



Cloud Logging, Alerting & Monitoring Framework (CLAM Framework)



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What is Cloud Logging Alerting and Monitoring (CLAM) Framework?

This Framework focuses on the attack vectors and provides prescriptive guidance to customers on what SHOULD be logged, alerted on, and monitored based on a given attack vector.

What is MITRE ATT&CK Framework?

ATT&CK is a powerful way to classify and study adversary techniques and understand their intent. You can use it to enhance, analyze, and test your threat hunting and detection efforts.

MITRE ATT&CK for GCP

Initial Access	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Collection	Exfiltration	Impact
Exploit Public-Facing Application	Account Manipulation	Valid Accounts	Redundant Access	Account Manipulation	Cloud Service Dashboard	Data from Cloud Storage Object	Transfer Data to Cloud Account	Resource Hijacking
Trusted Relationship	Create Account		Revert Cloud Instance	Cloud Instance Metadata API	Cloud Service Discovery	Data from Information Repositories		
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Initial Access - Exploit Public-Facing Application

Data Sources

- Cloud Audit Logs, Security Command Center, Web logs, Web application firewall logs, Application logs

Detection

- Use [Cloud Armor WAF](#) to monitor improper inputs attempting exploitation, such as SQL injection.
- Use [Security Health Analytics \(SHA\)](#) to identify misconfigurations.
- Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation.

Mitigation

- Use [Cloud Armor WAF](#) to block the web's most common attacks.
- Use [Cloud Security Scanner](#) to scan externally facing applications for vulnerabilities and establish procedures to patch applications when critical vulnerabilities are discovered.
- Use [VPC Service Controls](#) to limit access and protect against data exfiltration.
- Use [GKE Sandbox](#) for application isolation.
- Use [Identity Aware Proxy \(IAP\)](#) to control access to cloud applications by verifying user identity and context.
- Use [IAM policies](#) to enforce the principle of least-privilege by limiting dashboard visibility to only the resources required.

Initial Access - Trusted Relationship

Data Sources

- Cloud Audit Logs, Admin activity logs, Application logs, Authentication logs, Third-party application logs

Detection

- Use [Cloud Audit Logs](#) to establish monitoring for activity conducted by second and third party providers and other trusted entities that may be leveraged as a means to gain access to the network.

Mitigation

- Use [VPC Service Controls](#) to isolate infrastructure components that do not require broad network access.
- Perform third-party risk assessments to analyze and control risks presented to your company by parties other than your own company.

Initial Access - Valid Accounts

Data Sources

- Cloud Audit Logs, Authentication logs

Detection

- Use [Event Threat Detection \(ETD\)](#) to monitor Cloud IAM abuse.
- Use [Cloud Anomaly Detection \(CAD\)](#) to monitor service account credentials that are accidentally leaked online or compromised.

Mitigation

- Use [Org Policy](#) to limit who can create service account keys.
- Monitor [Cloud Anomaly Detection](#) for exposed keys.
- Use [VPC Service Controls](#) to protect GCP APIs from arbitrary networks.
- Use [2FA / U2F](#) and require its use.
- [Use a tool](#) that prevents password re-use at the company site.
- [Install password check up](#) on corp browsers.

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Persistence - Account Manipulation

Data Sources

- Cloud Audit Logs, Admin activity, API monitoring, Windows event logs, Packet capture

Detection

- Use [Event Threat Detection \(ETD\)](#) to monitor Cloud IAM abuse.
- Use [Cloud Anomaly Detection \(CAD\)](#) to monitor service account credentials that are accidentally leaked online or compromised.

Mitigation

- Use [Org Policy](#) to limit who can create service accounts.
- Use [2FA / U2F](#) and require its use.

Persistence - Create Account

Data Sources

- Cloud Audit Logs, G Suite, Cloud Identity audit logs, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows event logs

Detection

- Use [Event Threat Detection \(ETD\)](#) to monitor Cloud IAM abuse.
- Use [Cloud Audit Logs](#) to perform regular audits of user and service accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.

Mitigation

- Use [Org Policy](#) to limit who can create service accounts.
- Use [Org Policy](#) to restrict the creation of accounts that are outside of the domain.
- Use [2FA / U2F](#) and require its use.

Persistence - Implant Container Image

Detection

- Use [Cloud Audit Logs](#) to monitor calls that have been made to the Kubernetes API server.

Mitigation

- Use [Container-Optimized OS \(COS\)](#), which is Hardened, purpose-built minimal host OS image based on Chromium OS.
- Use [Binary Authorization](#) for verification of provenance and block deployments that do not meet the requirements.
- Use [Container Registry Vulnerability Scanning](#) to scan images and packages for known CVEs.

Persistence - Redundant Access

Data Sources

- Cloud Audit Logs, Packet capture, Network protocol analysis, File monitoring, Authentication logs

Detection

- Use [Event Threat Detection \(ETD\)](#) to monitor connections to malicious IPs/Domains.
- Use [Packet Mirroring](#) to monitor suspicious network traffic.

Mitigation

- Implement third-party Network Intrusion detection and prevention (IPS/IDS) systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware.

Persistence - Valid Accounts

Data Sources

- Cloud Audit Logs, Authentication logs

Detection

- Use [Event Threat Detection \(ETD\)](#) to monitor Cloud IAM abuse.
- Use [Cloud Anomaly Detection \(CAD\)](#) to monitor service account credentials that are accidentally leaked online or compromised.

Mitigation

- Use [Org Policy](#) to limit who can create service account keys.
- Monitor [Cloud Anomaly Detection](#) for exposed keys.
- Use [VPC Service Controls](#) to protect GCP APIs from arbitrary networks.
- Use [2FA / U2F](#) and require its use.
- [Use a tool](#) that prevents password re-use at the company site.
- [Install password check up](#) on corp browsers.

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Privilege Escalation - Valid Accounts

Data Sources

- Cloud Audit Logs, Authentication logs

Detection

- Use [Event Threat Detection \(ETD\)](#) to monitor Cloud IAM abuse.
- Use [Cloud Anomaly Detection \(CAD\)](#) to monitor service account credentials that are accidentally leaked online or compromised.

Mitigation

- Use [Org Policy](#) to limit who can create service account keys.
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Defense Evasion - Redundant Access

Data Sources

- Cloud Audit Logs, Packet capture, Network protocol analysis, File monitoring, Authentication logs

Detection

- Use [Event Threat Detection \(ETD\)](#) to monitor connections to malicious IPs/Domains

Mitigation

- Implement Network Intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware.

Defense Evasion - Revert Cloud Instance

Data Sources

- Cloud Audit Logs

Detection

- Use [Cloud Audit Logs](#) to monitor resource API calls.

Mitigation

- Use [Org Policy](#) to limit who can use compute and storage resources
- Use [IAM policies](#) to enforce the principle of least-privilege by limiting dashboard visibility to only the resources required.

Defense Evasion - Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions

Data Sources

- Cloud Audit Logs

Detection

- Use [Cloud Audit Logs](#) to monitor system logs to review activities occurring across all cloud environments and regions. Configure alerting to notify of activity in normally unused regions or if the number of instances active in a region goes above a certain threshold.
- Use [CSCC Asset Inventory](#) to monitor all the resources at the organization level

Mitigation

- Use tools like [Forseti](#) and [Chef Inspec](#) to ensuring consistent standards are enforced in every environment, at every stage of development.
- Use [Org Policies](#) to restrict resource location.

Defense Evasion - Valid Accounts

Data Sources

- Cloud Audit Logs, Authentication logs

Detection

- Use [Event Threat Detection \(ETD\)](#) to monitor Cloud IAM abuse.
- Use [Cloud Anomaly Detection \(CAD\)](#) to monitor service account credentials that are accidentally leaked online or compromised.

Mitigation

- Use [Org Policy](#) to limit who can create service account keys.
- Monitor [Cloud Anomaly Detection](#) for exposed keys.
- Use [VPC Service Controls](#) to protect GCP APIs from arbitrary networks.
- Use [2FA / U2F](#) and require its use.
- [Use a tool](#) that prevents password re-use at the company site.
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Credential Access - Account Manipulation

Data Sources

- Cloud Audit Logs, Authentication logs

Detection

- Use [Event Threat Detection \(ETD\)](#) to monitor Cloud IAM abuse.
- Use [Cloud Anomaly Detection \(CAD\)](#) to monitor service account credentials that are accidentally leaked online or compromised.

Mitigation

- Use [Org Policy](#) to limit who can create service account keys.
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Credential Access - Cloud Instance Metadata API

Data Sources

- Cloud Audit Logs, Authentication logs, CLI commands, Powershell, syslogs

Detection

- Monitor access to the Instance Metadata API and look for anomalous queries.
- It may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained. See [Valid Accounts](#) for more information.

Mitigation

- A properly configured Web Application Firewall (WAF) may help prevent external adversaries from exploiting Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks that allow access to the Cloud Instance Metadata API.

Credential Access - Credentials in Files

Data Sources

- CSCC, DLP, Data access logs

Detection

- Use [Cloud Security Command Center \(CSCC\)](#) to monitor [Data Loss Prevention \(DLP\)](#) alerts.

Mitigation

- Use [DLP API](#) to preemptively search for files containing passwords and take actions to reduce the exposure risk when found.
- Conduct user training to ensure that developers and system administrators are aware of the risk associated with having plaintext passwords in software configuration files that may be left on endpoint systems or servers.
- Use [GCP Secrets Manager](#) to encrypt, store, manage, and audit infrastructure and application-level secrets.

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Discover - Cloud Service Dashboard

Data Sources

- Cloud Audit Logs

Detection

- Use [Cloud Audit Logs](#) to monitor account activity logs to see actions performed and activity associated with the cloud service management console.

Mitigation

- [Use 2FA / U2F](#) and require its use.
- Use [IAM policies](#) to enforce the principle of least-privilege by limiting dashboard visibility to only the resources required

Discover - Cloud Service Discovery

Data Sources

- Cloud Audit Logs

Detection

- Use [Cloud Audit Logs](#) to monitor API call made to cloud services for anomalous behavior that may indicate adversarial presence within the environment.

Mitigation

- Use [IAM policies](#) to enforce the principle of least-privilege by limiting dashboard visibility to only the resources required.
- Use [VPC Service Controls](#) to protect GCP APIs from unauthorized access.

Discover - Network Service Scanning

Data Sources

- VPC flow logs, Netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process command-line parameters, Process use of network

Detection

- Use network intrusion detection/prevention systems ([partner solutions](#)) to identify scanning activity. Monitor for process use of the networks and inspect intra-network flows to detect port scans.

Mitigation

- Implement [CIS system hardening](#) benchmark standards to ensure that unnecessary ports and services are closed to prevent risk of discovery and potential exploitation.
- Use [GCP VPC](#) networks to implement proper network segmentation.
- Use network intrusion detection/prevention systems to detect and prevent remote service scans.
- Use [VPC Service Controls](#) to protect GCP APIs from arbitrary networks.

Discover - Network Share Discovery

Data Sources

- VPC flow logs, Netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process command-line parameters, Process use of network

Detection

- Use [Cloud Audit Logs](#) and [data access logs](#) to monitor anomalous access.

Mitigation

- Use [VPC Service Controls](#) to protect GCP APIs from arbitrary networks.

Discover - Remote System Discovery

Data Sources

- Cloud Audit Logs, CLI commands, Powershell, syslogs

Detection

- Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information.

Mitigation

- This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.

Discover - System Information Discovery

Data Sources

- Cloud Audit Logs, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters

Detection

- [Cloud Audit Logs](#) can be used to identify access to certain APIs and dashboards that may contain system information. Depending on how the environment is used, that data alone may not be useful due to benign use during normal operations.

Mitigation

- Use [IAM policies](#) to enforce the principle of least-privilege by limiting dashboard visibility to only the resources required.

Discover - System Network Connections Discovery

Data Sources

- Process command-line parameters (Windows and Linux)

Detection

- Monitor processes and command-line arguments (e.g. netstat, lsof) for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information.

Mitigation

- This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.

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Collection - Data from Cloud Storage Object

Data Sources

- Cloud Audit Logs, CSCC SHA

Detection

- Use [Security Health Analytics \(SHA\)](#) to identify misconfigurations, such as publically accessible storage buckets
- Use [Cloud Audit Logs](#) to monitor data access logs for unusual activity.
- Use [DLP API](#) to identify files with sensitive information in storage buckets

Mitigation

- Use continues compliance tools like [Forseti](#) to enforce security policy on storage buckets.
- [Use VPC service controls](#) to further protect APIs with sensitive data.
- Use [IAM policies](#) to limit user account to the least privileges required.
- [Use Bucket Policy Only](#) to prevent individual ACLs.
- [Use org policy](#) to disallow the creation of public buckets

Collection - Data from Information Repositories

Data Sources

- Cloud Audit Logs, OAuth audit logs, Application logs, Authentication logs, Data loss prevention, Third-party application logs

Detection

- Monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository.

Mitigation

- Consider periodic review of accounts and privileges for critical and sensitive repositories.
- Use [DLP API](#) to preemptively search for files containing passwords and take actions to reduce the exposure risk when found.

Collection - Data from Local System

Data Sources

- File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters.

Detection

- Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system.

Mitigation

- Use hardened OS like COS to limit number of services that can be exploited.
- Enforce Data classification policy to limit storing of sensitive data on local systems.
- Use [OS login](#) to manage SSH access to Linux instances.

Collection - Data Staged

Data Sources

- File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters

Detection

- Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files.

Mitigation

- This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.

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Exfiltration - Transfer Data to Cloud Account

Data Sources

- Cloud Audit Logs, Data Access logs, Authentication logs

Detection

- Use [Cloud Audit Logs](#) to monitor data access logs for unusual activity, monitor for anomalous file transfer activity between accounts and to untrusted VPCs.
- Use DLP API to identify files with sensitive information like service accounts keys and application passwords.

Mitigation

- Use [DLP API](#) to preemptively search for files containing passwords and take actions to reduce the exposure risk when found.
- [Use VPC service controls](#) to further protect APIs with sensitive data.
- Use [IAM policies](#) to limit user account to the least privileges required.

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Impact - Resource Hijacking

Data Sources

- Cloud Audit Logs, Process use of network, Process monitoring, Network protocol analysis, Network device logs

Detection

- Use [Event Threat Detection \(ETD\)](#) to monitor crypto hijacking.
- Use [Cloud Anomaly Detection \(CAD\)](#) to monitor abuse of cloud resources.

Mitigation

- Use [Cloud Functions](#) to auto-remediate affected resources.