

STATE OF CONFLICT


**An investigation
into the landgrabbers,
loggers and lawless
frontiers in Pará State,
Amazon**

GREENPEACE

PARÁ BATTLEFIELD

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GRANTSPACE



Greenpeace campaigns to protect the world's biological diversity, particularly forest ecosystems. We campaign to ensure that the use of these resources is ecologically and socially responsible and includes the establishment of networks of protected areas around the world. Our actions are dedicated to protecting the world's remaining ancient forests and the plants, animals and people that depend upon them.

We investigate and expose the causes of ancient forest destruction. We support the rights of forest people and consider them the legitimate protectors of their environment. We challenge governments and industry to end their role in ancient forest destruction. We promote real alternatives such as products certified to international standards set by the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), which help to ensure that timber comes from environmentally and socially responsible forest management. We consider that forests play a crucial role in maintaining climate equilibrium and water supply, and that additional threats to the forests represent an unacceptable risk for the future of the planet as a whole.

This report is compiled from official and authoritative data, including testimonies, field investigations and expert opinions. A list of reference papers from other institutions is at the end of this report. Greenpeace is indebted to the generosity of countless people who made this report possible, and to activists for their dedication and work uncovering evidence of forest crime.

FOREWORD

In 1992, Greenpeace began to investigate illegal and predatory logging in the Brazilian Amazon. In October 2001, it released a report introducing the actors and accomplices in the illegal trade in mahogany – *Partners in Mahogany Crime* – which gave crucial information to the Brazilian government's environmental agency, IBAMA, in support of suspending the logging of, and trade in, mahogany.

This latest report is the result of an investigation into the timber sector in Pará State, the largest producer and exporter of wood products in the Brazilian Amazon. Pará is also the site of one-third of the region's total deforestation.


State of Conflict concentrates on the two most aggressive logging frontiers in Pará: the regions of Porto de Moz and Prainha, on the left bank of the Xingu River, and the Middle Land, a large area of relatively intact forest, between the Xingu and the Tapajós rivers. The Transamazon Highway and the legally protected Indian lands, south of the Highway, separate these two regions.

Logging and cattle ranching are now the main driving forces behind the illegal assault on land in these regions. The development of these industries is surging ahead, leaving the law behind. In both regions local communities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and sectors of the Brazilian government are engaged in a fight for an alternative model of land-use based on community ownership of land and protected areas.

This report exposes an alarming picture of land invasions and illegal occupancy of public land, of violence, murder and modern-day slavery that is the secret face of Amazon destruction. Considered in isolation, each of these cases is an offense against human dignity and human rights. Combined, they create a dramatic picture of a Brazilian region that appears to be forging its way into a future without law.

During our investigations it became clear that the economically aggressive logging sector in Pará cannot be fully understood in isolation and must be framed in a broader context of forest destruction in this region – the process of invasion and conquest of remote and pristine areas of this immense territory. This rapid process of development has been fuelled by the actions of economic groups operating under little or no control from the Brazilian Federal government or Brazilian society.

As more and more high-value timber species are exhausted in older logging frontiers, the remaining unprotected frontier areas, including Porto de Moz and the Middle Land, are increasingly under threat. More and more loggers are migrating into these areas in search of the last remaining commercial stocks of high value timbers in Pará, and more and more cattle ranchers are eager to increase the size of their herds and the land to raise them. Soya farming is now adding to the deforestation equation. The cycle of predatory logging and deforestation therefore continues.



Almost half of all known species live in the Amazon Basin. Among them are 353 species of mammals, 3,000 fish species, 1,000 species of birds, 60,000 plant species and an estimated 10 million species of insects.



“Pará leads the way on the use of slave labor. During the first half of 2003, Pará accounted for over 60% of all workers liberated by the government’s antislavery Mobile Enforcement Team.”

“[São Félix do Xingu], where the law values nothing and death costs R\$100.”

O Estado de S. Paulo newspaper,
September 2003.



In many cases this destruction has been the result of government initiatives, such as road-building, tax incentives for rural projects, settlements and dams, aimed at bringing a pattern of economic development to the region. Both scientists and economists have shown that this predatory pattern of development is wholly inappropriate for the Amazon, a region with poor soil and intense levels of rainfall.

As with many other areas of the Amazon, environmental problems in Pará are often associated with social injustice and the lack of law enforcement. The victim is not only the forest, commonly seen as a cheap source of valuable commodities or as a barrier to ‘economic development’. It is also the traditional communities and indigenous people, for whom the Amazon is their home and their way of life.

To date, Federal and State authorities, lacking funds and infrastructure, usually react to the problem on a case-by-case basis. Environmental enforcement agents are sent to fight illegal operations here and there; the Federal Police raid farms that are using slave labor to clear the forest and make cattle ranches. Necessary as they are, these limited operations do not begin to solve the overwhelming set of problems facing Pará. The roots are too deeply embedded in a perverse model of boom and bust development and in the structural deficiencies of the Brazilian public sector.

To refer to Pará in terms of warfare, as a ‘State of Conflict’, is no exaggeration: there is an undeclared war going on – over land, over forest resources and over rapid profit at any price. If the conflict is not brought under control, the weaker side, local communities and indigenous groups, will pay the highest price. Ultimately, Brazil stands to lose hundreds of thousands of square kilometers of the Amazon, along with millions of animals and plants, with some species becoming extinct. Not only Pará State, but Brazil may lose the opportunity of opening the way to a better and sustainable future.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Around 40 percent of the world's remaining tropical rainforest is found in the Amazon Basin, a place of enormous ecological importance in sustaining global water and climate systems. Despite decades of intense focus in the spotlight of international environmental concern, the Amazon is today, more than ever, under siege from the loggers, farmers, and politicians who view it as a modern Eldorado to be plundered for profit.

Of all Brazil's Amazon regions, it is Pará State that has suffered the worst impact from logging. The largest timber exporting region of the entire Amazon, Pará has lost an area of rainforest the size of Austria, the Netherlands, Portugal and Switzerland combined.

Pará's story is one that resonates throughout the Amazon. It tells of a 'boom and bust' cycle whereby loggers exploit the land, strip it of forest cover and abandon it to cattle ranchers or other large-scale farming ventures. The period of boom, fuelled by the extraction of high-value species such as mahogany and cedar, quickly gives way to decline as lesser species of timber are exhausted in their turn, and the land is transformed into nutrient-poor grazing or farmland, providing little economic opportunity for the community.

Fuelling this cycle is a state of lawlessness in which land invasions and illegal occupancy of public land are backed by violence and even murder. Pará has Brazil's highest rate of assassinations linked to land conflicts, and these are hardly ever investigated. As local forest dwellers who depend on the land for hunting, fishing and small-scale farming are forced away from their territory, the gulf between rich and poor in Pará widens.

In remote, hard-to-police areas of the forest, deforestation is frequently driven by slavery. Workers are lured into forest areas with promises of well-paid farm work, and become trapped in debt bondage, working under dangerous and inhumane conditions for little or no pay. Those who try to escape are sometimes killed.

The variety of methods of land title falsification that enable loggers and others to lay claim to the rainforest are described by the term *grilagem*. *Grilagem* is made possible by the legal quagmire which characterizes land ownership in the Brazilian Amazon, with little checking by land registration authorities. Loggers exploit the legal and bureaucratic vacuum to seize land using a mixture of *grilagem* and physical force. Greenpeace produced a detailed map showing *grilagem* linked to Forest Management Plans in Porto de Moz. This map – the first of its kind – was submitted to IBAMA in October 2003 along with a demand for action.

The conflict for land and forests today is raging most intensely in two key frontiers in the west of Pará, the Middle Land and Porto de Moz. Here, the Federal Police force has been cut to a quarter of its size twenty years ago, and an illegal assault on the rainforest is underway. Assisted by their political allies, a number of companies which have



In Pará there is an undeclared war going on over land, over forest resources and over rapid profit at any price. Today, illegal occupancy of public land, violence, murder and modern-day slavery form the secret face of Amazon destruction.




exploited the legal and bureaucratic tangle to seize land, using a mixture of grilagem and physical force, are leading the charge.

In the face of the threat to their traditional lands, local inhabitants are joining forces to propose the creation of Extractive Reserves, areas protected by Federal law for conservation and sustainable use by traditional communities. The proposed *Verde para Sempre* (Green Forever) and *Renascer* (Reborn) reserves have become the target of angry opposition from logging and political interests, particularly since 400 community members took direct action in late 2002 to blockade barges loaded with illegal timber destined for export.

Greenpeace has investigated and documented many cases of illegal and predatory behavior by logging interests. Yet the landholders who have already devastated large swathes of the forest are now demanding that the government authorize new areas for exploitation, arguing that they create jobs and contribute to the economic development of regions like Pará. Under pressure from these powerful interests, the Federal and State governments are discussing a new system of concessions.

While the debate is reaching the press, and the public to some extent, Greenpeace recently discovered that the first 'authorization of use of public state property'¹ has been issued by Pará State to a logger in Porto de Moz. Nothing in the contract obliges the logger to do even basic regeneration of the forest after exploiting its resources.



Greenpeace believes that the real long-term future of Pará lies in a new social and economic model of sustainable use of the forests combined with areas of protection. Logging companies committed to truly legal, sustainable and certified operations have a place in this future, but the main effort must be concentrated on bringing governance and environmental and social justice to the Amazon. The only way to achieve this is through the strong commitment of the Brazilian Federal and State governments, backed by international cooperation, to empower the traditional communities and other forest dwellers to become the driving force for economic development and environmental protection in the Amazon.

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SECTION 1

PARÁ UP FOR GRABS

The Amazon Basin covers five percent of the land surface of the planet, extending over some 7.8 million km². It has 25,000 km of navigable rivers and contains around 20% of the Earth's fresh water. Its forests represent one of the most important ecosystems on Earth, accounting for 45% of tropical forests and storing 40% of the carbon residing in terrestrial vegetation.³ Almost half of all known species live in the Amazon. Among them, 353 species of mammals, 3,000 fish species, 1,000 species of birds, 60,000 plant species and an estimated 10 million species of insects.⁴ The Amazon plays a vital role in maintaining biodiversity, regional hydrology and climate.

This region has long been regarded by those wishing to exploit it as a latter-day Eldorado, a place of fabulous wealth and opportunity and the last frontier on Earth to be conquered. Short-term political and economic interests have fuelled boom and bust predatory development in the region, which has undergone rapid deforestation in recent years.


According to a report published in 2002 by IMAZON (Institute of Man and the Environment of the Amazon), around 95 percent of the timber exploited in the Brazilian Amazon (Amazon)⁵ is produced by predatory logging.⁶

The Amazon has one the world's highest absolute rates of forest destruction, currently averaging around 18,000 km² per year.⁷ The latest data shows a forty percent increase in deforestation, reaching 25,476 km² in just one year.⁸ Today, loggers, farmers, private enterprises and many politicians, local public administrators and legislators still view the Amazon as a vast territory to seize, occupy and exploit.⁹

Pará is the second largest Brazilian state, covering an area over 1.2 million km², about twice the size of France. Today it is the largest timber producing and exporting region in the Amazon, accounting for 40% of production¹⁰ and 60% of all exports from all Amazon States.¹¹ An estimated one-third of timber produced in Pará is now exported, making it the second most valuable commodity exported from the state (after minerals).¹² In 2002, Pará exported at least US\$312 million in timber products, to markets in the USA (34.9%), France (13.7%), Spain (8.1%), the Netherlands (7.4%), China, Portugal, the Dominican Republic, Japan and the UK, amongst others.¹³ (See *Markets of timber and timber products from Brazil, Amazon and Pará State*, page 7)

At the same time Pará accounts for over one-third¹⁴ of the total Amazon deforestation in Brazil amounting to an area larger than the size of Austria, Netherlands, Portugal and Switzerland combined.¹⁵ Satellite images released by INPE – the Brazilian Institute of Space Research – in 2003 show that the majority of the illegal deforestation occurred in areas surrounding Pará's Middle Land.

Deforestation in Pará has been driven by over four decades of predatory and unsustainable logging. Land-use is largely a question of the illegal seizure of public lands, which are exploited for logging, then turned over to cattle ranching.¹⁶



The Amazon region is of critical importance to forest dwelling communities and to wildlife, sheltering numerous species including jaguars, giant alligators, spider monkeys and anteaters.



Pará accounts for over one-third of the total Amazon deforestation in Brazil. Deforestation for timber and cattle ranching is commonly linked with the employment of slave labor.

Markets for timber and timber products from Brazil, Amazon and Pará State

Exports by value US\$, January to December 2002 (source: SECEX, 2003)

Destination Country	Brazil	Amazon	Pará State	Pará (as % of all Brazil exports to country of destination)	Pará (as % of all Amazon exports to country of destination)	Pará (as % of all Pará exports)
USA	741,933,092	147,683,262	109,199,517	14.72	73.94	34.92
China	78,254,200	57,650,189	17,865,821	22.82	30.99	5.71
France	61,074,110	51,132,084	42,913,010	70.26	83.93	13.72
Spain	50,430,469	29,438,824	25,462,037	50.49	86.49	8.14
UK	142,822,928	28,776,927	7,030,310	4.92	24.43	2.25
Netherlands	33,672,476	27,097,150	23,176,419	68.82	85.53	7.41
Portugal	47,927,179	20,734,299	16,557,741	34.55	79.85	5.30
Japan	63,420,604	18,104,826	7,377,957	11.63	40.74	2.36
Belgium	62,616,433	18,072,704	3,250,470	5.19	17.98	1.04
Hong Kong	22,378,676	14,275,283	2,427,161	10.85	17.00	0.78
Italy	34,020,824	9,752,361	2,550,910	7.49	26.14	0.82
Germany	48,729,952	5,081,574	1,592,554	0.31	19.65	0.51
Canada	41,131,029	4,668,754	3,801,081	9.24	81.42	1.22
Others	336,946,205	87,797,741	49,469,591	14.82	56.34	15.82
Total	1,765,358,177	520,265,078	312,674,579	17.70	60.09	100.00

“Essentially, the dynamic of destruction and pillage of natural resources attempts to make unfeasible another kind of project to the region, based on the sustainable use of environment and its resources”.

Brazilian National Report to the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, April 2003.²

This development has been an environmental disaster and has had a lasting detrimental impact on indigenous people who have lived in the region since colonial times, and forest dwelling communities who migrated to the region during various waves of occupation of the Amazon. This short-lived cycle of forest destruction, often justified by those who defend it in the name of economic development, concentrates lands in the hands of a few landlords, resulting in a situation of poverty for those communities who live in the region as their means of subsistence is degraded, affecting hunting, fishing and other traditional resources.¹⁷

In 1997, over one-third of the rural population, who depend on the Amazon were considered to be living in a situation of “critical poverty.”¹⁸ The value of the land diminishes once it has become degraded so that the ‘economic development’ is short-lived even for those exploiting it.

GRILAGEM - USING FALSE LAND TITLES TO EXPLOIT PUBLIC LAND

Illegal land grabs have become one of the most powerful means of land-based domination in the Amazon – resulting in a major social disparity.²⁰ Known as *grilagem* in Brazil, the falsification of land titles is the method employed by a large number of loggers, cattle ranchers and land speculators to exploit public land. Illegal landholders take over public lands by forging titles of ownership with the complicity of land registration offices, and by using violence to expel informal settlers and Indian communities who have legitimate rights to the lands.²¹ (See *Methods Commonly Used by Land Grabbers*, page 20.)

The legal quagmire of land ownership in the Amazon was characterized by the prominent Pará legal expert Professor Otávio Mendonça, in a debate on land ownership in May 1980. “Unfortunately, with very few exceptions, the Amazon Cartórios [private offices authorized by the government to legally register documents] registered every paper and claim that any prospective landowner brought forward.”²² Due to multiple claims and the lack of a central registry in Brazil, the total area of land registrations recorded in one region can exceed the size of the region itself.²³

In Pará, the main economic motives for *grilagem* have shifted with time, according to the availability of natural resources and the market. Between the 1960s and 1980s, gold, bauxite and tin ore mining were the primary motives. From the 1990s onwards, the motive was logging and the vast expansion of large-scale cattle ranching, which supplies the timber sector.

In 1999, the Federal government carried out an initial investigation into *grilagem* and concluded that at least 100 million hectares had suspicious documentation. After the investigation INCRA, the agency in charge of regulating tenure on federally held land in Brazil, cancelled the registration of over 70 million hectares. One-third of this area was in Pará, some 20.8 million hectares in 422 farms.²⁴ Cancellation of INCRA registration prevents public funds from being used for development, but does not lead to the land title becoming void as, in many cases, claimant owners started suing INCRA. The legal battles are far from over.

The INCRA investigation was followed up with a more detailed investigation into *grilagem* in the Amazon by a special Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (CPI), set up by the Federal House of Deputies.²⁵ It should be noted that both the CPI and INCRA investigations failed to include the region of Porto de Moz, which has a high incidence of *grilagem* by logging companies.

One of the extraordinary cases documented by both the INCRA and CPI investigations was of land in Pará registered under the name of ‘Carlos Medeiros’. According to the CPI investigation a gang of *grileiros* (land-grabbers) used documents under the name Carlos Medeiros to seize about 12 million hectares of land, some 10 percent of Pará. However, the CPI report concluded that, based on the ambiguous documentation, “the total area controlled by Medeiros could span 35 million hectares.” This would represent some 30% of Pará. Medeiros’ lawyers and representatives broke this



Illegal land grabs have become one of the most powerful means employed by a large number of loggers, cattle ranchers and land speculators to exploit public land.

“...all illegal action aimed at transferring public land to the assets of third parties constitutes grilagem”

White Book of Illegal Land Appropriation in Brazil, INCRA 2000

“It’s not an improbable connection that wood extraction and ‘grilagem’ are used to launder money.”

Police Marshal José Alcântara Machado, São Félix do Xingú, Pará.¹⁹



Extraction of high-value timber species including mahogany and cedar finances the pioneer roads that cut through previously unavailable frontier areas.

massive area of land into parcels and sold them to dozens of third parties, with both real and invented identities.²⁶

Lawyers claiming to represent him stated that Medeiros, in the 1970s, received land from the heirs of two Portuguese settlers who had claimed ownership of large sections of Pará. A Pará judge in 1975 recognized the legitimacy of the claim of Medeiros, but was later removed from office for irregularities.²⁷

Carlos Medeiros has never come forward. His lawyers said they could not locate him to bring him to the CPI investigation. His existence has never been confirmed. He is almost certainly a 'ghost'.

Medeiros was not the only huge case that the CPI investigated in Pará. They also looked closely at land acquired by one large Brazilian company, C.R. Almeida S.A., established by Mr. Cecílio do Rego Almeida, who was listed by *Forbes* magazine in 1992 as one of the richest men in the world, and considered by *Veja* magazine to be the largest landholder. Almeida is a self-made businessman who claims ownership to some 7 million hectares of forest, almost the size of Belgium and Holland together, in two large farms (*Fazenda Curuá* and *Fazenda Xingu*) in the Middle Land.²⁸ (See *Cecílioland*, page 22–23.)

Both the Federal and State authorities contest his legal ownership. *"The CPI considered illegitimate the ownership and property of Fazenda Curuá... registered in the name of Sr. Cecílio do Rego Almeida,"* at the Cartório Moreira land registry office in Altamira as 4.7 million hectares.²⁹ After analyzing the documents and maps, Dr. Cândido Paraguassu Élleres, former director of ITERPA (the Pará State Land Institute), declared that he had personally found a larger area – 5.7 million hectares³⁰ – controlled by the company C.R. Almeida. *"The CPI states that it is clear that a lease contract for 30,000 hectares made possible the registration of almost 6 million hectares [in the region of the Middle Land] in the Book of Properties in the name of the company C.R. Almeida."*³¹

The tangled web of land ownership in Pará is being further exacerbated by offers of millions of hectares of land for sale over the internet. For example, www.imeisvirtuais.com.br offers dozens of 'farms' for sale, including one of 306,000 hectares in the Middle Land. The advertisement offers *"all virgin forest, at the right margin of the Iriri River, with excellent documentation"* for R\$60 (around US\$20) per hectare. Despite the large area of land on offer, the ad makes clear that only 4,356 hectares have *escritura* – or a legal land title. According to the Procuradoria Jurídica do Instituto de Terras do Pará, the legal department of ITERPA, the sales are illegal. *"The lands of this region belong to Pará State and can't be sold unless by the state itself"*, says the Procuradoria Jurídica.³²



"In the Brazilian Amazon, the expansion of cattle ranching is occurring at such a rapid pace that concerned analysts have adopted the term 'cattelization' to depict the extraordinary increase in the cattle herd."

Vieira et al. 2001

THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL QUAGMIRE OF LAND OWNERSHIP

“Only by integrating the Amazon with the Brazilian territory through developing the region and increasing its security will we be free from the threat of international control.”

General Rodrigo Otávio, former Director of the Superior Academy of War, 1971.³⁴

The process of *grilagem* has historical roots: “*In Brazil all lands were originally public in that they belonged to the Kingdom of Portugal by right of conquest. Later they were transferred to the Brazilian Empire, and then to the Republic, but always as dominion of the nation.*”³⁵ With the dissolution of the Brazilian Empire, the 1891 Brazilian Constitution of the Republic transferred all *terras devolutas* (public lands lacking official documentation) from Federal dominion to the dominion of individual states, except for land along Brazil’s international frontiers. The new Republican constitution recognized previous documents of land use, and effective private occupation of lands registered at *paróquias* (churches) and municipalities.³⁶ Proof of payment for the land, as well as demarcation of the borders and proof of occupation were required to obtain final legal private ownership of an area, even for land that had previously been registered.

Throughout the entire country, fewer than 10% of the properties complied with the new law.³⁷ The immense majority of properties in private hands therefore continued to be based on titles that didn’t prove legal private domain. The transfer of authority from Federal to State level made it very difficult, if not impossible, to confirm private land use and occupation as the states had neither the infrastructure nor, in many cases, the will to check that land registrations were legitimate. These precarious land titles were later registered in *Livro 3* (Book 3), the public registry for land title transfers – i.e. for sales and purchase of land between private owners, and transfer through inheritance. In remote areas such as the Amazon, it became common to increase the area of land on paper by thousands of hectares, or to have more than one claimant for the same area.

Despite the lack of definitive proof, and the precarious nature of the land titles, areas larger than permitted under the new law were recorded in *Livro 3*, resulting in thousands of hectares of public lands being transferred illegally to private ownership.

In the 1960s and the 1970s the military government pushed forward with large scale development plans for the Amazon – roads, railways, dams and other infrastructure projects, aided by incentives such as low-interest loans for farming and ranching. This caused an increased demand for land, and an influx of entrepreneurs keen to exploit the riches of the Amazon using government loans and grants to fund their enterprises. It also triggered a massive immigration from other regions of poor people who were promised small landholdings by the military government, under the banner “*A land without people for people without land*”.

The overall situation was further aggravated by a Military Government decree on April 1, 1971, Decreto-Lei Nº 1.164, transferring back to the Federal government ownership of all land 100 km on either side of existing and planned Federal roads and highways. Under this decree, two-thirds of the entire area of Pará State reverted to Federal government ownership. The confusion over land ownership increased, with the State and Federal governments disputing who had the right to issue land titles. This legal vacuum has been used, and is still being used, by *grileiros* to access new areas or force traditional communities to renounce their land rights.

However, the decree was considered crucial to the military dictatorship’s ambition of integrating the Amazon with the rest of Brazil by means of rapid development. In June 1970, the military announced the construction of 12,000 km of roads in the Amazon, the most important one being the Transamazon Highway, crossing the Amazon from east to west. The road has been one of the main vector for the development of the region. To attract companies, farmers and settlers, the military dictatorship ordered INCRA to create settlements along the Highway. Between 1971 and 1975, 100,000 families were transferred from poor regions of Brazil to INCRA settlement areas of 100 hectares each in size.³⁸ The ambitious highway remains unpaved, with large areas now eroded and reclaimed back by the forest. Abandoned by the State, those settlers who remained in the region support themselves by subsistence activities, or work for cattle ranchers and loggers.

WOOD FOR BLOOD

Grilagem, along with logging, is often accompanied by the use or threat of physical violence. Loggers and large landowners pressure powerless traditional communities to leave their land and, in some cases, simply expel the residents by destroying their crops, burning houses, firing at them or even by killing them.⁴⁰

Pará has the highest rate of assassinations linked to land conflicts in Brazil. Between 1985 and 2001 nearly 40 percent of the 1,237 rural workers killed in Brazil were killed in Pará, according to the Pastoral Land Commission (CPT), a Catholic organization campaigning for landless people and the poor.⁴¹ An inventory conducted by the Pará State government during the same period reported that there were 804 victims of assassination.⁴² In 2002, the number of victims increased by almost 50 percent compared to the previous year, and half were killed in Pará.⁴³

Although numerous cases of violence, including murders, are reported, they are hardly ever properly investigated. Those responsible are rarely if ever punished, often because witnesses are intimidated or killed. Public intervention is unstructured, sporadic, partial and fragmented. Different levels and sectors of government do not converse or interact. Some organized communities, who refuse to accept ruin and devastation and have proposed alternative development projects based on the sustainable use of natural resources, live under frequent threats and the risk of being killed.⁴⁴

In August 2001, Ademir Alfeu Federicci (known as 'Dema') was assassinated inside his house in front of his family. Dema, a coordinator of the Movement for the Development of the Transamazon and the Xingu Area (MDTX), had voiced numerous condemnations of corrupt politicians and illegal logging inside Indian lands in Pará, including mahogany logging.⁴⁵ Federal Police officers and the MDTX believe his murder was a contract killing. However, the civil police claimed that Dema was killed during a bungled burglary, and obtained a confession from Julio Cesar dos Santos shortly after the event. Santos has since claimed that he only confessed to the burglary after being tortured by Pará State Civil Police officers. The people believed to be behind the murder of Dema reportedly attempted to silence Santos.⁴⁶

In the town of São Félix do Xingu, the main frontier for the Middle Land, 30 people have already been murdered this year in cases related to disputes for land and mahogany. The Brazilian newspaper *O Estado de S. Paulo* reported in late September – under the evocative title: “*Where the law values nothing and death costs R\$100*” – that at least three groups of gunmen are operating in the area. According to *O Estado*, the violence was related to the dispute for wood stocks, in particular mahogany, and is linked with other illegal activities.⁴⁷

A week before the article was published, eight rural workers were assassinated by gunmen on a farm in São Felix do Xingu. According to preliminary investigations, the massacre was related to the dispute over land and rich wood stocks.⁴⁸ Mario Lúcio de Avelar, the Federal Prosecutor who was leading the investigation into crime in the region and its relation with drugs and money laundering, was on the



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In July 2002, a rural worker's leader known as Brasília was assassinated one month after sending a letter to the authorities denouncing threats he and local families were receiving from loggers and farmers.



“Cattle ranchers follow the direction of loggers into the region, because logging activities capitalise, directly or indirectly, the actual and potential cattle ranchers.”

Instituto Socioambiental, 2003

‘Gunmen are often used to push and throw local people off their pieces of land.’

National Report to the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, April 2003³⁹

receiving end of a death threat and was moved to Brasília, the Federal capital, for his protection.⁴⁹ In his report, Avelar states: “According to preliminary data from Customs, the existence of much financial movement of groups, persons and companies was identified... Some of those people, due to ‘grilagem’ activities and the establishing of farms, were denounced as responsible for the crime of keeping their workers under conditions similar to slave work”.⁵⁰

VICIOUS CYCLE OF PREDATORY LOGGING, DEFORESTATION AND ‘CATTTELIZATION’ OF THE AMAZON

In 2003 Brazil became the largest exporter of beef in the world.⁵¹ Around 80 percent of Amazon deforestation areas currently in use are occupied by the cattle-ranching industry – much of it in the hands of large landowners.⁵² In the 1990s almost all of Brazil’s expansion of cattle farming took place in the Amazon – in Pará the herd was increased by nearly six million.⁵³ This rapid expansion has led some analysts to adopt the term ‘cattelization’ to depict the extraordinary increase in the Amazon cattle herd.⁵⁴

In the boom and bust cycle of predatory logging and deforestation, *madeireiros* (loggers) exploit the land, deplete it of forest cover and abandon it to the *fazendeiros* (farmers). On average, ranching requires the clearing of 1.4 hectares of Amazon forest to support one cow; it generates very limited revenue and employment.⁵⁵


The short-lived economic booms of predatory logging are created by the extraction of high value timber species – including mahogany and cedar – which finances the pioneer roads that cut through previously unavailable frontier areas. Thousands of kilometers of illegal logging roads have been opened across Pará by those in search of high value timber species, which have helped facilitate a process of colonization. The 'boom' economy begins to decline after several years, when the supply of high value timber has been depleted and a second round of logging begins.⁵⁶

Once the second or third wave of loggers starts to exploit the medium-value timber species – including jatobá, tauari and ipê – farmers or cattle-ranchers come in search of land to transform into grazing areas, profiting from the existing roads created by loggers. Where buyers are available, farmers or cattle ranchers sell remaining logs resulting from the final clearcutting of land to timber companies to finance the transformation of forest into grazing land.⁵⁷ For the timber companies it is easier and less expensive to buy logs from areas of illegal deforestation than to obtain them through authorized Forest Management Plans (FMPs).⁵⁸

Approximately 20 years after the start of the 'boom', the complete exhaustion of marketable wood occurs, and the local economy enters a crisis. Loggers abandon the region, leaving behind only low-productivity land for ranching.⁵⁹

This unsustainable pattern of an illusory rapid economic growth followed by a severe decline in forest resource, revenues and employment has led to a drastic reduction in timber production in the old logging frontiers in the east and south of Pará, also the main areas of deforestation (see *Pará Battlefield*, inside front cover).⁶⁰

Today a new cycle of deforestation is emerging in the Amazon region with the expansion of Brazil's soya market. Soya farmers are increasing their foothold on more valuable areas of land in the Amazon, within reach of export facilities in Pará. Cattle ranchers are now starting to sell their existing pastures and simply migrating to open up new areas of the Amazon. Over three-quarters of a million hectares of soya had been planted within the Amazon deforestation belt by the end of 2001.⁶¹ In Santarém, where the Tapajós and the Amazon rivers meet, Cargill has built a huge granary and a shipping terminal, and the town is now a strategic port for accessing the external market.



Over three-quarters of a million hectares of soya had been planted within the Amazon deforestation belt by the end of 2001. Cargill has built a huge granary and a shipping terminal in Santarém, which is now a strategic port for accessing the external market.

“Impunity and lack of control make possible that most of the wood is illegally exploited, with no concern about the reproduction and conservation of the species.”

Brazilian National Report to the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, April 2003⁶⁰



Federal government agents, accompanied by Greenpeace's investigations team, converge on illegal mahogany logging on public and Indian lands around the Middle Land, October 2001.

THE BALANCE OF TIMBER LEGALITY IN PARÁ STATE – 2001

The trade in timber is only legally permitted where it originates from authorized Forest Management Plans (FMPs) or authorized deforestation for the purpose of land settlement. Both have to be approved by IBAMA.⁶²

(1) Total log production in Pará – 10,800,000 m³⁶³

The exact figure of log production in Pará is almost impossible to determine due to rampant illegality in the timber industry. The above figure is based on conservative statistics from IMAZON for 2001.

(2) Log production in Pará from authorized FMPs – 4,665,383 m³

In 2001 the total authorized log production from valid FMPs in Pará amounted to 4,665,383 m³.⁶⁴ It is well known in the Amazon that many FMPs are only instruments for legalizing illegal logs through documents issued by IBAMA.

(3) Log production in Pará from authorized deforestation – 121,571 m³

The vast majority of timber coming from deforestation in Pará is illegal. In 2001, for example, the area approved by IBAMA for deforestation was only 5,342 hectares,⁶⁵ whereas the actual area of deforestation detected by INPE was a staggering 523,700 hectares.⁶⁶ In other

words, in 2001 only one percent of the total area was authorized for deforestation – and the figures in previous years are similar.⁶⁷ The authorized volume of timber produced from deforestation was 121,751 m³.

Balance of legality 2001

An initial analysis of IBAMAs authorized log production in Pará for 2001, shows that the total volume of logs from both FMPs and deforestation was 4,786,954 m³, or 44 percent of the total production estimated by IMAZON. This is, an incredible 66 percent of all timber produced in Pará would be illegal.

However, the majority of the FMP holders do not respect the legislation for harvesting or the FMPs are located in forest areas that are in fact public land, as confirmed by Greenpeace in the Porto de Moz region (see page 35–37). According to an initial assessment carried out by IBAMA-Pará in 2003, some 88 percent of all FMPs in the state have been inappropriately planted on public land. IBAMA is now giving all companies one year to present valid land title documents or their FMPs will be suspended. Until these companies can prove the legality of their properties, their legal production cannot be considered without suspicions.

SLAVERY – ALIVE AND WELL IN PARÁ

Slavery in the Amazon is a more covert process than the one which provided forced labor for the plantations of the New World in past centuries, but it is equally inhumane. Thousands of impoverished people are lured away from squalid city slums or small villages of Maranhão State, east of Pará, and other poor states of the northeast of Brazil, by hopes of making their fortunes. However, they end up in very isolated areas of Pará, generally at gunpoint, clearing areas of forest to make way for enormous cattle ranches producing beef. Between 1995 and 2001, 49% of the cases of slavery in Brazil occurred in cattle ranches and 25% were related to deforestation. The expansion of the soya frontier into the Amazon is drawing on slave labor – already six percent of all known cases.⁶⁹


Pará leads the way on slavery, a rampant problem that is affecting many other Amazon states. During the first half of 2003, Pará accounted for over 60 percent of all the workers liberated in Brazil by the government's antislavery Mobile Enforcement Team.⁷⁰ The Ministry of Labor has concluded that for every enslaved person who is freed, a further three remain in a state of servitude.⁷¹ Of the 116 cases located by the Mobile Enforcement Team in Pará in 2002,⁷² the majority originated within the timber-producing and cattle-ranching region in the south of Pará. Forty-nine of the workers were children. The region of Iri in the Middle Land is also known to have a major concentration of slave workers.⁷³

According to CPT, the Pastoral Commission on Land, Pará has more than 25,000 rural people working in slavery or semi-slavery conditions in 167 farms in the south and southeast of Pará.⁷⁴ In 2001, CPT found 45 cases involving 2,416 slave workers: this increased to 147 cases involving 5,559 workers in 2002. São Félix do Xingu municipality, on the eastern border of the Middle Land, leads the way in these perverse statistics.⁷⁵

Workers fall into the trap of slave labor most commonly by being recruited for *fazendas* (farms) by their agents, known as *gatos* (literally meaning cats), on the basis of fraudulent promises of well-paid work, accepting a verbal contract without knowing their real future. They are then taken to areas deep within the forests and become indebted with the expense of travel to the area, then through having to pay exorbitant prices for accommodation, clothes, medicine and food.⁷⁶ They receive very little or no salary and become trapped in debt bondage – defined as a form of slavery under Article 1 of the UN Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, 1956.⁷⁷



In 2002, the majority of cases of slavery originated within the timber-producing and cattle-ranching region in the south of Pará.



“Three of Brazil’s most important exports are steel, timber and beef. They account for billions of dollars in foreign earnings. All three are tainted with slavery.”

Dr Kevin Bales, Consultant to the UN Global Program on Trafficking in People, 2003.⁶⁸



Workers fall into the trap of slave labor on the basis of fraudulent promises of well-paid work. They are then taken to areas deep within the forests and become indebted with the expense of travel to the area, then through having to pay exorbitant prices for accommodation, clothes, medicine and food. This picture illustrates that people are given numbers, not names.

They are forced to live in inhumane sanitary and health conditions, sleeping under a canvas and under constant surveillance by armed guards.⁷⁸ Those who try to rebel against the subhuman conditions or to escape are sometimes simply killed.⁸¹ A few lucky ones do escape. In 2002 the BBC carried out an investigation into slave labor and deforestation in Pará. They interviewed Evandro Rodrigues who had spent most of his life logging mahogany. “We were cutting mahogany deep in the rainforest you cannot reach by plane. The power saw slipped and went into my leg. I was bleeding and couldn’t walk. But the foreman said you’ll have to walk 30 km to the farm or die. So I walked all night, with the shirt tied around my legs. My boots were full of blood.” The BBC concluded that when “Evandro reached his village after a week there was a man who was sent to shoot him: they were afraid he would denounce their logging”.⁸⁰

SECTION 2

LAND WITHOUT LAW - THE MIDDLE LAND AND PORTO DE MOZ

The struggle for land has become most significant, and often violent, in two key frontiers in the west of Pará – the Middle Land and Porto de Moz regions. Having plundered much of the rest of Pará, loggers, cattle ranchers and land speculators, amongst others, are turning these regions into the new lawless frontiers.

Brazil has far-sighted environmental laws, but policing them has proved almost impossible. The lack of governance and law enforcement has led to a situation where murder, violence, slavery, land invasions and illegal occupancy of public land are characteristic of this region of Pará. This complete lack of the rule of law makes it easy for the logging companies or large-scale farmers to seize and exploit public lands.

There is often little financial support for the Federal or State law enforcement agencies, or what support there was has been almost entirely withdrawn by cuts in the government's annual budget. This is a disastrous consequence of an agreement between the Brazilian government and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which made reducing public expenditure a precondition to continuing to receive international financial aid.⁸² Brazil currently contributes around 10.53 percent of its Gross Domestic Product to honoring the interest payments on its external debts.⁸³ Brazil is one of many countries in the Amazon region that remains in 'debt-bondage' – slaves to the IMF.

Cuts in the Federal budget have affected the whole administration, including IBAMA and the Federal Police. Over 20 years ago, with fewer crimes than today, the Federal Police in Santarém employed 48 agents, five marshals and five lawyers. In September 2002, the Federal Police office was reduced to a dozen people (most of them involved in administration), who have to cover more than half of Pará, an area the size of France. There was no fuel for the police cars. Electricity, water supply and telephones were cut off at the beginning of the year due to lack of payment, but were kept working by judicial orders. The situation became so dire that the Chief Marshall started paying bills out of her own pocket.⁸⁴ Conditions at IBAMA's office in Santarém were no different.

Even when there is funding for a handful of inspection agents, bribes become an important source of income for those who work in remote regions.⁸⁵ The new IBAMA administration is investigating various cases of corruption among its own agents in the Amazon. Recently, the new manager of IBAMA-Santarém, Geraldo Pastana, created a commission to investigate agents accused of receiving bribes and having a better lifestyle than their salaries would allow. On September 16, 2003, the Federal Police arrested three IBAMA inspectors and ten loggers in the Amazonian state of Rondônia during an operation against this corruption.⁸⁶



Satellite images released by the Brazilian Institute of Space Research in 2003 show that the majority of the illegal deforestation occurred in areas surrounding Pará's Middle Land.

“In our region there are so many families that don't have any land left because big logging companies have taken everything.”

Community woman, Porto de Moz, 2002.¹⁴⁷



METHODS COMMONLY USED BY LAND GRABBERS⁸⁷

The name *grilagem* comes from a traditional process to give forged documents the patina of age. Papers were placed in a box of crickets (*grilos*). The crickets would chew and foul the documents, making them appear worn and older than they actually were. A *grileiro* is a land-grabber who “pretends to have legitimate title to the land through a vast repertoire of deceptions.”⁸⁸ Below are some common methods used by *grileiros* to become ‘owners’ of public land in the Amazon.

Step 1. *Grileiro* identifies the land for *grilagem*

Step 2. *Grileiro* gets control of land, commonly by the following four methods:

Method A – using invalid rubber concessions (seringais).

During the 1940s and 1950s, prompted by the demands of the Second World War, Brazil required a large production of rubber and granted rubber concessions that were valid for only one year (i.e. now illegal). However decades later – mainly during the 1980s – these concession documents were still being used as a basis for applying for a land title. Most of the time, the imprecise description of land limits in the title facilitates the registration of areas much larger than the original concession. Large areas of the Middle Land have been illegally privatized based on these old *seringais*.

Method B – physical occupation of an area without any previous physical occupants.

Grileiro arrives in a forest area, demarcates this new land and guards the area with gunmen.

Method C – use of invalid concessions (sesmarias)

Between 1531 and 1822, concessions of uncultivated lands called *sesmarias*⁸⁹ were assigned to settlers to work on these lands.⁹⁰ Recently these old concession rights have occasionally been used as a basis for registering land titles, despite the fact that the system was abolished when Brazil became independent from Portugal in 1822.⁹¹

Method D – occupation, purchase or ‘false renting’ of land occupied physically by others (traditional settlers, such as ribeirinhos).

When there are several traditional small communities occupying a chain of small posses⁹² along a river or a road, a *grileiro* purchases all of the posses, or only some, including those posses at edge of the communities. He then marks a large area with paths around communities, claiming the entire area. Those

who don’t accept the *grileiro*’s claims of ownership of their land are frequently expelled from the area with the use of violence.

Step 3. *Grileiro* selects a municipal “cartório” (local notary’s office) to declare ownership of the land.

Normally the *grileiro* forges papers stating that he has occupied the area for a long time – or he depends on the complicity of notaries who declare so. Municipal *Cartórios* register the limits of properties located hundreds of miles away in the forest. Normally they do not check the validity of the *grileiro*’s claim, or cross check the application with existing land titles registered at other offices.

Step 4. *Grileiro* submits the *Cartório* document to the official land agencies and the Federal Tax Authority.

Government land agencies⁹³ usually agree to register the title of uncontested land based on *Cartórios*’ documents. In theory, a map should be submitted along with a description of the land, proof of the origin of land title and testimonies, etc. The official agencies usually accept these questionable documents from *Cartórios* and issue a certificate of registry showing that the institution is in the process of analyzing the ownership of land (a precarious document which in theory recognizes that the *grileiro* is in possession of the land until further decision). Therefore, overlapping land claims are very common. The land agency can issue a possession title, can sell or even donate the land in the cases of ‘relevant economic or social interest’. In the two last cases, the land will have a definitive title (*escritura definitiva*) of property. By law, if the total land area is greater than 2,500 hectares, its purchase or donation must be approved by the Congress. To avoid this complication, the *grileiro* registers multiple posses of less than 2,500 hectares each under the names of multiple people, some of whom may be ‘ghosts’, saying he is leasing the land for a project, such as logging (see *Crime File 3 – Grupo Madenorte*, page 43).

Usually, the *grileiro* registers the documents at the State agency (which is ITERPA in the case of Pará), as well as at INCRA (the Federal agency) and even at the Receita Federal (the Brazilian Tax Authority). The objective is to cross-register the fraud giving the consistent appearance of legality.⁹⁴

MIDDLE LAND UNDER SIEGE BY LAND GRABBERS, LOGGERS AND FARMERS

Situated between the Xingu and Tapajós rivers, the Middle Land is one of the largest relatively undisturbed areas of rainforest in the eastern Amazon. Surrounded by Indian lands, the Middle Land covers over 8 million hectares, an area about the size of Austria.⁹⁵ Most of the Middle Land is located in the municipalities of Altamira and São Félix do Xingu, with a small part in the municipality of Trairão.


The presence of indigenous groups, natural geographic barriers such as rivers with strong variations in water level and the inaccessibility of the area have contributed to making the Middle Land one of the most biologically unknown regions in the Amazon.⁹⁶ The best studies available are still those carried out by the RADAM project in the 1970s, when the Brazilian government mapped the whole Amazon by satellite. In the same decade, some scientific expeditions explored the Tapajós river valley. In 1990, more than 100 scientists and researchers participated in "Workshop 90" in Manaus to define priority areas for conservation in the Amazon. As a result, two large areas in the Middle Land, showing a very high level of endemism (species only found in this area) and many rare or threatened species of fauna and flora, were considered "very high priority" for conservation.⁹⁷

The region is of critical importance to Indian communities and to wildlife, sheltering numerous species including jaguars, giant alligators, spider monkeys and anteaters. The largest remaining concentrations of mahogany (*Swietenia macrophylla*) in Brazil are located inside the Middle Land and the surrounding Indian Lands.

The Indian Lands and the Middle Land were invaded by miners in the 1970s and loggers in the 1980s. Even though not all Indian Lands in the region are demarcated, they have some status of legal protection. The Middle Land is, however, currently legally unprotected – either on paper or otherwise. Various parties have claimed the vast majority of the area by using invalid rubber concessions (*seringais*) granted in the 1940s and 1950s.⁹⁸

Most of the Middle Land is under the jurisdiction of the Pará State land institution, ITERPA, but part is regulated by INCRA. With the Brazilian government's suspension of the exploitation and trade in mahogany in October 2001, there are no FMPs currently legally authorized in the Middle Land.

According to a private map drawn up in the 1980s, a total area covering 6.1 million hectares was based on 21 individual *seringais*.⁹⁹ A number of these and other properties in the region have since been sub-divided or sold on to third parties and have been under investigation by INCRA since 1999.¹⁰⁰ The investigation has dealt with a total area on paper covering some 118,000 km², equal to around three-quarters of the municipality of Altamira, and suspected of being illegally held.¹⁰¹



According to a private map of the Middle Land drawn up in the 1980s, land ownership covering 6.1 million hectares was based on 21 invalid rubber concessions (*seringais*).

Step 5. *Grileiro* applies for a permit to exploit the area

When the *grileiro* wants to log the land or raise cattle, he has to apply to IBAMA, the Federal environment agency, to get approval for a Forest Management Plan (FMP) or a Deforestation Permit, providing proof of land ownership. Prior to 2000, IBAMA used to issue authorizations based on either a declaration (*Declaração*) from ITERPA or INCRA, or a contract of sale or purchase between individuals (*Escritura de Compra e Venda*) from a *Cartório*.

Since August 2003, IBAMA, due to rampant forgeries, no longer accepts precarious contracts of sale or purchase issued by *Cartórios* and 'ITERPA declarations' as legitimate proof of final land title and does not authorize deforestation or FMPs based on these documents.

CECILIOLAND

Two of the properties in the Middle Land, which have been under investigation by INCRA are *Fazenda Curuá* and *Fazenda Xingu*, covering some 7 million hectares claimed through the company C.R. Almeida,¹⁰² which was founded by Cecílio do Rego Almeida.¹⁰³ In 1995, Cecílio obtained control of a company named INCENXIL,¹⁰⁴ whose owners, according to him, had a mortgage on 4.7 million hectares of land with the Bank of Pará.¹⁰⁵ After analyzing maps and documents, ITERPA stated that the area, named *Fazenda Curuá*, had in fact 5.7 million hectares.¹⁰⁶

In August 1996, ITERPA launched a lawsuit in the local court in Altamira to cancel the registry of *Fazenda Curuá*¹⁰⁷ but Cecílio's lawyers issued a counter-attack. However, the long legal battle has been complicated by the fact that *Fazenda Curuá* includes three indigenous lands (Xipaia, Curuaia and Kayapó-Baú-Mekragnoti), one National Forest, four settlement areas (two under ITERPA and two under INCRA) and one area belonging to the Brazilian Armed Forces. There are also about 200 families of *ribeirinhos* and extractivists who have lived in the area since the 1940s.¹⁰⁸ In March 2003, the Federal Prosecution office in Belém asked the Federal Justice in Santarém to cancel all land titles and registries of *Fazenda Curuá* claimed by C.R. Almeida at the Cartório de Altamira (4.7 million hectares).¹⁰⁹ In the same document he also laid criminal charges against the seven people involved, including the Cartório de Altamira's notary and her brother.¹¹⁰ According to the newspaper *O Liberal*, Cecílio was excluded on the grounds that he was older than 70 (i.e. protected by the Brazilian law).¹¹¹

Veja magazine, which dedicated a feature story to Cecílio, stated that the price of the land was R\$6 million (some US\$1 per hectare at the time). According to *Veja*, the size of 'Cecilioland' increased in 1997 when he bought several continuous areas of original *seringais* totaling 1.2 million hectares. The *seringais* were inherited by the brothers Moura along the Xingu River and were later registered as *Fazenda Xingu*. *Veja* accused Cecílio of being the largest *grileiro* in the world, controlling an area with billions of dollars worth of mahogany. Cecílio brought a court case against *Veja*, attacking the publication in an interview with *Istoé* magazine a week later,¹¹² in which he said that *Fazenda Curuá* was owned by his son, Roberto B. Almeida, and the company Rondon Projetos Ecológicos, controlled by C.R. Almeida.¹¹³ Cecílio told *Istoé* that he wants to develop 'ecological projects' in the region. Rondon commissioned a consultancy company named Phorum to produce a substantial study, called *Amazônia: Floresta para Sempre (Amazon: Forest forever)*.¹¹⁴ This has not, however, been implemented.¹¹⁵

In October 2001, Greenpeace visited and investigated Cecilioland, and, during a joint operation with IBAMA, seized, outside the area claimed by C.R. Almeida, 7,165 m³ of mahogany and 1,169 m³ of cedar illegally extracted in the Middle Land. At the time, Cecílio's company INCENXIL had received a mandate from the judge of Altamira to seize timber stolen from *Fazenda Curuá*.¹¹⁶ INCENXIL accused the mahogany king Osmar Ferreira of being responsible for the illegal harvesting.¹¹⁷ Greenpeace and IBAMA landed their planes on an airstrip at the region known as Entre Rios, property of C.R.




Veja magazine have accused Cecílio of being the largest *grileiro* (land grabber) in the world, controlling an area with billions of dollars worth of mahogany.

Almeida, and were well received by a C.R. Almeida lawyer, who stated that the company was protecting a large area of Pará from being invaded by *grileiros* and loggers. Later, through his lawyers, C.R. Almeida claimed ownership of all timber – those logs seized by his team and those seized by IBAMA. The judge of Santarém, however, decided in favor of IBAMA and ordered the timber to be donated to local communities.¹¹⁸

Rubber Concessions in the Middle Land

GREENSPACE



THE ASSAULT

Despite numerous investigations and legal proceedings being initiated by various government departments against grilagem, the illegal assault on the Middle Land has long since begun, leaving the law behind. Logging and cattle ranching are the main driving forces behind the five advancing frontiers into the Middle Land.

• **Southeast frontier – São Félix do Xingu**

Invasion 1: From the southeast, loggers and cattle ranchers are leading the advancing frontier towards the heart of the Middle Land from the town of São Félix do Xingu, on the right bank of the Xingu River. This is by far the most aggressive of all the advancing frontiers.

São Félix is a traditional mahogany logging town at the end of a 250 km section of unpaved road which connects it to the town of Xinguara on the state road PA-150. Cattle farms have replaced the rich forests alongside the Xinguara-São Félix road following many years of intensive logging for mahogany. For many years, the Xingu River has contained the advance of the farming frontier.


In response to the decreasing availability of high value species and new land for cattle farming in other areas, the natural barrier of the Rio Xingu has been crossed. An ex-mining road, linking the Rio Xingu to Vila Canopus, a mining settlement on the Rio Iriri, has become a principal route of the invasion for loggers and large *fazendeiros* into the heart of the Middle Land.¹¹⁹ From this main road, loggers have opened over 600 km of illegal roads to reach mahogany trees.¹²⁰ The majority of loggers came from the logging region covering Redenção, Rio Maria, Xinguara, Tucumã, Ourilândia and São Félix do Xingu, all of them traditional mahogany towns until a few years ago. Many are linked in some way to the mahogany kings – Osmar Alves Ferreira and Moisés Carvalho Pereira – who are notorious for logging inside indigenous lands.¹²¹

These illegal logging roads form an extensive secondary road network between the Rio Xingu and Rio Iriri, offering entry points for loggers and farmers.¹²² During late August 2003, Greenpeace conducted aerial monitoring – between Itaituba, in the northwest of the Middle Land, and Vila Canopus in the center of the Middle Land – and documented massive areas of large-scale illegal deforestation. A number were already burned or ready to be burned, but others were already in green pasture with cattle. At the current rate in the region, illegal deforestation is soon likely to cross Rio Iriri to the BR-163, the Cuiabá-Santarém Highway at the west of the Middle Land.¹²⁵



In July 2003, an agent of IBAMA and the Federal Police apprehended a truck transporting 3,500 liters of herbicide in 175 barrels. According to the manager of IBAMA-Pará, Marcílio Monteiro, the toxic chemical,¹²⁶ similar to the 'Agent Orange' used by the Americans during the Vietnam War, was to be used to deforest an area of the Middle Land near São Félix.¹²³

• **Western frontier – Novo Progresso**

Invasion 2: From the west the loggers are leading the advancing frontier from Novo Progresso (New Progress), a turbulent town with



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In response to the decreasing availability of high value species, an ex-mining road has become a principal route of the invasion for loggers and large cattle ranchers into the heart of the Middle Land. From this main road, loggers have opened over 600 km of illegal roads to reach mahogany trees.

23,000 inhabitants 750 km south of Santarém. Companies moved to the town of Novo Progresso along the Cuiabá – Santarém highway (BR-163) during the late 1990s with the expectation that it would be paved. In 1998, there were nine active sawmills, consuming around 300,000 m³ of logs a year. In 2001, the industry was in boom as the consumption of timber increased to 700,000 m³ of logs a year, with around 60 sawmills operating.¹²⁸ There are now around 200 mills in the region,¹²⁷ a number which will surely only increase when the road is paved.

Conflict over land and the rich forests of the Middle Land is rampant in this area. In July 2002, a rural workers' leader known as 'Brasília' (Bartolomeu Morais da Silva), was assassinated one month after sending a letter to the authorities denouncing threats he and local families were receiving from loggers and farmers. In the letter, entitled *Revolt of the settlers*, Brasília described in detail how the local police were colluding with farmers and gunmen to threaten and expel families that denounced *grilagem*.¹²⁸

In late 2002, a group of French journalists who went to Novo Progresso were expelled by armed loggers and farmers, arriving at their hotel in seven pickup trucks. The pilot of the chartered airplane and their guide were threatened with death. According to one of the journalists, a farmer told them that the "BR-163 is not yet paved because of pressures from Greenpeace and WWF". Another of the gang, mistaking the French journalists for Americans, stated: "You already killed all your Indians. Leave us in peace to kill ours".¹³¹

The paving of the BR-163, yet to be decided by the new Lula government, is predicted to induce massive deforestation in the region, increasing the exposure of the Middle Land to destructive logging and agriculture. In an article published in *Science* magazine, it is forecast that up to 49,000 km² of forest will be destroyed within the next 25 to 35 years by the paving of the road, with a similar area put at risk of fire.¹²⁹

The asphalt will make it cheaper and quicker to transport timber to the port of Santarém for export and to the domestic markets in the south of Brazil, providing the motivation for a second and third wave of loggers to exploit low-to-middle value timber species.¹³⁰ Crop producers from Mato Grosso State are also pushing for the Federal government to pave the BR-163. This will provide easy access to the port facilities in Santarém, which is becoming a major point of export for ships accessing the Atlantic Ocean via the Amazon River.

The section of BR-163 already paved in Mato Grosso illustrates what the future holds in store for the highway in Pará. Fifty-seven percent of the area immediately along BR-163 in Mato Grosso is already deforested, while the buffer along the unpaved road as far as Santarém is only nine percent deforested. Novo Progresso, however, has had the largest increase in deforestation rate between 2000 and 2001 – some 340 percent. In 2001, 225 km² of forest was cut down and in 2002, 767 km².¹³²



Recent satellite data analyzed by Greenpeace shows that two illegal logging roads from the BR-163 have extended across the Baú indigenous lands and reached the Rio Curuá. Many other illegal road networks are developing on the east side of the BR-163.

In 2000, Greenpeace investigated an illegal road opened by the company Porbras on the Xingu River.

• **From the northwest – Trairão**

Invasion 3: This invasion of the Middle Land, from the Itaituba and Santarém part of the Cuiabá-Santarém highway (BR-163),¹³³ is being led by the loggers and followed by large cattle ranchers.¹³⁴

Already a network of illegal logging roads is developing, and during Greenpeace's aerial monitoring in the region in late August many areas of deforestation were observed.

• **From the north – Transamazônica Highway**

Along the Transamazônica Highway, loggers, cattle ranchers and governmental settlement projects are leading the advancing frontier from the north from the following two locations:

Ruopólis Municipality

Invasion 4: In Ruopólis Municipality – towards the mouth of Riozinho do Anfrísio – the advance is from a mixture of governmental settlement projects and also logging and cattle ranching.

Uruará Municipality

Invasion 5: In Uruará Municipality an illegal logging road, known as the Trans-Iriri road, now crosses the indigenous land of the Cachoeira Seca do Iriri and meets the Rio Iriri, which has become an important route for smuggling illegal logs to feed mills in the region. In Uruará there are powerful economic groups involved in logging in the Middle Land, including Uruará Madeireira Ltda (considered by IBAMA to belong to Osmar Ferreira, one of the mahogany kings) and Vargas and Vargas Ltda.¹³⁵

‘THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY IS BROKEN HERE’

The long-standing absence of any legitimate government in the Middle Land region has the ultimate irony. Much of the local population has become dependent for their very livelihoods on an economy rooted in illegal operations by loggers and farmers and see no alternative but to stand alongside them in opposition to government intervention.

In March 2003, the Minister of Justice, Dr Márcio Thomaz Bastos received a dossier¹³⁶ on organized crime in the south of Pará, including the Middle Land. The dossier, produced by the Institute of Amazon Studies (Instituto de Estudos Amazônicos – IEA), showed the connection between the violence in the region and *grilagem*, the illegal extraction of wood in Indian Lands, traffic of guns and drugs, and bio-piracy. The report listed various large farms – Três Poderes, J. Veríssimo, Santa Cruz, Tibórnia, Santa Cristina and Belauto, “under the control of criminals and defended with heavy weapons”. One of the cases reported was the invasion by three gunmen of the farm Barra do Triunfo, in São Felix do Xingu. During the invasion, the rural worker Antônio Queiroz was murdered – shot 16 times. Three other workers were wounded. “*The wounded and the dead were transported to São Félix, where no help could be found, not from the police, not from the local hospital.*” The hospital director was threatened by an anonymous caller stating that “*none of the workers injured would remain alive to tell the story*”.¹³⁷

This relationship between violence, farming and illegal logging in Pará has attracted the attention of the Brazilian press. *O Liberal*, reported the case of two farms, *Terra Roxa I* and *Terra Roxa II*, composed of 35 contiguous plots of 4,356 hectares, totalling 152,460 hectares in São Félix do Xingu: “*Men with heavy weapons [were] hidden there.*”¹³⁸ The area was sold by Madeireira Serra Dourada Ltda to the companies Aluminal Com. e Participações and Agropecuária Caraiabas Ltda, according to a contract of sale and purchase obtained by the newspaper. *O Liberal* stated that Serra Dourada belongs to the mahogany king Osmar Ferreira. This company has record of numerous infractions in IBAMA’s files for illegal logging and their operations were suspended by IBAMA in 2001. The area controlled by Serra Dourada technically could not be sold as it is public land, *grilada* from Pará State, INCRA and Indian Lands. In spite of this, the land was sold. The contract between Serra Dourada and the two companies obligated the buyers to “*extract all trees of the species mahogany and cedar in the area*”.¹³⁹ The area was later invaded again by at least seven men,¹⁴⁰

and the two companies, who had purchased illegal land, went to the courts to demand the removal of the invaders, and the return of the land to the companies.


According to ITERPA, however, the 35 plots were not located in the places described in the sales contract. “*The grileiros got 35 areas spread throughout the region and put them all together in a paper, and registered them at the cartórios in Altamira and São Félix ... these two cartórios are famous for supplying false documents to grileiros and are now under the control of the State Justice Tribunal.*”¹⁴¹

According to *O Liberal*, Antonio Lucena Barros (‘Maranhense’) has been under prosecution by the Federal Court of Marabá since 1998 for illegal mahogany logging inside the Kayapó Indian Reserve. IBAMA suspects that he is linked to the mahogany king Moisés Carvalho Pereira, a powerful man in Redenção.¹⁴² Maranhense has a long criminal file. He was arrested in Redenção on 26 February 2003 by the Federal Police after being accused by five federal prosecutors¹⁴³ of numerous crimes, including slavery and destruction of protected areas. His arrest was ordered by the Judge of Marabá, Herculano Nacif.

In October 2002 the TV network, Record, aired a special program about São Félix do Xingu and the region of Porto de Moz. Record TV accompanied 70 agents of IBAMA and the Federal Police in a raid on the logging towns on the Xinguara-São Félix do Xingu Road, and discovered that bridges had been sabotaged in an attempt to stop the official convoy from arriving in São Félix. The agents inspected 8 sawmills along the road and seized both mahogany logs and sawn mahogany.¹⁴⁴ The manager of one sawmill was arrested and transported to Marabá. In São Félix, the agents were received by a mob of angry farmers and loggers, accompanied by some small landholders. Although they were heavily armed, the agents were obliged to leave the town after being trapped by the mob in a restaurant. Record TV described the conflict as the fight between ‘the real Brazil’ (loggers and farmers) and ‘the official Brazil’ (the government trying to enforce the law).


“*What is happening here is that the principle of authority is broken*”, explained IBAMA agent Julio Silva.¹⁴⁵ His point was that because farmers and loggers have become the only significant economic force in the region, much of the populations in the towns have become dependent on these industries, and fight alongside them against the government.

GOVERNMENT FUNDED PROPOSAL TO PROTECT THE MIDDLE LAND GATHERERS DUST



In 2002, as a late reaction to the exposure of illegal mahogany logging in the Middle Land, the Federal government commissioned ISA – an important Brazilian NGO – to produce a conservation proposal for the area.

The result was a proposal for a network of conservation units throughout the Middle Land, including National Forests, Indigenous Lands and Extractive Reserves. To date, this proposal remains locked in a drawer in the offices of the Federal government. NGOs and local



ISA's government-funded conservation proposal to establish a network of conservation areas for the Middle Land, including National Forests, Indigenous Lands and Extractive Reserves.

communities recently decided to take 'ownership' of the maps and demand the proposal's implementation with a participatory planning process that would look at the suggested zoning.

Greenpeace considers this proposal an important step towards the objective of protecting the Middle Land against predatory activities and *grilagem*. However, a moratorium on all industrial scale activities in the area is necessary until the zoning process is complete and the protected areas are established.



Fearing the loss of their traditional lands, and desperate to put an end to illegal and predatory logging, the communities from Porto de Moz are demanding the creation of an Extractive Reserve in the region.

STATE OF CONFLICT - PORTO DE MOZ

Known as Porto de Moz, the large area of the municipalities of Porto de Moz and Prainha, on the left margin of the Rio Xingu, has become the battleground between the forest communities who live in the region and depend on its natural resources for their survival, and logging companies who have invaded the area either with or without official sanction from the authorities.

The area is the eastern part of an immense rectangle named 'Low Amazon' that covers eight million hectares of forest and small rivers between the Transamazon Highway and the Amazon, Xingu and Tapajós rivers.¹⁴⁸ The Porto de Moz rural area is home to 125 communities with a total population of around 20,000. The area was first occupied during the rubber boom, which eventually collapsed in 1914. Nowadays, communities' livelihoods are based on fishing, hunting, subsistence agriculture and the extraction and sale of forest products.¹⁴⁹

In recent years, the arrival of loggers and disputes over the communities' resources have created a situation of violent conflicts. Many cases of violence and death threats have been reported. The *Brazilian National Report on Human Rights and Environment*, presented to the United Nations High Commissioner on Human

Rights in April 2003, chose Porto de Moz as one of three municipalities in Pará in which to gather testimonies and accusations of victims affected by *grilagem* and violence.¹⁵⁰ A number of the cases are associated with illegal logging, by the timber industry or large-scale farmers in these municipalities.

There are almost no local police in Porto de Moz, and the Federal Police, who could protect the community leaders and their families, are 285 km away in Santarém. Although they are the most respected police force in Brazil, the Federal Police don't have enough agents to accomplish their tasks, nor money to transport agents to the scenes of crimes.

Loggers started to move into the Porto de Moz region in the early 1990s, to take advantage of the new markets in medium-value timber species (such as ipê, jatobá, tauari, cedar, etc.), and the development of the ports of Santarém and Breves.¹⁵¹ Most of these logging companies are small- to medium-sized Brazilian firms, which



“For every 100 families, an average 99 percent have problems with their lands and the remaining one percent is threatened with losing their land. Nobody lives well. To have this life, I believe it is better to die than live like this.”

Community leader, Porto de Moz Sustainable Development Committee, September 2002.¹⁴⁶

supply traditional Amazon wood exporters such as DLH Nordisk, Eidai, Curuatinga, Rancho da Cabocla and Madesa according to contracts registered at IBAMA.

The Porto de Moz region has become a new Eldorado for the timber industry. The rate of logging has rapidly increased in the region. By 2001, a staggering 50,000 cubic meters of logs per month was being transported along the Rio Jaurucu, a tributary of the Rio Xingu.¹⁵² The Jaurucu has become the principal route for smuggling illegal logs to feed mills in Santarém as well as mills further away in Altamira and Belém.¹⁵³

Greenpeace has identified and mapped 50 FMPs in the region, and found that between 2001 and 2003, 90 companies directly exploited or traded timber from the region. Two of these groups are of special interest due to the size of their operations, the fact that they are exploiting large forest areas and the methods they use to ensure their access to wood stocks. The groups are: Grupo Campos and Grupo Madenorte.

It was in the late 1990s that communities here really started to feel the impact of the logging companies' invasion of their traditional land. At this time the Grupo Campos became the biggest company in the region, and also achieved political and economic power. Gérson Salviano Campos was elected Mayor in 1996 and re-elected in 2000. He appointed half a dozen relatives to positions in his government, controlling all the institutional space of the municipality, and dictating the rules in order to exercise local power in economic, social and environmental planning.¹⁵⁴ Led by the mayor, the Grupo Campos is accused by IBAMA and the Federal Prosecution office of many irregularities – including illegal logging, *grilagem*¹⁵⁵ and misuse of federal public funds.¹⁵⁶

Also economically and politically influential is Madenorte and its subsidiary, Marajó Island Business, controlled by the powerful entrepreneur José Severino Filho. Local communities accuse Madenorte employees of imposing a regime of fear in the region.¹⁵⁷ Another important player is Porto de Moz Ltda, controlled by the President of the influential AIMEX (the Pará association of timber exporters).¹⁵⁸ There are no reports of violence attributed to this company. Politically less influential, but economically very aggressive, is the Portuguese company, Porbras, which has a sawmill in Senador José Porfírio, a town on the right bank of the Xingu River. In 2000, Greenpeace investigated an unauthorized road opened by Porbras on the left bank of the river for the exploitation of the rich stocks of jatobá and other wood species in Porto de Moz's forests.

PROPOSED EXTRACTIVE RESERVES – ‘VERDE PARA SEMPRE’ AND ‘RENASCER’

Fearing the loss of their traditional lands, and desperate to put an end to illegal and predatory logging, in 1999 community leaders created a resistance movement¹⁶⁰ called the Porto de Moz Sustainable Development Committee.¹⁵² In April 2000, the Rural Workers Union, representing the communities, sent a letter to INCRA, IBAMA and SECTAM – Pará State’s Department of Science, Technology and Environment – demanding the creation of an Extractive Reserve.

The first seminar on the creation of the Extractive Reserve was held in November 2001 in Porto de Moz and was attended by 300 community leaders who gave the reserve a name: *Verde para Sempre* (Green Forever). Two years later, in a similar movement, local communities of the adjacent rural municipality area of Prainha (to the west of Porto de Moz) proposed the creation of another reserve, *Renascer*.¹⁶¹ The proposed reserves are contiguous and would together create the largest area of protected forest and river under the collective control of communities in Brazil, covering around 1.6 million hectares.

The Federal government, through the CNPT (National Center for the Sustainable Development of Traditional Populations), part of IBAMA, agreed to initiate studies into the viability of the *Verde para Sempre* reserve, but these have yet to be completed due to lack of money and political will.¹⁶² Meanwhile, executive powers of the state of Pará and local mayors have been outspoken in their opposition to the creation of the reserve. The President of ITERPA-Pará, Ronaldo Barata, wrote to the then State Governor, Almir Gabriel, claiming: “If an extractive reserve is established in the area, it would be a serious impediment to the economic development of the region, since the principles on which the idea of an extractive reserve are based contain very restrictive measures.”¹⁶³

Also opposing the *Verde para Sempre* reserve are the Mayors of Porto de Moz and Painha, both from the PSDB political party, the party of former Governor Almir Gabriel and of the new Governor Simão Jatene, elected in October 2002. Gerson Campos, Mayor of Porto de Moz, expressed his opposition to the reserve in an interview with Greenpeace in 2002.¹⁶⁴ Gandor Hage, Mayor of Painha, “incited scenes of violence” at a public meeting discussing the creation of the reserve in February 2002, according to an IBAMA press release.¹⁶⁵ *O Liberal* newspaper reported that he tore up the book of signatures of community members and delegates who had attended the meeting.¹⁶⁶ Hage had been officially invited to participate in the meeting by CNPT/IBAMA as part of the assessment process for the creation of the reserve.

At the time of writing this report, the Extractive Reserve remains only an area defined on an IBAMA map and an incomplete set of viability studies. What is missing is the political will of the Federal and State governments to resolve their differences.

Tired of waiting, in September 2002 about 400 community members blocked the Rio Jaurucu, to protest against the destruction of their



Community leaders in Porto de Moz discuss the next steps in their campaign to create an Extractive Reserve which will guarantee their land rights and protect their natural resources.

forests and to ask for the creation of the *Verde para Sempre* reserve. During the protest, metal barges loaded with illegal logs exploited by the Campos Group were stopped and later seized by IBAMA. The company received two fines¹⁶⁷ by IBAMA, totaling R\$196,291.50 (around US\$67,000).¹⁶⁸ A day after the blockade, some community people, journalists and activists received death threats and were physically attacked on arriving in the city of Porto de Moz. In a national TV broadcast, a journalist from the Record TV network accused Mayor Campos of inciting violence, which she and her crew had suffered.¹⁶⁹

Since the river blockade, the anger of the loggers in the Porto de Moz region against local communities and their leaders and the opposition to the creation of *Verde para Sempre* has increased – as have the risks for social movements. For example, on the day a public meeting was held to announce the *National Report to the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights*, a local leader, Mr Idalino Nunes Assis, received a phone call warning him not to go out of his house at night, or he would run the risk of being killed¹⁷⁰ (see *Crime File 1: Grupo Campos*, page 38–41).



Tired of waiting, in September 2002 about 400 community members blocked the Rio Jaurucu, to protest against the destruction of their forests. Greenpeace supported their activities.

EXTRACTIVE RESERVES

“Today RESEX is the only judicial instrument which recognises the right of ribeirinhos to the land.”

Felício Pontes Jr., Pará Federal Public Prosecutor – April 2003¹⁷¹

Extractive Reserves (RESEX) are areas protected by law designated for the conservation and sustainable management of natural resources by the traditional communities inhabiting them. This model was developed in the 1980s by forest dwellers under the leadership of Chico Mendes and the National Council of Rubber Tappers (CNS) and adopted by the Brazilian Federal government in 1990.

These reserves guarantee local families the collective right to land and its natural resources, allowing them to support themselves by their traditional economic activities, while preserving the environment.

The responsibility to create a RESEX lies with the Federal government, but it is up to local communities to team up and request its creation.

The murder of Chico Mendes by farmers in December 1988 led to his worldwide recognition as an environmental martyr. In 1990, the Federal government issued the Extractive Reserves General Decree¹⁶⁴ which established the legal basis for the creation of such areas. In March 1990, the Brazilian government created the ‘*Extractive Reserve Chico Mendes*’, covering 970,570 hectares in the Amazon state of Acre. Since then, another 12 reserves have been created in the Amazon, giving collective ownership and control to local communities in a total area of 3.5 million hectares.

A further law from 2000, and a Decree issued in 2002, proclaims that Conservation Units should be created throughout the national territory as an instrument for consolidating public environmental protection policies established by the Ministry of the Environment.



SECTION 3

PARTNERS IN CRIME

Between 2001 and 2003, 90 companies were identified by Greenpeace as trading in logs or sawnwood originating in the proposed extractive reserves all directly exploiting the forests in the region.¹⁶⁶

Most of the 90 companies are small- or medium-sized national companies. However, toward the end of the processing chain, there are large exporters, such as Curuatinga, Rancho da Cabocla, Madesa, Eidai and DLH Nordisk.¹⁷⁴

Three of the identified companies, Grupo Campos, Comabil (Madeira Bianca) and Grupo Madenorte, have been accused of involvement in violence against local community members and activists in the Porto de Moz region.¹⁷⁵

Greenpeace's investigation identified and mapped FMPs in the region of Porto de Moz and Prainha. All areas have been mapped by Greenpeace using information and data from IBAMA, and include land titles and/or maps of the FMP as presented by the proponents (see map on page 36–37). Not all of the FMPs show the full delimitation of their area as some documents contain no geographical reference perimeters: these projects are included on the map, but the exact geographic limits are unknown (see case study on page 35).

“Declarations of posse (possession) and other precarious instruments supplied by state and federal land agencies are vague and imprecise, and do not offer legal security for environmental authority decisions on forest management plans or deforestation authorizations.”

IBAMA's President Marcus Barros, August 2003.

CASE STUDY OF PUBLIC LAND APPROPRIATION BY LOGGING COMPANIES IN PORTO DE MOZ AND PRAINHA

In total, 54 FMPs were submitted to IBAMA between 1991 and 2003 in the region of Porto de Moz and Prainha. Of these, 48 are located in the municipality of Porto de Moz, and six in Prainha. However, another FMP, located in Medicilandai, just outside Porto de Moz, was identified and mapped as it was harvesting timber¹⁷⁶ inside the areas proposed by the local communities for the Extractive Reserves *Verde para Sempre* and *Renascer*, and their surrounding areas (see *Crime File 2: Comabil*, page 41).¹⁷⁷ The total number of FMPs mapped is therefore 55.

Of these 55 FMPs, 26 were submitted between 1991 and 2000 and covered a total area of 92,879 hectares. Since 2000, 20 more new FMPs were officially submitted to IBAMA, adding 184,434 hectares to the total area of proposed exploitation of 277,314 hectares.

All six FMPs in the region of Prainha were submitted to IBAMA between 2000 and 2003, covering an area of 87,322 hectares. There are other FMPs in the area but insufficient information exists to plot them on the map.

Of the grand total of 48 plans in Porto de Moz Municipality submitted to IBAMA between 1991 and 2003, only four are outside the area requested by the communities to become registered as an Extractive Reserve. Three of these plans are on the right bank of the Xingu River: the ones under the names of Rivaldo Salviano Campos (brother of the Mayor of Porto de Moz, Gerson Campos),¹⁷⁸ Dilcilene Tenório de Souza (wife of Mayor Campos)¹⁷⁹ and Magebras (Madeiras Gerais do Brasil),¹⁸⁰ near the town of Senador José Porfírio. The fourth plan, *Madeiraira Cruz Machado*,¹⁸¹ is near the village of Vitoria do Xingu.


All 26 FMPs submitted to IBAMA between 1991 and 2000 contain a copy of a 'contract (*escritura*) of sale and purchase' registered by a *Cartório* (registry office) as proof of land ownership. However, in 13 cases, the *escrituras* did not supply sufficient proof of the chain of custody of ownership, which is necessary to prove legal title of the land, and therefore cannot be considered 'legal'. Of the remaining 13 FMPs, Greenpeace is


awaiting additional information from ITERPA.

After 2000, the practice of showing land ownership changed: only three of 29 FMPs submitted to IBAMA contained an *escritura* as the land title document. The other 26 FMPs, totalling 166,336 hectares, included an 'ITERPA declaration' as the land title document. One, in the name of Francisco Cunha da Silva, covering 2,515 hectares, introduces an 'innovation': it is based on an 'authorization of use of public state property'¹⁸² issued by the President of ITERPA. Another one has no data yet available. The remaining 24 FMPs are located within public lands and therefore are not eligible for an IBAMA authorization for exploitation, as confirmed by IBAMA's memorandum No. 001/Diref/Proge of 12 August 2003.¹⁸³ The memo instructed executive managers not to approve any FMPs or deforestation plans based on land agency declarations, including those from ITERPA.¹⁸⁴

Among 29 FMPs submitted between 2001 and 2003, five were submitted by the company Madenorte in Porto de Moz and Prainha, to harvest areas leased from 50 people claiming ownership of public land. Another three are under the names of individuals from the same list of Madenorte leasers. Three FMPs in Porto de Moz are registered in the names of shareholders of the Santarém based company Curuatinga, and one is in the name of Rivaldo Campos (shareholder of Maturu sawmill and brother of Mayor Campos). One FMP is in the name of Elias Salame, president of AIMEX, the Para Association of Timber Products Exporters.

In a letter to INCRA (the Federal land agency) IBAMA's President Marcus Barros states that "*declarations of posse (possession) and other precarious instruments supplied by state and federal land agencies are vague and imprecise, and do not offer legal security for environmental authority decisions on forest management plans or deforestation authorizations.*"¹⁸⁵ IBAMA also makes clear that documents "*of lease or other means of use and temporary possession of public land contracted between individuals cannot be accepted by IBAMA for authorization of deforestation and forest management plans.*"¹⁸⁶





FOREST MANAGEMENT PLANS IN THE PROPOSED AREA OF THE EXTRACTIVE RESERVES VERDE PARA SEMPRE AND RENASCER

- River
- Municipality
- Limit of the Proposed Extractive Reserve
- Community
- Municipality

Land Documents

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CRIME FILE 1: GRUPO CAMPOS

Grupo Campos is controlled by the Mayor of Porto de Moz, Gérson Salviano Campos. He is joint owner of the sawmill Exportadora Cariny. Two of his brothers, Rivaldo Salviano Campos (a city councilor in Porto de Moz) and Francimeire Saviano Campos (a lawyer), are co-owners of Indústria Madeireira Maturu Ltda (Maturu). The Campos brothers are also among the biggest cattle ranchers of the municipality, holding around 5,000 to 6,000 stock.¹⁸⁸

Maturu has contracts to purchase logs from at least two companies, Marajó Island Business (Grupo Madenorte) and Acaraí Comércio e Transporte Rodofluvial Ltda, both accused of involvement in illegal logging.¹⁸⁹ In 2001, Maturu supplied 5,167 m³ of sawn wood to Nordisk Timber Ltda (DLH Group).¹⁹⁰ In the same year, 150 sawmills in Pará supplied Nordisk, four of which, including Maturu, were involved in illegal operations in the Porto de Moz region.¹⁹¹

Mayor Campos is now one of the biggest landowners in the municipality, with 100,000 hectares or perhaps two to three times that area. He claims to own land that is considered to be federal public land – a farm that invades the Caxiuanã National Forest and the Pracupi settlement area, which was already demarcated by INCRA. The Federal Public Prosecution Office has denounced Campos for involvement in “*fraud and grilagem*”.¹⁹² He has also received fines for deforestation.¹⁹³

CASE IN POINT

The case which most illustrates the Campos family's involvement in forest crime is that of the trade between Maturu and Nordisk – documented by an inspector from the Belém branch of IBAMA, Formentini. Although there is ample evidence of crime in this case, including documents and videos, the final report was never acted upon by IBAMA itself.

In August 2002, an IBAMA inspection team discovered a sawmill operating illegally, close to Rio Maruá, near the Caxiuanã National Forest. The sawmill belongs to Rivaldo Campos, the joint owner of Maturu.¹⁹⁴ At the sawmill, the inspection team found 227 packages of special gauge sawn timber (angelim vermelho and maçaranduba) and 381 m³ of logs (cumaru and jatobá). A document bearing Nordisk's name was reportedly found with the sawn timber, which was ready for export. In addition, 476 logs (around 853 m³) of jatobá, maçaranduba, muiracatiara, angelim vermelho and angelim pedra were located in the forest during the investigation.¹⁹⁵


Although the timber and documents were seized by IBAMA and Rivaldo Campos was fined R\$212,583 (US\$70,000), Formentini's report explains that when IBAMA agents returned to the area they found that the confiscated sawn timber was gone and had already been sent to Breves to be exported. Also the confiscated logs had been loaded onto a barge, the *Rainha de Rondônia*, with a tugboat *Comandante Campos III*, ready to be brought to the Maturu sawmill, at the request of Rivaldo Campos. Three police officers were then appointed to accompany the tugboat with the confiscated wood and machinery, to transfer it to Breves. According to Formentini, Mayor Campos intervened in the confiscation, with the intention of stopping



Gérson Salviano Campos, logger (Campos Group) and Mayor of Porto de Moz

“My position? My position is contrary to the creation of the Reserve.”

Mayor of Porto de Moz, September 2002.



In August 2002, an IBAMA inspection team discovered an illegal sawmill belonging to Rivaldo Campos, the joint owner of Maturu. At the sawmill, a document bearing Nordisk's name was reportedly found with the sawn timber, which was ready for export.

“So he [Mayor] sent a group of soldiers to humiliate me so that I would sign a document, probably so that I would authorize them to pull down my fence, as they did. His gangsters were all armed, with revolvers, machine guns. My son asked if [they] had brought any judicial order for this. And they brought four chainsaws to destroy my fence.”

Senhor Carnaci, a farmer of about 70 years of age from Colônia Majari, Porto de Moz.



its transfer to Breves. Also, an unknown woman came to inform them that Rivaldo Campos would be “calling some armed people, to lynch the team, topple the boat and, even, if it would be the case, to reach ultimate consequences.”¹⁹⁶

Ultimately, Mayor Campos managed to become the legal depository of all the confiscated goods, according to the then Executive Manager of IBAMA-Belém. According to Formentini, Mayor Campos asked him “several times” how much he wanted to be paid to keep quiet about the wood in Breves. The inspection team went to Breves to identify the confiscated sawn timber. However they received an urgent call from the Executive Manager of IBAMA to return to Belém. Two days later, IBAMA-Breves office staff reported to the IBAMA-Belém office that there were authorizations for some of the wood in question. Two weeks later, Formentini was discharged.¹⁹⁷ The then head of IBAMA-Belém explained to Greenpeace that Formentini was punished not because of the substance of his report but for his lack of respect for authority as a manager of IBAMA. IBAMA-Belém received a parallel report, written by agents of the state police who were accompanying Formentini in the investigation to Porto de Moz and Breves. The police document listed offensive comments made by Formentini towards his boss.

In September 2002, a month after these incidents, both the metal barge *Rainha de Rondônia* and the tug-boat *Comandante Campos III* seized by Formentini’s team in August were stopped by a blockade organized by 400 community people on the Jaurucu river. Both vessels should have been out of commission pending further judicial decisions. However, the metal barge was loaded with logs destined for Maturu, according to the skipper, another brother of Mayor Campos.¹⁹⁸ The logs had no transportation documents (ATPFs).¹⁹⁹ Greenpeace has video footage of the pilot saying to an IBAMA agent that the wood was extracted “in a project up river owned by [José Biancardi]” (see *Crime File 2: Comabil*, page 41). In the video, the pilot states: “This wood is illegal, 100% illegal.”

GROUP CAMPOS AND THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN VIOLENCE

The Brazilian National Report to the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights highlights many cases of land invasion and violence by the Campos Group.¹⁸⁸ The following cases are excerpts from this report:

- João Pinheiro de Souza, a farmer, whose land – 100 hectares along the PA-167 – was reportedly invaded by Gérson Campos. João tried many times to discuss a solution with Gérson. However, according to de Souza, at his last attempt, he was threatened with death and impeded from working on his land and getting sustenance for his family because the land 'belonged' to the mayor.
- At Colônia Majari, Senhor Carnaci, a farmer of about 70 years of age, is said to have had his land violently invaded by Gérson Campos, with participation by military police. He testified, *"On 29 December 2001 the mayor called me and said that from that day on I cannot put even one nail on my land, which is 500 meters by 1000 meters. He entered 300 meters into my area. I resolved to make a fence at the limit of my land and his land. This was when he sent three armed men to tear away my fence, more than 700 meters. My lawyer told me to put up a fence again. I did that. So he [Mayor] sent a group of soldiers to humiliate me so that I would sign a document, probably so that I would authorize them to pull down my fence, as they did. His gangsters were all armed, with revolvers, machine guns. My son asked if (they) had brought any judicial order for this. And they brought four chainsaws to destroy my fence. The mayor's cows invaded my land and destroyed my field. I was forced to rent another area...The case is in the court, but nothing is solved. What I can do is to stay quiet, wait for the court, for the good will of the judge. I hope that they can resolve our situation. I am Brazilian, I have a right to a piece of land. I was born and grew up in the farm from where I get sustenance for my family."*
- In Nazaré Community, a man known as Santo Baiano had his land invaded by order of Mayor Gérson Campos. People entered his land to open trails, but ended up leaving the area because of resistance by Mr Baiano. The police were called to arrest him, but STR (*Sindicato dos Trabalhadores Rurais*) looked for a judge during the night to communicate the illegal arrest and Mr Baiano was eventually released. Mr Baiano accused a gunman known as 'Pastor' of acting under orders of Gérson Campos and showed as evidence the cartridge of a bullet which was shot

by Pastor at him. Idalino Nunes Assis of STR stated: *"We came to court asking for a security mandate for Mr Baiano, and asking also to keep him in his own land, because he is threatened and people said that they want revenge and to take him from his land. Mr Baiano has been living on that land for more than 40 years."*

- Farmers Cândido Pinheiro Sanches and Lucina Froes Castro, residents of Rio Quati, Bom Jesus Community, reported being prosecuted by Mayor Gérson Campos, alleging invasion of property. The Mayor is accused of hiring a man to open a trail in the middle of their land and field, partially destroying their crops, and threatening the couple's young children with death. According to the farmer, at the first hearing on 27 October 1999, he received an arrest warrant for refusing to sign a document that forced him to leave his lands to the mayor's wife. Eight days later, a court order authorized the destruction of his house. Mr Sanches tried to obtain a copy of the documents to inform his lawyer and constitute it in the lawsuit, however, the judge denied access to them. In order to keep his house, the farmer said he signed a document that forced him to leave the area immediately. During the trial, the victim reported the invasion by the Mayor's loggers into the community area (11 landowners) to IBAMA. IBAMA confiscated chainsaws, but three days later the logging started. The invasion of the other plots continues. According to Mr. Sanches, João Leite is the person in charge of carrying out the orders of the Mayor in the field, including giving support to the court officials when forcing court decrees, and is always armed. With the help of the STR lawyer, the farmers won the first verdict, thus temporarily keeping the land they have owned for more than 20 years. However, an appeal to the Tribunal has not yet been heard. The *varzea* (flooded forest) area of Mr Sanches' land is still being disputed at court by a city councilor, the Mayor and others. Mr Sanches tried to enroll his children in the Bolsa Escola (school scholarship) project, but has not received any reply from the government and suspects that as an object of political persecution his application is being kept at the city hall.



Mayor Campos

“He has people with heavy guns threatening residents... to protect a large area of grilagem disputed by other grileiros”.

Letter from the Rural Workers Union of Medicilândia to the State Prosecutor Mauro Mendes, accusing logger Biancardi, 18 September, 2003

CRIME FILE 2: COMABIL (MADEIREIRA BIANCARDI)

Separating *Verde para Sempre* from the Arara Indigenous Land and the Middle Land, is the town of Medicilândia with 21,000 inhabitants, 14,000 of whom live in rural areas. José Biancardi claims ownership to 14,173 hectares of forests in the municipality of Medicilândia, which includes areas in the southern part of *Verde para Sempre*.

The town of Medicilândia, on the Transamazon Highway, was named after former President Médici, a general who governed Brazil during the military dictatorship and conceived the Transamazon Highway under the banner of “a land without people for people without land”.

Biancardi, who trades with Maturu and other sawmills in the region, is the owner of the ‘project’ with “100% illegal wood” mentioned by the pilot of the *Comandante Campos* during the Jaurucu river blockade in September 2002 (see *Crime File 1: Grupo Campos*, page 38–40). According to the newspaper *O Liberal*, José Biancardi is accused of many forest crimes in the region, including illegal exploitation of timber in the Arara Indigenous Land, at the north of the Middle Land. The newspaper accused Biancardi of being linked with the murder of Ademir Federicci (Dema) and of receiving personal protection from agents of Pará’s Military Police (State Police).²⁰¹

In 1999, Biancardi submitted a forest management project to IBAMA-Santarém under the name of Comabil Ind. Com. Madeira Biancardi. He was hoping to exploit 12,000 hectares, producing 41,000m³ of wood in the first year in an area of 1,040 hectares. The area is located between the Penentecaua and Jaurucu rivers, in the Porto de Moz region. ITERPA document No.182, dated 9 December 1998, was presented to IBAMA as proof of ownership of the area to be exploited. However, ITERPA declared on 12 November 2001 that this document was false. On 30 April 2003, the Legal Department of IBAMA recommended cancellation of the project. This gave Biancardi enough time to exploit the land before being stopped by IBAMA.

In July 1999, IBAMA agents seized 140 mahogany logs being extracted by Comabil in the Arara Indian Reserve. Biancardi and his partner Constante Trezeciak were both fined.²⁰² Prior to this, both had been denounced by the Federal Prosecution office for devastation of another area in the same Indian land.

CASE IN POINT

In October 2003, the police of Altamira arrested José Biancardi, following the orders of the Judge of Medicilândia. Guns were seized and a gunman accused of involvement with drug dealing was also arrested. In an interview on local television, Biancardi claimed his innocence and said he was a victim of Fetagri (the rural workers union) and the social movements in the region. According to the police, there was a large volume of logs in the place where Biancardi was arrested, which came from the *Verde para Sempre*.²⁰³

A month before his arrest, the Rural Workers Union of Medicilândia sent a letter¹⁹² to the State Prosecutor of Altamira, Mauro Mendes, accusing Biancardi of grilagem and of closing a secondary road (known as Travessão 75),²⁰⁵ asking local people for payments for use of the road. Some 200 settlers live along this road, which departs north from the Transamazon Highway. It is one of the three main logging roads draining timber from the proposed reserve *Verde para Sempre* area to sawmills in Brasil Novo and Medicilândia municipalities, according to Greenpeace's own investigations.²⁰⁶

A month before being arrested, Biancardi had asked the Military Police in Altamira to act against three other loggers who invaded the forest area he claims to own. On 16 September 2003, four police officers went to the region, accompanied by José Biancardi, following the orders of the captain of the Military Police. In a report²⁰⁷ submitted to his commanders three days later, the sub-lieutenant in charge of the operation claimed that *"there is some doubt about the ownership rights in the complex of properties that constitutes the area"*, mentioning the fact that the land title document submitted to him by Biancardi was *"a term of agreement without legal value"*, filled out by a lieutenant and signed by Biancardi and another man named Claudio Goiano. The sub-lieutenant states that some *"100,000m³ of wood"* was illegally extracted, including Brazil nut trees which are protected by law. The report says that loggers *"devastated 20,000 hectares"*. The police team seized two trucks, four bulldozers and a chainsaw. According to the sub-lieutenant, his group also found 546 logs illegally extracted by order of two loggers, Erich Horst Peper (known as 'Jiló'), and his brother known as 'Pipoca'. He states that the logs were due to be transported by a metal barge to *"clandestine sawmills in Porto de Moz"*.

The report exposes not only conflicts amongst individual loggers, but bizarre behavior by the authorities. According to the sub-lieutenant, Jiló went to the area the next day with a lieutenant and a soldier under instructions from the Altamira's captain to liberate *"all the seized equipment and leave the place"* until he could get clarification from IBAMA on the status of exploitation. He obeyed. The sub-lieutenant also stated in this report that IBAMA had previous knowledge of the problems as their agents fined Pipoc and Jiló in 2001. *"Their embargo didn't stand for more than a week"*, he said in the report.²⁰⁸



In September 2002, a barge loaded with logs from Biancardi and destined for Maturu (Grupo Campos) was brought to stand still by 400 local communities during their blockade of the Jaurucu river. The skipper, a brother of Mayor Campos, confirmed with an IBAMA agent that "this wood is illegal, 100% illegal."



Logs stacked at Mayor Campos's sawmill in Porto de Moz.



“Our biggest conflicts have been with grileros of lands, typical in the region. With the communities, we do not have problems.”

José Severino Filho, Group Madenorte
FSC Public Meeting in Belém,
3 September 2002

CRIME FILE 3 - GRUPO MADENORTE

Grupo Madenorte is one of the most important players in the area proposed by the Porto de Moz and Prainha communities as future extractive reserves.²⁰⁹ The group is controlled by Mr José Severino Filho, and includes Madenorte S/A Laminados e Compensados, Norte Madeiras Importação e Exportação Ltda and Marajó Island Business Ltda.²¹⁰ They produce sawn timber and plywood, 90% of which is destined for export, mainly to the USA (55%), Europe (30%) and Asia (10%).²¹¹

Madenorte claims to hold 200,000 hectares of forests in Breves, Portel, Prainha and Porto de Moz municipalities.²¹² However, under its Forest Management Plan (FMP),²¹³ the company claims that the group has a total area of only 144,700 hectares in three properties: 24,900 in Portel (*Fazenda Sta. Catarina*); 72,400 in Prainha (*Fazenda Uruará*) and other of 47,400 in Porto de Moz, on the left bank of the Juarucu River (*Fazenda Jaurucu*).²¹⁴

Madenorte admits that it would need to have a total area of 360,000 hectares under management (in a 30-year harvesting cycle) in order to supply their actual timber requirements of 240,000 m³. The group consumes 175,000m³ of logs per year, of which 60 percent comes from third parties.²¹⁵

Documents issued by ITERPA and INCRA, which were submitted by Madenorte to IBAMA requesting a permit to exploit Fazenda Uruará, show that the company does not own the land. The areas are leased from 31 individuals who do not own the land either. Between 2001 and 2002, they made declarations of ownership to the state land agency ITERPA for various areas, all somewhat smaller than 2,500 hectares.²¹⁶ Curiously, none of the individuals lives in Porto de Moz: all have declared that they live in Breves, the town where Madenorte has its mill. All share the profession of ‘industry worker’. The coincidences grow: of four of the people, two share identical ID and CPF (tax)²¹⁷ numbers and addresses. Analyzing INCRA’s documents, Greenpeace discovered another curiosity: two individuals born in 1977 declared to INCRA that they had begun occupation of their area in October 1988 – when one was ten years old and the other eleven. Greenpeace has checked the names of all 31 individuals to see if they appeared on the list of more than 2,500 members of STR – the rural workers union of Porto de Moz. However, none of them was found to live in the area proposed for the extractive reserve.

Despite this bizarre situation, according to ITERPA documents, all of these people have legal rights to the land.²¹⁸ However, IBAMA did not approve Madenorte’s FMP at the Fazenda Uruará “because land cannot be leased out by someone who doesn’t own it”.²¹⁹ Following this rejection, a number of the individuals submitted new FMPs of their own to IBAMA, all using the same forest engineer, an employee of Madenorte, and these plans were approved.²²⁰

The various fines received by the group are proof that companies in Grupo Madenorte have been involved in systematic illegal logging. Between October 1999 and November 2002, IBAMA issued fines to the value of at least R\$1.1 million – around US\$300,000 at today’s exchange rates.²²¹


For the period of October 2002 to April 2003, IBAMA's records for Madenorte S/A Laminados e Compensados show 340 sales transactions between themselves and suppliers of timber.²²² An analysis of the records shows that 193 contain irregularities.

CASE IN POINT

In Rio Arimum, a tributary of Rio Acaraí, a communal area is in conflict with Madenorte and residents say they suffer threats from employees who pressure the families to sell their lands. In the Itapéua Community, neighboring Caroçal (claimed by Madenorte), people cannot hold a meeting, because the company's employees always arrive first to occupy the place, armed, to discourage participation by the residents.²²³

Greenpeace, who attended the Porto de Moz community meeting, observed that the company was accused of *grilagem* (illegal land acquisition) and irregularities in their forest management. Roberto Baunch, the representative of SCS in Brazil, confirmed to Greenpeace a week later that the certification process was now paralyzed until the company resolved some of the disputes presented at the meeting. It remains paralyzed to this day.

Madenorte also claimed that, since July 2002, IBAMA had authorized its FMP for the *Fazenda Caroçal*, which the company claimed to be 56,000 hectares. However, at the Porto de Moz meeting, representatives of Itapéua Community, adjacent to *Fazenda Caroçal*, stated that this is a small area of land of less than 500 hectares, belonging to Mr Edson Tenório, and the lands behind this *fazenda* are for his traditional use. Raul Porto, another director of Madenorte, answered these accusations by saying that ITERPA sold the lands to the company. However, this contradicts Severino Filho's statement at the Belem meeting: "...with the communities we do not have problems." Other loggers in the region and small wood extractors also questioned the legality of these lands.



The National Report to the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights documented a number of testimonies by community members in Porto De Moz – a number of them involved violence, death threats and even deaths.

TESTIMONIES BY COMMUNITY MEMBERS LOCATED WITHIN THE PROPOSED EXTRACTIVE RESERVE VERDE PARA SEMPRE

The *National Report to the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights* documents a number of testimonies by community members located within the proposed extractive reserve *Verde para Sempre*. A number of them involved violence, death threats and even deaths.

- **Benção dos Lares Community (Rio Jaurucu):**

José Orlando Duarte Souto (known as 'Ponga') and his brother invaded this community's land, demarcated the area and sold it to Sílvio Tadeu Coimbra, of Santarém. Coimbra came to Porto de Moz in January 2002, claiming to be the landowner. Death threats, without any negotiation proposals, have hindered farmers from working on their lands since December 2001.

- **Batata Community (Rio Jaurucu):** A farmer, aged 76, who has been working on her land for 48 years, testified that Sílvio Tadeu Coimbra "*has personally threatened me and also sent people to threaten me to expel me from my land*". She resisted these threats and her plantations were burned: she says she lost almost everything.

- José Orlando makes death threats to an entire family who reside in the area named **Vista Alegre** or **Casa Queimada**. The parents and eight children are all farmers, working in an area which they can only reach by boat at present, since José Orlando guards a road and trails to the river, day and night. Wood extracted in the area goes to the company of Senhor Deti. The family contacted the police and the chief police officer summoned José Orlando; however, he did not show up and no other action was taken.

- **Cristo Libertador Community (Rio Jaurucu):**

Death threats are intense in this community and the wood extracted is sold by Osmarino Filho and Raimundo brothers to Senhor Dedeca, city councilor and madeireiro at Porto de Moz.

- **São Francisco de Assis Community (Igarapé**

Ai): This area, where 20 to 25 families live, was invaded by two men, Deti and Nivaldo. In November 2002, the residents discovered that more than 300 trees had been logged. Nivaldo refused to pay any money for these trees but told the farmer who owns the land to look for another place to live and work. In 1999, the land of another resident who had lived in the area for 26 years was invaded by a gunman, hired by Nivaldo, and known to be the manager of his company.

- **São João Batista Community (Igarapé Juapi):**

This land was illegally apprehended and sold to a madeireira who exploits the adjacent region. The company threatened and intimidated the residents by invading their homes. They are hindered from working in the area; in fact, there have been records of people being killed for doing so.

- **São João do Cupari Community:** A trade unionist who cares for this 13,000 hectares community, where the residents want to make a management plan, is indignant to see the *madeireiras* rapidly snatching land. The area was demarcated by *piques* (narrow trails in the forest, informally accepted as land dividers) by residents with the help of Laboratório Agroecológico da Transamazônica (LAET). However, today the land is surrounded by *piques* placed by the company Celvapi. She has been threatened with death because of her role as a community leader.

CONCLUSIONS – WHERE IS THE NEW GOVERNMENT?

Although Brazil is the tenth largest economy in the world, it faces enormous social and economic disparities. Highly sophisticated upper and middle classes hold most of the assets and opportunities, while millions of Brazilians are condemned to poverty and hunger. Land is concentrated in the hands of a few, an inheritance from colonial times, helping to keep Brazil near the top of world rankings of inequitable revenue distribution: 10 percent of the population controls 46.8 percent of the revenue and the bottom 20 percent controls only 3.6 percent.²²⁶

Brazilian President Luís Inácio Lula da Silva was elected to power in November 2002 on a platform of ending poverty, establishing social justice and protecting the environment. But he also made a commitment to keep Brazil attractive to foreign investors and to recuperate economic growth in order to generate 7.8 million new jobs. In the current reality of a country lacking strong currency and weak in law enforcement, these objectives appear contradictory.

During the electoral campaign, the importance of the Amazon was highlighted by Lula; it was the only region to be the subject of a thematic paper²²⁷ published by the coalition of political parties.²²⁸ The paper, *The Role of the Amazon in Brazil's Development*, contains an extensive diagnosis of the region's historical problems and potential, and concludes with a long list of initiatives to be undertaken after Lula's election. The promises in this paper helped the 'left' to win the Presidential election for the first time in Brazilian history.

Lula's coalition recognized that the Amazon's potential and its vast territory are vital to the development of the entire nation of more than 170 million people: "*The country needs the opportunities offered by the Amazon and that can't be found anywhere else on the planet... however, such opportunities will only exist if the region will be conserved.*"

Lula's paper proposed a careful shift from the past economic model of boom and bust cycles of development ("*a predatory logic that ignores the basis of natural reproduction of the ecosystems in the region*") towards a new development paradigm geared toward social and environmental justice that respects cultural diversity and traditional knowledge. This aimed to reverse historical patterns of unsustainable exploitation of the region's natural resources that have brought benefit to a minority of the population. The paper concludes that the "*challenge our government proposes to face in the Amazon sees environmental investment and the sustainable use of natural resources as an opportunity for development that encompasses social concerns.*"





“In the Amazon, the State is the main driver for transformation of the economy”.

Brazilian Presidential Candidate Luís Inácio da Silva Lula's *Program of Government*, 2002.²²⁴

“...[the Program of Government would] create extractive reserves in areas occupied by traditional communities that use natural resources in a sustainable way”

Brazilian Presidential Candidate Luís Inácio da Silva Lula's *“Program of Government”*, 2002.²²⁵

According to Lula's platform for the Amazon, *“the region must generate social and economic opportunities based on its rich biodiversity and natural resources, on its population, and on the environmental services the region provides to the rest of the country and the planet. A priority is to manage, on a sustainable basis, activities contributing to deforestation, including the use of fire for land clearing, and logging extraction, whose impacts threaten regional and global climate change, loss of biodiversity and degradation of hydrological regimes affecting all of society”*.

Despite the good intentions of the Presidential campaign, the new four-year plan of government submitted to Brazil's Congress in September 2003 – *Plano Brasil para Todos* (Brazil for Everyone Plan) – shows clear signs of heading in another direction. The plan, known as PPA (Multi-Annual Plan), is the result of a series of public hearings in all Brazilian states, coordinated by the Ministry of Planning.

Lula's government intends to invest R\$1.85 trillion (US\$620 billion) from the Federal budget between 2004 and 2007 in programs aiming to ensure social inclusion, reduce social disparities and kick-start economic growth. The Plan aims for an annual economic growth of 5% by 2007 (GDP), at the same time reducing inflation to 4%. This development will be *“environmentally sustainable and will reduce regional disparities”*.²²⁹

The PPA commits R\$595 billion (US\$205 billion) to projects generating revenue. Economic growth will be fuelled by the generation of an additional 14,085 MW²³⁰ of electrical energy and the construction of 12,425 km of new transmission lines.

Of this huge investment, only R\$6.4 billion is allocated to the item 'environment'. Balancing the disparity in the environmental debt seems to be far from a real priority, as 60 percent of the total investment in the Plan will be used to address social inequity according to the item 'Social inclusion and reduction in social disparities'.

Lula's PPA intends to increase annual national crop production (led by soya) from the current 120 million tonnes to 150 million tonnes by 2007, and to triple beef exports from 1 million to 3 million tonnes per year. Both the beef and soya exporting sectors are in the hands of big land owners. Both sectors are shifting production more and more into the Amazon. Both are linked to slavery, violence and *grilagem*. Both are implicated in deforestation and have a direct partnership with the logging sector, and are far away from being considered examples of 'social inclusion'.

To transport this massive production of crops and meat to export ports and consumers, Brazil will build or improve 5,500 km of roads, and repair another 43,000 km, as well as install 2,400 km of railways, and implement 10,000 km of waterways.

Pará State will benefit from numerous investments from the Federal government. Among the roads to be paved or upgraded are BR-163 (Cuiabá-Santarém) and the Transamazon (between Marabá and Altamira). The exporting ports of Belém and Santarém will be dredged and modernized, the Tucuruí hydroelectric project will have its capacity expanded, and feasibility studies will be completed for Belo Monte – a controversial proposed hydroelectric project in the Xingu River near Altamira, between Porto de Moz and the Middle Land.

All these projects are bad news for both the environment and the local communities in the Amazon. In the last 50 years, Brazil has tried to fast-track development by attracting international investment, speculative capital and transnational companies, offering in exchange massive investments in transport and energy infrastructure. The result of this model in the Amazon was a complex of roads that remain partially unpaved and eroded (such as the Transamazonian Highway, Cuiabá-Santarém, and Manaus-Porto Velho); large and destructive hydroelectric dams such as Tucuruí (which supplies subsidized energy to mineral exporting companies in Pará), a highly competitive agribusiness sector that is destroying the *cerrado* (savanna) and the Amazon rainforest itself, and the ever-increasing concentration of land and revenues in fewer and fewer hands. Brazil's resulting immense financial debt has made the country even more dependent on external funding – and more dependent on the export of natural resources; primarily cheap commodities such as timber, beef, soy and minerals.

The largest soya producer in the world, Mr Blairo Maggi, was elected Governor of Mato Grosso in the same election that made Lula the President of Brazil. Mr Maggi is campaigning for more 'flexibility and malleability' towards the logging sector and said in July 2003 that the 25,000 km² deforested in the Amazon in one year "represents absolutely nothing compared to the size of the region".²³¹

Maggi has supplemented his economic power by adding the political influence of a Brazilian governor. Meanwhile, the Minister of the Environment, Ms Marina Silva, a former rubber-tapper whose appointment brought immense hope when it was announced by Lula, faces a struggle with powerful colleagues such as the Minister of Agriculture, an aggressive defender of genetically engineered soya and the expansion of agribusiness. At the same time as she struggles to run a ministry handicapped by serious underfunding.

The risk is that the losers of this battle will once again be the environment and the powerless communities and settlers scattered throughout the Amazon. As is the case throughout the world for the poor and disempowered, they are the people least able to compete in the global economy, and the least able to prove ownership of the land they have occupied for generations. They have no documents, they have no lawyers, and they have no politicians or judges in their back pockets.

They have only hope that one day both the social and the environmental debts will be paid. Then they will gain the respect and protection of their human and civil rights; then they will have the Amazon, upon which they depend.



The physical integrity and security of communities fighting for their forests in Porto de Moz, Prainha and the Middle Land will largely depend on whether the President Lula will keep his election promise to create Extractive Reserves throughout this region of the Amazon.



GREENPEACE DEMANDS

Greenpeace calls on the:

Brazilian Federal and State governments to:

Guarantee the physical integrity and the security of communities fighting for their forests in Porto de Moz, Prainha and the Middle Land and all the communities demanding their traditional rights in the Amazon.

Expropriate the farms where slave work occurs and designate the land to sustainable use by communities.

Expropriate *griladas* (illegally held farms) and designate them as National Parks, biological reserves, and areas for sustainable use – as already proposed to the Brazilian Congress by nine civil society organizations, including Greenpeace, on 19 April 2001.

Reinforce the operational and political capacity of the Ministry of Environment and its agencies, in particular IBAMA.

Implement the three main objectives of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) – conservation, sustainable use and equitable sharing of benefits – by immediately:

- 1. Creating** Conservation Units to be used exclusively by the extractive and riverside communities in the Municipalities of Prainha and Porto de Moz. This will guarantee the survival of the local communities and their development, and guarantee that the forest will be used by its rightful residents – those who depend on and care for it.
- 2. Suspending** all industrial scale exploitation of timber in Porto de Moz and Prainha.
- 3. Implementing** a moratorium on all industrial activities that threaten the integrity of the remaining large unprotected areas of the Middle Land.
- 4. Establishing** a network of protected areas in the Middle Land by applying the prior informed consent principles for indigenous peoples and local communities, and by applying the ecosystem based approach to biodiversity protection.

Timber Sector to:

- **Stop** buying timber and timber products derived from companies exploiting the forests in Porto de Moz and Prainha until the Extractive Reserves (*Verde para Sempre* and *Renascença*) are agreed and implemented.

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 - The exact figures are higher as large volumes of wood harvested in Pará are being exported through the ports of Paraná and Santa Catarina states, in the south of Brazil.
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 - Amnesty International 2001, Leroy & Silvestre 2003
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 - 'Chacina no Pará deixa 8 agricultores mortos', in O Estado de S. Paulo, 15 September, 2003, page A4.
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 - Channel 4 & HBO 2000; IPS 15 May, 2001; CPT 2003
 - 116 cases out of 147 involving 4,227 out of 5,559 workers were in Pará in 2002
 - Trade Union World 2002; CPT 2003
 - O Liberal, March, 8, 2003
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 - Antislavery International 1998; Channel 4 & HBO 2000; CPT 2003; Social Justice 24 April 2001; and many news articles on slave workers
 - Each of the States Parties to this Convention shall take all practicable and necessary legislative and other measures to bring about progressively and as

- soon as possible the complete abolition or abandonment of the following institutions and practices, where they still exist. Debt bondage, that is to say, the status or condition arising from a pledge by a debtor of his personal services or of those of a person under his control as security for a debt, if the value of those services as reasonably assessed is not applied towards the liquidation of the debt or the length and nature of those services are not respectively limited and defined
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 86. In "O Estado de S. Paulo", Sep 16, 2003. <http://www.estadao.com.br/ciencia/noticias/2003/set/16/175.htm>
 87. examples from the Middle Land and Porto de Moz
 88. Holston 1991
 89. Concessions of 6 léguas quadradas (1 légua=4,356ha)
 90. In Para, between 1700 and 1818, 35 "cartas de sesmarias" were confirmed with the total area approximately of 302,742ha (Instituto Socioambiental February 2003. p.127)
 91. INCRA 2000
 92. Usually about 100ha per family, considered a "modulo rural" by INCRA
 93. Two governmental institutions are responsible for the lands in the region: INCRA (federal) and ITERPA (Land Institute of the State of Pará). INCRA is responsible for the land within 100km on both sides of Transamazon highway, where it granted titles of even up to 3,000 ha as "land of Union (terra da União)", with the objectives of colonization or for the farming and cattle ranching projects. The rest of the area falls under the responsibilities of ITERPA, who acknowledges tenures ("posses") of up to 2,500 ha as soon as a series of requirements are met (including a local inspection)
 94. CPI 2002
 95. ISA 2003
 96. Phorum Consultants - report prepared for Rondon Projetos Ecológicos, no date
 97. Workshop 90, Manaus, January 1990
 98. Paulo Adário, personal communication with CPT
 99. Mapa Demonstrativo Dos Seringais Existentes no Município de Altamira depicts a total area of 6.146,950.49 hectares within the Municipality of Altamira, through 21 seringais
 100. A total of 11,812,757.30 was under investigation in Altamira, covering 16,075,500 hectares
 101. MDA & INCRA. 2002; Portaria INCRA/P/No 558/1999; ISA 2003
 102. Treccani 2001; INCRA 1999; CPI 2002; ISA 2003
 103. Cecílio do Rego Almeida is a wealthy self-made businessman born in Pará and based in the State of Paraná, who made his fortune building roads and large infrastructure projects.
 104. INCENXIL (Indústria, Comércio, Exportação e Navegação do Xingu Ltda.)
 105. Declaration of Cecílio Rego de Almeida and his lawyer published by Agência Estado, August 2002
 106. 5,694,964 hectares in total
 107. Processo n.º 270/96 – Comarca de Altamira (Ação Ordinária de Nulidade e Cancelamento de Matrícula, Transcrições – ITERPA vs. INCENXIL.
 108. INCRA 1999; CPI 2002; Processo n.º 270/96 (as previous endnote)
 109. O Liberal, 16 March, 2003, "Posses de 4,7 milhões de hectares é uma fraude"
 110. The seven accused were Roberto B. Almeida, the engineer from CR Almeida Jose R. Moraes, the 3 sellers of the property to CR Almeida Carlos Oliveira, Sebastião Oliveira and Humberto Oliveira; the notary Eugênia Silva de Freitas and her brother Sebastião Lima da Silva. Mr. Cecílio was excluded for being older than 70 (i.e. protected by the Brazilian law). The name of Sebastião Silva will be also excluded as he died during the investigations. The same happened with the main accused of fraud, Umbelino Oliveira, dead in 2002. O Liberal, 16 March, 2003
 111. Seis denunciados por fraude no Xingu", in O Liberal, June 22, 2003. (www.oliberal.com.br/arquivo/noticia/policia/n22062003default.asp)
 112. Istoé, 20 January, 1999, "Para não dizer que não falei de flores"
 113. Industria, Comércio, Exportação e Navegação do Xingu Ltda. Between 1994 and 1995, shares of INCENXIL were sold to Rondon Agropecuária Ltda. and Roberto B. de Almeida (son-in-law of C.R. Almeida), since then the shares were separated between various companies and people related to C.R. Almeida
 114. Greenpeace has a copy of the project
 115. Istoé, 20 January, 1999, "Para não dizer que não falei de flores".
 116. Mandate issued by the Judge Jackson Sodré Ferraz in 25/09/2001. Altamira, Pará
 117. In "Sobre a Guerra do Mogno", public response from CR Almeida published by Agência Estado. August 28, 2002
 118. Paulo Adário, personal communication with Federal Prosecutor, Ubiratan Cazetta, and IBAMA
 119. ISA 2003
 120. Machado 2001
 121. ISA 2003
 122. Mertens et al. 2002
 123. Greenpeace flights over the Middle land between 31 August and 1 September 2003
 124. Herbicide U-46 D (diletamina)
 125. Marcilio Monteiro, head of Ibama in Pará, quoted by the newspaper "O Liberal" in July 14, 2003
 126. Verissimo et al. 2002
 127. Amazonie, La Guerre du Bois". Témoignage Chrétien, no 3025, August 29, 2002. Paris, France
 128. Brasília's letter "Revolt of the settlers". Greenpeace has a copy of the letter
 129. Paulo Adario, personal communication with journalists, 28 August 2002
 130. Laurance et al. 2001
 131. Lima et al. 2003; Verissimo et al. 2002, Arima & Verissimo 2002
 132. INPE , 2003
 133. towards Riozinho do Anfrísio
 134. ISA 2003
 135. ISA 2003
 136. The dossier was a respected entity created in the 1990's by the current Secretary of the Amazon, Mary Allegretti.
 137. In "O Liberal", 23 March 2003
 138. Disputa de terra expõe o terror em São Félix, O Liberal, 20 October 2003
 139. Item I of the contract, according to O Liberal, 20 October 2003
 140. Named in the article
 141. O Liberal, 20 October 2003
 142. Moisés Pereira activities are described in the Greenpeace report "Partners in mahogany Crime", Greenpeace, October 2001.
 143. Federal Prosecutors Mário Lúcio Avelar, Raquel Dodge, Maria Eliane Menezes de Farias, Ubiratan Cazetta and the prosecutor of the Ministry of Labor, Lóris Pereira Júnior.
 144. Mahogany extraction, transport and trade was already forbidden by the Brazilian Government
 145. TV Record, "Reporter Record", wired in October 9, 2002. Greenpeace has a copy of the video.
 146. Name omitted for security reasons
 147. Name omitted for security reasons
 148. Municipalities includes Medicilândia, Brasil Novo, Altamira, Uruará, Trairão, Santarém, Prainha, Porto de Moz and Vitória do Xingu
 149. In general, tenure holders ("posseiros") who live near the rivers or the Transamazon highway are the only ones who have legal rights to the lands recognized by the government, even when they do not have titles to their land properties. Socially, "pique" – a narrow trail in the forests - is accepted as divisions of lands. On average, "posses" at the riverbanks are 100 ha (500m along the river x 2km from the river) and they are registered by INCRA, but beyond the 2 km from the river is a lawless area
 150. The National Reporter was nominated by the Brazilian Economic, Social and Cultural Human Rights Platform
 151. Until the 1990s, industrial scale logging was non-existent in the region, largely because markets at that time were focussed on high-value species. As there was a gradual a shift in the market, particularly in the export markets to more medium valued species several logging companies moved into the region taking advantage of the new situation
 152. Porto de Moz Rural Workers Union and Paróquia São Braz. 2001
 153. Greenpeace Amazonia 2003
 154. Silva Moreira, Edma & Hebetete, cited by Leroy & Silvestre 2003
 155. Civil Public Action against the mayor Gerson Campos, Federal Prosecution Office of Santarém, March 1st, 2003.
 156. Controladoria Geral da União: "Síntese dos Relatórios de Fiscalização, 4o sorteio. Município 25. Porto de Moz", 25 October, 2003.
 157. José Severino Filho is the president of Madenorte (source: Aimex, list of

- members – www.aimex.com.br. In Madenorte website (www.madenorte.com.br) 11 September, 2003, Marajó was mentioned as "a company of Madenorte group".
158. Leroy & Silvestre, 2003
 159. Four local executive groups represent the movement: the Rural Workers Union, the Artisanal Fishermen's Association, the Rural-Urban Women's Association and the Fishermen's Association of Porto de Moz. Other groups that take part in the Committee are four rural community associations and the Catholic Church, through the Pastoral Land Commission, which also supports the movement. The Committee is also supported by Greenpeace and by the MDTX (Movement for the Development of the Transamazon Highway and of the Xingu River)
 160. Comitê de Desenvolvimento Sustentável de Porto de Moz
 161. Renascer Reserve would have some 400,000 hectares according to the memorandum 204 send in August 2003 by the Santarém's representative of CNPT – Traditional Populations National Council – to her boss in Brasília. CNPT is an IBAMA's institution in charge of extractive reserves, among other things
 162. Investigation 02001.007795/01-48: At present, the CNPT has finished its land survey and but its report on the area's biological and socio-economic conditions is yet to be finalised
 163. Letter 067/2002-PG
 164. Greenpeace interview with Mayor Campos, September 2003 (video)
 165. IBAMA-PA 2002
 166. IBAMA-PA 2002; O Liberal 2002
 167. Act of Infraction numbers 370010 and 370090, from September 2001, 2002
 168. At October 2003 exchange rate
 169. Journalist Fernanda Fernandes, in Reporter Record, special TV program nationally broadcasted on 9 October, 2002. Record TV Network
 170. Leroy & Silvestre 2003
 171. Felício Pontes Junior, Public Prosecutor. Ideira e Debates - Terra do Meio: Poder, Violência e Desenvolvimento. Museu Paraense Emílio Goeldi, 28 April 2003
 172. Federal Decree 98.897/90
 173. Leroy & Silvestre 2003
 174. Greenpeace Amazônia 2003
 175. eg Leroy & Silvestre 2003; "Relatório da missão na área da gleba Surubim/ Medicilândia", Sep. 19, 2003; O Liberal, September 20, 2003, "Madeiro foragido bloqueia estrada para cobrar pedágio"
 176. According to the Operation Report in the area of Surubim/ Medicilândia, Military Police of Altamira, 19 September, 2003.
 177. Currently, 16 are suspended, but only after the forest had been exploited; 10 are considered by IBAMA as "pending"; 12 are authorized for exploitation; and 17 are new plans still under analysis and therefore not authorized by IBAMA.
 178. Plan number 2882/01
 179. Plan 16825/02
 180. Plan 9118/95
 181. Plan 2484/00
 182. ITERPA, document 0001/2003, from 10 October 2003, named "Autorização de Uso de Bem Público Estadual", signed by ITERPA's new president Sérgio Luiz Almeida Maneschy.
 183. Memorandum signed by the Director of Forests, Antonio Carlos Hummel and IBAMA's General Prosecutor Sebastião Azevedo, and sent to IBAMA's executive managers in all the Amazon states.
 184. Letter from 12 August 2003
 185. Letter from 1 August 2003, memorandum number 166/2003
 186. Letter from 1 August 2003, memorandum number 166/2003
 187. Greenpeace interview with Mayor Campos September 2003 (video)
 188. Salgado & Kaimowitz 2002, cited by Leroy & Silvestre 2003, Leroy & Silvestre 2003
 189. Ibama Santarém record of files
 190. Angelim vermelho, maçaranduba, piquia, quaruba, quaruba-cedro etc
 191. Greenpeace Amazônia 2003
 192. Leroy & Silvestre 2003; Salgado & Kaimowitz 2002, cited by Leroy & Silvestre 2003
 193. Leroy & Silvestre 2003
 194. Formentini 2002; Greenpeace Amazônia 2003
 195. Formentini 2002; Greenpeace Amazônia 2003
 196. Formentini 2002; Greenpeace Amazônia 2003; Leroy & Silvestre 2003
 197. Formentini 2002; Greenpeace Amazônia 2003; Leroy & Silvestre 2003
 198. Greenpeace Amazônia 2003
 199. Authorisation for Transport of Forest Products (ATPFs)
 - 200 Leroy & Silvestre 2003
 201. O Liberal, September 20, 2003, "Madeiro foragido bloqueia estrada para cobrar pedágio"
 202. O Estado de S. Paulo, 17 July, 1999
 203. A copy of the video has been received by Greenpeace
 204. The letter is dated of September 18, 2003, and signed by the president of the Union and the three settlers
 205. The name comes from the fact that the road starts at the Transamazon Highway 75 km from Altamira
 206. All three logging roads invade the area of Verde para Sempre from the south, until they reach the the Transamazon Highway. "Travessão 75" starts circa Medicilândia, as well as the "Travessão 85" meanwhile "Travessão da 20" starts in Brasil Novo
 207. "Relatório da missão na área da gleba Surubim/ Medicilândia", September 19, 2003
 208. "Relatório da missão na área da gleba Surubim/ Medicilândia", September 19, 2003
 209. Madenorte Group started as an exporting company in 1973 (Norte Madeiras Importação and Exportação Limitada). In 1976 they established a sawmill in Breves. Ten years later they diversified by creating a plywood factory named Madenorte Laminados e Compensados, in the same town, to produce 40,000 m³/year of plywood and veneer. By that time, they had already established their own customhouse in their port in Breves. Madenorte has 1,300 employees and created a Foundation (Fundação J. Severino) "to give assistance to Madenorte staff". The Foundation participated of the creation of an entity "to promote citizenship in Breves. "Concib - Conselho de Cidadania de Breves (Breves Citizenship Council)
 210. According to Mr. Severino Filho, in a public meeting on 3 September 2002, the holding company is not the owner of Marajó Island Business Ltda., although the holding company manages Marajó. However, on September 11th, the website www.madenorte.com.br showed on its first page a huge logo of the company Marajó, with the following inscription: "Marajó Island Business Ltda., of the group Madenorte...". Junta Comercial do Pará lists Luzinaldo Tomasso da Cunha and Enami Management Inc. as Marajó's associates.
 211. Scientific Certification Systems. 2002; Madenorte S.A. 2002
 212. Madenorte advertisement appeared on the page page 12 of O Liberal, 28 August 2003
 213. Madenorte FMP No. 02018.007643/03
 214. The forest area to be managed is 130,000 hectares
 215. Madenorte S/A. Projeto Xingu e audiência pública sobre certificação realizada. 3 September 2002. Belém, PA.
 216. Areas larger than 2,500 ha must be approved by the Brazilian Congress
 217. CPF is the Brazilian tax number
 218. Greenpeace has copies of all 31 declarations
 219. A similar decision was taken by IBAMA in the case of another company – Curuatinga. Ibama's Legal Division decision is No. 027/2003
 220. Forest engineer Antonio Teófilo Gomes Dias
 221. R\$1,110,133.20
 222. "Controle da prestação de contas da Madenorte SA Laminados e Compensados", IBAMA
 223. Leroy & Silvestre 2003
 224. "O Lugar da Amazônia no Desenvolvimento do Brasil", Program of Government, "Lula President"- 2002
 225. "O Lugar da Amazônia no Desenvolvimento do Brasil", Program of Government, "Lula President"- 2002
 226. In "Anuário Estatístico do Trabalhador", Departamento Intersindical de Estudos Econômicos e Sociais". São Paulo, 2001
 227. Lula's coalition published 16 thematic papers: www.lula.org/obrasil/documentos.asp
 228. The coalition was led by PT – the Workers Party founded by Lula
 229. PPA 2004-2007 – Ministério do Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão.
 231. Brazil's electric installed capacity in 2003 is 84,654 MW
 231. "Blairo frustra ministra e defende madeireiros", Gazeta de Cuiabá, 27 July 2002, www.gazetadigital.com.br.



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