could have similar administrative processes, design decisions, and administrative and compliance costs as a border carbon adjustment. This includes an assessment of emissions intensity of production in originating countries, a reporting and verification system, and a system for checking and applying the standard at the border. These would all carry similar costs to government and business as a border carbon adjustment as outlined in the preceding chapter.

The same international trade law principles that must be considered in relation to a border carbon adjustment are also relevant to a mandatory emissions product standard, especially non-discrimination. A mandatory emissions product standard that restricted the sale of non-compliant imports would also need to prevent non-compliant domestically produced commodities from being sold in the local market.

As such, a mandatory emissions product standard would have to be set by reference a new domestic policy to prevent the sale of goods that exceed the relevant standard.

This would be a new regulation in addition to the Safeguard Mechanism and would create considerable complexity and reduce flexibility.

For domestic producers, the Safeguard Mechanism is designed to be flexible and provide facilities lowest cost options to reduce their emissions over time.

A border carbon adjustment would mirror that flexibility to the treatment of imports. Compared to a mandatory product standard, a well-designed border carbon adjustment could provide a higher degree of flexibility and would not carry the risk of goods becoming ineligible for entry into the Australian market at a future point in time.

For a mandatory emissions product standard to be suitable to address carbon leakage risk, there would need to be a situation where particular high emissions intensity production methods or practices would undercut production that is subject to carbon obligations, and where suitable thresholds for product standards can be reliably identified. Consideration and consultation through the course of the Review has not identified such an instance.

There was little support for, and considerable concern about, mandatory emissions product standards expressed by business stakeholders in submissions and other consultations. The primary concern was that mandatory emissions product standards would be a blunt tool with a high possibility of unintended and detrimental consequences.

For example, there are several cement product standards that set a minimum percentage of clinker in accordance with the performance standard required for its application. A mandatory emissions product standard relating to cement would have to account for each of these standards or risk making it unlawful to import cement that meets a particular performance standard.

Some stakeholders were also concerned about the impact of a mandatory emissions product standard on downstream users and broader economic outcomes due to the risk of preventing import of critical commodities.

*By nature, these are blunt mechanisms that are not sensitive to varying amounts of embedded carbon. This means that there is little incentive to exceed the minimum requirements of the standard, which could stifle innovation.* – **Cement Industry Federation**

*Product emission standards are unlikely to adequately address the risk of carbon leakage, given the significant risk of non-conformance and spurious conformance claims.* – **Chemistry Australia**

*[E]missions product standards are a much blunter instrument because they create a binary threshold for what products can be sold and do not provide incentives to reduce emissions further below the standard, especially for hard to abate sectors such as iron and steel. If product standards impacted Australian manufactured product, these industries might well immediately cease to be viable, and Australia would lose sovereign capacity.* – **Bluescope**

Some stakeholders were supportive of the possibility of emission product standards that would follow future international standards, several of which are being negotiated or discussed in multilateral forums. In the steel industry, standards for evaluating emissions intensity already exist or are under development, such as ISO 14404, ISO 20915 and the Worldsteel Benchmarking Systems. However, these measurement standards do not specify normative thresholds or target levels for emissions intensities.[[117]](#footnote-118) There have also been collaborative, industry-led initiatives to set product and site-level decarbonisation standards such as ResponsibleSteel. None of these standards have been formally adopted as part of any multilateral forums.

The suitability of future international standards as a tool to address carbon leakage would depend on the standard itself and its application to Australia’s specific carbon leakage risks.

Product standards, including emissions product standards, can be effective policy tools where an established maximum emissions intensity can be efficiently determined and legislated. For example, the *Product Emissions Standards Act 2017* (PESA) sets emissions standards for outdoor power equipment and marine engines. The PESA standard can be satisfied using certification from established standards in the EU, United States and Canada. These standards are established, well-understood in the market and already widely used by manufacturers.

More generally and beyond the objective of curbing carbon leakage risk, product standards, both mandatory and voluntary, may have roles to play as part of overall future industrial decarbonisation strategies and to help Australia’s net zero objectives. A number of submissions expressed support for the creation of voluntary standards that estimate and declare the emissions intensity of different materials and commodities for the purposes of meeting possible future mandated government procurement guidelines, or green ‘star’ labelling. Such standards could help achieve a market premium for low emissions intensity commodities in Australian markets. However, they would not directly address carbon leakage concerns.

## Multilateral and plurilateral initiatives

**Preliminary findings for consultation**

Given Australia’s strong stake in the international rules-based system, policy responses to address carbon leakage risks should advance and support the international system.

Enhanced global climate action would reduce carbon leakage, but divergences in ambition and policy approaches will persist in the medium-term.

An internationally agreed solution to address carbon leakage risk developed through multilateral and plurilateral initiatives would be ideal, but is uncertain and would take time to develop. Possible long-term international solutions will not replace the near- and medium-term need for domestic policy action.

Multilateral and plurilateral initiatives could support the implementation of border carbon adjustments through the development of interoperable standards and approaches, for example development of agreed default emissions intensities or standards to measure embedded emissions.

Australia’s active engagement in these initiatives would support the development of best practice policy to address carbon leakage. Enhanced engagement is an opportunity for Australia to contribute positively to international policy development.

The Review has assessed the role of multilateral and plurilateral initiatives to both address carbon leakage and to support the implementation of policy approaches to reduce leakage risk in an internationally cohesive and effective manner.

Australia is an active participant in international discussions and initiatives that are considering carbon leakage, including the Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches and the Climate Club (see **Box 5**).

Active engagement in relevant multilateral and plurilateral initiatives will support the development of policy responses to carbon leakage in a way that advances Australia’s interests in the rules-based system and can help develop international policy innovations. Discussions on these issues are underway in a variety of bodies, including the UNFCCC, the WTO, the OECD and the G7 Climate Club.

**Box 5 - Australia’s engagement in multilateral and plurilateral initiatives**

Australia is an active participant in initiatives focused on carbon leakage. Australia participates in the Climate Club[[118]](#footnote-119) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches[[119]](#footnote-120). Australia is also a member of the Coalition of Trade Ministers for Climate[[120]](#footnote-121) and is actively involved in discussions on the nexus of trade and climate, including carbon leakage at the WTO through the Committee on Trade and Environment and the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions.[[121]](#footnote-122) In each of these bodies, Australia advocates for greater transparency and enhanced cooperation on carbon leakage.

Australia is a proponent of the international rules-based system, including the global climate and trade regimes. International cooperation underpinned by this system is critical for a peaceful, stable and prosperous world. This system has been a foundation of Australia’s economic and social development. The international rules-based system has a crucial role to play with the challenge of climate change sharpening and as international trade patterns become more complex.

### Enhanced global climate ambition

International cooperation is essential to encourage the ambitious cooperative responses needed to address climate change. Such action has an important role to support industrial decarbonisation by, for example, assisting the spread of advanced decarbonisation technology, enabling access to finance and promoting harmonised regulatory approaches, and enabling coordinated and effective policy responses.

Enhanced and converging global climate action would reduce the risk of carbon leakage. This would be the most desirable outcome from a climate and trade perspective. Ongoing encouragement for enhanced ambition, including as part of Australia’s existing climate diplomacy, could help to address carbon leakage in the longer-term. In the short- to medium-term, divergence of climate ambition will persist and domestic policy approaches will continue to differ given differing national circumstances, preferences and objectives. Carbon leakage risks will remain whilst this divergence continues.

### International solutions developed through multilateral and plurilateral initiatives

Internationally agreed solutions developed through multilateral and plurilateral initiatives to address carbon leakage risks would be ideal. For example, internationally agreed standards and approaches for border carbon adjustments. These types of solutions could support policy effectiveness and efficiency, minimise transaction costs, balance different national perspectives and reduce tensions between different jurisdictions based on different perspectives of unilateral measures.

Efforts underway in existing bodies, for example at the WTO, the OECD and the Climate Club are building some momentum towards these goals. Sectoral or narrower plurilateral cooperative efforts could also lead to effective and efficient solutions and are inherently less complex than initiatives with a wider sectoral scope or broader participation. An example of these types of agreements is the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium, currently under negotiation between the US and the EU.

The initiatives focused on carbon leakage are at an early stage. This presents an opportunity for Australia to contribute to positive international policy innovation in a manner that supports the international system and can encourage the benefits of harmonious policy responses.

As more countries adopt or strengthen climate policies covering industrial production, including through market instruments, carbon leakage policy is likely to become a more prominent feature of multilateral and plurilateral discussions.

Building consensus or broad-based agreement on international solutions to address carbon leakage will take time. Whilst some of these initiatives underway are prospective for future cooperation, in the short to medium-term they will not replace the need for domestic action to address carbon leakage risk**.**

### Multilateral and plurilateral cooperation to support domestic policy implementation

Multilateral and plurilateral initiatives could play a more immediate role by contributing to the development of commonly accepted and interoperable policy approaches that could support effective and efficient implementation of domestic policies, particularly border carbon adjustments.

Multilateral and plurilateral initiatives, such as the Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches and Climate Club, are advancing several streams of work that could contribute practically to the implementation of interoperable and more harmonised border carbon adjustments. In particular, efforts towards common emissions accounting standards, agreed default emissions intensities and to independently assess the effect or equivalence of different carbon pricing policies could contribute significantly to better border carbon adjustment policies.

Discussions underway at the WTO (at the Committee on Trade and Environment and under the working group on trade-related climate measures of the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions) have focused on the need for greater interoperability and coherence of measures, including on emissions measurement and verification.

International and domestic work on a sustainable finance taxonomy may also present opportunities when developing domestic carbon leakage policies. In November 2023, the Australian Treasury published the Sustainable Finance Strategy consultation paper, which among other issues suggests improving transparency on climate and sustainability through access to credible, accurate and actionable information. The strategy proposes continued support of the development of consistent global standards and a scaled-up focus on bilateral and regional mechanisms to promote knowledge sharing, capability development and interoperability.

The Review has indicated how a border carbon adjustment in Australia’s context could rely on such tools in the Appendix (Box 7*).* Generally speaking, any Australian border carbon adjustment would rely on internationally agreed standards and guidelines, where relevant and appropriate.

Using multilaterally and plurilaterally developed tools or assessments by plurilateral initiatives to support implementation of a border carbon adjustment can reduce international policy divergence and fragmentation, minimise transaction costs, create business certainty, enhance policy effectiveness and contribute to the development of best practice.

Given Australia’s interests in this carbon leakage policy, there could be value in deepening collaboration with like-minded trade and climate partners. The Climate Club and the Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches represent some of the most advanced discussions and are suitable forums where collaboration could occur. This work could also be advanced in other multilateral architectures, such as the WTO and the UNFCCC, or regional groupings such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum or the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, or through small groups or under bilateral dialogues, such as the Australia-United States Climate, Critical Minerals and Clean Energy Transformation Compact. The work could also take place in new bodies. For example, there could be utility in creating a new initiative of like-minded countries focused on developing common and interoperable approaches to measure and reduce embedded emissions in traded commodities.

## Acronyms

| ABS | Australian Bureau of Statistics |
| --- | --- |
| ACCU | Australian Carbon Credit Unit |
| ARENA | Australian Renewable Energy Agency |
| BCA | Border carbon adjustment |
| BLADE | (ABS) Business Longitudinal Analysis Data Environment |
| CBAM | Carbon border adjustment mechanism |
| COP | (UNFCCC) Conference of Parties |
| CCUS | Carbon capture, utilisation and storage |
| CGE | Computational General Equilibrium |
| CPI | Consumer price index |
| DFAT | Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade |
| ETS | Emissions trading scheme |
| EU | European Union |
| EV | Electric vehicle |
| GDP | Gross domestic product |
| GTAP | Global Trade Analysis Project database |
| IEA | International Energy Agency |
| IFCMA | Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| IPCC | Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change |
| ISO | International Organisation for Standardisation |
| LNG | Liquified natural gas |
| NGER | National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Scheme |
| NGO | Non-government organisation |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| PESA | Product Emissions Standards Act 2017 |
| SMC | Safeguard Mechanism Credits |
| TEBA | Trade Exposed Baseline Adjusted |
| UNFCCC | United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change |
| WTO | World Trade Organisation |



## Appendix: Design considerations for a border carbon adjustment

This appendix provides further consideration of detailed design issues related to any Australian border carbon adjustment, including calculation of the adjustment and key administrative aspects.

**Calculation of a border carbon adjustment**

Calculation of a border carbon liability that approximates Safeguard Mechanism provisions can be described as comprising the following three steps.

**Step 1:** Assess whether and by how much the imported commodity’s emissions intensity exceeds the relevant Safeguard baseline (’Assessed excess emissions intensity’). A diagram of a factory

Description automatically generated  
**Step 2:** Determine the ’equivalent carbon cost’ that applies per tonne of imported products. This is the assessed excess emissions intensity multiplied by the relevant Australian unit price (credit price).   
**Step 3:** Any carbon costs incurred in the producing jurisdiction or in transit to Australia are then deducted, to result in the border carbon liability.

A liability arises only if there is a positive assessed excess emissions intensity, and if the carbon cost already incurred is lower than the equivalent emissions obligation.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Step 1: Emissions intensity of imports** | **Step 2 and 3: Foreign jurisdiction carbon cost compared to Australian equivalent carbon cost** | | |
|  | Lower than Australia | Equal or higher than Australia |
| Higher than Safeguard benchmark | Liability applies | No liability |
| Lower than Safeguard benchmark | No liability | No liability |

**Figure 7: Illustration of when a border carbon adjustment liability applies.**

**Box 6 – Examples of the potential border carbon adjustment calculation**

**Example 1: A commodity with an emissions intensity higher than the baseline and some carbon costs already incurred in the production jurisdiction.**

A company produces a commodity with an emissions intensity of 1.1 tCO2-e/t. They have incurred a carbon cost of $2/tCO2-e on all scope 1 emissions associated with production, so $2.20/t of commodity.

The relevant Australian unit price at time of importation is $50/tCO2-e and the baseline emissions intensity for the commodity is 1.0 tCO2-e/t.

**Step 1: Calculate the assessed excess emissions intensity**

1.1 tCO2-e/t – 1.0 tCO2-e/t = 0.10 tCO2-e/t

**Step 2: Calculate the Australian equivalent carbon cost**

0.10 tCO2-e/t x $50/tCO2-e = $5/t

**Step 3: Calculate the border carbon adjustment liability**

$5/t - $2.20/t = $2.80/t

The importer incurs a border carbon adjustment liability of $2.80 per tonne of commodity.

**Example 2: A commodity with an emissions intensity higher than the Australian baseline and higher carbon costs in the production jurisdiction.**

A company produces a commodity with an emissions intensity of 1.0 tCO2-e/t of commodity. They have a domestic carbon price of $100/tCO2-e with 75% free allocations on a production basis, equating to an effective carbon cost of $25/t of commodity.

The relevant Australian unit price at time of importation is $50/tCO2-e and the baseline emissions intensity for the commodity is 0.90 tCO2-e/t.

**Step 1: Calculate the assessed excess emissions intensity**

1.0 tCO2-e/t – 0.90 tCO2-e /t = 0.10 tCO2-e/t

**Step 2: Calculate the Australian equivalent carbon cost**

0.10 tCO2-e/t x $50/tCO2-e = $5/t

**Step 3: Calculate the border carbon adjustment liability**

1.0 tCO2-e/t x $100/tCO2-e x 25% (free allocations) = $25/t paid in production jurisdiction.

$5/t - $25/t = -$20

Because the carbon cost already incurred exceeds the Australian equivalent carbon cost, the importer will not incur a border carbon adjustment liability.

**Example 3: A commodity with a lower emissions intensity than the Australian baseline and no carbon costs already incurred in the production jurisdiction.**

A company produces a commodity with an emissions intensity of 0.85 tCO2-e/t of commodity. They have incurred no carbon costs prior to importation.

The relevant Australian unit price at time of importation is $50/tCO2-e and the baseline emissions intensity for the commodity is 0.90 tCO2-e/t.

**Step 1: Calculate the assessed excess emissions intensity**

0.85 tCO2-e/t – 0.90 tCO2-e/t = -0.05 tCO2-e/t

Because the emissions intensity of the imported commodity is less than the Australian baseline, the importer will not incur a border carbon adjustment liability.

*Step 1 – Emissions intensity calculation*

For the border carbon adjustment liability to be calculated, importers will need to account, report and be able to verify their emissions in a manner suitable to Australian frameworks.

In principle, Australia would be confident in emissions accounting that follows international rules and standards, uses approaches developed in the context of other countries’ border carbon adjustments (e.g., reporting for the EU and UK CBAMs), and is measured in line with IPCC methodological guidelines.

Further discussion of emissions reporting, verification and the importance of default values is included in the **Administrative considerations** **section** below.

*Step 2 – Relevant Australian unit price*

Specific provisions for determining relevant Australian unit price levels would be left for a detailed design process.

Discussion of the administrative considerations in setting a relevant Australian unit price are included in next section below.

*Step 3 – Recognising carbon costs paid*

Carbon costs paid in the country of production or in transit would need to be recognised and subtracted from any border carbon adjustment in Australia.

Foreign carbon costs could be assessed by a relevant authority according to established methods, and ultimately could be drawn from international standard measures, for example if developed in the future under a body such as the Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches.

The proposed border carbon adjustment would be based on the effective price paid.[[122]](#footnote-123) This would recognise price-based instruments, such as taxes or emissions trading schemes.

It is not proposed that implicit carbon costs (encompassing non-price-based policies, rebates, subsidies, or other compensations) would be considered until such a time as there are internationally agreed methods to price non-pricing-based policies.[[123]](#footnote-124)

However, under the proposed approach it would not be necessary for other jurisdictions to have in place explicit carbon pricing. If the emissions intensity of imports is lower as a result of policies that impact producers’ emissions, the importer would have that lower emission intensity accounted for in Step 1.

**Administrative considerations**

**Emissions accounting, reporting, and verification**

*Reporting and verification*

Should a border carbon adjustment be pursued, emissions reporting requirements would need to balance the needs of regulators to administer a border carbon adjustment and any producer confidentiality issues. Reporting directly to government may ease confidentiality concerns. The administrative burden of reporting is a key consideration, particularly for micro and small to medium-sized enterprises. Detailed design of a border carbon adjustment would need to carefully consider these matters in close consultation with both domestic stakeholders and trading partner countries. The design should minimise administrative burden as far as possible and ensure that procedures are non-discriminatory and do not constitute an obstacle to trade consistent with international trade laws and obligations.

Independent verification will be required to validate production emissions. Independent verification by internationally recognised accrediting bodies could be desirable, whether via international organisations such as the International Accreditation Forum, or in a network of intergovernmental arrangements.

National inventory data is produced in line with Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Guidelines. The minimum (Tier 1) standards estimate energy and process emissions through the IPCC default emissions factors. This approach is lower cost than direct measurement (Tier 3) of emissions at the facility-level.[[124]](#footnote-125) For countries that do not have extensive measurement and reporting, obtaining accurate facility or process-level emissions data may be challenging for some industries or incur significant costs to producers.

*It is important that agreements that are struck between trade partners that have carbon border adjustment policies, and those that are considering them, streamline the process for trade of emissions intensive and emissions free products. Customers must have confidence in the integrity of the product they are purchasing through the use of government programs like the Australian Guarantee of Origin product scheme. The interoperability of these schemes across jurisdictions is key to maintaining consumer confidence and accurate emissions accounting across the life cycle of a product. –* ***Fortescue***

*Emissions intensity default values*

Allowing importers to rely on appropriate default values reduces compliance and transaction costs where importers do not have accurate data, or where it is too costly to produce and verify. Default values can also assist importing businesses by providing a certain reference point for emissions intensity. A default standard that is also accepted in other contexts removes the need to comply with multiple standards further reducing compliance and transaction costs.

Default values can be developed on a by-country basis or by-production pathway basis or using global weighted averages. The EU CBAM is proposing to set both by-country and by-product default values and the proposed UK CBAM will determine by-product default values using global average embodied emissions weighted by production volumes of key UK trading partners.

Default values could be set to incentivise emissions monitoring and reporting by setting generally high default emissions intensity values for a particular product. Such an approach tends to penalise low emissions producers that are unable to meet emissions measurement requirements or face particularly high costs for emissions measurement. Alternatively, default emissions intensity values could be set to approximately reflect actual emissions, for example by setting default values based on specific production circumstances on a by-country basis. If default values tend to be very close to, or below, actual emissions, this reduces the incentive to report actual emissions. Conversely, default values that tend to be well above actual emissions intensities will tend to strongly incentivise reporting actual emissions, even if this is costly.

Setting default values appropriately therefore means to avoid underestimating emissions intensities whilst maintaining an incentive to report emissions where reporting is not overly costly. A system that allowed reporting of actual emissions and the use of default values that approximate actual emissions intensity would be desirable.

**Box 7 - Role of the OECD Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches and the Climate Club**

Work is underway at the Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches (IFCMA) related to the calculation of sector- and product-level emissions intensities, including the move to interoperable and harmonised methodologies. This could lead to a commonly accepted set of default emissions intensity values, which could be used in the calculation of any border carbon adjustment charge. Such a standard would avoid the need to make specific determinations for an Australian border carbon adjustment, could reduce transaction and compliance costs, and could promote interoperability between border carbon adjustments in different countries.

Similar efforts underway in the Climate Club to investigate approaches to address carbon leakage and to build a common understanding of comparable and interoperable emissions computation standards with a focus on the cement and steel sectors could help create international standards for the measurement of emissions intensity. Such an approach would avoid unnecessary costs associated with divergent compliance and separate verification requirements.

The IFCMA’s work to build transparency and a deeper understanding of different jurisdictions’ approaches to carbon pricing policy also has potential for arriving at agreed methods for assessing effective carbon pricing that applies to traded commodities produced in specific countries. Relying on an international or plurilaterally agreed assessment of the domestic policy efforts would reduce compliance costs and enhance predictability, and improve overall acceptability of border carbon adjustments.

**Setting Australian reference unit price**

If a border carbon adjustment is implemented through a fee-based system (see below), then it will be necessary to set a reference price that represents the Australian relevant unit price. This price could be drawn from recent averages of the headline ACCU price, for example using the Safeguard Mechanism’s Default Prescribed Unit Price which is to be published in June of each financial year. Alternatively, a shorter-term rolling average of market prices could be applied.

Consideration could be given to acquitting obligations on an aggregate basis across shipments from facilities within the same corporate group, over some period of time (for example quarterly). This would allow shipments with emissions intensity below the baseline to offset emissions intensity obligations from shipments above baselines, within defined temporal and ownership boundaries.

Importers would not receive SMCs for emissions intensities below the Safeguard baseline. SMCs are generated within a regulated emissions limit which restricts the overall emissions of all Safeguard facilities. This ensures SMCs have integrity under the Safeguard Mechanism as a tradeable credit, facilitating abatement wherever it is most cost-effective to do so. These policy objectives and settings could not be mirrored in a border carbon adjustment.

**Paying for border carbon adjustment liability**

Paying the border carbon adjustment liability could involve either:

* paying a fee calculated by reference to the relevant Australian unit price, either at the border or reconciled later, and/or
* purchasing and surrendering ACCUs.

Payment of a fee would be administratively simpler and provide greater predictability of liabilities as the fee would be set for a defined period of time and published, providing certainty to importers.

Surrendering ACCUs would more closely reflect domestic requirements, but trading in ACCUs has legislative requirements that would have to be met by importers which would require careful consideration. It is possible that ACCUs could be wholly secured and surrendered domestically by the importer, but importers need to consider the administrative or practical burden this option may impose. The ACCU purchase option would create additional demand in the Australian credit market, raising the prices prevailing in emissions credit markets. The abatement associated with any ACCUs surrendered would contribute to the achievement of Australia’s emissions reduction targets.

In principle, importers could acquit the liability by paying a fee or surrendering ACCUs. On balance, the Review’s preliminary finding suggests that payment of a fee on imports may be the preferable option. It would also be theoretically possible to provide importers the choice of either a fee or surrendering ACCUs.

**Customs administration and costs of the border carbon adjustment**

A border carbon adjustment would have administrative costs to government and compliance costs to business. The level of cost would depend on design and could include:

* *Government administrative costs:* including checking and verifying declarations of emissions, calculating and collecting border carbon adjustment liability, compliance checks, record keeping and reporting.
* *Compliance costs to business:* including meeting emissions verification requirements, engaging with government to report emissions and any carbon price already paid, and training and hiring employees to comply with border carbon adjustment requirements, or the cost of engaging professional services to do so. Australian producers already face these compliance costs through NGER scheme and the Safeguard Mechanism.

*Government administrative costs*

Should a border carbon adjustment be pursued, the government would face both establishment and ongoing costs. Establishment costs would include personnel and ICT system costs.

The main ongoing government administrative cost would be staffing. Staffing costs would be higher during the design and implementation stage of applying a border carbon adjustment to a commodity and would then reduce during the monitoring and compliance stage. Final staffing costs would depend on design decisions and the extent to which processes can be automated and streamlined. Ongoing arrangements could be cost recovered.

*Compliance costs*

The costs associated with any border carbon adjustment would be directly related with the complexity of the compliance process. Any border carbon adjustment mechanism should be designed to minimise administrative burden and costs arising to businesses from processes to comply.

To ensure that compliance costs are commensurate with the value of the import, it is likely that a minimum annual threshold would be set before an importer would become liable for a border carbon adjustment liability. This would align with the proposed UK CBAM approach.[[125]](#footnote-126)

Several stakeholders expressed the need for any border carbon adjustment mechanism to minimise compliance cost for business.

*The design of a CBAM should aim to minimise the costs of emissions accounting and compliance, recognising the complexity of accounting for emissions across what may be complex supply chains. –* ***Business Council of Australia***

*While addressing any unique Australian circumstances is important, ideally Australia will apply common international approaches in order to minimise compliance costs and ease trade. –* ***Ai Group***

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6. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report for the 6th Assessment Report. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. World Bank 2024: State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2024, available [here](https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/b0d66765-299c-4fb8-921f-61f6bb979087). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. Media release, March 2023, available [here](https://minister.dcceew.gov.au/bowen/media-releases/safeguard-mechanism-one-step-closer-parliamentary-passage). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. Information on the Review including the previous consultation paper and Terms of Reference is available [here](https://www.dcceew.gov.au/climate-change/emissions-reduction/review-carbon-leakage). [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. Public submissions have been [published on the Consultation Hub](https://consult.dcceew.gov.au/consultation-proposed-approach-carbon-leakage-risk-as-part-of-the-carbon-leakage-review/take-the-survey-014179ff/list). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. Speech, 11 April 2024, available [here](https://www.pm.gov.au/media/future-made-australia). [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. Future Made in Australia - National Interest Framework, Treasury, May 2024, available [here](https://treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2024-05/p2024-526942-fmia-nif.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. Budget Measures Budget Paper No.2, The Commonwealth of Australia, May 2024, available [here](https://budget.gov.au/content/bp2/download/bp2_2024-25.pdf). Media Release, May 2024, available [here](https://minister.dcceew.gov.au/bowen/media-releases/delivering-reliable-and-renewable-future-made-australia). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. Trade-exposed commodities are those listed in Schedule 2 of the *National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting (Safeguard Mechanism) Rule 2015*, available [here](https://www.legislation.gov.au/F2015L01637/latest/text). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. For example, iron ore pellets, coke oven coke and lime (integrated iron and steel manufacturing) production variables are regarded as part of the steel commodity group and were not analysed separately. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. Data sourced from UN Comtrade. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. Default (industry average) emissions intensity values are used as a proxy for emissions intensity levels in 2022. Baseline emissions intensities in 2030 for each good are calculated by averaging ‘baseline components’ for each facility and production variable corresponding to that good. Further details are described in the annex. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. In the case of onsite abatement, this reflects an economically rational assumption that onsite abatement is undertaken when abatement costs are equal to or cheaper than the cost of ACCUs. In practice, there may be other reasons why firms choose to undertake onsite abatement in preference to purchasing ACCUs. The equation does not take into account any likely reductions in emissions intensity due to onsite abatement that is greater than the reduction in baselines between 2022 and 2030. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. This approach to estimating carbon costs is the same as the approach taken for the ‘carbon costs as a share of commodity prices’ indicator. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. Availability of consistent and reliable emissions intensity data for foreign production is limited or not available for many commodities. Where data was available, differences in emissions intensities between Australian and foreign commodities appeared to have modest impacts on leakage estimates, compared to other factors. As such, the simplifying assumption of equal emissions intensities for Australian and foreign commodities was considered appropriate and sufficient in the context of an approach that seeks to generate illustrative insights rather than accurate forecasts. This assumption also means leakage estimates generated are solely due to differences in climate policy stringency across jurisdictions and exclusive of other non-leakage factors such as differences in emissions intensities. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. Australia’s total emissions in 2023 was 465 Mt CO2-e. Data available [here](https://www.dcceew.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/australias-emissions-projections-2023.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. Import and production data are in volumetric units, and presented as ranges to ensure confidentiality of underlying data. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. Import elasticity. N/A indicates when a useable trade sensitivity estimate could not be obtained. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. Reduction in production of goods covered by the Safeguard Mechanism due to 2030 carbon cost substitution effects with imports, expressed as a percentage of Safeguard-covered production. Rounded to the nearest per cent given the range of plausible values for key input parameters. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. Under the Safeguard Mechanism, the production variable for crude steel (steel in its first solid state upon leaving a furnace) is described as ‘primary steel’. Primary steel also refers to steel made from iron ore, rather than scrap. To avoid confusion, this paper uses ‘primary steel’ to mean steel made from iron ore, and ‘crude steel’ for the primary steel Safeguard production variable. N/A indicates when a meaningful estimate could not be produced. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. Export and production data are in volumetric units. Results are presented as ranges because some underlying Safeguard data is confidential and given the range of plausible values for key parameters. For some commodities marked with an asterisk, the ratio may exceed 1.0 for various reasons, including because Safeguard production is less than total domestic production for some commodities. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. Export elasticity. N/A indicates when a useable trade sensitivity estimate could not be obtained. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
28. Reduction in exports of goods covered by the Safeguard Mechanism due to 2030 carbon cost substitution effects for exports, expressed as a percentage of Safeguard-covered production. Rounded to the nearest per cent. N/A indicates when a meaningful estimate could not be produced. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
29. Commodities with imports relative to Safeguard production below 0.02 are excluded. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
30. Commodities with exports relative to Safeguard production below 0.02 are excluded. For some commodities, exports relative to Safeguard production may exceed 1.0 for various reasons, including because Safeguard production is less than total domestic production for some commodities. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
31. Centre for Policy Development, 2023, Green Gold: A strategy to kickstart Australia’s renewable industry future, available [here](https://cpd.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/20230925-Green-gold-Report__.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
32. Fournier Gabela, J. G. and Freund, F., 2023, Potential carbon leakage risk: a cross‑sector cross‑country assessment in the OECD area, *Climatic Change*, available [here](https://rdcu.be/dJuTE). [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
33. Based on integrated NGER scheme emissions data and ABS BLADE economic activity data. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
34. See Cement Industry Federation data [here](http://cement.org.au/australias-cement-industry/about-cement/australias-cement-industry). [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
35. Based on default emissions intensity values for these commodities under the Safeguard Mechanism. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
36. See [Cement Industry Federation](http://cement.org.au/sustainability/climate-change/). [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
37. Presentation, 2023, [Cement Industry Federation](http://cement.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Decarbonisastion_Pathways_Australian_Lime_Sector.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
38. Based on the default emissions intensity value under the Safeguard Mechanism. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
39. Resources for the Future, 2022, Greenhouse Gas Index for Products in 39 Industrial Sectors, available [here](https://media.rff.org/documents/WP_22-16_M10.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
40. Some of this ammonia is used as inputs for other commodities, such as ammonium nitrate. Australian Industry Energy Transition Initiative, 2023, Pathways to industrial decarbonisation, available [here](https://energytransitionsinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Pathways-to-Industrial-Decarbonisation-report-Updated-August-2023-Australian-Industry-ETI.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
41. Construction of Perdaman Chemicals and Fertilisers’ urea plant begins, 2023, available [here](https://www.worldfertilizer.com/project-news/10052023/construction-of-perdaman-chemicals-fertilisers-urea-plant-begins/). [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
42. Future Made in Australia - National Interest Framework, Treasury, May 2024, available [here](https://treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2024-05/p2024-526942-fmia-nif.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
43. Imports relative to Safeguard production for urea is based on production data prior to the closure of the sole domestic urea producer at the end of 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
44. Exports relative to Safeguard production for urea may increase in future as new urea production capacity comes online. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
45. International Energy Agency, Ammonia Technology Roadmap, available [here](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/6ee41bb9-8e81-4b64-8701-2acc064ff6e4/AmmoniaTechnologyRoadmap.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
46. Australian Industry Energy Transition Initiative, 2023, Pathways to industrial decarbonisation, available [here](https://energytransitionsinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Pathways-to-Industrial-Decarbonisation-report-Updated-August-2023-Australian-Industry-ETI.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
47. Orica Media release, available [here](https://www.orica.com/news-media/2021/orica-partners-with-government-to-reduce-kooragang-island-site-ghg-emissions-by-48). [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
48. The analysis for ammonia and urea includes Perdaman’s new facility in the Pilbara which is due to commence in 2027. In the specific case of these commodities, this is considered the correct representation of expected domestic production capacity in 2030. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
49. Spherical Insights, data available [here](https://www.sphericalinsights.com/reports/green-ammonia-market) [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
50. Yara International media release, available [here](https://www.yara.com/corporate-releases/yara-and-acme-signed-a-binding-agreement-for-supply-of-green-ammonia/) [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
51. Includes secondary and primary steel, data available from World Steel [here](https://worldsteel.org/steel-topics/statistics/annual-production-steel-data). [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
52. Primary steel generally refers to steel made from iron ore (as opposed to scrap). Under the Safeguard Mechanism, the production variable for crude steel (steel in its first solid state upon leaving a furnace) is described as ‘primary steel’. To avoid confusion, this paper uses ‘primary steel’ to mean steel made from iron ore, and ‘crude steel’ for the primary steel Safeguard production variable. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
53. BloombergNEF, available [here](https://about.bnef.com/blog/green-steel-demand-is-rising-faster-than-production-can-ramp-up/). [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
54. Resources and Energy Quarterly, December 2023, available [here](https://www.industry.gov.au/publications/resources-and-energy-quarterly-december-2023). [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
55. In ABS data, the country sources of steel imports are not disclosed for a significant portion of overall imports. The Review used UN Comtrade data (including data on foreign steel exports to Australia) to help address this data gap. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
56. Based on default emissions intensity values for these commodities under the Safeguard Mechanism. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
57. Depending on whether natural gas or renewable hydrogen is used for DRI. BCG, 2022, available [here](https://www.bcg.com/publications/2022/forging-a-path-to-green-steel). [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
58. Based on industry submissions. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
59. These estimates use illustrative price assumptions for flat glass drawn from different sources, which may be considered further during the consultation period. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
60. See [Australian Aluminium Council](https://aluminium.org.au/australian-industry/australian-aluminium-industry/). [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
61. The Strategic Materials List identifies minerals where Australia has geological potential for resources, that are important for the economy and national security, and that are in demand by strategic international partners. Minerals on this list have supply chains that are currently not vulnerable enough to be included on the Critical Minerals List, available [here](https://www.industry.gov.au/publications/australias-critical-minerals-list-and-strategic-materials-list). [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
62. Fastmarkets, available [here](https://www.fastmarkets.com/insights/low-carbon-aluminium-demand-expected-to-grow-exponentially-by-2030-mckinsey-says/). [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
63. Based on the default emissions intensity value under the Safeguard Mechanism. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
64. Australian value based on the default emissions intensity under the Safeguard Mechanism. Global value based on data for perfluorocarbon and process emissions is from the International Aluminium Institute, available [here](https://international-aluminium.org/statistics/greenhouse-gas-emissions-intensity-primary-aluminium/). [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
65. Based on industry submissions. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
66. There is currently no domestic production of printing and writing paper. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
67. It is recognised that in a scenario of import dependency, Australia’s price elasticity of demand is likely to be inelastic. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
68. The Critical Minerals List identifies minerals where Australia has geological potential for resources, that are essential for the economy and national security, that are in demand from strategic international partners, and are vulnerable to supply chain disruption, available [here](https://www.industry.gov.au/publications/australias-critical-minerals-list-and-strategic-materials-list). [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
69. S&P Global, 2023, Magnesium Oxide and Other Magnesium Chemicals, available [here](https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/ci/products/magnesium-oxide-chemical-economics-handbook.html). [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
70. See [Qenos](https://www.qenos.com/internet/home.nsf/web/OurPlants). [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
71. Resources and Energy Quarterly, March 2024, available [here](https://www.industry.gov.au/sites/default/files/2024-03/resources-and-energy-quarterly-march-2024.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
72. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
73. Future Gas Strategy, 2024, available [here](https://www.industry.gov.au/sites/default/files/2024-05/future-gas-strategy-in-brief.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
74. Production variables covered include wheat protein products (dried gluten), direct wheat starch and wheat based dried distillers grain. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
75. See Manganese Ore, Geoscience Australia, available [here](https://www.ga.gov.au/scientific-topics/minerals/mineral-resources-and-advice/australian-resource-reviews/manganese). [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
76. Budget Measures Budget Paper No.2, The Commonwealth of Australia, May 2024, available [here](https://budget.gov.au/content/bp2/download/bp2_2024-25.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
77. Resources and Energy Quarterly, March 2024, available [here](https://www.industry.gov.au/sites/default/files/2024-03/resources-and-energy-quarterly-march-2024.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
78. Media release, 2021, available [here](https://www.gfgalliance.com/media-release/gfg-alliance-completes-purchase-of-temco/). [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
79. [World Economic Forum](https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/01/chart-countries-produce-lithium-world/). [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
80. Resources and Energy Quarterly, March 2024, available [here](https://www.industry.gov.au/sites/default/files/2024-03/resources-and-energy-quarterly-march-2024.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
81. Future Made in Australia - National Interest Framework, Treasury, May 2024, available [here](https://treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2024-05/p2024-526942-fmia-nif.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
82. [Tianqi Lithium Energy Australia](https://www.tianqilithium.com.au/site/About-Us/tianqi-lithium-global). [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
83. Elasticity was estimated based on spodumene, as historical data for lithium hydroxide was unavailable. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
84. Resources and Energy Quarterly, March 2024, available [here](https://www.industry.gov.au/sites/default/files/2024-03/resources-and-energy-quarterly-march-2024.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
85. This relates to the run-of-mine metal ores production variable under the Safeguard Rule 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
86. Safeguard Mechanism: prescribed production variables and default emissions intensities, available [here](https://www.dcceew.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/safeguard-mechanism-document-production-variable-definitions-2022.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
87. Resources and Energy Quarterly, March 2024, available [here](https://www.industry.gov.au/sites/default/files/2024-03/resources-and-energy-quarterly-march-2024.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
88. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
89. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
90. PVs covered include primary nickel from nickel bearing inputs, primary nickel from imported intermediate nickel products, and intermediate nickel from nickel bearing inputs. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
91. Resources and Energy Quarterly, March 2024, available [here](https://www.industry.gov.au/sites/default/files/2024-03/resources-and-energy-quarterly-march-2024.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
92. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
93. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
94. UK HM Treasury, Factsheet, 18 December 2023, available [here](https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/addressing-carbon-leakage-risk-to-support-decarbonisation/outcome/factsheet-uk-carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism). [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
95. Government of Canada, Exploring Border Carbon Adjustments for Canada, 2021, available [here](https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/programs/consultations/2021/border-carbon-adjustments/exploring-border-carbon-adjustments-canada.html). [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
96. US Government, 16 April 2024, available [here](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2024/04/16/remarks-as-prepared-for-john-podesta-columbia-global-energy-summit/). [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
97. World Trade Institute, The EU Proposal for a CBAM: An analysis under WTO and Climate Change Law, 2022, available [here](https://www.wti.org/media/filer_public/ee/61/ee6171fd-a68d-4829-875e-d9b0c32298b5/wti_working_paper_06_2022.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
98. For example, the World Steel Association has developed a methodology for calculating the emissions intensity of steel using common definitions and boundaries. Further information available [here](https://worldsteel.org/climate-action/climate-action-data-collection/). [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
99. Other policies focus on reducing emissions in the electricity sector including the Powering Australia plan, but these do not impose a liability on domestic producers and therefore could not be included in calculating a border carbon adjustment liability. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
100. International Maritime Organisation, Strategy on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships, 2023, available [here](https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Pages/2023-IMO-Strategy-on-Reduction-of-GHG-Emissions-from-Ships.aspx). [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
101. This may differ from other border carbon adjustments, as it reflects Australia’s specific Safeguard Mechanism settings. If an overseas climate policy provides no right to emit up to a baseline, then a liability would accrue for domestic producers at any emission intensity, which would mean a border carbon adjustment would apply regardless of emission intensity. This is the case under the EU CBAM. [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
102. *National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting (Safeguard Mechanism) Rule 2015,* available [here](https://www.legislation.gov.au/F2015L01637/latest/text). [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
103. International carbon prices are taken from the World Bank Carbon Pricing Database and discounted by the coverage of national emissions reported by the World Bank. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
104. Based on the gross value add sum of Basic chemical manufacturing, Cement, lime and ready-mixed concrete manufacturing, and Iron and steel manufacturing industries in the 2021-22 ABS input output table 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
105. Based on the sum of Basic chemical manufacturing, Cement, lime and ready-mixed concrete manufacturing, and Iron and steel manufacturing industries total value of competing imports in the 2021-22 ABS input output table 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
106. This increase was predominantly driven by steel imports, which accounted for 1.8% industry imports in 2021-22, up from 1.2% in 2020-21. Source: DFAT Input Output Model. [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
107. Source: DFAT Input-Output model. [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
108. Further discussion relating to price impacts is included in the Annex. [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
109. See submission from the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
110. See submissions from the Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia and Bluescope. [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
111. See [Mission Impossible Partnership](https://missionpossiblepartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Making-Net-Zero-Steel-possible.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
112. Price at 2030 assumes emissions intensity of products are constant. Carbon cost estimates assume a 2030 ACCU price consistent with Australia’s emissions projections and no carbon costs in the base price. Commodity prices are based on indicative consumer prices. [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
113. Price at 2030 assumes emissions intensity of products are constant. Carbon cost estimates assume a 2030 ACCU price consistent with Australia’s emissions projections and no carbon costs in the base price. [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
114. Average house area in 2021-22. Data available [here](https://www.abs.gov.au/articles/average-floor-area-new-residential-dwellings). [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
115. Capital cost for a recent 110 MW onshore wind project. Data available [here](https://www.cleanenergycouncil.org.au/resources/project-tracker). [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
116. Assumes wheat price of $435 tonne for 2024-25, data available [here](https://www.agriculture.gov.au/abares/research-topics/agricultural-outlook/wheat#easing-prices-reflect-high-world-supply). Average nitrogen requirement of 40 kg per tonne yield, data available [here](https://agriculture.vic.gov.au/crops-and-horticulture/grains-pulses-and-cereals/growing-grains-pulses-and-cereals/growing-wheat-in-victoria). [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
117. International Energy Agency, International Renewable Energy Agency and UN Climate Change High-Level

     Champions, 2022, *The Breakthrough Agenda Report 2022: Accelerating Sector Transitions Through Stronger International*

     *Collaboration*, available [here](https://www.iea.org/reports/breakthrough-agenda-report-2022). [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
118. See information on the Climate Club [here](https://climate-club.org/). [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
119. See information on IFCMA in Box 7 and [here](https://www.oecd.org/climate-change/inclusive-forum-on-carbon-mitigation-approaches/). [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
120. See information on the Committee on Trade and Environment and the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions [here](https://www.tradeministersonclimate.org/). [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
121. Australia is actively involved in discussions on these issues at the WTO’s Committee on Trade and Environment and the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
122. ‘Effective price paid’ is defined for jurisdictions with an ETS or carbon tax as the explicit carbon price ($ per tonne of CO2-e) faced after taking account of free allocations. In the context of the Safeguard Mechanism, the equivalent ‘effective price paid’ is defined as the carbon compliance costs (per tonne) which arise on emissions above Safeguard regulated baselines, i.e. from ACCU or SMC surrender. ‘Effective price paid’ is distinct from the term ‘carbon cost’ ($ per tonne of good), which is the cost arising from an effective price paid being applied to the emissions intensity of a good, i.e. the carbon costs are simply the (effective) price times the quantity of emissions. [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
123. OECD, 2024, Towards more accurate, timely, and granular product-level carbon intensity metrics: a scoping note, *Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches Papers,* available [here](https://doi.org/10.1787/4de3422f-enhttps:/doi.org/10.1787/4de3422f-en). Note the EU and UK CBAM focus on explicit pricing. [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
124. OECD, 2024, Towards more accurate, timely, and granular product-level carbon intensity metrics: a scoping note, *Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches Papers,* available [here](https://doi.org/10.1787/4de3422f-en). [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
125. UK HM Treasury, 21 March 2024, Introduction of a UK carbon border adjustment mechanism from January 2027, available [here](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65fc11fef1d3a0001132ac6f/Introduction_of_a_UK_carbon_border_adjustment_mechanism_from_January_2027.docx.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-126)