Google Opening Statement

September 12, 2023

United States, et al. v. Google LLC State of Colorado, et al. v. Google LLC

Case Nos. 1:20-cv-03010 (APM) & 1:20-cv-03715 (APM)

DOJ Press Release



"Today, millions of Americans rely on the Internet and online platforms for their daily lives.

Competition in this industry is vitally important, which is why today's challenge against Google

— the gatekeeper of the Internet — for violating antitrust laws is a monumental case both for the Department of Justice and for the American people," said Attorney General William Barr.

As alleged in the Complaint, Google has entered into a series of exclusionary agreements that collectively lock up the primary avenues through which users access search engines, and thus the internet, by requiring that Google be set as the preset default general search engine on billions of mobile devices and computers worldwide and, in many cases, prohibiting preinstallation of a competitor. In particular, the Complaint alleges that Google has unlawfully

DOJ Press Release



like Standard Oil and the AT&T telephone monopoly. Decades ago the Department's case against Microsoft recognized that the antitrust laws forbid anticompetitive agreements by high-technology monopolists to require preinstalled default status, to shut off distribution channels to rivals, and to make software undeletable. The Complaint alleges that Google is using similar

Colorado Attorney General Press Release



Colorado Attorney General Phil Weiser leads multistate lawsuit seeking to end Google's illegal monopoly in search market

Bipartisan coalition of 38 Attorneys General allege Google illegally maintained a monopoly, created insurmountable barriers to entry for competitors

Dec. 17, 2020 (DENVER, Colo.) — Colorado Attorney General Phil Weiser led a bipartisan coalition of 38 attorneys general in filing a Lawsuit today against Google LLC for anticompetitive conduct in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

The states allege that Google illegally maintains its monopoly power over general search engines and related general search advertising markets through a series of anticompetitive contracts and conduct. As a result, Google is butring both consumers and advertisers. Consumers are denied the benefits of competition, including the possibility of higher quality services and better privacy protections. Advertisers are harmed through lower quality and higher prices that are, in turn, passed along to consumers.

"Our economy is more concentrated than ever, and consumers are squeezed when they are $\,$

As alleged in the complaint, Google is employing the same exclusionary contracting tactics to extend its search-related monopolies into the emerging ways consumers access general search engines, such as through their home smart speakers, televisions, or their cars.

Finally, Google hinders consumers' ability to access information provided by specialized vertical providers in certain lucrative commercial segments—such as travel, home

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To further entrench its monopoly position, Google uses its Search Advertising 360 (SA360) advertising tool to deny interoperability with competing search engine advertising features,

Legal Standard

TT Dance

Possession of monopoly power in a relevant market

T

Exclusionary conduct that has anticompetitive effects in the relevant market

Has the conduct harmed the competitive process and consumers?

Is the conduct "competition on the merits" and does it provide procompetitive benefits?

Has the conduct resulted in "a significant degree of foreclosure"?

Plaintiffs Must Show That "Each Type of Alleged Exclusionary Practice Has the Requisite Anticompetitive Effect"

- Browser Default Search Engine Agreements
- Android Mobile Device Agreements
- SA360 Integration of Bing Ads Functionality

Browser Default Search Agreements Promote Search Competition

Setting Defaults Is Long-Standing Practice

All Browsers Set a Default Search Engine Including Rivals Like Microsoft, DuckDuckGo and Brave


Rival Search Engines Have Competed for Defaults for Decades

- Defaults offer valuable promotional opportunities for search engines to integrate services with reputable partners
- Provides users with easy and quick access to search resulting in increased search volumes
- Browser monetization opportunities enhance browser innovations that result in higher search usage

Browser Developer Witnesses







Apple's Safari Agreement with Google



Apple controls the design of the Safari browser

 Apple evaluates competing search engines and decides what it believes is best for its users

Apple promotes a variety of non-default search providers

Has agreements to promote rival search providers on Safari

Apple designed Safari to make switching defaults easy


Rival search provider agreements require as much

App store makes it easy to access apps directly

Important feature of Apple's ecosystem design and user experience

Safari's Integrated Search Functionality






DX0267 (Jan. 2003 Apple Press Release)

Safari's Integrated Search Functionality






DX0270 (Jan. 2007 Apple Press Release)

Changing the Default in Apple's Safari Browser















Firefox's Integrated Search Functionality





Mozilla Foundation releases the highly anticipated Mozilla Firefox 1.0 web browser

November 9, 2004

 Faster, Easier, More Accessible Search – Firefox tightly integrates support for leading search services into the toolbar, including Google search, Yahoo!, eBay, Amazon, Dictionary.com, Creative Commons, and more. The new Firefox Start Page also provides access to Firefox information, resources and application

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Mozilla's Agreement with Google



Mozilla controls the design of its Firefox browser

 Mozilla evaluates different search engines and determines which one meets its needs

Mozilla promotes a variety of general and specialized search providers

- Simple process to change Firefox default from Google to rivals
- Prominent placement of other search providers, including bookmarks and other drop-down menu promotions

The Default in Mozilla's Firefox Browser





Mitchell Baker

moz://a

"The concept of a default search has always been there and from when we made a consumer product, so Firefox 1.0, the prevalent or the existence of multiple search engines in the product has always been there."

Baker (Mozilla) Tr. 48:10-14

The Default in Mozilla's Firefox Browser





Mitchell Baker


moz://a

"We're very big on choice, and so it's always been a key principle of our search philosophy that users always have choice, and we try to make it easy for people to pick a different search engine if they want it."

Baker (Mozilla) Tr. 47:12-16

Mozilla's Promotion of Rivals in Firefox







The Android Agreements Promote Competition in Search and Do Not Substantially Foreclose Rivals

Google's Android Agreements



Mobile Application Distribution Agreement ("MADA")

Mobile Application Distribution Agreement ("MADA")

- Optional no requirement for OEM to execute MADA to obtain Android operating system
- License to suite of core apps royalty free
- OEMs can chose whether or not to preload suite of apps on device-by-device basis
- No exclusivity requirement OEMs can preload apps that compete with Google apps
- Minimal placement requirements on default home screen

Minimal Preload and Placement Requirements / No Exclusivity




Samsung Galaxy A51

MADA vs. iOS: Out-of-Box Functionality

android 📥










Google's Android Agreements




Revenue Share Agreements ("RSAs")



Android and iOS Competition

Smartphone Shipments by Launch Price, 2016 – 2021 (U.S.)




Murphy Opening Report Figure 24


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Android Users Can Easily Access Other Search Engines

Downloading an Alternative Search Engine on Android








Android Users Can Easily Access Other Search Engines


Removing Google Search Widget on Android







Users Ubiquitously Download Apps That They Demand



In the U.S., <u>12.2 billion</u> total app downloads in 2021 Top 10 apps were each downloaded <u>45 million</u> times or more

 $https://www.businessofapps.com/data/us-app-market/; \ https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnkoetsier/2021/12/27/top-10-most-downloaded-apps-and-games-of-2021-tiktok-telegram-big-winners/?sh=72093a9e3a1f$

OEM and Carrier Witnesses











The Android Agreements Do Not Foreclose a Substantial Share of the Alleged Market

"[T]he likely competitive effects of Google's behavior locking up search access points through the challenged agreements is ideally examined relative to a 'but-for' world."

Whinston Rebuttal Report ¶ 326

Android Agreements Affect Small Share of Queries

- Plaintiffs' estimated shift with mandatory choice screen: ~1%
- Plaintiffs' estimated shift with rivals as default: 11.6 13.5%

Defaults Do Not Foreclose Consumers from Accessing Products









Google's Rivals Do Not Lack "Scale" To Compete with Google

In 2009, Microsoft Claimed To Have Acquired the Scale To Compete Through Yahoo! Agreement




DX0271 (July 2009 Microsoft Press Release)


In 2023, Microsoft Claimed To Achieve "the Largest Jump in Relevance" – NOT Through Scale



Microsoft Claimed To Be "Reinventing Search"




Quality Gap Is Not Due to Scale



Fox Opening Report at 7, 61


Google

Search Quality Witnesses












Examples of Google Search Innovations




Plaintiffs' Alleged Relevant Markets


Where Users Search for Information Online: Examples



Plaintiffs' Alleged Market: General Search Engines



Verticals Present Significant Competition




Sales & Deals

Sort by | Best Match

Verticals Present Significant Competition


Looking for a Hotel





Verticals Present Significant Competition

Looking for Food Delivery Nearby









Digital Advertising

Examples of Digital Advertising Providers




Google

Plaintiffs' Alleged Market: General Search Text Advertising




U.S. Digital and Search Advertising Spend, 2008-2021



Israel Opening Report Figure 9

56


Shares of U.S. Digital Advertising Revenue, 2008-2021



Israel Opening Report Figure 16

Google

Examples of Advertisers' Digital Options



Search Advertising Witnesses














Google's SA360 Search Engine Management Tool



No Evidence SA360 Conduct Harmed Competition

- No legal duty to deal with rival on its preferred terms
- SEM tools are a small channel for ad buying
- Advertisers can use Microsoft's native tools or other SEM tools to access the disputed features
- Google has implemented 4 of 5 disputed features
- The fifth feature is being tested with advertisers
- Microsoft decided not to buy or develop its own SEM tool
- No competent evidence of any lost advertising spend due to alleged delay in implementation

Colorado Plaintiffs' Expert – Professor Baker

- No opinion that SA360 has market power in any market
- No analysis of what percentage of advertisers only use SA360 to buy search ads
- No analysis of cost of switching from SA360 to Bing Ads native tools
- No independent analysis of whether Bing Ads lost ad spend due to delayed feature implementation on SA360
- No opinion that Google's SA360 conduct has impacted ad auction pricing or overall search advertising output