

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
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**Only incorporate comments with a blue A.  
They include the other changes (appropriately modified in some cases)  
and have been adjudicated by the JSDS.**

1.		USN	S	0.0			<p>GENERAL COMMENT: There is very little of substance in this pub. Recommend all but the essential material dealing with nuclear operations be removed.</p> <p>There is repeated reference to how critical it is that nuclear and conventional forces be integrated, but there is no explanation of how to do this.</p>	Conciseness and relevance to the title of the pub.	M – JSDS comment – I'm sure we all have attempted to add value to substance of the pub – however many things remain under development in classified fora, like the integration discussion.
2.	2	NORAD	A	0.0			Joint Pub identifier and page number locations inconsistent throughout document. In some cases one or the other or both are missing.	Accuracy	A
3.	1	EUCOM	A	0.00	2	13	<p>UNDO change 19 from the previous comment matrix (i.e., change back the text so that it reads as follows): It <del>Joint Publication 3-12</del> provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not <del>the</del> intent of this publication <del>is not</del> to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.</p>	Semantic. Although there are in fact several “it”s in the text at this point, replacing “it” with the name of the publication halfway through this paragraph forces the reader do a double-take to ensure that the publication being read actually is JP 3-12 and not some other. Also, the change in lines 16, 17 is counterproductive. Before the change, the sentence meant that restricting the JFC was <i>not</i> a goal of this pub; the revised wording of the sentence means that the pub has as one of its <i>specific goals</i> not to restrict the	A

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								JFC. Although the difference is subtle, the former sense is closer to the pub's intent than the latter.	
4.	1	J7	A	.01	2	13	Change to read as follows: "It Joint Publication 3-12 provides military guidance . . . appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication is not to restrict the authority of the JFC from . . ."	This is an approved boilerplate.	M – See New Preface
5.	2	J7	A	.05	1	L col	Change to read as follows: "The first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government is defending our Nation against its enemies adversaries."	Consistency with the rest of the pub.	R – Use the New Executive Summary
6.	4	J7	A	.05	2	R col	Change to read as follows: "The new triad offers a mix of strategic offensive and defensive capabilities that include nuclear and non-nuclear strike capabilities, . . ."	Correctness.	R – Use the New Executive Summary
7.	5	J7	A	.06	1	L col	Change to read as follows: "The challenge of deterrence is to convey convincingly convey to the opposition both the will and capacity to retaliate."	Correctness IAW the chapter text.	R – Use the New Executive Summary – comment taken and incorporated there.
8.	6	J7	A	.06	2	R col	Change to read as follows: "To fulfill deterrence, US military forces are capable of achieving US national objectives throughout the range of military operations. Developing and sustaining a modern and diverse portfolio of military capabilities serves the four key defense policy goals. These capabilities require maintaining a diverse mix of conventional forces capable of high-intensity, sustained, and coordinated operations across the range of military operations; survivable and secure nuclear forces, and the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems required to direct these forces."	Correctness IAW the chapter text. Makes better sense.	R – Use the New Executive Summary
9.	7	J7	A	.06	3	R col	Change to read as follows: ". . . alternative employment options. The use of nuclear weapons represents a significant . . ."	Correctness.	R – Use the New Executive Summary – comment was

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									already incorporated there.
10.	8	J7	A	.06	4	R col	Change to read as follows: "International reaction toward the country or non-state entity that first employs WMD constitutes and important political consideration. Nevertheless, while the belligerent that initiates nuclear warfare may find itself the target of world . . ."	Correctness. Correctness IAW the chapter text. Makes better sense.	R – Use the New Executive Summary
11.	9	J7	A	.08	1	R col	Change to read as follows: "At the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander (JFC) level, targeting is the process of selecting . . ."	Acronym needs to be established.	R – Use the New Executive Summary – comment taken and incorporated there.
12.	10	J7	A	.08	1	L col	Change to read as follows: "Adversaries may conclude that their only chance of victory is the use of WMD."	Period is needed.	R – Use the New Executive Summary – Bullet Deleted.
13.	11	J7	A	.09	1	R col	Change to read as follows: "Geographic combatant commanders may request Presidential approval for the use of nuclear weapons for a variety of reasons conditions, all with the intent of deterring . . ."	Correctness IAW the chapter text.	R – Use the New Executive Summary – reasons left because Combatant commanders have reasons for making recommendations, not conditions . . .
14.	12	J7	A	.09	2	R col	Change to read as follows: "Commanders must ensure	Correctness IAW the chapter text.	R – Use

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							constraints and release guidance are clearly understood, yet execution . . .”		the New Executive Summary
15.	13	J7	A	.09	4	R col	Change to read as follows: "Geographic combatant commanders are responsible for defining theater objectives and developing nuclear plans required to support those objectives, including selecting targets. The supported commander defines the desired operational effects and, with USSTRATCOM assistance through a strategic support team, theater objectives and developing nuclear plans required to develops courses of a action to achieve those effects."	Correctness IAW the chapter text.	M – Use the New Executive Summary
16.	14	J7	A	.10	2	R col	Change to read as follows: ". . . only and be prepared to fight and win on a contaminated battlefield."	Period is needed.	M – Use the New Executive Summary
17.	15	J7	A	.10	3	R col	Change to read as follows: "This publication provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commander and other joint force commanders JFCs and prescribes doctrine for joint nuclear planning, operations, and training."	Correct use of acronym.	R – Use the New Executive Summary – comment taken and incorporated there.
18.	6	USA	A	1.01		21	Change title to read: Purpose of US Nuclear Forces.	“US” is used so much that it is not necessary to state “United States (US),” despite convention.	R – accepted Navy version.
19.		USN	A	1.01		21	Change as follows: Purpose of United States (US)-Nuclear Forces.	Don’t have to establish “US.”	M – See JSDS Comments.
20.	16	J7	A	1.01	1a	21	Change to read as follows: "Purpose of United States (US) Nuclear Forces. The first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government is defending our Nation against its enemies adversaries."	Common acronym. Consistency with the remaining pub.	R – Most of the paragraph deleted.
21.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	1.01	1	21.29	Change as follows:  " a. Purpose of United States (US) Nuclear Forces. The first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government is defending our Nation against its enemies. The US defense strategy serves the national objective of	These changes:  Directly quote the current CPG for the goals.	A – accepted comment on US ...

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							<p><u>peace with prosperity. The strategy aims to achieve four key goals that guide the development of U.S. forces capabilities, their development and use:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <u>Assuring allies and friends of the U.S. steadfastness of purpose and its capability to fulfill its security commitments.</u></li> <li>• <u>Dissuading adversaries from undertaking programs or operations that could threaten US interests or those of our allies and friends.</u></li> <li>• <u>Deterring aggression and coercion by deploying forward the capacity to swiftly defeat attacks and imposing sever penalties for aggression on an adversary's military capability and supporting infrastructure.</u></li> <li>• <u>Decisively defeating an adversary if deterrence fails.</u></li> </ul> <p><u>The size, composition, and readiness posture of US nuclear forces contribute to the each of these four goals. We best achieve this through a defense posture that makes possible war outcomes so uncertain and dangerous, as calculated by potential adversaries, as to remove all incentive for initiating attack under any circumstance.</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <u>Assurance. US nuclear forces assure our friends and allies by remaining available for the President to employ should he determine that a threat to a friend or ally warrant a potential nuclear response.</u></li> <li>• <u>Dissuasion. US nuclear forces dissuade potential adversaries by being so numerous, advanced, and reliable that the US retains an unassailable edge for the foreseeable future.</u></li> <li>• <u>Deterrence. US nuclear forces deter potential adversaries by providing the President the means to respond appropriately to an attack on the US, its friends or allies. US nuclear forces must be capable of, and be seen to be capable of, destroying those critical war-making and war-supporting assets and capabilities that a potential enemy leadership values most and that it would rely on to achieve its own objectives in a post-war world. US nuclear forces continue to deter the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and to serve as a hedge against the emergence of an overwhelming conventional threat.</u></li> <li>• <u>Defeat. US nuclear forces provide the means to apply</u></li> </ul>	<p>Attempt to give some useful one-line perspectives on how nuclear weapons support each of the goals.</p> <p>Under the Deterrence Section, the phrase:</p> <p>"US nuclear forces must be capable of, and be seen to be capable of, destroying those critical war-making and war-supporting assets and capabilities that a potential enemy leadership values most and that it would rely on to achieve its own objectives in a post-war world."</p>	

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							<u>overwhelming force to a broad range of targets in a time and manner chosen by the President."</u>	is a direct, unclassified quote from the current NUWEP – 19 April 04.	
22.	4	USN	S	1.01	1	23.24	While the Constitution allows the government to provide for the common defense, the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) does not support the opening sentence of chapter one. Recommend reviewing the CPG and modify this statement as appropriate.	To bring guiding documents into alignment.	M – See JSDS Comment
23.	20	EUCOM	S	1.01		27.29	Change this sentence to read: Thus, US nuclear forces continue to <u>serve, among other things, as an ultimate hedge against adversary deter the use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and to serve as a hedge against the emergence of an overwhelming conventional threat.</u> attack.	This sentence presents the deterrence of WMD use as the primary purpose of US nuclear weapons. Even if that is true, the statement needs to portray the concern over WMD use <i>as merely one</i> among several possible (but not necessarily stated) reasons for which the nation might elect to use nuclear weapons.	M – see JSDS comment below
24.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	1.01		27.29	Change as follows:  "Thus, US nuclear forces <del>continue to deter the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and to serve as a hedge against the emergence of an overwhelming conventional threat</del> <u>deter potential adversary use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and dissuade against a potential adversary's development of an overwhelming conventional threat.</u> "	Recognizes the deterrent role of nuclear weapons and the fact that there does not now exist even a potential overwhelming conventional threat to the US.	A
25.	31	J-3	A	1.01	1.a	27.29	"... weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and to serve..."	Grammar	M – See JSDS Comment
26.	31	DTRA	A	1.01	1.a	27.29	"... weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and to serve..."	Grammar	M – See JSDS Comment
27.	5	USMC	S	1.01	1.b	31	Change to read: "...Presidential Directive <del>44</del> 17 lays out..."	Correct reference is NSPD 17.	R -- NSPD 14 is the correct reference. Additionally, the subject of NSPD-17

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									is classified and will therefore not be reflected in this document.
28.	9.	USAF	S	1.01	1b	33	Add sentence: "...weapons planning. <u>National Security Presidential Directive 28 provides Presidential guidance on the command and control, safety and security of nuclear weapons.</u> The Policy..."	Completeness. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 28, <i>United States Nuclear Weapons Command and Control, Safety, and Security</i> (U) provides direction on various nuclear issues, to include security. Since the changes in JP 3-12 reflect items in NSPD 28, it should be referenced and summarized in JP 3-12.	A
29.	17	J7	A	1.01	1b	35	Change to read as follows: "... Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction (CJCSI) 3110.04A, <u>Nuclear Supplement to JSCP</u> , provides. . ."	References to publications need the title included.	M – See JSDS Comments
30.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	1.01	1b	35	Change as follows:  "... Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction (CJCSI) <del>3110.04A</del> 3110.04B, <u>Nuclear Supplement to JSCP for FY05</u> , provides. . ."	Accepts J7 recommendation with correct title for the document.	A
31.	6	USMC	A	1.01		36	Change to read: "...Chiefs of Staff's (CJCS's) guidance to..."	Acronym is plural not possessive in this usage.	A
32.	10.	USAF	A	1.01	1b	36	Change "CJCSs" to CJCS's"	Grammar	A
33.	21	EUCOM	A	1.01		37.38	Change "deploy" to "use" as follows: "...the combatant commanders and Service Chiefs for preparing and coordinating plans to deploy and <del>employ</del> use nuclear weapons."	Diction	R – Existing text is a direct quote of first paragraph of JSCP N
34.		USN	S	1.01 to 1.02		40 to 15	Change as follows:  c. <b>2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).</b> <del>The following laws required the Department of Defense (DOD) to conduct a</del>	Focus, relevance and simplicity	M – See JSDS Comments

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							<p>comprehensive review of the US nuclear posture and develop a long range plan to sustain and modernize US strategic nuclear forces in order to counter emerging threats and satisfy evolving deterrence requirements.</p> <p>(1) Section 1041 and 1042 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2001 (Public Law 106-398).</p> <p>(2) Section 1033 of the Fiscal Year 2002 Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 107-107).</p> <p><del>d.</del> The 2001 NPR constituted the first comprehensive review of nuclear forces since the first NPR was completed in 1994; and because of the critical role played by US nuclear forces in the national security strategy of the United States and its allies, the report was broader in scope than required by law. Conducted in parallel with the Quadrennial Defense Review—2001 (QDR 2001), the 2001 NPR reflected and reinforced the strategic premises of the QDR—2001. In a significant change to the US approach to offensive nuclear weapons, the 2001 NPR articulated a new capabilities-based strategy for US strategic nuclear forces that reflects the unpredictable security environment of the 21st century and responds to US strategic deterrence objectives and force capability requirements.</p>		
35.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	<b>S</b>	1.01 to 1.02		40 to 15	<p>Change as follows:</p> <p>c. <b>2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).</b> The following laws required the Department of Defense (DOD) to conduct a comprehensive review of the US nuclear posture and develop a long-range plan to sustain and modernize US strategic nuclear forces in order to counter emerging threats and satisfy evolving deterrence requirements.</p> <p>(1) Section 1041 and 1042 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2001 (Public Law 106-398).</p> <p>(2) Section 1033 of the Fiscal Year 2002 Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 107-107).</p> <p><del>d.</del> The 2001 NPR constituted the first comprehensive review of nuclear forces since <del>the first NPR was completed in 1994.</del></p> <p><u>(Insert as a footnote: The 1994 NPR focused on the strategic nuclear force structure which would have been deployed under the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty</u></p>	<p>These changes</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Keep the legal requirements for the NPR in view – which is important for the intended JPME audience.</li> <li>2. Moves the detail about the 1994 NPR to a footnote to support the history of NPRs, which is important – explaining how we got here. But since the 1994 NPR focused on getting the US ready to work within the bounds of a non-ratified treaty, there is little or no reason to distract the reader from the changes in US strategy (the QDR and capabilities-based) that drove</li> </ol>	<b>A</b>



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							(START II), which was never ratified. "START II: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Executive Summary," Internet available at <a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/acq/acic/treaties/start2/st2_es.htm">http://www.defenselink.mil/acq/acic/treaties/start2/st2_es.htm</a> ) <del>and because</del> Because of the critical role played by US nuclear forces in the national security strategy of the United States and its allies, the report was broader in scope than required by law. Conducted in parallel with the Quadrennial Defense Review - 2001 (QDR-2001), the 2001 NPR reflected <del>and reinforced</del> the strategic premises of the QDR- 2001. In a significant change to the US approach to offensive nuclear weapons, the 2001 NPR articulated a new capabilities-based strategy for US strategic nuclear forces that <del>reflects</del> recognizes the unpredictable security environment of the 21st century and responds to US strategic deterrence objectives and force capability requirements.	the approach to the Nuclear Posture Review.	
36.	22	EUCOM	A	1.02		11	Omit “and reinforced”	Redundant; diction: the premises did not change, so they cannot have been reinforced—only reflected.	A
37.		USN	S	1.02		17.24	Change as follows: (1) <del>Capabilities-Based Forces. The QDR 2001 shifts defense strategy to a capabilities-based approach. This approach reflects the fact that although the United States cannot know with confidence what state, combinations of states, or non-state actors will pose threats to US interests, it is possible to anticipate the capabilities an adversary might employ to coerce its neighbors or to deter or directly attack the US or US deployed forces. A capabilities-based approach focuses more on how an adversary might fight and the means it might use than who the adversary might be and where a war might occur. This approach requires a modern and diverse portfolio of military capabilities: Under the new capabilities-</del>	Focus, relevance and simplicity	M – see JSDS comments
38.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	1.02		17.24	Change as follows:  "(1) <del>Capabilities-Based Forces. The QDR 2001 shifts defense strategy to a capabilities-based approach. This approach reflects the fact that although the United States cannot know with confidence what state, combinations of</del>	Keeps the USN changes, recognizes that the "capabilities-based approach" isn't quite so "new" any more.	A

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							states, or non-state actors will pose threats to US interests, it is possible to anticipate the capabilities an adversary might employ to coerce its neighbors or to deter or directly attack the US or US deployed forces. A capabilities based approach focuses more on how an adversary might fight and the means it might use than who the adversary might be and where a war might occur. This approach requires a modern and diverse portfolio of military capabilities. Under the new capabilities ..."		
39.	23	EUCOM	A	1.02		21	General Comment: Change "employ" to "use" here and wherever possible	Diction; "employ" is a vastly overused word in military writing	R – paragraph deleted
40.	32	DTRA	A	1.02	(1)	21	"...employ to coerce its neighbors or to deter or directly attack..."	Typographic error	R – paragraph deleted
41.	32	J-3	A	1.02	(1)	21	"...employ to coerce its neighbors or to deter or directly attack..."	Typographic error	R – paragraph deleted
42.	24	EUCOM	A	1.02		23	Change "who" to "whom"	Correctness: this word is the object of the preposition "on" in line 22 and must therefore be "whom."	R – paragraph deleted
43.	11.	USAF	S	1.03	Fig I-1	N/A	Replace Minuteman I image with Minuteman III	Accuracy / Credibility. Minuteman I missiles are no longer used.	A – Images provided separately.
44.	8	USPACOM	A	1.03	Fig I-1	F1.01	Change "non-nuclear" to read, "nonnuclear"	Word misspelled. Dictionary shows as one word like almost all "non" words.	A
45.	18	J7	M	1.03		F1.01	Remove the Cold War Triad triangle from the New Triad triangle.	The inclusion of this triangle is deceptive. Per para 1d(2)(a), the strike capabilities to be considered are much broader than the old strategic triad.	R – The transition from old to new is necessary to overcome our history.
46.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	1.03		01.10	Change as follows:	These changes	A

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							<p>"... the United States will reduce its operationally-deployed strategic nuclear <del>forces</del> warheads to a range of 1,700 to 2,200. <del>operationally-deployed strategic warheads</del>. <u>This range establishes</u> the lowest possible number consistent with national security requirements and alliance obligations while maintaining a level that <del>still</del> provides a credible deterrent. <del>At the same time, these levels</del> <u>The weapons retained in a non-deployed status</u> will preserve the ability to respond to deterioration in the international security environment if necessary. <u>The</u> <del>Furthermore, the</del> NPR established an <u>initial</u> approach to reduce operationally-deployed strategic nuclear forces, <del>over the next decade</del>, outlined plans to sustain and modernize <u>the</u> existing nuclear force structure, and defined a new triad of strategic capabilities.</p>	<p>1. Mirror the Moscow Treaty language</p> <p>2. Add some detail regarding the weapons that are no longer operationally deployed without going into the active / inactive stockpile discussion.</p> <p>3. Deletes hyphen in instances of "operationally deployed"</p> <p>4. The NPR did not lay out a path for the entire decade's worth of reductions. Its specifics stop at 2007. The NPR Implementation Plan of March 2003 also did not establish specifics beyond 2007, although it did give considerable detail in the force structure through FY07.</p> <p><b>NSPD-34 directs a force structure through 2012.</b></p> <p>The specifics of the baseline nuclear force structure beyond 2007 is addressed in the <u>in-progress</u>, OSD-Policy-led Strategic Capability Assessment. <b>As of 21 December the results of the SCA had not been briefed above the USD for Policy.</b></p>	
47.		USN	A	1.03		8	Change as follows: ...operationally-deployed strategic nuclear forces...	No hyphen necessary when using adverb	A
48.		USN	A	1.03		12.13	Change as follows: The new triad offers a mix of strategic offensive and defensive capabilities that includes nuclear and non-nuclear strike capabilities,...	Verb matches singular subject "mix".	A
49.	9	USPACO M	A	1.03	d.(2)	13	Change "non-nuclear" to read, "nonnuclear"	Word misspelled. Dictionary shows as one word like almost all "non" words.	A

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50.	19	J7	A	1.03	1d(2)	15	Change to read as follows: "Enhanced command and control (C2), intelligence, and adaptive planning capabilities . . ."	Acronym needs to be established.	R – No need to establish it. It is not used for the next several pages.
51.	25	EUCOM	A	1.03		17	Change "postures deterrence" to "provides a deterrence posture"	The phrase "postures deterrence" is essentially meaningless	A
52.		USN	S	1.03		17.19	Change as follows:  The new triad postures deterrence suitable for the emerging threat environment; it incorporates post-Cold War advances in defensive and non-nuclear capabilities, and it provides additional <u>credible</u> military options <del>that are credible to adversaries and reassuring to allies.</del>	Simplicity & understanding  "military options that are credible to adversaries" doesn't make sense	R
53.	10	USPACO M	A	1.03	d.(2)	18	Change "non-nuclear" to read, "nonnuclear"	Word misspelled. Dictionary shows as one word like almost all "non" words.	A
54.		LC	A	1.03	2	18	Change as follows: "... non-nuclear capabilities; <u>and</u> , it provides ..."	Grammar	A
55.	11	USPACO M	A	1.04	d.(2)(a)	1	Change "non-nuclear" to read, "nonnuclear"	Word misspelled. Dictionary shows as one word like almost all "non" words.	A  Editors please review document globally for this admin change.
56.		USN	A	1.04	(a)	1.04	Change as follows:  "Non-nuclear strike capabilities include advanced conventional weapons systems (long-range, precision-guided weapons and associated delivery means), offensive information operations, and special operations forces <del>(the latter</del> which can be used to hunt for mobile missiles or operate against WMD facilities)."	Remove parentheses for clarity.	A

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57.	20	J7	A	1.04	1d(2) (a)	4	Change to read as follows: "Deployed nuclear strike capabilities include the three legs of the existing strategic triad ( <u>intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBMs]</u> , <u>submarine-launched ballistic missiles [SLBMs]</u> , and bombers) and theater-based . . ."	Acronyms need to be established.	R – See JSDS Comment.
58.	7	USMC	S	1.04		5.6	Change to read: "...strategic triad ( <u>intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)</u> , <u>submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)</u> , and bombers) and theater-based..." of the <del>Fiscal Year</del> <u>FY 20002</u> ..."	Acronyms should be identified on first use.	R – Acronyms defined in figure on preceding page and in glossary.  "A" vice "R" #56 and #57 are correct.  JSDS Comment.  I disagree with contactor assertion.  These are common acronyms.  They are defined in the figure on the preceding page and in the glossary.  There is no need to gum up the works with

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									<b>additional parentheses.</b>
59.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	<b>S</b>	1.04		7.8	Change to read as follows:  "... Initiative, are <del>maintained in a reserve status</del> <u>secured in central areas where they remain available, if necessary.</u>	Revised language taken from President G.H.W. Bush's speech of 27 September 1991.  Explains what was done with the weapons without unnecessary detail.	<b>A</b>
60.		DTRA	<b>S</b>	1.04	(a)	8	"... <del>a reserve status</del> <u>the Inactive Stockpile.</u> "	Factual terminology error	<b>R – Inactive, Active Stockpile characterizations more detailed than appropriate in this unclassified document</b>
61.		J-3	<b>S</b>	1.04	(a)	8	"... <del>a reserve status</del> <u>the Inactive Stockpile.</u> "	Factual terminology error	<b>R – Inactive, Active Stockpile characterizations more detailed than appropriate in this unclassified document</b>
62.	8	USA	<b>S</b>	1.04	1	10.11	Change to read: (b) Defense. Active defense includes ballistic missile defense, air defense, <u>and Air defense artillery (ADA).</u>	Rational: Air defense comprises all defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy aircraft. Air defense artillery (ADA) are units and weapons used in an AD role are the Army's contribution to joint operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)	<b>R – See JSDS comments.</b>

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
63.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	1.04	1	10.11	Change as follows: (b) <b>Defenses.</b> Active defenses include <del>ballistic missile defense</del> and air <del>defense</del> defenses.	Broadens the scope to include ballistic and cruise missile defenses.  Retains "Air Defense" which includes ADA as described by Army. #8 above.	A
64.	9	USA	S	1.04	1	11.14	Change to read:  "Passive defense includes measures that reduce vulnerability through <u>implementing operations security (OPSEC), communications security (COMSEC), and emission security (EMCOM), ...</u> " mobility, dispersal, redundancy, deception, concealment, and hardening; warn of imminent attack and support consequence management activities that mitigate the damage caused by WMD use; and protection against attacks on critical information systems. This element of the new triad comprises defenses for the US homeland, forces abroad, allies, and friends.	Rationale: FM 3-01.20, MTTP for Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC) and Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) Coordination. Chapter III.	M – See JSDS comments
65.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	1.04	1	11.15	Change as follows:  "Passive defenses include measures that reduce vulnerability through <u>operations security, communications security, emission security, physical security,</u> mobility, dispersal, redundancy, deception, concealment, and hardening. <u>Passive defenses</u> warn of imminent attack, <del>and</del> support consequence management activities that mitigate the damage caused by WMD use; <del>and protect protection against attacks on</del> critical information systems. This element of the new triad comprises defenses for the US homeland, forces abroad, allies, and friends. "	Original paragraph was a direct lift from the NPR (p 10).  Accepted most Army changes, but deleted unnecessary acronyms, since they are not used elsewhere on the page.  Broke into two parts for readability.	A
66.	26	EUCOM	A	1.04		14	Change "protection" to "protect"	Although it is difficult to see in this long, unwieldy sentence, the change is necessary to preserve parallelism. "Protect" in line 14 follows from "measures that" in	M – See JSDS comments

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								line 11.	
67.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	1.04		17.24	<p>Change as follows:</p> <p><b>(c) Infrastructure.</b> The research, and development, and industrial infrastructure includes the research facilities, manufacturing capacity, and skilled personnel needed to produce, sustain, and modernize the elements of the new triad as well as supporting intelligence and command and control (C2) capabilities.</p> <p><b>Break into two paragraphs:</b> A responsive infrastructure that can augment US military capabilities through the development of <del>timely</del> new systems or accelerated production of existing capabilities <u>in a timely manner</u> provides strategic depth to the new triad. In particular, a secure, modern, responsive nuclear weapons sector of the infrastructure is indispensable, especially as the size of the <u>operationally</u> deployed nuclear arsenal is reduced.</p>	<p>Mirrors NPR language found on pages 10 and 11 of that document with the following exceptions:</p> <p>a. replaced R&amp;D abbreviation</p> <p>b. added "the" in "the development of new..." line for readability.</p> <p>c. retained the addition of "secure" in list that characterized the infrastructure.</p> <p>d. Includes the comma after "secure" from EUCOM comment #27.</p> <p>e. Rejects EUCOM # 29. All guidance given to date focuses on keeping the existing weapons full up rounds. Because we have fewer eggs in our baskets, they have to be very good eggs.</p>	A
68.	27	EUCOM	A	1.04		19	Change "supporting" to "to support"	Parallelism	M – See JSDS comments
69.	21	J7	A	1.04	1d(2) (c)	20	Change to read as follows: "... intelligence and <del>command and control (C2)</del> capabilities."	Acronym already established.	A
70.	8	USA	A	1.04	(2)(c)	21	Remove the word "timely"	Removal of timely does not effect the meaning.	R – it does when considered in the context of a cumbersome PPBS
71.	3	USTC	A	1.04	3	21	In particular, a secure modern, responsive nuclear weapon's Infrastructure is	Grammatical –Possessive form of noun.	R – "nuclear weapons"



ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
									being used as an adjective, not a possessive
72.	28	EUCOM	A	1.04		23	Add comma after “secure”	First element in a series	M – See JSDS comments
73.	29	EUCOM	S	1.04		24	Delete everything after the word “indispensable,” as follows: “...infrastructure is indispensable, especially as the size of the deployed nuclear arsenal is reduced.”	Policy and logic. The shrinking size of the stockpile has <i>not</i> generated a need for the stockpile to be <i>more</i> secure, modern, or responsive. These requirements exist independent of stockpile size.	R – See JSDS comments
74.	10	USA	S	1.04	1d(3)	26	Change the title of (3) to read; (3) <del>Broad Array of Options</del> (3) <u>Primary Defense Policy Goals</u>	(a) Through (d) are the stated “four primary defense policy goals.” By labeling (3) Broad Array of Options leaves the reader searching for the Primary Defense Policy Goals when reading page 1.06 Para 2b, line 13.	M – See JSDS comments
75.	4	USTC	A	1.04	5	26	Change: steadiness to <u>steadfastness</u> of purpose.....	More acceptable, correct definition	M – See JSDS comments
76.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	1.04	1d(3)	26.39	Change as follows:  (3) <u>The New Triad and the Defense Policy Goals. Broad Array of Options.</u> The new triad provides the United States with a broad array of options to address a wide range of possible contingencies, and serves the four primary defense policy goals defined in the QDR-2001:  (a) <u>Assuring allies and friends;</u> (b) <u>Dissuading future military competition;</u> (c) <u>Deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests; and</u> (d) <u>If deterrence fails, decisively defeating any adversary.</u>  (a) <del>Assure allies and friends of US steadiness of purpose and capability to fulfill its military commitments.</del> (b) <del>Dissuade adversaries from pursuing programs or operations that threaten US interests or those of our allies and friends.</del>	These changes:  1. connect the title of the paragraph to the Defense Policy Goals, as commented on by Army #10.  2. replace the misquote of the Defense Policy Goals in the NPR (page 8) with actual QDR language (a – d) – see pages 11 – 13 of the 2001 QDR Report for more detail.	A

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							(c) <del>Deter threats and counter coercion against the United States, its forces, allies, and friends.</del> (d) <del>Decisively defeat any adversary and defend against attack if deterrence fails.</del>		
77.	33	DTRA	A	1.04	(3)	27	"...array of options to address a wide range of possible contingencies; and serves four..."	Grammar	M – See JSDS comments
78.	33	J-3	A	1.04	(3)	27	"...array of options to address a wide range of possible contingencies; and serves four..."	Grammar	M – See JSDS comments
79.		USN	A	1.04		30	Change as follows: Assure allies and friends of US <del>steadiness</del> <u>steadfastness</u> of purpose...	Better noun	M – See JSDS comments
80.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	1.04		41.45	Change as follows:  (4) <b>New Thinking for a New Era.</b> In a major break from Cold War thinking, <del>the results of DOD-organized</del> the 2001 <del>NPR-Nuclear Posture Review reflect around</del> the capabilities required of nuclear forces in the new strategic environment, <del>rather than around an arms control framework.</del> <u>This approach <del>capabilities that allow</del> allows</u> the United States to take the lead in reducing nuclear stockpiles rather than rely on protracted arms control negotiations. The NPR outlines implications for various arms control treaty regimes, underscores the need for a new cooperative approach to Russia, and establishes a new strategic ..."	Clarity.	<b>A</b>
81.	30	EUCOM	A	1.04		43	Change the punctuation from a colon to a dash (—)	Technically preferable to a colon here.	M – See JSDS comments
82.	31	EUCOM	A	1.05		1	Delete "more"	Syntax: Incomplete comparison	<b>R – Disagree</b> that a comparison is in effect. In fact, <i>more</i> is being used as an adverb to modify <i>consistent</i> .

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
83.		USN	A	1.05		3	Change as follows: In response, we <del>will</del> need a range of capabilities...	We need it now.	M – See JSDS comments
84.	32	EUCOM	A	1.05		3.4	Change “we” to “the US” in line 3 and “US” to “its” in line 4, as follows:  “In response, <del>we</del> <u>the US</u> will need a range of capabilities to assure friend and foe alike of <del>US</del> <u>its</u> resolve.	Semantics: illicit pronoun shift	M – See JSDS comments
85.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	1.05		3.4	Change as follows:  “In response, <del>we</del> <u>the US</u> <del>will need</del> <u>needs</u> a range of capabilities to assure friend and foe alike of <del>US</del> <u>its</u> resolve.	Incorporates USN and EUCOM comments	A
86.	23	J7	S	1.05	1c(4)	4	Change to read as follows: "A broader array of capability is needed to dissuade states from undertaking political, <del>and</del> military, or technical courses of action (COAs) that would threaten US and allied security."	What is meant by The term, “technical course of action” is not used in joint doctrine.	R – technical COA was provided by the lead agent – STRATCOM. Accept its use as an obfuscation for technical IO
87.		USN	S	1.05		4.6	Change as follows: A broader array of capability is needed to dissuade states from undertaking <u>diplomatic</u> , political, military, or technical courses of action (COAs) that would threaten US and allied security.	Accuracy and completeness  Diplomacy is between states while politics is internal to a state	A
88.		USN	A	1.05		6.07	Change as follows: ...adversaries who have access to <del>modern</del> military technology,...	Typo.	A
89.	33	EUCOM	A	1.05		7	Change “modern” to “modern”	Spelling	A
90.	9	USA	A	1.05	(4)	7	The word “modern” should be “modern.	Misspelling	A
91.	34	J-3	A	1.05	(4)	7	“ <del>modern</del> ”	Typographic error	A
92.	9	J8/Forces	A	1.05	1	7	<b>Administrative:</b> first word on line 7 should be <b>modern</b> vice	Typographical Error.	A

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
		Division					<u>modern</u> .		
							<u>Recommended Change</u> : replace letter ‘m’ with letter ‘n.’		
93.	13.	USAF	A	1.05	1d4	7	Change to read: “modern <del>modern</del> ”	Typo	A
94.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	1.05	(5)	13.22	Change as follows:  “... next generation of nuclear systems. <u>Under the requirements of the NPR, the United States will maintain a force structure that simultaneously complies with Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) limits and limits operationally-deployed strategic nuclear warheads (ODSNW) to 1,700 - 2,200 by 2012. The ODSNW total is a result of the May 2002 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (The Moscow Treaty). It is important to note that the Moscow Treaty and START are separate. The START provisions do not extend to the Moscow Treaty, and the Moscow Treaty does not terminate, extend or in any other way affect the status of START. START will remain in effect until December 5, 2009 unless it is superseded by a subsequent agreement or extended. Under the requirements of the NPR, the United States will maintain a force structure that not only complies with Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I limits but has significantly fewer operationally-deployed strategic nuclear warheads (1,700 – 2,200 by 2012) and uses a new framework for accounting and compliance than under START. The lower warhead total is a result of the May 2002 US Russia Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (The Moscow Treaty).- The NPR fulfilled ...”</u>	These changes  Restore the number of warheads  Deletes hyphen in "operationally deployed"  Reflect the issues involved in the START and Moscow Treaty that could create confusion if not explained  Correct use of the adjective "myriad"	A
95.	34	EUCOM	A	1.05		15	remove hyphen	Superfluous; the adjoining words are adverb and verb. The –ly ending makes the hyphen unnecessary.	A
96.		USN	A	1.05		15	Change as follows: ...significantly fewer operationally-deployed strategic nuclear warheads...	No hyphen necessary when using adverb	A
97.	5	USN	S	1.05	(5)	16	Delete: “...and uses a new framework for accounting and compliance than under START.”	The NPR has no requirement for accounting and compliance. It is not a binding agreement like START. Further, the Moscow Treaty does not have any	M – See JSDS comments

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								compliance-related language in it. In fact, the 1700-2200 limit only applies for one day 31 December 2012.	
98.	35	EUCOM	A	1.05		19	Omit “of”	“Myriad” is used as an adjective here and should not be followed by a preposition.	A
99.		USN	S	1.05		20.22	Change as follows: It provides a roadmap that outlines the future of US nuclear capabilities and puts forward a new framework for national security <del>in the 21st century.</del>	Removes limiting phrase  Unnecessary	M – See JSDS comments
100.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	1.05	2.a	24.45	Change as follows:  <b>2. Fundamental Considerations</b> a. <del>Deterrence. The central focus of deterrence is to dissuade an adversary’s leadership from attacking.</del>  <u>Strategic Deterrence is defined as the prevention of adversary aggression or coercion that threatens vital interests of the United States and / or our national survival. Strategic deterrence convinces adversaries not to take grievous courses of action by means of decisive influence over their decision making. (Insert the following footnote:) Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept, November 2004, p8.</u>  <u>(Insert a new paragraph)</u> <u>Deterrence broadly represents the manifestation of a potential adversary’s decision to forego actions that he would otherwise attempt. Diplomatically, the central focus of deterrence is for one nation to exert such influence over a potential adversary’s decision-making process that the potential adversary makes a deliberate choice to refrain from a course of action. The focus of US deterrence efforts is therefore to influence potential adversaries to withhold actions intended to harm US’ national interests. Such a decision is based on the adversary’s perception of the benefits of various courses of action compared with an estimation of the likelihood and magnitude of the costs or consequences corresponding to these courses of action. It is these adversary perceptions and estimations that US deterrent actions seek to influence. Potential</u>	These changes:  1. Incorporate most of the Army contributions  2. Remove most of the personal pronoun challenges  3. Gives more detail into basis of deterrence  4. Accepts Navy's recommended comma change.	A

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<p>adversary decision making in the face of US deterrent actions is also influenced by their strategic culture, idiosyncrasies of <u>decision mechanisms and the leader's decision style, and leadership risk tolerance.</u></p> <p><u>(Insert a new paragraph)</u> The effectiveness of deterrence depends on how <del>an adversary's leadership</del> <u>a potential adversary</u> views US capabilities and its will to use those capabilities. <del>If they think US forces can inflict such damage upon their military forces and means of support as to effectively deny them their war aims</del> <u>If a potential adversary is convinced that US forces can deny them their goals (by damage to their military, its support, or other things of value); and if that stops them from attacking</u> perception leads the <u>potential adversary to limit their actions</u>, then deterrence is effective. Deterrence of <u>potential adversary WMD employment use</u> requires the <u>potential adversary leadership</u> to believe the United States has both the ability and will to preempt or retaliate promptly with responses that are credible and effective.</p> <p><u>(Insert a new paragraph)</u> Deterrence assumes an opposing actor's leadership proceeds according to the logic of self-interest, <u>and</u> although this self-interest is viewed from differing cultural perspectives and the dictates of given situations. This will be particularly difficult with nonstate actors who employ or attempt to gain use of <del>a WMD weapon</del>. Here deterrence may be directed at states that support their efforts as well as the terrorist organization itself. However, the continuing proliferation of WMD along with the means to deliver them increases the probability that someday a state/nonstate actor nation/terrorist may, through miscalculation or by deliberate choice, <del>employ use</del> those weapons. In such cases, deterrence, even based on the threat of massive destruction, may fail and the United States must be prepared to use nuclear weapons; if necessary. <u>A major</u> <del>The</del> challenge of deterrence is <u>therefore</u> to convincingly convey both will and capability to the opposing actor.</p> <p><u>(Insert a new paragraph)</u> Figure I-2 lists <u>the most prominent</u> <del>that were most prominent</del> deterrence challenges in a <u>2003</u> strategic deterrence requirements study commissioned</p>		

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council for the Joint Staff		
101.	6	USN	S	1.05	2.a.	26	Add a discussion of the individual elements of deterrence including denial of benefits, imposing costs and inducing adversary restraint.	This will bring the document into alignment with the Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept and provide more insight to the reader as to how deterrence can be accomplished.	M – See JSDS comments
102.	37	EUCOM	A	1.05	2d full	26	Throughout this paragraph, the word “them” (plural) is used to refer to “adversary’s leadership” (collective singular). If a pronoun is to be used, the pronoun must be singular (like “it”). A better solution requires additionally changing “adversary’s leadership” to “adversary.” After all, “adversary” in this context <i>means</i> “leadership”— not Private Schmedlap down on the trenches.	Pronoun agreement	M – See JSDS comments
103.	38	EUCOM	A	1.05	2d full	26	Confusing use of the word “employ” throughout the paragraph; change it to “use”	See, for example, lines 35 and 36. “Use or attempt to use” is much more comprehensible.	M – See JSDS comments
104.	36	EUCOM	S	1.05		26.27	Change the first sentence of this paragraph to read: “ <del>The central focus of deterrence is to dissuade an adversary’s leadership from attacking</del> <u>cause a potential adversary to conclude that the cost of attacking is unacceptably high.</u> ”	Tempting though it may be, do not use the word “dissuade” to define “deter.” This is an illicit and confusing move since, in the QDR 2001 (see the present document, p. I-4, lines 33,34) uses “dissuade” in a technical sense that refers to nonproliferation. At no time in this document should the words “deter” and “dissuade” be used interchangeably. To do so will risk policy confusion. Also, this change resonates with the message of Figure I-2 on page I-6.	M – See JSDS comments  Concur with concern for confusion of deter and dissuade.
105.	11	USA	S	1.05	2a	27	Change first sentence to read as:  “The central focus of deterrence is exerting such influence over an adversary’s decision making that he chooses to withhold actions intended to harm United States national interests. Deterrence is the manifestation of an adversary’s decision to forego actions he would otherwise undertake in	Accuracy. Deterrence is more than preventing an attack.	M – See JSDS comments

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							the absence of deterrence. Such a decision is based on the adversary's perception of the benefits of various courses of action compared with his estimation of the likelihood and magnitude of the costs or consequences corresponding to these courses of action. It is these adversary perceptions and estimations that U.S. deterrent actions seek to influence. Adversary decision making in the face of U.S. deterrent actions is also influenced by adversary strategic culture, idiosyncrasies of decision mechanisms and leader's decision style, and leadership risk tolerance."		
106.	14.	USAF	S	1.05	2a	27.28	Change to read: "...leadership views US capabilities- <u>and will to use these capabilities.</u> "	Consistency with rest of document.	M – See JSDS comments
107.	35	DTRA	A	1.05	2.a	28	Replace: " <del>If they think US forces can inflict...is effective.</del> " Insert: " <u>Deterrence is effective when an adversary believes US forces can inflict such damage on their military forces and means of support as to deny their war aims and prevents an adversary's attack.</u> "	The original sentence is awkward; the suggested replacement makes the meaning of the sentence more clear.	M – See JSDS comments
108.	35	J-3	A	1.05	2.a	28	Replace: " <del>If they think US forces can inflict...is effective.</del> " Insert: " <u>Deterrence is effective when an adversary believes US forces can inflict such damage on their military forces and means of support as to deny their war aims and prevents an adversary's attack.</u> "	The original sentence is awkward; the suggested replacement makes the meaning of the sentence more clear.	M – See JSDS comments
109.	15.	USAF	A	1.05	2a	29	Change to read: "If they think US forces can inflict such damage upon their military forces and means of support as to effectively deny them their war aims, and <del>if that</del> <u>this stops</u> them from attacking, then deterrence is effective."	Clarity	M – See JSDS comments
110.	36	J-3	S	1.05	2.a	32.35	Replace: " <u>Deterrence assumes an opposing actor's leadership proceeds according to the logic of self-interest. However, self-interest may vary across culture and may be situationally dependent. Deterrence will be...</u> " Delete: " <del>although this self-interest is viewed from differing cultural perspectives and the dictates of given situations.</del> "	Clarify; give an idea a context	M – See JSDS comments
111.	36	DTRA	S	1.05	2.a	32.35	Replace: " <u>Deterrence assumes an opposing actor's leadership proceeds according to the logic of self-interest. However, self-interest may vary across culture and may be situationally dependent. Deterrence will be...</u> " Delete: " <del>although this self-interest is viewed from differing cultural perspectives and the dictates of given situations.</del> "	Clarify; give an idea a context	M – See JSDS comments



ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
112.		USN	S	1.05		41.42	Change as follows: ... the United States must be prepared to use nuclear weapons; if necessary.	Delete comma.	M – See JSDS comments
113.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	1.05		43	Change as follows:  "Figure I-2 lists <u>the most prominent</u> deterrence challenges <del>that were most prominent</del> in a <u>2003</u> strategic deterrence requirements study commissioned by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council for the Joint Staff."		M – See JSDS comments
114.	1.	USJFCOM	A	1.05		44	<b>Comment:</b> Specify the timeframe that the JROC study was commissioned. That would help place this action in a historical frame of reference.		M – See JSDS comments
115.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	1.05		46	Add the following new paragraph and renumber subsequent paragraphs:  <b><u>"b. Declaratory Policy.</u></b>  <u>The US does not make positive statements defining the circumstances under which it would use nuclear weapons. Maintaining US ambiguity about when it would use nuclear weapons helps create doubt in the minds of potential adversaries, deterring them from taking hostile action. This calculated ambiguity helps reinforce deterrence. If the US clearly defined conditions under which it would use nuclear weapons, others might infer another set of circumstances in which the US would not use nuclear weapons. This perception would increase the chances that hostile leaders might not be deterred from taking actions they perceive as falling below that threshold.</u>  <u>In the past, when NATO faced large Warsaw Pact conventional forces, the US repeatedly rejected calls for adoption of a no first use policy of nuclear weapons, since this policy could undermine deterrence. The US countered such calls by stating that it would not be the first to use <i>force</i> (vice nuclear force).</u>  <u>The US declaratory policy also supports its non-proliferation objectives. The US has made policy statements and binding commitments in the non-proliferation context that may seem</u>	Adds an important (and unclassified) connection between the philosophy of deterrence in the preceding paragraph and the actions and public statements of the US regarding nuclear weapons.	A

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							to create tension with its desire to enhance deterrence through ambiguity. The US policy of Negative Security Assurance (NSA) responds to that apparent tension and ensures that there is no contradiction in US policy. The US continues to reaffirm its 1978 Negative Security Assurances which state: “The U. S. will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states party to the Nonproliferation Treaty except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a state toward which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon state in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state.”		
116.	3	NORAD	A	1.06	2.b.	4	Line reads, “...what threats states, combinations of states, or nonstate actors...”. Recommend changing to read, “...what threats <b>a</b> state, combination of states, or nonstate actors...”.	Accuracy	M – See JSDS comments
117.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	1.06	2.b	4.5	Change as follows:  <b>b. Force Capabilities.</b> Real force capabilities, <u>US national determination to use them, and a potential adversary's perception of both the capabilities and the will to use them and the perceived national determination to use these forces if necessary constitute contribute to the effectiveness of deterrence.</u>	Breaks the deterrence statement into its three components: – Capabilities – Will – Adversary's perception	<b>A</b>
118.	16.	USAF	A	1.06	2b	4.5	Change to read: “Real force capabilities and the perceived national determination to use <del>these forces</del> <u>those these capabilities, if necessary, constitute deterrence.</u> ”	Clarity	M – See JSDS comments
119.		USN	<b>S</b>	1.06		5.8	Change as follows: <del>To fulfill this purpose, US military forces are capable of achieving US national objectives throughout the range of military operations.</del>	Overused joint phrase. Unnecessary here.	M – See JSDS comments
120.	10	USA	A	1.06	2.b.	7	Re-edit correction	Ambiguous phrasing and many grammatical errors.	M – See JSDS comments
121.	17.	USAF	A	1.06	2b	7	Change to read: “Although the United States cannot know with confidence what threats <u>that states, non-state, or a combination of states, or nonstate these two</u> actors pose	Clarity	M – See JSDS comments

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<del>threats</del> to US interests, it is possible to anticipate the capabilities an adversary might employ.		
122.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	1.06		7.10	Change as follows:  "Although the United States <del>cannot</del> <u>may not</u> know with confidence what threats <del>a states state</del> , combinations of states, or nonstate actors pose <del>threats</del> to US interests, it is possible to anticipate the capabilities an adversary might <del>employ</del> <u>use</u> ."	These changes incorporate most of EUCOM and USMC comments and correct the grammar.	A
123.	39	EUCOM	S	1.06		7.10	Change to read:  "Although the United States <del>cannot</del> <u>may not</u> know with confidence what threats states, combinations of states, or nonstate actors pose threats to US interests, it is possible to anticipate the capabilities an adversary might <del>employ</del> <u>use</u> ."	"May not" is much closer to reality than "cannot."	M – See JSDS comments
124.	8	USMC	A	1.06		7.9	Change to read: "...Although the United States cannot know with confidence what threats states, combinations of states, or nonstate actors pose <del>threats</del> to US interests, it is possible to anticipate the capabilities an adversary might employ. Thus, the..."	Grammar.	M – See JSDS comments
125.	37	DTRA	A	1.06	2.b	8	"... nonstate actors pose <del>threats</del> to US interests..."	Repeated word	M – See JSDS comments
126.	37	J-3	A	1.06	2.b	8	"... nonstate actors pose <del>threats</del> to US interests..."	Repeated word	M – See JSDS comments
127.	38	J-3	S	1.06	2.b	9.11	Delete: " <del>Thus, the capabilities-based approach focuses more on how an adversary might fight... and where a war might occur.</del> " Redundant; idea stated and restated already in earlier sections	This is already stated and made clear in preceding sections. Redundancy.	A
128.	38	DTRA	S	1.06	2.b	9.11	Delete: " <del>Thus, the capabilities-based approach focuses more on how an adversary might fight... and where a war might occur.</del> " Redundant; idea stated and restated already in earlier sections	This is already stated and made clear in preceding sections. Redundancy.	A
129.	2.	USJFCOM	S	1.06		14.19	<b>Change as follows:</b> "These capabilities require maintaining a diverse mix of conventional forces capable of high-intensity, sustained, and coordinated <del>operations</del> <u>actions across the range</u> "	Clarity and correctness.	M – See JSDS comments

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							of military operations; <u>employed in concert with</u> survivable and secure nuclear forces; and the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems required to direct these forces.”		
130.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	1.06		14.24	<b>Change as follows:</b>  "These capabilities require maintaining a diverse mix of conventional forces capable of high-intensity, sustained, and coordinated <del>operations</del> actions <u>across the range of</u> military operations; <u>employed in concert with</u> survivable and secure nuclear forces; and the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems required to <u>inform and</u> direct these forces. <u>For deterrence to be effective, the</u> <del>The</del> force mixture must hold at risk those assets most valued by adversary leaders and provide a range of options <u>for the US, in response to attack.</u> It is possible, however, that <del>an a potential adversary may misperceive or purposefully ignore a credible threat either</del> <u>may misperceive or choose to disregard the risk posed by U.S. deterrence actions.</u> Therefore, if deterrence fails, the force mixture must provide a variety of options designed to control escalation and terminate the <del>conflicts</del> <u>conflict</u> on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. "	These changes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Accept most of the EUCOM comment and other corrections.</li> <li>– Repeats the effectiveness discussion that has been carried over from page 1.05.</li> <li>– Recognizes that deterrent options may not be limited to the "post attack" phase of an operation.</li> </ul>	A
131.	11	USA	A	1.06	2.b.	16	Eliminate the word “operations”	The added verbiage in line 17 “range of military operations” replaces the term “operations”	M – See JSDS comments
132.	39	DTRA	A	1.06	2.b	16	Add words: “... coordinated operations <u>throughout the range</u> of military options;”	Adding the words “throughout the range” makes it clear that within this range any option is viable.	M – See JSDS comments
133.	39	J-3	A	1.06	2.b	16	Add words: “... coordinated operations <u>throughout the range</u> of military options;”	Adding the words “throughout the range” makes it clear that within this range any option is viable.	M – See JSDS comments
134.	18.	USAF	A	1.06	2b	16	Change to read as follow: “These capabilities require maintaining a diverse mix of conventional forces capable of high-intensity, sustained, and coordinated operations <i>across the range of</i> military operations . . .”	Clarity	M – See JSDS comments
135.	24	J7	A	1.06	2b	16	Change to read as follows: ". . . capable of high-intensity, sustained, and coordinated <u>across the range of</u> military	Makes better sense.	M – See JSDS

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							operations; survivable . . .”		comments
136.		USN	A	1.06		16.17	Change as follows: ... and coordinated operations <u>across the</u> range of military operations;...	Need a preposition and article here.	M – See JSDS comments
137.	40	EUCOM	A	1.06		21	It is possible, however, that an adversary <del>may misperceive or purposefully ignore a credible threat</del> either may misperceive or choose to disregard a risk posed by U.S. deterrence efforts.	The statement must make clear that the “threat” mentioned here is a threat posed by U.S. deterrence efforts, and not some other kind of threat (bearing in mind that “threat” typically refers to an adversary and not to friendly forces).	M – See JSDS comments
138.	19.	USAF	A	1.06	2b	23	Change “conflicts” to conflict	Clarity	M – See JSDS comments
139.	40	J-3	A	1.07			Number figure	Other figures in the text have numbers.	A
140.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	1.07		2.3	Change as follows:  "Senior commanders make recommendations affecting nuclear policy decisions on force structure, weapon <del>and/or</del> <u>and</u> force capabilities, and alternative employment options. "	Clarity.	A
141.		USN	S	1.07		7.9	Change as follows: Clearly, the use of nuclear weapons represents a significant escalation from conventional warfare <del>and is provoked by some grave action, event, or perceived threat.</del>	Unnecessary.	M – See JSDS comments
142.	41	EUCOM	S	1.07		7.9	Omit the sentence: “ <del>Clearly, the use of nuclear weapons represents a significant vertical escalation from conventional warfare and is provoked by some grave action, event, or perceived threat.</del> ”	This statement is not necessarily true. For example, the use of a bunker-buster “mini-nuke” might not, in fact, be “provoked by some action, event, or perceived threat” per se; rather, it may be used simply because it is the only weapon that will destroy the target! For example, neither Hiroshima nor Nagasaki were “provoked by some action, event, or perceived threat”! The strategy there was not one of “upping the	M – See JSDS comments

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								ante,” so to speak; it was war termination.	
143.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	1.07		7.9	Change as follows:  <del>Clearly, the</del> The use of nuclear weapons represents a significant escalation from conventional warfare and <del>is</del> <u>may be</u> provoked by some action, event, or <del>perceived</del> threat. However, like any military action, the <u>decision to use of</u> nuclear weapons is <del>fundamentally determined</del> <u>driven</u> by the <b>political</b> objective sought. <del>The decision to use nuclear weapons</del> <u>This choice</u> involves many political considerations, <u>all of which impact not only</u> nuclear weapon use, <u>but also the type types</u> and number of weapons used, <u>and method of</u> employment.	These changes  – Add deliberate ambiguity. The US will not commit to a nuclear or nonnuclear response ahead of time, so the "is provoked" characterization is inappropriate.  – Add clarity in the language used.	A
144.	12	USA	S	1.07	2.c.	9	Reinstate the eliminated word “grave”	The use of “grave” lends a note of seriousness as opposed to some action or event	R – "significant escalation" should be adequate to address the gravity of the concern.
145.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	1.07		15.23	Change as follows:  <del>d. <b>International Reaction.</b> International reaction toward the country or nonstate entity that first employs WMD constitutes an important political consideration. The United States and its allies articulated their abhorrence of unrestricted warfare, codifying “laws of war,” and turning to definitions of “just war.” The tremendous destructive capability of WMD and the consequences of their use yielded a number of arms control agreements (see Figure I-3, which discusses the Nuclear Arms Control Treaties) restricting deployment and use. Nevertheless, while the belligerent that initiates nuclear warfare may find itself the target of world condemnation, no customary or conventional international law prohibits nations from employing nuclear weapons in armed conflict.</del>  <u>International reaction toward the country or nonstate entity</u>	These changes  Accept the grammatical and substantive changes proposed, or their intent.  Flags the change to figure numbers.	A

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<u>that first employs WMD is an important political consideration. The United States and its allies articulated their abhorrence of unrestricted warfare by codifying “laws of war,” and turning to definitions of “just war.” The tremendous destructive capability of WMD and the consequences of their use resulted in a number of agreements (see Figure I-3-I-4, which summarizes US Treaty Limitations on Nuclear Weapons) restricting deployment and use. Nevertheless, while the belligerent that initiates nuclear warfare may find itself the target of world condemnation, no customary or conventional international law prohibits nations from employing nuclear weapons in armed conflict.</u>		
146.	9	USMC	S	1.07		15.23	<del>d. <b>International Reaction.</b> International reaction toward the country or nonstate entity that first employs WMD constitutes an important political consideration. The United States and its allies articulated their abhorrence of unrestricted warfare, codifying “laws of war,” and turning to definitions of “just war.” The tremendous destructive capability of WMD and the consequences of their use yielded a number of arms control agreements (see Figure I 3, which discusses the Nuclear Arms Control Treaties) restricting deployment and use. Nevertheless, w</del> While the belligerent that initiates nuclear warfare may find itself the target of world condemnation, <u>the LOAC does not prohibit no customary or conventional international law that prohibits</u> nations from employing nuclear weapons in armed conflict.”	Accuracy and clarity and to correct grammatical errors. The description of the US position on the use of nuclear weapons in light of LOAC is confusing and unclear. The term “conventional international law” is not a correct statement of the law.	M – See JSDS comment
147.	42	EUCOM	A	1.07		17	Change “...unrestricted warfare, codifying...” to read “...unrestricted warfare by codifying...”	Clarity	M – See JSDS comment
148.	43	EUCOM	A	1.07		18	Change the sentence to begin “Moreover, the <del>The</del> tremendous destructive capability...”	Necessary to show the link to the preceding idea.	M – See JSDS comment
149.	41	DTRA	A	1.07	2.d	18	“The tremendously <u>ly</u> destructive...”	Grammar	M – See JSDS comment
150.	41	J-3	A	1.07	2.d	18	“The tremendously <u>ly</u> destructive...”	Grammar	M – See JSDS comment
151.	20.	USAF	S	1.07	2.d.	19	Change to read: “...arms control, <u>non-proliferation, and risk reduction</u> agreements (see Figure I-3, which discusses the	Not all applicable agreements are “arms control” agreements. The	M – See JSDS

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							nuclear treaties) restricting deployment and use.	term “control” has a specific connotation within the nuclear community.	comment
152.	13	USA	S	1.07	2.d.	20	Replace “discusses” with “lists and summarizes”	The figure does not discuss, it only lists	M – See JSDS comment
153.	14	USA	S	1.07	2.d.	20	Eliminate “the Nuclear” and replace with “US”	This changes would reflect the title of Figure I-3	M – See JSDS comment
154.	21.	USAF	A	1.07	2d	21	Change to read: “restricting deployment and use <u>of nuclear weapons</u> .”	Clarity	M – See JSDS comment
155.		USN	A	1.07		21.23	Change as follows: Nevertheless, while the belligerent that initiates nuclear warfare may find itself the target of world condemnation, no customary or conventional international law <del>that</del> prohibits nations from employing nuclear weapons in armed conflict.	Clarity	M – See JSDS comment
156.	1	USTC	A	1.07	d.	21.23	<b>Change to read:</b> “Nevertheless, while the belligerent that initiates nuclear warfare may find itself the target of world condemnation, no customary or conventional international law <del>that</del> prohibits nations from employing nuclear weapons in armed conflict.”	Grammar	M – See JSDS comment
157.	25	J7	A	1.07	2d	22	Change to read as follows: “. . . no customary or conventional international law <del>that</del> prohibits nations from employing nuclear weapons in armed conflict.”	Makes better sense.	M – See JSDS comment
158.	3.	USJFCOM	A	1.07		22.23	<b>Change as follows:</b> “. . . nuclear warfare may find itself the target of world condemnation, <u>there is</u> no customary or conventional international law that prohibits nations from employing nuclear weapons in armed conflict.”	Clarity and completeness.	M – See JSDS comment
159.	12	USPACOM	A	1.07	2d.	22.23	Delete “that” from sentence to read: “Nevertheless, while the belligerent that initiates nuclear warfare may find itself the target of world condemnation, no customary or conventional international law <del>that</del> prohibits nations from employing nuclear weapons in armed conflict.”	Correctness: “that” was added, but not necessary in the sentence structure to complete the statement.	M – See JSDS comment
160.	22.	USAF	A	1.07	2d	22.23	Change to read: “. . . nuclear warfare may find itself the target of world condemnation, <u>there is</u> no customary or conventional international law that prohibits nations from employing nuclear weapons in armed conflict.”	Grammar.	M – See JSDS comment
161.	23.	USAF	S	1.07	2.d.	23	Change to read: “. . . no customary or conventional international law <del>that</del> <u>generally</u> prohibits nations from employing nuclear weapons in armed conflict.”	Some treaties do limit all nations, but there is no <u>general</u> international law prohibition.	M – See JSDS comment



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162.	12	USA	A	1.07	2.d	23	Eliminate the word “that”	Not needed	M – See JSDS comment
163.	42	DTRA	A	1.07	2.d	23	“... international law <del>that</del> ...” Remove added word from previous edit	The addition of “that” is incorrect for the meaning of the sentence.	M – See JSDS comment
164.	42	J-3	A	1.07	2.d	23	“... international law <del>that</del> ...” Remove added word from previous edit	The addition of “that” is incorrect for the meaning of the sentence.	M – See JSDS comments
165.		LC	A	1.07	2	23	Change as follows: “... law <del>that</del> prohibits ...”	Grammar	M – See JSDS comments
166.	26	J7	A	1.08	F1.03		5 <sup>th</sup> box down. Change to read as follows: "Through the Moscow Treaty, the US continues to reduce nuclear arms <del>LAW</del> in accordance with the NPT"	Correct use of an acronym within a figure.	A
167.		USN	A	1.08	F1.03	F1.03	Change as follows:  ... short-range ground-launched ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles	Hyphenate for consistency	M – See JSDS comments
168.	24.	USAF	S	1.08	F1.03	F1.03 .0	Replace title “Summary of Applicable US Arms Control Treaties” with “Summary of US Treaty Limitations on Nuclear Weapons”	Not all listed agreements are “arms control” agreements	A
169.	7	USN	S	1.08	F1.03	F1.03 .b	Delete: “Not yet entered into force” in the impact section of the Moscow Treaty.	The Treaty entered into force when it was signed (June 2003) although the limits do not have to be met until December 2012.	M – See JSDS comments
170.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	1.08	F1.03	F1.03 .b	Moscow Treaty – Last Bullet, change as follows: <del>Not yet entered into force</del> Entered into force 01 June 2003	Accuracy	A
171.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	1.08	F1.03	F1.03 .c	INF Treaty – First Bullet, change as follows:  "... intermediate-range and short-range ground-launched ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles"	Consistent hyphenation	A
172.		USN	A	1.08	F1.03	F1.03 .e	Change as follows: Nuclear weapons sState signatories of treaty...	Capitalize	R – "states" not normally capitalized elsewhere in this document

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
173.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	1.08	F1.03	F1.03 .e	NPT Treaty, add the following new bullet: – North Korea withdrew from the NPT effective February 2003	Updates North Korea's status.	A
174.	43	DTRA	S	1.08	2.e	2	This thought requires a topic sentence that gives the following ideas a framework. Suggest adding sentence from later in same paragraph: “ <u>Nuclear weapons use is not prohibited in armed conflict by LOAC. They are, however, unique from conventional and even other WMD in the scope of their destructive potential and long term physiological effects.</u> ”	Creating a topic sentence for this paragraph tying the LOAC and the idea of the preceding paragraph (international reaction) makes this section flow better. Gives the discussion of the LOAC a context and makes it logical.	M – See JSDS comments
175.	43	J-3	S	1.08	2.e	2	This thought requires a topic sentence that gives the following ideas a framework. Suggest adding sentence from later in same paragraph: “ <u>Nuclear weapons use is not prohibited in armed conflict by LOAC. They are, however, unique from conventional and even other WMD in the scope of their destructive potential and long term physiological effects.</u> ”	Creating a topic sentence for this paragraph tying the LOAC and the idea of the preceding paragraph (international reaction) makes this section flow better. Gives the discussion of the LOAC a context and makes it logical.	M – See JSDS comments
176.		USN	A	1.08		2.05	Change as follows: <u>The LOAC is a portion of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. The LOAC primarily derives from generally accepted principles (customary law) of international law, treaties, and conventions that bind countries under international law. The LOAC seeks to prevent combatants from unnecessary suffering...</u>	Insert article Insert article  Insert article	M – See JSDS comments
177.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	1.08 and 1.09	2.e	2.7 to 1.10	Delete existing paragraph 2.e and replace with the following:  <del>e. <b>The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).</b> LOAC is a portion of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. LOAC primarily derives from generally accepted principles (customary law) of international law, treaties, and conventions that bind countries under international law. LOAC seeks to prevent combatants from unnecessary suffering, protect noncombatants, safeguard fundamental human rights, and facilitate the restoration of peace by limiting the amount and type of force, and the manner in which force is applied.</del>  Neither LOAC nor national policy sanction devastation as an end in itself. Both recognize the necessity of force to achieve legitimate military objectives and to ensure military	These changes  Accept the intent of the associated comments.  With respect to the environmental discussion – US policy and international law do not endorse or authorize wholesale destruction for its own sake; consequently, the environment is not a lawful target – Therefore, environmental damage in the context of nuclear operations is an outcome more appropriate to be addressed in the	A

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<p>advantage gained by attack. However, both also recognize that these objectives and advantages cannot be offset by the expected collateral damage. Commanders have the responsibility to attempt to minimize collateral damage to the greatest extent practicable. Nuclear weapons use is not prohibited in armed conflict by LOAC. They are, however, unique from conventional and even other WMD in the scope of their destructive potential and long-term physiological effects.</p> <p><b><u>e. The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).</u></b> The LOAC is a portion of international law that seeks to regulate the conduct of armed hostilities. The LOAC is primarily derived from generally accepted principles (customary law) of international law, treaties, and conventions that bind countries under international law. The LOAC seeks to prevent combatants from unnecessary suffering, protect noncombatants, safeguard fundamental human rights, and facilitate the restoration of peace by limiting the amount and type of force, and the manner in which force is applied. Neither the LOAC nor national policy sanction devastation as an end in itself. Both recognize the necessity of force to achieve legitimate military objectives and to ensure military advantage.</p> <p>However, the principle of proportionality requires that the anticipated loss of civilian life and damage to civilian property incidental to attacks must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained. Commanders therefore have the responsibility to attempt to minimize collateral damage to the greatest extent practicable. The LOAC does not prohibit nuclear weapons use in armed conflict although they are unique from conventional and even other WMD in the scope of their destructive potential and long-term effects.</p>	realm of collateral damage.	
178.	44	EUCOM	A	1.08		3	Change “regulates” to “seeks to regulate”	Closer to the truth	M – See JSDS comments
179.	45	EUCOM	A	1.08		4	Delete “of international law”	Redundant; see line 5	M – See JSDS comments
180.		USN	A	1.09		1	Change as follows: Neither <u>the</u> LOAC nor national policy...	Insert article	M – See

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									JSDS comments
181.	10	USMC	A	1.09		1.4	Change to read: “Neither LOAC nor national policy sanction devastation as an end in itself. Both recognize the necessity of force to achieve legitimate military objectives and to ensure military advantage gained by attack. However, <del>both also recognize that these objectives and advantages cannot be offset by the expected collateral damage</del> <u>the principle of proportionality requires that the anticipated loss of civilian life and damage to civilian property incidental to attacks must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained.</u> Commanders have...”	Grammar. Correctly sets out the definition of proportionality.	M – See JSDS comments
182.		LC	M	1.09	1	03.04	Change as follows:  “However, <del>both also recognize that these objectives and advantages cannot be offset by the expected collateral damage.</del> recognize that the anticipated loss of life and damage to property incidental to the use of force must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained.”	Accuracy. The sentence as written incorrectly states the Principle of Proportionality. The change is necessary to accurately reflect this LOAC principle.	M – See JSDS comments
183.	46	EUCOM	A	1.09		3.4	Change to read: “However, both also recognize that these objectives and advantages cannot <del>be disregard the effects of offset by the expected collateral damage.</del> ”	As the sentence currently is written, it makes no sense; the earlier change from “outweighed” to “offset” did not clarify anything	M – See JSDS comments
184.	25.	USAF	M	1.09	2e	3.4	Change to read: “However, both also recognize that <u>the expected collateral damage cannot be excessive in relation to the specific and direct military advantage expected to be gained.</u> <del>these objectives and advantages cannot be offset by the expected collateral damage.</del> ”	Use of the word “offset” is unacceptable as it does not state the correct test for proportionality, which is a key concept of LOAC. Expected collateral damage must be weighed against expected military benefit. Expected military benefits are not “offset” or replaced by collateral damage.	M – See JSDS comments
185.	47	EUCOM	S	1.09		8	Change to read: “ <u>Therefore, although nuclear</u> <del>Nuclear</del> weapons use is not prohibited in armed conflict by LOAC. <del>They are, however, unique</del> nuclear weapons are, nevertheless,	As written, the emphasis in this sentence is wrong. This can be corrected by subordinating the	M – See JSDS comments

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							<u>distinctly different</u> from conventional and even other WMD in the scope of their destructive potential and long-term physiological effects.”	first clause and altering the wording as shown in the recommended change.	
186.		USN	A	1.09		8.9	Change as follows: They are, however, <del>unique</del> <u>vastly different</u> from conventional and even other WMD...	Use of unique is trite and certainly inappropriate in this case.	M – See JSDS comments
187.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	<b>S</b>	1.09		16.19	Change as follows:  "... help assure their security. Because the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict could provoke serious <u>diplomatic, political, economic, and military, and environmental</u> consequences, <del>clear allied as well as adversary</del> <u>clear allied and potential adversary</u> understanding of US nuclear <del>weapon</del> <u>weapons</u> policy is essential. <u>This broad range of possible applications for nuclear weapons use requires that planners and policymakers be fully aware of the correspondingly broad range of planning considerations that accompany the decision to use a nuclear weapon.</u> ”	These changes:  Connect the range of military operations with allies and adversaries.  With respect to the environmental discussion – US policy and international law do not endorse or authorize wholesale destruction for its own sake; consequently, the environment is not a lawful target – Therefore, environmental damage in the context of nuclear operations is an outcome more appropriate to be addressed in the realm of collateral damage.	<b>A</b>
188.	48	EUCOM	<b>S</b>	1.09		17.19	Delete the sentence and replace it as follows: <del>Because the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict could provoke serious political, economic, military, and environmental consequences, clear allied as well as adversary understanding of US nuclear weapon policy is essential.</del> “This broad range of possible applications for nuclear weapons use requires that planners and policymakers be fully aware of the correspondingly broad range of planning considerations that accompany the decision to use a nuclear weapon.”	As written, the sentence is completely out of place in this paragraph.	M – See JSDS comments
189.		USN	<b>S</b>	1.09		17.19	Change as follows: Because the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict could provoke serious <u>diplomatic</u> political, economic, military, and environmental consequences, clear allied as well as adversary understanding of US nuclear weapon policy is essential.	Completeness and consistency	M – See JSDS comments

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190.		USN	A	1.09		23	Change as follows: (1) Force Employment.	Use bold font. Consistency.	A
191.	11	USMC	A	1.09		23	Bold sub-section heading "Force Employment" for consistency with other sub-section headings under this paragraph.	Consistent format.	A
192.	45	J-3	A	1.09	a(1)	23	Make " <b>Force Employment.</b> " Bold	Consistency	A
193.	45	DTRA	A	1.09	3a(1)	23	Make " <b>Force Employment.</b> " Bold	Consistency	A
194.	26.	USAF	A	1.09	3a1	23	Bold " <b>Force Employment.</b> "	Paragraph heading.	A
195.	27	J7	A	1.09	3a(1)	23	The title "Force Employment" needs to be bold.	Consistency.	A
196.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	1.09		23.26	Change as follows:  " <b>Force Employment.</b> <del>We</del> <u>The US</u> must carefully consider nuclear force survivability, credibility, safety, and security when organizing and employing US nuclear forces. <del>As one element part of the military instrument of national power, nuclear forces must meet the criteria shown in Figure I-42.</del> Moreover, decisions regarding nuclear force <u>structure</u> , deployments or uses must accommodate the concerns outlined in Figure I-2."	Incorporates EUCOM change with minor modification.	A
197.	49	EUCOM	S	1.09		24.26	Change the sentence to read: <del>As one element part of the military instrument of national power, nuclear forces must meet the criteria shown in Figure I-42.</del> "Moreover, decisions regarding nuclear force deployments or uses must accommodate the concerns outlined in Figure I-2."	"Meet the criteria" is an odd way to make reference to the elements listed in the table. The fact that nuclear weapons are part of the military element of national power is true but totally irrelevant to the point of this paragraph.	M – See JSDS Comments
198.		USN	A	1.09		30	Change as follows: ... confidence-building measures...	Hyphenate	A
199.		USN	S	1.09		30.33	Clarify or change: These measures make conflict or war less likely by improving communication, reducing opportunities for miscalculation, providing ways to resolve crises, and reducing the destructive capacity of available arsenals.	How can measures "reduce the destructive capacity of available arsenals"? Would it make more sense to say "reducing available arsenals"?	R – Not a metrics discussion -- Nonproliferation efforts all attempt to reduce the destructive capacity of the available arsenals by

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
									reducing the arsenals.
200.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	1.09		35.43	<p>Change as follows:</p> <p>"(3) <b>Readiness.</b> Increased readiness levels help deter aggression. Consequently, an increased risk of attack, prompted by adversary war readiness measures, may require US forces to maintain visibly increased states of alert. Delivery system postures can send a clear warning. <del>Nuclear delivery systems</del> <u>Nuclear-capable bombers and submarines</u> deploying to dispersal locations can send a forceful message that demonstrates the national will to use nuclear weapons, <u>and increase if necessary, as well as increasing the delivery system's</u> their survivability. However, the danger also exists that the adversary may perceive either an exploitable vulnerability or the threat of imminent use. Accordingly, while the United States signals national resolve through increased readiness postures, it <del>must</del> <u>may</u> also signal the willingness to de-escalate through overt measures."</p>	<p>These changes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Recognize that ICBM fields do not disperse</li> <li>– Restores "their"</li> <li>– Accept EUCOM Comment regarding US signals</li> </ul>	A
201.	50	EUCOM	A	1.09		39	Change “increasing” to “increase”	Parallelism	A
202.	13	USA	A	1.09	3.a.(3 )	40	Change “system’s” to “systems’ ”	Since the plural “systems” is used in line 38 it will agree with the intent of multiple systems	M – See JSDS Comments
203.	51	EUCOM	S	1.09		42	Change “must” to “may”	<p>The sentence as it stands is false. For example, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the US gave no overt signal of its willingness to deescalate. Nevertheless, it did deescalate by removing obsolete nukes from Turkey (albeit covertly as far as the public was concerned; the Soviets were quietly apprised of the removal through diplomatic back channels).</p> <p>JSDS comment – Weren't the Jupiter missiles removed after the Cuban Missile Crisis had been peacefully resolved, and was</p>	M – See JSDS Comments

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								publicly and resolutely "not connected" with the Soviet withdrawal of missiles from Cuba?  Covert measures may, circumstantially, be as efficacious as, or more efficacious than, overt measures.	
204.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	1.10		01.07	Change as follows:  (continued from page I-9) "... Conventional forces and intelligence activities require prudent management to avoid inadvertent escalation <del>or mistaken warnings of adversary WMD attack</del> of the kind that could result from, for example, <u>erroneous warnings of an adversary's WMD attack</u> . If the crisis is successfully resolved without employment of nuclear weapons, reductions in the alert posture of nuclear forces can send a reinforcing message. This <u>also</u> requires careful management. <u>US and multinational leaders</u> <del>allied, or coalition leadership should</del> <u>must also</u> consider potential military advantages an adversary might gain as <del>nuclear weapons stand down</del> <u>US nuclear alert levels are reduced</u> . The adversary may choose to destabilize the de-escalation effort <u>by exploiting using</u> those advantages. "	These changes  Accept most of the comments improving accuracy and clarity	A
205.	52	EUCOM	S	1.10		1.2	Change to read: <del>or mistaken warnings of adversary WMD attack</del> . "...of the kind that could result from, for example, the misinterpretation of warnings of an adversary WMD attack."	Accuracy. Misunderstanding signals associated with a possible WMD attack is only one of many possible misinterpretations that could result in inadvertent escalation.	M – See JSDS Comments
206.	53	EUCOM	A	1.10		4	Insert the word "also" between "This" and "requires."	Continuity of discourse in the paragraph	M – See JSDS Comments
207.	54	EUCOM	A	1.10		4	Insert the word "Likewise," before "US, allied, ..."	Continuity of discourse in the paragraph	M – See JSDS Comments
208.	15	USA	S	1.10	3a(4)	4	Change the sentence to read; "This requires careful management. US, <u>multinational</u> leadership should consider..."	Change from allied or coalition to multinational as elsewhere.	M – See JSDS Comments



ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
209.		USN	A	1.10		6.7	Change as follows: The adversary may choose to destabilize the de-escalation effort <u>by</u> using those advantages.	Better grammar	M – See JSDS Comments
210.		USN	A	1.10		16.17	Change as follows: "Thus, when an adversary is confronted with overwhelming conventional forces or a prolonged conventional conflict."	Probably better to use the singular "force".	A
211.	14	USA	A	1.10	b.(1)	18	Reword sentence "... making WMD use appear <u>to be</u> the only..."	Clarity	A
212.	55	EUCOM	A	1.10		43	Change "provide" to "provides"	Subject-verb agreement. The subject is "Publication."	?? Open – Can't find the location. Page 1.10 does not have a line 43.
213.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	1.11	(3)	15.37	Change as follows:  <b>(3) Friendly Nuclear Strike Warning (STRIKWARN).</b> Friendly forces <u>must</u> receive advanced warning of friendly nuclear strikes. <del>to</del> This allows them <del>ensure they can</del> to take actions to protect themselves from the effects of the attack. In theater operations, the commander <del>executing</del> <u>ordering</u> the strike issues the initial warning to subordinate headquarters (HQ) whose units are likely to be affected by the strike. <u>Geographic combatant commands must develop procedures to ensure multinational forces receive STRIKWARN warning if they are likely to be affected by the effects of US nuclear strikes.</u> <del>Commanders must ensure that STRIKWARN messages are disseminated in a sufficient amount of warning is given in enough time for subordinate friendly units to take actions to mitigate the possible consequences of limit their damages caused by a US use of nuclear weapons. Consideration should also be given for dissemination of STRIKWARN information to allies. The commander also ensures coordination with adjacent commands and elements of other commands in the vicinity, giving them sufficient time to provide warning and take protective measures. Joint forces potentially affected by US nuclear strikes are informed of nuclear strikes through a STRIKWARN message. Geographic combatant commands must develop procedures to ensure that multinational forces receive STRIKWARN information if they are likely to be affected by the effects of</del>	Clarity. These changes:  – Overlook the oxymoronic term "friendly nuclear strike." JSDS comment – I could not come up with a better term that was equally clear.  – Accepts Army comment re: warning order source.  – Compacts the paragraph by removing redundancy.  – Deletes term "STRIKWARN" from the document – not required.  – Removes discussion about US communications procedures. Not appropriate for an unclassified document.	A

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<del>US nuclear strikes. Disseminate nuclear STRIKWARN warning messages as rapidly as possible, and, when possible, over secure networks. When If secure networks are not available, unit signal operations instructions contain authentication procedures and encoding instructions for disseminating STRIKWARN messages. STRIKWARN messages may be sent in the clear if the issuing commander determines that safety warnings override security requirements.</del>		
214.		J-3	A	1.11	(3)	18.19	“Friendly forces receive advanced warning of friendly nuclear strikes to <u>allow them to</u> take actions to protect themselves from the effects of the attack.”	Sentence worded as is sounds awkward.	M – see JSDS comments
215.		DTRA	A	1.11	(3)	18.19	“Friendly forces receive advanced warning of friendly nuclear strikes to <u>allow them to</u> take actions to protect themselves from the effects of the attack.”	Sentence worded as is sounds awkward.	M – see JSDS comments
216.	16	USA	<b>S</b>	1.11	3b(3)	21	Change the sentence to read:  “In theater operations, the commander <del>executing</del> <u>ordering</u> the strike issues the initial warning to subordinate headquarters (HQ) whose units are likely to be affected by the strike.”	Is it the executing commander of the unit launching /dropping the nuclear devise, or is it the commander ordering the execution (e.g. combatant commander, CJTF). Identifying which subordinate units receive the STRIKWARN is important.	M – see JSDS comments
217.		USN	A	1.11		23.24	Change as follows: Commanders must ensure that STRIKWARN messages are disseminated <del>in a sufficient amount of time</del> <u>early enough</u> for subordinate units to...	Simpler	M – see JSDS comments
218.		J-3	A	1.11	(3)	29.30	Remove: “ <del>Theater Joint forces potentially affected by the effects... message.</del> ”	Redundant	M – see JSDS comments
219.		DTRA	A	1.11	(3)	29.30	Remove: “ <del>Theater Joint forces potentially affected by the effects... message.</del> ”	Redundant	M – see JSDS comments
220.	10	J8/Forces Division	A	1.11	3	29.30	<b>Administrative:</b> Sentence on lines 29-30 beginning with: “Joint Forces potentially affected by...” is out of place near	Clarity	M – see JSDS

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							the middle of the paragraph.  <u>Recommended Change:</u> Use sentence at the very beginning of paragraph 3 (Friendly Nuclear Strike Warning (STRIKWARN) since it provides intended purpose for a STRIKWARN message up front and serves to introduce the remainder of the paragraph.		comments
221.	46	DTRA	A	1.11	(3)	33	“Nuclear STRIKWARN messages must be disseminated as rapidly as possible...” Replaces: “Disseminate nuclear STRIKWARN messages as rapidly as possible...”	Clarify	M – see JSDS comments
222.	46	J-3	A	1.11	(3)	33	“Nuclear STRIKWARN messages must be disseminated as rapidly as possible...” Replaces: “Disseminate nuclear STRIKWARN messages as rapidly as possible...”	Clarify	M – see JSDS comments
223.		DTRA	A	1.11	(3)	39	Add: “When formulating <u>Courses of Actions (COAs)</u> ...”	Acronym use	A
224.		J-3	A	1.11	(3)	39	Add: “When formulating <u>Courses of Actions (COAs)</u> ...”	Acronym use	A
225.	28	J7	A	1.11	3b(4)	40	Change to read as follows: "Planning should also evaluate nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defensive measures.	Acronym needs to be established.	R- The acronym is spelled out in the next line as part of the title of the book.  Unnecessary parentheses.
226.	4.	USJFCOM	A	1.11		40.44	<b>Change as follows:</b> “Planning should also evaluate nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defensive measures. Joint Publication (JP) 3-11, <i>Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Environments</i> and JP 3-40, <i>Joint Doctrine for Counterproliferation</i> , and the appropriate JP 3-XX series provide additional guidance.”	Grammatical.	R – see PACOM Comment
227.		USN	A	1.11		41.43	Change as follows: Joint Publication (JP) 3-11, <i>Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological and Chemical</i>		R – see PACOM

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<i>(NBC) Environments, and JP 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Counterproliferation</i> ; provide additional guidance.	Insert conjunction. Delete comma.	Comment
228.	13	USPACO M	S	1.11	3b(4)	41.43	Change as follows:  “... defensive measures. Joint Publication (JP) 3-11, <i>Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Environments, and JP 3-40, <u>Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction</u></i> <del><i>Counterproliferation</i></del> , provide additional guidance.”	Accuracy: JP 3-40 Final Coordination Draft, 17 Nov 03, shows “Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction” as the official name of that publication.	A
229.	47	DTRA	A	1.11	(4)	42	“... <i>Environments, and JP 3-40...</i> ”	Missing word	M – see PACOM comments
230.	47	J-3	A	1.11	(4)	42	“... <i>Environments, and JP 3-40...</i> ”	Missing word	M – see PACOM comments
231.	12	USMC	A	1.11		43	Change to read: “... <i>Joint Doctrine for Counterproliferation Operations</i> , provide...”	Correct title of pub.	M – see PACOM comments
232.		USN	A	1.12		1	Change as follows: ...active and passive <del>offensive</del> <u>defensive</u> and <del>offensive</del> <u>defensive</u> measures...	More generally used word order	R – original wording more appropriate.  "Active and Passive" in this sense modifies <b>Defensive</b> , not necessarily <b>Offensive</b> .  I cannot conceive of a "passive offensive measure" to which the revised text would infer...

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
233.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	1.12	5	4	Change as follows:  <del>Nuclear weapons influence the objectives and conduct of conventional warfare. Additionally, Nuclear or conventional warfare may result in the attrition of nuclear forces and supporting systems, which could negatively affect the forces available for nuclear employment. If this attrition results in a radical change in the strategic force posture by eliminating intermediate retaliatory steps, escalation is possible. Thus the ability to precisely gauge the attrition of conventional and nuclear forces directly affects the decision making processes for both escalation to and termination of nuclear warfare.</del>	Clarity  Accounts for possibility that conventional attacks might be targeted against nuclear forces. Probably not a major concern in the Cold War MAD world, but much more likely in a world of coordinated terrorism.	A
234.	27.	USAF	A	1.12	5	4	Change to read:  <del>Nuclear and weapons influence the objectives and conduct of conventional warfare. Additionally, conventional warfare may result in the attrition of nuclear forces and supporting systems, which could negatively affect the forces available for nuclear employment. If this attrition results in a radical change in the strategic force posture by eliminating intermediate retaliatory steps, escalation is possible. Thus the ability to precisely gauge the attrition of conventional and nuclear forces directly affects the decision making processes for both escalation to and termination of nuclear warfare.</del>	Clarity	M – see JSDS Comments
235.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	<b>S</b>	1.12		13.29	Change as follows:  "(6) <b>Nuclear Effects.</b>  The immediate and prolonged effects of nuclear weapons – including blast (overpressure, dynamic pressure, ground shock, <u>and</u> cratering), thermal radiation ( <u>fire and other material effects</u> ), <u>and</u> nuclear radiation (initial, residual, fallout, blackout, <u>and</u> electromagnetic pulse), <del>pose</del> <u>impose</u> physical and psychological challenges for combat forces and noncombatant populations alike. These effects also pose significant survivability requirements on military equipment, supporting civilian infrastructure resources, and <del>host nation/coalition</del> <u>host-nation/coalition</u> assets. <del>Not only must</del> <u>US forces must</u> prepare to survive and perhaps operate in a	These Changes: – Give some idea of thermal effects which might be expected (fire and other effects e.g. melting tires on aircraft) – Accepts EUCOM diction change – Accepts Navy hyphenation change – Removes the "long period of	A

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							nuclear/radiological environment. <del>for long periods of time, they must also develop, procure, field, and maintain effective, sustained C4ISR to accomplish their missions.</del> Commanders and military planners must contend with significant challenges in a nuclear/radiological environment and incorporate mitigating or avoidance measures into operation planning. <del>by using authoritative documents detailing nuclear/radiological effects. The results of nuclear weapons may have a synergistic impact on the human body with the total effect being greater than the individual effect.</del> "	time" operation discussion. – Removes the "authoritative documents" discussion – rationale – do we really think the COs and planners would not use authoritative documents? – Accepts synergy deletions	
236.	56	EUCOM	A	1.12		18	Change “pose” to “impose”	Diction	M – see JSDS Comments
237.		USN	A	1.12		19.20	Change as follows: ... and host-nation/coalition assets.	Hyphenate when used as an adjective	M – see JSDS Comments
238.	11	J8/Forces Division	A	1.12	6	21	<b>Administrative:</b> Word ‘long’ is less appropriate than ‘extended.’  <b>Recommended Change:</b> Replace word ‘long’ with ‘extended’ so sentence reads: <i>Not only must US forces prepare to survive and perhaps operate in a nuclear/radiological environment for <b>extended</b> periods of time, the must also develop, procure, field, and maintain effective, sustained C4ISR to accomplish their missions.</i>	Clarity	R – sentence deleted
239.		USN	S	1.12		25.27	Delete: <del>The results of nuclear weapons may have a synergistic impact on the human body with the total effect being greater than the individual effect.</del>	Don't need to define synergistic, which in itself is an overused word.	M – see JSDS Comments
240.	57	EUCOM	A	1.12		25.27	Delete sentence: <del>The results of nuclear weapons may have a synergistic impact on the human body with the total effect being greater than the individual effect.</del>	Redundant. A synergistic effect is, by definition, one whose total effect is greater that the sum of the parts.	M – see JSDS Comments
241.	5.	USJFCOM	A	1.12		25.27	<b>Change as follows:</b> “ <del>The results of nuclear weapons may have a synergistic impact on the human body with the total effect being greater than the individual effect.</del> ”	Clarity and correctness. A “total effect” is obviously greater than an “individual effect.” This statement adds no value to the discussion.	M – see JSDS Comments
242.	12	J8/Forces	A	1.12	6	27	<b>Administrative:</b> Assume author intended to have an ‘s’ on	Typographical Error.	R – sentence

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		Division					the end of the word ‘effect’ on line 27.  <u>Recommended Change:</u> Make the word ‘effects’ plural so sentence reads: <i>The results of nuclear weapons may have a synergistic impact on the human body with the total effect being greater than the individual effects.</i>		deleted
243.		USN	A	1.12		31	Change as follows: Mitigation <del>Efforts</del> .	"Efforts" implies lack of success or incomplete action.	A
244.	16	USA	A	1.12	c.	36.46	Subparagraphs (1), (2), & (3) do not reflect the order in Figure I-7 and last 2 lines in Figure I-7 aren't addressed	Subparagraphs should be in the same sequence as Figure I-7 for clarity	A
245.		DTRA	A	1.12	C(1)	37	Change:  “... conflict <del>at the lowest level of destruction with the least amount of destruction...</del> ”	Preferred word choice	A
246.		J-3	A	1.12	C(1)	37	Change:  “... conflict <del>at the lowest level of destruction with the least amount of destruction...</del> ”	Preferred word choice	A
247.	58	EUCOM	A	1.12		40	Change “is” to “would be” or “will be”—your choice	Conditional tense or future tense is appropriate here	M – see JSDS Comments
248.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	1.12		40.44	Change as follows:  "However, there are no assurances that a conflict involving WMD <del>is would be</del> controllable or of short duration. Indeed, it may be essential to ensure that an adversary is unable to rearm expended delivery systems. Therefore, US nuclear forces and supporting C4ISR systems <del>are must be</del> survivable, redundant, secure, and safe to ensure their survival and deny adversary war aims. <del>Information assurance protects and defends information by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating, protection, detection, and reaction capabilities."</del>	These changes  – Accept EUCOM's three changes  – Deletes the Information Assurance text. Not sure of its role in a war termination strategy.	A
249.	59	EUCOM	S	1.12		42	Change “are” to “must be”	The point here is what the weapons <i>need</i> to be—not what they allegedly <i>are</i> .	A

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250.	60	EUCOM	A	1.12		44	Change “their” to “its”	Pronoun agreement: the antecedent is “information” (collective singular)	R – sentence deleted
251.	29	J7	A	1.13	F1.07		Change lines 4 and 5 to read as follows: “Consequence Mmanagement” and Transition to Ppost-Wwar Mmilitary Ssupport Ooperations””	Consistency with the other bullets.	R- See #254
252.		USN	A	1.13	F1.04	F1.04	Change as follows: MITIGATION EFFORTS (both title and caption)	“Efforts” implies lack of success or incomplete action.	A
253.		USAF	A	1.13	N/A	F1.07	Change to read: “Transition to Post-War Military Support Conflict Operations”	Consistency with JP 3-11.	M – See JSDS Comments
254.	6.	USJFCOM	S	1.13	F1.04	F1.07	<b>Comment:</b>  The first two bullets are out of sequence with the text. Supporting text for the bullets “consequence management” and “transition to post-war military support operations” are missing. Either delete those two bullets or add supporting text.		M – draft paragraphs added see other comments.
255.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	1.13	F1.07	F1.07	Change Figure I-7 Fifth bullet as follows:  <del>Transition to Post War Military Support Operations.</del> <b><u>Transition to Postconflict Operations</u></b>	Consistency with JP 3-11 – despite apparent hyphenation problem in JP 3-11.	A
256.	14	USPACO M	A	1.13	F1.07	F1.07	Change figure title to read as follows: <del>Post-Wartime</del> <u>Postwartime</u> Considerations  Fabricated word misspelled: “Postwartime” (one word)	When a word is fabricated, it should follow the established rules of grammar; most “post” words are one word and not hyphenated. (Example: “Postwar” is in the dictionary and other parts of the pub.)	R – bullet changed – see JSDS Comments
257.	15	USPACO M	A	1.13	F1.07	F1.07	Change figure’s fifth bullet to read as follows: Transition to <del>Post War</del> <u>Postwar</u> Military Support Operations  Word misspelled: “Postwar” (one word)	Word misspelled. Example: “Postwar” is in the dictionary and other parts of the pub.	R – bullet changed – see JSDS Comments
258.	16	USPACO M	A	1.13	F1.07	F1.07	Change figure designation to read as follows: <b>Figure I-7.</b> <del>Post-Wartime</del> <u>Postwartime</u> Considerations	When a word is fabricated, it should follow the established rules of grammar; most “post” words are one word and not	R – bullet changed – see JSDS Comments



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							Fabricated word misspelled: "Postwartime" (one word)	hyphenated. (Example: "Postwar" is in the dictionary and other parts of the pub.)	
259.		USN	A	1.13		2.6	<p>Change as follows:</p> <p>The fundamental differences between a potential nuclear war and <del>previous other</del> military conflicts involve the speed, scope, and degree of destruction inherent in most nuclear weapons employment, as well as the uncertainty of negotiating opportunities and ensuring control over military forces. Depending on the scope and intensity of a nuclear war, the termination conditions may differ considerably <del>from previous conflicts</del>.</p>	<p>Better word choice</p> <p>Not necessary</p>	M – see JSDS Comments
260.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	1.13		2.7	<p>Change as follows:</p> <p>" (2) <b>War Termination.</b></p> <p><u>Although the development and implementation of broad war termination objectives are discussed in JP 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations, the differences between wholly conventional conflicts and nuclear conflicts are worthy of examination. In the case of a global nuclear conflict, an intense exchange may limit the pool of available negotiators, especially if leaders have been targeted. In many foreseeable cases, however, nuclear weapons might only be used in coordination with conventional forces, with the intent to coerce war termination from the opponent. The fundamental differences between a potential nuclear war and previous military conflicts involve include the speed, scope, and degree of destruction inherent in most nuclear weapons employment, as well as the uncertainty of negotiating opportunities and ensuring control over military forces. Depending on the scope and intensity of a nuclear war conflict involving nuclear weapons, the termination conditions may differ considerably from previous solely conventional conflicts. The war termination strategy phase may initially involve the end of nuclear combat actions, but not necessarily..."</u></p>	<p>These changes</p> <p>Refer to the overarching reference for War Termination discussion – JP 3-0</p> <p>Focus on issues more relevant to nuclear ops.</p> <p>Accepts STRATCOM change</p>	A
261.	61	EUCOM	S	1.13		3	Change "involve" to "include"	The list given here is, and only	M – see

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								can be, a partial one. "Include" better conveys that reality than "involve."	JSDS Comments
262.	1	J8/Forces Division	S	1.13	2 and Figure I-7	7	<p><b>Substantive:</b> Term "war termination strategy" in line 7 and "Termination strategy" in Figure I-7 are inconsistent with the more common terminology; "conflict termination objectives."</p> <p><b>Recommended Change:</b> Change paragraph heading from "War Termination" to "Termination Objectives," and replace "The war termination strategy..." in lines 6-7 with "The conflict termination objectives..."</p>	Consistent with language in Contingency Planning Guidance.	R – Open to discussion. I think it will not matter when the other paras are added.
263.		STRATCOM/J5515	S	1.13	3.c.(2)	5,6	Change meaning of sentence to read, "...intensity of a conflict involving the use of nuclear weapons, the..."	Replacing the word, "war" with , "conflict involving the use of" emphasizes the nature of most conflicts resulting in use of a nuclear weapon. Nuclear war implies the mutual exchange of nuclear weapons between warring parties—not fully representative of the facts.	M – see JSDS Comments
264.	62	EUCOM	S	1.14		3.5	Change to read: " <del>The maintenance of an</del> Adequate reserve of nuclear forces <del>would</del> <u>should</u> preclude another country or nonstate organization from coercing the United States before, during, or after the use of nuclear weapons."	Certainty should not be implied here; the fact that the US has reserve weapons entails no less uncertainty than the assumptions surrounding the theory of deterrence itself.	M – see JSDS Comments
265.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	1.14		3.7	<p>Change as follows:</p> <p>(3) <b>Reserve Nuclear Forces.</b> <del>Retaining an</del> Adequate reserve of nuclear forces <del>would</del> <u>should</u> preclude another country or nonstate <del>organization</del> <u>actor</u> from coercing the United States before, during, or after the use of nuclear weapons. Such forces provide the United States with the capability to continue <del>to</del> <u>nuclear deterrence</u>, deny adversary war aims, exert leverage for war termination, <del>influence other nations,</del> <u>dissuade potential adversaries from action, and assure allies.</u></p>	Clarity.	A

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266.	63	EUCOM	S	1.14		5	Insert “are intended to” as follows: “Such forces <u>are intended to provide the United States with the capability...</u> ”	Certainty should not be implied here; having reserve weapons is as uncertain in its effect as is deterrence itself.	M – see JSDS Comments
267.	28.	USAF	S	1.14	3c4	9	Add: <u>(4) Consequence Management.</u>	Subject is listed in Figure 1-7 but not mentioned or elaborated on in main text. Subject should be addressed or referenced to another directive.	M – see JSDS Comments
268.	28.	USAF	S	1.14	3c4	9	Add: <u>(4) Consequence Management. Those measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a chemical, biological, nuclear, and/or high-yield explosive situation. For domestic consequence management, the primary authority rests with the States to respond and the Federal Government to provide assistance as required. Also called CM.</u>	Subject is listed in Figure 1-7 but not mentioned or elaborated on in main text. <u>This is the CM definition from JP 1-02.</u> Subject should be addressed or referenced to another directive <u>JP 3-11.</u>	M – see JSDS Comments
269.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	1.14		9.10	Add the following new paragraph:  <b><u>(4) Consequence Management (CM).</u></b> <i>JP 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines CM as “Those measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a chemical, biological, nuclear, and/or high-yield explosive situation.” The effects of nuclear weapons mandate that <u>commanders plan for operations in the postnuclear environment.</u></i>	Adds a new paragraph in response to comments.	A
270.	29.	USAF	S	1.14	3c5	10	Add: <u>(5) Transition to Post-War Military Support Operations.</u>	Subject is listed in Figure 1-7 but not mentioned or elaborated on in main text. Subject should be addressed or referenced to another directive.	M – see JSDS Comments
271.	29.	USAF	S	1.14	3c5	10	Add: <del><u>(5) Transition to Post-War Military Support Operations.</u></del>  <b><u>Transition to Post-Conflict Operations.</u></b> <u>Conflict termination operations should establish the basis for post-</u>	Subject is listed in Figure 1-7 but not mentioned or elaborated on in main text. <u>The name change should be made to be consistent</u>	M – see JSDS Comments

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							<u>conflict operations that assure accomplishment of US long-term objectives in the region. To the degree that US forces and personnel are integral to post-conflict operations, planning for the transition should emphasize continuity across all relevant tasks, consistent with redeployment requirements.</u>	with JP 3-11. Subject should be addressed or referenced to another directive JP 3-11.	
272.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	1.14		10.10	Add the following new paragraph:  <b><u>(5) Transition to Postconflict Operations.</u></b> <u>Conflict termination operations should establish the basis for post-conflict operations that assure accomplishment of US long-term objectives in the region. To the degree that US forces and personnel are integral to post-conflict operations, planning for the transition should emphasize continuity across all relevant tasks, consistent with redeployment requirements</u>  <u>(new paragraph) Additional doctrine relating to consequence management an postconflict operations is in JP 3-11: <i>Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments.</i></u>	Adds a new paragraph in response to comments.	A
273.		USAF	S	1.14	3c	11	Add: <u>Additional information on “Post Wartime Considerations” is found in JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments.</u>	Fulfills reference requirements for paragraphs 3c4 and 3c5. Guides readers to JP 3-11 where more detailed information can be found on all the topics in Paragraph 3c.	M – see JSDS Comments
274.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	2.01	1	9.10	Change as follows:  "The critical elements of strategic and theater nuclear operations include detailed command relationships, <u>command responsibilities, and command and control (C2) actions; <del>C2, and command responsibilities</del></u> ; integrated planning and targeting..."	Incorporates Army recommendation and adds clarity.	
275.	17	USA	S	2.01	1	10	Change the sentence to read; “...command relationships, command and control (C2) actions and command responsibilities....”	Parallel sentence	M – see JSDS Comments
276.	30	JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	2.01	2a	16	Change as follows:  "a. Command Relationships. National policy requires a single	Clarity.	A

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							execution and termination authority for <u>the use of nuclear weapons</u> . The President retains sole authority for the employment and termination of nuclear weapons.”		
277.	30	J7	S	2.01	2a	16	Change to read as follows: "a. Command Relationships. National policy requires a single execution and termination authority for <u>use of nuclear weapons</u> . The President retains sole authority for the employment and termination of nuclear weapons <u>and termination of their use</u> .”	Clarity.	M – see JSDS Comments
278.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	2.02	2.a	1.6	Change as follows:  "... weapons is based on the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, and allies. This authority is exercised through a single chain of command that runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense directly to the combatant commanders. Nuclear weapon <del>release/termination and related instructions</del> orders are transmitted from the President and Secretary of Defense via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with <del>(IAW)</del> established <u>procedures</u> . <del>emergency action procedures (EAPs).</del> "	These changes:  Remove excessive detail from the paragraph.	A
279.		USN	A	2.02		4.6	Change as follows:  Nuclear weapon release/termination and related instructions are transmitted from the President and Secretary of Defense via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with (IAW) established emergency action procedures <del>(EAPs)</del> .	Acronym is not used again	M – see JSDS Comments
280.	13	USMC	A	2.02		6	Change to read: "...action procedures (EAPs)."	There is not 's' at the end of this acronym in this usage.	M – see JSDS Comments
281.		USN	S	2.02		11.12	Clarify: Top-down communication ensures critical orders are received for execution, increases survivability, and reduces vulnerability of C2 systems.	How is survivability increased?	
282.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	2.02	2b	11.12	Change to read:  "Top-down <u>communication transmitted over reliable, secure, and survivable communications systems</u> ensures critical orders are received for execution, <del>and</del> increases survivability, and reduces vulnerability <del>problems</del> of C2 systems <u>across the</u>	Accepts USAF change below – replaces <i>redundant</i> with <i>reliable</i> . The requirement to get the word to the forces drives the reliability, which in turn drives the redundant comms channels.	A

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							<u>range of military operations.”</u>		
283.	31.	USAF	S	2.02	2b	11.12	Change to read:  “Top-down <u>communication over redundant, secure, and survivable communications systems</u> ensures critical orders are received for execution, <del>and</del> increases survivability, and reduces vulnerability <del>problems</del> of C2 systems <u>across the range of military operations.”</u>	Highlights importance and critical operational attributes of nuclear command and control systems and when those systems must be available for use.	M – see JSDS Comment
284.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	C	2.02		17.19	Change as follows:  “ <del>Circumstantially, geographic</del> Geographic combatant commanders <del>have</del> <u>may be assigned</u> operational control (OPCON) over <u>USSTRATCOM</u> nuclear-capable forces employed for nuclear operations in support of theater conflicts. ”	Accepts EUCOM critical modifications with minor tweak changing "given" to "assigned."  JSDS concurs with EUCOM rationale.	A
285.	64	EUCOM	C	2.02		17.19	Change sentence to read:  “ <del>Circumstantially, geographic</del> Geographic combatant commanders <del>have</del> <u>may be given</u> operational control (OPCON) over <u>USSTRATCOM</u> nuclear-capable forces employed for nuclear operations in support of theater conflicts.	Geographic commanders might not receive OPCON over assets that end up on the ground in their AORs (What would it mean for a geographic commander to have OPCON over a nuclear weapon-laden B-2 flying through his airspace?). That does not mean that a CDRUSSTRATCOM and a geographical commander would not coordinate, but coordination is not the same as OPCON. Granted, geographic commanders may, in certain cases, receive OPCON over USSTRATCOM forces (and the recommended change to the text takes this fact into consideration). However, this is only circumstantially true.	M – see JSDS Comments
286.		USN	A	2.02		19.20	Change as follows: ...in Chapter III, “Theater Nuclear Operations:” <u>;</u>	Punctuation goes outside the quotation marks.	R – most stylebooks support punctuation

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									inside quotes for readability.
287.	30.	USAF and JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	2.02	2c	25	Replace B-52 photo with a Minuteman III missile and give it a figure number.  Renumber other figures and associated references accordingly.	Editorial. ICBM community is not represented in publication with a photo and is a major player in nuclear operations. Subs are represented on page I-2 and there is a B-52 photo on Page III-7.	A – New Image ready
288.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	2.03		1	Change Title to "3. <u>Integrated</u> Planning and Targeting"	Consistency with Table of Contents	A
289.	17	USA	A	2.03	3.	1	Rename " <u>Integrated</u> Planning and Targeting"	This reflects the terminology in Para 1, Page II-1 and Figure II-1	M – see JSDS Comments
290.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	2.03		3.9	Change as follows:  "a. <b>Strategic Nuclear Planning.</b> Detailed planning is key to the execution of strategic nuclear operations. <u>The President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff each provide guidance for Presidential, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff strategic nuclear weapon planning, and This execution guidance ensures optimal targeting and integration of US nuclear and conventional forces prior to, during, and after conflict, and is the framework used by the CDRUSSTRATCOM, to uses this framework to develop plans; and detailed -Detailed mission planning is expanded in coordination coordinated with standing task force commanders of all strategic nuclear forces and US nuclear-capable allies."</u>	These changes  – Incorporate recommended changes – Acknowledge but provide no detail (all still classified) regarding the direction to integrate conventional and nuclear planning (which is unclass). – Add some clarity.	A
291.	65	EUCOM	A	2.03		7	Change "is" to "provides"	This gets rid of the tedious combination of an action verb (ensures) and a being verb (is) joined by a coordinating conjunction (and).	M – see JSDS Comments
292.	66	EUCOM	A	2.03		7	Remove comma after CDRUSSTRATCOM	Superfluous	M – see JSDS Comments
293.	7.	USJFCOM	A	2.03		7	<b>Change as follows:</b> "conflict, and is the framework used by <del>the</del> CDRUSSTRATCOM, to develop"	Editorial.	M – see JSDS Comments

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294.		USN	A	2.03		7.8	Change as follows: ...used by <del>the</del> CDRUSSTRATCOM, to develop plans.	Delete article and comma.	M – see JSDS Comments
295.		USN	A	2.03		19.20	Change as follows: "... nuclear operations. This adaptive planning capability ensures the most efficient use of resources and <del>ensures the</del> <u>that</u> strategic forces are fully capable..."	Use of two "ensures" in the sentence is awkward.	A
296.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	2.03		21	Delete as follows:  "Adaptive planning must also respond to taskings directed by higher authorities."	Clarity. In general, planning already responds to tasks from higher authorities, so too, must adaptive planning.	A
297.	67	EUCOM	S	2.03		21	Change as follows: "Adaptive planning <del>must also respond</del> <u>also facilitates responsiveness</u> to taskings directed by higher authorities."	The sentence as written propounds the obvious: ALL plans—adaptive or not—must be responsive to subsequent direction from higher authorities	R – Deleted sentence. See JSDS Comments.
298.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	2.03	3a	22	Add the following new paragraph:  "(3) <b>Crisis Action Planning.</b> Strategic planners must also be prepared to conduct crisis action planning in those cases where adaptable, deliberate plans do not exist."	Accepts Army significant comment with minor word smithing.	A
299.	18	USA	S	2.03	3a	22	Add: (3) Crisis Action Planning. Strategic Planner must also be prepared to conduct crisis action planning in those cases where no deliberate plans exist to adapt from.	Completeness and accuracy. Deliberate planning and adaptive planning are introduced in the preceding paragraphs but no mention is made of crisis action planning. Adaptive planning and crisis action planning are not synonymous. JOPES and EAP Vol. VIII are separate documents.	M – see JSDS Comments
300.	14	USMC	A	2.03		25	Change to read: "... <i>Planning (S).</i> "	Classification of JP.	A
301.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	2.03		27.40	Change as follows:  "c. <b>Targeting.</b> Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking into account operational requirements and capabilities. <u>As nonnuclear strike capabilities and nuclear</u>	These changes:  – Support most of Navy's recommended deletions  – Reinforce the conventional	A



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							<p><del>strike are integrated, targets that may have required a nuclear weapon to achieve the needed effects in previous planning may be targeted with conventional weapons, provided the required effects can be achieved. At the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander level, targeting is the process of selecting, prioritizing, and identifying the desired effects on targets. Targeting includes the analysis of an adversary situation relative to the commander's mission, objectives, and resources at the commander's disposal, as well as the identification and nomination of specific vulnerabilities that, if exploited, accomplish the commander's purpose through capture, neutralizing, deceiving, delaying, disrupting, disabling, or destroying critical adversary forces or resources. Nuclear targeting Targeting decision decisions must also consider environmental considerations and impacts IAW in accordance with JP 3-0, <i>Doctrine for Joint Operations</i>, JP 3-34, <i>Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations</i>, and JP 4-04 <i>Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support</i>. Environmental considerations will probably be most relevant as elements of collateral damage, since the environment falls short of most, if not all, of the criteria associated with legal targets. Finally, targeting is accomplished IAW international law, international agreements and conventions, and rules of engagement approved by the President and Secretary of Defense.—JP 3-60: <i>Joint Doctrine for Targeting</i> addresses the myriad factors associated with the targeting process.</del></p>	<p>and nuclear strike integration requirements of the NPR</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>With respect to the environmental discussion – US policy and international law do not endorse or authorize wholesale destruction for its own sake; consequently, the environment is not a lawful target. Therefore, environmental damage in the context of nuclear operations is an outcome more appropriate to be addressed in the realm of collateral damage.</li> <li>Deletes reference to President and SecDef approval. Their guidance is already addressed in para 3.a of the same page.</li> <li>It is not clear to me that we need to address PLAN approval in this document.</li> <li>Gives reference to the source document – JP 3-60 Strike planning</li> </ul>	
302.		USN	A	2.03		27.43	<p>Change as follows:  <b>Targeting.</b> <del>Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking into account operational requirements and capabilities. At the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander level, targeting is the process of selecting, prioritizing, and identifying the desired</del></p>	<p>Generic discussion of targeting not required.</p> <p>Targeting has its own JP</p> <p>Based on the target audience for this pub this seems remedial</p>	M – see JSDS Comments

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							<p>effects on targets Targeting includes the analysis of an adversary situation relative to the commander’s mission, objectives, and resources at the commander’s disposal, as well as the identification and nomination of specific vulnerabilities that, if exploited, accomplish the commander’s purpose through capture, neutralizing, deceiving, delaying, disrupting, disabling, or destroying critical adversary forces or resources. Targeting decision must also consider environmental considerations and impacts IAW JP 3-0, JP 3-34, and JP 4-04. Finally, targeting is accomplished IAW international law, international agreements and conventions, and rules of engagement approved by the President and Secretary of Defense.</p> <p>(1) <del>Nuclear Targeting Process</del>. Whether supporting national strategic goals or geographic combatant commanders, the nuclear targeting process is cyclical.</p>		
303.	31	J7	M	2.03	3c	29	<p>Change to read as follows:</p> <p>"At the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander level, targeting is the process of selecting, prioritizing, and identifying the desired effects on targets that will achieve the commander’s objectives."</p>	Consistency with JP 3-60, Chapter I, para 1. Effects are intended to achieve objectives.	M – see JSDS Comments
304.	68	EUCOM	A	2.03		29.31	Delete the sentence: “At the geographic . . . effects on targets.” At the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander level, targeting is the process of selecting, prioritizing, and identifying the desired effects on targets.”	This sentence is merely a restatement of the first sentence in the paragraph, and the statement about effects on targets is so obvious as to provide no added value. Figure II-2 clearly indicates that the same elements are part and parcel of the targeting process, regardless of the echelon involved. So, singling out the geographic commander only introduces confusion at this point in the chapter.	M – see JSDS Comments
305.	4	NORAD	A	2.03	3.c.	34	Recommend deleting, “. . . at the commander’s disposal, . . .”. Sentence is already very long and conveys the same idea without these words.	Readability	M – see JSDS Comments

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							Recommended rewrite would read, " <a href="#">Targeting includes the analysis of an adversary situation relative to the commander's mission, objectives, and resources, as well as the identification and nomination...</a> "		
306.	69	EUCOM	A	2.03		37	Change "decision" to "decisions." Or else, another less desirable option would be to change "Targeting decision" to "The targeting decision."	The sentence as written is an example of "telegraphed" discourse, i.e., the improper omission of natural sentence elements in an attempt to achieve economy.	M – see JSDS Comments
307.	18	USA	A	2.03	3.c.	37	Sentence should read "Targeting decisions"	Clarity	M – see JSDS Comments
308.	32	J7	A	2.03	3c	37	Change to read as follows: "Targeting decision must also consider environmental considerations and impacts IAW JP 3-0, <i>Doctrine for Joint Operations</i> , JP 3-34, <i>Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations</i> , and JP 4-04., <i>Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support</i> ."	Reference pubs need to include a title.	M – see JSDS Comments
309.	32.	USAF	S	2.03	3c	39.41	Change to read: "Finally, nuclear targeting is accomplished IAW international law, international agreements and conventions, and rules of engagement approved by the President and Secretary of Defense."	Correctness. The President and SECDEF do not necessarily approve conventional targeting, but they are required to approve all nuclear targeting.	R – deleted the sentence
310.		USN	S	2.04	F2.02	F2.02	Clarify: NUCLEAR TARGETING PROCESS	Is this specific to nuclear targeting? It appears to be generic.	M – See JSDS Comments
311.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	2.04	F2.02	F2.02	Change title of the figure as follows: " <del>NUCLEAR TARGETING PROCESS</del> JOINT TARGETING CYCLE PHASES"  Change the caption of the figure as follows: "Figure II-2. <del>Nuclear Targeting Process</del> Joint Targeting Cycle Phases"	Graphic used duplicates the language of JP 3-60 Figure II-1 on page II-2 exactly and duplicates the look and feel of the chart very closely.	A
312.	33	J7	S	2.04	3c(1)(a)	3	Change to read as follows: "...and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff initiate the targeting cycle process. The CDRUSSTRATCOM, provides additional ..."	Consistency with Figure II-2. Correctness.	R / M –  The Cycle title mirrors

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									the Joint Targeting Cycle Phases as previously accepted.  Deletion of The accepted elsewhere.
313.	19	USA	A	2.04		4	Change to read: targeting cycle. CDRUSSTRATCOM provides additional targeting	No need for the word “The.”	A
314.	8.	USJFCOM	A	2.04		4	<b>Change as follows:</b> “ <del>The</del> CDRUSSTRATCOM, provides additional targeting...”	Editorial.	A
315.		USN	A	2.04		4	Change as follows: <del>The</del> CDRUSSTRATCOM, provides...	Delete article	A
316.	19	USA	S	2.04	3c(1)(a)	4	Change the sentence to read; “...Joint Chiefs of Staff initiate the targeting <u>process</u> .”	Agrees with Figure 2.2 Nuclear Targeting Process.	R – Fig II-2 titles changed to match JP 3-60.
317.		USN	A	2.04		9.11	Change as follows: <b>Target Development, Validation, Nomination, and Prioritization.</b> Target development focuses on identifying and nominating critical adversary capabilities and <del>means of support and</del> their means of support for attack.	Grammar	M – See JSDS Comments
318.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	2.04	3c1b	9.12	Change as follows:  “(b) <b>Target Development, Validation, Nomination, and Prioritization.</b> <del>Target development focuses on identifying and nominating critical adversary capabilities and means of support and their means of support for attack.</del> <u>The net result of target development is to produce a target nomination list (TNL) that identifies appropriate elements within an adversary’s power base (e.g., forces, infrastructure, and political support) for attack. Successful attacks against these targets should closely support US objectives.</u> ”	These changes:  Accept most of the USAF significant comment  Correct the typo	A

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319.	20	USA	A	2.04	(b)	11	Sentence should read “capabilities and means of support for attack.”	Second “and their means of support” is redundant	M – See JSDS Comments
320.	5	NORAD	A	2.04	3.c. (1)(b)	11	Paragraph reads, “...identifying and nominating critical adversary military forces capabilities and means of support <del>and their means of support</del> for attack.” Recommend deleting, “...and their means of support...”.	Readability	M – See JSDS Comments
321.	33.	USAF	<b>S</b>	2.04	3c1b	11	Change to read:  “ <del>Target development focuses on identifying and nominating critical adversary and their means of support for attack.</del> The net result of target development is to produce from the approved targets a target nomination list (TNL) that identifies those elements within an adversary’s power base (e.g., forces, infrastructure, and political support) that most closely support the JFC’s objectives, and that has been vetted through all joint force component and interagency concerns.”	Consistency with JP 3-60. Target development goes beyond just identifying and nominating targets. It matches targets to actually achieving JFC objectives.	M – See JSDS Comments
322.	49	DTRA	A	2.04	(c)	13	“...desired effects <del>are</del> <u>is</u> ...”	Grammar	M – See JSDS Comments
323.	49	J-3	A	2.04	(c)	13	“...desired effects <del>are</del> <u>is</u> ...”	Grammar	M – See JSDS Comments
324.	34.	USAF	A	2.04	3c1c	13	Change to read: “...recommendations. <u>Targeting personnel translate Commander’s guidance on desired effects into weapon recommendations as a result of capabilities analysis, which includes quantification of</u> <del>quantify</del> the expected results, to include consequences of execution, and calculation of desired ground zeros.	Clarity	M – See JSDS Comments
325.	21	USA	A	2.04	(c)	13.14	Sentence should read “Commander’s guidance on desired effects <u>is</u> translated into weapon recommendations by targeting personnel <u>who</u> quantify...”	Clarity and grammar	M – See JSDS Comments
326.	1.	J2 - DCI/ UFAC J. Hillmer 202-231- 2766	<b>S</b>	2.04	(c)	13.15	Change to read: Commander’s guidance on desired effects are translated into weapon recommendations and targeting personnel quantify the expected results, to include consequences of execution, and calculate desired ground zeros <u>based on targeting intelligence</u> .	Although the distinction between J3 actions in target development and intelligence support to targeting are covered in the italics note on the next page after paragraph (f), the key intelligence input to support targeting takes	M – See JSDS Comments

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								place after target development ((paragraph (b)) and as part of the Capabilities Analysis and should be so stated.	
327.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	2.04	3c1c	13.15	Change as follows:  "(c) <b>Capabilities Analysis.</b> Commander’s guidance on desired effects <del>are</del> <u>is</u> translated into weapon recommendations. <u>Targeting personnel translate the commander’s guidance on desired effects into weapon recommendations as a result of capabilities analysis, which includes quantification of and targeting personnel quantify the expected results, to include consequences of execution, and calculate calculated desired ground zeros based on targeting intelligence.</u> "	These changes accept USAF and Intel comments.	A
328.	70	EUCOM	A	2.04		14	Insert a comma after “recommendations.”	When two independent clauses are joined by a coordinating conjunction (and), the first clause concludes with a comma.	R – sentence split into two.
329.	34	J7	A	2.05	F2.03		1st box on right column: Change to read as follows: " <u>Preplanned Options Deliberate Planning</u> " 3rd box on right column: Change to read as follows: " <u>Nuclear Collateral Damage</u> "	Correctness IAW the text of the pub.	M – See JSDS Comments
330.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	2.05	Fig 2.03	Fig 2.03	Figure II-3: Change the boxes as follows:  " <u>Preplanned Options</u> " should be " <u>Deliberate Planning</u> " " <u>Emergent Targets and Adaptive Planning</u> " should be " <u>Adaptive Planning</u> ," " <u>Collateral Damage</u> " should be " <u>Nuclear Collateral Damage.</u> " Add the following new box " <u>Crisis Action Planning</u> "	Supports Army comment with minor presentation tweak for clarity of editing.  Adds new "crisis action planning" block to remain in parallel with changes accepted below (page 2.06 and 2.07) from Army and JFCOM.	A
331.	20	USA	S	2.05	Fig 2.03	Fig 2.03	Figure 2.03 Change the box label; " <u>Preplanned Options Deliberate Planning</u> " the box labeled " <u>Emergent Targets and Adaptive Planning</u> " to " <u>Adaptive and Crisis Action Planning</u> ," box " <u>collateral Damage</u> " to " <u>Nuclear Collateral Damage.</u> "	Makes the Figure agree with the text.	M – See JSDS Comments

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332.	22	USA	A	2.05	Fig 2.03	Fig 2.03	Entries “Preplanned Options”, “Emergent Targets and Adaptive Planning”, and “Collateral Damage” do not reflect subparagraphs (f), (g) on page II-6 and (h) on page II-7	Figure and subparagraph titles should match	M – See JSDS Comments
333.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	C	2.05		Figure 2.03	Change as follows:  "Nuclear Counterforce Targeting" ← Top Left box "Critical Infrastructure Targeting" ← Second Left box  Rearrange Table as appropriate.	Incorporates changes in text in the table.	A
334.	71	EUCOM	A	2.05		5	Change to read: “This phase includes preparation and transmission of the <del>involves</del> final tasking order, specific mission planning and material preparation at the unit level, Presidential authorization for use, and execution.”	Sentence fragment. As written, the paragraph is a “telegraphed” style of discourse that is out of harmony with the style of the adjacent paragraphs (which are written in complete sentences).	M – See JSDS Comments
335.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	2.05		5.7	Change as follows:  “ <u>This phase includes preparation and transmission of the</u> <del>involves</del> final tasking order, specific mission planning and material preparation at the unit level, Presidential authorization for use, and execution.”	Accepts EUCOM comment	A
336.	72	EUCOM	S	2.05		9	Change to read:  “ <u>In the</u> <del>The</del> final phase, <u>the commander</u> determines <del>if</del> whether the achieved target effects are consistent with either the strategic or the theater campaign objectives.”	Factually incorrect as written. The phase does not determine anything; people do.	A
337.	15	USMC	A	2.05		20	Change to read: “... <u>Planning (S).</u> ”	Classification of JP.	A
338.		USN	A	2.05		22.23	Change as follows: Counterforce targeting <del>is a strategy to</del> employs forces to destroy,...	Simpler.	R – See JSDS Comments
339.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	C	2.05		22.31	Change as follows:  “(a) <del>Counterforce</del> <b>Nuclear Targeting.</b> <u>Nuclear targeting seeks to hold at risk those things upon which a potential adversary places a high value as it pursues its interests, and which support the accomplishment of US objectives. These include those critical war-making and war-supporting assets</u>	This change and its associated one on page 2.06 removes the discussion of counterforce vs countervalue targeting from the document.  Also removed the definitions	A

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							<p><u>and capabilities that a potential enemy leadership values most and that it would rely on to achieve its own objectives. They may include military forces, military bases of operation, infrastructure supporting those forces, command and control systems and nodes, and WMD storage facilities, delivery systems and deployment sites.</u></p> <p><del>Counterforce targeting is a strategy to employ forces to destroy, or render impotent, military capabilities of an adversary force. Typical counterforce targets include bomber bases, ballistic missile submarine bases, intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos, antiballistic and air defense installations, C2 centers, and WMD storage facilities. Generally, the nuclear forces required to implement a counterforce targeting strategy have specifically designed yields and more accurate weapon systems than the forces and weapons required to implement a critical infrastructure strategy, because counterforce targets are generally harder, more protected, difficult to find, and more mobile than critical infrastructure targets."</del></p> <p><b>Renumber / reletter subsequent paragraphs.</b></p>	from the glossary – see GL-3 (99.03).	
340.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	2.05		22.31	<p>Change as follows:</p> <p><b>"(a) Counterforce Targeting.</b>                      Counterforce targeting <del>is a strategy to employ</del> <b>employs</b> forces to destroy, or render impotent, military capabilities of an adversary force. <del>Typical counterforce</del> <b>Counterforce</b> targets <u>may</u> include bomber bases, ballistic missile submarine bases, intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos, antiballistic and air defense installations, C2 centers, and WMD storage facilities. <del>Generally, the nuclear forces required to implement a counterforce targeting strategy have specifically designed yields and are more accurate weapon systems than the forces and weapons required to implement a critical infrastructure strategy, because counterforce targets are generally harder, more protected, difficult to find, and more mobile than critical infrastructure targets."</del></p>	These changes:  Accept Navy language change  Adds some ambiguity  Deletes specific discussion about relative yields and hardening.	<p><b>R – original JSDS AO recommendation.</b></p> <p><b>Rejected 23 Nov 04</b></p>



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341.	35	J7	A	2.05	3c(2)(a)	24	Change to read as follows: "... ballistic missile submarine bases, intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos, antiballistic and air defense ..."	Acronym already established.	R – Text Deleted
342.	36	J7	S	2.05	3c(2)(a)	26	Change to read as follows: "Generally, the nuclear forces required to implement a counterforce targeting strategy have specifically designed yields and are the weapons systems are more accurate weapon systems than the forces and weapons required to implement a critical infrastructure strategy, because counterforce targets are generally harder, more protected, difficult to find, and more mobile than critical infrastructure targets."	Sense.	R – Text Deleted
343.	13	J8/Forces Division	A	2.05	(2)(a)	26.31	<b>Administrative:</b> Sentence which runs from line 26 through line 31 is confusing.  <u>Recommended Change:</u> Recommend rewording sentence as below:  <i>Given the typical counterforce target characteristics (harder, more difficult to find, more mobile), the nuclear forces generally employed in a counterforce targeting strategy have specifically designed yields allowing them to be more accurate than those typically employed against critical infrastructure targets.</i>	Clarity	R – deleting the sentence
344.	6	NORAD	A	2.05	3.c.(2)(a)	30	Paragraph reads, "...harder, more protected, difficult to find, and <del>more</del> mobile than critical infrastructure targets." Recommend deleting second, "more" since "more mobile" was already qualified by the first "more" that precedes "protected." An alternate solution to make it read better would be to change the " <del>more protected</del> " to " <u>better protected</u> ".	Readability	R – deleting the sentence
345.	22	USA	S	2.06	3c(2)b	2-8	Delete: <del>Critical Infrastructure</del> , Add: Countervalue.	Completeness. Critical infrastructure cannot be substituted for countervalue as it encompasses far less than countervalue. Infrastructure is but one of many valuable assets. Critical Infrastructure and Counterforce targets are subsets of countervalue targeting. Needs	R

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								to be consistent with JP 3-12.1 wording.	
346.	37	J7	A	2.06	3c(2)(b)	2	Change to read as follows: "Critical Infrastructure targeting strategy directs the destruction . . . targeting strategy, because <del>Critical Infrastructure targets are generally softer and unprotected in relation to counterforce targets.</del> "	Correctness.	R – Critical Infrastructure targeting discussion deleted.
347.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	C	2.06		02.08	Delete the following paragraph:  " <del>(b) Critical Infrastructure Targeting. Critical Infrastructure targeting strategy directs the destruction or neutralization of selected adversary military forces and their means of support, such as industries, resources, and institutions that contribute to an adversary’s ability to wage war. In general, weapons required to implement this strategy are not as numerous or accurate as those required to implement a counterforce targeting strategy, because Critical Infrastructure targets are generally softer and unprotected in relation to counterforce targets.</del> "	This change eliminates the discussion around Countervalue and critical infrastructure targeting.	A
348.		USN	A	2.06		2.08	Change as follows: (b) Critical Infrastructure Targeting. Critical Infrastructure targeting strategy directs the destruction or neutralization of selected adversary military forces and their means of support, such as industries, resources, and institutions that contribute to an adversary’s ability to wage war. In general, weapons required to implement this strategy are not as numerous or accurate as those required to implement a counterforce targeting strategy, because <del>Critical Infrastructure targets are generally softer and unprotected in relation compared</del> to counterforce targets.	Lower case. Unnecessary.  Use generic term  Lower case Better verbiage	R
349.	16	USMC	S	2.06		2.7	Change to read: "...Critical Infrastructure targeting strategy directs..... targeting strategy, because <del>Critical Infrastructure targets are...</del> "	Terms are not capitalized in this general usage.	R
350.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	C	2.06		2.8	Change as follows:  " <del>(b) Critical Infrastructure Countervalue Targeting. A countervalue targeting strategy, as the name implies, seeks to hold at risk things upon which an adversary places a high value as it pursues its interests. Historically, this targeting</del> "	These changes:  – Accept intent of EUCOM critical comment	R – original JSDS AO recommendation.  Rejected 23

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							<p><u>strategy has referred principally to things other than committed military forces; such as industries, resources, and institutions that contribute to an adversary’s ability to wage war. Critical Infrastructure Countervalue targeting strategy directs the destruction or neutralization of selected adversary military forces and their means of support, such as industries, resources, and institutions that contribute to an adversary’s ability to wage war. In some fora, a countervalue targeting strategy has come to be perceived as synonymous with attacks on cities and population centers. The goal of such targeting would be to break the will of the adversary population; resulting in the surrender of the adversary on terms favorable to the United States. In general, weapons required to implement this strategy are not as numerous or accurate as those required to implement a counterforce targeting strategy, because Critical Infrastructure targets are generally softer and unprotected in relation to counterforce targets.</u></p> <p><b>(New Paragraph) (c) Critical Infrastructure Targeting.</b> <u>Critical Infrastructure targeting is a targeting methodology that can support either a countervalue or counterforce targeting strategy. Critical infrastructure targeting seeks the destruction, interruption, or neutralization of selected adversary assets, which may include transportation systems, electrical grids, financial systems, or entire industries etc. without the implied mass killing of non-combatants with which countervalue has come to be associated. Critical infrastructure targeting therefore, focuses attacks upon the means of support for the adversary and the industries and resources that contribute to their ability to wage war. The role of critical infrastructure targeting in the new triad will continue to expand as advanced conventional weapons and information operations become more integrated into the strategic targeting process. These advanced capabilities may replace nuclear weapons as the most effective means to achieve the required strategic effects while reducing collateral damage to the lowest practicable level.</u></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Recognize the perception that 40 years of MAD has developed in the public</li> <li>– Deletes specific discussion about relative yields and hardening</li> <li>– Attempts to add the intent of the advanced capabilities portion of the new triad and the intent of conventional – nuclear integration with respect to achieving the desired strategic effects.</li> <li>– The new paragraphs are matched pretty well with the glossary terms that mirror these.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Nov 04</b></p> <p><b>Open – Need to discuss with Legal, STRATCOM, and EUCOM</b></p> <p><b>I think this is what both of them would like to say....</b></p> <p><b>Although one could make a case for "kinetic and nonkinetic"</b></p>
351.	73	EUCOM	<b>C</b>	2.06	1	2.8	<b>EUCOM NONCONCURS</b> both with the paragraph entitled “Critical Infrastructure Targeting” and its associated definition on GL-3. Recommend deletion of paragraph.	The change in name from “countervalue” to “critical infrastructure” is not helpful.	<b>R</b> <b>Open – Need to</b>

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<p>A paragraph acceptable to EUCOM would read:</p> <p><u>“A countervalue targeting strategy, as the name implies, seeks to hold at risk things upon which an adversary places a high “value” as it pursues its interests. Historically, this has referred principally to things other than committed military forces (accounted for by the definition of “counterforce” targeting), such as industries, resources, and institutions that contribute to an adversary’s ability to wage war. In general, weapons required to implement this strategy need not be as numerous or accurate as those required to implement a counterforce targeting strategy, because countervalue targets tend to be softer and less protected than most counterforce targets. Nevertheless, given the case in which an adversary hardens to an unusual degree locations not directly associated with the directing of committed military forces per se but vital to its long-term interests, it may become necessary to target these locations using munitions (including nuclear munitions) with precision guidance or deep penetration capability.”</u></p>	<p>“Countervalue” has an institutionalized and broadly understood meaning in the academic literature on nuclear warfare and in international security studies in general. To assign a new name to the concept involved will serve only to disassociate JP 3-12 from the standard body of literature that deals with the subject of this publication, thus making it less comprehensible to its broader audience. If in doubt on this point, insert the word “countervalue” in any electronic search engine and note how many “hits” appear that are directly relevant to nuclear policy. Conversely, insert the phrase “critical infrastructure” and note how few “hits” deal exclusively with nuclear policy. Recall that joint pubs are not merely technical manuals designed for small, highly specialized populations; they need to remain useful vehicles for expressing the intent of U.S. national security doctrine to a relatively broad audience. Changing this definition will <i>not</i> enhance comprehensibility. One more point: Changing “countervalue” to “critical infrastructure” obscures the reality that although nuclear weapons are, in some cases at least, weapons with military utility, they are <i>always political</i> weapons in a way that other weapon systems are not. If we lose the ability to speak in</p>	<p><b>discuss with Legal – STRATCOM position from the Second Draft which generated the change to which EUCOM objects is:</b></p> <p>Many operational law attorneys do not believe “countervalue” targeting (especially as defined in this JP) is a lawful justification for employment of force, much less nuclear force. Countervalue philosophy makes no distinction between purely civilian activities and military related activities,</p>

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								<p>terms of “value” when dealing with nuclear weapons and instead must think of them in “infrastructure” terms, we risk losing view of the reality that the US <i>may</i> at some juncture use nuclear weapons for political—rather than strictly military—purposes.</p>	<p>and could be used to justify deliberate attacks on civilians and non- military portions of a nations economy. It therefore cannot meet the “military necessity” prong of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Countervalue targeting also undermines one of the values that underlies LOAC – the reduction of civilian suffering and to foster the ability to maintain the peace after the conflict ends. For example, under the countervalue target philosophy, the attack on the World</p>

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									Trade Center Towers on 9/11 could be justified.  See Proposed JSDS language above.
352.	14	J8/Forces Division	A	2.06	(b)	5.8	<b>Administrative:</b> Final clause of sentence which runs from line 5 through line 8 is redundant and unnecessary.  <b>Recommended Change:</b> Recommend deleting the final clause so sentence reads as below:  <i>In general, weapons required to implement this strategy are not as numerous or accurate as those required to implement a counterforce targeting strategy because critical infrastructure targets are generally softer and unprotected. <del>in relation to counterforce targets.</del></i>	Eliminates redundancy.	<b>R</b> – See JSDS Comments
353.	50	DTRA	A	2.06	(b)	7	“...critical infrastructure...” be consistent, other instances of this phrase are not capitalized	Consistency	<b>R</b> – See JSDS Comments
354.	50	J-3	A	2.06	(b)	7	“...critical infrastructure...” be consistent, other instances of this phrase are not capitalized	Consistency	<b>R</b> – See JSDS Comments
355.		USN	A	2.06		17.18	Change as follows: "Prioritization may change as the war/campaign progresses <del>in time.</del> "	Superfluous.	<b>A</b>
356.	6	USTC	A	2.06	3	18	Used by <u>US</u> STRATCOM	More consistent with unit designation used throughout document.	<b>M</b> – see JSDS Comments.
357.	23	USA	A	2.06	(d)	20	Sentence should read “...target defeat mechanism...”	Shouldn't be plural	<b>M</b> – see JSDS Comments.
358.	51	DTRA	A	2.06	(d)	20	“... mechanisms <del>used by</del> STRATCOM...”	Grammar	<b>M</b> – see JSDS

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									Comments.
359.	74	EUCOM	A	2.06		20	Change “mechanisms” to “mechanism”	Correctness: agreement	M – see JSDS Comments.
360.	51	J-3	A	2.06	(d)	20	“... mechanisms used by STRATCOM...”	Grammar	M – see JSDS Comments.
361.	35.	USAF	A	2.06	2d	20	Change “mechanisms” to “mechanism”.	Grammar.	M – see JSDS Comments.
362.	7	NORAD	A	2.06	3.c. (2)(d)	20	Recommend deleting last “s” from “mechanisms”. This should be singular vs. plural in this context.	Accuracy	M – see JSDS Comments.
363.		LC	A	2.06	3	20	Change as follows: “... is a target defeat <del>mechanisms</del> <u>mechanism</u> used by ...”	Grammar	M – see JSDS Comments.
364.	38	J7	A	2.06	3c(2) (d)	20	Change to read as follows: “Layering is a target defeat <del>mechanisms</del> <u>mechanisms used by the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) in which more than one weapon is planned against . . .</u> ”	Acronym needs to be established.	M – see JSDS Comments
365.	17	USMC	S	2.06		20.21	Change to read: “...target defeat mechanisms used by <u>US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)</u> in which more...”	Correct grammar. and acronyms should be identified on first use; correct terminology.	M – see JSDS Comments.
366.	9.	USJFCOM	A	2.06		20.21	<b>Change as follows:</b> “Layering is a target defeat mechanisms used by <u>USSTRATCOM</u> in which ...”	Correctness.	M – see JSDS Comments.
367.		USN	A	2.06		20.22	Change as follows: Layering is a target defeat mechanisms used by STRATCOM in which more than one weapon is planned against a target to increase the probability of its destruction, or to improve the confidence that a weapon <u>will</u> arrives and detonates on the specified target and achieves a specified level of damage.	Singular.  Use future tense	M – see JSDS Comments.
368.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	2.06		20.23	Change as follows:  (d) <b>Layering.</b> Layering is a target defeat <del>mechanisms</del> <u>mechanism</u> used by <del>STRATCOM</del> <u>USSTRATCOM</u> . <u>In layering, in which more than one weapon is planned against a target to increase the probability of the target's its</u> destruction; or to improve the confidence that a weapon <del>arrives and detonates on the specified target and achieves a</del>	These changes  Accept the grammatical changes and revise for easier reading.	A

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							<del>specified</del> will arrive and detonate in the right location, and <u>achieve the required</u> level of damage.		
369.	15	J8/Forces Division	A	2.06	(d)	20.23	<p><b>Administrative:</b> Incorrect subject-verb agreement at the beginning of the first sentence of paragraph (d) and clearer wording at the end.</p> <p><u>Recommended Change:</u> Recommend deleting the ‘s’ from the word ‘<b>mechanism</b>’ making it singular rather than plural and replacing ‘<b>a specified</b>’ with ‘<b>the desired</b>’ at the end. Sentence should read:</p> <p><i>Layering is a target defeat mechanism used by STRATCOM in which more than one weapon is planned against a target to increase the probability of its destruction or to improve the confidence that a weapon arrives and detonates on the specified target and achieves the desired <del>a specified</del> level of damage.</i></p>	Typographical error and clarity.	M – see JSDS Comments.
370.	36.	USAF	A	2.06	3c2d	21	Change STRATCOM to USSTRATCOM	Consistency	M – see JSDS Comments.
<b>371.</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>J7</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>2.06</b>	<b>3c(2)(e)</b>	<b>27</b>	Change to read as follows: "Using different delivery platforms such as ICBMs, <del>submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), or aircraft-delivered weapons . . .</del> "	<b>Acronym already established.</b>	M – see JSDS Comments
372.	37.	USAF	A	2.06	3b2e	27.28	Change to read: "... <del>submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) SLBM,</del> ..."	Previously used acronym.	<b>A</b>
373.		USN	A	2.06		31.35	<p>Change as follows:</p> <p>(f) Deliberate Planning. Deliberate planning is a highly structured process that engages commanders and staffs of the entire Joint Planning and Execution Community in the methodical development of fully coordinated, complex planning for nuclear contingencies. The deliberately developed nuclear plans and options provide the President, Secretary of Defense, and Combatant Commanders with the capability to rapidly respond to preplanned contingencies.</p>	<p>Lower case.</p> <p>Lower case.</p>	M – see JSDS Comments.
374.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	2.06		31.39	Change as follows:	These changes	<b>A</b>



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							<p>" (f) <b>Planning.</b> JP 5-0 <i>Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations</i> sets forth the fundamental principles and doctrine that guide planning by the Armed Forces of the United States in joint or multinational operations. Additional guidance is available in CJCSM 3122.01 <i>Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)</i>; and CJCS emergency action procedures. The following paragraphs focus on the unique aspects of nuclear planning.</p> <p><b>(Insert the following New Paragraph)</b></p> <p><u>(i) Deliberate Planning.</u> Deliberate planning is a highly structured process that engages commanders and staffs of the entire <del>Joint Planning and Execution Community</del> joint planning and execution community in the methodical development of fully coordinated, complex planning for nuclear contingencies. The deliberately developed nuclear plans and options provide the President, Secretary of Defense, and <del>Combatant Commanders</del> <u>combatant commanders</u> with the capability to rapidly respond to preplanned contingencies. Plans and options developed during deliberate planning provide a foundation for adaptive <del>and crisis action</del> planning."</p>	<p>Break out the planning references from the nuclear context.</p> <p>Focus on the things that make nuclear planning special.</p> <p>Accept capitalization changes recommended</p> <p>Deletes "crisis action" from the last sentence because if a crisis develops and a plan exists that can be modified, it is then adaptively planned – but if no plan exists, then it falls into the realm of crisis planning.</p> <p>See details on Adaptive and Crisis Action Planning below.</p>	
375.	18	USMC	S	2.06		32.35	Change to read: "...the entire <del>J</del> oint <del>P</del> lanning and <del>E</del> xecution <del>C</del> ommunity in the methodical.....of Defense, and <del>C</del> ombatant <del>C</del> ommanders with the..."	Terms are not capitalized in this general usage per JP 1-02.	M – see JSDS Comments.
376.	40	J7	A	2.06	3c(2) (f)	34	Change to read as follows: "... provide the President, Secretary of Defense, and <del>C</del> ombatant <del>C</del> ommanders with the capability to rapidly respond to preplanned contingencies."	Correctness.	M – see JSDS Comments
377.	21	USA	S	2.06	3b(2)	41	Add: Paragraph (h) Crisis Action Planning. The time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and orders in response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning follows prescribed crisis action procedures to formulate and implement an effective response within the time frame permitted by the crisis.	Accuracy and Clarity. Need to differentiate between the two. The two are not synonymous and are derived from two separate documents. Crisis action is used when no deliberate plans exist to adapt from.	M – see JSDS Comments
378.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	2.06		41.46	Continuing the change from lines 31-39, change as follows:	These changes:	A
				and			<u>(ii) Crisis Action Planning.</u> The time-sensitive development	Change the order of the	

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
				2.07			<p><u>of joint operation plans and orders in response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning follows prescribed crisis action procedures to formulate and implement an effective response within the time frame permitted by the crisis. It is distinct from adaptive planning in that emerging targets are likely to have no preexisting plans that could be adapted. Success in engaging these types of targets depends heavily upon the speed with which they are identified, targeted, and attacked.</u></p> <p><b>(Insert New Paragraph)</b>  <del>(g) (iii) Adaptive and Crisis Action Planning. Within the context of nuclear operations, adaptive planning is a subset of crisis action planning. In adaptive planning, a deliberate plan of sufficient similarity to the developing crisis already exists and can be changed to meet national needs. Adaptive planning must synchronize emergent target attacks with existing force employment plans. Even after the initial laydown of nuclear weapons, a residual requirement to strike additional (follow on and/or emerging) targets in support of retaliatory or war termination objectives may exist. Commanders must maintain the capability to rapidly strike previously unidentified or newly emerging targets. Adaptive and Crisis Action Planning procedures contained in JP 5-0, and CJCS Emergency Action Procedures provide commanders with the procedures for conducting planning on emerging targets. It is important to recognize that success in engaging emerging targets depends heavily upon the speed with which they are identified, targeted, and attacked. Adaptive planning must also include synchronizing emergent targets with existing force employment plans and scheme of maneuver.</del></p>	<p>paragraphs to reflect the JP 5-0 categorization of the different planning types.</p> <p>Deletion removes discussion of the reserve force – which may or may not be crisis planned.</p> <p>Issue already addressed in JP 5-0</p> <p>Deletion recognizes the shift of the reference text to earlier in the page.</p> <p>Text moved to Crisis Planning paragraph.</p> <p>Text moved to Crisis Planning paragraph.</p>	
379.		USN	A	2.06 to 2.07		41.6	COMMENT: Please consult a thesaurus. There are five uses of "emergent" or "emerging" in the paragraph.	Style.	M – see JSDS Comments
380.	19	USMC	S	2.06		46	Change to read: "...targets. Adaptive and Crisis Action Planning procedures..."	Terms are not capitalized in this general usage per JP 1-02.	M – see JSDS Comments
381.	10.	USJFCOM	M	2.06 2.07		46 1	<b>Change as follows:</b> " <del>Adaptive and Crisis Action Planning</del> procedures contained in JP 5-0; <u>CJCSM 3122.01Joint</u>	Correctness and completeness. JP 5-0 does not contain doctrine for	M – see JSDS

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<i>Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)</i> , and CJCS Emergency Action Procedures provide commanders with the procedures for conducting planning on”	“adaptive planning procedures.”	Comments
382.	41	J7	A	2.06	3c(2)(g)	46	Change to read as follows: "Adaptive and Crisis Action Planning procedures contained in JP 5-0, <i>Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations</i> and CJCS Emergency Action Procedures provide commanders . . ."	Any reference to a pub needs a title.	M – see JSDS Comments
383.		USN	A	2.06 to 2.07		46.1	Change as follows: Adaptive and Crisis Action Planning procedures contained in JP 5-0 and CJCS Emergency Action Procedures provide commanders with the procedures...	Lower case. Lower case.	M – see JSDS Comments
384.	20	USMC	S	2.07		8.10	Change to read: “(h) <b>Nuclear Collateral Damage.</b> Nuclear collateral damage is defined as undesired damage or casualties produced by the effects from friendly nuclear weapons can be described as unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time. Such damage is not unlawful so long as it is not excessive in light of the overall military advantage anticipated from the attack. Commanders and staffs responsible...”	Accuracy and clarity. Original JP 1-02 definition is not attributed to any specific publication and is confusing and unclear.	M – see JSDS Comments
385.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	2.07	(h)	8.20	Change as follows:  (h) <b>Nuclear Collateral Damage.</b> Nuclear collateral damage is defined as undesired damage or casualties produced by the effects from friendly nuclear weapons can be described as the unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that would not normally be considered lawful military targets. As with collateral damage arising from the use of conventional weapons, such damage is not unlawful so long as the anticipated loss of life and damage to property incidental to the use of force is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained by the attack.  <b>(New Paragraph)</b> Commanders and staffs responsible for developing nuclear plans must consider avoidance of strive to minimize collateral damage as they develop their strike options; and targeting strategies. Specific techniques for reducing nuclear collateral damage may include reducing lower yield weapons, weapon yield, improving accuracy,	These changes:  Accept USMC proposed language for collateral damage  Uses stronger collateral damage reduction language  Rejects EUCOM significant comment re: counterforce and countervalue strategies – unnecessary wording.  Reiterates the commitment of the	A

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							employing multiple smaller weapons, adjusting the height of burst, and offsetting the desired ground zero (DGZ). <del>As the advanced conventional capabilities of the new triad are developed, the reliance on nuclear weapons to achieve the required effects will be reduced. Consequently, anticipated nuclear collateral damage will be reduced.</del> CJSCI 3110.04B, Nuclear Supplement to the JSCP (TS) provides detailed requirements to minimize anticipated collateral damage resulting from US use of nuclear weapons. Additionally, a <del>Detailed</del> detailed discussion of these techniques and collateral damage avoidance data is contained in JP 3-12.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Nuclear Planning (S), forthcoming. See CJCSI 3110.04A, Nuclear, the nuclear supplement to the JSCP, for a more detailed discussion.	NPR to use conventional weapons when they can do the job.  Recognizes the actual status of JP 3-12.1	
386.	2	J8/Forces Division	S	2.07	(h)	10.11	<b>Substantive:</b> Sentence on lines 10-11 currently reads, “Commanders and staff responsible for developing nuclear plans must consider avoidance of collateral damage as they develop their strike options.” Is <i>avoidance</i> really feasible or even possible when dealing with nuclear weapons or would we really just be striving to <i>minimize</i> ? <u>Recommended Change:</u> Recommend replacing ‘ <i>consider avoidance of collateral damage</i> ’ with ‘ <i>seek to minimize collateral damage</i> .’ Revised sentence would read:  <i>Commanders and staffs responsible for developing nuclear plans must seek to minimize collateral damage as they develop their strike options.</i>	Feasibility.	M – see JSDS Comments
387.		USN	S	2.07		10.11	Change as follows: Commanders and staffs responsible for developing nuclear plans must consider <del>avoidance of minimizing</del> collateral damage...	Avoidance of collateral damage is unrealistic with nuclear weapons.	M – see JSDS Comments
388.	75	EUCOM	S	2.07		11	Insert a sentence as follows: “...collateral damage as they develop their strike options. <u>This applies both to counterforce and countervalue targeting strategies.</u> Specific techniques for reducing...”	It is important to specify that the imperative to limit collateral damage applies to both strictly military targets (counterforce) and other kinds of targets as well (countervalue)	R – See JSDS comments
389.	42	J7	A	2.07	3c(2) (h)	13	Change to read as follows: “. . . adjusting the height of burst, and offsetting the desired ground zero (DGZ).”	Acronym does not meet guidelines.	M – see JSDS

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
									Comments
390.	21	USMC	S	2.07		13.14	Change to read: "...the desired ground zero ( <del>DGZ</del> ). Detailed..."	Only use of term, so no acronym is used.	M – see JSDS Comments
391.	3	USSOUTH COM	A	2.07	3c(2)(h)	19	Format/title of cited CJSCI reference is incorrect: <b>Change to read:</b> CJSCI 3110.04A, <i>Nuclear Supplement to JSCP.</i> "	Correctness and consistent with document citing in reference section. <b>Change here and throughout the document.</b>	M – see JSDS Comments
<b>392.</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>J7</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>2.07</b>		<b>19</b>	<b>Delete this cross-reference.</b>	<b>Cross-reference incorporated into para above.</b>	M – see JSDS Comments
393.		USN	A	2.07		19.20	Change as follows: Move sentence that starts with "See CJCSI 3110.04A" up to end of previous paragraph.	Style	M – see JSDS Comments
394.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	2.07		22.27	Change as follows:  " (i) <b>Damage Criteria.</b> Damage criteria are standards identifying specific levels of destruction or <del>materiel</del> <u>material</u> damage required for a particular target category. These criteria are normally levied on the executing commander by higher authority <del>IAW</del> <u>in accordance with</u> national strategy and policy. Commanders must estimate the number and characteristics of the weapons and delivery systems <u>needed to achieve the required level of damage to designated targets while minimizing collateral damage.</u> <del>required to achieve the level of desired damage to designated targets while minimizing undesirable collateral effects and environmental damage.</del> "	These changes:  Accept USN rhetorical comment  Reduce the Acronym level  Rephrase collateral damage discussion.  With respect to the environmental discussion – US policy and international law do not endorse or authorize wholesale destruction for its own sake; consequently, the environment is not a lawful target. Therefore, environmental damage in the context of nuclear operations is an outcome more appropriate to be addressed in the realm of collateral damage.	A
395.		USN	A	2.07		23	Change as follows: ...destruction or <del>materiel</del> damage...	Correct word.	M – see JSDS Comments
396.		USN	S	2.07		26.27	Change as follows: ...while minimizing <del>undesirable</del> collateral damage <del>effects and environmental damage.</del>	Is there such a thing as desirable collateral damage? If you want to	M – see JSDS

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								blow it up and it blows up, it is not collateral. Is there really consideration of environmental effects when using nuclear weapons?	Comments
397.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	2.07		29.36	<p>Change as follows:</p> <p><del>"(3) <b>Target Selection Factors.</b> Combatant commanders may consider the following target selection factors to determine how to defeat individual targets. These factors help determine the appropriateness of a target for nuclear weapon employment as well as specific weapon and delivery system selection. These factors are: target hardness/ability to survive conventional strikes, size of target, geology/depth of target (for underground targets), desired level of damage, target defenses, proximity to populated areas, mobile/stationary target, potential for collateral damage. Considering these target selection factors, possible adversary targets are:</del></p> <p><u>(3) <b>Target Selection Factors.</b> Combatant commanders may consider the following target selection factors to determine how to defeat individual targets. These factors may help determine the appropriateness of a target for nuclear weapon employment as well as specific weapon and delivery system selection. These factors are:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <u>Time sensitivity</u></li> <li>• <u>Hardness (ability to withstand conventional strikes)</u></li> <li>• <u>Size</u></li> <li>• <u>Surrounding geology and depth (for underground targets)</u></li> <li>• <u>Required level of damage</u></li> <li>• <u>Defenses</u></li> <li>• <u>Mobility</u></li> <li>• <u>Proximity to populated areas</u></li> <li>• <u>Potential for collateral damage</u></li> </ul> <p><u>Considering these factors, possible adversary targets include:"</u></p>	<p>These changes</p> <p>Break out the list into bullets for readability</p> <p>Accept Navy, Air Force and EUCOM comments</p>	A
398.		USN	A	2.07		32.36	<p>Change as follows: weapon and delivery system selection. These factors are: target hardness/ability to survive</p>	Colon not necessary	M – see JSDS

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							conventional strikes, size of target, geology/depth of target (for underground targets), desired level of damage, target defenses, proximity to populated areas, mobile/stationary target, potential for collateral damage. Considering these <del>target selection</del> factors, possible adversary targets are:	Unnecessary. The title of the paragraph is target selection factors.	Comments
399.	38.	USAF	S	2.07	3b2i	35	Change to read: "... <u>time-sensitivity</u> , potential for collateral damage..."	Time sensitivity is also a key-determining factor in how nuclear weapons are used and which delivery system is used.	M – see JSDS Comments
400.	76	EUCOM	S	2.07		36	Change “are” to “include”	More factually correct	M – see JSDS Comments
401.		USN	A	2.07		45.46	Change as follows: ... associated support facilities, and <del>command/control</del> <u>C2</u> capabilities.	Use common acronym	A
402.		USN	A	2.08		2	Change as follows: ... facilities and operations centers...	Pluralize	R – "centers" is already plural
403.	17	USPACOM	A	2.08	(3)(f)	5	Change “non-nuclear” to read, “nonnuclear”	Word misspelled. Dictionary shows as one word like almost all “non” words.	M – see JSDS Comments
404.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	2.08		05.06	Change as follows: " (f) <del>Underground facilities, to include nuclear</del> <u>Nuclear storage, non-nuclear nonnuclear storage, and hardened ICBM missile launch control centers.</u> "	Accepts USN and J2 / UFAC changes	A
405.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	2.08	3.c.(3)(f)	5.6	Change as follows: "(f) <del>Underground facilities, to include nuclear storage, non-nuclear storage, and hardened ICBM missile launch control centers</del> <u>launch facilities.</u> "	Clarity. Accepts STRATCOM comment.	A
406.	2	J2 - DCI/UFAC J. Hillmer 202-231-2766	S	2.08	(3)(f)	5.6	Change to read: (f) <del>Underground facilities, to include n</del> <u>Nuclear storage, non-nuclear storage, and hardened ICBM missile launch control centers.</u>	Underground facilities are an integral part of all the possible adversary targets listed in paragraphs (3) (a) through (3) (f) and that is pointed out in the third sentence of paragraph (3) on page	M – see JSDS Comments

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								II-7. Having underground facilities in paragraph (3) (f) is redundant and misleading listing them as separate targets when each of the targets listed could reside in an HDBT.	
407.	23	USA	S	2.08	3c(3)	7	Add the following new paragraph  (g) Political and military command and control	Completeness.  <i>JSDS Comment – Not sure what command and control has been missed in the list so far, but this change ensures that the political side is a consideration for the readers of this pub.</i>	A
408.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	2.08		8	Change Title to "4. <b>Employment and Force Integration</b> "	Consistency with Table of Contents	A
409.	24	USA	A	2.08	4	8	Rename "Employment and Force Integration"	This reflects the terminology in Para. 1, Page II-1 and Figure II-1	M – see JSDS Comments
410.		STRATCOM/J5515	S	2.08	3.c.(3)(f)	5,6	Add following, "...non-nuclear storage," "...hardend ICBM launch facilities,"	Associates complete LF/LCC target consideration for enemy ICBM capability	M – see JSDS Comments
411.	44	J7	S	2.08	4a(1)	12	Change to read as follows: "(1) <del>Nonstrategic Theater Nuclear Force Integration.</del> JP 3-12.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Nuclear Planning, (S), provides additional guidance for theater nuclear force integration."	Consistency with the remainder of the JP. The JP supplies no guidance in this paragraph concerning this subject.	M – see JSDS Comments
412.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	C	2.08		12.14	Change as follows:  " (1) <del>Nonstrategic Theater Nuclear Force Integration.</del> See JP 3-12.1, <i>Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Nuclear Planning</i> for guidance on theater nuclear force integration. JP 3-12.1, <i>Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Nuclear Planning</i> (S), <del>forthcoming, will provide,</del> provides additional guidance for theater nuclear force integration.	The current JP 3-12.1 does not do these things, nor is it classified.  Referring to a draft pub as if it were published is inaccurate at best, and possibly dishonest.  12 / 20 (?) -- J7 Comment: You have a point, but it may also be misleading to predict with such certainty ("will provide") that the information will be available when JP 3-12.1 is published. Also, when JP 3-12.1 is approved and contains the referenced guidance, then this paragraph is	A  J7 comment: See note in "comments" column  JS DS Comment.  Point Taken  However, I have no problem



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								<p>wrong (kind of a Catch 22).</p> <p>Suggest one of the following options:</p> <p>Option 1. Delete the reference to JP 3-12.1 and substitute a better one.</p> <p>Option 2. Use the standard phraseology as follows: "See JP 3-12.1, <i>Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Nuclear Planning for guidance on theater nuclear force integration.</i>"</p> <p>If a reference is necessary (and JP 3-12.1 will be the correct one), suggest Option 2. The new title will differentiate the versions to keep the reference correct. It will also help keep this doctrine pub "extant."</p>	<p>with citing a forthcoming document that:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. my office is going to be JSDS for</li> <li>2. That already does this in its latest draft</li> <li>3. That is in a holding pattern waiting on this one</li> </ol> <p>And</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4. As long as JP 3-12 tells no lies at the time it is signed and doesn't reveal classified information. I am okay with the reference.</li> </ol>
413.	24	USA	S	2.08	4	16	Change first line to read; "...is crucial to the overall strategy. <u>JP 3-12.1 provides additional guidance for strategic nuclear force integration.</u> For many contingencies..."	The reader now knows that JP 3-12.1 is used for both theater and strategic planning.	R – JP 3-12.1 as published does no such thing.
414.		USN	S	2.08		16.20	<del>Delete: (2) Conventional/Nuclear Force Integration. Integration of conventional and nuclear forces is crucial to the overall strategy. For many contingencies, conventional capabilities meet all known requirements. Conventional capabilities may be particularly useful to limit collateral damage and danger of escalation. It must be understood how</del>	Verbatim with the start of the following paragraph.	M – see JSDS Comments

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							integration of nuclear and conventional forces will affect the overall strategy.		
415.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	2.08		16.30	<p>Change as follows:</p> <p><del>"(2) <b>Conventional/Nuclear</b> <b>Conventional and Nuclear Force Integration.</b> Integration of conventional and nuclear forces is crucial to the overall strategy. For many contingencies, <u>existing and emerging</u> conventional capabilities <u>will meet all known anticipated requirements</u>; however, some contingencies will remain where the most appropriate response may include the use of US nuclear weapons. Integrating conventional and nuclear attacks will ensure the most efficient use of force and provide US leaders with a broader range of strike options to address immediate contingencies. Integration of conventional and nuclear forces is therefore crucial to the overall the success of any comprehensive strategy. This integration will ensure optimal targeting, minimal collateral damage, and reduce the probability of escalation. As the operations plans are developed, planners must articulate the contribution to the overall strategy and describe how nuclear and conventional integration will be achieved. Conventional capabilities may be particularly useful to limit collateral damage and danger of escalation. It must be understood how integration of nuclear and conventional forces will affect the overall strategy.</del></p> <p>(remove the paragraph split)</p> <p><del>(3) <b>Strategic Nuclear Force Integration.</b> Integration of conventional and nuclear forces is crucial to the overall strategy. For many contingencies, conventional capabilities meet all known requirements. Conventional capabilities may be particularly useful to limit collateral damage and conflict escalation. It must be understood how integration of nuclear and conventional forces will affect the overall strategy. To make the most efficient use of the nation's strategic assets and to maximize combat power, CDRUSSTRATCOM accomplishes strategic nuclear operations through the integration of US and allied strategic assets. To make the most efficient use of the nation's strategic assets, to maximize combat power, or to facilitate alliance or coalition action, strategic nuclear operations may also be</del></p>	<p>These changes:</p> <p>Delete duplicative paragraph</p> <p>Accepts Army comment regarding planner articulation</p> <p>Accepts EUCOM comment re: any comprehensive strategy</p> <p>Accepts EUCOM Critical Comment proposed alternate language (with some modification) regarding use and integration between the President, NATO, and SACEUR.</p>	A

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							<u>accomplished through the integration of US and allied nuclear assets. Integration of forces exploits the full range of characteristics offered by US strategic nuclear forces to support national and regional deterrence objectives."</u>		
416.	77	EUCOM	S	2.08		17	Change "the" to "any comprehensive"	More factually correct. "The" is semantically inappropriate here because it has no referent in the preceding text.	M – see JSDS Comments
417.	25	USA	S	2.08	4a(2)	20	Add the sentence:  Planners must articulate the contribution to the overall strategy and how integration is achieved.	Potential operational benefit to nuclear operations.	M – see JSDS Comments
418.	52	J-3	A	2.08	(3)	22.25	Remove: " <del>Integration of conventional and nuclear...escalation.</del> "	Redundancy. This same sentence repeated one paragraph earlier (see lines 16-20)	M – see JSDS Comments
419.	52	DTRA	A	2.08	(3)	22.25	Remove: " <del>Integration of conventional and nuclear...escalation.</del> "	Redundancy. This same sentence repeated one paragraph earlier (see lines 16-20)	M – see JSDS Comments
420.	26	USA	S	2.08		22.26	Delete: <del>Integration of conventional...the overall strategy.</del>	Redundancy with previous paragraph.	M – see JSDS Comments
421.	11.	USJFCOM	A	2.08		22.26	<b>Change as follows:</b>  “(3) <b>Strategic Nuclear Force Integration.</b> <del>Integration of conventional and nuclear forces is crucial to the overall strategy. For many contingencies, conventional capabilities meet all known requirements. Conventional capabilities may be particularly useful to limit collateral damage and conflict escalation. It must be understood how integration of nuclear and conventional forces will affect the overall strategy.</del> ”	The first three sentences are redundant (verbatim) to previous paragraph.	M – see JSDS Comments
422.	39.	USAF	A	2.08	4a3	22.26	Delete the following text:  <del>“Integration of conventional and nuclear forces is crucial to the overall strategy. For many contingencies, conventional capabilities meet all known requirements. Conventional capabilities may be particularly useful to limit collateral</del>	This is a word-for-word repeat of the text in the preceding paragraph.	M – see JSDS Comments

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							<del>damage and conflict escalation. It must be understood how integration of nuclear and conventional forces will affect the overall strategy.</del>		
423.	8	USN	A	2.08	(3)	23.26	Delete: “For many contingencies...will affect the overall strategy.”	This exact sentence is in the paragraph above it.	M – see JSDS Comments
424.		USN	S	2.08		25.26	Clarify:  It must be understood how integration of nuclear and conventional forces will affect the overall strategy.	Agreed, but this is never explained satisfactorily in the pub. Coordination is certainly required, but integration is not clear. Specific examples are needed. This is a major weakness in the pub.	M – see JSDS Comments
425.		J-3	S	2.08	(3)	25.26	“It must be understood...overall strategy” should be removed from para 4.a.(3) and added to the beginning of Para 4.a.(2).	Context	M – see JSDS Comments
426.		DTRA	S	2.08	(3)	25.26	“It must be understood...overall strategy” should be removed from para 4.a.(3) and added to the beginning of Para 4.a.(2).	Context	M – see JSDS Comments
427.	78	EUCOM	C	2.08		26.28	<b>EUCOM NONCONCURS</b> with the sentence as it presently reads. An acceptable change to the sentence would be as follows:  “To make the most efficient use of the nation’s strategic assets, <del>and</del> to maximize combat power, <u>or to facilitate alliance or coalition action, CDRUSSTRATCOM accomplishes</u> strategic nuclear operations <u>may be accomplished</u> through the integration of US and allied strategic assets.”	At present, the sentence fails to take account of the fact that, absent specific directions to the contrary from the POTUS, CDRUSSTRATCOM does not necessarily have authority to integrate “US and allied strategic assets” in Europe. That integration can occur in consultation between the POTUS, SACEUR, and the NATO Secretary General, exclusive of any integrative actions by CDRUSSRATCOM.	M – see JSDS Comments
428.		USN	S	2.08		28.30	Delete: <del>Integration of forces exploits the full range of characteristics offered by US strategic nuclear forces to support national and regional deterrence objectives.</del>	Meaningless unless at least some notion of how it’s to be done is included.	R -- JSDS comment – There are lots of things that are classified

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									that are not explained in these unclas pubs. Rhetorically, why should this line be any different?
429.	79	EUCOM	A	2.08		28.30	Delete last sentence of paragraph: <del>Integration of forces exploits the full range of characteristics offered by US strategic nuclear forces to support national and regional deterrence objectives.</del>	The sentence adds no particular value to the paragraph	R – JSDS comment – There are lots of things that are classified that are not explained in these unclas pubs. Rhetorically, why should this line be any different?
430.		DTRA	A	2.08	(3)	32	Delete the word “ ..offer a <del>relatively</del> higher...”	Grammar	M – see JSDS Comments
431.		J-3	A	2.08	(3)	32	Delete the word “ ..offer a <del>relatively</del> higher...”	Grammar	M – see JSDS Comments
432.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	<b>S</b>	2.08		32.35	Change as follows:  “(a) Nuclear-capable aircraft offer a <del>relatively higher</del> <b>greater</b> degree of flexibility in escalation control because they <del>are</del> <u>may be</u> a highly visible sign of resolve and, <u>once ordered to conduct a nuclear strike</u> , are recallable, if necessary. <del>Aircraft delivered</del> <u>Aircraft-delivered</u> weapons also provide strike capability across the entire range of nuclear operations.”	Accepts USAF and EUCOM changes  Recognizes that they are only high visibility if we choose to make them so...	<b>A</b>
433.	80	EUCOM	A	2.08		34	Add hyphen between “aircraft” and “delivered”	Correctness. Closely related (i.e., words that in context exist in a	M – see JSDS

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								very close semantic relationship) that precede the word they modify are joined by a hyphen.	Comments
434.	81	EUCOM	A	2.08		37	Add a hyphen between “high” and “priority.” In this case, also add a comma after “priority” since two sets of hyphenated words occur sequentially.	Correctness. Closely related (i.e., words that in context exist in a very close semantic relationship) that precede the word they modify are joined by a hyphen.	M – see JSDS Comments
435.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	2.08 and 2.09		37.46 and 01.02	<p>Change as follows:</p> <p>" (b) SLBM and ICBM forces offer the capability to strike <del>high priority</del> <u>high-priority</u> time-sensitive targets. Fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) offer the added characteristic of increased survivability due to their unpredictable location while underway. <del>Additionally, sending SSBNs, which are also recallable, to dispersal locations is a sign of national resolve.</del> As a sign of national resolve and readiness, <del>the numbers of ICBMs on alert may be increased and SSBNs may be deployed. to dispersal locations.</del>"</p> <p><del>(c) Specific planning factors are considered during integration of strategic nuclear forces. These factors include prelaunch survivability, probable error in height of burst, probability to penetrate, weapons systems reliability, circular error probable, weapon system performance characteristics, and sortie separation criteria. Equally important is the effect of adversary defense capabilities and limitations.</del></p> <p><u>(c) Specific planning factors must be considered when planning integrated nuclear and conventional attacks. These factors include:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <u>Prelaunch survivability</u></li> <li>• <u>Weapon system reliability</u></li> <li>• <u>Circular error probable</u></li> <li>• <u>Weapon system performance characteristics</u></li> <li>• <u>Sortie separation criteria.</u></li> <li>• <u>Adversary defense capabilities and limitations</u></li> </ul> <p><u>(See associated definitions in the glossary and JP 3-12.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Nuclear Planning (S), forthcoming.)</u></p>	<p>Accepts EUCOM and USAF changes.</p> <p>Deletes "dispersal locations" as redundant – if the SSBNs are deployed, they are effectively dispersed.</p> <p><i>JSDS Comment – I understand EUCOM comment re: the definitions of the cumbersome terms, but can not come up with a better set of words that accurately reflects the admittedly technical nature of these terms. And some were stricken from the glossary.</i></p>	A

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436.	40.	USAF	S	2.08	4a3	41.42	Delete; “the numbers of ICBM’s on alert may be increased”	Accuracy. ICBM force is continuously on alert.	M – see JSDS Comments
437.	53	DTRA	A	2.08	(c)	46	Compare “weapons systems” with “weapon system”... need consistency with plural and non-plural	Consistency. Whichever one the writers choose to use “weapons systems” or “weapon systems” must be used consistently.	M – see JSDS Comments
438.	53	J-3	A	2.08	(c)	46	Compare “weapons systems” with “weapon system”... need consistency with plural and non-plural	Consistency. Whichever one the writers choose to use “weapons systems” or “weapon systems” must be used consistently.	M – see JSDS Comments
439.		STRATCO M/J5515	S	2.08	4.a.(3)(a)	34,35	Either delete last sentence or change last part of sentence following the word, “across” to read, “the full range of theater and strategic applications.”	As shown the sentence is meaningless. The range should be defined.	R – JSDS comment – without going into the classified realm, I do not see a need to define entire range of nuclear operations as the full range of theater and strategic applications. I do not see how that improves the information.
440.	82	EUCOM	S	2.09		1	After the word “criteria” and before the period, add “(see associated definitions in the glossary).”	Unfamiliar readers will think that phrases like “probability to penetrate” are ungrammatical in this context unless they are apprised that this is a list of technical terms with special	M – see JSDS Comments

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								definitions. The text does the reader a favor by pointing this out. <b>However, the solution most favored by EUCOM is to use the phrase grammatically and to omit altogether the technical definition of the phrase. See EUCOM comment #112.</b>	
441.	54	DTRA	A	2.09	(4)	4	Check spacing between words “Offensive and” in subject heading	Spacing	A
442.	54	J-3	A	2.09	(4)	4	Check spacing between words “Offensive and” in subject heading	Spacing	A
443.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	2.09		04.13	Change as follows:  (4) <b>Offensive and Defensive Integration.</b> Offensive and defensive force integration is becoming increasingly important. Offensive and defensive forces are <u>becoming</u> linked doctrinally and procedurally to achieve successful integration. Defensive systems include space warning, air defense warning and interceptors, <u>computer network defense systems</u> , ballistic missile defense (BMD) warning, and a worldwide-integrated tactical warning and attack assessment (ITW/AA) <del>system systems</del> . These systems, coupled with additional passive defense measures, <del>offer a damage limitation potential</del> <u>attempt to limit attack damage</u> to US warfighting capabilities <u>and population</u> . <del>Defensive and Offensive Information Operations as described in JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, expands</del> <u>elaborates on</u> the integration of offensive and defensive <u>information operations</u> capabilities. Defensive forces can directly support offensive forces in five important areas:	These changes:  Accept most of the recommended changes.	A
444.	41.	USAF	S	2.09	4	6	Change to read: Defensive systems include space warning, air defense warning and interceptors, <u>computer network intrusion systems</u> , ballistic missile defense (BMD) warning, ...	Need to capture the integration of Information Operations into nuclear operations. Secure communication is key part of nuclear operations.	M – see JSDS Comments
445.	12.	USJFCOM	S	2.09		6.7	<b>Change as follows:</b> “Defensive systems include space warning, air defense warning and interceptors, <u>Computer Network Intrusion systems</u> , ballistic missile defense (BMD)	Completeness; ties into reference to IO on lines 11-12.	M – see JSDS Comments



ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							warning, ...”		
446.	29	USMC	S	2.09		7	Change to read: “...missile defense (BMD) warning, and a...”	Only use of term, so no acronym is used.	M – see JSDS Comments
447.	45	J7	A	2.09	4a(4)	7	Change to read as follows: “. . . air defense warning and interceptors, ballistic missile defense (BMD) warning, and a worldwide integrated . . . Defensive . . . as described in JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations expands the integration of offensive and defensive capabilities.”	Acronym does not meet guidelines. Any reference to a pub needs a title.	M – see JSDS Comments
448.		USN	S	2.09		10.11	Clarify: ...offer a damage limitation potential to US warfighting capabilities.	Confusing	M – see JSDS Comments
449.		USN	A	2.09		11	Change as follows: Defensive and Offensive Information Operations as described in...	Lower case.	M – see JSDS Comments
450.	83	EUCOM	A	2.09		11.12	Change to read “...Operations, as described in JP 3-13, expand...”	The verb “expand” should agree with “Operations”—not with “JP 3-13.” Addition of the commas will make this plain.	M – see JSDS Comments
451.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	2.09		15.17	Change as follows:  (a) In a national-level application, strategic defensive systems offer the potential of improving <del>may improve</del> the US deterrence posture by increasing <del>an adversary’s a potential adversary’s</del> <u>an adversary’s</u> uncertainty of achieving its attack objectives.	Clarity	A
452.	46	J7	S	2.09	4a(2)(c)	24	Change to read as follows: "(c) In an operational application, defenses allow a regional geographic combatant commander to consider employing offensive counterforce strikes while enhancing security from catastrophic results if an adversary launches a retaliatory strike while under attack.”	Correctness.	A
453.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	2.09		28.31	Change as follows:  (d) Early warning systems include an ITW/AA capability, providing the President and Secretary of Defense with <del>enough warning</del> <u>the means</u> to maximize the survivability of US and allied forces. Deterrence is enhanced because of the increased survivability of US retaliatory forces and their associated C2.	Accepts EUCOM significant comment	A
454.	84	EUCOM	S	2.09		29	Change “enough warning” to “the means”	It is not clear that every “early	M – see

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								warning” would be “enough.” Maximization of survivability is the best that can be expected from such a system.	JSDS Comments
455.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	2.09 and 2.10		40.46 and 1.10	Change as follows:  (a) <b>Aircraft and Cruise Missile Flight Corridors.</b> Flight corridors must comply with international law governing airspace rights of non-hostile sovereign nations. <del>In addition, Because strategic nuclear forces could simultaneously occupy the same flight corridors simultaneously, affecting both aircraft and missile flyout over friendly territory, it is imperative that flight corridors are deconflicted, and force employment is synchronized. Additionally, commanders must create and ensure strict adherence to flight plans through corridors that avoid potential launch sites and defense intercept areas. This planning must include using alternate landing sites and immediately identifying and transmitting alternative ingress and egress routes when friendly defenses are active. These routes must avoid areas scanned by defenses to reduce potential engagement of friendly aircraft.</del>  (b) <b>Overflight.</b> ICBM and SLBM flight corridors may traverse the territory and airspace of other sovereign nations only when permitted under international law. As a matter of national policy and pursuant to international law, the US respects the airspace rights of non-hostile, sovereign nations. <del>Overflight plans must be carefully reviewed to ensure compliances with international law.</del>	These changes:  Add clarity – by focusing flight corridors on A/c and cruise missiles.  Delete additional detail above that required for this unclassified pub.	A
456.	25	USA	A	2.09	(5)(a)	41	Remove “In addition...” and reinstate “Since...”	Clarity	M – see JSDS Comments
457.	47	J7	A	2.09	3c(5)(a)	41	In addition, since strategic nuclear forces could occupy the same flight corridors simultaneously, . . . “	Makes better sense.	M – see JSDS Comments
458.		USN	A	2.09		41.42	Change as follows: In addition, because strategic nuclear forces could occupy the same flight corridors simultaneously, affecting both aircraft and missile flyout over friendly territory, it is imperative that flight corridors are deconflicted and force employment is synchronized.	Need a conjunction here.  Style	M – see JSDS Comments

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
459.	85	EUCOM	A	2.09		43	Change "...territory, it..." to "...territory. Hence, it"	Correctness: run-on sentence.	M – see JSDS Comments
460.		DTRA	A	2.09	(5)(a)	43	"... missile <del>flyout over</del> <u>overflight of</u> friendly territory..."	Word choice	M – see JSDS Comments
461.		J-3	A	2.09	(5)(a)	43	"... missile <del>flyout over</del> <u>overflight of</u> friendly territory..."	Word choice	M – see JSDS Comments
462.		STRATCO M/J5515	M	2.10	5.b.	5-10	<p>Comment: overflight considerations affecting ICBM &amp; SLBM transit are not applicable under the sovereign airspace rights generally observed. Rather, those systems fall under the global agreements that impact operations of space systems and general space orbit and sub-orbit authorizations. As such, no requirement exists to coordinate missile flight trajectories that lie over a sovereign nation (hostile or friendly).</p> <p>Overflight concerns in the strategic planning environment are generally concerned with the potential for detection by a non-hostile but potentially threatening source, and the measures necessary to avoid such overflight if possible</p>	Implied in comment	R – JSDS Comment: I am pretty confident that STRATCO M was the source of the original text
463.	42.	USAF	S	2.10	4a5b	5.10	<p>Change to read: "(b) <b>Overflight.</b> ICBM and SLBM flight corridors may traverse the <del>territory and</del> airspace of other <del>nuclear powers</del> sovereign nations only when permitted under international law. <del>Consideration must be made with regard to their response.</del> As a matter of national policy and pursuant to international law, the US respects the airspace rights of non-hostile, sovereign nations. <del>Therefore, overflight</del> <u>Overflight</u> plans must be carefully reviewed to determine whether nations to be overflown are belligerents or whether the US will need to obtain permission for overflight. <del>to ensure compliances with international law,</del>"</p>	Clarity. The concern is overflight of airspace, not territory. Also clarifies obligations under international law for overflight.	M – see JSDS Comments
464.		DTRA	A	2.10	(b)	9	"...ensure compliances ..."	Grammar	M – see JSDS Comments
465.		J-3	A	2.10	(b)	9	"...ensure compliances ..."	Grammar	M – see JSDS Comments
466.	26	USA	A	2.10	(c)	12	Rename "Land, Air, Maritime, <u>Space</u> , and Special Operations Forces"	Reflects listing in Figure II-4	A

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
467.	48	J7	S	2.10	4a(5) (c)	12	Change to read as follows: "To the maximum extent practical, joint land, air, maritime, <u>space</u> , and special operations forces employment into or through an area with a high concentration of adversary nuclear warheads or delivery systems should be avoided to the maximum extent practical."	Sense.	M – see JSDS Comments
468.		USN	A	2.10		12.16	Change as follows: To the maximum extent practical, joint land, air, maritime, and special operations forces employment into or through an area with a high concentration of nuclear warheads or delivery systems should be avoided to the maximum extent practical. Conversely, nuclear weapon use in areas where friendly joint forces are operating.	Only need one "maximum extent practical" in the sentence.  The friendly forces don't have to be joint.	M – see JSDS Comments
469.		JSJS J5 Nuc	A	2.10		12.21	Change as follows:  "(c) <b>Land, Air, Maritime, Space, and Special Operations Forces.</b> To the maximum extent practical, joint land, air, maritime, <u>space</u> , and special operations forces employment into or through an area with a high concentration of nuclear warheads or delivery systems should be avoided to the maximum extent practical. Conversely, nuclear Nuclear weapon use in areas where friendly joint forces are operating should be carefully planned to prevent damage to friendly forces fratricide.	Accepts proposed changes.	A
470.		DTRA	A	2.10	(c)	15	"... avoided_ To the maximum extent practical."	Word choice	M – see JSDS Comments
471.	86	EUCOM	A	2.10		15	Delete "...to the maximum extent practical."	Redundant. See lines 12, 13.	M – see JSDS Comments
472.		J-3	A	2.10	(c)	15	"... avoided_ To the maximum extent practical."	Word choice	M – see JSDS Comments
473.	43.	USAF	A	2.10	5c	15	Change to read: <u>To the maximum extent practical, joint land, air, maritime, and special operations forces employment into or through an area with a high concentration of nuclear warheads or delivery systems should be avoided to the maximum extent practical.</u>	Redundant	M – see JSDS Comments
474.	3	J8/Forces Division	S	2.10	(c)	15.17	<b>Substantive:</b> Sentence on lines 15-17 currently reads: <i>Conversely, nuclear weapon use in areas where friendly joint forces are operating should be carefully planned to prevent</i>	Clarity.	M – see JSDS Comments

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<p>damage to friendly forces. The adverb <i>conversely</i> at the beginning of the sentence implies an opposite or contrary position than what was stated in the previous sentence. Since this sentence builds upon or supports the previous sentence, recommend a different adverb. Additionally, believe the term <i>fratricide</i> should be used instead of ‘damage to friendly forces.’</p> <p><i>Recommended Change:</i> Replace word ‘Conversely’ with ‘Additionally’ or ‘In addition’. At the end of the sentence, recommend replacing the words ‘damage to friendly forces’ with ‘fratricide.’ Revised sentence should read:                      Additionally, nuclear weapon use in areas where friendly joint forces are operating should be carefully planned to prevent fratricide.</p>		
475.		DTRA	A	2.10	(c)	16	“... planned to <del>prevent</del> <u>avoid</u> ...”	Word choice	M – see JSDS Comments
476.		J-3	A	2.10	(c)	16	“... planned to <del>prevent</del> <u>avoid</u> ...”	Word choice	M – see JSDS Comments
477.		USN	A	2.10		23.26	Change as follows: Ground, maritime, and space systems can provide the commander near-real-time IPP information following the launch of adversary missiles. Depending on the location of forces, the commander can use the IPP data to: move threatened forces...	Hyphenate when used as an adjective. Colon not necessary.	M – see JSDS Comments
478.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	2.10 and 2.11		23.27 and 1.2	Change as follows:  (d) <b>Impact Point Prediction (IPP) Information.</b> Ground, maritime, and space systems can provide the commander near real time IPP information following the launch of adversary missiles. Depending on the location of forces, the commander can use the IPP data to: move threatened forces to safer locations (time permitting), <u>execute an intercept (of some adversary missiles), or –allow a missile to reach its predicted monitor the missile's flight and impact. impact point when the missile is expected to detonate in a noncritical area (e.g., desolate, uninhabited land or unoccupied waters).</u>	Accepts the grammatical changes  Recognizes reason for deletion of the intercept discussion (see comments #312 – 314 of the second draft coordination)  However, in keeping with the attitude that doctrine must reflect current capabilities, the US has no choice but to "allow" some missiles (ICBMs / SLBMs) to keep flying – but we can try to kill others (SCUDs).	A

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								Leaving this sentence as an "or" statement means that the commander can make one of those choices – and recognizes that for some missiles, the choice is already made.	
479.	87	EUCOM	A	2.10		26	Delete colon	Superfluous. The two elements that follow do not really constitute a “list” per se. They are merely two elements joined by a coordinating conjunction.	M – see JSDS Comments
480.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	2.11		4.10	Change as follows:  (e) <b>Defended Assets and Adversary Targets.</b> A priority list for defended assets and adversary targets is crucial. This list helps commanders decide proper force employment as resources are expended, including execution of passive protection measures. Based on these priorities, active defenses <del>are may be</del> deployed near the highest priority resources <del>to maintain effective execution of offensive forces</del> . Priority lists for defended assets <u>may</u> include protection of C4ISR nodes, supply points, transportation nodes, and population centers.	This change removes an assumption regarding the placement of active defenses.	A
481.		USN	S	2.11		4.10	Clarify: (e) Defended Assets and Adversary Targets. A priority list for defended assets and adversary targets is crucial. This list helps commanders decide proper force employment as resources are expended, including execution of passive protection measures. Based on these priorities, active defenses are deployed near the highest priority resources to maintain effective execution of offensive forces. Priority lists for defended assets include protection of C4ISR nodes, supply points, transportation nodes, and population centers.	Is this specifically relevant to nuclear operations?	M – see JSDS Comments
482.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	2.11		12.19	Change as follows:  "f) <b>Decision Timelines.</b> Decision makers <del>are may be</del> required to review and select defensive and offensive actions within severely compressed timelines. Procedures and equipment must facilitate informed decisions in this <u>stressed</u>	Adds some degree of ambiguity back into the paragraphs.  Probably not appropriate for us to state definitively what courses our leaders will take, at least not in an	A

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							environment. <del>In the future, predelegated</del> <del>Predelegated</del> defensive engagement authority <del>is</del> <u>may be</u> appropriate under certain conditions to permit <del>efficient</del> <u>effective</u> engagement of ballistic missile threats. <del>Additionally, visible early</del> <del>Early</del> deployment of air defenses sends an unmistakable signal of US senior leadership concern and resolve, thereby maximizing the deterrent potential of these forces. "	unclass document.  Re: predelegated authority – the metric we should be concerned with is effective engagement, not necessarily the least cost / fewest missiles	
483.		USN	A	2.11		16	Change as follows: Pre-delegated defensive engagement ...	Hyphenate	R – constructed word.
484.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	2.11		21.34	Change as follows:  (g) <b>C4ISR Processing and Linkages.</b> Adequate C4ISR systems are required to process and provide timely warning of bomber, cruise missile, or ballistic missile attack. <del>Processing</del> <u>Assigned nodes must should</u> analyze tracks of launched adversary ballistic missiles to determine <u>impact points, and when feasible, intercept locations.</u> <del>Both offensive</del> <u>Offensive</u> and defensive systems share C4ISR assets to acquire information and transmit the execution orders to the forces. Critical C4ISR nodes require survivable (electromagnetic pulse, <del>EMP</del> radiation hardened, <u>secure, robust and redundant</u> reliable) communications with each other and must <u>be able to</u> operate independently if adversary attacks eliminate individual nodes. In addition to providing warning of a nuclear attack and the data necessary to initiate a <del>defensive</del> response, defensive C4ISR systems also provide <u>valuable</u> information to update the offensive commander on counterforce targeting options. Furthermore, <u>integrated</u> offensive and defensive C4ISR systems <del>require full integration to</del> <u>will</u> provide the President and Secretary of Defense a single decision support capability across the range of military operations. This <del>decision-making process</del> <u>must will strive to</u> correlate offensive and defensive information in real time to eliminate redundant information and facilitate rapid decision-making capabilities.	These changes:  Accept most of the comments below:  Recognizes that ICBM intercept is not likely – although other Ballistic Missile intercepts are possible.  Accepts Navy's comment re: "both"  Deletes EMP acronym – only time used on the page.  Accepts addition of Secure in comms discussion  Accepts EUCOM comment regarding only a "defensive" response being addressed.  Looking towards the future – these are things I am not sure we can do now.	A
485.		USN	S	2.11		23.24	Change as follows: Processing nodes must analyze tracks of	Impact points need to be	M – see

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							launched adversary ballistic missiles to determine <u>impact points and intercept locations</u> . <del>Both</del> Offensive and defensive systems share C4ISR assets...	determined for warning friendlies. "both" implies there are only two systems.	JSDS Comments
486.	27	USA	A	2.11	(g)	26	Reword sentence "...robust and redundant) <u>and secure</u> ..."	Clarity	M – see JSDS Comments
487.	88	EUCOM	<b>S</b>	2.11		29	Change as follows: "In addition to providing warning of a nuclear attack and the data necessary to initiate a <del>defensive</del> response, defensive C4ISR systems also provide valuable information to update the offensive commander on counterforce targeting options."	The response will not necessarily be a defensive one.	M – see JSDS Comments
488.	5	USTC	A	2.11	2	32	Change to read as follows: strikes. <u>They must</u> disseminate nuclear STRIKWARN messages as rapidly as possible and, when	Begins new sentence, adds to flow.	??
489.		USN	A	2.11		32.24	Change as follows: ...a single decision support capability across the range of military operations. This <del>decision-making</del> process must correlate offensive and defensive information in real time to eliminate redundant information and facilitate rapid decision-making capabilities.	Redundant. Already have enough "decisions" in this paragraph.	M – see JSDS Comments
<b>490.</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>J7</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>2.11</b>	<b>4b</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>Change to read as follows: "... and supporting systems under COCOM of CDR-USSTRATCOM and OPCON of the geographic combatant commanders."</b>	<b>Correctness.</b>	M
491.		USN	A	2.11		38	Change as follows: ...COCOM of CDR-USSTRATCOM...	Delete space.	M
492.	22	USMC	A	2.11		38	Change to read: "...COCOM of CDR-USSTRATCOM and OPCON..."	Delete the space between 'CDR' and 'USSTRATCOM' to form one acronym.	A
493.	44.	USAF	A	2.11	4b	38	Change "CDR USSTRATCOM" to "CDRUSSTRATCOM".	Consistency with rest of document.	A
494.	15	USA	A	2.11	(4)	42	Reword sentence "...Biological and Chemical (NBC) Environments <u>and</u> JP 3-40..."	Clarity	??
495.		USN	<b>S</b>	2.11		43.46	Delete: <del>Planning and Coordination. Nuclear weapon employment is politically and militarily constrained. Senior political and military decisions, treaties, and agreements shape nuclear weapon employment doctrine. Therefore, advanced planning and coordination is crucial to effective nuclear weapon employment.</del>	This is so obvious that it borders on insulting the reader's intelligence.	A
496.	45.	USAF	<b>S</b>	2.12	N/A	F2.05	Replace Minuteman I with Minuteman III image.	Accuracy and Credibility.	A — See associated document



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497.		USN	S	2.12	F2.05	F2.05	COMMENT: Figure II-5 is somewhat misleading. Would a better title be "Strategic Nuclear Force Readiness"? It would tie in better with previous text.	Figure consistency with text	R – balanced against NPR and current SCA efforts – Figure OK as it is.
498.		USN	S	2.12	F2.05	F2.05	Change as follows: <del>Augmentation Capability</del> <u>Responsive</u>	Align figure II-5 with text in para 5.a. which talks about "operationally deployed" and "responsive" forces.	R – balanced against NPR and current SCA efforts – Figure OK as it is.
499.	50	J7	S	2.12		F2.05	Change title to read as follows: “Strategic Nuclear Forces”	Consistency with para 5a.	R – balanced against NPR and current SCA efforts – Figure OK as it is.
500.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	2.12		1.8	Change as follows:  (2) <u>(1) Employment Options.</u> Nuclear options define the type and number of weapons <del>as well as</del> <u>and</u> the employment area. Options <del>can</del> range from the selective employment of a <del>limited</del> <u>small</u> number of nuclear weapons against a carefully constrained <del>preplanned or emerging</del> target set to a general <del>laydown of weapons attack</del> against a larger, <del>or</del> more diverse set of targets. <del>An option or even a portion of an option</del> <u>Executing a nuclear option, or even a portion of an option, should</u> <del>can</del> send a clear signal of <u>United States'</u> resolve <del>and</del> <u>criticality.</u> <u>Hence, options must be selected very carefully and deliberately so that the attack</u> <del>Options that are very restrictive in location and time can help ensure the adversary recognizes the “signal” and should therefore does not assume the United States has escalated to general nuclear war, although that perception cannot be guaranteed.</del>	These changes:  Reflect deletion of the preceding paragraph by renumbering  Other changes for clarity.  Not sure that preplanned or emerging targets are a relevant distinction for the targets.  Proving state of mind for an adversary leader is pretty challenging – not sure we should sign up for asserting something here as a "fact."	A
501.		JSDS – J5		2.12		Figur	Change as follows:	Change the chart to mirror NPR	A

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		Nuc				e 2.05	" <del>Augmentation</del> Responsive Capability"	language.	
502.	89	EUCOM	S	2.12		6.8	Change the sentence to begin: <u>Hence, options must be selected very carefully and deliberately so that</u> <del>Options that are very restrictive in location and time can ensure</del> the adversary recognizes the “signal” and therefore does not assume the United States has escalated to general nuclear war.”	“Restrictiveness” is not so much the issue here as are <i>carefulness</i> and <i>deliberateness</i> ; these two concerns are central to the issue. Circumstantially, a large display of force may be the best hedge against mis-recognition of signals. Such was arguably the US strategy used successfully during the Cold War.	M – see JSDS Comments
503.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	2.12		10	Change Title to "5. Combat Readiness"	Consistency with Table of Contents	A
504.	28	USA	A	2.12	5	10	Rename “Combat Readiness”	This reflects the terminology on Para. 1, Page II-1 and Figure II-1	M – see JSDS Comments
505.		JSDS – J5 Nuc		2.12		12.23	Change as follows:  a. To maintain their deterrent effect, US nuclear forces must maintain a strong and visible state of readiness. <u>Strategic nuclear Nuclear</u> force readiness levels are categorized as <u>either operationally-deployed or as part of the responsive capability.</u> <del>responsive.</del> <u>US Operationally Deployed Strategic Nuclear Warheads (ODSNW) will be limited to 1,700 to 2,200 weapons as discussed previously. In the "Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions" (Moscow Treaty), ODSNW are defined as</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <u>Reentry vehicles on ICBMs in their launchers</u></li> <li>• <u>Reentry vehicles on SLBMs in their launchers onboard submarines</u></li> <li>• <u>Nuclear armaments loaded on heavy bombers or stored in weapons storage areas of heavy bomber bases</u></li> </ul> <u>The remaining US strategic nuclear weapons remain in storage and serve as an augmentation capability should US strategic nuclear force requirements rise above the levels of</u>	These changes:  Reflect that this chart is lifted out of the NPR (in an unclassified form – although that chart uses Responsive <i>vice</i> Augmentation) and is limited to Strategic Nuclear forces.  Connects the limits back to the Law of the Land – the ratified Moscow Treaty.  Describes, albeit briefly, the idea of the Augmentation Capability.	A

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							<p><u>the Moscow Treaty.</u>                      These two readiness levels provide nuclear forces <del>responsive that can respond</del> to potential, immediate, and unexpected threats as depicted in Figure II-5. <del>Specific conditions for employment are provided in CJCSI 3110.04A, Nuclear, the nuclear supplement to the JSCP.</del> Specific conditions for employment are provided in CJCSI 3110.04B, <i>Nuclear Supplement to the JSCP for FY05.</i></p> <p>b. <u>A portion of the US operationally deployed strategic nuclear force maintains a A certain percentage of US nuclear forces must maintain a readiness level that permits permitting</u> a swift response to any no-notice nuclear attack against the United States, its forces, or allies. <u>In a developing crisis, the augmentation capability may be required to increase the number of ODSNW above the limits of the Moscow Treaty. Such a change to the US operational nuclear force level could only be considered following a US withdrawal from the Moscow Treaty and appropriate action by the President and the Congress. In the event of a deteriorating military situation where there is adequate time prior to hostilities, remaining nonalert nuclear assets quickly integrate to favorably alter the strategic situation. During force employment, the goal is de-escalation or as a minimum containing the conflict at the lowest possible level and termination on terms favorable to the US and its allies.</u></p>	<p>Accepts J8 changes regarding the JSCP N</p> <p>Addresses the requirements that would have to be met in order to invoke the augmentation capability.</p>	
506.		USN	A	2.12		13.14	Change as follows: ... as operationally- <del>deployed</del> or responsive.	Delete hyphen.	M – see JSDS Comments
507.	90	EUCOM	A	2.12		13.15	Change to read: Nuclear force readiness levels are categorized as “operationally-deployed” or “responsive.” These two readiness levels <u>are designed to ensure that nuclear forces are able to counter any provide strategic nuclear forces</u> <del>responsive</del> to potential, immediate, and— <del>or</del> unexpected threats as depicted in Figure II-5. 15.	<p>The quotation marks around “operationally deployed” and “responsive” are necessary because these words are being referred to in a technical sense— as names designating particular readiness statuses—and not words being used as part of the semantic content of the sentence per se. The second use of the word “responsive” (last word, line 15) must be eliminated or else its use</p>	M – see JSDS Comments

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								will induce the logical fallacy of equivocation, i.e., the same word is being used twice in the same sentence to mean very different things.	
508.	29	USA	A	2.12	5	14	Use of the word “responsive” as a category of readiness level isn’t reflected in Figure II-5	Paragraph and Figure II-5 should match	M – see JSDS Comments
509.	46.	USAF	A	2.12	5a	14	Change to read: These two readiness levels provide <u>strategic</u> nuclear forces responsive to potential, immediate, and unexpected threats as depicted in Figure II-5.	Consistency with Figure II-5.	M – see JSDS Comments
510.	16	J8/Forces Division	A	2.12	5.a	15.16	<b>Administrative:</b> Extra word in final sentence of paragraph 5a. Currently reads: Specific conditions for employment are provided in CJCSI 3110.04A, Nuclear, the nuclear supplement to the JSCP.  <i>Recommended Change: Recommend deleting the words “Nuclear” and “the.” Also need to capitalize “Nuclear” and “Supplement.” Sentence should read: Specific conditions for employment are provided in CJCSI 3110.04A, Nuclear Supplement to the JSCP.</i>	Typographical Errors.	M – see JSDS Comments
511.		USN	A	2.12		16	Change as follows: ...CJCSI 3110.04A, <del>Nuclear</del> Nuclear, the nuclear supplement...	Format consistency	M – see JSDS Comments
512.	91	EUCOM	A	2.12		20	Change “where” to “in which”	A “situation” is not a location; “in which” is preferable for the sake of clarity and precision.	M – see JSDS Comments
513.	47.	USAF	A	2.12	5b	21	Change to read: “...remaining non-alert nuclear assets <u>integrate will generate</u> to favorably alter the strategic situation.”	Clarity. Forces are already integrated, but they are not generated and placed on alert until required.	M – see JSDS Comments
514.	92	EUCOM	A	2.12		22	Set off the phrase “as a minimum” with commas	Clarity	M – see JSDS Comments
515.	93	EUCOM	A	2.12		22	Change “containing” to “containment of”	Parallelism. As written, the words “de-escalation” and “containing” are not parallel in structure. Making them parallel will contribute to clarity.	M – see JSDS Comments

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
516.		USN	S	2.12		22.23	Change as follows: During force employment, the goal is de-escalation, or at a minimum, containing the conflict at the lowest possible level and termination on terms favorable to the US and its allies.	Proper usage. Insert two commas.	M – see JSDS Comments
517.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	2.12		26	<p>Insert the following new paragraph:</p> <p><b><u>6. Continued Operations After Nuclear Weapons Use</u></b></p> <p><u>a. The effects of nuclear weapons on the battlefield and the resulting casualties can produce friendly casualties from the psychological and physiological stresses. Training can help prepare friendly forces to survive the effects of nuclear weapons and improve the effectiveness of surviving forces. Additional information on shielding and NBC defense can be found in JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Environments, and Service publications.</u></p> <p><u>b. US, allied, and multinational forces must prepare for further operations under conditions ranging from continued nuclear weapons use to a resumption of conventional-only operations. The US must be prepared to fight and win on a contaminated battlefield following a US nuclear strike. The demonstrated ability of US forces to survive and to sustain successful combat operations in WMD environments presents a stronger deterrent force to potential US adversaries.</u></p>	<p>These changes:</p> <p>Attempt to respond to EUCOM significant comment. Understand the concern, but not sure where else to put the paragraph. Concur that characterization of WMD environment is too broad for a strictly postnuclear-use environment</p> <p>Limiting this discussion to post-nuclear-weapons-use, although it will refer to the broader CBRN Environment Document.</p>	A
518.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	3.01		1.6	<p>Change as follows:</p> <p><del>“With the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction placing greater lethality in the hands of many challengers . . . the prospects are increasing that a future surprise failure of deterrence will result in an unprecedented catastrophe.”</del></p> <p><del><b>Keith Payne, The Failures of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction, 2001</b></del></p> <p><u>Who suspected Pearl Harbor would occur? Who suspected that Hitler would really be as dreadful as he turned out to be? You know, the worst possible case is generally worse than the imagination can imagine.</u></p>	Accepts Navy Significant comment – gives replacement text.	A

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<u>Paul Nitze</u>		
519.	9	USN	S	3.01	0	1.6	Delete Keith Payne quote. Replace with Paul Nitze quote.	The quote gives a sense of hopelessness that is not useful to the document. The Nitze quote more succinctly tells us that we must be cautious. It, ultimately, goes one step beyond the Payne quote reminding us that while our imagined worse case scenarios are bad, maybe there is even something worse out there.	M – see JSDS Comments
520.		JSDS J5 Nuc	S	3.01		11.19	<p>Change as follows:</p> <p>a. <del>Proliferation and US Vulnerabilities.</del> While the end of the Cold War has lowered concerns for strategic global nuclear war, the proliferation of WMD raises the danger of nuclear weapons use. <del>There are 30 countries with various WMD programs, including many rogue states. With continuing advances in science, information technology, and the unstoppable spread of knowledge, WMD proliferation is likely.</del> There are numerous non-state organizations (terrorist, criminal) and about thirty nations with WMD programs, including many rogue states. Further, the possible use of WMD by nonstate actors either independently or as sponsored by an adversarial state, remain a significant proliferation concern.</p> <p>(1) Future adversaries may conclude they cannot defeat US military forces and thus, if they choose war, may reason their only chance of victory is through WMD use.</p>	<p>These changes</p> <p>Delete the "and US Vulnerabilities" – not sure what value it adds to the title.</p> <p>Accepts most of the Army significant comment</p> <p>Revises Navy's proposed language slightly.</p>	A
521.	27	USA	S	3.01	1.a.	13	<p>Change 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> sentences to read as follows: <b><u>“There are numerous non-state organizations (terrorist, criminal) and about 30 countries with WMD programs, to include many rogue states. The possible use of WMD by nonstate actors either independently or sponsored by an adversarial state is a growing concern and should be highlighted as a proliferation concern.”</u></b></p>	This more thorough description, supports the concern raised in paragraph 2a on page I-5, on deterring use of WMD by nonstate actors.	M – see JSDS Comments

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
522.		USN	S	3.01		15	Change as follows: ... WMD proliferation is <del>likely</del> inevitable.	If not inevitable, it certainly is more than likely. Pick a stronger adjective.	M – see JSDS Comments
523.		USN	A	3.01		17.18	Change as follows: if they choose war, may reason their only chance of victory is <u>through</u> WMD use.	Need a preposition here	M – see JSDS Comments
524.	48.	USAF	A	3.01	1a2	21	Change to read: “(2) US military operations <del>have become</del> <del>reliant</del> <u>rely</u> on computers and high-tech electronics, <del>making global and theater military operations the United States much more</del> <del>which increases vulnerabilities</del> to the EMP effects of air-burst nuclear weapons detonated at high altitude.”	Reads better without using passive tense.	M – see JSDS Comments
525.	13.	USJFCOM	A	3.01		21.24	<b>Change as follows:</b> “(2) US military operations <del>have become</del> <del>reliant</del> <u>rely</u> on computers and high-tech electronics, <del>making global and theater military operations the United States much more</del> <del>vulnerable</del> to the EMP effects of nuclear weapons detonated at high altitude.”	Clarity; eliminates passive voice.	M – see JSDS Comments
526.	17	J8/Forces Division	A	3.01	1.a.(2 )	21.24	<b>Administrative:</b> First sentence in Paragraph 1.a.(2) could be worded better.  <i>Recommended Change:</i> <i>US military operations have become increasingly reliant <del>on</del> upon computers and high-tech electronics,; therefore making global and theater military operations <del>much</del> more vulnerable to the EMP effects of nuclear weapons detonated at high altitude.</i>	Clarity.	M – see JSDS Comments
527.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	3.01		21.27	Change as follows:  (2) US military operations <del>have become</del> <del>reliant</del> <u>rely</u> on computers and high-tech electronics, <del>making global and theater military operations the United States much more</del> <del>that</del> <u>may be vulnerable to the electromagnetic pulse</u> EMP effects of nuclear weapons detonated at high altitude. An adversary may conclude that <u>the military advantages gained by the effects of a single just one</u> high altitude nuclear detonation <del>could wreak enormous danger to theater and global communications, computers, and weaponry electronic components, possibly reducing the US high tech warfare advantage on global communications, computers, and electronic components outweigh the negative geopolitical ramifications of using a nuclear weapon. Furthermore, the blast and radiation effects of EMP-optimized detonations are less likely to impact the surface of the Earth, and could make this option more appealing.</del>	These changes  Accept most of the comments regarding passive voice  Accept USAF comment regarding "military advantage"  Not all US electronics are vulnerable to EMP and predicting which ones might be is beyond the scope of this document – probably adequate to say that US electronics "might" be vulnerable and leave it at that.	A

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528.	49.	USAF	<b>S</b>	3.01	1a2	24	Change last sentence to read: “An adversary may conclude that the military advantages gained by just one high altitude nuclear detonation <del>could wreak enormous danger to theater and global communications, computers, and weaponry electronic components, possibly reducing the US high tech warfare advantage</del> on global communications, computers, and electronic components outweigh the negative geo-political ramifications of utilizing a nuclear weapon. Furthermore, the blast and radiation effects of EMP-optimized detonations do not impact the surface of the Earth, could make this option even more appealing.”	The two sentences in para (2) say essentially the same thing. This change expounds on the implied danger of rogue states using nukes as an EMP weapon.  If there is national policy stating that high altitude detonation of a nuclear weapon constitutes the first use of WMD regardless of the lack of traditional terrestrial effects, then an additional sentence should be added stating this. There does not appear to be a stated position on nuclear weapons used as an EMP weapon. A statement on EMP weapons in doctrine will enhance overall deterrence.	<b>M</b> – see <b>JSDS Comments</b>
529.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	<b>S</b>	3.01		35.44	Change as follows:  <b>b. Preparation.</b> Responsible security planning requires preparation for threats that are possible, though perhaps <del>implausible unlikely</del> today. The lessons of military history <del>are</del> <u>remain</u> clear: unpredictable, irrational <del>Wars</del> <u>conflicts</u> occur. Military forces must prepare to counter weapons and capabilities that exist <u>or will exist</u> in the near term even if no immediate likely scenarios for war are at hand. To maximize deterrence of WMD use, it is essential US forces prepare to use nuclear weapons effectively <del>on the battlefield and against adversary WMD</del> , and that US forces <del>appear are</del> determined to employ nuclear weapons if necessary to prevent <del>and punish or retaliate against</del> WMD use.	These changes  Accept EUCOM and Navy Admin changes  Recognizes that we must prepare for developing adversary capabilities, not necessarily only those that exist today  Strikes out US nuke use locations (the battlefield line) – where the US plans to use weapons is our business – the audience reading this should only need to know that we will use them effectively  "appearances" are good, but reality is better.  Accept PACOM significant comment regarding retaliation	<b>A</b>



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530.	94	EUCOM	A	3.01		36	Change “though perhaps implausible” to “even if unlikely”	Diction	M – see JSDS Comments
531.		USN	A	3.01		37	Change as follows: ... unpredictable, irrational <del>wars</del> <u>conflicts</u> occur.	Not necessarily wars.	M – see JSDS Comments
532.	18	USPACO M	S	3.01	1b.	39.41	Change sentence to read: “To maximize deterrence of WMD use, it is essential US forces prepare to use nuclear weapons effectively on the battlefield and against adversary WMD, and that US forces appear determined to employ nuclear weapons if necessary to prevent and <b>retaliate against</b> <del>punish</del> WMD use.”	Incorrect/unclear terminology: doctrinally we do not “punish”, we “retaliate” against the use of WMD. Our purpose, if WMD is used, is clearly to stop further employment and shape the battlespace for US, coalition and allied successful operations.	M – see JSDS Comments
533.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	3.01		45	Insert the following new sub-paragraph:  “(2) <u>When requesting or tasked with nuclear planning requirements, the geographic combatant commander is responsible for defining theater objectives, selecting specific targets and targeting objectives, and developing the plans required to support those objectives. Theater nuclear forces and planning are closely coordinated with nuclear supporting forces and the supported conventional forces to ensure unity of effort.</u> ”	Accepts comments recommending it be moved forward from page III-10, with some text changes.	A
534.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	3.02		3.15	Change as follows:  (1) Geographic combatant commanders may request Presidential approval for use of nuclear weapons for a variety of conditions. <del>Amongst those conditions might be the following</del> <u>Examples include:</u>  (a) An adversary using or intending to use WMD against <del>US/multinational/alliance forces and/or US, multinational, or allied forces or innocent</del> <u>civilian population. that conventional forces cannot stop.</u>  (b) Imminent attack from adversary <del>BWs</del> <u>biological weapons</u> that only <u>effects from nuclear weapons effects</u> can safely destroy. <del>incinerate (versus dispersed into atmosphere with</del>	These changes:  Accept recommendation to change from "amongst"  Concur with comments that address US weapon use against the combatants, but it is not clear to me that the caveat of "conventional forces can't stop" is appropriate. The US may have another commitment for its conventional forces that it does not choose to forego and therefore although feasible for conventional	A

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<p><del>conventional munitions).</del></p> <p>(c) Attacks <del>limited to</del> <u>on adversary installations including WMD, (e.g., against deep, hardened bunkers containing chemical or biological weapons or the C2 infrastructure required for the adversary to execute a WMD attack) that could be employed against the United States or its friends and allies.</u></p>	<p>forces to respond, nuclear weapons may be more appropriate.</p> <p>Accepts STRATCOM comment regarding <i>innocence</i>.</p> <p>Accepts the BW vs biological weapons changes. Not sure that the entire nuke effect vs BW question has been resolved – most of the studies I've seen involve the accuracy of the Intel regarding the target, the weaponized substance, and ensuring that the site is encompassed by the fireball – which itself leads to further complications for consequences of execution...</p> <p>Accepts EUCOM significant comment on WMD targeting.</p>	
535.	95	EUCOM	A	3.02		4	Change “Amongst” to “Among”	This is the preferred American usage; “amongst” is the preferred British usage.	M – see JSDS Comments
536.	14.	USJFCOM	A	3.02		4	<b>Change as follows:</b> “nuclear weapons for a variety of conditions. <del>Amongst those conditions might be the following</del> <u>Examples include:</u> ”	Editorial.	M – see JSDS Comments
537.		USN	A	3.02		4	Change as follows: <del>Amongst</del> those conditions...	Preferred word form	M – see JSDS Comments
538.	50.	USAF	A	3.02	1c1	4	Change to read: “...nuclear weapons for a variety of conditions. <del>Amongst those conditions might be the following</del> <u>Examples include:</u> ”	Simpler language	M – see JSDS Comments
539.		USN	A	3.02		6.8	Change as follows: (a) An adversary using or intending to use WMD <del>that conventional forces cannot stop</del> against US/multinational/alliance forces and/or innocent civilian populations <del>that conventional forces cannot stop.</del>	Better word order. It's WMD we are trying to stop, not innocent populations.	M – see JSDS Comments
540.		STRATCO M/J5515	S	3.02	1.c.(1)(a)&	7	Change the term “innocent civilians” to read, “civil populace”, or “civilian non-combatant” etc.	The term innocent civilian is not generally applied in the planning	M – see JSDS

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					(h)			lexicon – it is more of a media term.	Comments
541.	30	USMC	S	3.02		10	Change to read: “...from adversary <del>BW</del> <u>biological weapons</u> that only...”	Only use of term, so no acronym is used.	M – see JSDS Comments
542.	30	USA	A	3.02	c.(1)(b)	10	Reword sentence “...adversary <u>biological weapons</u> (BW)...”	If the acronym BW page I-12, line 28-29, is to be eliminated, then this becomes the acronym’s first use, and therefore should be spelled out.	M – see JSDS Comments
543.	57	DTRA	A	3.02	(1)(b)	10	“...BWs...” Write out	First instance of acronym should be written out	M – see JSDS Comments
544.	57	J-3	A	3.02	(1)(b)	10	“...BWs...” Write out	First instance of acronym should be written out	M – see JSDS Comments
545.	51.	USAF	A	3.02	1c1b	10	Change to read: Imminent attack from adversary <u>biological weapons</u> <del>BW</del> —that only nuclear weapons effects can safely destroy/incinerate (versus dispersed into atmosphere with conventional munitions).	Only time used in publication	M – see JSDS Comments
546.	51	J7	A	3.02	1c(1)(b)	10	Change to read as follows: “Imminent attack from the adversary <del>BWs</del> <u>biological weapons</u> that only nuclear weapons effects can safely destroy/incinerate . . . .”	Acronym does not meet guidelines.	M – see JSDS Comments
547.		USN	A	3.02		10.11	Change as follows: Imminent attack from adversary <del>BWs</del> <u>biological weapons</u> that only nuclear weapons effects can safely destroy/incinerate ( <del>versus rather than being</del> dispersed into <u>the</u> atmosphere with conventional munitions).	Acronym not introduced yet - and not used again. Better grammar.	M – see JSDS Comments
548.	96	EUCOM	S	3.02		13.15	Change entire clause to read: “Attacks <del>limited to on</del> adversary <u>installations including WMD</u> (e.g., <del>against</del> deep, hardened bunkers containing chemical or biological weapons or the C2 infrastructure required for the adversary to execute a WMD attack) <del>that could be employed</del> against the United States <u>or its allies</u> .”	While it is proper to emphasize the fact that nuclear weapons might be used against WMD—and this revision provides this emphasis—it is not a good idea to risk the misinterpretation that the US would not consider nuclear weapons use against targets not related to WMD. This mistake is being repeated elsewhere in our professional literature, and it should not be perpetuated here. Besides, the matter of using	M – see JSDS Comments

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								nuclear weapons to counter WMD receives adequate attention in subparagraphs (g) and (h) later on the page.	
549.		USN	A	3.02		17	Change as follows: (d) <del>To c</del> Counter potentially overwhelming...	Fits better with rest of list.	M – see JSDS Comments
550.	15.	USJFCOM	A	3.02		17.18	<b>Change as follows:</b> “(d) <del>Counter</del> <u>To counter</u> potentially overwhelming adversary conventional forces, to include mobile and area targets (troop concentrations).”	Editorial.	M – see JSDS Comments
551.	52.	USAF	A	3.02	1c1d	17.18	Change to read: “(d) <del>Counter</del> <u>To counter</u> potentially overwhelming adversary conventional forces, to include mobile and area targets (troop concentration).”	Improves readability.	M – see JSDS Comments
552.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	3.02		17.28	Change as follows:  (d) <del>Counter</del> <u>To counter</u> potentially overwhelming adversary conventional forces, <del>to include</del> <u>including</u> mobile and area targets (troop concentration).  (e) <del>Rapid</del> <u>For rapid</u> and favorable war termination on US terms.  (f) <del>Ensure</del> <u>To ensure</u> success of US <u>and multinational</u> ; <del>coalition, and allied</del> operations.  (g) <del>Demonstration of</del> <u>To demonstrate</u> US intent and capability to use nuclear weapons to deter adversary use of WMD.  (h) <del>Use of</del> <u>To respond to</u> adversary-supplied WMD <u>use by third party terrorist organizations surrogates against US and multinational /coalition/allied forces and/ or innocent</u> civilian populations.	These changes:  Accept admin changes "to counter"  Accept Admin changes  Accept Admin changes  (h) Minor change for clarity - do we really care whether the adversary supplies an allied state or terrorists with WMD? Remember, terrorism is not the end, only the means.  Accepts STRATCOM <i>innocence</i> comment.	A
553.	16.	USJFCOM	A	3.02		20	<b>Change as follows:</b> “(e) <del>Rapid</del> <u>For rapid</u> and favorable war termination on US terms.”	Clarity; parallel construction.	M – see JSDS Comments
554.	53.	USAF	A	3.02	1c1e	20	Change to read: “(e) <del>Rapid</del> <u>For rapid</u> and favorable war termination on US terms.”	Improves readability.	M – see JSDS Comments
555.		STRATCO	M	3.02	1.c.(1	10,11	Comment: current analysis of nuclear weapon effects against	Implied in comment.	R – JSDS

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		M/J5515			) (b)		BW products/components do not support a complete neutralization effect on BW. This statement should be reworded to show that nuclear weapons may have an effect or in some cases may destroy/incinerate some kinds of BW. Additionally, some nuclear weapon applications may even provide excessive dispersal effects when detonated.		<b>Comment. I concur with the comment, but as written, there is sufficient ambiguity that only nuclear weapons effects can safely destroy the target.</b>
556.	17.	USJFCOM	A	3.02		22	<b>Change as follows:</b> “(f) <del>Ensure</del> <u>To ensure</u> success of US, coalition, and allied operations.”	Clarity; parallel construction.	M – see JSDS Comments
557.		USN	A	3.02		22	Change as follows: (f) <del>To ensure</del> <u>To ensure</u> success of US,...	Fits better with rest of list.	M – see JSDS Comments
558.	54.	USAF	A	3.02	1c1f	22	Change to read: “(f) <del>Ensure</del> <u>To ensure</u> success of US, coalition, and allied operations.”	Improves readability.	M – see JSDS Comments
559.	52	J7	S	3.02	1c(1) (f)	22	Change to read as follows: (f) <u>Ensure success of US, coalition, and allied multinational operations.</u> (g) <u>Demonstration of US intent and capability to use nuclear weapons to deter adversary use of WMD.</u> (h) <u>Use of adversary-supplied WMD by third party terrorist organizations against US/coalition/allied multinational forces and/or innocent civilian populations.</u> ”	<u>Consistency with JP 3-16.</u>	M – see JSDS Comments
560.	55.	USAF	A	3.02	1c1g	24	Change to read: “(g) <del>Demonstration</del> <u>To demonstrate</u> of US intent and capability to use nuclear weapons to deter adversary use of WMD.”	Improves readability.	M – see JSDS Comments
561.	18.	USJFCOM	A	3.02		24.25	<b>Change as follows:</b> “(g) <del>Demonstration</del> <u>To demonstrate</u> of US intent and capability to use nuclear weapons to deter adversary use of WMD.”	Clarity; parallel construction.	M – see JSDS Comments
562.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	3.02		30.35	Change as follows:	Accuracy.	A

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							(2) Use of nuclear weapons within a theater requires that nuclear and conventional plans be integrated to the greatest extent possible and that careful consideration be given to the potential impact of nuclear effects on friendly forces. JP 3-12.1, <i>Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Nuclear Planning (S)</i> , forthcoming, <del>provides</del> <u>will provide</u> theater planners the nuclear weapons <del>planning</del> data necessary to determine troop safety information such as minimum safe distances, collateral damage distances and least separation distances.	The new 3-12.1 is not yet published.	
563.	28	USA	S	3.02		37.38	Change: CDRUSSTRATCOM <u>assists the geographical combatant commander with the development of TNOs against facilities selected by the supported regional geographic combatant commander.</u>	Clarity. It's the GCC's TNO. USSTRATCOM supports the development.	M – see JSDS Comments
564.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	3.02		37.40	Change as follows:  " <del>(3) CDRUSSTRATCOM develops TNOs against facilities selected by the supported geographic combatant commander.</del> <u>Geographic Combatant Commanders are responsible for the development of Theater Nuclear Options (TNOs) and their submission to the Secretary of Defense for approval. CDRUSSTRATCOM, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), and the United States Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency (USANCA), provide</u> <del>provides</del> nuclear expertise to the supported combatant commander throughout the planning process."	Accepts and consolidates proposed changes.	A
565.	97	EUCOM	S	3.02		37.40	Change paragraph to read: “ <u>CDRUSSTRATCOM assists geographic combatant commanders throughout the nuclear planning process and in the development of</u> <del>develops TNOs against facilities selected by the supported geographic combatant commander. CDRUSSTRATCOM provides nuclear expertise to the supported combatant commander throughout the planning process.</del> ”	The paragraph as written is factually incorrect; CDRUSSTRATCOM does not prepare the TNOs for all geographic combatant commanders.	M – see JSDS Comments
566.	58	DTRA	S	3.02	(3)	38	Add: “ <del>As the Plan Manager, CDRUSSTRATCOM develops TNOs against facilities selected by the supported regional geographic combatant commander. Geographic Combatant Commanders have responsibility for developing Theater Nuclear Options and submitting them to the Secretary of</del>	Completeness of thought	M – see JSDS Comments

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							<u>Defense for approval. CDRUSSTRATCOM, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency ( DTRA), and the United States Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency (USANCA), ...”</u>		
567.	58	J-3	S	3.02	(3)	38	Add: “ <del>As the Plan Manager, CDRUSSTRATCOM develops TNOs against facilities selected by the supported regional geographic combatant commander. Geographic Combatant Commanders have responsibility for developing Theater Nuclear Options and submitting them to the Secretary of</del> <u>Defense for approval. CDRUSSTRATCOM, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency ( DTRA), and the United States Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency (USANCA), ...”</u>	Completeness of thought	M – see JSDS Comments
568.	53	J7	S	3.02	1c(3)	38	Change to read as follows: “ <u>CDRUSSTRATCOM provides nuclear expertise to the supported geographic combatant commander throughout the planning process.”</u>	Correctness.	M – see JSDS Comments
569.		LC	A	3.02	3	40	Change the colon after "process" to a period.	Grammar	A
570.	54	J7	S	3.03	1c(4)	4	Change to read as follows: “(4) <u>CDRUSSTRATCOM will coordinate all supporting component and combat support agency actions necessary and assist the supported geographic combatant commander in understanding the effects, employment procedures, capabilities, and limitations of nuclear weapons.”</u>	Correctness.  JSDS Comment. As modified, a second <i>geographic</i> would be redundant.	M – see JSDS Comments
571.	98	EUCOM	S	3.03		4.6	Change sentence to read: “ <u>CDRUSSTRATCOM will continue to assist geographic combatant commanders by coordinating</u> <del>coordinate</del> all supporting component and combat support agency actions necessary and assist the supported combatant commander in understanding the effects, employment procedures, capabilities, and limitations of nuclear weapons.”	This is more factually accurate.	M – see JSDS Comments
572.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	3.03		4.7	Change as follows:  “(4) <u>CDRUSSTRATCOM will continue to assist geographic combatant commanders by coordinating</u> <del>coordinate</del> all supporting component and combat support agency actions necessary and assist the supported combatant commander in understanding the effects, employment procedures, capabilities, and limitations of nuclear weapons.”	Accepts EUCOM Change	A
573.		USN	A	3.03		11.19	Change as follows: Theater nuclear support may be provided by a geographic combatant commander’s assigned forces, USSTRATCOM, or from another supporting <del>C</del> combatant	Lower case.	M – see JSDS Comments

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<p>Commander. Weapons in the US nuclear arsenal include: gravity bombs deliverable by Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA) and long-range bombers; the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile - Nuclear (TLAM/N) deliverable by submarines; cruise missiles deliverable by long-range bombers; SLBMs; and ICBMs. These systems provide the President and the geographic combatant commander with a wide range of options that can be tailored to meet desired military and political objectives. Each system has <u>unique specific</u> advantages and disadvantages when applied in a theater nuclear support context.</p>	<p>Lower case. Lower case. Hyphenate.  Pluralize.  Use of unique is trite</p>	
574.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	3.03		11.20	<p>Change as follows:</p> <p>"Theater nuclear support may be provided by a geographic combatant commander's assigned forces, USSTRATCOM, or from <del>another supporting Combatant Commander</del> <u>a supporting combatant commander</u>. Weapons in the US nuclear arsenal include: gravity bombs <u>and cruise missiles</u> deliverable by <del>Dual Capable Aircraft</del> <u>Dual Capable Aircraft</u> (DCA) and long-range bombers; the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile - Nuclear (TLAM-N) deliverable by attack submarines; <b>(insert footnote A below)</b> <del>cruise missiles deliverable by long range bombers</del>; SLBM; and ICBM. These systems provide the President and the geographic combatant commander with a wide range of options that can be tailored to meet desired military and political objectives. <u>It should be noted that these weapon types support both strategic and theater nuclear plans.</u> Each system has <u>unique specific</u> advantages and disadvantages when applied in a theater nuclear support context. Specific weapon data <del>can</del> <u>will</u> be found in JP 3-12.1, <i>Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Nuclear Planning (S)</i>, <u>forthcoming</u>.</p> <p><b>(footnote A)</b> <u>Nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles, removed from ships and submarines under the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiative, are secured in central areas where they remain available, if necessary for a crisis.</u>"</p>	<p>These changes</p> <p>Accept editorial changes</p> <p>Add a comment noting that there is a lot of cross-over between Strategic and Theater nuclear forces.</p> <p>DCA is unique to fighter aircraft</p> <p>Recognize the real status of JP 3-12.1</p> <p>Acknowledge JFCOM concerns re: TLAM-N in the footnote</p>	A
575.	31	USA	A	3.03		12	<p>Change to read: Assigned forces, USSTRATCOM, or from another supporting combatant commander.</p>	<p>Combatant commander is not capitalized.</p>	M – see JSDS Comments



ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
576.	55	J7	A	3.03	2	12	Change to read as follows: "... assigned forces, USSTRATCOM, or from another supporting <del>combatant commander.</del> "	Correctness.	M – see JSDS Comments
577.	23	USMC	S	3.03		12.15	Change to read: "...USSTRATCOM, or from another supporting <del>combatant commander.</del> Weapons in the US nuclear arsenal include: gravity bombs deliverable by <del>Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA)</del> and long-range bombers; the Tomahawk <del>Land-Attack Missile/Nuclear (TLAM/N)</del> deliverable..."	Terms are not capitalized in this general usage per JP 1-02. 'land-attack' is hyphenated.	M – see JSDS Comments
578.	19.	USJFCOM	S	3.03		13.14	<b>Change as follows:</b> "Theater nuclear support may be provided by a geographic combatant commander's assigned forces, USSTRATCOM, or from <del>another</del> supporting <del>combatant commander.</del> Weapons in the US nuclear arsenal include: gravity bombs <u>and air launched cruise missiles</u> deliverable by Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA) and long-range bombers; the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile/Nuclear..."	Completeness, clarity, and correctness. ALCMs are then addressed in para 3.c.	M – see JSDS Comments
579.	57.	USAF	S	3.03	2	13.14	Change to read: "Weapons in the US nuclear arsenal include: gravity bombs <u>and air launched cruise missiles (ALCMs)</u> deliverable by Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA) and long-range bombers; the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile/Nuclear..."	Completeness. ALCMs are then addressed in para 3.c.	M – see JSDS Comments
580.	20.	USJFCOM	S	3.03	2	14.15	<b>Comment:</b> The mention of TLAM/N contradicts the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiative, which states that these missiles are maintained in a reserve status (para 1d(2)(a)).	JSDS comment – TLAM N remains an available weapons system that combatant commanders may develop plans for... although they are not normally deployed per the PNI.	M – see JSDS Comments
581.	24	USMC	A	3.03		22	Change to read: "a. Gravity bombs deliverable by DCA and long-range bombers;"	Delete period at end of section heading; correct format.	R – paragraph deleted.
582.	58.	USAF	A	3.03	2a.2e	22	Delete subparagraphs 2.a. through 2.e.	Advantages and disadvantages of individual platforms are too specific for top-level joint doctrine and are more relevant to TTP and planning documents. JP 3-12.1 is a more appropriate location for this type of information.	M – see JSDS comments
583.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	C	3.03		22.47	Delete subparagraphs 2.a. through 2.e.	Accepts USAF Major comment. Review of Second Draft comment matrix gives no reason for the	A

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								addition of this information	
584.	56.	USAF	<b>M</b>	3.03	2a	22,47	Delete paragraphs 2.a. through 2.e.	Advantages and disadvantages of individual platforms are too specific for top-level joint doctrine. They are more relevant to TTPs and planner documents. The reference to JP 3-12.1 at the end of paragraph is sufficient.	<b>M</b> – see JSDS comments
585.	99	EUCOM	<b>S</b>	3.03		31	Delete “—from very high to very low”	This phrase does not add any value or clarity. It is sufficient to know in an unclassified publication that various yields are available. Anything more than this may tread too closely to the “classified” line.	<b>R</b> – paragraph deleted.
586.		USN	<b>A</b>	3.03		31	Change as follows: (c) Various weapon yields available — from <u>low to very high</u> to <u>very low</u>	Better word order. No nuclear yield is "very low".	<b>R</b> – paragraph deleted.
587.		USN	<b>A</b>	3.03		37	Change as follows: Crew at risk in a high threat environment	Insert article	<b>R</b> – paragraph deleted.
588.	59.	USAF	<b>S</b>	3.03	2a2b	39	Change to read: “...lead time required for planning, <u>generation</u> , and transit...”	Accuracy. Day to day status of bomber forces requires generation before use. (Submitted in the event USAF Comment #56 is not accepted)	<b>R</b> – paragraph deleted.
589.	56	J7	<b>A</b>	3.03	2a(2)(d)	44	Change to read as follows: "Equipment may have to be released from other <del>operation plan</del> OPLAN tasking."	Acronym already established.	<b>R</b> – paragraph deleted
590.	25	USMC	<b>A</b>	3.03		46	Change to read: “b. TLAM/N:-”	Delete period at end of section heading; correct format.	<b>R</b> – paragraph deleted.
591.		STRATCOM/J5515	<b>S</b>	3.03	2.a.(1)(b)&(d)	29,33	Precede both paragraphs by adding the word, “Some”.	Not all nuclear-capable aircraft are capable of performing the operations mentioned in their respective paragraphs.	<b>R</b> – paragraph deleted.
592.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	<b>C</b>	3.04		1.46	Delete subparagraphs 2.b. through 2.c.	Accepts USAF Major comment. Review of Second Draft comment matrix gives no reason for the addition of this information	<b>A</b>

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
593.	60.	USAF	<b>S</b>	3.04	2b1d	9	Delete: " <del>(d) Launching platform is recallable.</del> "	Clarity. Saying the launching platform is recallable as an advantage of TLAM is not the same thing as saying an aircraft is recallable. It is more like saying an airbase is recallable. (Submitted in the event USAF Comment #56 is not accepted)	<b>R – paragraph deleted.</b>
594.	59	DTRA	A	3.04	(1)(e)	11	Remove extra spacing between “(e)” and “Basing”	Spacing	<b>R – paragraph deleted.</b>
595.	59	J-3	A	3.04	(1)(e)	11	Remove extra spacing between “(e)” and “Basing”	Spacing	<b>R – paragraph deleted.</b>
596.	4	USSOUTH COM	A	3.04	2b(1)(e)	11	Sentence has additional spaces. Reformat as required.	Formatting.	<b>R – paragraph deleted.</b>
597.	61.	USAF	<b>S</b>	3.04	2b1e	11.12	Delete: " <del>overflight of third party nations alleviated depending on the launch platform.</del> "	Clarity. The overflight issue for TLAM is the same as for bombers so this is not an advantage either. (Submitted in the event USAF Comment #56 is not accepted)	<b>R – paragraph deleted.</b>
598.	21.	USJFCOM	<b>M</b>	3.04		20	<b>Delete:</b> “(b) Lead-time required to transit to desired launch point” as a disadvantage.”	Correctness. U.S. Navy ships are usually on-station (in most areas of the world where national interests are high) well-ahead of any planned strike. Normal transit time would be negligible.	<b>R – paragraph deleted.</b>
599.	62.	USAF	A	3.04	2b2b	20	Change to read: “(b) Lead time required to generate and transit <del>needed</del> to desired launch point.”	Grammar. (Submitted in the event USAF Comment #56 is not accepted)	<b>R – paragraph deleted.</b>
<b>600.</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>J7</b>	<b>S</b>	<b>3.04</b>	<b>2b(2)(b)</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>Change to read as follows: “(b) Lead time required to generate and transit <del>needed</del> to desired launch point”</b>	<b>Sense.</b>	<b>R – paragraph deleted</b>
601.		USN	<b>S</b>	3.04		22	Change as follows: (c) <del>System</del> <u>missiles</u> may be vulnerable to modern air defense systems	The TLAM system is quite safe. The missiles may be vulnerable.	<b>R – paragraph deleted.</b>
602.	22.	USJFCOM	<b>S</b>	3.04		26	<b>Delete:</b> “(e) Weapon yield may be too large for certain theater targets.”	Correctness, unclassified sources suggest a <u>very</u> low yield for TLAMs therefore this statement	<b>R – paragraph deleted.</b>

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								is probably incorrect.	
603.	23.	USJFCOM	<b>M</b>	3.04		28	<b>Delete:</b> “(f) Launch transfer must receive data transfer device in order to update a mission plan.”	Correctness; ships and submarines no longer need to receive a new DTD to update a TLAM mission. Now (and for some time) they are only required to receive an MDU which is transmitted via EHF.	<b>R – paragraph deleted.</b>
604.		USN	<b>S</b>	3.04		28.29	<del>Delete: (f) Launch platform must receive updated data transfer device in order to update a mission plan</del>	Untrue –no longer a limitation. A new DTD is unnecessary. Only require an MDU (not time consuming).	<b>R – paragraph deleted.</b>
605.	26	USMC	<b>A</b>	3.04		31	Change to read: “c. Cruise missiles launched from long-range bombers.”	Delete period at end of section heading; correct format.	<b>R – paragraph deleted.</b>
606.	29	USA	<b>S</b>	3.05	2c(2)(b)	1	Change to read; <del>System may have to be released from OPLAN 8044 commitment</del> to <u>System may have to be released from OPLAN commitments</u>	Specifying OPLAN 8044 requires details not required within the JP.	<b>R – paragraph deleted.</b>
607.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	<b>C</b>	3.05		1.46	Delete subparagraphs 2.d. through 2.e.	Accepts USAF Major comment. Review of Second Draft comment matrix gives no reason for the addition of this information	<b>A</b>
608.	63.	USAF	<b>S</b>	3.05	2c2	7	Add new subparagraph (f) to read: “Lead time required for planning, generation, and transit.”	Accuracy. Disadvantages for cruise missiles are in many cases the same as for gravity weapons, since they use the same delivery platform. (Submitted in the event USAF Comment #56 is not accepted)	<b>R – paragraph deleted.</b>
609.	64.	USAF	<b>S</b>	3.05	2c2	7	Add new subparagraph (g) to read: “Significant combat support and ground support infrastructure may be required, depending on scenario.”	Accuracy. Disadvantages for cruise missiles are in many cases the same as for gravity weapons, since they use the same delivery platform. (Submitted in the event USAF Comment #56 is not accepted)	<b>R – paragraph deleted.</b>
610.	30	USA	<b>S</b>	3.05	2c(2)	8	Add: (e) May be misunderstood to be a strategic delivery rather than a theater delivery system.	May inadvertently escalate the situation.	<b>R – paragraph deleted.</b>
611.	27	USMC	<b>A</b>	3.05		9	Change to read: “d. SLBMs.”	Delete period at end of section	<b>R –</b>

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								heading; correct format.	paragraph deleted.
612.	10	USN	S	3.05	D.(2)	25.34	ADD: “(e) Overflight of friendly/neutral territory including possible component fall back.”	A timely execution may preclude a submarine from positioning to prevent overflight.	R – paragraph deleted.
613.	31	USA	S	3.05	2d (2)(d)	33	Change to read; System may have to be released from OPLAN 8044 commitment to <u>System may have to be released from OPLAN commitments</u>	Specifying OPLAN 8044 requires details not required within the JP.	R – paragraph deleted.
614.	65.	USAF	S	3.05	2d2	34	Add: “(f) Booster may fall on friendly territory.”	Same issue as for ICBM. (Submitted in the event USAF Comment #56 is not accepted)	R – paragraph deleted.
615.	1	STRATCO M	S	3.05	2-d(2)	34	Add the statement, “(e) Sail time to a launch area that will not produce over flight of non-combatant counties:”	Reflects over flight considerations that are considered when planning for utilization of these weapon systems	R – paragraph deleted.
616.	28	USMC	A	3.05		35	Change to read: “e. ICBMs:”	Delete period at end of section heading; correct format.	R – paragraph deleted.
617.	66.	USAF	S	3.05	2e1d	45	Change to read: “(d) Weapon has multiple-warheads <u>capability, but also has single-warhead configuration</u> ”	Current fielded ICBM force contains a mixture of MIRV capable and single reentry vehicle. (Submitted in the event USAF Comment #56 is not accepted)	R – paragraph deleted.
618.	67.	USAF	S	3.05	2e1	46	Add: “(e) Weapon is launched from CONUS providing maximum security, safety, and stability”	Additional advantage. (Submitted in the event USAF Comment #56 is not accepted)	R – paragraph deleted.
619.	10	NORAD	A	3.06	F3.03		Remove the first bullet in the figure. All subsequent bullets pertain to the first sentence/bullet	Improve understanding of the figure.	R – paragraph deleted.
620.		STRATCO M/J5515	S	3.06	3.a.(3 )	39-42	Comment: The term “selective release” is no longer used in the most recent draft version of JSCP-N. This concept also carries multiple definitions and may confuse planners. Recommend this paragraph be deleted	Implied in comment.	M – see JSDS Comments
621.		STRATCO M/J5515	S	3.06	2.e.(2 )	1	Add another Disadvantage, “Includes overflight concerns.”	Clearly a potential disadvantage in certain planning application considerations.	R – paragraph deleted.
622.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	C	3.06		1.11	Delete subparagraph 2.e.	Accepts USAF Major comment. Review of Second Draft comment matrix gives no reason for the addition of this information	A

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623.	11	USN	S	3.06	(2)	1.12	ADD: “ (f) Overflight of friendly/neutral territory including risk of component fall back.”	This is a disadvantage.	R – paragraph deleted.
624.	32	USA	S	3.06	2e(2)(b)	5	Change to read; System may have to be released from OPLAN 8044 commitment to <u>System may have to be released from OPLAN commitments</u>	Specifying OPLAN 8044 requires details not required within the JP.	R – paragraph deleted.
625.	68..	USAF	A	3.06	2e2c	7	Change to read: “Missile is not recallable <u>in flight</u> .”	Clarity. Use same format as SLBM comment. (Submitted in the event USAF Comment #56 is not accepted)	R – paragraph deleted.
626.	8	NORAD	A	3.06	2.a.(1)	9	Recommend changing sentence that reads, “...must be well rehearsed so as to compress the time...”, to read. “must be well rehearsed <u>in order</u> to compress the time...”.	Readability	R – paragraph deleted.
627.	2	STRATCOM	S	3.06	2-e(2)	9	Change to read, “(d) Booster may fall on US or Canadian territory and sortie may potentially over fly non-combatant countries”	Reflects over flight considerations that are considered when planning for utilization of these weapon systems	R – paragraph deleted.
628.	69.	USAF	A	3.06	2e2e	11	Delete subparagraph 2.e.(2)(e)	Accuracy. Current fielded ICBM force contains a mixture of MIRV capable and single reentry vehicle. (Submitted in the event USAF Comment #56 is not accepted)	R – paragraph deleted.
629.	33	USA	S	3.06		12	Add a new sub-paragraph that states, words to the effect: <u>(f) Weapon locations are known and may be vulnerable to attack.</u>	Vulnerability of land-based missiles should be mentioned.	R – paragraph deleted.
630.		USN	A	3.06		17	Change as follows: " ... pass information and conclusions to higher levels of <del>control</del> <u>command</u> ,..."	Better word	A
631.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	3.06		22.32	Change as follows:  (1) Execution procedures are flexible and allow for changes in the situation. Commanders <u>will</u> ensure <u>that</u> constraints and release guidance are clearly understood. The commander controlling the nuclear strike package must maintain communications with the delivery unit and establish a chain of succession that maintains connectivity in case of <del>HQ headquarters</del> destruction. <del>CDRUSSTRATCOM relays through a secure communications channel to provides the</del>	These changes:  Make minor changes for readability  Delete the comms channel discussion. More detail than	A

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							supported geographic combatant commanders the authority for the expenditure of nuclear weapons following Presidential authorization. Command and Command control and coordination must be flexible enough to allow the theater geographic combatant commander to strike time-sensitive targets such as mobile missile launch platforms. Procedures must be well rehearsed so as to compress the time required between the decision to strike and actual strike. Note that EUCOM United States European Command has a unique nuclear C2 command and control relationship with Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe to facilitate nuclear operations conducted in conjunction with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.”	appropriate in an unclass pub.  Accepts EUCOM and USMC comments regarding EUCOM role.	
632.		J-3	A	3.06	(1)	28	“Command, and control,...”	Grammar	M – see JSDS Comments
633.		DTRA	A	3.06	3a(1)	28	“Command, and control,...”	Grammar	M – see JSDS Comments
634.	58	J7	S	3.06	3a(1)	28	Change to read as follows: “Command and control and coordination must be flexible enough to allow the theater geographic combatant commander to strike time-sensitive targets such as missile launch platforms.”	Correctness.	M – see JSDS Comments
635.	100	EUCOM	A	3.06		29	Insert “mobile” between “as” and “missile”	Clarity	M – see JSDS Comments
636.		USN	S	3.06		31	Clarify: Note that USEUCOM has a unique nuclear command and control relationship with Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe.	Proper title. Is this note necessary? This "unique" relationship is not explained.	M – see JSDS Comments
637.	31	USMC	S	3.06		31	Change to read: “...strike. Note that EUCOM United States European Command has a unique...”	Only use of term, so no acronym is used.	M – see JSDS Comments
638.	101	EUCOM	A	3.06		31	Change EUCOM to USEUCOM	Correct command designation	M – see JSDS Comments
639.	59	J7	A	3.06	3a(1)	31	Note that United States European Command EUCOM has a unique nuclear command and control C2 relationship with Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe.”	Correct use of acronyms.	M – see JSDS Comments
640.	102	EUCOM	S	3.06		31.32	Add to the sentence as follows: “Note that EUCOM has a unique nuclear command and control relationship with	This addition is important to clarify the point that not all	M – see JSDS

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							<i>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe to facilitate nuclear operations conducted in conjunction with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.</i>	USEUCOM involvement in nuclear operations necessarily would require coordination with SHAPE—only those undertaken within the context of the NATO alliance.	Comments
641.	60	J7	A	3.06	3a(2)	35	Change to read as follows: "The US combatant element commander in a multinational command provides guidance and publishes directives on the use of nuclear weapons by US forces in such commands."	Consistency with JP 0-2, Chapter III, para 16c, which states: "The US element commander in a multinational command will provide guidance and publish directives on the use of nuclear weapons by US forces in such commands."	A
642.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	3.06		39	Change as follows:  (3) <del>CJSCI 3110.04B, Nuclear Supplement to JSCP for FY05. The Nuclear Supplement to the JSCP</del> describes situations that could lead to a <del>combatant commander's</del> request for the selective release of nuclear weapons.	Accepts editorial comments below  Requests would need to come from the combatant commanders.  Deleted "Selective" – We can be pretty sure that all such requests will not be for a general release of weapons – further, general weapons releases does not follow the precedents we have used in recent conventional conflicts.	A
643.		USN	A	3.06		39	Change as follows: The <del>N</del> nuclear <del>S</del> supplement to the JSCP...	Lower case. Consistency with the rest of this pub.	M – see JSDS Comments
644.	5	USSOUTH COM	A	3.06	3a(3)	39	Format/title of cited CJSCI reference is incorrect: <b>Change to read:</b> CJSCI 3110.04A, <i>Nuclear Supplement to JSCP.</i> "	See item # 3	M – see JSDS Comments
645.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	3.07		0.0	Picture of the B-52 and caption needs a figure number assigned and a better picture		A Better picture is available from the JSDS.
646.		JSDS – J5	M	3.07		1.18	Change as follows:	These changes	A



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		Nuc					<p>b. <b>Support Coordination.</b> Nuclear support is coordinated through geographic combatant commander <del>and/</del> or subordinate JFC channels. US Air Force or Navy delivery systems can provide nuclear support to Army or Marine Corps operations. Coordination with the Air Force air <u>and space</u> component is through the air operations center by the collocated Army battlefield coordination <u>detachment element</u>. Coordination with the Navy <u>component and Marine Corps components</u> is through the naval and amphibious liaison element. <u>Coordination with the Marine Corps component is through the Marine liaison officer.</u> Coordination with special operations forces is through the special operations liaison element <u>found in the joint forces air component command (if designated), or appropriate Service component air command and control organization.</u></p> <p><b>(Begin new paragraph)</b> When assisting in the preparation of nuclear support plans, CDRUSSTRATCOM coordinates with supporting Service components and the geographic combatant commander. <del>to avoid fratricide and promote unity of effort.</del> USSTRATCOM planners require input from Service experts on the theater or joint task force staffs to ensure appropriate weapon yields, delivery methods, and safe delivery routing. Targeting conflicts are resolved <del>with</del> <u>through</u> direct consultations between the supporting and supported combatant commander's staffs. CDRUSSTRATCOM will deploy a strategic support team, familiar with the theater, to the supported combatant commander to provide nuclear planning and WMD expertise. The strategic support team <u>in addition to deployed teams from DTRA and USANCA</u> will provide a consequence of execution and hazard prediction analysis to the supported combatant commander. The consequence of execution analysis provides the decision maker with an estimate of <del>collateral effects during the expenditure of nuclear weapons</del> <u>the anticipated collateral damage that will follow from the use of nuclear weapons.</u></p>	<p>Accept SOCOM Major comment.</p> <p>Accepts EUCOM significant comment that as written this could be misleading.</p> <p>Accepts USN change</p> <p>Accepts DTRA addition</p>	
647.	61	J7	S	3.07	3b	3	Change to read as follows: "Coordination with the Air Force component is through the <u>Air Force air and space operations</u>	Consistency with JPs 3-09.3 and 3-30.	M- see JSDS

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							center by the collocated Army battlefield coordination element detachment. Coordination with the Navy and Marine Corps components is through the naval and amphibious liaison element. Coordination with the Marine Corps component is through the Marine liaison officer.”	<b>JSDS Note: Add those two pubs to the list of references in Appendix A at the appropriate place.</b>	Comments
648.	1	SOCOM	<b>M</b>	3.07		6.7	Change as follows: “...amphibious liaison element. Coordination with special operations forces is through the special operations liaison element <u>found in the joint forces air component command (if designated), or appropriate Service component air command and control organization.</u> ”	Accuracy. While the draft mentions “special operations liaison element,” which is a team from the theater special operations command or joint forces special operations component command, it does not state where the team is found.	M – see JSDS Comments
649.		DTRA	A	3.07	(b)	7	Replace: “ <del>When assisting in the preparation of nuclear support plans, CDRUSSTRATCOM coordinates with supporting Service components and the geographic combatant commander to avoid fratricide and promote unity of effort. CDRUSSTRATCOM assists the Geographic Combatant Commanders by coordinating with the supporting Service components to avoid fratricide and promote unity of effort.</del> ”	Better stated with new wording.	M – see JSDS Comments
650.		J-3	A	3.07	(b)	7	Replace: “ <del>When assisting in the preparation of nuclear support plans, CDRUSSTRATCOM coordinates with supporting Service components and the geographic combatant commander to avoid fratricide and promote unity of effort. CDRUSSTRATCOM assists the Geographic Combatant Commanders by coordinating with the supporting Service components to avoid fratricide and promote unity of effort.</del> ”	Better stated with new wording.	M – see JSDS Comments
651.	103	EUCOM	<b>S</b>	3.07		9	Delete “to avoid fratricide”	While this certainly is a true statement, it is misleading to single out this consideration and leave unstated myriad other considerations that will require coordination. If any single consideration requires special notice, it is the general concern over collateral damage broadly construed (i.e., as it pertains to non-combatants on either side <i>and</i> friendly combatants.)	M – see JSDS Comments
652.		USN	A	3.07		11.12	Change as follows: Targeting conflicts are resolved <del>with</del> <u>through direct consultations between...</u>	Better verbiage	M – see JSDS

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
									Comments
653.	61	DTRA	S	3.07	3.b	16	“The strategic support team, <u>in addition to deployed teams from DTRA and USANCA...</u> ”	Adding words for completion	M – see JSDS Comments
654.	61	J-3	S	3.07	3.b	16	“The strategic support team, <u>in addition to deployed teams from DTRA and USANCA...</u> ”	Adding words for completion	M – see JSDS Comments
655.		USN	A	3.07		17.18	Change as follows: The consequence of execution analysis provides the decision maker with an estimate of collateral effects <del>during</del> of the expenditure of nuclear weapons.	Better preposition	M – see JSDS Comments
656.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	3.07 and 3.08		22.24 and 1.5	Change as follows:  a. When directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, JFCs plan for nuclear weapon employment in a manner consistent with national policy and strategic guidance. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with <del>the Commander, CDRUSSTRATCOM,</del> and appropriate supporting combatant commanders, initiates crisis action planning procedures contained in CJCSI 3110.04B, <del>Nuclear, the nuclear to,</del> <i>Nuclear Supplement to Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for FY05</i> , and the appropriate <del>Commander, CDRUSSTRATCOM,</del> support plans. Geographic combatant commander OPLANs and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff <u>Emergency Action Procedures EAPs</u> provide additional guidance. Nuclear operations planning is integrated into theater plans to <del>maximize effects needed</del> <u>ensure conventional campaign plans are complemented by nuclear weapons employment.</u>	These changes accept numerous proposed changes.	A
657.		USN	A	3.07		24	Change as follows: ... in coordination with <del>the Commander, CDRUSSTRATCOM...</del>	Use acronym	M – see JSDS Comments
658.	9	NORAD	A	3.07	3.a.	24	Recommend changing, “...with <del>the Commander, USSTRATCOM,</del> and...”, to read, “...with <u>CDRUSSTRATCOM,</u> and...”. Acronym previously used throughout document.	Accuracy and consistency	M – see JSDS Comments
659.	62	J7	A	3.07	4a	24	Change to read as follows: “... of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the <del>Commander CDRUSSTRATCOM,</del> and appropriate supporting combatant commanders, ... appropriate <del>Commander, CDRUSSTRATCOM,</del> support plans.”	Correct acronym.	M – see JSDS Comments

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
660.	19	USPACO M	S	3.08	4a.	2	Change sentence beginning on page III-7, to read: “The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Commander, USSTRATCOM, and appropriate supporting combatant commanders, initiates crisis action planning procedures contained in CJCSI 3110.04A, <del>Nuclear, the nuclear to,</del> <u>Nuclear Supplement to Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan,</u> and the appropriate Commander, USSTRATCOM, support plans.”	Correctness: The official name of the publication is “Nuclear Supplement to Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan” and the corresponding FY.	M – see JSDS Comments
661.	6	USSOUTH COM	A	3.08	4a	2	Format/title of cited CJCSI reference is incorrect: <b>Change to read:</b> CJCSI 3110.04A, <i>Nuclear Supplement to JSCP.</i> ”	See item #3	M – see JSDS Comments
662.		USN	A	3.08		2.04	Change as follows: ... procedures contained in CJCSI 3110.04A, <i>Nuclear,</i> the nuclear supplement to the JSCP, and the appropriate <del>Commander,</del> <u>CDRUSSTRATCOM,</u> support plans.	Insert comma. Use acronym. Delete comma	M – see JSDS Comments
663.	32	USMC	A	3.08		4	Change to read: “...of Staff EAPs provide...”	There is not ‘s’ at the end of this acronym in this usage.	M – see JSDS Comments
664.		USN	A	3.08		4.05	Change as follows: Nuclear operations planning is integrated into theater plans to <del>maximize</del> <u>ensure the</u> effects needed.	With nukes we want to get just the right effects, not the maximum effects.	M – see JSDS Comments
665.		DTRA	A	3.08	4.a	5	<del>“...theater plans to maximize effects needed. ensure</del> <u>conventional campaign plans are complemented by nuclear weapons employment.”</u>	Clarify	M – see JSDS Comments
666.		J-3	A	3.08	4.a	5	<del>“...theater plans to maximize effects needed. ensure</del> <u>conventional campaign plans are complemented by nuclear weapons employment.”</u>	Clarify	M – see JSDS Comments
667.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	3.08		7.33	Change as follows:  "(1) <b>Theater Planning.</b> Geographic combatant commanders are responsible for defining theater objectives and developing nuclear plans required to support those objectives, including selecting targets. When tasked, CDRUSSTRATCOM, <del>as the</del> <u>as a</u> supporting combatant commander, provides detailed planning support to meet theater <u>planning requirements</u> <del>strategy during crisis action, adaptive, and deliberate</del> <u>planning.</u> All theater nuclear option planning follows prescribed Joint Operation Planning and Execution System procedures to formulate and implement an effective response within the timeframe permitted by the crisis. Since options do not exist for every scenario, combatant commanders must	These changes:  Clarity  See discussion about planning on	A

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<p>have a capability to <del>plan and execute nuclear options for nuclear forces generated on short notice</del> <u>perform crisis action planning and execute those plans.</u> <del>during crisis and emergency situations.</del> <u>Adaptive planning addresses emerging targets during either deliberate or crisis action planning.</u> <del>Adaptive</del> <u>Crisis action</u> planning provides the capability to develop new options, or modify existing options, when current limited or major response options are inappropriate. The supported commander defines the desired operational effects, and with USSTRATCOM assistance, develops <del>COAs</del> <u>Theater Nuclear Options</u> to achieve those effects (e.g., disrupt, delay, disable, or destroy).</p> <p>(2) As a supporting combatant commander, CDRUSSTRATCOM provides theater planning support to the supported geographic combatant commander through deployment of a strategic support team and detailed target analysis, development, weaponeering, and mission planning/analysis as depicted in Figure III-1. <u>Upon geographic combatant commander request, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and US Army Nuclear &amp; Chemical Agency (USANCA) support theater nuclear planning efforts by providing the DTRA Planning and Consequence Management Teams and the USANCA Nuclear Employment Augmentation Team (NEAT). These elements provide necessary operational, consequence of execution and consequence management planning expertise to the combatant commander.</u> The geographic combatant commander <del>continually</del> monitors theater events and recommends <del>(nominates)</del> <u>targets whose destruction will support the theater strategy.</u> <del>supporting theater strategy, based on military objectives that support the national security strategy.</del> Geographic combatant commanders consider many factors when implementing theater strategy including alternative means to accomplish objectives, likelihood and acceptability of probable adversary response <del>against</del> <u>on</u> the United States or its allies, relationship to US vital interests, treaty commitments, diplomatic agreements, nuclear weapon effects to include estimated adversary fatalities as well as <del>environmental impacts</del> <u>how allied forces will continue to fight in a contaminated environment</u>, effects beyond the target country, and allied and coalition perception and possible</p>	<p>pages 2.06 and 2.07 regarding planning.</p> <p>Adaptive planning is usually considered a sub-set of crisis action planning. Adapting a deliberate plan in a "non-crisis" environment equates to plan maintenance, and is not normally associated with the term "adaptive planning."</p> <p>Accepts Army Significant comment to include support teams.</p> <p>With respect to the environmental discussion – US policy and international law do not endorse or authorize wholesale destruction for its own sake; consequently, the environment is not a lawful target. Therefore, environmental damage in the context of nuclear operations is an outcome more</p>	

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							reactions to nuclear strikes. "	appropriate to be addressed in the realm of collateral damage.	
668.		J-3	A	3.08	(1)	9	"CDRUSSTRATCOM, as <del>the</del> a supporting..."	Grammar	M – see JSDS Comments
669.		DTRA	A	3.08	4a(1)	9	"CDRUSSTRATCOM, as <del>the</del> a supporting..."	Grammar	M – see JSDS Comments
670.		USN	<b>S</b>	3.08		14.15	Change as follows: ...commanders must have a capability to plan and execute nuclear options for nuclear forces generated on short notice during crisis and emergency situations.	Implied and redundant.	M – see JSDS Comments
671.		DTRA	A	3.08	(1)	19	"... develops COAs Theater Nuclear Options to achieve..."	Clarify	M – see JSDS Comments
672.		J-3	A	3.08	(1)	19	"... develops COAs Theater Nuclear Options to achieve..."	Clarify	M – see JSDS Comments
673.	34	USA	<b>S</b>	3.08	4a(2)	25	Add sentence. Upon GCC request, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and US Army Nuclear & Chemical Agency (USANCA) support theater nuclear planning efforts by providing the DTRA Planning and Consequence Management Teams and the USANCA Nuclear Employment Augmentation Team (NEAT). These elements provide necessary operational, consequence of execution and consequence management planning expertise to the GCC.	Completeness. The USSTRATCOM SST is introduced as a supporting element to theater nuclear planning but DTRA and USANCA supporting capabilities are omitted. See JSCP-N.	M – see JSDS Comments
674.		USN	<b>S</b>	3.08		25.28	Change as follows: The geographic combatant commander continually monitors theater events and recommends (nominates) targets supporting theater strategy, <del>based on military objectives that support the national security strategy.</del>	Implied, understood and superfluous.	M – see JSDS Comments
675.	104	EUCOM	A	3.08		26	Select either "recommends" or "nominates" but don't use both.	Redundant	M – see JSDS Comments
676.	12	USN	<b>S</b>	3.08	(2)	28.33	ADD: "how allied forces will continue to fight in a contaminated environment." This could be added after discussion of adversary fatalities and before possible allied and coalition reactions.	This should be a concern of the GCC.	M – see JSDS Comments
677.		USN	A	3.08		30	Change as follows: ... acceptability of probable adversary		M – see

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							response <del>on</del> <u>against</u> the United States or its allies,...	Better preposition	JSDS Comments
678.		USN	S	3.08		32	Change as follows: ... estimated adversary fatalities <del>as well as environmental impacts</del> , effects beyond the target...	Is there really consideration of environmental effects when using nuclear weapons?	M – see JSDS Comments
679.		USN	S	3.08		35.36	Delete: <del>Successful integration of conventional and nuclear forces is crucial to fulfilling overall theater strategy.</del>	Saying this repeatedly without addressing it further is of no use.	M – see JSDS Comments
680.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	3.08		35.41	Change as follows:  (3) <del>Successful integration of conventional and nuclear forces is crucial to fulfilling overall theater strategy.</del> Nuclear operations in the theater may require a significant conventional support package that addresses concerns such as aerial refueling, <u>Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), Consequence Management (CM), and Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)</u> , and nuclear weapons recovery. Geographic combatant commanders and staffs evaluate <del>the impact of</del> <u>and balance</u> force allocation for conventional and nuclear operations. Combatant commanders <u>should understand the interaction between nuclear and conventional forces and contribution of nuclear missions to their strategy.</u> <del>must comprehend how nuclear and conventional forces interact and how nuclear missions affect support the conduct of the entire campaign plan and, ultimately, theater strategy.</del>	These changes  Accept Navy deletion recommendation  Accepts additions  Evaluate and Balance requirements is closer to what is normally expected.  Clarity	A
681.		J-3	A	3.08	(3)	37	“...refueling, Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), Consequence Management (CM), and Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)...”	Clarify	M – see JSDS Comments
682.		DTRA	A	3.08	4a(3)	37	“...refueling, Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), Consequence Management (CM), and Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)...”	Clarify	M – see JSDS Comments
683.		USN	S	3.08		39.40	Clarify: Combatant commanders must comprehend how nuclear and conventional forces interact and how nuclear missions support the conduct of the entire campaign.	Agreed, but this is not explained.	M – see JSDS Comments
684.		STRATCOM/J5515	S	3.09	Fig III-1		Ref box labeled “Mission Planning”, split coloration of box to reflect both STRATCOM/GCC	Collaborative process throughout this block should be reflected in the figure.	A
685.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	3.09	F 3.01	0	<b>Renumber</b> figure to III-2 → this follows from giving the B-52 picture on page III-7 a figure number.	Consistency	A

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
686.	63	J7	S	3.09		F3.01	Change “battle damage assessment” to “combat assessment.”	Correctness.	A
687.	62	DTRA	A	3.09	b	1	“weapon system” Be consistent; see number 59 and 61	Consistency	M – see JSDS Comments
688.	62	J-3	A	3.09	b	1	“weapon system” Be consistent; see number 53 and 55	Consistency	M – see JSDS Comments
689.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	3.09 and 3.10		1.15 and 1.3	Change as follows:  b. Nuclear weapons and <del>nuclear weapon associated</del> systems may be deployed into theaters, but <del>geographic</del> combatant commanders have no authority to employ them until <u>that authority is specifically granted</u> by the President. There are <u>myriad considerations governing theater nuclear use, and a complete listing is beyond the scope of this unclassified doctrine. Some of the more common considerations include: seven elements to control and constrain theater nuclear weapons use:</u>  (1) A decision to use nuclear weapons. (2) The number, type, and yields of weapons. (3) Types of targets to be attacked. (4) Geographical area <del>for</del> <u>of</u> employment. (5) Timing and duration of employment. (6) Damage constraints. (7) Target analysis.	These Changes  Accept Admin comments  Accepts EUCOM authority comment  Accepts EUCOM significant comment / recommendation to not couch these as the be-all and end-all list of considerations.  Accepts USAF change	A
690.	105	EUCOM	A	3.09		2	Insert: “authority is” between “until” and “specifically”	Ambiguity: Does “specifically granted” refer to “authority” or to “them” (i.e., geographic combatant commanders)? This insertion solves the ambiguity problem.	M – see JSDS Comments
691.	106	EUCOM	S	3.09 and 3.10		3.0 on 3.09 to	Delete the sentence beginning “There are . . . “ and the seven-item list that follows.	This is a misleadingly partial list that considers (some of) the military considerations that would be required, similar to the kind that would accompany virtually any operational decision. While conventional wisdom maintains	M – see JSDS Comments



ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
						3.0 3.10		that military commanders should restrict their recommendations to “best military advice,” nuclear weapons use is the case par excellence in which the geographical combatant commander must take full account of not only military considerations, but also considerations <i>other</i> than strictly military (i.e., political) that bear upon the decision to recommend nuclear weapons use. Rather than provide a comprehensive list that might transgress the boundary of classified information, it probably is better to omit the list altogether.	
692.	70.	USAF	A	3.09	4b4	12	Change to read: “...geographical area <del>for</del> <u>of</u> employment.”	Grammar and clarity.	M – see JSDS Comments
693.	107	EUCOM	<b>S</b>	3.10	5		Delete the entire paragraph entitled <b>Continued Operations After Weapons of Mass Destruction Use</b>	This paragraph altogether departs from the theme of this chapter and appears here to be merely an afterthought. This manual should not conclude on the note that identifies the post-friendly nuclear strike environment to be a “WMD environment.” This may not be the case. If a WMD environment exists, commanders must be prepared to deal with that environment whether or not US nuclear weapons are used. Although there is a place for discussing these ideas in tandem, the concluding paragraph of this publication is <i>not</i> that place, because the ideas are not intrinsically related.	M – see JSDS Comments re: page 2.12
694.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	<b>S</b>	3.10		5.11	Delete the following paragraph:	Deletes the paragraph that was moved to page III - 1	<b>A</b>

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<del>"c. When requesting or tasked with nuclear planning requirements, the geographic combatant commander is responsible for defining theater objectives, selecting specific targets and targeting objectives, and developing the plans required to support those objectives. Theater nuclear forces and planning are closely coordinated with nuclear supporting forces and the supported conventional forces to ensure unity of effort. The intent is to facilitate timely consideration and refinement in a crisis and to facilitate the development and generation of new adaptively planned nuclear options."</del>		
695.		J-3	<b>S</b>	3.10	c	5.11	Move entire paragraph to the bottom of pg III-1	Discussion of this subject belongs earlier in this chapter	M – see JSDS comments
696.		DTRA	<b>S</b>	3.10	c	5.11	Move entire paragraph to the bottom of pg III-1	Discussion of this subject belongs earlier in this chapter	M – see JSDS comments
697.		USN	<b>S</b>	3.10		9.11	<del>The intent is to facilitate timely consideration and refinement in a crisis and to facilitate the development and generation of new adaptively planned nuclear options.</del>	Confusing	M – see JSDS Comments
698.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	<b>S</b>	3.10		13.32	<p>Delete the following paragraph:</p> <p><b>5.Continued Operations After Weapons of Mass Destruction Use</b></p> <p>a. <del>The effects of nuclear weapons on the battlefield and the casualties caused by WMD weapons, can produce casualties from the psychological stress and effect of their use. Training can help counter fear and uncertainty concerning exposure and future use of WMD weapons. Better defenses and shielding are also critical in protecting and improving the effectiveness of surviving forces.</del>  <i>Additional information on shielding and NBC defense can be found in JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Environments, and Service publications.</i></p> <p>b. <del>US, allied, and multinational forces must prepare for further operations under conditions ranging from continued WMD use to a resumption of conventional means only. The demonstrated ability of US forces to survive and to sustain successful combat operations in a WMD environment presents a stronger deterrent force to potential US adversaries. The US must be prepared to fight and win on a contaminated</del></p>	<p>Accepts EUCOM deletion recommendation</p> <p>Revised paragraph moved to page II – 12, the end of Chapter II, since it is appropriate to address operations in the postuse environment in the operations section...</p>	<b>A</b>

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<del>battlefield following an adversary's or friendly WMD attack or US offensive nuclear strike.</del>		
699.		USN	A	3.10		16.17	Change as follows: The effects of nuclear weapons on the battlefield and the casualties caused by WMD weapons, can <u>also</u> produce casualties from the psychological stress...	Need adverb here.	M – see JSDS comments re: page II - 12
700.	24.	USJFCOM	A	3.10		16.18	<b>Change as follows:</b> “The effects of nuclear weapons on the battlefield and the casualties caused by WMD weapons can <u>also</u> produce casualties from the psychological stress and effects of their use.”	Clarity.	M – see JSDS comments re: page II - 12
701.		DTRA	A	3.10	5a	17	“... psychological <u>and physiological</u> stress and effect...”	Clarify	M – see JSDS comments re: page II - 12
702.		J-3	A	3.10	5a	17	“... psychological <u>and physiological</u> stress and effect...”	Clarify	M – see JSDS comments re: page II - 12
703.	64	J7	A	3.10	5	22	Change to read as follows: "Additional information on shielding and NBC defense can be found in JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Environments, and Service publications."	The title of a pub is displayed in the opposite style from the other part of the reference.  JSDS comment: comment for page 2.12 seems to incorporate the desired text. Not sure what the intent is here.	M – see JSDS comments re: page II - 12
704.		USN	S	3.10		26.31	Change as follows: US and multinational forces must prepare for further operations under conditions ranging from continued WMD use to a resumption of conventional- <u>only</u> operations <del>means only</del> . The demonstrated ability of US forces to survive and to sustain successful combat operations in a WMD environment presents a stronger deterrent force to potential US adversaries. The US must be prepared to fight and win on a contaminated battlefield <del>following an</del>	Better verbiage.  Stronger than what?  Delete weak sentence ending.	M – see JSDS comments re: page II - 12

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<del>adversary's or friendly WMD attack or US offensive nuclear strike.</del>		
705.		STRATCO M/J5515	S	51.01	App A		Comment: consider potential changes affecting this document when the latest draft of JSCP-N (aka CJCSI 31101.04B) is signed by CJCS. Recommend applying draft JSCP-N reference.	Implied in comment.	M – Ref List updated
706.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	51.02		19	<p>Delete existing references on pages A-1 and A-2 and replace with the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. National Security Presidential Directive – 14, Nuclear Weapons Planning Guidance, June 2002.</li> <li>2. Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons (NUWEP), 19 April 2004.</li> <li>3. CJCSI 3110.04B, <i>Nuclear Supplement to JSCP for FY05</i>, 31 December 2004.</li> <li>4. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 2002, CJCSI 3110.01E, 01 October 2002.</li> <li>5. 2002 Contingency Planning Guidance, 28 June 2002.</li> <li>6. The National Security Strategy of the United States, 17 September 2002.</li> <li>7. National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 13 March 2004.</li> <li>8. Strategic Planning Guidance, Fiscal Years 2006-2011, 15 March 2004.</li> <li>9. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, September 30, 2001.</li> <li>10. Nuclear Posture Review Report to Congress, December, 2001.</li> <li>11. Nuclear Posture Review: Implementation Plan, DoD Implementation of the December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review Report to Congress, March 2003.</li> <li>12. Section 1041 and 1042 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 106-398).</li> <li>13. Section 1033 of FY 2002 Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 107-107).</li> <li>14. National Security Presidential Directive – 28, United States Nuclear Weapons Command, Control, Safety, and Security, June 2003.</li> </ol>	<p>These changes:</p> <p>Remove obsolete references from the document.</p> <p>Remove classified titles from the document that should not have been included.</p> <p>Provide the set of references in an approximate order for their influence on Nuclear Policy.</p>	A

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							15. National Security Presidential Directive - 34, Fiscal Year 2004-2012 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan, May 2004. 16. National Security Presidential Directive - 35, Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization, May 2004. 17. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002. 18. Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept, November 2004 19. Operation Plan 8044 Revision (05) (Rev Year). 20. Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, 27 September 1991. 21. Law of Armed Conflict. 22. Proliferation Security Initiative – Statement of Interdiction Principles, 04 September 2003. 23. JP 0-2, <i>Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)</i> . 24. JP 1-02, <i>DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms</i> . 25. JP 2-0, <i>Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations</i> . 26. JP 2-01.1, <i>Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Support to Targeting</i> . 27. JP 3-0, <i>Doctrine for Joint Operations</i> . 28. JP 3-01, <i>Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats</i> . 29. JP 3-01.1, <i>Aerospace Defense of North America</i> . 30. JP 3-01.5, <i>Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense</i> . 31. JP 3-11, <i>Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments</i> . 32. JP 3-12.1, <i>Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Nuclear Planning (U)</i> , and its forthcoming Secret revision 33. <u>JP 3-13, <i>Joint Doctrine for Information Operations</i></u> 34. <u>JP 3-34, <i>Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations</i></u> 35. JP 3-40, <i>Counterproliferation</i> . 36. JP 3-60, <i>Joint Doctrine for Targeting</i> . 37. <u>JP 4-04, <i>Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support</i></u> 38. <u>JP 5-0, <i>Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations</i></u>		

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							39. NATO Standardization Agreement 2140, <i>Friendly Nuclear Strike Warning</i> . 40. Strategic Deterrence Requirements 2020 Study, Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum (JROCM) 132-03, 17 June 2003. 41. Weaver, Greg, and J. David Glaes, <i>Inviting Disaster: How Weapons of Mass Destruction Undermine U.S. Strategy for Projecting Military Power</i> , Mclean, VA: AMCODA Press, 1997.		
707.	33	USMC	S	99.00			General comment. The following acronyms are used two or more times in the text of the pub and should be added to the glossary:  “ <u>CDRUSSTRATCOM Commander, United States Strategic Command</u> ” “ <u>DCA Dual Capable Aircraft</u> ” “ <u>NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical</u> ” “ <u>OPCON operational control</u> ” “ <u>START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty</u> ” “ <u>TLAM/N Tomahawk land-attack missile/nuclear</u> ”	Compliance with JP 1-01.	M – see JSDS comments
708.	34	USMC	S	99.00			General comment. The following acronyms are not used two or more times in the text of the pub and should be deleted from the glossary:  “ <del>BMD – ballistic missile defense</del> ” “ <del>BW – biological weapon</del> ” “ <del>TPRC – theater planning response cell</del> ”	Compliance with JP 1-01.	M – see JSDS comments
709.	35	USMC	S	99.01			Change to read:  “ <del>STRIKWARN F</del> riendly <del>N</del> nuclear <del>S</del> strike <del>W</del> arning”	Term is not capitalized in this general usage. The fact that it is the title of STANAG 2104 is one thing; however, in the glossary as shown here it should be lower case.	R – References to US Message Traffic have been removed from the Pub
710.	71.	USAF	S	99.01	N/A	N/A	General Comment. There are numerous terms used in the text	Self-explanatory.	M – see

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							that are not listed in the Glossary. For example: CDRUSSTRATCOM, OPCON, TLAM, and WMD.		JSDS comments
711.	65	J7	A	99.01			The following acronyms should be deleted: BMD, BW, TPRC, US,	Acronyms do not meet guidelines.	M – see JSDS comments
712.	66	J7	A	99.01			The following acronyms should be added: CDRUSSTRATCOM, DCA, NBC, OPCON, START, TLAM/N	Acronyms are used in the pub IAW the guidelines.	M – see JSDS comments
713.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	99.01 and 99.02		1.43 and 1.11	Add the following:  <u>CDRUSSTRATCOM Commander, United States Strategic Command</u>  <u>DCA Dual Capable Aircraft</u>  <u>NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical</u>  <u>OPCON operational control</u>  <u>START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty</u>  <u>SST Strategic Support Team</u>  <u>TLAM-N Tomahawk land-attack missile, nuclear</u>	Accepts USMC comment regarding acronym use	A
714.		USN	A	99.01		2	Delete: <del>BW biological weapon</del>	Acronym not used  <b>J7 Comment: Correctness .and consistency with formatting rules. An acronym has no relevance to a glossary if not used in the pub. The curious can refer to JP 1-02.</b>	R
715.	72.	USAF	A	99.01	N/A	2	Delete acronym BW	Only used once in document (para III-1c1b).  <b>J7 Comment: Correctness .and consistency with formatting rules. An acronym has no relevance to a glossary if not used in the pub. The curious can refer</b>	R

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								to JP 1-02.	
716.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	99.01		43	Delete the following:  “ <del>STRIKWARN</del> Friendly Nuclear Strike Warning”	Term has been removed the pub	A
717.		STRATCOM/J5515	S	99.02	Glossary	2	Delete the term, “TPRC”. Add the term, “SST – Strategic Support Team”	New terminology	M – see JSDS comments
718.		J-3	A	99.02		3	“ <del>TPRC</del> theater planning response cell- <u>SST</u> Strategic Support Team”	New terminology used	M – see JSDS comments
719.		DTRA	A	99.02		3	“ <del>TPRC</del> theater planning response cell- <u>SST</u> Strategic Support Team”	New terminology used	M – see JSDS comments
720.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	99.02		3.5	Delete the following terms:  <del>TPRC Theater Planning Response Cell</del>  <del>US – United States</del>	Term has been removed the pub  US is obvious as United States	A
721.		USN	A	99.02		5	Delete: <del>US United States</del>	Unnecessary	M – see JSDS comments
722.		USN	S	99.03		4.09	Change as follows:  apportionment (nuclear). The apportionment of specific numbers and types of nuclear weapons to a commander for a stated time period as a planning factor for use in the development of war operation plans. (Additional authority is required for the actual deployment of allocated weapons to locations desired by the commander to support the war operation plans. Expenditures of these weapons <del>are</del> <u>is</u> not authorized until <del>released</del> <u>approved</u> by proper authority.)	Singular. More correct verb?	M – see JSDS comments
723.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	99.03		4.10	Change as follows:  "apportionment (nuclear). The apportionment of specific numbers and types of nuclear weapons to a commander for a stated time period as a planning factor for use in the development of operation plans. ( <del>Additional</del> <u>Additional</u>	These changes  Accept proposed changes for removal of parentheses.	A



ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							authority is required for the actual deployment of allocated weapons to locations desired by the commander to support the operation plans. <del>Expenditures</del> <u>Expenditure</u> of these weapons <del>are</del> <u>is</u> not authorized until <u>directed by the President through the chain of command.</u> <del>released by proper authority.)</del> (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term " <u>allocation (nuclear)</u> " and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)"	Need to address the role of the President in the decision to use nuclear weapons. "Release authority" does not define an order to go use a device. The "release" metaphor fails in light of current operational techniques where "weapons free" is almost never declared, even in the height of conflict (Desert Storm, OEF, OIF)	
724.	36	USMC	S	99.03		4.10	Change to read:  "apportionment (nuclear). The apportionment of specific numbers and types of nuclear weapons to a commander for a stated time period as a planning factor for use in the development of operation plans. (Additional authority is required for the actual deployment of allocated weapons to locations desired by the commander to support the operation plans. Expenditures of these weapons are not authorized until released by proper authority.) (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term " <u>allocation (nuclear)</u> " and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)"	There is no existing term by this name to replace in JP 1-02.	M – see JSDS comments
725.	108	EUCOM		99.03		6.9	Re: Definition for "apportionment (nuclear)."  Remove parentheses around the sentence (Additional authority is required for the actual deployment of allocated weapons to locations desired by the commander to support the war operation plans. Expenditures of these weapons are not authorized until released by proper authority.)	This point is crucial to the definition—not an aside.	M – see JSDS comments
726.		USN	S	99.03		12.15	Change as follows:  augmentation capability. A force intended to address potential contingencies. <del>The ability to reinforce in a timely and efficient manner the operationally deployed force will contribute to the deterrence of challenges and the dissuasion of arms competition.</del>	Do not concur with this definition. 1. This definition clashes with the same term in JP 3-35, 4-01.5, 4-01.8, and 4-09. 2. Second sentence is not part of a definition.	M – see JSDS comments

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
727.	109	EUCOM	<b>M</b>	99.03		12.16	Re: Definition for “augmentation capability.” <b>EUCOM NONCONCURS</b> with the definition. Recommend its deletion.	The phrase on the face of it, the term “augmentation capability” appears to have nothing particular to do with nuclear weapons. However, the definition as written refers to concepts like “deterrence” and “dissuasion of [should read dissuasion <i>from</i> ] arms competition. This latter point suggests that the general phrase “augmentation capability” should always have some sort of special application, which of course is not true. The best solution would be simply not to try to make a common phrase like this into a specialized definition and let the words speak for themselves.	<b>R – although I largely concur with the comment – bottom line: Augmentation capability has come to have some very specific meanings in the realm of nuclear weapons policy – despite the NPR's depiction of a responsive capability – which had some overlap challenges</b>  <b>The revised definition attempts to resolve the discrepancy</b>
728.		JSDS – J5 Nuc		99.03		12.16	Change as follows:  "augmentation capability ( <b>nuclear</b> ). <u>The inventory of US strategic nuclear warheads that are not operationally deployed and that could serve to augment the deployed forces should the US strategic nuclear force requirements rise above the</u>	This change  Mirrors the language found in the NPR Implementation Plan to the maximum extent possible without	<b>A</b>

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<p>level of the Moscow Treaty. In a developing crisis, the augmentation capability may be required to increase the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads above the limits of the Moscow Treaty. Such a change to the US operational nuclear force level could only be considered following a US withdrawal from the Moscow Treaty and appropriate action by the President and the Congress. See also <i>operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons</i></p> <p>A force intended to address potential contingencies. The ability to reinforce in a timely and efficient manner the operationally deployed force with warheads from the responsive force will contribute to the deterrence of challenges and the dissuasion of arms competition. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.) "</p>	going into a classified discussion.	
729.		USN	S	99.03		18.20	<p>Change as follows:</p> <p>"<b>circular error probable</b>. An indicator of the delivery accuracy of a weapon system, used as a factor in determining probable damage to a target. It is the radius of a circle within which half of a missile's <u>the delivered bombs or</u> projectiles are expected to fall. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)"</p>	Definition is too narrow. CEP applies to bombs as well as missiles. Modify JP 1-02 definition.	A – JSDS made minor tweak to language
730.		USN	S	99.03		22	<p>Change as follows:</p> <p><del>C</del>ollateral <del>D</del>amage <del>D</del>istance. The minimum distance that a desired ground zero must be...</p>	Terms are generally lower case.	M – see JSDS comments
731.	67	J7	A	99.03		22	<p>Change to read as follows: "Collateral Damage Distance. The minimum distance that a desired ground zero must be separated from civilian personnel and materiel to ensure with a 99 percent assurance that a 5 percent incidence of injuries or property damage will not be exceeded. For more information see JP 3-12.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Nuclear Planning (S). (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)"</p>	This term and definition should be included in JP 1-02. Cross-references to JPs should not be included in definitions.	R – see JSDS comments.

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
732.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	<b>S</b>	99.03		22.26	Change as follows:  " <del>Collateral Damage Distance.</del> <u>collateral damage distance.</u> <u>1.</u> The minimum distance that a desired ground zero must be separated from civilian personnel and materiel to ensure with a 99 percent assurance that a 5 percent incidence of injuries or property damage will not be exceeded. <u>2.</u> It is the sum of the radius of collateral damage and the buffer distance. Also called CDD. For more information see JP 3-12.1, <i>Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Nuclear Planning (S)</i> , forthcoming. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.) "	Accepts change proposals and recognizes the state of JP 3-12.1  <b>J7 Comment: See #729 (J7 #67 re JP 3-12.1)</b>  <b>JSDS Comment: The only users who are going to care what the detailed definition is, (as given here) are likely to be the users of 3-12.1 or people who should be users of 3-12.1.</b>  <b>There should be no issue with giving a valid definition and directing the appropriately cleared practitioners to the best source of information.</b>	<b>A</b>
733.	37	USMC	<b>S</b>	99.03		22.26	Change to read:  " <del>C</del> <u>ollateral D</u> <del>amage D</del> <u>istance.</u> <u>1.</u> The minimum distance that a desired ground zero must be separated from civilian personnel and materiel to ensure with a 99 percent assurance that a 5 percent incidence of injuries or property damage will not be exceeded. <u>2.</u> It is the sum of the radius of collateral damage and the buffer distance. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 3-12.1.) For more information see JP 3-12.1, <i>Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Nuclear Planning (S)</i> ."	JP 3-12.1 has only been through first draft and the previous JP 3-12.1 did not have this term and it has not yet been approved for inclusion in JP 1-02. Correct terminology per JP 1-01. Term is not capitalized.	<b>M</b> – see JSDS comments
734.		J-3	<b>A</b>	99.03		26	Add after last sentence: " <u>Also called CDD.</u> "	Consistency with remainder of glossary	<b>M</b> – see JSDS comments
735.		DTRA	<b>A</b>	99.03		26	Add after last sentence: " <u>Also called CDD.</u> "	Consistency with remainder of glossary	<b>M</b> – see JSDS comments
736.	2	SOCOM	<b>S</b>	99.03		32	Add the following:  " <u>conventional forces.</u> Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear weapons. (JP 1-02)"	References are made to "conventional forces" throughout this draft pub and it is a term defined in JP 1-02. As such, it should be included in the glossary	<b>A</b>

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								of JP 3-12.	
737.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	<b>S</b>	99.03		33.37	Change as follows:  “ <b>counterforce targeting.</b> The employment of strategic <del>air and missile</del> forces in an effort to destroy, or render impotent, selected military capabilities of an adversary force under any of the circumstances by which hostilities may be initiated. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term “ <u>counterforce</u> ” and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)”	This change  Accepts and modifies the USMC language slightly to recognize that "air and missile" are probably not the only "strategic forces" available to the US.  Yes, an argument could be made that for US nuclear forces these are the only ways of delivering the weapons; but it is not the only way of delivering strategic weapons (Nuc, IO, SOF, and advanced conventional weapons) as described in the Nuclear Posture Review.	<b>R – original JSDS AO recommendation.</b>  <b>Rejected 23 Nov 04</b>
738.	38	USMC	<b>S</b>	99.03		33.37	Change to read:  “ <b>counterforce targeting.</b> The employment of strategic air and missile forces in an effort to destroy, or render impotent, selected military capabilities of an adversary force under any of the circumstances by which hostilities may be initiated. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term “ <u>counterforce</u> ” and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)”	There is no existing term by this name to replace in JP 1-02.	<b>M – see JSDS comments</b>
739.		JSDS – J5 Nuc		99.03		33.43	Delete the following:  " <del><b>counterforce targeting.</b> The employment of strategic air and missile forces in an effort to destroy, or render impotent, selected military capabilities of an adversary force under any of the circumstances by which hostilities may be initiated. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)</del>  <del><b>critical infrastructure targeting.</b> Strategy directing the destruction or neutralization of selected adversary military and military related activities, such as industries, resources,</del>	Terms deleted from the document.  Although they may be appropriate in historical context, in our current era of at most ones or twos nuclear weapon employment, they do not necessarily add value for driving potential adversaries decision – making process.  The issues of attacking	<b>A</b>

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<del>and institutions that contribute to the adversary's ability to wage war. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.) "</del>	infrastructure are thoroughly addressed in the targeting section, and in classified fora.	
740.		USN	A	99.03		39.42	Change as follows:  critical infrastructure targeting. Strategy directing the destruction or neutralization of selected adversary military and military-related activities, such as industries, resources, and institutions that contribute to the adversary's ability to wage war.	Hyphenate. Use generic singular form.	M – see JSDS comments
741.	108	EUCOM	C	99.03		39.43	Re: definition for “critical infrastructure targeting.” EUCOM <b>NONCONCURS</b> with the definition as written. An acceptable definition would read:  <u>“countervalue targeting. A targeting strategy that seeks to hold at risk things upon which an adversary places a high “value” as it pursues its interests. Historically, this has referred principally to things (other than committed military forces, i.e., “counterforce” targets), such as industries, resources, and institutions that contribute to an adversary’s ability to wage war.”</u>	The change in name from “countervalue” to “critical infrastructure” is not helpful. “Countervalue” has an institutionalized and broadly understood meaning in the academic literature on nuclear warfare and in international security studies in general. To assign a new name to the concept involved will serve only to disassociate the joint definition from the standard body of literature that deals with the subject of this publication, thus making it less comprehensible to its broader audience.  One more point: Changing “countervalue” to “critical infrastructure” obscures the reality that although nuclear weapons are, in some cases at least, weapons with military utility, they are <i>always political</i> weapons in a way that other weapon systems are not. If we lose the ability to speak in terms of “value” when dealing with	M – see JSDS comments

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								nuclear weapons and instead must think of them in “infrastructure” terms, we risk losing view of the reality that the US <i>may</i> at some juncture use nuclear weapons for political—rather than strictly military—purposes.	
742.		JSDS – J5 Nuc		99.03		39.43	<p>Change as follows:</p> <p><b>(insert the following new definition)</b>  <u><b>countervalue targeting.</b> A targeting strategy that seeks to hold at risk things upon which an adversary places a high “value” as it pursues its interests. Historically, this has referred principally to things (other than committed military forces, i.e., “counterforce” targets), such as industries, resources, and institutions that contribute to an adversary’s ability to wage war. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)</u></p> <p><u><b>critical infrastructure targeting.</b> Strategy A targeting methodology that supports both countervalue and counterforce targeting strategies. Critical infrastructure targeting directing directs the destruction or neutralization of selected adversary assets, military and military related activities, and may be broad or narrow in focus, and may include such as entire industries, resources, and institutions that contribute to the an adversary’s ability to wage war. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)</u></p>	<p>These changes:</p> <p>Accept intent of EUCOM critical comment regarding Countervalue Targeting.</p> <p>Recognizes that critical infrastructure targets may fit in either countervalue or counterforce strategies depending on what the intended effect is; e.g. taking out a power grid that principally supports a military base and town would be a critical infrastructure attack that directly affects the military forces, and would therefore be a critical infrastructure counterforce attack. In a similar vein, an attack on an electrical grid that removes power from a manufacturing or financial center with a relatively low military force structure would clearly be a critical infrastructure countervalue attack.</p> <p>Granted, the military base example above does not address a broad attack on all or most potential Critical Infrastructure targets, however, since we have apparently chosen to open the critical infrastructure targeting discussion, let’s acknowledge the</p>	<p><b>R – original JSDS AO recommendation.</b></p> <p><b>Rejected 23 Nov 04</b></p> <p><b>A – Need a JS Legal Review</b></p> <p><b>?? A or R?</b></p> <p>JSDS Comment: It is not a Blue A – so reject it.</p> <p>Only included here for documentation to accompany the Planner Review for how the comments were adjudicated.</p>

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								<p>difference between this sort of targeting and its relationship with the more traditional (and more broadly understood) counterforce / countervalue approaches.</p> <p>Some targeting is broad in nature and some is very focused – infrastructure targets fit in both traditional categories.</p>	
743.	32	USA	A	99.04		8	<p>Reword sentence</p> <p>“An action to hinder or deny <u>an</u> adversary...”</p>	Clarity	R – See USMC comment.
744.	68	J7	A	99.04		8	Delete this term and definition.	It is never used in the JP.	R – It connects to and supports understanding of other documents.
745.	39	USMC	S	99.04		8.11	<p>General comment.</p> <p>Changing the definition of “denial measure” will render it a non-NATO approved term. The ‘*’ will also need to be removed from the new JP 1-02 entry for this term if it is accepted.</p>	AAP-6 current version still has it as ‘enemy’ and changing renders it no longer a NATO agreed definition.	A
746.	69	J7	A	99.04		13	Delete this term and definition.	It is never used in the JP.	R – It connects to and supports understanding of other documents.
747.	70	J7	M	99.04		33	Change to read as follows: "hold at risk. The ability to threaten to attack <u>those assets that generates a desired effect or level of damage against that which</u> the adversary values.	Consistency with Chapter I, para 2b. The existing definition makes no sense.	M – see JSDS comments



ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							(Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)		
748.		USN	S	99.04		33.34	Delete: hold at risk. The ability to threaten to attack that generates a desired effect or level of damage against that which the adversary values.	Even after modification this definition is unhelpful. This definition adds nothing to dictionary definitions. Not necessary.	M – see JSDS comments
749.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	C	99.04		33.35	Change as follows:  <del>hold at risk. The ability to threaten to attack that generates a desired effect or level of damage against that which the adversary values. The ability to threaten an attack against those things an adversary values.</del> (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)	This change  Accepts the intent of EUCOM comment and the reality that while most of us in the military and nuclear deterrence world speak and understand " <b>hold at risk</b> " as different from the acts of " <b>blowing stuff up and killing people,</b> " the educational value to be gained by building and incorporating a useful definition of " <b>hold at risk</b> " should serve our broader purposes and further differentiate the " <b>deterrence by being able to reach out and smack a target</b> " from the perception of " <b>deterrence by actual use of the weapon by people who really want to use them.</b> "  It is not clear that a more precise definition of enemy vs adversary or level of damage is appropriate. Leaving this ambiguity in place should fill the requirements described above and compromise with the folks who think the previous definition is extraneous.	A
750.	111	EUCOM	C	99.04		33.35	Re: definition for "hold at risk."	The definition is at least intelligible as originally written	M – see JSDS

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<b>EUCOM NONCONCURS</b> with this definition and recommends its deletion.	but is unintelligible as revised. In either case, the phrase “hold at risk” is so common in politico-military discourse that a special attempt to define it seems counterproductive.	comments
751.	71	J7	A	99.04		37	Change to read as follows: "Least Separation Distance (LSD). The minimum distance that a desired ground zero must be separated from an object to ensure no more than a 10 percent incidence of damage or obstacles with 99 percent assurance. For more information see JP 3-12.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Nuclear Planning (S). (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)"	This term and definition should be included in JP 1-02. <b>Cross-references to JPs should not be included in definitions.</b>  <b>JSDS Comment: The only users who are going to care what the detailed definition is, (as given here) are likely to be the users of 3-12.1 or people who should be users of 3-12.1.</b>  <b>There should be no issue with giving a valid definition and directing the appropriately cleared practitioners to the best source of information.</b>	R – see JSDS comments.
752.		USN	A	99.04		37.39	Change as follows <b>and</b> clarify:  <del>L</del> east <del>S</del> eparation <del>D</del> istance ( <del>LSD</del> ). The minimum distance that a desired ground zero must be separated from an object to ensure no more than a 10 percent incidence of damage or obstacles with 99 percent assurance. <u>Also called LSD.</u>	Terms are generally lower case. Move acronym to end of definition as in JP 1-02. What is meant by incidence of obstacles?	M – see JSDS comments
753.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	99.04		37.40	Change as follows: " <del>Least Separation Distance (LSD)</del> <b>least separation distance.</b> <u>1. The minimum distance that a desired ground zero must be separated from an object to ensure no more than a 10 percent incidence of damage or obstacle generation with 99 percent assurance. 2. It is the sum of the radius of preclusion and the buffer distance.</u> For more information see JP 3-12.1, <i>Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Nuclear Planning (S)</i> , forthcoming. <u>Also called LSD.</u> (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed	These changes  Accept Navy and Marine Corps comments and acknowledges the correct status of JP 3-12.1  <b>J7 Comment: R - See #749 (J-7 #71) re JP 3-12.1</b>  <b>JSDS Comment: The only users who are going to care what the</b>	A

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 3-12.1.) "	<b>detailed definition is, (as given here) are likely to be the users of 3-12.1 or people who should be users of 3-12.1.</b>  <b>There should be no issue with giving a valid definition and directing the appropriately cleared practitioners to the best source of information.</b>	
754.	40	USMC	S	99.04		37.40	Change to read:  " <del>Least Separation Distance (LSD).</del> 1. The minimum distance that a desired ground zero must be separated from an object to ensure no more than a 10 percent incidence of damage or obstacles <u>generation</u> with 99 percent assurance. 2. <u>It is the sum of the radius of preclusion and the buffer distance. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 3-12.1.)</u> For more information see JP 3-12.1, <i>Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Nuclear Planning (S)</i> ."	JP 3-12.1 has only been through first draft and the previous JP 3-12.1 did not have this term and it has not yet been approved for inclusion in JP 1-02. Correct terminology per JP 1-01. Term is not capitalized.	M – see JSDS comments
755.		J-3	A	99.04		42	"Minimum Safe Distance. (MSD)"	Consistency with remainder of glossary	M – see JSDS comments
756.		DTRA	A	99.04		42	"Minimum Safe Distance. (MSD)"	Consistency with remainder of glossary	M – see JSDS comments
757.	72	J7	A	99.04		42	Change to read as follows: " Minimum Safe Distance. It is the distance from desired ground zero at which a specific degree of personnel risk and vulnerability will not exceeded with a 99 percent assurance. For more information see JP 3-12.1, <i>Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Nuclear Planning (S)</i> . (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)"	This term and definition should be included in JP 1-02. <b>Cross-references to JPs should not be included in definitions.</b>  <b>JSDS Comment: The only users who are going to care what the detailed definition is, (as given here) are likely to be the users of 3-12.1 or people who should be users of 3-12.1.</b>	R

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
								There should be no issue with giving a valid definition and directing the appropriately cleared practitioners to the best source of information.	
758.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	99.04		42.45	Change as follows:  <del>Minimum Safe Distance</del> <b>minimum safe distance (nuclear).</b> <u>1. It is the distance from a desired ground zero at which a specific degree of personnel risk and vulnerability will not be exceeded with a 99 percent assurance. 2. It is the sum of the radius of safety and the buffer distances. For more information see JP 3-12.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Nuclear Planning (S), forthcoming. Also called MSD. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 3-12.1.)</u>	These changes  Accepts TRANSCOM, Navy and Marine Corps comments and acknowledges the correct status of JP 3-12.1 <b>J7 comment: R - See #755 (J-7 #72) re JP 3-12.1</b> <b>JSDS Comment: The only users who are going to care what the detailed definition is, (as given here) are likely to be the users of 3-12.1 or people who should be users of 3-12.1.</b>  There should be no issue with giving a valid definition and directing the appropriately cleared practitioners to the best source of information.	A
759.	41	USMC	S	99.04		42.45	Change to read:  <del>Minimum Safe Distance (nuclear).</del> <b>Minimum Safe Distance (nuclear).</b> <u>1. It is the distance from a desired ground zero at which a specific degree of personnel risk and vulnerability will not be exceeded with a 99 percent assurance. 2. It is the sum of the radius of safety and the buffer distance. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 3-12.1.) For more information see JP 3-12.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Nuclear Planning (S).</u>	JP 3-12.1 has only been through first draft and the previous JP 3-12.1 did not have this term and it has not yet been approved for inclusion in JP 1-02. Correct terminology per JP 1-01. Term is not capitalized.	M – see JSDS comments
760.	7	USTC	A	99.04	11	43	...of personnel risk and vulnerability will not be exceeded	Grammatical –Tense of verb	M – see JSDS comments
761.		USN	A	99.04		44.43	Change as follows:	Terms are generally lower case.	M – see

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<del>Minimum Safe Distance. It is</del> The distance from desired ground zero at which a specific degree of personnel risk and vulnerability will not <u>be</u> exceeded with a 99 percent assurance.	"It is" is not necessary in a definition. Need a verb here.	JSDS comments
762.		USN	A	99.05		1.03	Change as follows:  multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle. A reentry vehicle carried by a delivery system that can place one or more reentry vehicles over each of several separate targets. <u>Also called MIRV.</u> (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02)	"Also called MIRV is not in JP 1-02.	M – see JSDS comments
763.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	99.05		1.3	Change as follows:  <b>multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle.</b> <del>A reentry vehicle carried by a delivery system that can place one or more reentry vehicles over each of several separate targets. Also called MIRV. (JP 1-02)</del> <u>A ballistic missile system having warheads aimed at independent targets that can be launched by a single booster rocket. Also called MIRV. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02)</u>	Accepts USN comment for change.  Applies a generic definition.  Since we are bounded by today's technology in doctrine, JSDS deleted the ambiguous term "delivery system" with the more specific "single booster rocket" – no other system exists to get the weapons exo-atmospheric and target them for reentry.	A
764.	73	J7	S	99.05		12	Insert the following definition:  “ <b>nuclear collateral damage.</b> Undesired damage or casualties produced by the effects from friendly nuclear weapons. (JP 1-02)”	Accepts J7 recommendation.  Ignores previous Navy rhetorical question on whether any collateral damage is ever <i>desired</i> .  Although I agree with Navy's view on this, the J7 recommendation is the definition from JP 1-02, so we're running with it.	A
765.	73	J7	S	99.05		12	Insert the following: “nuclear collateral damage. Undesired	This is a key term used in Chapter	M – see

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							damage or casualties produced by the effects from friendly nuclear weapons. (JP 1-02)”	II.	JSDS comments
766.	42	USMC	S	99.05		22.24	Change to read:  “ <b>nuclear strike warning.</b> A warning of impending friendly or suspected <del>enemy adversary</del> nuclear attack. <del>(Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02-)</del> ”	A global replacement of ‘enemy’ with ‘adversary’ is never accurate. In this particular case if you suspect someone of launching a nuclear strike on you, it is safe to call them an enemy vice an adversary. NATO approved definition.	A
767.		J-3	A	99.05		22.24	How is this term different than the doctrinal STRIKWARN?	Clarification	See USMC comment
768.		DTRA	A	99.05		22.24	How is this term different than the doctrinal STRIKWARN?	Clarification	See USMC comment
769.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	99.05		33.36	Change as follows:  <b>operationally deployed nuclear weapons.</b> Nuclear weapons that are on operational ballistic missiles, <del>or</del> bombers, <del>or</del> in bomber or DCA base weapon storage, or aboard ships. <del>Operationally deployed weapons are for immediate and unexpected threats.</del> (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)  <b>(Insert the following new paragraph in correct alphabetical location)</b>  <u>US Operationally Deployed Strategic Nuclear Warheads are defined as</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <u>Reentry vehicles on ICBMs in their launchers</u></li> <li>• <u>Reentry vehicles on SLBMs in their launchers onboard submarines</u></li> <li>• <u>Nuclear armaments loaded on heavy bombers or stored in weapons storage areas of heavy bomber bases</u></li> </ul> <u>Also called ODSNW. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)</u>	These changes  Accepts Navy change for operationally deployed definition, and ensures that the definition is broadened for theater nuclear forces.  Deleted sentence for their purpose – not needed.  Adds the legal definition for ODSNW as written in the Moscow Treaty.	A
770.		USN	S	99.05		33.36	Change as follows:		M – See

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							operationally deployed weapons. Nuclear weapons that are on operational ballistic missiles, <del>or</del> bombers, <del>or</del> in bomber base weapon storage, <u>or aboard ships</u> . Operationally deployed weapons are for immediate and unexpected threats. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)	Aircraft carriers are nuclear weapon capable also. Proposed definition is too restrictive.	JSDS comment
771.		USN	A	99.05		38	Change as follows: pre-launch survivability.	Hyphenate. Not in Webster's Unabridged  JSDS comment – hyphenated form mirrors JP 1-02 construction.	A
772.		USN	A	99.05		41.42	Change as follows:  probability to penetrate. <del>The d</del> Depth that projectile and/or missile fuzes may be expected to penetrate <del>as often as not</del> <u>50 percent of the time</u> .	Insert article. Let's use percentiles as in the other definitions such as "least separation distance" in this pub. As often as not is pretty casual.	R – definition deleted – see JSDS comment
773.	33	USA	A	99.05		41.43	Rethink/reword definition	Definition isn't clear	See JSDS comment
774.	112	EUCOM	S	99.05		41.46	Re: definitions for “probability to penetrate” and Probable error height of burst.” EUCOM recommends deletion of both definitions.	These phrases are tedious, ungrammatical when used in a sentence, and not terribly descriptive. If these concepts must be defined, then something like “mean penetration depth” or “mean probable height of burst” may function more successfully.	See JSDS comment
775.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	A	99.05		41.46	Delete as follows:  <del>probability to penetrate. Depth that projectile and/or missile fuzes may be expected to penetrate as often as not. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)</del>	Not appropriate for this pub.  As written, this definition doesn't dovetail well with accepted usage in the world of nuclear weapons.  A commonly accepted definition would not be usable due to classification concerns.  Concur with EUCOM deletion	A

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<del>probable error height of burst. Error in height of burst that projectile and/or missile fuzes may be expected to exceed as often as not. (JP 1-02)</del>	recommendation  Concur with EUCOM deletion recommendation	
776.		USN	S	99.05		45.46	Change as follows:  probable error height of burst. Error in height of burst that projectile and/or missile fuzes may be expected to exceed as often as not <u>50 percent of the time.</u> (JP 1-02)	Let's use percentiles as in the other definitions such as "least separation distance" in this pub. "as often as not" is pretty casual. Recommend revising JP 1-02 definition.	See JSDS comment
777.		USN	S	99.06		2.04	Change as follows:  proliferation (nuclear weapons). The process by which one nation after another comes into possession of, or into the right to determine the use of, nuclear weapons; <del>each nation and</del> becomes potentially able to launch a nuclear attack upon another nation. (JP 1-02)	Definition as written is confusing. Recommend revising JP 1-02 definition.	M – See JSDS comment
778.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	99.06		2.4	Change as follows:  <b>proliferation (nuclear weapons).</b> The process by which <u>nations that do not possess nuclear capabilities come into possession of, or into the right to determine the use of nuclear weapons.</u> <del>one nation after another comes into possession of, or into the right to determine the use of, nuclear weapons; each nation becomes potentially able to launch a nuclear attack upon another nation. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be revised in JP 1-02.)</del>	This change  Uses simpler language  Recognizes that having "the right to determine the use of nuclear weapons" includes the potentiality to attack another nation...	A
779.	3	SOCOM	M	99.06		9	Add the following:  <b><u>“special operations liaison element.</u></b> <u>A special operations liaison team provided by the joint forces special operations component commander to the joint force air component commander (if designated), or appropriate Service component</u>	Completeness. The reference to the “special operations liaison element,” Chapter III-7, lines 6-7, requires inclusion of this term in the glossary	A



ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	LINE	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (A/R/M)
							<u>air command and control organization, to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate special operations air, surface, and subsurface operations with conventional air operations. Also called SOLE. (JP 1-02).”</u>		
780.		JSDS – J5 Nuc	S	99.06		10.14	Delete the following paragraph  <del><b>strategic nuclear forces.</b> Those nuclear capable forces with a capability to employ nuclear weapons by land, sea, or air forces against opposing forces, supporting installations, or facilities. Such forces may be employed, when authorized by competent authority, to support operations that establish national and multinational military objectives. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)</del>	With the definition of deployed nuclear weapons and ODSNW included this becomes an extraneous definition.	A
781.		USN	S	99.06		10.14	Change as follows:  <del><b>strategic nuclear forces.</b> Those nuclear-capable forces with a capability to employ nuclear weapons by land, sea, or air forces against opposing forces, supporting installations, or facilities. Such forces may be employed, when authorized by competent authority, to support operations that establish national and multinational military objectives. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)</del>	Not necessary. This sentence is not part of a definition.	R – definition deleted
782.	20	USPACO M	A	99.06		17	Change “non-nuclear” to read, “nonnuclear”	Word misspelled. Dictionary shows as one word like almost all “non” words.	A