

# The CAST-256 Encryption Algorithm

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CAST-256 is a symmetric cipher designed in accordance with the CAST design procedure as outlined in [A97]. It is an extension of the CAST-128 cipher and has been submitted as a candidate for NIST's Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) effort -- see [http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/aes\\_home.htm](http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/aes_home.htm) for details.

This document contains several sections of the CAST-256 AES Submission Package delivered to NIST on June 9<sup>th</sup>, 1998. All complete submissions received by NIST will be made public in late August at the First AES Candidate Conference, but the following material is being made available now so that public analysis of the CAST-256 algorithm may begin (see, for example, <http://www.ii.uib.no/~larsr/aes.html> for the current status of submitted algorithms).

Many thanks are due to those who worked with me in the (long, challenging, frustrating, and very enjoyable!) design and analysis phases that ultimately led to the detailed specification given below: Howard Heys (Memorial University); Stafford Tavares (Queen's University); and Michael Wiener (Entrust Technologies). As well, many thanks are due to the two who did the various implementations on a variety of platforms (Reference C, Optimized C, Optimized Java, and even M6811 Assembler): Serge Mister and Ian Clysdale (both of Entrust Technologies).

- [A97] C. Adams, "Constructing Symmetric Ciphers Using the CAST Design Procedure", in *Selected Areas in Cryptography*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997, pp.71-104 (reprinted from *Designs, Codes and Cryptography*, vol. 12, no. 3, November 1997).

# CAST-256

## Algorithm Specification

### 1. Algorithm Specification

#### *1.1 CAST-128 Notation*

The following notation from CAST-128 [A97b, A97c] is relevant to CAST-256.

- CAST-128 uses a pair of subkeys per round: a 5-bit quantity  $k_{r_i}$  is used as a “rotation” key for round  $i$  and a 32-bit quantity  $k_{m_i}$  is used as a “masking” key for round  $i$ .
- Three different round functions are used in CAST-128. The rounds are as follows (where  $D$  is the data input to the operation,  $I_a$  -  $I_d$  are the most significant byte through least significant byte of  $I$ , respectively,  $S_i$  is the  $i^{\text{th}}$  s-box (see following page for s-box definitions), and  $O$  is the output of the operation). Note that  $+$  and  $-$  are addition and subtraction modulo  $2^{32}$ ,  $\oplus$  is bitwise eXclusive-OR, and  $\lrcorner$  is the circular left-shift operation.

Type 1:

$$I = ((k_{m_i} + D) \lrcorner k_{r_i})$$
$$O = ((S_1[I_a] \oplus S_2[I_b]) - S_3[I_c]) + S_4[I_d]$$

Type 2:

$$I = ((k_{m_i} \oplus D) \lrcorner k_{r_i})$$
$$O = ((S_1[I_a] - S_2[I_b]) + S_3[I_c]) \oplus S_4[I_d]$$

Type 3:

$$I = ((k_{m_i} - D) \lrcorner k_{r_i})$$
$$O = ((S_1[I_a] + S_2[I_b]) \oplus S_3[I_c]) - S_4[I_d]$$

Let  $f_1, f_2, f_3$  be keyed round function operations of Types 1, 2, and 3 (respectively) above.

## CAST-128 Notation (cont'd)

- CAST-128 uses four round function substitution boxes (s-boxes),  $S_1$  -  $S_4$ . These are defined as follows (entries (written in hexadecimal notation) are to be read left-to-right, top-to-bottom).

### S-Box $S_1$

30fb40d4	9fa0ff0b	6beccd2f	3f258c7a	1e213f2f	9c004dd3	6003e540	cf9fc949
bfd4af27	88bbdbb5	e2034090	98d09675	6e63a0e0	15c361d2	c2e7661d	22d4ff8e
28683b6f	c07fd059	ff2379c8	775f50e2	43c340d3	df2f8656	887ca41a	a2d2bd2d
a1c9e0d6	346c4819	61b76d87	22540f2f	2abe32e1	aa54166b	22568e3a	a2d341d0
66db40c8	a784392f	004dff2f	2db9d2de	97943fac	4a97c1d8	527644b7	b5f437a7
b82cbaef	d751d159	6ff7f0ed	5a097a1f	827b68d0	90ecf52e	22b0c054	bc8e5935
4b6d2f7f	50bb64a2	d2664910	bee5812d	b7332290	e93b159f	b48ee411	4bfff345d
fd45c240	ad31973f	c4f6d02e	55fc8165	d5b1caad	alac2dae	a2d4b76d	c19b0c50
882240f2	0c6e4f38	a4e4bfd7	4f5ba272	564c1d2f	c59c5319	b949e354	b04669fe
b1b6ab8a	c71358dd	6385c545	110f935d	57538ad5	6a390493	e63d37e0	2a54f6b3
3a787d5f	6276a0b5	19a6fcdf	7a42206a	29f9d4d5	f61b1891	bb72275e	aa508167
38901091	c6b505eb	84c7cb8c	2ad75a0f	874a1427	a2d1936b	2ad286af	aa56d291
d7894360	425c750d	93b39e26	187184c9	6c00b32d	73e2bb14	a0bebc3c	54623779
64459eab	3f328b82	7718cf82	59a2cea6	04ee002e	89fe78e6	3fab0950	325fff6c2
81383f05	6963c5c8	76cb5ad6	d49974c9	ca180dcf	380782d5	c7fa5cf6	8ac31511
35e79e13	47da91d0	f40f9086	a7e2419e	31366241	051ef495	aa573b04	4a805d8d
548300d0	00322a3c	bf64cddf	ba57a68e	75c6372b	50afd341	a7c13275	915a0bf5
6b54bfab	2b0b1426	ab4cc9d7	449ccd82	f7fbf265	ab85c5f3	1b55db94	aad4e324
cfa4bd3f	2deaa3e2	9e204d02	c8bd25ac	eadf55b3	d5bd9e98	e31231b2	2ad5ad6c
954329de	adbe4528	d8710f69	aa51c90f	aa786bf6	22513f1e	aa51a79b	2ad344cc
7b5a41f0	d37cfbad	1b069505	41ece491	b4c332e6	032268d4	c9600acc	ce387e6d
bf6bb16c	6a70fb78	0d03d9c9	d4df39de	e01063da	4736f464	5ad328d8	b347cc96
75bb0fc3	98511bfb	4ffbcc35	b58bcf6a	e11f0abc	bfc5fe4a	a70aec10	ac39570a
3f04442f	6188b153	e0397a2e	5727cb79	9ceb418f	1cacd68d	2ad37c96	0175cb9d
c69dff09	c75b65f0	d9db40d8	ec0e7779	4744ead4	b11c3274	dd24cb9e	7e1c54bd
f01144f9	d2240eb1	9675b3fd	a3ac3755	d47c27af	51c85f4d	56907596	a5bb15e6
580304f0	ca042cf1	011a37ea	8dbfaadb	35ba3e4a	3526ffa0	c37b4d09	bc306ed9
98a52666	5648f725	ff5e569d	0ced63d0	7c63b2cf	700b45e1	d5ea50f1	85a92872
af1fbda7	d4234870	a7870bf3	2d3b4d79	42e04198	0cd0ede7	26470db8	f881814c
474d6ad7	7c0c5e5c	d1231959	381b7298	f5d2f4db	ab838653	6e2f1e23	83719c9e
bd91e046	9a56456e	dc39200c	20c8c571	962bda1c	e1e696ff	b141ab08	7cca89b9
1a69e783	02cc4843	a2f7c579	429ef47d	427b169c	5ac9f049	dd8f0f00	5c8165bf

### S-Box $S_2$

1f201094	ef0ba75b	69e3cf7e	393f4380	fe61cf7a	eec5207a	55889c94	72fc0651
ada7ef79	4e1d7235	d55a63ce	de0436ba	99c430ef	5f0c0794	18dcd7b7d	a1d6eff3
a0b52f7b	59e83605	ee15b094	e9ffd909	dc440086	ef944459	ba83ccb3	e0c3cdfb
d1da4181	3b092ab1	f997f1c1	a5e6cf7b	01420ddb	e4e7ef5b	25a1ff41	e180f806
1fc41080	179bee7a	d37ac6a9	fe5830a4	98de8b7f	77e83f4e	79929269	24fa9f7b
e113c85b	acc40083	d7503525	f7ea615f	62143154	0d554b63	5d681121	c866c359
3d63cf73	cee234c0	d4d87e87	5c672b21	071f6181	39f7627f	361e3084	e4eb573b
602f64a4	d63acd9c	1bbc4635	9e81032d	2701f50c	99847ab4	a0e3df79	ba6cf38c
10843094	2537a95e	f46f6ffe	a1ff3b1f	208cfb6a	8f458c74	d9e0a227	4ec73a34
fc884f69	3e4de8df	ef0e0088	3559648d	8a45388c	1d804366	721d9bfd	a58684bb
e8256333	844e8212	128d8098	fed33fb4	ce280ae1	27e19ba5	d5a6c252	e49754bd
c5d655dd	eb667064	77840b4d	alb6a801	84db26a9	e0b56714	21f043b7	e5d05860
54f03084	066ff472	a31aa153	dadca755	b5625dbf	68561be6	83ca6b94	2d6ed23b
eccf01db	a6d3d0ba	b6803d5c	af77a709	33b4a34c	397bc8d6	5ee22b95	5f0e5304
81ed6f61	20e74364	b45e1378	de18639b	881ca122	b96726d1	8049a7e8	22b7da7b
5e552d25	5272d237	79d2951c	c60d894c	488cb402	1ba4fe5b	a4b09f6b	1ca815cf
a20c3005	8871df63	b9de2fcb	0cc6c9e9	0beeff53	e3214517	b4542835	9f63293c
ee41e729	6e1d2d7c	50045286	1e6685f3	f33401c6	30a22c95	31a70850	60930f13

73f98417	a1269859	ec645c44	52c877a9	cdff33a6	a02b1741	7cbad9a2	2180036f
50d99c08	cb3f4861	c26bd765	64a3f6ab	80342676	25a75e7b	e4e6d1fc	20c710e6
cdf0b680	17844d3b	31eef84d	7e0824e4	2ccb49eb	846a3bae	8ff77888	ee5d60f6
7af75673	2fdd5cdb	a11631c1	30f66f43	b3faec54	157fd7fa	ef8579cc	d152de58
db2ffd5e	8f32ce19	306af97a	02f03ef8	99319ad5	c242fa0f	a7e3ebb0	c68e4906
b8da230c	80823028	dcdef3c8	d35fb171	088a1bc8	bec0c560	61a3c9e8	bca8f54d
c72feffa	22822e99	82c570b4	d8d94e89	8b1c34bc	301e16e6	273be979	b0ffeea6
61d9b8c6	00b24869	b7ffce3f	08dc283b	43daf65a	f7e19798	7619b72f	8f1c9ba4
dc8637a0	16a7d3b1	9fc393b7	a7136eeb	c6bcc63e	1a513742	ef6828bc	520365d6
2d6a77ab	3527ed4b	821fd216	095c6e2e	db92f2fb	5eea29cb	145892f5	91584f7f
5483697b	2667a8cc	85196048	8c4bacea	833860d4	0d23e0f9	6c387e8a	0ae6d249
b284600c	d835731d	dcblc647	ac4c56ea	3ebd81b3	230eabb0	6438bc87	f0b5b1fa
8f5ea2b3	fc184642	0a036b7a	4fb089bd	649da589	a345415e	5c038323	3e5d3bb9
43d79572	7e6dd07c	06dfdf1e	6c6cc4ef	7160a539	73bfbe70	83877605	4523ecf1

### S-Box $S_3$

8defc240	25fa5d9f	eb903dbf	e810c907	47607fff	369fe44b	8c1fc644	aececa90
beb1f9bf	eefbcaea	e8cf1950	51df07ae	920e8806	f0ad0548	e13c8d83	927010d5
11107d9f	07647db9	b2e3e4d4	3d4f285e	b9afa820	fade82e0	a067268b	8272792e
553fb2c0	489ae22b	d4ef9794	125e3fbc	21ffffce	825b1bfd	9255c5ed	1257a240
4e1a8302	bae07fff	528246e7	8e57140e	3373f7bf	8c9f8188	a6fc4ee8	c982b5a5
a8c01db7	579fc264	67094f31	f2bd3f5f	40fff7c1	1fb78dfc	8e6bd2c1	437be59b
99b03dbf	b5dbc64b	638dc0e6	55819d99	a197c81c	4a012d6e	c5884a28	ccc36f71
b843c213	6c0743f1	8309893c	0feddd5f	2f7fe850	d7c07f7e	02507fbf	5afb9a04
a747d2d0	1651192e	af70bf3e	58c31380	5f98302e	727cc3c4	0a0fb402	0f7fef82
8c96fdad	5d2c2aae	8ee99a49	50da88b8	8427f4a0	1eac5790	796fb449	8252dc15
efbd7d9b	a672597d	ada840d8	45f54504	fa5d7403	e83ec305	4f91751a	925669c2
23efe941	a903f12e	60270df2	0276e4b6	94fd6574	927985b2	8276dbcb	02778176
f8af918d	4e48f79e	8f616ddf	e29d840e	842f7d83	340ce5c8	96bbb682	93b4b148
ef303cab	984faf28	779faf9b	92dc560d	224d1e20	8437aa88	7d29dc96	2756d3dc
8b907cee	b51fd240	e7c07ce3	e566b4a1	c3e9615e	3cf8209d	6094d1e3	cd9ca341
5c76460e	00ea983b	d4d67881	fd47572c	f76cedd9	bda8229c	127dadaa	438a074e
1f97c090	081bdb8a	93a07ebe	b938ca15	97b03cff	3dc2c0f8	8dlab2ec	64380e51
68cc7bfb	d90f2788	12490181	5de5ffd4	dd7ef86a	76a2e214	b9a40368	925d958f
4b39ffff	ba39aee9	a4ffd30b	faf7933b	6d498623	193cbcfa	27627545	825cf47a
61bd8ba0	d11e42d1	cead04f4	127ea392	10428db7	8272a972	9270c4a8	127de50b
285ba1c8	3c62f44f	35c0eaa5	e805d231	428929fb	b4fcd8f2	4fb66a53	0e7dc15b
1f081fab	108618ae	fcfd086d	f9ff2889	694bcc11	236a5cae	12deca4d	2c3f8cc5
d2d02dfe	f8ef589e	e4cf52da	95155b67	494a488c	b9b6a80c	5c8f82bc	89d36b45
3a609437	ec00c9a9	44715253	0a874b49	d773bc40	7c34671c	02717ef6	4feb5536
a2d02fff	d2bf60c4	d43f03c0	50b4ef6d	07478cd1	006e1888	a2e53f55	b9e6d4bc
a2048016	97573833	d7207d67	de0f8f3d	72f87b33	abcc4f33	7688c55d	7b00a6b0
947b0001	570075d2	f9bb88f8	8942019e	4264a5ff	856302e0	72dbd92b	ee971b69
6ea22fde	5f08ae2b	af7a616d	e5c98767	cf1feb2d	61efc8c2	f1ac2571	cc8239c2
67214cb8	b1e583d1	b7dc3e62	7f10bdce	f90a5c38	0ff0443d	606e6dc6	60543a49
5727c148	2be98a1d	8ab41738	20e1be24	af96da0f	68458425	99833be5	600d457d
282f9350	8334b362	d91d1120	2b6d8da0	642b1e31	9c305a00	52bce688	1b03588a
f7baefd5	4142ed9c	a4315c11	83323ec5	dfef4636	a133c501	e9d3531c	ee353783

### S-Box $S_4$

9db30420	1fb6e9de	a7be7bef	d273a298	4a4f7bdb	64ad8c57	85510443	fa020ed1
7e287aff	e60fb663	095f35a1	79ebf120	fd059d43	6497b7b1	f3641f63	241e4adf
28147f5f	4fa2b8cd	c9430040	0cc32220	fdd30b30	c0a5374f	1d2d00d9	24147b15
ee4d111a	0fca5167	71ff904c	2d195ffe	1a05645f	0c13fefe	081b08ca	05170121
80530100	e83e5efe	ac9af4f8	7fe72701	d2b8ee5f	06df4261	bb9e9b8a	7293ea25
ce84ffdf	f5718801	3dd64b04	a26f263b	7ed48400	547eebe6	446d4ca0	6cf3d6f5
2649abdf	aea0c7f5	36338cc1	503f7e93	d3772061	11b638e1	72500e03	f80eb2bb
abe0502e	ec8d77de	57971e81	e14f6746	c9335400	6920318f	081dbb99	ffc304a5
4d351805	7f3d5ce3	a6c866c6	5d5bcc9a	daec6fea	9f926f91	9f46222f	3991467d
a5bf6d8e	1143c44f	43958302	d0214eeb	022083b8	3fb6180c	18f8931e	281658e6
26486e3e	8bd78a70	7477e4c1	b506e07c	f32d0a25	79098b02	e4eabb81	28123b23
69dead38	1574ca16	df871b62	211c40b7	a51a9ef9	0014377b	041e8ac8	09114003

bd59e4d2	e3d156d5	4fe876d5	2f91a340	557be8de	00eae4a7	0ce5c2ec	4db4bba6
e756bdf	dd3369ac	ec17b035	06572327	99afc8b0	56c8c391	6b65811c	5e146119
6e85cb75	be07c002	c2325577	893ff4ec	5bbfc92d	d0ec3b25	b7801ab7	8d6d3b24
20c763ef	c366a5fc	9c382880	0ace3205	aac9548a	ecal	d7c7	041afa32
6701902c	9b757a54	31d477f7	9126b031	36cc6fdb	c70b8b46	d9e66a48	56e55a79
026a4ceb	52437eff	2f8f76b4	0df980a5	8674cde3	edda04eb	17a9be04	2c18f4df
b7747f9d	ab2af7b4	efc34d20	2e096b7c	1741a254	e5b6a035	213d42f6	2c1c7c26
61c2f50f	6552daf9	d2c231f8	25130f69	d8167fa2	0418f2c8	001a96a6	0d1526ab
63315c21	5e0a72ec	49bafefd	187908d9	8d0dbd86	311170a7	3e9b640c	cc3e10d7
d5cad3b6	0caec388	f73001e1	6c728aff	71eae2a1	1f9af36e	cfc	bd12f
ac07be6b	cb44a1d8	8b9b0f56	013988c3	b1c52fca	b4be31cd	d8782806	12a3a4e2
6f7de532	58fd7eb6	d01ee900	24adffc2	f4990fc5	9711aac5	001d7b95	82e5e7d2
109873f6	00613096	c32d9521	ada121ff	29908415	7fbb977f	af9eb3db	29c9ed2a
5ce2a465	a730f32c	d0aa3fe8	8a5cc091	d49e2ce7	0ce454a9	d60acd86	015f1919
77079103	dea03af6	78a8565e	dee356df	21f05cbe	8b75e387	b3c50651	b8a5c3ef
d8eeb6d2	e523be77	c2154529	2f69efdf	afe67afb	f470c4b2	f3e0eb5b	d6cc9876
39e4460c	1fda8538	1987832f	ca007367	a99144f8	296b299e	492fc295	9266beab
b5676e69	9bd3ddda	df7e052f	db25701c	1b5e51ee	f65324e6	6afce36c	0316cc04
8644213e	b7dc59d0	7965291f	ccd6fd43	41823979	932bcd	f6	b657c34d
7ae5290c	3cb9536b	851e20fe	9833557e	13ecf0b0	d3ffb372	3f85c5c1	0aef7ed2

## 1.2 CAST-256 Notation

The following notation is employed in the specification of CAST-256.

Let  $f_1, f_2, f_3$  be as defined for CAST-128.

Let  $\beta = (ABCD)$  be a 128-bit block where  $A, B, C$ , and  $D$  are each 32 bits in length.

Let “ $\beta \leftarrow Q_i(\beta)$ ” be short-hand notation for the following:

$$C = C \oplus f_1(D, k_{r_0}^{(i)}, k_{m_0}^{(i)})$$

$$B = B \oplus f_2(C, k_{r_1}^{(i)}, k_{m_1}^{(i)})$$

$$A = A \oplus f_3(B, k_{r_2}^{(i)}, k_{m_2}^{(i)})$$

$$D = D \oplus f_1(A, k_{r_3}^{(i)}, k_{m_3}^{(i)})$$

Let “ $\beta \leftarrow \overline{Q}_i(\beta)$ ” be short-hand notation for the following:

$$D = D \oplus f_1(A, k_{r_3}^{(i)}, k_{m_3}^{(i)})$$

$$A = A \oplus f_3(B, k_{r_2}^{(i)}, k_{m_2}^{(i)})$$

$$B = B \oplus f_2(C, k_{r_1}^{(i)}, k_{m_1}^{(i)})$$

$$C = C \oplus f_1(D, k_{r_0}^{(i)}, k_{m_0}^{(i)})$$

( $Q(\cdot)$  is called a “forward quad-round” and  $\overline{Q}(\cdot)$  is called a “reverse quad-round”.)

Let  $k_r^{(i)} = \{k_{r_0}^{(i)}, k_{r_1}^{(i)}, k_{r_2}^{(i)}, k_{r_3}^{(i)}\}$  be the set of rotation keys for the  $i^{\text{th}}$  quad-round, where  $k_{r_j}^{(i)}$  is a 5-bit rotation key for  $f_1, f_2$ , or  $f_3$  (as specified above).

Let  $k_m^{(i)} = \{k_{m_0}^{(i)}, k_{m_1}^{(i)}, k_{m_2}^{(i)}, k_{m_3}^{(i)}\}$  be the set of masking keys for the  $i^{\text{th}}$  quad-round, where  $k_{m_j}^{(i)}$  is a 32-bit masking key for  $f_1, f_2$ , or  $f_3$  (as specified above).

*CAST-256 Notation (cont'd)*

Let  $\kappa = (ABCDEFGH)$  be a 256-bit block where  $A, B, \dots, H$  are each 32 bits in length.

Let “ $\kappa \leftarrow \omega_i(\kappa)$ ” be short-hand notation for the following:

$$G = G \oplus f_1(H, t_{r_0}^{(i)}, t_{m_0}^{(i)})$$

$$F = F \oplus f_2(G, t_{r_1}^{(i)}, t_{m_1}^{(i)})$$

$$E = E \oplus f_3(F, t_{r_2}^{(i)}, t_{m_2}^{(i)})$$

$$D = D \oplus f_1(E, t_{r_3}^{(i)}, t_{m_3}^{(i)})$$

$$C = C \oplus f_2(D, t_{r_4}^{(i)}, t_{m_4}^{(i)})$$

$$B = B \oplus f_3(C, t_{r_5}^{(i)}, t_{m_5}^{(i)})$$

$$A = A \oplus f_1(B, t_{r_6}^{(i)}, t_{m_6}^{(i)})$$

$$H = H \oplus f_2(A, t_{r_7}^{(i)}, t_{m_7}^{(i)})$$

( $\omega(\cdot)$  is called a “forward octave”.)

Let “ $k_r^{(i)} \leftarrow \kappa$ ” be short-hand notation for the following:

$$k_{r_0}^{(i)} = 5LSB(A), \quad k_{r_1}^{(i)} = 5LSB(C), \quad k_{r_2}^{(i)} = 5LSB(E), \quad k_{r_3}^{(i)} = 5LSB(G)$$

where  $5LSB(x)$  denotes “the five least significant bits of  $x$ ”.

Let “ $k_m^{(i)} \leftarrow \kappa$ ” be short-hand notation for the following:

$$k_{m_0}^{(i)} = H, \quad k_{m_1}^{(i)} = F, \quad k_{m_2}^{(i)} = D, \quad k_{m_3}^{(i)} = B$$

### 1.3 The CAST-256 Cipher

$\beta = 128$  bits of plaintext.

```
for( $i = 0; i < 6; i++$ )  
     $\beta \leftarrow Q_i(\beta)$   
for( $i = 6; i < 12; i++$ )  
     $\beta \leftarrow \overline{Q}_i(\beta)$ 
```

128 bits of ciphertext =  $\beta$

#### Round Key Re-Ordering for Decryption

The cipher employs a 256-bit primary key  $K$ . Decryption is identical to encryption except that the sets of quad-round keys  $k_r^{(i)}, k_m^{(i)}$  derived from  $K$  are used in reverse order as follows.

```
for( $i = 0; i < 12; i++$ ) {  
     $k_{r_{new}}^{(i)} = k_r^{(11-i)}$   
     $k_{m_{new}}^{(i)} = k_m^{(11-i)}$   
}
```



### 1.4 The CAST-256 Key Schedule

*Initialization:*

$$c_m = 2^{30} \sqrt{2} = 5A827999_{16}$$

$$m_m = 2^{30} \sqrt{3} = 6ED9EBA1_{16}$$

$$c_r = 19$$

$$m_r = 17$$

```
for(i = 0; i < 24; i++){
    for(j = 0; j < 8; j++){
         $t_{m_j}^{(i)} = c_m$ 
         $c_m = (c_m + m_m) \bmod 2^{32}$ 
         $t_{r_j}^{(i)} = c_r$ 
         $c_r = (c_r + m_r) \bmod 32$ 
    }
}
```

*Key Schedule:*

$\kappa = ABCDEFGH = 256$  bits of primary key,  $K$ .

```
for(i = 0; i < 12; i++){
     $\kappa \leftarrow \omega_{2i}(\kappa)$ 
     $\kappa \leftarrow \omega_{2i+1}(\kappa)$ 
     $k_r^{(i)} \leftarrow \kappa$ 
     $k_m^{(i)} \leftarrow \kappa$ 
}
```

Note:

$$(|K| = 128) \Rightarrow (E = F = G = H = 0)$$

$$(|K| = 160) \Rightarrow (F = G = H = 0)$$

$$(|K| = 192) \Rightarrow (G = H = 0)$$


$$(|K| = 224) \Rightarrow (H = 0)$$

## 2. Design Rationale

### *2.1 Overall Structure*

The fundamental mechanism for the expansion of a 64-bit block size to a larger block size is the generalization of the basic Feistel network (Schneier and Kelsey [SK96] have referred to the structure used here as an “incomplete” Feistel network). The motivation is as follows. In a traditional Feistel network (such as DES), rather than thinking of the exchange of left and right halves in each round as a “swap”, it may be viewed as a circular right-shift of 32 bits. Such a view allows one to consider a cipher with a block size of  $32n$  bits, which uses the same round function as the original cipher but requires  $n$  rounds (instead of 2) to input all bits of the block to the round function.

A picture may help to clarify the operation.



**Figure 1**

The left-most diagram is the “traditional” Feistel network. If this describes two rounds of DES, then  $L$  and  $R$  are each 32 bits in length and the cipher has a 64-bit block size. Continuing the illustration, the middle diagram describes an extended Feistel network for a cipher with a 96-bit block size, and the right-most diagram describes the structure of a cipher with a 128-bit block size. In each case, we may think of the number of rounds shown as a basic “unit” (in terms of submitting all input bits to the round function); the actual number of rounds chosen for the full cipher will be some multiple of this “unit” (e.g., for DES, the multiple is 8).

## *2.2 Decryption Considerations*

The disadvantage of the generalized structure given above is that it requires a separate structure for decryption (since data must be left-shifted, rather than right-shifted, in each round in order to go backwards through the rounds). By contrast, with the “traditional” Feistel network decryption and encryption are identical except for a change in the ordering of the round keys so no separate structure is needed. Clearly, in constrained environments (such as hardware or firmware implementations that are very resource-limited) requiring two structures is unattractive.

A simple solution to the above concern is to design the structure such that if there are  $r$  rounds in the full cipher, the first  $r/2$  rounds use right-shifting (as shown in the diagram above) and the last  $r/2$  rounds use left-shifting. In this way, the desirable feature of “traditional” Feistel networks with respect to decryption (i.e., that decryption is identical to encryption, requiring only a reversal of the round keys) is preserved. This simplifies implementation and operation of the cipher and helps to make its use feasible in resource-limited environments.

## *2.3 Choice of Round Function*

One of the very attractive features of the generalized structure given above is that it enables direct re-use of the round function from the “traditional” Feistel network. Within the class of DES-like ciphers, it is well known that increasing the size of the round function typically involves increasing the size of its component substitution boxes (s-boxes); it is also well known that increasing s-box size is generally difficult. For those ciphers that already employ large s-boxes, size increases can be a monumental task. [As a particular example, doubling the input and output sizes of a carefully-constructed  $8 \times 32$  s-box may require a work factor of roughly  $2^{64}$  steps (more than is necessary to break DES by exhaustive search!), aside from the fact that the resulting s-box grows from 4 Kbytes to more than half a million bytes of memory.] Being able to re-use the original round function is therefore very desirable. The important technical decision, however, is which “traditional” Feistel network round function to use in the generalized network.

The CAST-128 set of round functions has a number of appealing features.

- Firstly, the component bent-function-based s-boxes are designed according to a mathematical procedure which produces substitution boxes with several important cryptographic properties (such as high nonlinearity, low XOR difference distribution table values, good higher-order Strict Avalanche Criterion, and good higher-order (Output) Bit Independence Criterion) [A97b].
- Secondly, the use of both a “masking” key and a “rotation” key ensures that the key entropy is higher than the data entropy in each round (following the recommendation of [RPD97]) and appears to make the construction of iterative statistical attacks such as linear and differential cryptanalysis significantly more difficult (or impossible) [A97b].
- Thirdly, the mixing of operations from different algebraic groups (addition modulo 2 and addition / subtraction modulo  $2^{32}$ ) appears to be effective not only in reducing the probability of the round differential [AM97, O’C98], but in reducing the possibility of higher-order differential attacks as well [MSK98].
- Finally, mixing the order of the group operations (i.e., by varying the order of round functions throughout the cipher, as is done in CAST-128) appears to frustrate the practical construction of iterative characteristics.

In summary, then, the extensive analysis done on the CAST design procedure (including focused attention within several master’s- and doctoral-level theses on symmetric cipher design and analysis) lends confidence to its choice as the round function for this generalized Feistel network.

[See *CAST-256: Algorithm Analysis* below for a partial list of published work which discusses or analyzes various aspects of the CAST design procedure. For one significant example of unpublished work that has been done on CAST, the Communications Security Establishment, after extensive analysis, has determined and will formally state that the CAST-128 algorithm is suitable for the protection of all levels of Designated information within the Government of Canada. Please see the attached letter dated June 5<sup>th</sup>, 1998, and note that “CAST5” is the name used for “CAST-128” when specific key lengths are explicitly intended (see [A97c], Section 2.5).

## 2.4 Number of Rounds

Given that the basic unit (see “Overall Structure” above) in DES is a “double round” and that a multiple of 8 is used to give the full 16-round cipher, it is reasonable to conclude that a 128-bit block size, with a “quad-round” as the basic unit, should consist of at least 32 rounds for the full cipher. It is important to note, however, that a cipher being constructed as a candidate for AES consideration must support not only twice the block size of CAST-128, but twice the key size as well. A deeper security analysis (see attached document, *CAST-256: Algorithm Analysis*) suggests that 48 rounds (i.e., 12 “quad rounds”) provides security protection commensurate with the parameters of the desired cipher.

## 2.5 Key Schedule

Key scheduling (deriving a set of round keys from an initial key) is an extremely important aspect of cipher design since sub-optimal key schedules can lead to exploitable weaknesses in the cipher (including weak keys, equivalent keys, complementation properties, and susceptibility to related-key attacks), and overly-complicated key schedules can lead to prohibitively-long set-up times (limiting the use of the cipher in some environments).

The design philosophy chosen for the CAST-256 key schedule is identical to that chosen for the CAST-256 cipher itself: the key schedule essentially describes a generalized Feistel network with a 256-bit block size. A simple (but fixed) set of round keys is used to key this network and the CAST-256 initial key is used as the plaintext input. Some of the output bits of selected rounds during this “encryption” define the actual round keys for the CAST-256 cipher. Important features of this key scheduling approach include the following.

- The inherent strength of the generalized Feistel network is used in the key schedule to create round keys, increasing confidence that the set of key values (comprised of the generated round keys and the CAST-256 initial key) will appear to be pair-wise independent to any statistical analysis.
- If an attack can be mounted that derives four or more full round keys (i.e., full masking keys and the corresponding rotation keys) from the CAST-256 cipher, it still appears to require a computational effort of at least  $2^{256 - (4 * 32) - (4 * 5)} = 2^{108}$  guesses to derive the CAST-256 initial key from this information.

- Since the key schedule describes a generalized Feistel network, it is extremely unlikely that key collisions can occur. The key schedule defines a cipher with a fixed key (i.e., a permutation over the input space) so for two different CAST-256 initial keys to produce identical sets of round keys, the different cipher inputs would have to map to round function outputs (in every relevant round) that differed only in the 108 bits *not* used to produce round key bits. The probability of this occurring in each octave that produces round keys is  $2^{108}/2^{256} = 2^{-148}$ , so the probability that this occurs over the full set of round keys is  $2^{-148 \cdot 12} = 2^{-1776}$  (essentially zero, since there are only  $2^{256}$  possible initial keys).
- The key scheduling operation requires the equivalent of four CAST-256 encryption operations to produce a full set of round keys. This ratio is not prohibitive for most environments and compares favorably with many current implementations of DES.

The key schedule chosen for CAST-256 appears to have a number of desirable cryptographic features and takes into account much of the research into key schedule design and analysis over the past two decades (see, for example, [A94] and the references included in [A97]).

## 2.6 Conclusions

A number of alternatives exist for doubling the block size of a cipher from 64 bits to 128 bits, including the following.

- Feistel network. In such a design, the round function of the Feistel network is the original 64-bit cipher, which may itself be a Feistel network (this is a simple extension of ideas presented in, for example, [LR88, L96]).
- Substitution-Permutation (SP) network [F73]. In such a design, two parallel implementations of the original cipher are used as the substitution layers; these are interspersed with an extended permutation layer (i.e., a permutation which is the width of the desired block size).
- “Fenced” Construction [R96]. In such a design, two parallel implementations of the original cipher are surrounded by specially-constructed mixing operations, which in turn are surrounded by a layer of substitution boxes.

However, it was felt that all the alternatives considered had one or more drawbacks which made them somewhat less attractive as AES submission candidates. For example, the Feistel network suffers significant security degradation if one or two rounds may be “peeled off” by some attack (not an uncommon situation) since the entire outer network would likely consist of only four or six rounds (for performance reasons). The SP network may be subject to poor encryption / decryption performance since even two substitution layers with a permutation layer in between (the minimum possible configuration) halves the speed of the original cipher; a larger number of layers decreases performance significantly beyond this. Finally, the Fenced construction has non-trivial design and implementation impacts with the need for solid theoretical justification for the particular mixing operations used and the need for sufficient processing time and memory for the pseudo-random generation and storage of the necessary s-boxes.

The approach taken in this proposal to achieve block size doubling (i.e., the use of a generalized Feistel network) appears to be the simplest and most elegant of the various alternatives. It has none of the drawbacks listed above, is straightforward to understand and to analyze, and builds on the confidence gained from the extensive literature on ciphers based on Feistel networks. Furthermore, it allows unmodified re-use of a round function with a number of attractive cryptographic features, and suggests an intuitive architecture for the associated key scheduling algorithm.

We conclude that the rationale for CAST-256 is solid, resting on firm theoretical results and immediately appealing, defensible, concepts for every aspect of the cipher design. The resulting algorithm has good performance, reasonable code and memory size, and high security (according to all analysis conducted to date); it thus appears to meet all the requirements for an AES submission candidate.

### 3. Bit Naming / Numbering Convention Provided

True (needed only in section *1.1 CAST-128 Notation* above, where most- to least-significant bytes of a 32-bit word are specified).

### 4. No Parity Bits Specified in the Key Definition

True.

### 5. References

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- [SK96] B. Schneier and J. Kelsey, "Unbalanced Feistel Networks and Block Cipher Design", in *Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption*, Cambridge, UK, February 1996, Springer, LNCS 1039, pp.121-144.

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05 June 1998

Mr. Brian O'Higgins  
Executive Vice President and  
Chief Technology Officer  
Entrust Technologies  
750 Heron Road  
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Ottawa, Ontario  
K1V 1A7

Dear Mr. O'Higgins,

I am very pleased to advise you that CSE has completed its evaluation of the CAST5 algorithm (80 and 128 bit versions). We have determined that CAST5 is suitable for the protection of all levels of Designated information within the GOC. A formal statement of this approval will be promulgated to Government of Canada departments and agencies in the very near future.

On behalf of the Communications Security Establishment please accept my congratulations.

David McKerrow  
Communications Security Establishment  
Director General Information Technology Security

# CAST-256

## Computational Efficiency

### 1. Efficiency Estimates for the NIST AES Analysis Platform

#### *1.1 Platform Description*

IBM-compatible PC, with an Intel Pentium Pro Processor, 200MHz clock speed, 64MB RAM, running Windows95.

#### *1.2 Speed Estimates (in clock cycles)*

<u>Operation</u>	<u>128/128</u>	<u>192/128</u>	<u>256/128</u>
Encrypt one data block:	1790	1790	1790
Decrypt one data block:	1790	1790	1790
Key setup:	9090	9090	9090
Algorithm setup:	0	0	0
Key change:	9090	9090	9090

#### *1.3 Tradeoffs Between Speed and Memory*

For environments in which memory is not a scarce resource, s-boxes  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  can be combined into three  $16 \times 32$  s-boxes (one corresponding to  $S_1 \oplus S_2$ , one corresponding to  $S_1 - S_2$ , and one corresponding to  $S_1 + S_2$ , for each of the three round function types). This saves one memory lookup and combining operation per round, which will result in a modest performance increase.

## 2. Efficiency Estimates for 8-Bit Processors

### *2.1 Platform Description*

Motorola 6811 microprocessor, 2MHz clock speed, assembly language implementation.

### *2.2 Speed Estimates (in clock cycles)*

<u>Operation</u>	<u>128/128</u>	<u>192/128</u>	<u>256/128</u>
Encrypt one data block:	26000	26000	26000
Decrypt one data block:	26000	26000	26000
Key setup:	110000	110000	110000
Algorithm setup:	0 ms	0 ms	0 ms
Key change:	110000	110000	110000

### *2.3 Tradeoffs Between Speed and Memory*

None known.

### 3. Efficiency Estimates for Other Platforms

#### *3.1 Platform Description*

IBM-compatible PC, with an Intel Pentium II Processor, 300MHz clock speed, 128MB RAM, running Windows NT 4.0, assembly language implementation.

#### *3.2 Speed Estimates (in clock cycles)*

<u>Operation</u>	<u>128/128</u>	<u>192/128</u>	<u>256/128</u>
Encrypt one data block:	815	815	815
Decrypt one data block:	815	815	815
Key setup:	4130	4130	4130
Algorithm setup:	0	0	0
Key change:	4130	4130	4130

#### *3.3 Tradeoffs Between Speed and Memory*

For environments in which memory is not a scarce resource, s-boxes  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  can be combined into three  $16 \times 32$  s-boxes (one corresponding to  $S_1 \oplus S_2$ , one corresponding to  $S_1 - S_2$ , and one corresponding to  $S_1 + S_2$ , for each of the three round function types). This saves one memory lookup and combining operation per round, which will result in a modest performance increase.

## 4. Efficiency Estimates for Other Platforms

### *4.1 Platform Description*

Sun UltraSparc 1, 167MHz clock speed, 124MB RAM, running Solaris 2.5.

### *4.2 Speed Estimates (in clock cycles)*

<u>Operation</u>	<u>128/128</u>	<u>192/128</u>	<u>256/128</u>
Encrypt one data block:	1180	1180	1180
Decrypt one data block:	1180	1180	1180
Key setup:	5830	5830	5830
Algorithm setup:	0	0	0
Key change:	5830	5830	5830

### *4.3 Tradeoffs Between Speed and Memory*

For environments in which memory is not a scarce resource, s-boxes  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  can be combined into three  $16 \times 32$  s-boxes (one corresponding to  $S_1 \oplus S_2$ , one corresponding to  $S_1 - S_2$ , and one corresponding to  $S_1 + S_2$ , for each of the three round function types). This saves one memory lookup and combining operation per round, which will result in a modest performance increase.

## 5. General Efficiency Comments

As will be noted in the tables given above, CAST-256 has the following features:

- it requires no algorithm setup time (e.g., there is no need to generate s-boxes or other tables, and no need to pre-compute values);
- decryption performance is identical to encryption performance;
- key change time is identical to key setup time;
- there is no penalty for key size differences (i.e., encryption / decryption performance and key setup performance are unaffected by whether the primary key is 128 bits, 256 bits, or a value in between).

# CAST-256

## Algorithm Analysis

### 1. Analysis With Respect to Known Attacks

The classical attacks on ciphers are as follows: *ciphertext only*; *known plaintext*; and *chosen plaintext*. The advent of public-key cryptography added utility to the concept of a *chosen ciphertext* attack, but this appears to be of little added value in the analysis of symmetric ciphers. Research in the past decade or so has also introduced the notions of *chosen key* and *related key* attacks, which have enjoyed some success in the cryptanalysis of specific symmetric ciphers. Within the iterated symmetric ciphers (the class of algorithms to which CAST-256 belongs), the techniques known as *linear cryptanalysis* and *differential cryptanalysis* (along with their combinations and higher-orders) currently represent the most general and powerful instances of *known plaintext* and *chosen plaintext* attacks, respectively.

This section of the submission package examines the CAST-256 algorithm with respect to the families of cryptanalytic attack listed above.

#### *1.1 Ciphertext Only Attack*

No techniques are currently known that will allow an attacker to infer or derive information about the plaintext, the primary key, or any subset of round keys from any collection of ciphertext blocks. The one (unavoidable) exception to this is the technique applicable to all  $n$ -bit-block ciphers when used in Cipher-Block-Chaining (CBC) mode: once  $2^{n/2}$  blocks have been encrypted, with probability roughly  $\frac{1}{2}$  (rapidly increasing as more blocks are encrypted) an XOR relationship between a particular pair of plaintexts will be known.

#### *1.2 Known Plaintext Attack: Linear Cryptanalysis*

Linear cryptanalysis [M94] attempts to exploit any high-probability occurrences of linear expressions of input, output, and round key bits in the round function of an iterated cipher. It has been approximated [M94] that the best linear expression for  $r$ -rounds of a cipher has a probability of being satisfied that is bounded as follows:



$$\left|p_L - \frac{1}{2}\right| \leq 2^{\alpha-1} \cdot \left|p_\beta - \frac{1}{2}\right|^\alpha$$

where  $p_L$  represents the probability that the linear expression holds,  $p_\beta$  represents the probability of the best linear approximation, and  $\alpha$  represents the number of s-boxes involved in that linear approximation. This expression is based on the assumption of independent round keys such that the linear approximations of the s-boxes are independent. In an analogous way to “differentials” and “characteristics” in differential cryptanalysis, provable immunity in linear cryptanalysis relies on bounding the likelihood of an overall linear expression (sometimes referred to as the “linear hull”) rather than any particular linear “characteristic”. However, for many ciphers (including CAST-256) this is a difficult analytical task. What are typically considered, therefore, are the building blocks of an overall linear expression: the sequence of approximations of the round functions which result in the overall linear expression.

A basic linear attack typically uses a sequence of linear approximations of the rounds to create an overall linear expression involving subsets of plaintext and ciphertext bits. From this it is possible to derive the equivalent of one key bit represented as the XOR of a number of round key bits. In this case, it is shown [M94] that the number of known plaintexts required is approximately

$$N_L = \left|p_L - \frac{1}{2}\right|^{-2}.$$

It can be shown that the best linear approximation has a probability given by

$$\left|p_\beta - \frac{1}{2}\right| = \frac{2^{m-1} - NL_{\min}}{2^m}$$

where  $m$  is the number of input bits to the s-box and  $NL_{\min}$  is the nonlinearity of the s-box [LHT97]. For the s-boxes of CAST-256,  $m = 8$  and  $NL_{\min} = 74$ . Furthermore, for the CAST-256 cipher, the best linear approximation appears to involve 4 s-boxes every 4 rounds such that the linear approximation of the round function for every 4<sup>th</sup> round involves no output bits. That is, the linear expression used is  $X_{i_1} \oplus X_{i_2} \oplus \dots \oplus X_{i_r}$ , where  $X_{i_j}$  represents an input bit to the s-box. Hence, for an  $r$ -round linear approximation,  $\alpha = r$ . The number of known plaintexts required for a 48-round linear approximation of CAST-256, then, is approximately  $2^{122}$ . Note that this is almost equal to the total number of plaintexts available ( $2^{128}$ ) and argues against the practicality of a linear attack on this cipher.

Furthermore, Youssef, *et al*, have proposed [YCT97] that a more accurate bound on the number of plaintexts required for linear cryptanalysis of a CAST cipher can be obtained by considering the combination of s-boxes in the round function rather than the individual s-boxes. In particular, they compute the value for  $NL_S$ , the nonlinearity of the composite

32×32 s-box when the individual 8×32 s-boxes are combined using XOR. Using this in place of  $NL_{\min}$  in the equations above and setting  $m = 32$  and  $\alpha = 1/2$  (since an  $r$ -round linear approximation must involve at least as many 32×32 s-boxes as  $r/2$  iterations of the best 2-round approximation) yields a number of known plaintexts required for a 48-round linear approximation at more than  $2^{174}$  (far beyond the number of plaintexts available). Note that experimental evidence suggests that combining s-boxes using mixed operations may increase the nonlinearity of the composite s-box even further.

It therefore appears that CAST-256 is immune to a linear cryptanalysis attack.

### *1.3 Chosen Plaintext Attack: Differential Cryptanalysis*

Differential cryptanalysis [BS93] attempts to exploit any high-probability output differences resulting from particular input differences in the round function of an iterated cipher. A block cipher can be proved to be resistant to differential cryptanalysis if it can be shown that no high-probability differentials [LMM91] exist, where an  $i$ -round differential is defined to be the XOR of two outputs after  $i$  rounds, where the outputs correspond to two plaintexts with a given XOR.

In a good cipher the probability of all differentials should approach  $2^{-N}$ , where  $N$  is the block size. Strictly speaking, differential cryptanalysis requires only the existence of a highly-probable differential to succeed. However, differentials can be viewed to be comprised of a number of possible characteristics, where a characteristic specifies the exact sequence of input and output XORs for each round to achieve the overall differential input and output XOR.

It is typically difficult to derive the probability of any particular differential and, in practice, it would be hard for a cryptanalyst to determine the existence of a highly-probable differential without searching for highly-probable characteristics. Although it is often the case that an upper bound on the probability of a differential cannot be stated for a particular cipher (that is, resistance to a differential cryptanalytic attack cannot be proved), the probabilities of the most likely characteristics can be determined. These probabilities can then be used as a measure of the cipher's resistance to differential cryptanalysis.

As is common in the literature, the analysis here is based on the assumption that all round keys are independent (although this assumption is not always necessary; see [C97]) and that the occurrence of output XORs given particular input XORs is independent for different rounds. Under such conditions, the probability of an  $r$ -round characteristic is given by

$$p_{\Omega_r} = \prod_{i=1}^r p_i$$

where  $p_i$  represents the probability of the output XOR given the input XOR in round  $i$ . The best characteristics that can be constructed are typically iterative in nature. For the CAST-256 cipher with  $R$  rounds, the following appears to be the best possible  $r$ -round characteristic, where  $r$  is a multiple of 4. (Note that the notation  $(W,X,Y,Z)$  represents XOR vectors for the four 32-bit sub-blocks in a CAST-256 round function input.)

$(0,0,0,\Delta)$	[input XOR to round 1]
$0 \leftarrow \Delta$ with probability $p$	[round 1]
$0 \leftarrow 0$ with probability 1	[round 2]
$0 \leftarrow 0$ with probability 1	[round 3]
$0 \leftarrow 0$ with probability 1	[round 4]
...	repeat up to $R/2$ rounds
$(0,\Delta,0,0)$ , or some variation	[input XOR to round $(R/2 + 1)$ ]
$0 \leftarrow 0$ with probability 1	[round $(R/2 + 1)$ ]
$0 \leftarrow 0$ with probability 1	[round $(R/2 + 2)$ ]
$0 \leftarrow \Delta$ with probability $p$	[round $(R/2 + 3)$ ]
$0 \leftarrow 0$ with probability 1	[round $(R/2 + 4)$ ]
...	repeat up to $r$ rounds for $r$ -round char.

The input XOR to round  $(R/2 + 1)$  will be a vector in which one of the sub-blocks is non-zero and the other three sub-blocks are zero (the precise variation which applies for a given cipher depends upon the value of  $R$ ). Without loss of generality, the example  $(0,\Delta,0,0)$  is shown above.

As per the analysis and rationale given in [LHT97], the input-output XOR pair for a simplified CAST round function (i.e., one which does not include the key-dependent rotation, and for which the only s-box combining operation used is XOR) can be assumed to have a probability of  $p \leq 2^{-14}$ . This is based on the fact that all four s-boxes in the CAST round function are injective and the format of the XOR pair has the output XOR being equal to 0. This leads to the conclusion that the best  $r$ -round iterated characteristic as shown above has a probability given by

$$p_{\Omega_r} \leq (2^{-14})^{r/4}$$

In particular, a 40-round characteristic must have a probability less than or equal to  $2^{-140}$  according to the assumptions of the analysis. This implies that the number of chosen plaintexts required for this attack would be greater than  $2^{140}$  for the 48-round cipher (substantially greater than the number of plaintexts available for a 128-bit block size).

It therefore appears that CAST-256 is immune to a differential cryptanalysis attack.

### *1.4 Chosen Key Attack*

CAST-256 appears to be secure with respect to this attack. The use of a cipher (built around the CAST-128 set of round functions) as a key schedule gives confidence that no exploitable statistical correlation exists between the primary key and the set of generated round keys. Thus, allowing an attacker to choose a particular primary key difference appears to yield no exploitable similarities in the corresponding sets of round keys compared with the victim encrypting with two randomly-chosen primary keys.

### *1.5 Related Key Attack*

CAST-256 appears to be secure with respect to this attack. The use of a cipher (built around the CAST-128 set of round functions) as a key schedule gives confidence that no exploitable statistical correlations exist within the set of generated round keys. Thus, this attack, which depends upon the use of a simple derivation algorithm for a round key from previous round keys, appears not to be applicable to CAST-256.

### *1.6 Enhancements to the Above Statistical Attacks: Combinations and Higher-Orders*

The analysis given above for both linear and differential cryptanalysis applies to a greatly simplified version of the CAST-256 cipher. The actual cipher, which includes key-dependent rotation and mixed operations in the round function (both for data masking and for s-box combination), appears to be much more difficult / impossible to attack using the methods as described in [M94] and [BS93] (see [A97] for some discussion of this). In particular, experiments in which two CAST-256 s-boxes are combined using addition or subtraction modulo  $2^{32}$  show that the maximum value in the XOR difference distribution table is approximately 10% of the maximum that occurs when the s-boxes are combined using XOR. Experiments on combinations of three CAST-256 s-boxes are on-going, but thus far show similar results. This lends confidence that combinations of four s-boxes using mixed operations (as is done in the CAST-256 round function) are effective in increasing resistance to differential cryptanalysis.

The above experimental work [AM97] is supported by a new analytical result [O'C98], which shows that for a random  $n$ -bit permutation, the probability that the maximum entry in a differential table based on XOR differences is greater than a bound  $B_n$  approaches 1 as  $n$  grows, whereas the probability that the maximum entry in a table based on non-XOR differences (e.g., modular addition or multiplication) is greater than that same bound approaches 0. Furthermore, the bound is accurate for the 8-bit case. Thus, although the details of the analyzed structure differ slightly from the internals of the CAST-256 round

function as used in the above experiments, the conclusion is the same: using operations from different algebraic groups appears to be helpful in increasing resistance to differential cryptanalysis (by lowering the differential probability of a single round).

### 1.6.1 Combination Attacks

CAST-256 appears to be immune to both linear and differential cryptanalysis (requiring more plaintext than is available from the 128-bit block size) and appears to be immune to both chosen and related key attacks (due to the absence of exploitable statistical correlations among its generated keys). Given this, it seems highly unlikely that various combination attacks (such as *linear-differential*, or *differential-related-key*) can have any measure of success.

It therefore appears that this cipher is immune to the combination attacks currently known in the literature.

### 1.6.2 Higher-Order Attacks

The concept of *higher-order differentials* has been introduced [L94, K95] and used to successfully cryptanalyze ciphers proved secure against ordinary differential cryptanalysis [JK97]. A simplified version of the CAST-128 cipher (one which uses XOR for all operations in the round function) has been examined with respect to the higher-order differential attack [MSK98]. It has been shown that this attack is successful up to 5 rounds, but cannot be extended to higher numbers of rounds. Furthermore, the introduction of the key-dependent rotation operation is effective in increasing the computational complexity of this attack. Finally, the use of operations from different algebraic groups “makes the degree too high to cryptanalyze by the higher-order differential attack” [MSK98], so that the attack cannot even be mounted on a 5-round version of the cipher.

It therefore appears that CAST-256 (which has 48 rounds and uses the CAST-128 round functions) is immune to a higher-order differential attack.

## 2. Statements Regarding Properties of Keys

This section provides statements regarding the following properties of keys with respect to CAST-256: *weak keys*, *semi-weak keys*, *fixed points of a key*, *equivalent keys*, and *restrictions on key selection*. It also includes a statement on *complementation properties* since this is sometimes related to the way that round keys are used within a DES-like cipher.

### *2.1 Weak Keys*

None known. In the CAST-256 cipher, all keys appear to be of equivalent strength and are usable for double encryption (i.e., no key appears to be its own inverse).

### *2.2 Semi-Weak Keys*

None known. In the CAST-256 cipher, there appear to be no pairs of keys which cannot be used for double encryption (i.e., there do not appear to be pairs of keys  $k_i$  and  $k_j$  such that  $k_j$  is the inverse of  $k_i$ ).

### *2.3 Fixed Points of a key K*

None known. From all evidence available thus far in the open literature, fixed points have only been easily found (i.e., requiring a level of effort for an  $n$ -bit block cipher of roughly  $2^{n/2}$  operations rather than  $2^n$  operations) in DES-like ciphers for weak and semi-weak keys. It therefore appears that CAST-256 has no easily-found fixed points for any key.

### *2.4 Equivalent Keys*

None known. The key schedule defines a cipher with a fixed key (i.e., a permutation over the input space) so for two different CAST-256 initial keys to produce identical sets of round keys, the different cipher inputs would have to map to round function outputs (in every relevant round) that differed only in the 108 bits *not* used to produce round key bits. The probability of this occurring in each octave that produces round keys is  $2^{108}/2^{256} = 2^{-148}$ , so the probability that this occurs over the full set of round keys is  $2^{-148*12} = 2^{-1776}$  (essentially zero, since there are only  $2^{256}$  possible initial keys).

### *2.5 Restrictions on Key Selection*

None known. The key scheduling algorithm defines a symmetric block cipher with a fixed key where the CAST-256 primary key is used as the plaintext input. Because in this symmetric block cipher there are no restrictions on the input space (i.e., any plaintext can be encrypted), it follows that no restrictions are placed upon selection of CAST-256 primary keys.

### *2.6 Complementation Properties*

None known. There appear to be no complementations of combinations of plaintext, key, and ciphertext that lead to identities. This is due to the complexity of the key scheduling operation (so that complementing the primary key leads to random-looking changes to all round keys) and also to the use of multiple operations to combine data, key, and s-boxes within the round functions (XOR, rotation, and addition and subtraction modulo  $2^{32}$ ).

### 3. Statement Regarding Trap-Doors

None known. There are several reasons to feel confident that there are no trap-doors in this cipher.

- CAST-256 uses the four round function s-boxes in CAST-128. The design criteria and construction procedure for these s-boxes have been published [A97, MA96] and the specific s-boxes themselves have been examined by a number of researchers.
- CAST-256 uses the three round functions in CAST-128. The design criteria for these round functions have been published [A97] and the specific round functions themselves have been examined by a number of researchers. Furthermore, the complexity introduced by the mixed operations in the round functions would seem to make it difficult to insert a trap-door of any kind.
- CAST-256 uses 48 rounds. Inserting a non-obvious trap-door that will carry through 48 rounds of the cipher would seem to be a formidable task.
- CAST-256 uses a significantly more complex key scheduling algorithm than DES. A trap-door in the final round that allows the attacker (i.e., the one knowing this trap-door) to recover information about the final round key will be of little help in deriving either other round keys or the primary key. This contrasts with DES in which knowledge of any round key gives knowledge of the primary key with only a brute-force search over 8 bits of key.



#### 4. Publications Discussing or Analyzing Aspects of the CAST Design Procedure

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[Please note that a number of the above papers are available at the following location:  
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