productive nomos: The conception of reason that describes it as the producer or regulator of the universe

scene of regulation: The account of how reason performs its sovereign role as a regulating power

scene of representation: The account of how reason performs its sovereign role as a productive power

science (the field): The region of modern knowledge that posits space as the privileged ontoepistemological dimension, that is, as in disciplines such as classical physics and chemistry

stage of exteriority: The mode through which scientific knowledge describes the setting of natural phenomena

stage of interiority: The setting in which philosophy (as well as history and other humanities disciplines) places human phenomena

strategy of engulfment: The scientific concepts that explain other human conditions as variations of those found in post-Enlightenment Europe

strategy of intervention: The methods, techniques, and procedures of the sciences of man and society, highlighting how they apprehend other modes of human existence as variations of post-Enlightenment conditions

strategy of particularization: The categories of human beings deployed by the sciences of man and society

transcendental poesis: Hegel's rewriting of reason as a transcendental force

transparency thesis: The ontoepistemological assumption governing post-Enlightenment thought

transparent "I": Man, the subject, the ontological figure consolidated in post-Enlightenment European thought

universal nomos: The first, nineteenth-century, physics conception of reason as the exterior regulator of the universe

universal poesis: The formulation of reason as the sovereign interior producer of the universe

Introduction: A Death Foretold

Not only can man's being not be understood without madness, it would not be man's being if it did not bear madness within itself as the limit of his freedom.

—JACQUES LACAN, ÉCRITS

What does Nietzsche's madman already know when he yells, "I seek God"? What does he mean when he says that the "murder" of God unleashed a history "higher than all history hitherto?" Why does he ask, "Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing?" and "Is not night continually closing in on us?"? What he knows—and what his listeners do not care to hear—is this: that the great accomplishment, the culmination of the victorious trajectory of reason that instituted man, the Subject, also foreshadowed his eventual demise. He knows that the philosophical conversation that instituted Man at the center of modern representation also released powerful weapons that threatened his most precious attribute. Why? Because that which falls prey to Reason by becoming its object has no place in the realm of Freedom.

While Nietzsche's madman recognizes that the arsenal that manufactured the transparent "I" threatened his freedom, he seems to ignore that reason, the powerful force that signaled that man had gone beyond the horizon of his finite existence, produces more than a limited human being. For this productive "Will to Truth" authorizes
the "creation" of various and diverse kinds of human beings, as it has instituted subjects that stood differentially before universality when it deployed the powerful weapon, the concept of the racial, which manufactured both man and his "others" as subjects that gaze on the horizon of their finite existence. Many contemporary critics of modern thought, like the madman, show a limited engagement with modern thought when ignoring the role the racial has played in manufacturing man. From the other side of the critical terrain, contemporary race theorists also provide a partial critique when inquiring into how the productive narratives of science and history have consistently contained the others of Europe outside the trajectory of the subject that emerged in post-Enlightenment Europe. None, I think, engage the task at hand, which is to consider how both productive narratives—History and Science—of modern representation have worked together to institute the place of the subject. Put differently, in neither stream does the analysis of the racial guide a critique of the whole field of modern representation.

Why undertake such an insane task? the reader may ask. Why return to old moral and intellectual anxieties? My answer is simple: I find no moral or intellectual ease in quick dismissals of the raced as a scientific concept. I am convinced that the most crucial challenge for critics of modern thought requires displacing history's privileged ontological standing by engaging with science as the proper domain for the production of the truth of man. What is required, I think, is a radical gesture that clears up a critical position by displacing transparency, the attribute man has enjoyed since his institution as the sole self-determined being; consequently, it also requires creating a critical arsenal that identifies science and history as moments in the production of man without rehearsing either the logic of discovery or the thesis of transparency.

What the reader will find in the following pages is my attempt to meet this challenge, that is, a critique of modern representation guided by the desire to comprehend the role the racial plays in modern thought. I trace various philosophical, scientific, and national statements to identify the signifying strategies that have produced both man and his others. In other words, I provide a mapping of the analytics of raciosity: a description of its context of emergence, its conditions of production, and the effects of signification of the conceptual arsenal generated in scientific projects that sought to discover the truth of man. In tracing the analytics of raciosity, I identify the productivity of the racial and how it is tied to the emergence of an ontological context—globality—that fuses particular bodily traits, social configurations, and global regions, in which human difference is reproduced as irreducible and unsublatable. With this, I challenge the ontological privilege accorded to historicity and offer an account of modern representation that refocuses the subject as homo modernus. That is, I demonstrate how the productive weapons of reason, the tools of science and history, institute both man and his others as global-historical beings.

Initially, I began this project because of my dissatisfaction with the way the sociology of race relations "explains" racial subjection. The matter became all the more urgent to me when I realized how the sociological account of racial subjection continues to govern the contemporary global configuration: cultural difference, the mode of productive narratives—History and Science—of modern representation that the markers of the death of man—the proliferating subaltern (racial, ethnic, postcolonial) ontologies and epistemologies—indicate how the powers of the subject remain with us, that the strategies of the modern Will to Truth, the tools of science and history, remain the productive weapons of global subjection.

THE BURIAL GROUNDS

St. Anselm's "ontological argument" goes more or less like this: if a supreme, infinite and eternal, perfect being can be conceived, and if God is an infinitely and eternally perfect being, God must exist. Even before the first signs of its demise, however, the subject—the self-determined being that would finally occupy the seat of "perfection" at the close of the eighteenth century—could never be described in the same way. Although self-evidence would become man's exclusive attribute, neither infinity nor eternity could be ascribed
to him precisely because he is thoroughly a worldly, global, finite being. And yet, when the rumors of his death began to be heard, many seemed taken by surprise, as if they had forgotten their inheritance. Following the demise of the divine author and ruler in late eighteenth-century Europe, as the madman laments, should we not expect that a lesser entity would eventually share in the same fate? For one thing, the philosophical statements that transformed reason from an exclusive attribute of the mind into the sovereign ruler of science and history—the sole determinant of truth and freedom—situated this process entirely within the spatial and temporal borders of post-Enlightenment Europe. Furthermore, although it has been said that the process that found completion with the realization of man's transcendental “essence” has always already comprehended other modes and moments of being human, never and nowhere, the apostles of reason proclaimed, has a figure akin to man ever existed. Hence, if the Subject, the thing that actualizes reason and freedom, had been born somewhere in time, would it not also eventually die?

What was probably less self-evident, perhaps, was that the subject’s passing would not result in its complete annihilation. I am not referring here to how the former private holdings of the subject, Truth and Being, were being invaded by its others, because it was precisely their “fragmentation” that led many observers to announce his death. What has yet to be acknowledged, however, is how this invasion belies the productive powers of the very tools that carved and instituted the place of the subject. To wit: “learning” about his passing in college in the 1980s, I was annoyed by the nostalgic accounts of that unseemly and untimely death. The metanarratives of the subject seemed too far removed from what was at stake in my corner of the globe. Freedom and reason had an immediate significance that seemed lost in most accounts of his passing. I could not quite comprehend the relevance of this loss for those of us engaged in the struggle to overthrow a nineteen-year-old military dictatorship in Brazil. I was young then. Also young were the transformations accompanying the announcement of the subject’s death. And what we did not immediately realize was how this Brazilian moment was part of an event unfolding in so many elsewheres. Lyotard’s (1984) crisis of the metanarratives of Western culture and Vattimo’s (1992) announcement of the “end of modernity” were playing out everywhere: black activists in Rio, along with graffiti artists in New York, First Nation leaders in Vancouver, and people of color elsewhere had somehow changed knowledge in its production and circulation; black feminist writings in the United States were advancing new statements of “truth” and “being,” challenging scientific and literary canons while defending the validity of their local narratives (Carby 1887; Collins 1989; Wall 1991); hip-hop artists, rappers, and break dancers, in addition, had surely participated in bringing about the loss of culture’s “integrative” role; in “looking to getting paid” (Kelley 1997), they commodified culture, helping to rewrite the logic of capitalism (Jameson 1991) and the grounds for knowledge (Lyotard 1984). We had something to do with the crisis of science; we, the others of man, were upsetting history: our words and deeds unleashed the predicament of the “modern order.”

In seeking to comprehend this Global event, however, writers of postmodernity and globalization could only announce the death of the subject. Not surprisingly, social analysts described these circumstances as the onset of a new site of political struggle—the politics of representation, that is, the struggle for the recognition of cultural difference—that registered the demise of the metanarratives of reason and history that compose modern representation. Looking back, it seems a matter of course that, in reading this event as a proliferation of smaller “reasons” and “histories,” social analysts would describe it in terms of the ascension of culture. After all, culture was the one thing they had ascribed to these suddenly speaking others, the peoples formerly described as lacking reason and placed outside history. Expectedly, anthropologists, the manufacturers of culture as a scientific concept, were the first to respond, recognizing the threat to their craft. Some welcomed the crisis as a relief, providing them with an opportunity to rewrite the discipline’s project (Marcus and Fisher 1986). Finally, the anthropologist could share her burden with her object: the “natives” of today could and should represent themselves, we were told, and she could finally (critically) inhabit her own position of privilege (Clifford 1988).

The problem, however, was that this epistemological emancipation seemed out of sync with the concept’s ontological inheritance. As Lisa Lowe (1996) notes, culture has “become the medium of the present [and] the site that mediates the past, through which history is grasped as difference, as fragments, shocks, and flashes of disjunction” (6,
Nevertheless, the speech of the other could never be a thoroughly historical "voicing," because cultural difference is also a product of the scientific tools of reason. Hence, a truly emancipatory recrafting of the cultural also requires a critical engagement with how scientific universality institutes spaces of history, a radical move that few seem willing to make. Michael Taussig (1987) captures this necessity when he argues, "With European conquest and colonization, these spaces of death [symbolic spaces instituted by terror and torture] blend into a common pool of key signifiers biding the transforming culture of the conqueror with that of the conquered” (5). Postmodern anthropologists have succeeded in rewriting culture out of fixity, boundedness, and "ethnographic authority," a move that places the objects of anthropological desire in the comfortable ontological niche historicity rules, but one that can be celebrated only if one forgets the discipline's complicity, how its tools (concepts, theories, and methods) participated in the production of these "spaces of death."

For most sociologists, on the other hand, the passing of the subject threatened a terrifying ontoepistemological crisis. But, unlike many of their anthropological cousins, most sociologists decided to hold onto the bars of their disciplinary cage, rejecting postmodern descriptions of the demise of the "modern (social or moral) order," that is, the universal-historical order. Not surprisingly, epistemology and ontology would follow more familiar paths, for the divide here is between competing accounts of the emerging social or moral order, a global order—accounts that produce the world as a small community or a fragmented moral whole. Regardless of the positions taken, however, writers of globalization, global culture, and consumerism would describe a process that echoes Durkheim’s account of the emergence of "modern civilization," one tied to the spread of mass media, expanded means of transportation, and growing consumption (Featherstone 1990, 1991). Unlike anthropologists who engaged in a battle to redefine the discipline’s project, then, most sociologists held fast to their disciplinary grounds, revisiting debates that seem to belong to a past long gone.

Many of my undergraduate students, some actively involved in the struggle for global justice, stare blankly at my mention of the death of the subject. "The death of whom?" they ask, demanding clarification. After my initial surprise, I usually find myself trying to explain why the political significance of his death derives precisely from the ontoepistemological irrelevance of his death: the subject may be dead, I tell them, but his ghost—the tools and the raw material used in his assemblage—remain with us.

AN UNHOLY GHOST

Each time I attempt to explain to my students how the productive narratives of the subject render his death irrelevant, I become more convinced that the power of cultural difference lies in its reconfiguration of the racial and the nation, concepts that instituted the political subjects described in accounts of postmodernity and globalization.

After all, their generation witnessed a return to political economy unleashed by mobilizations against the neoliberal reorganization of the global economy coincident with the institutionalization of postmodern and global accounts of cultural change, as reflected in recent international governmental and nongovernmental organizations' stipulations that multiculturalism and diversity should now constitute the new standard for social justice. What one finds in this new global juridical-moral agenda that gives women’s rights and cultural rights the same ethical weight attributed to the original declarations of human rights are not only outlines for government initiatives, such as affirmative action and diversity policies. It also defines an ethical mandate that legal and social reforms be informed by multiculturalism, that is, that public policy include racial and ethnic minorities, not merely juridically and economically, but also as bearers of cultural difference.

What is it that connects those “small [historical] narratives” that now crowd the symbolic postmodern saloon, those whose noisy emergence both announced the fall of the nation and re instituted it as a political force, if not the laborers that sustain the global economy and those whose traditions are now the new target of global crusaders fighting in the name of freedom and human rights? What is it that links maquiladora workers in Tijuana; undocumented immigrants and refugees from Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East who hang under the high-speed trains that cross Europe; their Mexican counterparts who sneak under barbed wire fences and dodge bullets along the border of the southwest United States; villagers starving in refugee camps in Sudan and Angola; the Palestinian mother mourning the death of another son; black
and brown teenagers killed by police officers in Los Angeles, Rio de Janeiro, and Caracas? In exasperation, I ask myself, Why is it not self-evident that, despite the pervasiveness of cultural difference, the racial and the nation still govern the global present precisely because of the way each refers to the ontological descriptors—universality and historicity—resolved in the figure of the Subject?9

I contend that we fail to understand how the racial governs the contemporary global configuration because the leading account of racial subjection—the sociohistorical logic of exclusion—reproduces the powers of the subject by rewriting racial difference as a signifier of cultural difference, an argument I will return to and elaborate in chapter 7. What characterizes this construct is the fact that it presupposes what Foucault (1980) terms the juridical-political conception of power, informing both liberalism and historical materialism, which, I argue, entails a view of subjection (domination or oppression) as exclusion from universality resulting from unbecoming sociohistorical (cultural or historical) strategies motivated by physical (sexual or racial) traits. As a consequence, the racial subaltern is always already inscribed as a historical subject who finally comes into representation as a 'transparent I' when articulating an emancipatory project. In this way, this formulation rehearses transparency, the modern ontological presupposition, when deploying universality and historicity as the privileged modern ontological descriptors: it suggests that racial emancipation comes about when the (juridical and economic) inclusion of the racial others and their voices (historical and cultural representations) finally realizes universality in postmodern social configurations.

My task in what follows is to demonstrate how this account deploys the authorized modern ontological descriptors—that is, as exclusion from universality and historicity—to construct the racial as an improper aid to otherwise appropriate strategies of power. I also seek to demonstrate how its “explanation” of social subjection merely describes how the racial, along with other social-historical categories, produces exclusion without really explaining how or why it does so. In what follows, I describe this tendency shared by feminist and critical race studies scholarship that has its origin in their reliance on the sociohistorical logic of exclusion and its account of social subjection.
re-organize or redistribute resources along particular racial lines" (56). That is, racial projects are competing ideologies deployed in the political arena; they also provide the basis for common-sense "racial identification," and explanations for differential positionings in the U.S. social structure.

Though Omi and Winant's historical-materialist rewriting of race as a sociohistorical concept postpones the descriptive manner in which the term is used in the United States, the privileged ontological status attributed to historicity poses a problem: if every historical (cultural or ideological) principle always interprets something structural, what would a racial project's structural, material referent be? After all, Omi and Winant are not merely stating that race exists solely in the minds of badly educated individuals who misrepresent racial differences or that it is the product of zealous, profit-hungry capitalists. For them, race is a principle of social configuration, a social signifier, a symbolic construct that identifies certain social conditions as "racial formations." My point is this: if racial difference precedes race, the sociohistorical concept, either it is an empirical referent (as construed by quantitative analysts) or it is tied to another referent. Even as they attempt to avoid it, Omi and Winant construct racial difference as a substantive bodily trait, an empirical (as opposed to material) referent of social signification. Thus, in repeating the ethically correct gesture, that is, in denying race any biological (scientific) soundness, they fail to demonstrate why racial difference, which is already an appropriation of the human body in scientific signification, should constitute a central dimension of social representation.

When incorporated into historical analysis, then, racial difference—otherwise conceived of as ("empty") irrelevant bodily difference—becomes a phenomenon: the empirical referent of social scientific signification. And when framed this way, the critical social analyst, suspicious of empiricism as he or she is, has no other choice than to write the racial as an unbecoming symbolic aid to what are otherwise properly modern (sociohistorical) mechanisms of exclusion from economic and juridical universality. This is evident in Hall's ([1980] 1996) description of race as a qualifier of class: "Race," he argues, "enters into the way black labor, male and female, is distributed as economic agents at the level of economic practices, and the class struggles which result from it; and into the way the fractions of the black laboring classes are reconstituted, through the means of political representation...as political forces in the 'theater of politics'...and the political struggles which result; and the manner in which class is articulated as the collective and individual 'subjects' of emerging ideologies...and the struggles over ideology, culture, and consciousness which result" (55). That is, while no more guilty than other historical theoretical perspectives, historical materialism resists any account of the racial as an inherently modern (post-Enlightenment) strategy of power. The bounds of historicity are similarly evident in Balibar's genealogy of racism, which reduces it to an element of nationalism and class. The author argues that the idea of race, initially a signifier of caste that circulated among the European aristocracy, now circulates among the working classes, where racism "tends to produce...the equivalent of a caste closure at least for one part of the working class," providing the "maximum possible closure where social mobility is concerned" (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, 212). Thoroughly capitalist, from the nineteenth century on, racism would be added to other symbolic mechanisms of class exploitation as an excessive ideological device the dominant class imposed upon the exploited.

What troubles the account of racial subjection informing the CRES project is that its analysis of the racial in post-Enlightenment social configurations simultaneously embraces the post-Second World War moral command to erase it from the modern political lexicon. Because the sociohistorical logic of exclusion assumes that racial difference and the exclusionary symbolic (cultural or ideological) strategies it entails are extraneous to the modern ethical landscape, it can write the racial only as an unbecoming aid to (economic) class subjection. In saying this, it may seem that I have already thrown out the proverbial baby because, rather than joining those who excavate contemporary social configurations to collect specimens of racism, I have decided to engage precisely this "false" (ideological or cultural) construct, racial difference, that critical social analysts disavow by placing scare quotes around the term race. I could justify this choice by listing CRES statements, by unpacking arguments, to demonstrate how they repeatedly deploy the underlying account of racial subjection described here. But instead, rather than engage in such a superficial exercise, I seek to demonstrate how this investment in exclusion limits our understanding of how
the racial works along with gender, that other crucial critical device also haunted by bodily difference. As I will argue, this follows from feminist scholarship's own investment in the sociohistorical logic of exclusion.

**An Odd Coupling: Race and Gender**

Feminist scholars have been struggling to develop adequate accounts for how race and gender work together to institute subaltern social subjects. I suspect that part of this difficulty lies in the fact that gender addresses exclusion (from juridical universality) more comfortably than the racial, precisely because of how female subjection is articulated in the founding statements of modern thought: while the female's role in (physical) reproduction would seem to immediately explain her incarceration in domesticity, gender subjection rests on the liberal rewriting of patriarchy as a juridical-moral moment ruled by "natural (divine) law," a political domain subordinated to the "laws of society." From Locke's formulation of the "political society" to Hegel's account of "civil law," patriarchy as a mode of power circumscribes the domestic sphere, where females are locked away, yet within the political body created by the rational political subject, the male owner of property, ruler of the household, and citizen (Pateman 1988). In so articulating the female role, these founding statements postulate female subjection according to (divine) conceptions of the natural and the universal. This notion was subsequently displaced by nineteenth-century articulations of "laws of nature" when reason was consolidated as the privileged ground for modern ontoepistemological accounts. Hence, although the female body would also come under the scrutiny of scientific tools in the nineteenth century, biological difference would remain a secondary basis for gender subjection, that is, though grounded on "naturalization," gender subjection, unlike racial subjection, does not presuppose a scientific account of bodily difference.

For this reason, feminist scholars in the 1960s and 1970s could assume (with moral ease) that sexual difference served as the self-evident universal (empirical) basis for female subjection. However, during the 1980s, at the height of the politics of representation, when feminist scholars deployed "experience" and "difference" to rewrite gender as a sociohistorical category—thereby retrieving it from the dangerously "naturalizing" waters of sexual difference—they project was immediately unsettled by denunciations of gender's own universalizing tendency. Western and non-Western feminists of color refused the absorption of their difference into a universal female experience, insisting that race, class, and culture also be recognized as axes of subjection, a move nicely captured by one of the keenest critics of Anglo-feminism, Chandra Mohanty (1991b), who proclaimed: "I want to recognize and analytically explore the links among the histories and struggles of third world women against racism, sexism, colonialism, imperialism, and monopoly capital. What I am suggesting, then, is an 'imagined community' of third world oppositional struggles... with divergent histories and social locations, woven together by the political threads of opposition to forms of domination that are not only pervasive but also systemic." While relatively brief, then, the trajectory of theorizing gender has covered considerable ground, from the divine and natural category of "woman," which produces the excluded female global subject via naturalization, to the analytic conception of gender, where sociohistorical constructions of difference and experience delimit female exclusion and seek to include female trajectories determined by other exclusionary mechanisms. It has also witnessed a productive debate about the representation of the gendered subaltern subject.

What has yet to be acknowledged, I think, is the troublesome coupling of gender and race, how these principles of social exclusion form a strangely compatible pair: both identify sociohistorical processes, both refer to supplemental cultural or ideological mechanisms that subordinate women and people of color, and each captures a particular way in which women of color experience that subordination. Nevertheless, this match made in patriarchal hell, I argue, has hindered the theoretical labor necessary to capture how they produce the female of color as a subaltern subject.

During the past twenty years or so, a large library has been built by scholars using difference and experience to address the combined effects of race and gender. Few dare to deploy one without gesturing toward the other, for it has become conventional wisdom that neither can adequately capture all dimensions of a subject's sociohistorical trajectory. Even fewer scholars go beyond the assertion that these categories operate as exclusionary principles—that is, most analyses can be catalogued in terms of analyzing the effects of gender on race or of race on gender—for the social trajectories of women of color.
That is, when coupled with gender, race produces additional gender exclusion and, when coupled with race, gender produces additional racial exclusion, and so on.20

What I am suggesting is that precisely this sociohistorical logic of exclusion that makes the racial and gender such a suitable pair also hinders our understanding of how gender and race work together to institute a particular kind of subaltern subject. As Joan Scott (1991) argues, the conception of historicity has informed writings of the experience of women, blacks, and homosexuals limits our understanding of the trajectories of these subaltern collectivities. Because most analyses that privilege experience and difference fail to address discursive power, she contends, they reproduce the very logic that instituted the authority of the subject, the epistemological figure against which they write the other in history. Noting that this derives from the separation between language and experience, which leads to the naturalization of the former, she advocates a strategy of historical interpretation that “historicizes the terms by which experience is represented, and so historicizes 'experience' itself” (795). Put differently, the subject’s transcendental mantra and the subalterns’ immanent (naturalized) experience are made of the same “essentialist” threat, for prevailing critical strategies produce the latter as a specimen of the “individual,” the liberal-historical being.

Beyond the theoretical quandary the racial creates for contemporary critical analyses drawing from historical materialism—the labor of slaves and indentured workers, for instance, has been considered productive and yet never fully integrated into the historical-materialist arsenal—the most troubling aspect of examinations of the intersection of race, class, and gender is that they deploy these categories as descriptive devices. For this reason, rather than attempting to avoid the accusation of ignoring gender and class by recounting the ways each furthers racial exclusion, I have decided to follow Scott’s suggestion. In doing so, however, I will not revisit history to indicate how, in various sociohistorical moments, alone and in combination with class and gender, the racial brings about exclusion from universality. Rather, I seek to engage in the kind of analytical groundwork necessary for a critical account that moves beyond listing how each excludes and, instead, examine how the racial combines with other social categories (gender, class, sexuality, culture, etc.) to produce modern subjects who can be excluded from (juridical) universality without unleashing an ethical crisis. Because a guiding question here is why, despite its moral ban, the racial still constitutes a prolific strategy of power, it is also necessary to chart the symbolic terrain the racial shares with the other tools the narratives of history and science have deployed to carve the place of the subject.

THE SYMBOLIC TRINITY

Which of the two meanings of culture should one employ when analyzing collective practices and products? Should it be the normative meaning, the one that refers to standards and values, products and practices (classical music, the opera, etc.) that distinguish modern culture? Or should it be the descriptive meaning, the one that refers to particularity, which writes a collectivity as a unified (geohistorical) consciousness? Following Bourdieu’s (1984) lead, I argue that one can understand the meaning of culture, in either sense, only by engaging the anthropological sense, where one finds that the normative and the descriptive refer to two other concepts with which the cultural shares the task of instituting modern subjects, namely, the racial and the nation. For centuries they have been used to describe human collectives. Nevertheless, as modern signifying devices—as signifiers in the text of science and history—they have a shorter trajectory, one whose pace has increased so dramatically over the last fifty years that it has become difficult to establish their signifying boundaries and combined effects.

Much of what I do in the following chapters, mapping the analytics of raciality, is an attempt to unpack this conceptual mess by delimiting the signifying boundaries of the racial, establishing how it differs from the cultural and the nation by delineating the regions of signification—science and history—in which these modern productive tools thrive. This strategy, a crucial task for any critique of their effects of signification, enables us to trace their post-Enlightenment trajectories. In doing this, I demonstrate how in the mid-nineteenth century, (a) the scientists of man deployed an arsenal that produced self-consciousness as an effect of scientific determinants (the laws of “fecundity” and “heredity”) and (b) the nation was consolidated as the concept that instituted modern polities as historical (moral) subjects, that is, as bound by principles expressed in its common language, religion, art, and so on, and how in the twentieth century
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(c) the cultural emerged as a scientific concept that wrote the mind as a historical thing, but insofar as it produced moral relief, it did not displace, but actually repeated the effects of signification of the racial (Stocking 1968). In short, because the cultural is neither the racial nor the nation under an assumed name, the ontoepistemological placing of the cultural, in both senses identified by Bourdieu, determines effects of signification that overflow the borders it shares with each.

What makes this critical analytical groundwork necessary is precisely the fact that in the late twentieth century the cultural seems to have displaced the nation and the racial to become the governing political signifier. Prior to this, the racial and the nation guided constructions of the foremost modern political subject, namely, the nation-state, and both were appropriated worldwide by subaltern subjects in transnational and transcontinental alliances against colonialism and imperialism (Von Eschen 1997; Brock and Fuertes 1998). It was not until the late 1960s, however, that the nation would frame projects of racial emancipation. For example, many have identified how the anticolonial wars in Africa influenced the Black Power, Chicano, American Indian, and Asian American (nationalist) movements in the United States, which sought not merely inclusion but a radical transformation of the U.S. social configuration. As far as I am aware, however, no one has asked why the racial could not become the sole basis for an emancipatory project that could, for example, reclaim what Ture and Hamilton ([1967] 1992) refer to as “[black] history and our identity from what must be called cultural terrorism” and “the right to create our own terms through which to define ourselves and our relationship to the society, and to have these terms recognized,” which is “the first necessity of a free people, and the first right that any oppressor must suspend” (35). It seems that precisely because these movements aimed beyond inclusion toward that ever-receding promised land of self-determination—that is, transparency—race (the social scientific signifier) could not sustain their projects. Instead, in the 1960s black, Chicano, American Indian, and Asian American activists and intellectuals deployed the nation, the historical signifier, to write the trajectory of the racial subaltern subject as a transparent “I.” Whether this was the inevitable course of the racial and the nation it is not clear. But the extent to which they were bound to meet each other in twentieth-century political statements is relevant only because of how short-lived these emancipatory struggles were, joining concepts that refigured different modes of representing modern subjects.

During the next two decades, the cultural would fill in the gaps of earlier nationalist projects, guiding attempts to recuperate the particular “histories” of racial subaltern collectivities. In the 1970s, for instance, U.S. blacks would gesture toward Africans and the black populations of Latin America and the Caribbean, claiming slavery as a common historical past, to manufacture a black “culture” that spread beyond the borders of the United States (Karenga 1993; Asante 1987; and Howe 1998; among others). Facing these sweet gifts of 1960s nationalist struggles, however, was the bitter fate of thriving in a conjuncture that no longer supported “essentialist” projects. In the 1980s, the heyday of the politics of representation—after this nationalist desire had been discarded along with many other promises of the 1960s—the cultural would be consolidated as the racial’s historical companion (Gilroy 1993a and 1993b; Baker et al. 1997; Kelley 1997). During those years, cultural politics met innumerable challenges, the most serious of which, multiculturalism, now moves forcefully ahead as it guides the official agenda for global justice. This liberal appropriation of multiculturalism is especially troubling because it embraces the sociohistorical logic of exclusion as the correct account of social (racial, ethnic, gender) subjection and accepts the emergence of claims for recognition of cultural difference as proof of the failure of assimilation (Mabry 1996; Silva 2005); it simultaneously normalizes claims of cultural difference in arguments that are seemingly critical of the earlier project of “assimilation” while retaining the earlier sociology of race relations argument concerning the extraneousness of the others of Europe that the biologic of racial difference is superseded by a sociologic of cultural difference to incarcerate the others of Europe in bounded transparency. As postmodern accounts sent the earlier formulation of the cultural to join the racial in ethical exile, the others of Europe embraced another doomed strategy of emancipation, namely, the project of producing and interpreting crafts that communicate their particular sociohistorical trajectories as subaltern travelers on the road to transparency.

The problem of cultural politics that undermines the postmodern emancipatory agenda is one of correlation: as any number cruncher
knows, when two independent variables affect each other, the result of a linear regression is biased. In the same way, the equation of the racial and the cultural undermines cultural politics projects insomuch as the effect communicated by both scientific concepts, which produce "meanings and beings" as effects of exterior determination, is oversignified. Therefore, although the postmodern rendering of the cultural has shed its "boundeness and fixity" when used to describe black cultural politics, not only does the old cultural resurface; it also resuscitates racial difference to produce a doubly "fixed" and doubly "bounded"—that is, a doubly determined—black culture. For instance, Gilroy (1993b) identifies this effect in what he calls the "ethno-absolutist" view of black culture. Unfortunately, Gilroy's alternative does not fare any better. His "Black Atlantic," which he offers as an alternate approach to black cultural politics and is based on a transnational, trans-Atlantic, and consistently English-speaking formation, errs in the same (historical) direction. The early twentieth-century black U.S. American male intellectual trans-Atlantic travelers who, according to Gilroy, shared in the "desire to transcend both the structures of the nation state and the constraints of ethnicity and national particularity" (19), seemed to have wished nothing but these very things. In other words, the two trends Gilroy identifies rehash the central themes of modern representation. I grant that he recognizes that the "politics of fulfillment," houses the "spirit" of the liberal project, namely, juridical universality. But why does he not recognize that his account of "the politics of transfiguration"—which marks "the emergence of qualitatively new desires, social relations, and modes of association within the racial community of interpretation and resistance and between that group and its erstwhile oppressors" (37)—produces a bit more than a transparent "I" in blackface? Without its nicely chosen postmodern or modern Habermasian communicating disguise, how different is his account of black culture compared to those he designates using terms of "cultural insiderism" or "ethnic absolutism"? Not much, I am afraid.

This, I argue, is the effect of the transparency thesis, the ontological assumption governing the social descriptors universality and historicity that has survived the death of the subject. The fact that it remains at the core of critical accounts of racial subjection and "post" mappings of the global configuration is clearly reflected in the postmodern refashioning of the cultural. Despite the patronizing project of giving "voice" or "agency" to their object, these anthropologists' intentions have (as always) been good. The critical reassessment of the fixity and boundedness of culture has also deflated the discipline's "ethnographic authority." Nevertheless, the cultural still authorizes (re)writings of the others of Europe, but now as incarcerated subjects of cultural difference.

Because they presuppose the ruling ontological premise, namely, transparency, ethnographic descriptions of the global subaltern as a cultural "other" (re)produce the racial's effect of signification, which is to write all that is particular to post-Enlightenment Europe as a signifier of the subject, the transparent "I." When deployed to address the products and practices of people of color, the cultural produces a kind of transparency that is self-defeating, as is the case with Gilroy's "racial community of interpretation" and its countercultural "politics of transfiguration." No matter how fluid, hybrid, or unbounded, when addressing a collectivity the racial has already inscribed as subaltern, the cultural acquires a descriptive sense that does not and cannot communicate interiority, as is the case with the nation, the historical signifier. It does not and cannot precisely because it remains fully within a scientific (anthropological) terrain of signification. As such, it reinforces the effects of signification of the racial: exterior determination. In short, it cannot institute a transparent (interior/temporal)—that is, self-determined—"I." Perhaps we are (post)modern in more ways than we care to be. But does this give us license to be careless when specifying how this predicament guides our emancipatory projects? The pressing task, I believe, is to engage the racial as a modern political strategy rather than attempting, once again, to resuscitate the sociohistorical logic of exclusion. There are only so many ways we can recount the mechanisms and effects of exclusion. There are only so many ways to account for the failed emancipatory projects that use race, nation, and culture precisely because we are not quite certain what happens when these notions are deployed separately or in conjunction with one another. Certainly, the writing of racism as a modifier of proper historical (cultural or ideological) strategies of power has been productive. Unfortunately, this formulation retains the sociologic of exclusion, which transformed the exteriority of the racial refuges as a scientific device into a substantive (preconceptual, prehistorical)
marker of the outsidersness of the others of Europe. More critical than this, however, as I argue elsewhere later, is how rendering the racial as a sociohistorical category reproduces the erasures that (trans)formed racial difference into a signifier of cultural difference: it (re)produces non-Europeans as others and (re)identifies the (instinctual, cultural, ideological) exclusionary strategies their presence evokes as extraneous to post-Enlightenment, modern, social (moral) configurations (Silva 2001).

For this reason, the necessary step for comprehending the present global configuration—necessary also for addressing the predicament of contemporary ("postmodern") critics of modern thought and race theorists—is to unpack how the racial, the cultural, and the nation institute modern subjects: by charting their contexts of emergence, describing their conditions of production, and delimiting their signifying effects. We need to abandon constructions of the racial as an add-on, an unbecoming device that reinforces the constitutive effects of otherwise appropriate modern political strategies, as it appears in Balibar's (1991) formulation of racism, which he defines as "a supplement internal to nationalism, always in excess of it, but always indispensable to its constitution and yet always insufficient to achieve its project" (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, 54, my emphasis). For Balibar, racism and nationalism are principles that institute political collectivities through the binary of inclusion-exclusion: his formulation of the "historical reciprocity" of these principles constructs racism as enabling the constitution of the internal and external boundaries of a collectivity unified by nationalist ideologies and practices. However, Foreclosed in this formulation—to which my summary does not do justice—are questions such as: Why should nationalism be supplemented by racism? What is it about the nation and the racial that makes them suitable companions? Why have they worked together even in circumstances where racial difference does not exclude, where the racial "other" is a bona fide national "same"? Why does the cultural so easily cross the borders it shares with both?

The relevance of these questions cannot and should not be dismissed in hoping for that moment of moral bliss, before and beyond the missteps of racism, when transparency will describe a social configuration where the racial no longer operates. Despite its laudable sentiments, this hope prevents our understanding the conditions of production of today's global subjects, of how they come into being. For we already know that the concepts used to describe them—the racial, the nation, and the cultural—fulfill the same signifying task of producing collectivities as particular kinds of modern subjects. Each, however, has very distinct effects of signification: (a) the racial produces modern subjects as an effect of exterior determination, which institutes an irreducible and unsublatable difference; (b) the nation produces modern subjects as an effect of historical (interior) determination, which assumes a difference that is resolved in an unfolding (temporal) transcendental essence; but (c) the cultural is more complex in its effects because it can signify either or both. In Bourdieu's second sense, the descriptive, the cultural is almost indistinguishable from the nation because it assumes that a "collective consciousness" is represented in artistic, religious, and other products. In the first sense, however, the cultural restores the racial in that the distinction between "high culture" and "low culture" presupposes "civilization," initially deployed by the sciences of man and society—the anthropology and sociology—to write the particularity of post-Enlightenment Europe (Elias 1982). The cultural, I repeat, is not a disguise of the nation, nor is it the racial under another assumed name, no matter how much moral relief may be found in replacing race with ethnicity; yet it reproduces the effects of signification of both. But this is something many of us ignore because we hope that the racial is politically relevant only because it operates as an added principle of exclusion in an otherwise thoroughly transparent social configuration governed by universality and historicity.

**WHENCE THE RACIAL?**

The Subject is dead! we have been told. So why is its most effective strategy of power still with us? The central task of this book is to map the analytics of raciality, to chart the contexts of emergence, to describe conditions of production, and to delimit the effects of signification of the arsenal that institutes self-consciousness as an effect of exterior (outer) determination. Although this road follows but one moment of the trajectory of the subject, the sole effect of interior (self-) determination, we will identify the most prolific modern strategies of power deployed to delimit its place, and this will show why its death, which has so many times been foretold, has not resulted in its complete annihilation. Hence, my first step is to elaborate my
argument about how transparency hinders our understanding of racial subjection as a prelude to charting the context of the emergence of the analytics of raciality, of excavating the modern philosophical grounds that generated the statements used to assemble the transparent “I,” the figure at the center of modern representation.

In Part I I introduce the idea of the modern text as an analytic strategy to describe modern representation as an ontoepistemological context composed of signifying strategies produced by two fields, namely, science and history. My excavation of the founding statements of modern thought identifies philosophical formulations that reproduce Descartes’s outline of self-consciousness as the only existing being to enjoy self-determination—the ability to alone decide on its essence or existence—which requires the bold articulation and disavowal of the ontoepistemological relevance of extended things, that is, bodies. I then identify how this formulation of self-determination is threatened when two framers of modern science deploy a version of reason, *universal nomos*, the constraining ruler of the “world of things,” that opens up the possibility of rewriting man as subjected to outer determination, namely, as an affectable thing. In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century statements, I identify the *universal nomos* and the *universal poesis* that emerged in social ontologies, which describe reason as the regulative and productive force, respectively. These are evident in the efforts of Locke, Leibniz, Kant, and Herder to (re)present the “I” as a self-determined being, seeking to postpone the threat introduced by the scientific rendering of universality. In their writing I identify statements that produce two scenes of reason, two ontological accounts of how it plays its universal regulative or productive role in the “world of men”: the *scene of regulation*, which introduces universality as the juridical descriptor, and the *scene of representation*, which introduces historicity as a moral descriptor.

I argue that these statements that articulate and disavow extended things protect the mind’s self-determination by designing two stages—interiority and exteriority—in which reason plays its sovereign role: in the *stage of exteriority* it operates as the exterior ruler of affectable things, and in the *stage of interiority* it is the force that guides the production of human knowledge and culture. Although these statements, most evident in Kant’s notion of the Transcendental and Herder’s formulation of the Historical, sought to secure interiority, the private holding man has always occupied in Western thought, none resolved the threat introduced in Descartes’s founding statement that grounded the mind’s ontoepistemological privilege on universal reason. It was only with Hegel’s intervention, which consolidated modern representation, that the full delineation of self-consciousness resolved this threat. The key figure in this formulation is “Spirit,” the transcendental (interior or temporal) “I,” which guides his version of the play of reason, *transcendental poesis*, where I find the framing of the *transparency thesis*, the ontoepistemological assumption guiding modern representation. That is, Hegel refashioned the Subject as the transparent “I,” the one whose emergence he located in post-Enlightenment Europe, where Spirit completed its self-actualizing trajectory. It is this tracing of subsequent refashonings of self-consciousness, and each version of universal reason this entails, that allows me to delineate the field of modern representation, the stage of exteriority, the context of emergence of the analytics of raciality—in sum, the arsenal that, in the nineteenth century, would finally write self-consciousness as an effect of the tools of scientific knowledge.

In Part II I identify another version of universal reason, *productive nomos*, introduced by the science of life, the project of knowledge that becomes a central element of the regimen of production of the analytics of raciality. Specifically, I show how it inaugurates the possibility of refashioning self-consciousness in the stage of exteriority when it describes how universal reason plays its regulative and productive role in the “world of men”: the *scene of regulation*, which introduces universality as the juridical descriptor, and the *scene of representation*, which introduces historicity as a moral descriptor. I argue that these statements that articulate and disavow extended things protect the mind’s self-determination by designing two stages—interiority and exteriority—in which reason plays its sovereign role: in the *stage of exteriority* it operates as the exterior ruler of affectable things, and in the *stage of interiority* it is the force that guides the production of human knowledge and culture. Although these statements, most evident in Kant’s notion of the Transcendental and Herder’s formulation of the Historical, sought
differently, my reading indicates that raciality, as a tool of productive nomos, constitutes an effective tool precisely because of the way its main signifiers—the racial and the cultural—provide an account of human difference, an account in which particularity remains irreducible and unsublatable, that is, one that would not dissipate in the unfolding of “Spirit.” My reading also suggests that this arsenal, which belongs in the stage of exteriority, can no longer postpone the threat posed by universal reason, that it necessarily produces modern subjects as coexisting and relational beings. In doing so, the analytics of raciality institutes another ontological context, globality, in which the particularity of the mental and social configurations found in post-Enlightenment Europe can be sustained only in reference to those existing in other regions of the globe.

In Part III I turn to the analysis of the effects of signification of raciality, describing how it produces modern subjects. To do so I select those statements that sought to write early postcolonial polities—the United States and Brazil—as modern political subjects and identify strategies that belong to both ontological contexts, namely, historicity and globality. My reading of statements about the U.S. and Brazilian nations deployed between the 1890s and the 1930s indicates that the place of the national (interior/temporal) subject is established by the apparatus of the analytics of raciality to ensure that the affectable others of Europe inhabiting these polities do not determine their global position. In other words, I show how the racial subaltern subject is placed before (in front of) the ethical space inhabited by the proper national subject. In the United States, articulations of racial difference produce the particularity of the U.S. nation as a manifestation of a European (liberal) desire, and I trace how these articulations produce the logic of exclusion as a mode of racial subjection that places Indians, blacks, and Asians as subjects not encompassed by the principles that govern the U.S. social configuration, that is, universality and self-determination. In Brazil, miscegenation produces a national subject haunted by a desire for an always elusive object, namely, Europeanness (whiteness), and in my reading I indicate how the deployment of miscegenation as a historical signifier enables the writing of the Brazilian subject, the subject of democracy, against scientific statements of its inviability. From this solution emerges a mode of racial subjection governed by a logic of obliteration that cannot be apprehended using the prevailing sociologic of exclusion precisely because the latter is predicated upon the annihilation of raciality for the (re)institution of a modern transparent social configuration. By showing how scientific and historical strategies are appropriated in texts that institute both the national subject and its subaltern others, I then indicate how the political subjects addressed in accounts of postmodernity and globalization are constituted by the same tools that instituted the deceased subject. In doing so, this mapping of the analytics of raciality refashions the figure of the modern subject as homo modernus, the effect of signifiers that refer to the two ontological contexts—namely, historicity (the one figured in the nation) and globality (the one instituted by the racial)—that constitute modern (post-Enlightenment) representation.
The Transparency Thesis

They seem to me people of such innocence that, if we understood them and they understood us, they would become Christian soon; for they do not have nor understand any faith, it seems to me; and, therefore, if the banished, who will remain here, learn well their language and understand them, I have no doubt, according to the holy desire of Your Highness, they will become Christian and believe in Holy Faith, . . . for it is sure this is a good and humble people, which will absorb anything given to them; and Our Lord gave them good bodies and good faces, as to good men, and he, who brought us here, I believe, was not without a cause.

—PERO VAZ DE CAMINHA,
"CARTA A EL-REI DOM MANUEL"

Not the conversion of “such” peoples’ souls, it would turn out, but the cataloguing of their minds, undertaken about three hundred years later, produced the strategies of power governing contemporary global conditions. Early colonial texts, like Pero Vaz de Caminha’s letter of May 1500 to King D. Manuel, are mostly tales of conquest: letters and diaries that provide the European traveler’s point of view; write the “native” first as “innocent” and “brute,” then as “irrational” and “savage”; and narrate the mishaps of the trips, the beauty and wealth of the newly appropriated royal lands, and the need to teach natives not to “reveal their vergonhas [sexual organs] with the same innocence they show their faces” and how to fear God. Each account narrates a political event, a double movement,
dislocation and engulfment, in which conqueror's and native's "beings" emerge as subjected to the divine author and ruler. Later accounts of European conquest would describe this political event as a moment in time, a fact of history. Nevertheless, Europe's conquest of the American continent has been first and foremost a spatial, that is, a global event—the dislocation of Europeans to the Americas and other parts of the planet and the engulfment of natives, their lands, and the resources of those lands. For this reason, because European juridical and economic appropriation of other lands and resources has from the outset required the symbolic appropriation of natives, the indigenous peoples, one cannot ignore that this beginning is always already mediated by a rearrangement of the modern grammar and the deployment of projects of knowledge that address man as an object, which took place over the first three hundred years following the "first encounter." For it was only in the post-Enlightenment period, when reason finally displaced the divine ruler and author to become the sovereign ruler of man, that human difference became the product of a symbolic tool, the concept of the racial, deployed in projects to "discover" the truth of man, which (trans)formed the globe itself into a modern ontological context.

Before describing how I have charted modern representation to identify the context of emergence, conditions of production, and effects of signification of the racial, in this chapter I indicate how the sociohistorical logic of exclusion splits the field of critique of modern ontology into two halves: postmodern interventions and critical racial theorizing. Both postmodern critics of modern thought and critical racial theorists, I think, engage the crucial challenge of describing how global subaltern subjects emerge in representation. Nevertheless, although they correctly address the symbolic as a privileged moment of modern power, the sociohistorical logic of exclusion prevents them from thoroughly unpacking modern mechanisms of signification and subjectification, a necessary move if one seeks to understand why an ethical crisis does not ensue from the consistent, numerous, and recurrent indications that the "others of Europe" are not comprehended by universality and self-determination, the principles governing post-Enlightenment social configurations. For it is because this prevailing account of racial subjection retains the presupposition that the racial is extraneous to modern thought that it prevents these proverbial twins from moving toward the point where they meet. Although this fracture could be attributed to theoretical-methodological differences, it seems to me that it reflects a profound similarity, which is the fact that, even in postmodern critical analyses that challenge transparency, the sociohistorical logic of exclusion (re)produces the post-Enlightenment version of the subject. Throughout the last five centuries or so, Europeans and their descendants have crossed the globe over and over again appropriating lands, resources, and labor. No doubt these dislocations have instituted the global economic and juridical formations historical and social scientific literatures apprehend with the concepts of colonialism, imperialism, modernization, and globalization. Although we know so much about the sociohistorical determinants of racial subjection, we are at pains to describe how precisely the racial institutes the others of Europe as subaltern subjects. Failing to grasp how the racial produces modern subjects (even though we have no doubt that it does so), I think, results from how we know it. For underlying the sociohistorical logic of exclusion is the dismissal of the project of knowledge usually termed "race theorizing," "scientific racism," or "race theories" and the insistence on attributing the notion of race to the fact that, in nineteenth-century Europe, science fell prey to "subjective" (psychological, cultural, ideological) elements, anachronistic and unbecoming "beliefs" or "prejudices" it erroneously validated (Stepan 1982). No doubt a rehearsal of the modern desire for freedom and truth, the statement that disqualifies and invalidates this early project of knowledge has failed to achieve its goal, that is, to erase the racial from the modern lexicon because it does not explore how it constitutes the modern grammar.

For this reason, I have chosen the less traveled road and address the racial as a scientific construct. Not, however, by assessing the "truth" of the statements of the scientists of man; I am not concerned with evaluation of methods and theories, nor do I follow the logic of discovery. My intent here is to address the apparatus the racial guides, the anaytics of raciality, as a productive symbolic regimen that institutes human difference as an effect of the play of universal reason. My analysis of the context of emergence, the conditions of production, and the effects of signification of the racial shows how the writing of modern subjects in the post-Enlightenment period would also require the deployment of scientific tools, strategies of symbolic engulfment that transform bodily and social configurations...
unto expressions of how universal reason produces human difference. By doing so, it provides an account of racial subjection that, by displacing historicity, the post-Enlightenment privileged context, situates the transparency thesis, that is, the ontoepistemological account that institutes "being and meaning" as effects of interiority and temporality. What this reading provides is the delineation of an other ontoepistemological context, globality, in which being and meaning emerge as an effect of exteriority and spatiality, a mode of representing human difference as an effect of scientific signification. By showing how the transparent "I," which the representation of the subject historicity presupposes and (re)produces, emerges always already in a contention with others that both institute and threaten its ontological prerogative, my reading displaces the transparency thesis to refashion the modern subject as homo modernus, the global-historical being produced with tools yielded by both fields of modern representation, namely, history and science.

PARTIAL DEPARTURES

My point of entry into this fractured field is the ubiquitous question that, I think, concerns both postmodern critics and racial theorists: What sort of theoretical account of the contemporary political landscape, with its corresponding criteria for truth and ethical claims, would avoid repeating the exclusionary effects of modern grand narratives of science and history? When considering how postmodern remappings of the social that privilege plurality and contingency—such as, for instance, that of Laclau and Mouffe (1985)—would contribute to the understanding of racial subjection, I could not locate racial subaltern subjects in their portrait of the social. Would they be "moments" (discursively instituted subject positions) or "elements" ("antagonistic parts") in their reframing of the social as a contingent "structured totality"? Under what conditions, what sort of "partial fixations," do they move into (as a "moment") and/or out (as an "antagonistic part") of this discursive field? Or is raciality a "total" fixation, that is, the sole always already feature of the field itself, which in this case would contradict their account of the social or force them to name it racial? With these unanswerable questions, I am not marking a failure of Laclau and Mouffe's theoretical project per se. For they introduce a notion of differentially constituted (open and incomplete) subjectivities or identities without attending to whether and how the formulation of "difference" it deploys re-institutes transparency, and with it the "the category of the 'subject' as a unified and unifying essence" (181), which they seek to displace. This happens, I think, because the sociohistorical logic of exclusion—and the transparency thesis it presupposes—conjures up the subject when critical texts (re)produce the racial others as already differentially constituted historical beings before their entrance into the modern political spaces where they become subaltern subjects.

My point is that, without addressing the regimen of production of such subaltern (postmodern) subjects, the subjects of cultural difference, one ends up attributing to them a self-defeating kind of transparency. For instance, in "Restaging the Universal: Hegemony and the Limits of Formalism," Judith Butler (2000) returns to Hegel to provide an account of hegemony that, displacing universality, rewrites the subject as an inherently social (historical or contingent) thing. She charges Laclau and Mouffe (1985) Lacanian rendering of the "incomplete subject" with retaining a "quasi-Kantian (formal or universal) foundation that colonizes their reformulation of the notion of hegemony by reinstituting a given particular (the West) as a universal limitation and excluding other particulars that sustain it. Her solution is to return to Hegel, where she finds a reformulation of the universal I as always already committed to the plurality that characterizes the social, the domain of the concrete, the particular, the contingent, and so on—which sustains her own (liberal) version of hegemony. The advantages of her Hegelian portrayal of the postmodern landscape appear in Butler's description of how it would resolve the challenge cultural difference poses to a global feminist project.

Though she consistently insists that the excluded particulars constitute the Universal, Butler provides a partial reading of Hegel, one that does not indicate how the excluded—the ones the Lacanian quasi-universal bar fails to recuperate—figures in Hegel's account of "true universality." Because she does not follow the trajectory of Hegel's self-consciousness to the moment of resolution, the final step in the trajectory of "Spirit," Butler argues that Hegel's notion of individuality (concrete, contingent, etc.) immediately includes the kind of (historic) particularity the notion of cultural difference institutes. How? Through translation, she says: "Without translation,
the very concept of universality cannot cross the linguistic borders it claims," so any universal claim thus conceived—here she refers to international feminism—risks repeating a "colonial and expansionist logic." Not surprisingly, her deployment of cultural difference, one that celebrates historicity as the basis of an ethical (the intrinsically good, just) global political project, troubles her version of the global feminist discourse, which, unlike academic Anglo feminism, would "override the problem local cultures pose for international feminism [which] does not understand the parochial character of its own norms." Without explaining why open and fluid local cultures would need translation and how these "linguistic borders" have been produced, Butler moves on to place postcolonial critics at the forefront of the battle against imperialist feminism. From these self-knowing critics she seems to have learned that "by emphasizing the cultural location of universality one sees . . . that there can be no operative notion of universality that does not assume the risk of translation" (35).

Definitely, the postmodern debate seems stuck in modernity's constitutive oppositions. Where is the alternative when all that is offered is an old account of domination in which a self-described (abstract) universal precludes any transformative opposition through a founding exclusion of (concrete) local cultures and a new account of hegemony in which the political field is inhabited by already constituted culturally different others of the West who are dominated because of the identification of a particular local [Western] culture with the Universal? If one opts for the "abstract" universal, particularity becomes an annoyance, that which needs to be excluded for a universal account to be sustained; if one opts for the "concrete" universal, the particular will flourish, but a viable political project will need to rely on already historic (linguistic or cultural) others who will aid in their own emancipation as "cultural translators" informing their universal (Western feminist) other by telling her how it works at home, in the recess of their "local cultures," where, before entering the political struggle for hegemony, her people rest peacefully in oblivious cultural transparency.

Whenever they alone guide the critical task, historic strategies such as culture and ideology necessarily produce transparent (intercultural) subjects while scientific constructs such as cultural difference proceed without disturbance to replace the others of Europe before transparency. That is, historicity cannot dissipate its own effects of power; it cannot institute subjects that signify otherwise. What I am suggesting is that racial subjection should not be conceived as a process of othering, of exclusion, in which an already historic racial or cultural other becomes the site of projection of unwanted attributes that, once specified, reveal the ideological (false or contradictory) basis upon which European particularity has been constructed. Without an examination of how the racial and the cultural institute (as scientific signifiers) the subjects crowding the global saloon, without a critical engagement with disciplinary (productive) power beyond the naming of the subjects of interiority Foucault traces, I contend, such critical remappings of the social will be at best irrelevant for the project of racial emancipation. For a relevant critique of the present global (juridic, economic, and moral) configuration in which raciality rules unchecked necessitates a full engagement with universality and historicity, one that would not stop at a critique of (the failure of juridical and economic) universality just to hold onto the promises of historicity. Instead of projects of inclusion, then, it would attempt to turn the transparency thesis on its head. For, I argue, it is precisely the failure to conceive the cultural and the racial as productive (scientific) signifiers that limits the understanding of how they govern the contemporary global configuration, instituting modern privileged and subaltern subjects.

"THE HISTORIC VEIL"

Following the sociohistorical logic of exclusion, critical racial theorists write the racial subaltern as barred from universality and the conception of humanity (the self-determined subject of history) that the transparency thesis sustains. That would not be a problem if, as Fanon teaches us, the position this subject inhabits could be apprehended in the ontological accounts the transparency thesis authorizes. And yet, in writings of the black subject, one consistently meets a transparent I, buried under historical (cultural or ideological) debris, waiting for critical strategies that would clean up the negative self-representations it absorbs from prevailing racist discourse. No doubt symbolic and actual violence (enslavement, lynching, police brutality) marks our trajectory as modern subaltern subjects. Nevertheless, the privileging of historicity limits accounts such as Cornel West's (1997) construct of the "historic Veil" that writes the black
subject as an effect of the “interiorizing” of violence limited? What is behind the veil? Is there a racial subject, a black sovereign that precedes our modern trajectories? If this is so—if before racial violence there is a pristine black subject fully enjoying its “humanity,” thriving in self-determined (interior or temporal) existence, that can refuse to “interiorize” and actualize violence—why does it not do so? I think that this desire to lift the veil to reveal an original self-determined black subject fails to ask a crucial question: How did whiteness come to signify the transparent I and blackness to signify otherwise? Because it does not ask such questions, the metaphor of the veil rehearses the sociohistorical logic of exclusion, which writes blackness and whiteness as the “raw material” and not as the products of modern strategies of power. And, in the case of West’s account, it (re)produces the black subject as a pathological (affectable) I, a self-consciousness hopelessly haunted by its own impossible desire for transparency.

My point is that the metaphor of the veil reproduces the effect of power of the sociohistorical logic of exclusion—which, as I show in Part 2, consists in a powerful tool of the analytics of raciality—which is to render racial emancipation contingent on the obliteration of racial difference. In Against Race, Paul Gilroy (2000) provides perhaps the best example of the perverse effects of this desire to recuperate the racial subaltern into an unbounded humanity. When advancing another claim for the erasure of the racial from modern political grammar, Gilroy announces that the demise of race is already under way, thanks to the radical alteration of bodies promised by genetic manipulation and the commodification of the black male body as an object for global and suburban white consumption. Any impulse to celebrate this “emancipation” from the (racial) body dies when one learns the answer to the question of how biotechnology ushers liberation from race in Gilroy’s interpretation of “the tragic story of Henrietta Lacks,” a working-class U.S. black woman whose cervical cells have been crucial to the advancement of cancer research, which exemplifies the passage from the “biopolitics of race” to “nano-politics.” For Gilroy, the fact that her blackness is irrelevant to medical research suggests a redefinition of the idea of humanity, for the “awareness of the indissoluble unity of all life at the level of genetic materials” displaces the idea of “specifically racial differences” (20, italics in the original). It would be all too easy to stop at pointing to the irony of how humanist desire needs science (genetics) to once again denounce race’s scientific irrelevance. But it is more interesting, I think, to point to how this desire cannot reduce or sublate the materiality (body and social position) of the economically dispossessed black female, which resists the liberating powers of “transfiguration,” “commodification,” and biotechnology.

How did Henrietta Lacks’s cervical cells become available to scientific research? Why did the cellular biologist at Johns Hopkins University see it as ethical to appropriate her cells without her consent? How has the use of economically dispossessed black neighborhoods as testing camps ensured advances in public health research at that university? What cells do not reveal is how the female racial subaltern has been consistently (re)produced as a kind of human being to whom neither juridic universality nor self-determination applies. Not only does her femaleness place Henrietta Lacks under patriarchal (divine or natural) law, away from the domain of the laws of the body politic. Her blackness also produces her as radically distinct from the kind of subject presumed in the ethical principles governing modern social configurations. Across the earth, women still die of cervical cancer despite the advances Lacks’s stolen cells have enabled, but they do not die the same way. Economically dispossessed women of color, like Lacks, die with more pain and no hope. Not only do they lack the financial means to access even the basic technologies available for the prevention and treatment of cervical cancer; in many cases (as in the case of a Brazilian federal program for the treatment of economically dispossessed cancer patients), when given access to this technology they are treated as little more than test subjects. This is not because blackness determines the kind of cells that will grow in their bodies, but because it determines how they live with or die from cancer. That cancer cells do not indicate dark brown skin or flat noses can be conceived of as emancipatory only if one forgets, or minimizes, the political context within which lab materials will be collected and the benefits of biotechnological research will be distributed.

Whether inspired by humanism or not, any critical ontoepistemological account couched upon the transparency thesis will ignore the conditions of production of modern subjects, how the arsenal of the modern “Will to Truth,” tools of reason, institute social (juridical, economic, ethical) subjects, the men and women who produce
and reproduce (and the institutions that regulate) their own trajectories. Whatever else can be said about the critical thought that Gilroy inhabits, it certainly holds onto the promises of historicity and universalism, which animate postmodern humanist discourses of postracial, transparent future: “The spaces in which ‘races’ end life,” Gilroy laments, “are a field from which political interventions have been banished” (41). What would be left, I ask, to the politics of social or global justice if modern subjects were freed from racial signification, produces social subjects who stand differentially before the institutions the transparency thesis sustains.

Perhaps it is evident now that the answer to the question of what lies behind the veil is more complicated than it appears to be. At least for the economically dispossessed racialized gendered person for whom, as for Henrietta Lacks, physical death is only the most evident effect of the post-Enlightenment desire for transparency and the historical and scientific signifying strategies that (re)produce it. What I am suggesting is that the moral ease with which the sociohistorical logic of exclusion captures racial subjection derives from how it (re)produces the transparency thesis by translating the obliteration of the kind of particularity the latter postulates into a demand for the obliteration of the signifier that institutes it, namely, the racial—a gesture that consistently reestablishes the transparent subject of science and history, the proper name of the man. For this reason, I claim, only an excavation of modern thought, an analysis of the economy of signification governed by the transparency thesis and the analytics of raciality, will enable critical ontological projects and the ethical principle that usually accompany them, which can aid in the project of global justice.

**THE NAMING OF MAN.**

Many racial theorists have recently undertaken this excavation, gathering instances of philosophical formulations of juridical universalism and humanity that exclude the others of Europe. Although they remain in the grip of the sociohistorical logic of exclusion, they indicate why the answer to the question of how the racial operates as a strategy of power is buried in the founding texts of modern thought (Fitzpatrick 1992; Goldberg 1993 and 2002; Mills 1997; and Eze 2002, among others). Nevertheless, although these theorists have explored how the racial delimits the reach of the law and humanity, they have yet to ask how it produces the principles—universalism and self-determination—these notions comprehend. How precisely does the racial (re)produce the universality of the law? How can the racial be reconciled with the ethical privilege, self-determination, historicity assures utility? Asking these questions, I fear, would signal a questioning of universalism and self-determination—a move too risky to make, it seems. With this statement, I am suggesting that postmodern critics of modern thought and racial theorists resist abandoning the transparency thesis, which so evidently undermines our understanding of how the racial operates as a strategy of power, but I am not intimating that they eagerly embrace transparency. For it is because they hold onto the sociologic of exclusion, I think, that the transparency thesis sneaks in on them.

Perhaps discussion of a text that could be placed at the very center of the critical field can help me to elaborate this point. In *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason*, Gayatri Chakraboty Spivak (1999) traces how the exclusion of the others of Europe from founding modern philosophical works has produced the ethical (cultural) narrative that has instituted the figure of man. What she finds in Kant’s, Hegel’s, and Marx’s texts are rhetorical moves in which the articulation and expulsion of the “native informant”—what she refers to as the “rejection of [its] affect” (4–5)—instituted “the name of Man,” the symbolic move that has sustained the various moments of European juridical and economic domination of other regions of the globe—colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, and so on. These “great narratives of ‘German’ cultural self-representation,” she argues, provide the material “for a narrative of crisis management,” that is, “the ‘scientific’ fabrication of new representations of self and world that would provide *alibis* for the domination, exploitation, and epistemic violation entailed by the establishment of colony and empire” (7, my italics). What I want to highlight in Spivak’s account is how she misses that these “master narratives” constitute the context of emergence of the racial when she immediately dismisses the latter as an “alibi”—an ideological construct, a false representation of the relationship between man and the “native informant”—for economic exploitation and juridical domination.
and reproduce (and the institutions that regulate) their own social trajectories. Whatever else can be said about the critical position Gilroy inhabits, it certainly holds onto the promise of historicity and universality, which animate postmodern humanist desires for a postracial, transparent future: “The spaces in which ‘races’ come to life,” Gilroy laments, “are a field from which political interaction has been banished” (41). What would be left, I ask, to the project of social or global justice if modern subjects were freed from raciosity? This is not just a rhetorical question. It requires a critique of modern thought that addresses scientific knowledge as a major productive site of power, one that addresses how the racial, the scientific signifier, produces social subjects who stand differentially before the institutions the transparency thesis sustains.

Perhaps it is evident now that the answer to the question of what lies behind the veil is more complicated than it appears to be. At least for the economically dispossessed racialized gendered person for whom, as for Henrietta Lacks, physical death is only the most evident effect of the post-Enlightenment desire for transparency and the historical and scientific signifying strategies that (re)produce it. What I am suggesting is that the moral ease with which the social-historical logic of exclusion captures racial subjection derives from how it (re)produces the transparency thesis by translating the obliteration of the kind of particularity the latter postulates into a demand for the obliteration of the signifier that institutes it, namely, the racial—a gesture that consistently reinstates the transparent subject of science and history, the proper name of the man. For this reason, I claim, only an excavation of modern thought, an analysis of the economy of signification governed by the transparency thesis and the analytics of raciosity, will enable critical ontoepistemological projects and the ethical principle that usually accompany them, which can aid in the project of global justice.

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THE TRANSPARENCY THESIS

Why, I ask, was ‘scientific fabrication’ necessary at all if the ‘master narratives’ had already foreclosed the ‘other of man’? If the (im)possible perspective... of the native informant has been written (in the source texts of European ethico-political self-representation) in its failure to replace the proper signifier of man (s), the ‘scientific’ (which the scare quotes cannot but name false) fabrication of the other seems unnecessary. Unless, of course, what has been expelled in the master narratives had some sort of pristine (precolonial) ‘true’ essence or existence before its foreclosure, prior to its becoming the ‘mark of expulsion’ that false science would later fabricate. For if one forgoes the desire for a Real that holds a historic (cultural subaltern) I and engages the Symbolic as the moment of production of the transparent I and its other, the scientific mill will have to be taken seriously as the very locus of production of the ‘name of Man’ and of the ‘others’ who fail to signify it and ask how scientific strategies, the alibis that sustain racial and colonial juridical domination and economic exploitation, populate the global space with a variety of modern subjects, who neither preceded nor are coextensive with man, but have been produced using the same raw material assembled during the long period of his gestation.

When describing how they play out in the contemporary global configuration, Spivak belies how historical-materialist strategies, such as ideology, provided but partial critiques of modern (self-)representation. In various guises, she contends, “they still inhabit and inhibit our attempts to overcome the limitations imposed on us by the newest division of the world, to the extent that, as the North continues ostensibly to ‘aid’ the South—as formerly imperialist ‘civilized’ the New World—the South’s crucial assistance to the North in keeping up its resource-hungry lifestyle is forever foreclosed. In the pores of this book will be the suggestion that, the typecase of the foreclosed native informant today is the poorest woman of the South” (7, italics in the original). What I am suggesting is that only by relinquishing the desire to include “local cultures,” through the unveiling of truth and/or the recognition of history, is it possible to address the questions racial subjection imposes: What is the ontological context inhabited by the transparent I and the others that institute and interrupt it? Under what conditions do they emerge as such, as dominant and subaltern, that is, as political subjects? Asking these questions would certainly prevent Spivak from fully embracing historical materialism, but it would also avoid a conflation that performs another troubling foreclosure. I am referring here to the conflation suggested in the immediate connection between ideology and political economy nicely compounded in her construct “axiomatics of imperialism,” which evades an engagement with the heterogeneity of the “oppressed.”

Before and beyond the gendered and self-interested alliances with imperialism and global capitalism, Spivak’s global or postcolonial (economic and juridical) dominant and subaltern are also racial subjects, that is, effects of raciality. For the advantages of a critical position that scratches off the erasures, the place of silence, one that avoids the reinstitution of a transparent subject by rewriting the “native informant” as a “name for that mark of expulsion from the name of Man—a mark crossing out the impossibility of the ethical relations” (6, italics in the original)—can be lost if one does not acknowledge that the juridical and economic mapping of the global space is but one instance of the political relationship that institutes Europe and its others. While such a contentious relationship has been effected by the common gendered self-interests of the colonizer and the colonized (I am not sure whether it is a curse or a blessing for feminist theorizing), the privileging of political economy and patriarchy misses the subtleties of the contemporary global political play.

How can one map a political context in which the U.S. political and economic interests both select (Islamic) Pakistan as an ally in their “war against (Islamic) terrorism” and the domination of Muslim women and allow for the continuing violence against Muslims in India and Palestine—while on the home front Christian Arabs, Latinos, light-skinned blacks, South Asians, and slightly darker Jews may fall prey to domestic “terror fighting”? Whatever “old” religious and geopolitical signifiers are brought to bear in the twenty-first century’s renderings of “evil,” the conspicuous figure of the (bearded or not) brown man on airplanes indicates how the racial all too easily overrides political-economic interest as well as national, regional, and global borders. What do Spivak’s “postcolonial,” “South,” and “poorest woman of the South” have in common besides being economically exploited and juridically dominated by the “North”? How do the rhetorical strategies she identifies relate to the explicit exclusions noted by Goldberg (1993), Mills (1997), Eze (2001), and
Narcissus, I am convinced, ought never gaze at his own face. That the political-economic (capitalism in the shape of colonialism, imperialism, or globalization) and the political-symbolic (the racial and the cultural) engulfment of the globe produce the same peoples and places as “the oppressed,” “the dominated,” the subaltern, and “the South” seems a self-evident truth that should be left alone lest there remain no self-assured position for the critic to take. For the pervasiveness of the tools of the analytics of raciality in the contemporary global political grammar threatens the radicality of political-economic critiques and the righteousness of (anti-)racial statements in defense of “real,” truly all-encompassing (as opposed to “ideological,” “false”), universality and humanity, precisely because they consistently play the crucial role, which is to rewrite their indigenous place.

TOWARD AN ANALYSIS OF PRODUCTIVE POWER

Though I recognize the relevance of statements by Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Kant, and Hegel that explicitly place non-Europeans outside the trajectory of universal reason, I find the explicit exclusions they deploy insufficient to institute racial subjection. To map the locus of emergence of today’s global subaltern subjects, one should ask: After the consolidation of the rule of reason in the nineteenth century, which new political-symbolic arsenal accompanied the apparatuses of juridical domination and economic exploitation of the others of Europe? My response is that, after the demise of the divine ruler and author rendered conversion an inappropriate mode of engulfment, what else if not scientific universality could produce an ethical position consistent with the attributes of universality and self-determination the early modern philosophers have given to man. My engagement with the founding statements of modern thought departs from postmodern critics’ and racial theorists’ approaches precisely because I am interested in the most subtle and yet powerful tools of racial subjection, the ones that the sociology of exclusion (and its resilient metaphors “double consciousness,” the “veil,” and “the color line”) can never capture precisely because of its privileging of historicity—that which nurses projects of a “post-racial” future where the expansion of universality would finally include the others of Europe in the conception of being human that the transparency thesis produces. For racial subjection is as an effect of the desire that writes post-Enlightenment Europe in transparency and necessarily demands the obliteration of the others of Europe, historic strategies that cannot help the critical task.

Because I am convinced that the critical arsenal still lacks an engagement with modern representation that addresses this ontological context as a productive regimen governed by universal reason, the analytical strategy I introduce in the following chapter guides an excavation of modern thought through which I gather the statements that prepared the terrain for the formulation of the productive apparatus governing contemporary global political configuration. Much like Foucault’s excavations of the modern episteme, the critical analysis of modern representation that I propose departs from Kant’s definition of analysis because it considers not only the principles and conditions but also the consequences of knowledge, its political (productive) effects. When charting modern representation, like anyone who forfeits the comfortable grounds provided by a concrete and/or ideological outsiders, I am aware of the risk (and the necessity, I might add) of, as Jacques Derrida (1976) says, “falling back within that which is being deconstructed” (14). Taking from this risk the critical edge necessary to engage that which disallow anything from standing outside its determination, I gather certain statements that organize modern thought, which, set against each other, become useful tools for excavating the territory of transparency.

My small contribution to this task here is to situate the tools of the analytics of raciality, to describe the context of emergence, the regimen of production, and the effects of signification of the productive apparatus instituted by the scientific signifying strategies that transformed the descendants of yesterday’s “natives” into modern subaltern subjects. With this I hope to unravel the contradiction haunting critical analyses of racial subjection, which, while recognizing the political significance of the racial, repeat the moral mantra that it is extraneous to modern ethicopolitical grammar. To do so, I pursue a question preempted by the lament for the scientific minds that let “prejudices” and “ideologies” colonize the domain of “truth”: Why was it necessary, and why does it remain so, to deploy a concept that demarcates the limits of transparency if the latter’s transcendental determinant is without limits, encompassing time and space, here and there, past and future, everything and everywhere?
This question, I think, requires that the racial be placed at the center of the critique of modern representation, which should begin with an account of how scientific universality institutes man. My point of departure is the acknowledgment that historicity is haunted. And it is not because man houses at his core the phantasm of an “other” historic “being.” I deploy an analytical toolbox to decenter the transparency thesis, the ontological assumption that still governs the critical arsenal, to produce a modern contra-ontology, that is, an account of the transparent I that shows how it can emerge—in a relationship, always already contending with its others.

Homo Historicus

Ontology—once it is finally admitted as leaving existence by the wayside—does not permit us to understand the being of the black man. For not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man. Some critics will take it on themselves to remind us that his proposition has a converse. I say this is false. The black man has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man.

—FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASK
What Fanon's account of the "fact of blackness" suggests is a formulation of the modern subject in which speech announces the precedence of the text, of language, of writing—a promise not undermined even when he refuses dialectics but embraces eschatology to reposis humanity at the horizon of racial emancipation. Holding onto this promise, I find in Fanon's ([1952] 1967) account of racial subjection indications for a rewriting of the modern play that would reconcile his seemingly contradictory statements: "The black man is not a man" (9, my italics) and "The Negro is not. Anymore than the white man" (231, my italics). Following the road Fanon sighted but would not pursue, I excavate the founding texts of modern thought, from which I gather the outlines of two ontologisticontological contexts: the one Fanon refutes, which the black man fails to signify, and the one the analytics of raciaity produces, in which the black man and the white man emerge as signifiers of an irreducible difference. What I find in this excavation are precisely statements that allow me to situate the transparency thesis, the ontological assumption guiding modern representation, that is, the components of historical and scientific signification that would later be assembled in accounts of universal reason that emerged in the nineteenth century—Hegel's narrative of the trajectory of "Spirit" and the scientific projects that attempt to "discover" the truth of man—which consolidate reason as the sovereign ruler or producer of modern representation.
My description of the context of the emergence of the analytics of raciality suggests that the warnings of the mind without reason anticipate the version of the modern drama Fanon envisions but does not pursue. Though Nietzsche's madman probably guessed it, he never articulated that the killing of "God" condemned the subject to be haunted by universal reason. Modern philosophy has been moved by the need to reconcile a conception of reason as the new ruler of the universe with the most cherished attribute of man, that is, self-determination. Following the trajectory of self-consciousness from its initial outline, I indicate why the racial would constitute such a prolific strategy of power. I show how the statements that write it as the thing that thrives in the stage of interiority also delineate another ontomethodological moment, the stage of exteriority. Not surprisingly, Hegel's transcendental poesis, which consolidates self-consciousness as an interior/temporal thing, the transparent "I," the one that always already knows that it houses that which is not itself, also renders the nineteenth-century deployment of the racial both possible and necessary. Without that other moment in which "being" is always less than, farther from, an "other being," that is, exteriority/spatiality, the ontological priority of the interior/temporal thing would be meaningless, as Derrida (1976) argues. For the racial emerges in projects of knowledge that presume scientific universality, for which universal reason plays the role of an exterior determinant; in modern representation, it governs a conceptual context in which man emerges as an exterior or spatial thing, that is, globality, the one that escapes critical analysts of modern thought precisely because the ethical grip of the transparency thesis does not allow the decentering of historicity that its sighting demands.

In the following, neither a Foucauldian archaeological or genealogical exercise nor a straightforward use of Derrida's deconstruction, but somewhere between the two, I chart the context of the emergence of the analytics of raciality, the scientific arsenal that consistently rewrites post-Enlightenment European consciousness and social configurations in transparency. As I do so, however, I show how it accomplishes that which has haunted modern thought since the initial ascension of universal reason, namely, the writing of the mind in outer determination, that is, always already before, in a relationship, contending with "others," a version of the self-determined "I" that necessarily signifies "other"-wise.

The Critique of Productive Reason

The ghost has its own desires, so to speak, which figure the whole complicated sociality of a determining formation that seems inoperative (like slavery) or invisible (like racially gendered capitalism) but that is nonetheless alive and enforced. But the force of the ghost's desire is not just negative, not just the haunting and staged words, marks, or gestures of domination and injury. The ghost is not other or alterity as such, ever. It is (like Beloved) pregnant with unfulfilled possibility, with the something to be done that the wavering present is demanding. This something to be done is not a return to the past but a reckoning with its repression in the present, a reckoning with that which we have lost, but never had.

—AVERY GORDON, GHOSTLY MATTERS

Following the ghost, seeking the lost treasures it announces, reason's accused offerings that refigure nothing, require an exploration of the grounds it haunts—the recuperation of the site where the transparent "I" and its "others" emerge as such, necessarily before each other. My task in this chapter is to describe analytical position and the toolbox I deploy to write modern representation "other"-wise. Both enable the refashioning of modern representation as the modern text, an account of the symbolic that describes how the "being and meaning" universal reason institutes are manufactured as byproductive strategies that both presuppose and instigate a relationship—as presumed in Marx's (1956), Schmitt's (1976), and Foucault's (2003) renderings of the political in terms of contention, that is, as a moment
of human existence defined by (the possibility of) violence. What distinguishes my approach is the fact that it recuperates scientific signification to introduce a conception of political subjects as an effect of symbolic, productive violence. When doing so, it brackets the transparency thesis, thus abandoning the moral ban that entails fast rejections of raciality to show how, as a tool of productive reason, the racial produces both the transparent I and its others as modern political subjects.

When delimiting the analytical position and assembling the tools necessary to accomplish this task, I borrowed from the critical arsenal but more particularly from Foucault’s critique of power/knowledge and Derrida’s account of signification. Both allow me to show how the sovereign ruler of modern representation, universal reason, institutes the subjects inhabiting the contemporary global configuration. To those who may tremble before my reconciliation of Foucault’s and Derrida’s critical formulations, I can only say this: I am not reinventing gunpowder here. In Society Must Be Defended, Michel Foucault (2003) proposes an account of the political that indicates that these two postmodern critics were moving parallel to one another. In the lectures on which the book was based, he introduced the idea of a “race war” against both disciplinary power and the theory of sovereignty to capture another moment of modern power. While many may read Foucault’s “race struggle” as an immediate reference to the notion of the racial deployed in the nineteenth century—and he suggests as much—I prefer to read it as a metaphor that allows him to return the view of power as a “relationship of force,” thus recuperating the possibility of violence as a dimension of the concept of the political. He asks, “If power is indeed the implementation and deployment of a relationship of force, rather than analyzing it in terms of securitization, contract, and alienation, or rather than analyzing it in function terms as the reproduction of the relations of production, shouldn’t we be analyzing it first and foremost in terms of conflict, confrontation, and war?” (13). When entertaining a positive answer to this question, Foucault makes a move that suggests a mode of analysis of power that I find akin to Jacques Derrida’s account of signification and Immanuel Levinas’s critique of representation in that it conceives of violence as a dimension of power beyond the liberal formulation, which restricts the use of force to the state and considers only political acts of violence that target the state. This reconciliation is but a resolution of Foucault’s notion of productive power, Derrida’s notion of writing, and Levinas’s rendering of representation as “partial violation.” With these tools I delineate a critical position and assemble an analytical arsenal that addresses globality as an ontological context, whereas they describe the subject of universal reason as an effect of acts of productive violence, force, or power, as an outer determined thing always already in a relationship with (im)possible others.

THE CRITIQUE OF PRODUCTIVE “TRUTH”

In Michel Foucault’s critique of modern thought I find the suggestion that attention to scientific signification can situate historicity (interiority-temporality), the ontological descriptor the transparency thesis authorizes. When addressing the modern episteme, modern representation, as the regimen of signification governed by the “will to truth,” his analyses of power show how knowledge institutes the subject, that is, how the transparent I, the subject of freedom, is but an effect of the rules of production of truth, of the mode of power, which Foucault (1980) argues, “produces effects” at the level of desire and knowledge (69). When describing how “discourses of truth” produce modern subjects—the fundamentally political things, which are “subjected to the production of truth and yet] cannot exercise power except through the production of truth,” and “we must speak the truth” (93, italics in the original)—he introduces a notion of productive power that brackets the juridical and economic moments privileged in the liberal and the historical-materialist ontology. Nevertheless, while his rendering of power/knowledge—which I term here productivity—suggests the possibility of addressing the racial as part of the arsenal of the modern regime of “truth,” it has not animated such exploration because, beyond the explicit Eurocentrism many identify, Foucault’s analyses of the power retains interiority as the distinguishing feature of man.

What I am arguing here is that Foucault limits his critique of historicity to an engagement with temporality, thereby addressing but one dimension of the transparent I. In The Order of Things, Foucault (1994) describes the modern episteme emerging with the deployment of an “analytics of finitude,” the enveloping of the things of the world by temporality, which institutes man as the sovereign subject and privileged object of knowledge. Although he notes that
the apprehension of the “things of the world” also results from that which in man is “finite”—the contingent, “empirical, positive (body and language)”—he stops at the realization that the positive is continuously brought back into the “figure of the Same” (315). Lost in the assumption that thought (reflection) returns, and reduces everything it addresses, to the temporality of the self-determined (interior) subject of knowledge—the knowing mind, man’s transcendental moment—is an engagement with how knowledge (science) addresses human beings and social configurations as phenomena, as extended (exterior/spatial), “empirical” things. What has no place in Foucault’s description of the “analytics of finitude,” due to his decision not to navigate the territory opened up by his critique of modern ontology, is a consideration of how shifts in knowledge relate to economic and sexual moments of modern power/desire.

Precisely because it addresses the intersection of two productive political moments—the economic and the sexual—of deployment of European desire across the globe, the racial indicates that any critique of the figure at the center of modern representation should engage interiority, the attribute it has exhibited since its articulation in the founding statements of Western thought. In The History of Sexuality, Foucault’s (1978) considerations of race and sex as referents of power indicate why this is a thread he would not pursue. Although biopolitics indicates precisely the moment when the machinery of the racial and the arsenal of sexuality meet, he does not pursue the subject because, for Foucault, the racial belongs to another mode of power, the “symbolics of blood,” one that does not operate via the production of minds. From “the second half of the nineteenth century,” he argues, “the thematics of blood was sometimes called on to lend its entire historical weight toward revitalizing the type of political power that was exercised through the device of sexuality. Racism took shape at this point... it was then that a whole politics of settlement, ... accompanied by a long series of permanent interventions at the level of the body, conduct, health, and everyday life, received their color and their justification from the mythical concern with protecting the purity of the blood and ensuring the triumph of the race” (149). What prevents Foucault from fully incorporating the nineteenth-century concept of the racial in his critique of modern thought, I think, is not an empirical limitation—though such limitations are significant, as indicated in Stoler’s (1995) examination of how the discourse of race participates in the formation of bourgeois European sexuality—but his partial engagement with modern representation.

In his critique of “truth,” Foucault challenges self-determination with the Kantian argument that, rather than the liberating ground, universal reason is the (interior) ruler or producer of freedom. My point is that, because he locates that which escapes the reductive powers of the “Same” in a domain not yet charted by modern thought (the it-self, the unconscious, etc.), Foucault’s excavations do not reach the place where European particularity is but an effect of the strategies of this productive ruler. For this reason, though a crucial contribution to the critique of modern representation, his own deployments of the thesis of productivity remain within its limits because he does challenge the ontological prerogative of interiority that guides accounts that locate man in transparency. Had he relinquished interiority, Foucault would have contributed to our understanding of how the productive force of the racial ensues from the haunting spatiality he spots at the core of modern thought, but would never fully explore.

THE HORIZON OF DEATH

What Foucault’s analyses of power—as both disciplinary power and a “relationship of force”—signal but he does not explore is an analytical position that recuperates extension (exteriority/spatiality) from the statements that outline historicity as man’s sole and exclusive horizon of existence. It is only from such a position that it is possible to dismantle interiority precisely because of how it addresses an ontological horizon that does not presuppose a “being” that precedes the context it shares with that which it is not, namely, “other beings.” From what position does the transparent I contend with that which delimited its particular place? From the critical analytical position I delimited, I spot the ontological context where the Subject stands before the horizon of death. In globality, the ontoepistemological descriptor by which “the scientific” attempts to discover the truth of man, resides the racial. From there, I will show, it sustains the writing of post-Enlightenment Europe as the moment of transparency. As this critical position decents historicity, the ontoepistemological context the transparency thesis institutes, it displaces interiority, the portal to self-determination, to refashion modern representation.
as a productive context of power, the signifying strategies of which institute the subject as an effect of ontoepistemological contexts, namely, historicity and globality, instituted respectively by the texts of history and science.

In *Of Grammatology*, Jacques Derrida (1976) offers an account of signification that enables the carving out of this critical analytical position. His decisive move is to reject the symbolic prerogative of *interiority*, the assumption of an immediate connection (transparency) between speech and truth. By giving the trace—the unstable link between signifier and signified—signifying primacy, he provides an account of signification that indicates the possibility of recovering exteriority from the belly of Hegel's Transcendental Subject. When proposing that spatiality (writing, *différence*) is the fundamental locus of signification and subjectification, Derrida adds to the critical arsenal a tool that refuses this absolute referent, the transcendental I, that precedes and institutes signification. With this, it rewrites the transparent (interior/temporal) I as an effect of differentiation or relationality, of the symbolic regimen where “being and meaning” emerge always already in exteriority and violence, out of the erasure of other (im)possible beings and meanings the trace hopelessly signifies. What spatiality offers is the possibility of recuperating from the debris of the founding statements of modern representation the effects of its productive violent acts, that which, according to the transparency thesis, the subject is not but without which it cannot be.

Through the reconciliation of Foucault’s notion of productivity with his own framing of the political as a “relationship of force,” which allows me to resolve both in Derrida’s rendering of spatiality, I have identified an analytical position that centers relationship, outer determination, that is coexistence, contemporaneity, and contention. From this stance I engage modern subjects as the effect of a political-symbolic arsenal that situates them as always already before the horizon of death, the one instituted by spatiality that does not house I’s and the others that can be resolved—reduced or sublated—in dialectical, phenomenological, or psychoanalytical accounts of negation or projection. Because “being and meaning” here result from the deferring, the postponement, the erasure of other possible “beings and meanings”—which can be spotted only in the trace that both produces and threatens signification—the ontoepistemological context that spatiality demarcates displaces interiority to establish exteriority as the ruler of signification. Before the reader attempts to resolve this position back into an account of nothingness, I repeat that I am not constructing death as negation, as always already comprehended by being—as in Sartre’s ([1943] 1984) statement that “Being is that and outside of that, nothing” (36, italics in the original)—which would consist in another rehearsal of Hegel’s narrative of “Spirit,” which writes being, self-consciousness, as that which always already is everything that is not itself. Nor is it a “post” (colonial, modern or racial) version of Hegel’s lordship and bondsman passage because, it does not presuppose self-consciousness as a transparent I that has to contend with an always already racial or cultural transparent other. That is, I do not assume that those in contention, political subjects, precede their emergence in representation. Instead I conceive of them as political, because they emerge in signification, which, as Derrida suggests, itself presupposes and inaugurates a “relationship of force.”

More specifically, I draw from Levinas’s (1996) critique of modern representation the statement that the impulse to comprehend the “Other” (*Autrui*), necessarily establishes a relationship with another being that becomes both an “object of representation” and an “interlocutor.” To speak of the Other, he states, presupposes the possibility of speaking to the Other; it is to invoke the Other, which, in itself, is a productive moment. In Levinas’s statement, then, I find the suggestion that modern political-symbolic strategies can be read as productive acts that address (articulate and disavow) the Other and, in doing so, institute the “face of the other.” Though this analytical position recognizes productivity as a dimension of scientific signification, it also reads it as a “partial” violent gesture, that is, as engulfment. Put differently, I read the other to mark the writing of the others of Europe in a mode of representation that privileges interiority. That is, I read modern representation as a regimen that produces beings that refigure, as they postpone, the Other—“the sole being whose negation can only announce itself as total: as murder”; this “Other... is that which escapes comprehension in the other (*autrui*)... that which I cannot negate partially, in violence, in grasping him within the horizon of being in general and possessing him” (9). I read modern representation not as a total appropriation or obliteration of the Other, that mode of being that remains outside representation, which it both threatens and institutes. Fully
retained before the horizon of death, this Other, I claim, threatens another ontology it is the "Other of the [narrative of the] Same." As such, it refers to the mode of representation—before and beyond modern thought—to which the distinction between interiority and exteriority belongs, and for this reason, it indicates that universal reason can exercise its sovereign rule only as productive force.

When addressing the racial as the political-symbolic tool that institutes the global itself as an ontoepistemological signer, I do not, as Chakrabarty (2000) does, read the other of man as another historical (interior-temporal) I. The critical analytical position I adopt does not presuppose preexisting or coexisting (interior) beings the (textual) erasure of which enables the writing of Europe in transparency. My intent here is to target what modern thought has defined as the moment of exteriority, that is, scientific signification, to chart the conditions under which the others of Europe can be represented as such, and to indicate why this exercise is necessary if one is to rewrite modern social configurations "other"-wise. What allows me to give analytical primacy to the horizon of death is precisely my refusal to rehearse the ethical condemnation of scientific signification as a moment of production of the truth of man. For the signifiers of death I gather refer precisely to that which modern thought deems the moment of outer determination, precisely because, as Derrida suggests, they produce an account of difference as neither sublatable nor reducible to the Transcendental I. That is, the I and the (actual, possible, or potential) others it institutes emerge before one another—in contention, in a relationship that always already presumes the horizon of death. For this reason, the retrieval of exteriority, of the moment of outer determination, allows a contra-ontological argument, one that reads modern representation as a political-symbolic apparatus; that is, as once violent and productive.

When delimiting the ontoepistemological location the pair exteriority-spatiality institutes, I borrow and reformulate Roland Robertson's (1995) account of "globality" as a privileged site of differentiation, "the general conditions which facilitated the diffusion of general modernity" (27). My rendering of the term, however, maintains but reverses the relationship between present ontoepistemological conditions and modernity that Robertson suggests. Instead of the context of deployment of claims for universalization and differentiation, I deploy globality to situate historicity, the authorized ontological stance, to refashion the latter as one moment in which one can trace the emergence of modern subjects. With this, I introduce a critical account that captures how scientific signifiers enable and unsettle the writing of the proper man, the post-Enlightenment European subject, the only one to enjoy the privilege of transparency. For I will show how in this ontological context, globality, the horizon of death, scientific signification has deployed the racial to produce modern subjects that emerge in exteriority/affectability and exist between two moments of violence: (a) engulfment, that is, "partial negation," the productive violent act of naming, the symbolic appropriation that produces them, inaugurating a relationship precisely because, in the regimen of representation interiority governs, it institutes unsublatable and irreducible subjects, and (b) murder, total annihilation, that which obliterates the necessary but haunting relationship between an I instituted by the desire for transparency (self-determination) and the affectable, always already vanishing others of Europe that the scientific cataloging of minds institutes. When the racial writes Europeans and the others of Europe as subjects of exteriority, it institutes the body, social configurations, and global regions as signifiers of the mind. Therefore, the racial is an effect and a tool of the productive violent act that produces the global as a modern context of signification, one that refers to a mode of existing before historicity, the horizon of life, that the ontological context transparency thesis produces.

My critique of modern representation, then, recuperates the Global as a signifying context constituted by the materializations (effects and products) of scientific signifying strategies. Though I acknowledge the centrality of the human body, my reading of the science of man will show that, as a signifier of irreducible and unsublatable mental difference, the racial is relevant only to mark the difference between post-Enlightenment European and other contemporaneous, coexisting social configurations, when it transforms yesterday's religious conquerors and natives into modern subjects, racial (biological) things, to define the boundaries of that which has neither beginning nor end without displacing the transparency thesis. When describing globality as the horizon of death, I highlight how the ethical and ontological primacy of the transparency thesis,
which emerges in Hegel's narrative of self-actualized "Spirit" that institutes beings and meanings that gaze solely at the horizon of life, both necessitates and rejects the I's and the others the analytics of raciality produces. For the racial constitutes an effective political-symbolic strategy precisely because the subjects it institutes are situated differently, namely, in globality. While the others of Europe gaze on the horizon of death, facing certain obliteration, the racial keeps the transparent I in self-determination (interiority) alone before the horizon of life, oblivious to, because already knowledgeable (controlling and emulating) of, how universal reason governs its existence. Not surprisingly, critical analyses of racial subjection cannot explain the effects of power of the racial. Spreading before historicity, the effects of raciality are inaccessible to the arsenal that the sociohistorical logic of exclusion informs precisely because the latter assumes that the transparency thesis constitutes the sole modern ontological presupposition.  

READING "OTHER"-WISE  

From the analytical position productivity and spatiality demarcate, I engage the racial as a modern political-symbolic strategy by asking what the reader may consider counterintuitive questions such as: What needs to be articulated in the text of man, but can never become his locus of emergence? What needs to be postponed, for otherwise it would erupt to render the speech of the transparent I troublesome? Relinquishing the moral shelter of historicity, these questions guided my tracing of the path of self-consciousness—from its outline in Descartes's inaugural statement, which maintains the mind in interiority, to its consolidation in Hegel's formulation of the Transcendental I—where I found that exteriority was consistently articulated to write its particularity but immediately disavowed lest its exclusive attribute, self-determination, vanish. What I gathered in this return to the founding statements of modern thought, then, were formulations that enabled me to locate the place exteriority occupies in modern thought. By reassembling these formulations, I was able to reconfigure modern representation as the modern text, for I show how the play of reason is described in two moments of signification, the stage of interiority and the stage of exteriority, the strategies of which constitute the "metanarratives" of history and science that bring modern subjects into representation.  

When the modern text allows me to do is decenter the transparency thesis as I describe the signifying gestures—displacement, negation, and engulfment—that render exteriority an (im)possible ontological moment. When reading the founding statements of modern thought deployed between the seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries, I borrow Jacques Lacan's (1977) symbolic structures, "displacement" and "negation," symbolic tools that at once articulate and disavow signifiers of the Name of the Father, to describe the signifying gestures deployed to describe how universal reason plays its sovereign role. Each allows me to show how the effort to secure the exclusive attribute of self-consciousness, self-determination—the ability to know and decide about one's essence and existence—resulted in the outlining of two symbolic regions, the stage of interiority and the stage of exteriority, in which universal reason plays its sovereign role. The challenge facing early modern philosophers, I will show, was how to sustain the writing of man as a self-determined (interior) thing in a mode of thought grounded on the assertion of the possibility of knowledge with certainty, that is, scientific universality, to establish that the mind has access to, relates to, and is affected by things other than itself, that is, exterior things, and yet the latter play no role in the determination of its essence or existence; that is, they consistently managed not to write the I as an affectable thing. In other words, this statement that inaugurates modern representation has held through the postponement—displacement and negation—of the moment of the "Thing," the "Other," that is, the recurrent articulation and disavowal of that which is not the interior thing, the writing of that which fails to signify self-determination, exterior things, as ontoepistemologically irrelevant. What I spot in these founding statements are the components of the two symbolic regions of modern representation: (a) the stage of exteriority, where reason plays its sovereign role, that of universal nomos, as the regulative (constraining) force that governs the things of the world that are subjected to outer determination, that is, affectable things, and (b) the stage of interiority, where universal reason plays its sovereign role as universal poesis, the productive (representing) power that founds the tools housed in the mind of man.  

When I turn to Hegel's statements, I describe the consolidation of these two stages in the third symbolic gesture, engulfment, the one that transforms exteriority into a moment of the version of universal reason he deploys, that is, transcendental poesis, which consolidates the transparency thesis as the ruling ontoepistemological assumption.
From an analytical position that engages modern representation as a political-symbolic context composed by strategies of engulfment, I show how the spelling of the proper name of man, the writing of the transparent I, is also an effect of raciality. For I choose engulfment to describe the productive effects of modern (scientific and historical) signifying strategies precisely because, as a spatial metaphor, it brackets the transparency thesis, the ontological assumption consolidated in Hegel's transcendental poesis. Because it situates power and desire in "the place of interval"—which, as Luce Irigaray (1993) proposes, conveys a sense of "the displacement of the subject or of the object in their relations of nearness or distance"—engulfment as an account of productive power, "partial" violence, opens up a critical position that does not describe modern subjects and social configurations in transparency. Used here purportedly because it refers to one possible account of female power/desire, engulfment brackets the phallocentric narrative—informing conceptions of power as domination, penetration, and oppression—that writes post-Enlightenment Europe as the last act of the play of universal reason that resolves, hides, or dissipates everything else in the self-unfolding transcendental I.

For this reason, because the gesture that swallows, (trans)forms, without destroying, the critique of engulfment does not write yesterday's natives as affectable "I's," nor does it uncover signs of what was before as resistances, a gesture that attempts to recuperate the native as always already self-consciousness, as a historical thing, an other minor transparent I. Because yesterday's conquerors and natives have been (trans)formed by the political-symbolic apparatus, the analytics of raciality, which carves them as global subjects, I hope this critique of modern representation shows how, precisely because it threatens and guarantees the coherence and consistency of the transparency thesis, the racial necessarily institutes the transparent I and its others as unstable subjects; therefore, it announces (the possibility of) ontoepistemological accounts that do not (re)produce the regions of transparency and the regions of affectability that compose the contemporary global configuration.

**WHAT LIES AHEAD**

I hope the following will show that my rejection of the sociohistorical logic of exclusion may constitute an ethical violation, but it is not...
a radical departure from modern representation. By refashioning it as the modern text, I move to erase the distinction forcing the choice (haunting “post” critiques of modern thought) between universality and historicity. Not because I deem it irrelevant, but because it becomes significant only when both are comprehended in the principle of transcendentality that Hegel’s resolution of exteriority into interiority introduces. My point is that universality and historicity gain ethical authority only when transparency is assumed as an attribute of the collectivities they institute as modern subjects: as an attribute of reason, as the grounds for Habermas’s speech acts, as an attribute of Butler’s translatable “local cultures,” or even as Laclau and Mouffe’s new political subjectivities. That is, these writings of moral collectivities united by rationality (universality) or contingency (historicity) presume the transparency thesis, for they assume that interiority holds all that is necessary for the manufacturing of modern subjects.

For this reason, any radical remapping of the contemporary global configuration should neither rely on nor reassemble universality and historicity. Today’s global subalterns inhabit the ethical place the arsenal of raciality produces. Facing the horizon of death, they stand perilously before the moment of transparency. Hence, the critical task is to engage the regimen of signification that composes this horizon of existence. For this reason, I acknowledge the productive powers of the modern “Will to Truth” and move to chart the modern text, the signifying context it produces, where I will gather the arsenal and effects of scientific signification. What I do in this mapping of the context of the emergence of the arsenal of raciality is to displace the transparency thesis, the ontological assumption informing both (a) critiques of juridical universality, which deploy the sociohistorical logic of exclusion to account for social subjection, and (b) critical racial analyses premised upon historicity, the ones that attempt to lift “the veil” and exhibit the racial subaltern in transparency. This gesture requires the retrieval of scientific universality from the waters of transcendental poesis, the one that institutes transcendentality as the ethical principle that guides the writing of post-Enlightenment European consciousness and social configuration in transparency. As I excavate the locus of the play of reason that scientific reason composes, the stage of exteriority, I find the regimen of production of raciality in the scientific projects that attempt to discover how the “laws of nature” produce mental and social configurations.

I will show that without this political-symbolic arsenal it would be impossible to hold onto what transcendental poesis promises but cannot deliver because it is constrained by interiority, that is, the delimitation of the moment of transparency. For the arsenal of raciality does precisely that when it produces both (a) the affectable (subaltern) subjects that can be excluded from juridical universality without unleashing an ethical crisis and (b) the self-determined things who should enjoy the entitlements afforded and protected by the principle of universality said to govern modern social configurations.

Disregarding how scientific universality governs strategies of racial subjection enabled the 1980s celebrations or mourning of the demise of the Subject, which all too quickly and uncritically constructed the now “liberated” cultural others as minor transparent subjects. Two decades later, these cultural (historical) subalterns, still subjected to economic exploitation and dispossession, meet the force of law (juridical universality) almost exclusively in its punitive instantiation, in the policing of immigrants and refugees and the threat of self-righteous neoimperial violence. Haunted by what lies before it, this book spells out its own limitations. But I claim no innocence. My project is indebted to recent critiques of modern thought—here I include postmodern, poststructurist, and feminist contributions and the finest specimens of postcolonial writings (with all the overlappings) that decenter and “provincialize” Europe. I hope to push the critical task further, with an engagement with modern representation that does not remain prisoner to its terms. I do not claim to have located a critical position outside modern representation. I merely offer a modern contra-ontology, that is, a selective excavation of modern thought that seeks for what has to be postponed, but never obliterated, in fashions of the transparent I, the homo historicus, to write its trajectory “other”-wise.
claim for "racial commonality" is a negative, an added ideological strategy to institute national homogeneity, which as noted before has resulted in its being considered a political category only when it operates as an exclusionary strategy. My reading of the U.S. American and the Brazilian national texts departs from this view, for I engage in a charting of the effects of the deployment of raciality in statements that write these nations' particularity. My objective is to show how the particular appropriations of the signifying strategies produced by the science of man, anthropology, and race relations have enabled the writing of these American subjects within the moment of transparency. With this, I introduce a critical strategy of social analysis that privileges the political-symbolic moment of modern social configurations. Instead of historicity, I read statements that write national subjects as political (historic) texts that include signifiers of historicity and globality. I hope to indicate how the historical subject is always already a racial "I"; it emerges situated, always already produced in relation to an "other," a racial "other," for both are produced in signifying contexts constituted by historic and scientific strategies. In other words, I read the national subject, the particular subject of transcendental poesis, as also a product of the analytics of raciality.

The national text captures a full-fashioned homo modernus, a specimen of the homo historicus that stands, as another specimen of the homo scientificus, before the affectable I's the racial institutes— that is, a global/historical subject. That is, the national text addresses narratives of the nation as an instance of productive violent political statements that reproduce the "others of Europe" as affectable consciousness (fully submitted to the tools of nomos) in order to re-place the national (historical) subject in transparency. My reading shows how, when deployed in these historical texts, the arsenal of raciality authorizes projects of social (re)configuration as it prescribes how its inhabitants participate in the nation's present and how they will perform in its future without ever accounting for their being placed in its past; it shows how the analytics of raciality institutes historical subjects; how it delimits the telenology, the particular version of transcendental poesis; how its political-symbolic strategies produce the national subject as a specimen of the homo modernus, that is, as a global/historical subject.

The Spirit of Liberalism

To me most certainly the United States did not seem a foreign country. It was simply English with a difference.

—JOHN G. BROOKS, AS THE OTHERS SEE US

Notwithstanding the U.S. liberal-capitalist configuration, at the turn of the twentieth century Europeans still questioned whether their North American cousins were building a "modern civilization." Most doubted that its "progress," economic prosperity, and democracy actualized a particular historical collective, that the people of the United States constituted a "spiritual individuality," that is, a nation. In Brander Matthews's (1926) reply to an unnamed French journalist, he indicates that such doubting could not be taken lightly: what Europeans call a "money-making" attitude behind U.S. economic prosperity, he says, was inherited from Pilgrim settlers whose courage and aggressiveness were pivotal for the conquest of the wild American land. Many late nineteenth-century commentators on the "American civilization" also noted the harmful effects of its juridical configuration, how "unlimited equality" affected the emerging American "spirit," how it would prevent the development of distinct moral and aesthetic principles. Linking political equality and the decline of "civilization" in this way was not new. Earlier in the nineteenth century, Tocqueville (1969) had observed that, of the principles U.S. Americans had inherited from their European ancestors, democracy
had been the one they had developed the most. “Equality of conditions,” he recognized, was the necessary outcome of “progress,” but the United States was the only “modern civilization” where democracy had a firm hold on institutions and “mores.” Nevertheless, political equality threatened the nation’s “spirit.” The “power of majority,” its heightened moral and political authority, he argued, posed a serious threat to “the institutions and the character” of the United States. Not only does majority rule hamper political dissent and, by concentrating power in the hands of lawmakers, considerably weaken the executive’s authority; it also stunts artistic genius. “Literary genius,” he observed, “cannot exist without freedom of spirit, and there is no freedom of spirit in America” (256).

What supported Europeans’ statements on the ill effects of “unlimited equality” if democracy constituted the greatest gift post-Enlightened Europeans claimed to have given to humanity? Matthew Arnold’s (1888) comments on the “civilization of the United States” suggest that they aimed at demarcating a moral distinction between the United States and Europe. The United States, Arnold recognizes, had answered the political and economic challenges of “modern civilization,” but it had yet to achieve that which characterizes “civilization” itself, the realization of the higher “ends” of humanity. Precisely that which enabled U.S. Americans to accomplish the economic aims of modernity, Arnold notes, prevented the development of that quality necessary for “spiritual progress,” the building of “complete human life” (3), that is, a “sense of distinction.”

Everything in America, Arnold claims, “is against distinction . . . and against the sense of elevation to be gained through admiring and respecting it. The glorification of the ‘average man’ . . . is against it” (9). Most probably, then, accusations of lack of “distinction,” of “spirit,” were reactions to U.S. Americans’ celebration of their rapid accession to global political-economic hegemony. Regardless of the possible motives, these comments on U.S. Americans’ “culture and civilization” are significant because, when deployed to differentiate U.S. Americans from Europeans, they conveyed an irreducible (spatial) difference to which writers of the U.S. American nation immediately responded.

My task in this chapter is to describe how the arsenal of the analytics of raciality enables articulation of the U.S. American subject as a transparent “I” as it dissipates the distance between the American and the European continent by writing the white (Anglo-Saxon) body as a signifier of a European consciousness. What my analysis of statements deployed between the 1880s and the 1930s will show is how the articulation of racial difference institutes an ontological account in which the bridging of this distance, which represents colonial dislocation, enables the writing of the U.S. “spirit” as a further developed manifestation of post-Enlightenment European principles. Following the narrative of transcendental poiesis, the writers of the U.S. American nation deploy statements that produce a transparent I and a social configuration that actualize the principles this version of the play of reason sustains, namely, universality and self-determination. When doing so, however, they face a challenge that is only imitated in the European commentaries described earlier but that is explicitly articulated in their writings, which is the fact that, by the late 1800s, globality already informed fashionings of self-consciousness. For not only is the United States situated in a different global region; it also had to deal with the effects of early colonial deployments of European power and desire—more specifically, the appropriation of lands, resources, and labor, out of which the United States itself emerged—which produced social configurations Europeans were condemned to share with their “others.”

It is not surprising that racial difference would become, and remains, a crucial political-symbolic strategy in ontologies of the U.S. subject and the guiding signifier of descriptions of the U.S. social configuration. Without the white body, the writers of the U.S. nation would not be able to resolve the distance that threatens to locate it in affectability, as European comments on its lack of “spirit” and “distinction” suggest, regardless of its economic and juridical accomplishments, nor would they be able to ensure that the U.S. social configuration, “progress” itself, actualizes a self-consciousness that could have and had emerged only in Europe; that is, they would not be able to write the U.S. American as a specimen of homo historicus, a transparent I. What I gather in these writings is an ontological account, the national text, in which self-consciousness always already emerges in contention, in a relationship that takes place at the level of the symbolic, one in which the transparent I becomes (comes into being as a self-determined thing) against that which needs to be written as not the same as itself, that is, an affectable “other,” the bearer of a difference that cannot be resolved (sublated or reduced)
in time. In short, my reading shows how the U.S. national subject, the liberal "I" actualized in the U.S. social (juridical, economic, and moral) configuration, was manufactured at the same time and with the same political-symbolic strategies, the tools of raciality, that produced its subaltern "others." As I do so, I indicate that the unequal placing of the descendants of the "others of Europe" before the principle of universality, the one said to alone govern the U.S. juridical and economic moments, was not an immediate effect of their God-given racial traits—resulting from prejudice, false beliefs and ideologies, and acts of discrimination—but that racial difference, the strategy of particularization that has produced the U.S. American as a European being, has also governed these moments of the U.S. social configuration as it has established the ethical place, the one transcendental rules, on which the latter alone stands.1

"WE, THE (ANGLO-SAXON) PEOPLE"

Madison Grant’s call for action, unleashed in his introduction to Lothrop Stoddard’s (1920) The Rising Tide of Color against White World Supremacy, conveys a message repeated in most statements on U.S. American particularity that proliferated in the first decades of the twentieth century. Hegel’s "land of the future" was under a threat, invaded by Eastern and Southern European immigrants from the East, blacks from the South, and Chinese and Japanese from the West. In the thirty years preceding the First World War, the physical frontier was being replaced by the "rising of the industrial metropolis" (Paxton 1920).2 Not only did this period see the appearance of the automobile, the introduction of Taylorism, city planning, the beginnings of suburbanization and urbanization, and the efforts to improve adult education and scientific farming; it also witnessed the first wave of Eastern and Southern European immigration. Between 1900 and 1910, three million foreign-born whites resided in the United States.3 The demographic changes animating Madison Grant’s call on the ("Anglo-Saxon") working class to maintain the "racial integrity" of the nation, which they eventually heard as the ambiguous alliances between organized labor, farmers, the federal government, and reformers of all kinds,4 guaranteed the passage of a number of legislative acts that aimed not only to "restrict the voracity of big monopolies" and to promote social reforms, but also to restrict immigration (Wish 1945). Moreover, as many historians have noted, U.S. prosperity did not result only from the accumulation of large individual fortunes and capitalist smartsness; the rise of the country to the status of major global economic power was also attributed to a political reconfiguration.5 The most important political event was the "segregation compromise," which gave Southerners the freedom to deal with the black population at their discretion. The "North abandonment of the Negro," as Beard (1913) states, was consolidated in a juridical statement, the Supreme Court decision to uphold the Southern states’ claims that "race relations" belonged to the domain of the private. The compromise that enabled the political unification crucial to the thorough industrialization of the U.S. American space, which facilitated the United States’ subsequent global predominance, also entailed deployments of "partial" violations (Jim Crow legislation) and "total violations" (lynchings), which resulted in the first large black movement northward. In short, transregional and intranational migratory movements would become crucial in the writing of the U.S. American text, in the definition of who among the inhabitants of the United States should enjoy the benefits of "progress."6

What I find in the statements deployed between 1880 and 1930 is the fashioning of a global/historical consciousness, that is, the writing of the U.S. nation through the articulation of signifying strategies belonging to both regions of modern representation, namely, science and history. Following the prevailing narrative of transcendental poesis, these statements wrote the trajectory of the U.S. American subject as the realization of a transparent historic signifier, the nation, which they eventually heard as the ambiguous alliances between organized labor, farmers, the federal government, and reformers of all kinds,4 guaranteed the passage of a number of legislative acts that aimed not only to "restrict the voracity of big monopolies" and to promote social reforms, but also to restrict immigration (Wish 1945). Moreover, as
place of the national subject, for they delimited the inhabitants of this postslavery polity whose ideas actualized and actions expressed the principles articulated in its juridical and economic dimensions, that is, universality and self-determination. On the one hand, whiteness connected bodily configuration to global region, instituting the American strand of the Anglo-Saxon and later Eastern and Southern European immigrants as proper signifiers of a transparent I. On the other hand, the physical attributes of Indians, blacks, and Asian immigrants became, as the text of race relations captures, signifiers of threatening but affectable consciousnesses that were either irrelevant (Indians and blacks), or would certainly perish, as U.S. (European/white) Americans fulfilled their historical destiny, that is, the building of a social configuration governed by universality and freedom (as individual self-determination). With this physical attributes produced a moral differentiation, the distinction between subjects of transparency and affectability, which does not challenge the view that the U.S. American social configuration expresses post-Enlightenment European principles.

Following the spirit of transcendental poesis and the letter of productive nomos, these statements wrote the particularity U.S. American subject as an effect of Anglo-Saxon spiritual (moral) attributes. For instance, Strong (1885) claims that Americans' value of freedom and their religiosity were fundamental expressions of their European inheritance. "The Anglo-Saxon," he claims, "is the representative of two great ideas, which are closely related. One of them is that of civil liberty. Nearly all of the civil liberty in the world is enjoyed by Anglo-Saxons: the English, the British colonists, and the people of the United States" (25). Notice that this claim was not just a defense of a self-attributed racial superiority. When claiming liberty (self-determination) as a monopoly of the "Anglo-Saxon race," Strong establishes who among the inhabitants of the United States should be recognized as the proper social (juridical and economic) subjects. Moreover, the writing of U.S. Americans as a current of the Anglo-Saxon race also enabled the particular temporal trajectory of the American subject to be written in its discontinuity with English history without threatening claims of belonging in the moment of transparency.

In The American People, Maurice Low (1917) indicates this when stating that, contrary to the opinion shared by most Europeans, the U.S. American people constituted a nationality that actualized fundamentally European (English) principles. "What the founders of the Republic in the beginning—and these were Englishmen and remained Englishmen until they became Americans—have endured," he argues, remains "fundamentally the same as it was then, inspired by English training and English tradition; unchanged by other forces than English" (9). What transformed these "Englishmen" into "Americans" was, according to Low, turning away from England and identifying their economic interests with the new land. Against the (European) argument that freedom and equality hindered the development of a U.S. American spirit, Low spells out the particular features of the American spirit, its peculiar contribution to "modern civilization." Unquestionably, he claims, the United States constituted a modern nation. What kind of nation? Low's answer to this question conveys the sense of "essential" unity and individuality Hegel defines as crucial to the "Spirit of a People." The U.S. American nation is not only the passive product of its past; it is also a self-productive thing that strives to maintain and assert itself in the midst of all differences. In his description, Low indicates all the attributes of the U.S. American historical subject. "The elements that go to constitute a Nation are many, and all must be present to form nationality," he argues. Low lists various elements that can be divided into those pertaining to (a) the scene of regulation, internal juridical configuring, that is, "an unchallenged possession of the country from which a people derive their national name; a common attachment to the political and social system that they have created or that has descended to them; a belief in their own strength and individuality"; (b) the scene of representation, common cultural or moral attributes, that is, "a common language...; a universality of religion or a tolerance of religion, that makes religion a matter of conscience between man and man and not under the control of the state; a literature that is truly national—i.e., that is based on heroic achievement or a struggle in defense of an ideal or to widen an idealistic conception"; and (c) the scene of engulfment, which situates the nation in the global space, that is, a "dominant virility that enables a people by imposing their own civilization to absorb and assimilate into themselves aborigines and aliens so that they become a part of, and do not remain apart from, the dominant race; uniform... code of moral and manners, so that in language as in thought, men find..."
the same forms of action. Morality is not merely a matter of latitude, and there is no meridian of ethics; he who utters a sublime thought has a Nation for his audience” (1930–31).

In other words, Low writes the U.S. American as a historical subject whose particularity is an effect of its liberal spirit. He describes the history of the United States as the actualization of English principles—in its language, literature, and morality—introduced by the first colonists and written in the nation’s constitution and that remained unchanged despite contacts with the original natives of the American space, slavery, and later European immigration. “The institutions and ideals of America are English,” he claims, “and although there was a simultaneous colonization of America by the English, the French, the Spanish, the Dutch, and the Swedes, it is only English speech and English customs and English ideals that have survived” (424). Low’s statement is important because it constructs the U.S. American nation as the outcome of the deployment of English desire in the American space, modified only to meet the specificities of its environmental (geographic) conditions. More important, it deploys the grammar of the U.S. national text, which reappears in other rewritings. The demarcation of the place of this “English” subject, however, would require a construction of other inhabitants of the American space as consciousness that did not participate in the unfolding of the subject of “world history.” In the following I show how the deployment of the racial to write Indians, blacks, and Asian immigrants in affectability instituted the logic of exclusion, which the arsenal of race relations so successfully captured and reproduced.

“Wild Woods”

Needless to say, the construction of the American continent as “empty land” has been central in the fashioning of self-consciousness as the liberal subject itself. When indicating how labor constitutes the basis for claims for private property, for instance, Locke (1690/1947) constructs “America” as a land that remains in the “state of nature” as “the wild woods and uncultivated waste . . . left to nature, without any improvement, tillage, or husbandry” (139)—as if its inhabitants had failed to exceed the command of the law of nature (the law of reason) and act upon nature to produce more than that which is necessary for the preservation of human life. From Locke’s formulation of property ownership as a requirement for “full participation in civil society” (Bauman and Briggs 2003) through the Enlightenment’s, the science of man’s, and the anthropological constructions of “civilization” that combine both meanings, the economic and political, to produce yesterday’s “natives” as collectivities whose trajectories were oblivious to the determinants of freedom to Turner’s deployment of the “frontier” to signify, as C. L. R. James (1993) writes, “the heroic quality of American individualism” (101), the figure of the American Indian wrote particularity, the place of the U.S. American subject in globality, for his obliteration constituted the condition of possibility for the building of a liberal-capitalist social configuration in the American continent.

Not surprisingly, the American “native” has from the outset occupied a troubled juridical position (Wilkins 1997). In the U.S. founding juridical documents, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, Indian tribes appear as foreign polities with which the newborn state would engage in the way sovereign collectivities relate to others, namely, trade, treaties, and war. Not long after the institution of the U.S. state, however, it was evident that two (or more) sovereign political bodies would not occupy the same territory, at least not when the economic configuration of one of them increasingly required more and more of the other’s lands, natural resources, and exploitable labor. In Worcester vs. Georgia (1832) the Supreme Court decided against Georgia’s claims of police rights in Cherokee land—the objective was to control white persons’ access to mines found in that territory—by recalling that “the Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities retaining their original natural rights as undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular region claimed, and this was a restriction which those European potentates imposed on themselves, as well as on the Indians.” However, as Justice John Marshall had indicated the previous year—when delivering the court’s opinion in Cherokee Nation vs. Georgia (1831) he asked: “Do the Cherokees constitute a foreign state in the sense of the constitution?”—the Indian would be contemplated in juridical statements only to signify the land itself. For Marshall acknowledges that “the condition of the Indians
in relation to the United States is perhaps unlike that of any other two people in existence. In the general, nations not owing a common allegiance are foreign to each other. The term foreign nation is, with strict propriety, applicable by either to the other. But the relation of the Indians to the United States is marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere else. The Indian Territory is admitted to compose a part of the United States. In all our maps, geographical treaties, histories, and laws, it is so considered.  

Even in the most idyllic moment of U.S. romanticism, the Indian is identified with nature—not Kantian nature, which was already a product of “pure reason,” but the Lockean version of the “state of nature,” that product of divine creation yet to be modified/appropriated by the rational thing. In statements on the U.S. American subject, the Indian is articulated to signify “the frontier,” the “empty land” that served as the main trope in the writing of the U.S. subject; that is, the “native American” emerges as the embodiment of the wilderness upon which U.S. American subjects would inscribe their “civilization.” That is, “regardless of whether the Indian was savage or noble,” as Berkhofer (1979) argues, “he would inevitably be replaced by White civilization. The transition from wild, savage nature to a cultivated, domesticated garden in the American West was believed to be as certain as the westward movement of progress had been in European history” (92). The brief references to Indians in the writing of the U.S. American nation deployed between the 1880s and the 1930s indicate how the “original” inhabitants of the American space were written as those whose obliteration enabled the actualization of the U.S. American subject.  

For the most part, these statements rehearsed the mid-nineteenth-century romanticism and referred to the earlier phase of Puritan settlement to construct the native inhabitants of the American space as those who, despite some “unfortunate” wars, had collaborated with the deployment of European power or desire in the “North.” However, in the last phase (the middle to late 1800s) of the appropriation of the lands of the native of the American space, the final occupation and incorporation of the West and the Southwest, the “Indian” was articulated to signify the superiority and effectiveness of “Anglo-American civilization.” These perspectives are implicit in Low’s (1911) observation that, although the “Indian” had “exercised a certain influence upon the civilization of the white man,” he was never able to impose his civilization on the Englishman or American, nor did “he in any lasting way modify or temper the civilization of the white man” (239). Certainly here we meet anthropology’s “vanishing native.” However, unlike U.S. twentieth-century anthropologists, who produced this figure as they traveled about seeking to rescue their “cultures” to include in the mosaic of humanity, these writers of the U.S. nation emphasized the “vanishing”; that is, they wrote the Indians’ trajectory as a movement toward certain obliteration. Indians were vanishing, Hill (1933) argues, because they “were doomed from the beginning; yet for almost three hundred years they struggled to push back the white man. Their tragic failure has left with many Americans a curious sense of their unimportance” (17). Indeed, the statements that produced the obliteration of “the Indian” in the U.S. national text also reveal that the American Indian has never been unimportant to the writing of the U.S. American nation (Berkhofer 1979). Because the frontier indicated the “ever-receding” completion of the engulfment of the world west of Europe by European power or desire, “Indians” signified the boundaries of the U.S. American nation, the condition of possibility for the deployment of U.S. American desire. What I find here is the writing of the European and the Indian in an ontological context, globality, in which the former emerges as always already victorious in the “relationship of force,” the contention necessary for the appropriation of these North American lands, because it produces this particular “other of Europe” as intrinsically affectable consciousness. The “vanishing Indian” instituted in the writings of the U.S. American subject has remained a conspicuous juridical-moral figure whose troubling position comments on the primary effect of the engulfment of the descendants of yesterday’s American “natives,” which has been to produce subjects that, though modern, do not inhabit the moment of transparency, that is, modern subjects that gaze but at the horizon of death.

“[E]masculated by a Peculiarly Complete System of Slavery”  
On 2 February 1865, the U.S. Senate passed the bill that created the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands in the War Department. Before the Freedmen’s Bureau was a crucial task, as W. E. B. Du Bois (1986) recalled in 1903: “The United States government definitely assumes charge of the emancipated Negro as the
ward of the nation. . . . Here at the stroke of a pen was erected a gov-
ernment of millions of men,—and not ordinary men either, but black
men emasculated by a peculiarly complete system of slavery" (378).
It was a task whose significance was proved by another compromise;
the 1877 Hayes-Tilden agreement, in which Democrats retracted
their challenge to the election results in Florida, Louisiana, and South
Carolina that guaranteed Hayes's election, ensured the inclusion of
Southern Democrats in Hayes's administration and support for the
expansion of a railroad system in the South. Bell (2000) describes the
effect of this political compact on Southern blacks: "The loss of pro-
tection for their political rights presaged the destruction of economic
and social gains which blacks in some areas achieved. Blacks lost
businesses and farms, progress in the public schools was halted, and
the Jim Crow laws that would eventually segregate blacks in every
aspect of public life began to emerge" (52).

Earlier in this chapter I argued that to understand blacks' subjec-
tion in the United States it is necessary to read statements on slavery
beyond the argument that it instituted a contradiction at the core of
a polity governed by universality and self-determination. Though
I address that U.S. juridical construction of and remedies to racial
injustice, I think that the particular U.S. mode of racial subjection
is consistent with ruling liberal principles. I also think that the most
crucial dimensions of this consistency disappear in arguments such
as (a) that whites' self-interest has guided legal and policy deci-
sions regarding the protection of U.S. blacks' civil rights (Bell 2000,
53–63), (b) that civil rights legislation has failed because it was met
with whites' mobilization (Lipsitz 1998), and (c) that throughout
U.S. history the law has had more than an instrumental role, that in
fact it has "constructed race," and that, as Crenshaw and her col-
leagues (1995) write, "racial power [is] the sum total of the pervasive
ways in which law shapes and is shaped by 'race relations' across the
social plane" (xxv).

Although racial difference governs the U.S. American social con-
figuration, the writing of U.S. blacks' absence that it enables more
crucially indicates how the attribution of affectability institutes sub-
jects that are comprehended in juridical universality. What I gather
in statements deployed between the 1880s and the 1930s—precisely
the period from the end of Reconstruction to just before the be-
ingning of the dismantling of segregation—is the resignification of
black difference, from the construction of blackness as a signifier of
property, which was sustained by both natural history's account of
"race and the varieties of men" and the religious text in which 
slaves, like other things of the world, became signifiers of their own-
ers' ability to follow the (economic) divine law of nature, to the
writing of blackness and Africanity as signifiers of an affectable
consciousness fully outer-determined, that is, to the tools of produc-
tive nomos and the institutions and actions of transparent subjects
of whiteness. Throughout its history both the juridical and the eco-
monic moments of the U.S. social configuration have presupposed
the bearers of the principles actualized by the transparent I. If in the
years preceding the Civil War the Southern (moral-economic) differ-
ence indicated how blacks departed from that which had defined the
U.S. American subject, the compromise of 1877 marked the moment
at which black difference, as racial difference, would signify that de-
parture. Not, however, as the ever-vanishing affectable "others," but
as the inhabitants of a moral-juridical place, a region of subalternity,
which coexists within social configurations built by the transparent
(Anglo-Saxon) I. That is, blacks' affectability would remain, for the
most part, tied to Southern difference as long as the racial govern-
ing of the U.S. social configuration threatened to disturb post–World
War II economic projects that required the resources and labor of
others of Europe still residing in their "original" global regions.

What I gather in these post-Reconstruction writings of the U.S.
American nation is a resolution of blacks' presence in Southern dif-
fERENCE, that is, the writing of their absence in the U.S. juridical
moment, beyond the reach of the U.S. Constitution. Not because
these statements did not refer to them, but more precisely because
when they did so they placed them in the fundamental split in the
American space produced by the two distinct modes of deploy-
ment of European power/desire as blacks were incorporated into
and conflated with constructions of the Southern difference. That
is, the engulfing of blacks in regions of subalternity, the process
captured by the sociologic of exclusion, resulted from how, in the
early twentieth-century United States, racial difference retained the
moral-juridical split initially articulated in statements on Southern
difference. In these statements, the moral split between the always
already modern Puritan "North" and the always already traditional
English cavalier "South" was resignified as a split between white and
black U.S. Americans. Hence, although the formulations of the science of man enabled the writing of their fundamental affectability, as indicated in Ross's (1919) comment that “blacks were dying out” after Emancipation because they could not meet the challenges of a “modern civilization,” the engulfing of U.S. blacks resulted from the writing of the “Negro problem” as the Southerners’ problem in statements that rescued the U.S. South from its moral distance. For instance, Low (1961) argues that “slavery in the South, was no mere social excrescence as it was in the North, where it was not woven into the fabric of society and did not color the thought, political institutions, the daily life and the commerce of a people” (492). More important, blacks’ erasure from the juridical place occupied by the U.S. American subject occurred in the writing of segregation, which, unlike slavery, would not concern the U.S. state and was construed as an exclusively Southern question, as Myrdal’s (1944, 1962) classic study on racial relations exemplifies.

No other statement more consistently articulates how racial difference governs the U.S. moral dimension, that is, its political-symbolic moment, than the landmark juridical decision that authorized segregation. In Plessy vs. Ferguson (1896), the Supreme Court was called on to rule whether an 1890 act of the General Assembly of the state of Louisiana, which provided for “separate railway carriages for the white and colored races,” violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. In its decision the court did more than merely determine whether Louisiana acted within the law when Plessy was charged for failing to obey the railroad official who asked him to move to the car allocated for his group. The court ruling also drew the line separating blackness from whiteness and delineated the domain to which the relations between blacks and whites belonged. When dismissing the petition that Louisiana’s ruling violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, the court argued that the designation of distinct railroads accommodations based on existing color distinctions did not constitute an attempt to promote “involuntary servitude,” nor did it question the “legal equality of the two races.” What, then, were the arguments deployed to support the decisions that would become the basis for all subsequent black civil rights rulings? On the one hand, the court ruling articulated what was implicit, because it was yet to be articulated, in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. It deployed racial difference to place the “relations” between blacks and whites rightfully outside the sphere of the state. Its reinterpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment moved the relations between blacks and whites from the civil (legal) domain to the (newly born) social (moral) domain and established that the unequal basis of their relations was a matter of social (moral) distance and not political inequality. “The object of the Amendment,” the opinion of the Court states, “was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of things, it could not have been intended to abolish distinction based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, and even requiring their separation in places where they are liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have been generally, if not universally recognized as within the competency of the state legislature in the exercise of their police powers” (68).9

When stating that the state of Louisiana had reasonably exercised its “police powers,” the Supreme Court ruling indicates why the deployment of racial difference to separate the moral (“social”) from the political (juridical) accomplishes what neither the Constitution nor the Emancipation Proclamation could. It established that, concerning the Fourteenth Amendment, “the case reduces itself to the question of whether the statute of Louisiana is a reasonable regulation . . . In determining the question of reasonableness [Louisiana's legislature] is at liberty to act with reference to the established usage, customs, and traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good order. Gauged by this standard, we cannot say that a law which authorizes or even requires the separation of the two races in public conveyances is unreasonable or more obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment than the acts of Congress requiring separate schools for colored children in the District of Columbia, the constitutionality of which does not seem to have been questioned, and the corresponding acts of state legislatures” (72). When it placed “race segregation” outside the scope of the U.S. Constitution, the court placed “the Negro” beyond the moral-juridical terrain, the principles of which the U.S. American subject actualizes, and therefore undeserving of the protections and entitlements they sustain.
By naming these masters local, private, or social rather than national, public, or political the court situated blacks outside the ethical terrain occupied by the U.S. American people. In this movement, blackness and whiteness came to signify the moral split of the U.S. American space, but still within Southern difference, which only reinforced the writing of the space of the U.S. social configuration as the actualization of universality and self-determination. "The argument," the opinion of the Court proceeds, "also assumes that social prejudices may be overcome by legislation and that equal Rights cannot be secured to the negro except by an enforced commingling of the two races. We cannot accept this proposition. If the two races are to meet on terms of social equality, it must be the result of natural consent of individuals." The Plessy court, however, did not need to wait for science to settle the question of whether blacks should be included in the body politic, because the scientists of man had already done so. "Legislation," it proceeds, "is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinction based upon physical differences, and the attempt so far to do so can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situation. If the civil and political rights of both races be equal, one cannot be inferior to the other civilly and politically. If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane." (73-74). Whatever else may have informed the court's decision, in the late nineteenth century, it could be articulated only with the deployment of the tools of raciality.

Nowhere was the writing of blacks' absence from the ethical place the U.S. American subject inhabits more dramatically indicated in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries than in the constant threats and episodes of physical violence they endured, which went unpunished; harassment by the Ku Klux Klan, numerous cases of lynchings during segregation, and the race riots of the first decades of the twentieth century terrorized U.S. blacks after the abolition of slavery. Perhaps the violence marking the conditions of enslaved blacks belonged to a mode of power that did not need the tools of productive nomos to write its subjects, for the power of slaveholders was consistently engraved onto the rebel slaves' bodies as punishment for refusal to accept their economic and juridical position as chattel labor. But later instances of the use of force to frighten U.S. blacks into a position of subalternity makes sense in the political context of the liberal subject only if one recalls that in Locke's formulation, to name a founding one, the common, consensual decision to relinquish the executive powers of the state of nature—the right to use violence to protect property (life, liberty, and possessions)—characterized those united in a "political society." In the postslavery United States, blacks have been forced into a juridical position that resembles Locke's "state of nature." Not, as the foundational statement has it, because "race prejudice" is a "natural reaction" to substantive difference, but because writings of the U.S. subject place them outside the body politic founded by the Anglo-Saxon.

What we have here is not a desire for domination, for domination requires a living being, as Hegel's lordship and bondsman passage indicates. Neither do the historical versions of race relations help us to understand U.S. blacks' subjection, because even if they were used only as an added element of class exploitation or as a principle of stratification, "race prejudice" would need to keep its subjects alive and able to participate in economic production. Perhaps the key to understanding resides in the first version of the sociologic of exclusion, in its assumption that the solution of "the problem of race relations," the restitution of a transparent social configuration, would take nothing less than the obliteration of the racial "other." Frightening as it seems, the sociology of race relations may provide such a useful toolbox for comprehending a kind of racial subjection in which racial difference operates as a strategy of exclusion because of its own participation in the writing of blackness as the signifier of an affectable consciousness, one that radically departed from the one the U.S. legislative and executive powers were instituted to protect.

**THE RISING TIDE OF "COLOREDS"**

When earlier writers of the U.S. American nation deployed the arsenal of raciality to construct Eastern and Southern European and Asian (Chinese and Japanese) immigrants as the "threatening immigrants" whose natural ability to withstand a lower "standard of living" gave them an advantage over the native (Anglo-Saxon) population, they did not produce them as "superior races." What I find in these earlier statements is how the arsenal of raciality
resolved an economic need, for these earlier immigrants constituted the primary source of cheap labor crucial to foster economic prosperity, which threatens to locate the U.S. American nation further way from transparency. Here the writing of the “others of Europe as affectable human beings, bearers of inferior bodies and minds, more explicitly indicate how globality constitutes an ontological context of articulation of the U.S. national subject. For one thing, not all of these “newcomers” were written as permanently “strangers.” Southern and Eastern Europeans would eventually be placed within the boundaries of U.S. Americanness because their bodies communicated an origin in the European space. Early Asian immigrants, on the other hand, would be the “newcomers” whose bodies would always communicate their foreignness in a social configuration built by and for Europeans. They were written as foreigners in the “land of freedom prosperity,” even though their presence resulted from juridical acts that attended the needs that ensured the success of early twentieth-century U.S. capitalism. This distinction between Asian and European immigrants indicates how globality guides the mapping of the U.S. social configuration as it enables the differentiation between “threatening” and “nonthreatening” foreigners. For a while both Asian and European immigrants shared the space of racial or national others, but the latter would very quickly move out of this position, for the U.S.-born generations had nothing besides their last names to indicate their non-English origins. The initial formulation of race relations describes this process according to a sociologic of exclusion that always already assumes whiteness as a signifier of transparency. My reading, however, indicates that the formulations of the science of man informed the very “natural reactions” Park and his students investigated, their construction of the others of Europe as marked by an affectability that proclaims but never really considers them a serious threat to the transparent U.S. American subject.

My analysis of writings of the U.S. American subject of the period between the 1890s and the 1930s focuses on how the articulation of Asian racial and cultural particularity produced the U.S. American subject as the threatened agent of economic prosperity while at the same time postulating that the Anglo-Saxon particularity would ensure the victory of this subject over “newcomers” who were fundamentally unfit to survive in a modern (liberal-capitalist) social configuration. Most statements against Chinese immigration deployed the arguments of the science of man, which, just as in the case of Eastern and Southern European immigrants, produced Chinese immigrant workers as a menace to the native Anglo Saxon. As in the case of the former, their difference was also attributed to the economic situation of their place of origin. When it was combined with arguments that defended the restriction of the extension of citizenship rights and the cessation of Chinese immigration on the basis of their being “non-assimilative with the whites,” the construction of Chinese workers as a threat would prevail in the U.S. political context and would later be extended to incorporate the Japanese and other immigrants from Asia. During the first three decades of the twentieth century, however, the writing of Asian difference privileged globality, not historicity.

When explaining how immigration would harm the American “national character,” Eliot Norton argued, in 1904, that after the Revolution and extending to the 1860s there was the beginning of the formation of a “national or racial type” that provided the specific U.S. moral standards. However, he noted, “religion, rule, laws, and customs are only the national character in the form of standards of conduct. Now national character can be formed only in a population which is stable. The repeated introduction into a body of men of other men of different type or types cannot but tend to prevent its formation” (cited in Stoddard 1920, 255). What I find here is not a blurring of the zones of deployment of the cultural and the racial, but actually an indication of how the former was deployed in a global-epistemological context in which racial difference had already established the place of the U.S. American subject. Not surprisingly, the most telling signifying gesture in statements on Asian immigrants was precisely the apparent reversal of the science of man's formulations. These statements conveyed two apparently contradictory arguments. On the one hand, they deployed “white racial superiority” to write U.S. particularity in terms of economic prosperity. On the other hand, however, when situating the U.S. American subject against Asian immigrants, these statements deployed Asian affectability in a version of the thesis of the “survival of the fittest,” which apparently reversed Darwin’s statement on the effects of “modern civilization,” in the argument that the dire conditions produced by industrialization and urbanization were adequate
the State should protect them against unjust competition and impos-
sible competition. Remunerative labor is the basis of contentment. Dem-
cracy rests on the equality of the citizen. Oriental coolism will give us another race problem to solve and surely we have had our lesson (cited in Ringer 1983, 286-87). Before and after Wilson's statement, which indicates, once again, how the racial maps early twentieth-century thought, the highest U.S. juridical body stepped in to ensure that economic needs would not undermine the writing of the U.S. American space as the "indigenous" domain of universal and self-determination. For instance, in Chin Chan Ping vs. United States (1889) the U.S. Supreme Court denied Ping's appeal of the Northern District of California decision that he should be detained for unlawful entrance. Having left the United States before the promulgation of the act of Congress of 1888 that excluded "Chinese laborers from the United States," Ping referred to the acts of 1882 and 1884 that ensured Chinese laborers the right of residence. With its decision the Court upheld Congress's sovereignty over immigration legislation, but not without commenting on the moral correctness of its motive. The Court stated: "If the government of the United States, through its legislative department, considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion is not to be stayed because at the time there are not actual hostilities with the nation of which the foreigners are subjects." That the court did not feel obliged to specify this "danger" can be explained only by the fact that it considered them well known. And indeed they were, not only by the writers of the U.S. subject, but by high-profile politicians like Woodrow Wilson, by white U.S. laborers, and by others who lived in the United States when racial difference ruled ontoepistemological accounts.

What these statements that produced Asian difference indicate is that Asians were placed in an ontological context, globality, in which the difference between "civilizations" could be articulated to produce a distinction between the transparent U.S. subject and its affectable "others." As Said (1978) has reminded us, the "Orient" has been written as the temporal other of Europe, the place of stationary and/or decadent "civilizations." However, it is in its exteriority to the U.S. prosperity—its ability to fulfill the projects of capitalism—that Asian difference is constructed. Here I locate Asian
Americans' ambiguous placing, which has allowed them to move in and out of the boundaries of cultural difference as either "yellow peril" or "model minority," without ever leaving the place raciality has assigned them. For every time the U.S. political and economic needs has required Asian labor, the borders of Asian difference have been open to whichever favored nationality would be retained, as well as to whichever disfavored nationality would be placed outside. In both instances, the doors would never be fully closed to these particular affectable others, because the U.S. state would promptly unleash juridical acts to attend to the state's most immediate economic needs without threatening to locate the Asian other in the place occupied by the U.S. American subject. Such a magnificent undertaking belongs in globality, for it enables the writing of the Asian subaltern subject both as a threat to and as an excessive signifier of that which only whiteness properly signifies, the subject able to actualize the economic and juridical ends of reason.

THE PEOPLE(S) OF THE UNITED STATES

What I find in these writings of the particularity of the U.S. American subject—the statements that sought to answer the question What is the American nation?—is precisely how globality constitutes a moment of the writing of the transparent I as a (liberal) juridical and (capitalist) economic thing. At the turn of the twentieth century, globality deployed racial difference to write the U.S. (Anglo-Saxon) American subject against virtually any other inhabitant of the U.S. American space—American Indians and blacks first, later Southern and Eastern Europeans and Asian immigrants. Most examinations of U.S. strategies of racial subjection focus primarily on the writing of the "other within" and assume that the racial operates solely as a strategy of exclusion. My reading shows, however, that the other of Europe had to be produced as such in representation, as an always already affectable thing, so that it would not be impossible to place the U.S. subject and social configuration in transparency. My reading also shows how this entailed a mode of racial subjection, the assumption of the affectability of the others of Europe, that would inform how they are situated before its juridical moment.

These statements constructed the U.S. American subject's proximity to the European space in two moments. On the one hand, they deployed racial difference to write the U.S. American social configura-
Conclusion: Future Anterior

He travels endlessly over that plain, without ever crossing the clear boundaries of difference, or reaching the heart of identity. Moreover, he is himself like a sign, a long, thin, graphism, a letter that has just escaped from the open pages of a book. His whole being is nothing but language, text printed pages, stories that have already been written down. He is made up of interwoven words; he is writing itself, wandering through the world among the resemblances of things. Yet not entirely so: for in his reality as an impoverished hidalgo he can become a knight only by listening from afar to the age-old epic that gives form to Law.

—MICHÉL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS

My life had its significance and its only deep significance because it was part of a Problem; but that problem was, as I continue to think, the central problem of the greatest of the world's democracies and so the Problem of the future world.

—W. E. B. DU BOIS, DUSK OF DAWN

What sort of answers would one find if she addressed the founding statements of modern representation, questions that already presuppose “Other”-wise? If abandoning “discovery,” the routine of “normal science,” which all too often repeats “thus it is proved” kinds of statements (Kuhn 1970), the analyst of the social asks other, disturbing, questions—for example, ones that assume that Don Quixote is both “right” and “wrong,” that windmills were indeed knights, though knights could never be come windmills. For such questions
to be imagined, the master account should not begin, as it does, “In the beginning, when God created the heavens and the earth was a formless void and darkness covered the face of the deep, while a wind from [the spirit, breath of] God swept over the face of the waters...” Because it would have to assume that the writing of time as “the interiority of the subject itself and space [as] its exteriority” (7, italics in the original), to borrow Luce Irigaray’s (1993) interrogation, has always already presumed, before the logos, the irreducible bar and the ontology it announces, which institutes and unsettles what the modern distinctions of “time and space,” “soul and body,” “right and wrong,” “truth and falsity,” “freedom and unfreedom” signify—something the analyst of the social should assume even if she could never recognize it.

When excavating the founding statements of modern thought guided by these questions, I found myself much like the “distracted” sociologist, Avery Gordon (1997) in her pursuit of the strategic naming of a critical sociological position that leaves the pathway of “discovery.” Instead of taking the road to literature, I chose a side road to philosophy, wondering whether my annoyance with historicity and universality, whether my hopeless inclination to ask “other”-wise, had led me astray. For I engaged interventions deployed in a moment when Western thought revered the “truth” of nomos, when reason was conceived as a constraining force, expecting to find statements that dismissed the illusions of poesis. What I found instead were statements that protected the mind’s self-determination, with a deferential disinterest in rendering it an object of scientific reason, which left the way open for its appropriation in accounts of universal poesis. Had I lost my way? Perhaps, but most likely not, because, rather than the contradiction my reading of postmodern and postcolonial critics of modern ontology has trained me to identify, the one their moral embracing of historicity assumes, I met with an intimacy that explains why my rejection of the normative choice has led me precisely to the place where I had begun. For this reason, I abandoned my initial question—namely, What if modern thought had been “other”-wise, if it had always privileged exteriority?—because once I missed the contradiction I was destined to find, I learned that nothing much would have changed. My failure to grasp the difference between interiority and exteriority, I think, derives from the fact that this distinction “signifies” always already within modern representation, where it corresponds to the fields of history and science and the two accounts of the self-determined thing they authorize. Hence, I could only but return to the least complex formulation of a more troubling question: If the distinction between interiority and exteriority does indeed belong to the ontological moment of globality—for Western thought has consistently accepted the view that the inside and the outside, the within and the without, are attributes of bodies, of extended (exterior/affordable) things—how is it possible that this distinction preserves interiority as the exclusive attribute of the transparent “I”?

Chasing the answer to this question, I traced the trajectory of self-consciousness, the figure who, by the end of the seventeenth century, had sent astrologers, magicians, witch doctors, and those engaged in the deciphering of the signs of the world into exile in the province of superstition, the figure which, because always already assumed, needed not be reasserted in statements that rewrote universal reason as a regulative or productive force. For had self-consciousness, the self-determined thing, the only one able alone to decide on its essence and existence, not shared a profound intimacy with a regulative or productive logos, universal reason, it could not have organized the “table of identities and difference,” the “space of order” in the margins of which Foucault (1994) locates two figures that entertain contrasting relations to modern signification: the madman and the poet. When revisiting this epistemological configuration, moved by the questioning of interiority the racial cannot but impose on modern representation, I learned that the madman and the poet are the limits only because they constitute the two faces of self-consciousness. Never oblivious to the logos, if it is taken to signify a given order (rule or disposition, connection or wording) of things, the mind that misrepresents, the one that fails to communicate the proper meanings, still assumes that correspondence between words and things that defines representation; rather than being without reason and word, the madman represents according to other rules of signification. Nor does the poet, the mind who attempts to unearth hidden similitude, move beyond the boundaries of modern representation; otherwise the meanings it produces would vanish as noise, as a loss, and not as an addition to signification.

What neither the madman nor the poet follows, that which responds to their appeal to modern imagination, is the logic of “discovery,” the stipulations (control and instrumentality) of scientific reason that consolidate but also threaten self-consciousness as a
thing of freedom. Nevertheless, as reführings of self-determination, of self-consciousness that rubs against the protective constraints of the logos, the madman and the poet represent "pure" inferiority only because they announce its (im)possibility. As the previous pages indicate, the figure of self-consciousness could not proceed without the logos, which, in the play of nomos or poesis, enables the assertion of the mind's ability to access the "truth of things," its ability to capture the manifoldness of the whole of created things with abstract symbols (mathematical and not). In the guise of a regulativistic (scientific, juridical) or productive (moral) force, universal reason has governed modern representation even as it has been divided into the themes of universality and historicity in attempts to ensure the privilege of self-consciousness in relation to other existing things. For this reason, the madman and the poet would follow distinct trajectories. The poet, the mind that reveals by rearranging signifiers, self-consciousness facing toward universal reason because—as long as poesis, this human productive yearning, does not aim to replace the divine author (as in the case of Frankenstein)—it remains within the boundaries of universal reason, from which it seeks to expand its ends or to (re)interpret its effects, as in Herder's account of universal poesis, where one finds the mind actualizing the principles it receives from the universal creator but never displacing it. Now the mind that represents according to other rules, self-consciousness facing away from universal reason, peering without the nomos and poesis, the madman (as Cervantes' wandering hidalgo) has been pushed to the irrelevant margins of modern representation as the signifier of a mind that comprehends neither space nor time. For what else explains why neither productive nomos (which locked away madness with pitiful abjection) nor transcendental poesis (for which madness does not even become a problem) has qualms, meeting the madman's admonitions with laughter?

Nor would the critiques of modern thought deployed in the second half of the twentieth century and their postmodern followers listen to the warnings of the madman, even though they owe as much to Nietzsche's attacks on reason as they do to Freud's use of the dreams of the hysteric to map the unconscious, Lacan's deciphering of psychotic speech to map a symbolic economy that does not need transparency, Fanon's account of the psychic effects of colonial violence, and Foucault's politicizing of the insane. For "post" critiques of modernity, whether analytic or hermeneutic, challenge universal reason but embrace universal poesis, remaining well at the core of modern representation. In postmodern critical exercises, this limit appears in the privileging of historicity, which, as strategies of inclusion or ideological unmasking, will fulfill the promises it shares with universality, that is, to reveal a "truth" that is but the other name of justice or vice versa, rendering the latter finally realized. My point here is that historicity cannot dissipate its effects, which, in the case of postmodern strategies, are (a) an account of particularity as the effect of the universality of differentiation that institutes "being" before any possible relationship that counts as political and (b) an account of universality that presumes the operation of ideological strategies that unite particular ("intrinsically different") collectivities at the level of "ideal equality," masking the "real" basis of their social existence, which is that these relationships are necessarily "political" (juridically and economically unequal).

Neither effect of historicity I acknowledge would hinder the formulation of global emancipatory projects, ones that would address the conditions of the racial subaltern subject, if transcendental poesis alone governed contemporary social configurations. In transcendental poesis, "Spirit" resolves particularity and universality, effect and cause, multiplicity and "inner force" in a narrative where temporality becomes the "essence" of universal reason; it reunités man and the things (of nature) by transforming the latter into moments of the trajectory of self-productive universal reason, which knowledge has the task of revealing, in the same movement that it reveals that individuals' actions and consciousness do no more than actualize the will and design of Spirit. From this derives the first effect of historicity, in which the various particular collectivities indicate the contemporaneity of disparate stages of Spirit's trajectory fundamentally united in the transcendental productive force they actualize. Nevertheless, transcendental poesis cannot fulfill the promise of inclusion because neither the transparent social conditions it describes nor the ethical principle they actualize, transcendentality, is global. Following eighteenth-century narratives of human history, Hegel's description of the various stages of human self-development locates the final moment of the realization of Spirit within the spatial-temporal boundaries of post-Enlightenment Europe, when human consciousness and the social (juridical, economic, and moral) configurations reached
the moment of transparency—when they realized universal reason as freedom. Hence the second effect of historicity, which, though not immediately prescribed by, is congenial with Hegel’s account. For if one begins with the assumption that particularity is but a manifestation of “a nonessential,” “nonfundamental” differentiation—that is, if one assumes that all particularity is resolved in universality (regulatory/productive) shape-shifted into transcendental—any use of difference to justify domination and exploitation does no more than to mask truth, that is, that any collectivity, _every human being_, constitutes but a manifestation of Spirit.

I am suggesting _here_ that _transcendental poesis_ does not sustain the boundaries it describes. For if the destiny of Spirit is realization, _each and every_ social configuration and shapes of consciousness preceding post-Enlightenment Europe’s would in time reach _the moment_ of transparency. For such possibility to be denied, it was necessary to write post-Enlightenment Europe’s _particularity_ as something irreducible and unsublatable that cannot be resolved or dissipated in _the trajectory of the subject_ of transcendental poesis, but will be achievable only when the difference between Europeans and yesterday’s natives becomes an effect of the tools of productive _nomos_. Precisely because they do not engage _scientific signification_, postmodern and postcolonial critics embrace the promises of historicity, oblivious to the _fact_ that _its_ limits do not reside on its margins, in the “other,” which is another poet, the subject of another poesis, but _in the “Other”_ (im)possible mode of representation that the speech of the madman cannot but signify. For this reason, the _first move_ of this text was to identify in the symbolic moment of modern power _the operation_ of scientific and historic rules of signification. I read _modern_ representation as a text in which scientific strategies _“ supplement”_ ruling historicity. When deployed in historic texts, scientific signifiers both add to and supplement, constitute and _interrupt_, the _transparency thesis_. On the one hand, they simultaneously institute and interrupt the narrative of the _transparent I_ that signifiers of exteriority constitute by adding, by making it possible to equate certain exterior, “objective” _conditions_ to the realization of the transcendent temporal movement. On the other hand, they also delimit and _produce the zone_ of operation of the principle of transcendentality, because, as products of scientific texts, _they indicate a moment of signification_ when “science” coexists with “history,” where “space” touches the boundaries of “time,” in which interiority comes into being against which it is not, that is, exteriority.

My argument in this book is that _modern representation_ can sustain transparency, as the distinguishing feature of post-Enlightenment European social configurations, only through the engulfment of exterior things, the inescapable effect of scientific reason’s version of _universality_, while at the same time postponing that “Other” ontology it threatens to institute. To be sure, the importance of an engagement with scientific reason is already indicated by the very text that introduces the ideological argument deployed in postmodern texts. It is in scientific signification that Marx finds the strategies he uses _in the critique of the account of transcendental poesis as ideology_—namely, the masking of the “material” (as opposed to “ideal”) _economic_ conditions that constitute human beings as social (interdependent) things—a critique, it should be acknowledged, enabled by Hegel’s limited resolution. For the consolidation of universal poesis as transcendental poesis does not displace the _universal nomos_ in its scientific and juridical moments, because self-consciousness could not relinquish that which supports its institutive claim, that is, the ability to know the “truth of things” and determine action. But also because, by resolving reason into freedom, the narrative of transcendent poesis introduces the symbolic, when writing of the nation, as a political-moral moment, one that, along with the juridical and _the economic_, consists in _a moment_ of actualization (exteriorization) of universal reason, as Spirit, the regulating/productive force, the one that _writes homo historicus_ as the subject of transparency by postulating the effect of the deployment of the _nomos_ in social conditions as the realization of poesis.

These gestures _enable the emergence of scientific projects_ that introduce an account of universal reason as productive _nomos_, the ones that, by assuming the resolution of regulation into representation (productivity), perform the engulfing of nature with the result that, subsumed to transcendent temporality, universality and exteriority become moments of a _productive (temporal) process_, respectively universalization and exteriorization. Hegel’s resolution, _which consolidates modern representation_, also offers the point of departure for scientific rewritings of the figure residing in its core, namely, _homo historicus_. I am not saying that it is the only source, though I have yet to locate a deployment of the productive _nomos_...
that does not in some way, directly or indirectly, engage Hegel's account. Rather, by pursuing this effect of transcendental poesis, I embarked on an analysis of modern representation that fully engages its promises and limits because I am convinced that the critical projects that have done otherwise, the ones that only partially engaged either or both, have but (re)produced its (highly productive) effects.

Perhaps the most crucial obstacle to postmodern critical projects has been the refusal to engage this predicament. If anything, our reflexive refusal to side with the madman betrays the intuition that any critique of modern representation should not abandon its grammar and lexicon lest it fall into visible oblivion. I wrote this text within the same constraint. For the mapping of the analytics of raciosity results from a critical analysis of that region of modern representation, namely, the field of science, the one consistently dismissed by most contemporary analysts of racial subjection as the moment of "falsification." This mapping is not an easy task. The problem here is that undertaking this project, which is crucial if one wishes to capture the political effects of the racial, demands a dive into the reservoir of available critical strategies while at the same time avoiding their limitations. Far from the madman's but even further from the poet's, this critical position faces modern representation sideways through an oblique—from without but without dismissing (as falsification) the logic of "discovery"—engagement with the scientific projects Hegel's resolution both necessitated and authorized. For to capture the political effects of the scientific texts in which man becomes a thing of nature, the most powerful and efficient modern strategies of power because the most productive, one should recognize that transcendental poesis cannot dissipate their effects because it has rendered their deployment necessary.

When I began this project I had only a vague idea of what I wanted to accomplish. I was unsatisfied with how the concept of race was deployed in sociological studies that attempted to explain the social conditions prevailing in the larger collectivities to which I belong juridically, as a Brazilian national and a U.S. permanent resident, though race is so obviously a crucial dimension of their economic and symbolic moment. I was tired of statements such as "Brazil has a multiple system of racial classification, while the U.S. has a binary one," "Americans are obsessed with race, while Brazilians repress
of the U.S. and Brazilian national subjects in transparency necessitated the deployment of the arsenal of raciality, which enabled the establishment of their political location while at the same time providing symbolic elements that can be used in the mapping of these social spaces. That is, it indicates that modern social configurations are the effects of political-symbolic strategies that defined who among the inhabitants of a given nation-state would inhabit the territory of transparency, the one governed by universality and self-determination. In other words, my mapping of the analytics of raciality shows how the philosophical displacement and negation of the human body in the institution of homo historicus was just one moment of the writing of the modern subject, namely, homo modernus. Moreover, the consistent deployment of the strategies of productive nomos in the delimitation of the place of the transparent I indicates the necessity of writing certain human beings as subjects of affectability; otherwise the frontiers between post-Enlightenment Europeans and their “others” would not be maintained.

And yet the transparency thesis has been rather powerful. Such is its appeal that the accounts that constituted the most radical critiques of modern thought have not escaped its logic. As noted earlier, historical materialism itself, which targets both dimensions of homo modernus, provides an account of emancipation, which is but the institution of “true” transparency, the moment in which the universally dispossessed proletarian overcomes the alienation imposed by liberal ideologies to seize the means and results of man’s productive powers. Marxism’s embracing of historicity limits its deployment as a basis for the projects of racial emancipation. For one thing, the assumption of a universal human being outside economic exploitation renders it impossible to account for modes of subjection that write human beings as fundamentally different. What I am suggesting here is that the idea of alienation itself presupposes transparency in that it wishes for a moment when the recognition of the productivity of labor, when the desire, will emerge for determining that the producers should enjoy the benefits it brings. Precisely because of its desire for transparency, historical materialism has been a rather limiting strategy for the writing of the racial subaltern as a subject.

What distinguishes writing of the racial subaltern subject is precisely the fact that the strategies of scientific reason, the racial and the cultural, consistently write its affectability. Here we are before the moment of transparency but already when modern minds claim a particularity derived from interiority and temporality. At this moment, Western thought learns of the universality of law (juridical) and the universality of causality (scientific) which, it postulates, can be captured only by beings with reason. As suggested in Part 1, the liberal account of the emergence of the political is premised on the certainty of the naturality of regulation, for its earlier framers assumed that the divine ruler and creator was the supreme regulator of nature, including that of human beings. But they also assumed—and here I have in mind Hobbes and Locke, not Kant—that the divine ruler and creator endowed human beings with self-determination, that freedom is to act solely according to the determination of the will. It is here that the universality of the “laws of causality” and the presupposition of universal (God-given) freedom clash, a problem that Kant attempted to resolve with the categorical imperative, which establishes freedom as always already determined by interiorized universal reason. What happens here is that universal reason becomes the foundation of a polity, for the authority of the state rests on democracy; and more importantly than playing its dominant role is protecting freedom. That is, as Locke, Rousseau, and Rawls posit, the sacrifice of self-determination is justified only if, before (in both senses) the creation of or a decision of law there is no fundamental power differential (unequal ability to affect or be affected by someone) among the framers of the “social contract” that institutes the political society. For this reason, liberal political theory and legal theory continuously deal with the problem of exclusion and universality, for they are consistently called on to establish the grounds and reach of freedom and equality.

We know that freedom and equality have never been all-encompassing, that the poor, slaves, and women were initially left out of the liberal founding “deal.” However, this has not prevented us from demanding that justice be based on the idea of universality, which is, as either demands for the actualization of or critiques of its pretended, universalism. Demands for both the economic inclusion of the racial subaltern and the denunciation of racial discrimination (individual or institutional) follow this pattern, for they consistently bring forth the “facts” of racism—that is, quantitative and qualitative sociological evidence of racial exclusion. Numerous sociological studies have shown that blacks share a tiny proportion of U.S.
American economic prosperity. The past and present determinants of this situation are known: the accumulated effects of the abandonment of reconstruction; segregation; the consistent explicit and implicit strategies used to deny U.S. blacks access to adequate formal education, jobs, and home property; and the flight of industries to the suburbs and overseas. Recent attacks on affirmative action, as we know, will just worsen this situation, for in the United States the view that only the descendants of Europeans show the necessary mental (moral and intellectual) attributes to benefit from prosperity has not gone away. To be sure, some Asian Americans have been given a share of it, but their fundamental foreignness helps rather than hurts the prevailing strategy of racial subjection, for now they can be used as examples that blacks', Latinos', and Southeast Asians' economic dispossession results from their own shortcomings, their intrinsic affectability.

Neither the liberal argument (nonsystemic or institutional discrimination) nor the critical field of racial and ethnic studies' focus on institutional racism touches on the most dramatic consequences of economic dispossession, nor can they apprehend recent re-significations of raciality. While recognizing that media-produced terms such as “gang banger” and “welfare queen” refer to the racial/gendered subalterns, they read them as codes for racial difference that mask the racially exclusionary aims of the legislation and policy initiatives these terms are deployed to support. The point here is obviously the relationship between racial and class subjection. How can we reconcile modern modes of subjection that have distinct referents, that is, economic position and racial difference? Surely the sociohistorical logic of exclusion explains this relationship, for it posits that racial subalterns will be maintained in a precarious economic condition, for they will not be able to compete under equal circumstances. The problem, however, is that the “gang banger” and the “welfare queen” do not participate in the U.S. economy, and the legislation (mid-1990s welfare reform and crime bills) and the public policies they enable displace them from the juridical moment as well, just as the Plessy decision displaced Southern blacks from the domain of the political, that of the U.S. Constitution and its amendments. What I am suggesting here is that to understand the contemporary effects of raciality it is necessary to address how it operates in all moments of the U.S. political configuration. To do so, one should consider

(substantive) racial difference not as the hidden referent of a new racially conservative ideological strategy, which is successful because it hides its racism using codes in the same way the sociohistorical logic of exclusion explains racial subjection away by attaching its political effects to individual bias (liberal) or to cultural (sociological) shortcomings of the racial subaltern subject. What the prevailing strategy of racial subjection in the United States indicates is not that the racial explains class subjection but that the association of criminality and material (economic) dispossession has become the new signifier of the affectability of the racial subaltern. That is, the gang banger and the welfare queen correspond to a rearrangement of the analytics of raciality, one that relies not on the strategies of the science of man but on the very sociological strategies that enable the identification of the causes of racial subalterns' juridical and economic exclusion.

Similarly, to comprehend how the racial and patriarchy operate as strategies of subjection requires an account of how racial difference and gender difference signify affectability, that is, outer determination. No other figure indicates their combined effect better than the welfare queen, the single female who engages in unprotected sex and uses her children to remain out of work. Beyond supporting the dismantling of the U.S. welfare state, this construct has produced economically dispossessed black mothers as social subjects entitled neither to the legal protections nor the remedies ensured in civil rights legislation. The attack on these women's reproductive freedom—a right women of color elsewhere have never had, as witnessed by the global population control projects along with the criminalization of black female drug users, enabled by their construction as “social problem”—indicates a juridical position that escapes the protection, now under attack, ensured by the Roe decision (Roberts 1997). What is stripped away here is precisely consent, that is, what in Locke's account of the scene of regulation ensures that self-determination remains a distinguishing attribute of the modern political subject. The criminalization of reproduction operates before consent because the cultural and economic conditions of these black women become the sole determinant of the way the laws are applied to them. The concept guiding gender studies, patriarchy, does not capture this political position because it assumes a woman who can decide, act, and perform out of her own desire, that is,
a transparent female subject who will emerge once the veil of patriarchy is lifted. This is a position that the economically dispossessed black mother cannot inhabit because in the various versions of raciality she is always already an outer-determined subject, one whose social trajectory is an effect of how the productive nomos institutes her biological, cultural, and social position.

Neither the sociohistorical logic of exclusion nor the notion of patriarchy can account for this particular kind of social subjection. Because both assume that the black female's subjection is an effect of her substantive difference, which becomes the point of departure for racial and gendered representations that support discrimination, the sociohistorical logic of exclusion and patriarchy fail to grasp how a double affectability locates the female of color before the moral (patriarchal text) boundaries of femaleness and the rational (juridical) boundaries of whiteness. My point is that, although the white female subject has been written in domesticity (as wife and mother) in the patriarchal (moral) domain, which has kept her outside the public (male) domain, the female racial subaltern has consistently been written to inhabit the public (non-European or non-white) place produced by scientific strategies where her body is immediately made available to a transparent male desire but where her desire (passion, love, consent) is always already mediated by her double affectability. The result is that she is constructed as the subject of lust; hers is a dangerously unproductive will because it is guided by nothing but that which human beings possess as being ruled not even by the "laws of [divine] nature," the preservation of life. Over the last thirty years or so, since the publication of Daniel Patrick Moynihan's (1965) report The Negro Family: The Case for National Action, this construction has rendered the economically dispossessed black female an object of public policy, for she has been constructed as the subject of an unrestrained, unruly sexual desire that thrives in the moral degeneracy that proliferates in the dwellings of the black subaltern subject.

During the last three decades, the racial has undergone another resignification, the consequences of which become more obvious if one analyzes its effects on the juridical moment. With this I am not suggesting that the economic moment is irrelevant. My concern here is with how this reshaping of the analytics of raciality is placing large regions of the social and global space—the ones inhabited by the others of Europe—altogether outside the domain of the operation of the law, with the result that people of color now inhabit a sort of "state of nature" to which the juridical devices that classic liberal theorists saw as necessary for the protection of life and liberty do not apply. My point is that it is an effect of the social scientific arsenal that produces the others of Europe as affectable consciousness, which, outer-determined, cannot but actualize that which is exterior to the domain of justice; that is, an effect of the signification of the sociohistorical logic of exclusion is to keep the political-symbolic determinants of such events behind the veil of transparency.

What I see operating in the present global configuration are symbolic and actual violent acts that follow the letter of the logic of obliteration. Today's racial subalterns, finding themselves struggling for juridical and economic justice in an ontoepistemological context, globality, in which they stand always already before the ruling ethical principle of transcendentality, face the horizon of death: existing in urban spaces marked by urban revolts, suicide bombings, or drug-related violence or troubled by wars for the scarce resources and land riches of Africa, Asia and the Pacific islands, and the United States that insatiable neoconservative capitalists desire. We need to trace every and each articulation of raciality, including those that profess its irrelevance, trace at each moment how it rewrites the racial subaltern subject in affectability, producing statements that not only excuse the violent effects of this rewriting but also redeploy the transparency thesis.

What lies before those who engage this text? Halting our future anterior (what the global configuration "shall have been for what it is in the process of becoming"). Engaging it with critical strategies that will undermine the political or symbolic arsenal—the tools of obliteration—that are remapping the place of transparency by instituting global regions and peoples that can be "rescued" through deployments of "total violence," recently renamed "enduring freedom."
Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. The previous quotes are from the madman parable of Nietzsche (1974, 181).

2. According to Lyotard (1984), changes in knowledge registered the dismantling of the "modern order," "the dissolution of the social bond and the disintegration of the social aggregates into a mass of individual atoms" (15), which resulted in the need to forge a new basis for the social bond and the legitimation of scientific discourse. Social interaction, he suggests, is now based on the acceptance of the heterogeneity and the multiplicity of meta-arguments (argumentation with metaprescriptives) that limit the circumstances of their formulation (66).

3. For these authors, "Such re-crafting would not fall too far from the tenets of anthropological desire. In the effort to improve accounts of the long-sought-after 'native point of view,' these experiments attempt different textual strategies to convey to their readers richer and more complex understandings of the subjects' experience. These ethnographies of experience, as we broadly term them, strive for novel ways to demonstrate what it means to be a Samoan, an Ilongot, or a Balinese to persuade the reader that culture matters more than he might have thought" (Marcus and Fischer 1986, 43).

4. The challenge to the "social order" imposed by intrasociety and extrasocietal shifts seemed to require a redefinition of the discipline's unit of analysis, namely, the nation-state (Robertson 1992). Regarding intrasocietal reconfigurations, the challenge is recognized even by those who have welcomed the latter. Nicholson and Seidman (1995), for instance, state that
they "were convinced that shifts in left public cultures, in particular the rise and development of the new social movements and their encounter with Marxist and liberal Enlightenment traditions, are one crucial matrix for understanding the formation of postmodern theories in America and perhaps elsewhere" (7).

5. Among these is Habermas (1984), for whom the solution is a new "social contract": if universal reason no longer constitutes an unquestionable foundation, perhaps it could provide a situated one, as a referee of dissenting speech acts deployed by diverse communicating communities. Others sought to refashion sociology's object—perhaps the surest sign of resistance—redefining "modern society" as simultaneously highly individualized and spatially unbounded. Illustrative of this is Giddens's (1990) refusal to equate the death of the subject with the "end of modernity," arguing that the latest phase of capitalism emerged from the worldwide expansion of modern institutions and the intensification of modern values such as individuality. But these were the times of the cultural, and any new social ontology was required to include the "histories" that unfolded in so many locales, to address this proliferation of "norms" and "values," and to recognize the globe as a shared space (Robertson 1992). Although he considers postmodern theorizing "anarchic," Habermas (1987) recognizes that it remains under the sway of the Hegelian yoke. Others emphasize the problem of inconsistency. Roseau (1992), for instance, notes that postmodernism's dismissal of theory building is inconsistent, because "an anti-theory position is itself a theoretical stand," and so is the critique of reason, given that "deconstruction . . . is a highly logical, reasoned, and analytical process" (176).

6. The volumes edited by Featherstone (1990) and King (1997) offer a sample of how sociologists and others have engaged the "global turn."

7. In Silva (2000b), I argue that the racial organizes the present discourse of human rights, for it enables writing certain social spaces, as in the campaign against female genital cutting, as resisting the incorporation of those principles that govern the global polity, in this case gender equity.

8. Although this reorganizing has been playing out in major U.S. cities and elsewhere since the mid-1980s, Brazil and other countries in the global South were already quite familiar with the disastrous effects of the structural adjustment policies imposed by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the former Group of 7. Only recently, however, have we witnessed the emergence of critical analyses that fully address these political-economic processes and consider its impact on the formulation of emancipatory projects in the global South (Bauman 1998; Touraine 1998; Harvey 2000). Nevertheless, this does not mark a radical rupture, because concerns with the political-economic also appeared in earlier "cultural approaches" found primarily, but not solely, as noted earlier, among anthropologists.

9. When asking this question, as will soon become evident, I do not conceive of the racial, as does Winant (2001), as an element of the "global social structure" or the "global world system." What I am targeting here is the racial as a symbolic strategy, an element of signification that preceded and instituted the configurations these social-scientific concepts address.

10. This is an appropriation of Gramsci's concept of social formation, which he uses—along with other historical-materialist concepts such as hegemony, war of maneuver, war of position, and so on—to situate material (economic) production in a historical totality, that is, one in which the cultural becomes a crucial moment in the political configuration of modern capitalist formations.

11. Later, in chapter 7, I show how this question already troubled early approaches to racial subjection.

12. For instance, in his use of racial formation to examine Britain's "new racism" in the mid-1980s, Gilroy (1987) chooses to deny race any meaning. When examining the emergence of this new "ideological" strategy and the "crisis of representation" it provoked, he introduces an analytical strategy that frames race subjection using the language of historical materialism, where racial difference becomes the effect of racism, a social-historical process, a gesture that displaces its biological relevance by constructing "race difference" as an "empty signifier."

13. This discussion addresses primarily U.S. gender and feminist scholarship for two reasons: first, because women of color in the United States have challenged the construction of a universal female subject for a longer time and more forcefully than the white, middle-class scholars who wrote her, and second, because, even though I acknowledge the wealth and critical engagement of cultural approaches that fully address these political-economic processes and consider its impact on the formulation of emancipatory projects in the global South (Bauman 1998; Touraine 1998; Harvey 2000). Nevertheless, this does not mean knowledge about sexual difference . . . [as] understanding produced by cultures and societies of human relationships in this case of those between men and women (3) seems compatible with her attempt to recuperate the effects of gender in the constitution of the nineteenth-century European working class. That is, "men" and "women" remain here as beings to be found everywhere, for they precede (though representations of them are constitutive of) cultural processes.

14. For instance, Scott's 1995 statement that "gender . . . means knowledge about sexual difference . . . [as] understanding produced by cultures and societies of human relationships in this case of those between men and women (3) seems compatible with her attempt to recuperate the effects of gender in the constitution of the nineteenth-century European working class. That is, "men" and "women" remain here as beings to be found everywhere, for they precede (though representations of them are constitutive of) cultural processes.

15. Perhaps this distinction is what Wittig (1981) has in mind when she challenges the idea that "women are a natural group," a "racial group," of sorts.

16. For instance, early feminist anthropologists immediately assumed (without theorizing) the pervasiveness of patriarchy by selecting sexual
difference as the “empirical” referent of gender systems and attributing variations in gender subjection to cultural difference (Ottmer and Whitehead 1981). For a critique of how this “naturalization,” which assumes a certain conception of the body and reproduction, prevents an understanding of other modes of writing the female as a social subject, see Oyèwùmi (1997).

17. For instance, De Lauretis (1987) proposes that the social subject “is constituted in gender, but to be sure not as sexual difference alone, but rather across languages and cultural representations, a subject gendered in the experiencing of race and class, as well as sexual, relations; a subject, therefore, not unified but rather multiple, and not so much divided as contradictory (1). Nevertheless, as Bahvnani (2001) notes, “Difference has become the pivot through which many feminist scholars have interrogated the fundamental bases of feminist intellectual projects” (2). A dangerous gesture emerges that recuperates other and older “differences” to outline distinct “experiences.” As Smith (1991) notes, “At precisely the moment when Anglo-American feminists and male Afro-Americans began to reconsider the material ground of their enterprises, they demonstrated their return to earth, as it were, by invoking the specific experiences of black women and the writings of black women” (45).

18. In non-Western feminist discourse, the “politics of experience” included attention to political economy. As Bahvnani (2001) notes, “Many women from The North—of color or otherwise—are coming to realize that the anti-colonial struggles and struggles of women in the third world, are critical for understanding how gender subordination is both reproduced and challenged everywhere” (2–3). Some met this challenge with the concept of diaspora, which articulates linkages between their own trajectories and those of other women of color in the third world. Collins (1989), for instance, identifies an “Afrocentric feminist standpoint,” an ontological position, that recognizes how race and gender delimit the black female “experience,” one that captures how Afrocentrism constitutes a set of values that emerged out of the material conditions of Africa and the black diaspora and recognizes that women everywhere experience “patriarchal oppression through the political economy of the material conditions of sexuality and reproduction” (756).

19. Crenshaw (1995), for instance, introduces the notion of intersectionality to capture “the various ways in which race and gender interact to shape the multiple dimensions of black women’s employment experiences” (358). However, when examining the unequal access to legal and institutional remedies to gender discrimination available to women of color, intersectionality merely describes how each of these dimensions—race, immigration status, and so on—functions to exclude women from accessing existing provisions.

20. A telling exception is Espiritu’s (1997) discussion of how changing U.S. immigration policies have shaped gender relations among Asian Americans through the control of the flux of Asian female immigrants. Her analysis avoids the staking effects of exclusion, however, because she shows how immigration legislation has been productive of (a certain kind of [Asian American]/patriarchal formation.

21. With this, I am not minimizing the fact that these racial or national­ist projects were also victims of the unremitting and systematically violent repression of the U.S. law enforcement apparatus.

22. This “institutionalization” of cultural difference within the frames of cultural pluralism (Parekh 2000) appears in the 2004 United Nations Development Program Human Development Report. See also Silva (2007) for a discussion of how cultural difference operates in the present global configuration.

23. He charges these approaches—specifically Afrocentrism—with reproducing “cultural insiderism,” which “typically construct[s] the nation as an ethnically homogenous object and invoke[s] ethnicity a second time in the hermeneutic procedures deployed to make sense of its distinctive cultural content” (3). That is, they claim historical (national, cultural, ethnic) particularity to signal the boundaries of the black subject.

1. THE TRANSPARENCY THESIS

1. This argument has appeared in all twentieth-century reviews of the science of men, but more forcefully in the ones deployed after World War II. In an early critique, Jacques Barzun (1938) argues that “race thinking” is a form of knowledge that derived its “truth” from its general acceptance. In other words, he contends that nineteenth-century anthropology assumed, rather than “scientifically” demonstrated, the common “conviction that mind is the simple correlate of physiological structure” (756). A decade later, Leon Poliakov (1947) would describe nineteenth-century race thinking as a modern expression of an intrinsically European psychological pattern, where the “Aryan myth”—a
"myth of origin"—found its way into scientific inquiry and became the basis of nineteenth-century political ideologies. Placing race thinking outside the objective (scientific) context of signification—as an effect of subjective conviction, beliefs, and error—these critics construe the term race as a nuisance, something improper and unwanted, an evil stain of error in otherwise blessed "truth-full" modern minds. According to Nancy Stepan (1982), nineteenth-century science was used to support a type of thinking that was explicitly, but mostly implicitly, "racist"—an unfortunate episode in which "unconscious beliefs" dominated an otherwise scientific enterprise. Personal "prejudices," she argues, gave origin not to "pseudoscience," but to "bad science," and led "so many outstanding scientists of the past [to believe] that biological races were the key to the most pressing problems of the day" (xvii). In short, "The language, concepts, methods and authority of science," Stepan claims, "were used to support the belief that certain human groups were intrinsically inferior to others, as measured by some socially defined criteria, such as intelligence or 'civilized' behavior" (ix, my italics). Guillaumin (1995), for instance, observes that the "causal link between mental and physical facts was subsequently deduced a posteriori, in an overzealous attempt to rationalize the idea, with the result that the assertion of a causal link [was then] presented as the distinguishing characteristic of racist doctrine" (36). Goedl (1981), for example, refuses the argument that "race theories" derived from individual scientists' subjective (discriminatory) inclinations and recalls that, rather than being purely "objective," any scientific work is embedded in its cultural and social conditions.

2. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) provide a compelling post-Marxist answer to this question by portraying the (postmodern) social space as a terrain constituted by relationally or differentially instituted subjects engaged in political struggle. They rewrite the social as a discursive (symbolic) field, a contingent "structured totality"—but without a fixing or transcendent foundation—in which the relational "identities" are determined by each other ("overdetermination") and by the open-ended rules ("partial fixations") that institute them as "differential positions." This poststructuralist account of the social introduces a reformulation of the political project of the left, "radical democracy," which, as the authors describe it, aims not to "renounce liberal democratic ideology but, on the contrary, to deepen and expand the direction of radical and plural democracy" (175). Because it recognizes and is committed to "the irreducible character of [the] diversity and plurality," they claim, their account of the social "forces" the myth of a rational and transparent society to recede progressively to the horizon of the social, which becomes a "nonplace," the symbol of its own impossibility" (191). When discussing the reconfiguring of the political, they identify a process that "stretches from the workers struggles of the nineteenth century to the struggle of women, diverse racial and sexual minorities, and diverse marginal groups" (181).

3. "My understanding of hegemony," she explains, "is that its normative and optimistic moment consists precisely in the possibilities for expanding the democratic possibilities for the key terms of liberalism rendering them more inclusive, more dynamic and more concrete" (13).

4. She claims that Hegel's concept of universality cannot "rest easily within the notion of a single culture, since the very concept of universality compels an understanding of culture as a relation of exchange and as task of translation," therefore rendering it "necessary to see the notion of a discrete and emulative 'culture' as essentially other to itself, in a definitional relationship with alterity" (24–25).

5. This body of literature is enormous. I do not claim to have covered it in its entirety. This assessment derives from a reading of historical, social scientific, and literary criticism pieces as well as novels by African American authors.

6. In The Melancholy of Race, Ana Cheng (2001) indicates how the writing of the racial subaltern subject in interiority cannot but produce an account of loss. Though she argues that melancholia is an attribute of racial ego, suggesting the view that the racial institutes both the dominant and the subaltern, because the privilege exclusion and interiority, Cheng's question of the "subjectivity of the melancholic object" (14) cannot but rewrite the racial subaltern ego in its nostalgia for a lost transparency, an effect that is even more explicit in her argument that the melancholy of race is the psychic version of the U.S. dilemma, a mark of how the presence of non-Europeans contradicts the nation's commitment to freedom, and so on.

7. In "Black Strivings in a Twilight Civilization," Cornel West (1997) argues that the predicament of black culture ensues from the need to survive under ideological and structural conditions built on the exclusion of black people from the human family in the name of white supremacist ideology (80). "Black invisibility and namelessness," he states, capture a condition traversing all levels of black experience—existential, social, political, and economic—which results from "the historic 'Veil' (slavery, Jim Crow, and segregation) that separates the black and white worlds." This "veil" erases "black humanity," "black individuallity," diversity, and heterogeneity, for it renders black people objects of white fantasies—"exotic, transgressive entities, hypersexual or criminal animals." Further, not only does it render communication between blacks and whites impossible; the "veil" produces subjects that "live in two worlds to survive [while] whites need not understand or live in the black world in order to survive" (86, italics in the original). From this need for survival, he argues, results a suppression of black rage and the perverse "interiorizing" of white fantasies: "After playing the
role and wearing the mask in the white world, one may accept the white world's view of one's self" (87).

8. In The Mythology of Modern Law, for instance, Peter Fitzpatrick (1992) shows how such constructions sustain the myth of progress that institutes the paradoxical construction of law as autonomous and socially bound. This construction of modern law, he argues, relies on a conception of the (social) subject as autonomous and socially bound, a contradiction that in the nineteenth century was resolved in the figure of the "native"—"The unevolved savage [that] continues to reside in the civilized subject as a converse and provocation to a disciplined self-control" (231). That is, the civilized (moral or legal) subject that shares in law's autonomy is also a self-regulating ring continuously called upon to tame the "savage," which both threatens and institutes that which is said to distinguish modern social configurations. Taking a slightly different route, in Racist Culture, David Theo Goldberg (1993) identifies in founding liberal texts formulations that place the native out of the reach of universality. Tracing the production of statements on the moral difference of the "others of Europe" all the way back to Ancient Greek thought, he points to how they are placed outside liberal morality both in explicit exclusions but also by the implicit rendering of the social moment as outside its scope. In The Racial State, Goldberg (2002) provides a more direct examination of how race is deployed by the foremost modern political institution, the state. He introduces the notion of "the racial state" to address the ways in which race constitutes and is constituted by the modern state. Focusing primarily, but not solely, on the state's power to exclude, Goldberg maps the distinct forms of racial rule, which characterizes the ways in which the state deploys raciality as a tool for internal differentiation. "Race," he argues, "is imposed upon otherness, the attempt to account for it, to know it, to control it... But paradoxically, once racially configured with modernity the threat becomes magnified, especially fraught, because in being named racially in a sense that is named as threat, the racial conception of the state becomes the racial definition of the apparatus, the project, the institutions for managing this threat, for keeping it out or ultimately containing it—but also paradoxically for keeping it" (23-24, italics in the original). More explicit racializing of liberal thought and its proper subject has appeared recently. For instance, against the view that it contradicts liberal tenets, in The Racial Contract Charles Mills (1997) introduces the "racial contract theory" to describe how a contract between whites has instated "white supremacy" as a system of "racial domination" (3). In Achieving our Humanity, Emmanuel Eze (2001) shows how connections between modern philosophy and natural history anticipate later articulations of race that exclude non-Europeans from the conception of humanity. He argues that Europeans' "travels and explorations," which dismissed medieval fantasies about those inhabiting distant lands, raised ontological questions that "philosophers answered...with ethnocentric flair and racial ethnocentrism" (26).

9. What Spivak's account of foreclosure in philosophical texts does not explore is how this signifying gesture opens up a moment in phallic signification in which the "other" becomes a constituent of the "I," whose emergence it marks. Lacan (1977) describes foreclosure as the signifying structure in which the signer, the Other, fails because it does not exhibit the attributes that would constitute it as a proper signifier of that to which it is supposed to correspond ("Name-of-the-Father"); here the proper signifier emerges as a "mere hole, which, by the inadequacy of the metaphorical effect will provoke a corresponding hole at the place of the phallic signification" (201).

10. Many have noted these exclusions in philosophical representations of Africa as the "heart of a darkness" that should be eliminated, saved, or ignored. As Mudimbe (1988) notes, most modern approaches to Africa follow Hegel's postulate that Europe was the only solution for rescuing Africans from their intrinsic "savagery," through "cultural and spiritual conversion" or continuous subjugation. Moreover, Africa has also been constructed as a place of obvious dangers (cannibalism) or hidden ones (deadly viruses). This is what Brantlinger (1986) recognizes in the nineteenth-century British perceptions of Africa as congenial. "[They] tended to see Africa" he argues, "as a center of evil, a part of the world possessed by demonic 'darkness' or barbarism, represented above all by slavery and cannibalism, which it was their duty to exorcise" (194).

2. THE CRITIQUE OF PRODUCTIVE REASON

1. Unlike Foucault, however, I do not find continuity between the late nineteenth-century concept of the racial and seventeenth-century France's notion of "race struggle," for he describes the social as "basically articulated around two races," that is, organized around the "idea that this clash between two races runs through society from top to bottom" (60). I insist that the notion of race deployed in political statements, such as those of Naziism—where it operates, as Foucault argues, "as a principle of exclusion and segregation and, ultimately, as a way of normalizing society" (6)—is informed by the mid-nineteenth-century scientific reformation of the racial, the one in which universal reason constitutes the ultimate foundation for statements on human difference.

2. As Eze (2002) shows, the emerging modern episteme not only presupposed but commented on the exploitative relations between Europeans
and the peoples inhabiting already constituted zones of deployment of European desire. Moreover, Stoler (1995) indicates that the colonial space was riveted by anxieties that required the deployment of sexual technologies and mechanisms to maintain the boundaries of Europeanness.

3. In Race and the Education of Desire, Ann L. Stoler (1995) addresses the limits of Foucault's mapping of the "analytics of sexuality" by showing how simultaneous workings of technologies of sexuality and "racial obsessions" in colonial spaces were crucial in the formation of European bourgeois sexuality. Certainly Stoler's analysis contributes to our understanding of how empire figures in the making of bourgeois sexuality through the regulation of the very effects of sexual desire, which are never too far removed from economic desire. More important, however, her analysis of Dutch, French, and British racial discourses and technologies of sexuality also indicates how "the discourse on race" consistently supports investments aimed at producing an ever-threatened European "self" both in the colonies and at the home. She writes: "The production and distribution of desires in the nineteenth-century discourse on sexuality were filtered through—and perhaps even patterned by—an earlier set of discourses and practices that figure prominently in imperial technologies of rule. Civilization could be defended against transgression by invoking the reasoned logic of race" (194).

4. What I am suggesting here is that though certainly, as Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) argue, Foucault has sidestepped structuralism, phenomenology, and hermeneutics as he refuses to attribute a foundation (formal or historical) to meaning, his antifoundationalism is not a radical rejection of interiority (as that which marks man's uniqueness), for his conception of productive power (as rules of discursive formation) resembles Kant's formulation of reason as the transcendental interior orderer of things (which I discuss in Part 2). That is, Foucault's account of knowledge as the interior orderer of man, the regulator and producer of desires, still ignores that which the latter shares with the things.

5. Why does transparency resist the critique of modern ontology? In "Can the Subaltern Speak?" Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1994) offers a powerful answer to this question. Reading an exchange between Foucault and Deleuze against their (re)formulations of power and desire, respectively, she identifies a double movement, the simultaneous rendering transparent of the oppressed and of the Western critical intellectual, which reintroduces the subject, the irrelevance of which they celebrate. She argues that the hiding of Western critical intellectuals' "geo-political positioning" combined with the "schematic opposition between interest and desire" reveals the conflation of two meanings of representation (the political and the symbolic). While the effacing of the critical intellectuals' position (re)produces

the transparent subject, she argues, the conflation of the two meanings of representation evades an engagement with ideology and political economy, because now it is assumed that the subaltern, the other, has finally come into representation, in transparency.

6. "In modern thought," Foucault (1994) notes, "what is revealed at the foundation of the history of things and the historicity proper to man is the distance creating a vacuum within the Same, it is the hiatus that disperses and regroups it at the two ends of itself. It is this profound spatiality that makes it possible for modern thought still to conceive of time—to know it as succession, to promise it to itself as fulfillment, origin, and return" (340, my emphasis).

7. Notice that the notion of spatiality I use is very distinct from the one employed in recent writings that address space, place, and location as social categories. Though these are not necessarily explicit deployments of Lefebvre's (1991) construction of space, they do seem to share in the assumption that the latter is an effect of historical processes.

8. "The (pure) trace," Derrida states, "is difference. It does not depend on any sensible plenitude, audible or visible, phonic or graphic. It is, on the contrary, the condition of such plenitude. Although it does not exist, although it is never present outside all plenitude, its possibility is by right anterior to all that one calls sign" (62). Keeping the possibility of an other within its structure, then, the sign will always refer to another sign, another possible structure of signification, another structure of difference. Hence, there can be no transcendental signified whose being is nonsignification.

9. While acknowledging that "Western societies" have been primary participants in the processes leading to the creation of an increasingly globalized world, Robertson observes that the interaction between different "civilizations," different "cultures" has been determinant in this process. Here he challenges accounts of the global conditions that write globalization as a process of homogenization or heterogeneization: as the moment in which the whole globe has come to be ruled by modern principles, of the disappearing "cultural difference" (the difference between "moderns" and "others") (Giddens 1990); as a scene marked by the coexistence of other historical "beings" (disparate cultural principles and practices), which might indicate (as postmodern accounts have it) the end of the modern project; or as the playground of shape-shifting cosmopolitans. According to Robertson, globalization results not from the juxtaposition of self-enclosed "homogeneous" entities, but conceptions of "collective identity" are largely produced in and through these interactions. Focusing primarily on the European context, Robertson distinguishes between several "phases" of the globalization process, where "degree of density and complexity" were a function of "particularistic" and "universalistic" conceptions, such as
formulations (Habermas 1987) and resolves the oppositions between rea­
son and passion, natural and man, and so on (Taylor 1975).

2. For the Roman philosopher Cicero (1994), moral goodness is pos­
bable because “nature and reason” have given human beings the ability to 
comprehend causality, which they deploy when examining their own con­
duct, and ensure a morally good soul, one not influenced by “outward 
circumstances,” “free of all passion . . . of every disturbing emotion, de­
sire and fear” (34). For Epictetus, the “virtuous man” chooses mind over 
body, thus realizing its nature by exercising the will, which is a faculty of 
the human mind that guides the major faculties (the senses) of the body. 
For self-discipline, as a quality of the will, the mind’s ability to decide, 
to choose a course of action, regardless of exterior determinants, is a gift from 
the divine ruler, Zeus, who gave men a “portion of our divinity, this faculty of 
impulse to act and not to act, of will to get and will to avoid” (cited in 
Albert et al. 1969, 85).

Augustine’s account produces an interiorization of power and freedom that 
is absent in ancient Western philosophy and has marked the modern con­
ception of the political as the moment of alienation of freedom. “If man has 
a will at all,” she notes, “it must always appear as though there were two 
wills present in the same man, fighting each other for power over his mind. 
Hence the will is both powerful and impotent, free and unfree” (452).

4. Medieval philosophers, such as Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and 
William of Occam also dealt with these themes—creation, natural (uni­
versal or divine) law, rationality, knowledge and freedom of will, and so 
on. However, although they asked how the rational soul could move from 
the comprehension of the universal and the multiplicity of things and 
attempted to indicate that which distinguishes human beings from other cre­
ated things, and produces distinctions in the “world of men,” for them the 
mind’s access to “truth” was guided by the supernatural creator and ruler of 
the universe.

5. Though I acknowledge that my discussion in this part of the book 
addresses a theme touched on by many early and contemporary philoso­
phers and theorists, such as Richard Rorty (1979) and Slavoj Zizek (1999), 
among others, I have chosen not to engage their readings of modern phi­
losophy and their notions of self-consciousness (subject, the mind, “I”) di­
rectly, for that would render it virtually impossible to provide a concise ac­
count of how the articulation and disavowal of exteriority has been crucial 
in maintaining the dualism that sustains the notion of the mind—or the 
mental, as Rorty seems to prefer—that organizes modern representation. 
The cogito has been denounced or rejected to be fragmented and then reas­
sembled in various (non-Western) otherwises, under various guises and for

“nationalism” and “Humanity,” for instance. In contemporary global cul­
ture, however, it is the intersection of claims for “universality” with claims 
for “particularity” that produces complexity: “They have become united in 
terms of the universality of experience, and increasingly, the expectation 
of particularity, on the one hand, and the experience and, increasingly, the 
expectation of universality, on the other” (102). Yet, because he privileges 
“particularity” and “universality” as the axes around which processes of 
differentiation occur, Robertson does not inquire into the conditions of 
production of universality and particularity.

10. Further, my portrait of the present global configuration does not 
privilege movement, the possibility of moving from here to there faster—the 
sapoge of “presence,” perhaps superseded only by the “voices” access to 
the transcendental signifyed—emphasized in accounts of the present global 
conditions. This is seen, for instance, in the argument that the distance 
between here and there and has become irrelevant and, more important, that 
being there, in spatial terms, has become irrelevant, rendered insignificant 
by the near-light speed of abstract systems (Giddens 1991) or that “time and 
space” have become “heterogeneous” (Harvey 1989, 204). I read these 
accounts not so much as a universalizing impulse, as Fitzpatrick (2001) 
argues, but as a redeployment of a modern dichotomy, “universal/time” 
versus “particular/space,” and the transparency thesis it presupposes. For 
these distinctions between today’s “globals” and “locals” do no more than 
reinstitute the gulf by writing the latter as those who have yet to join the 
transparent global or the ones who do not wish, or are not allowed, to do 
so, as in the case of political-economic analysis in which the transparency 
thesis prevents any examination of how the racial has been crucial in the 
writing of the particularity of the local (always already spatial) and of the 
global (always already self-present) (Bauman 1998).

11. Perhaps this project shares in what Marx called the fundamental 
Hegelian mistake, the belief that (productive) activity is a monopoly of the 
rational mind (and its products). My contention is that, like economic pro­
duction, symbolic production—representation—is also a political process, 
a perspective I inherit from twentieth-century versions of historical materi­
alism such as those of Williams (1977) and Gramsci (1999).

12. When describing the unconscious (symbolic) economy in Ecrits, 
Jacques Lacan (1997) indicates that the first two symbolic structures, dis­
placement and negation, refer to a mode of signification that is not premised 
on the transparency thesis. As descriptors of how the subject emerges in the 
Symbolic, he shows, each captures a particular moment of failure of phal­
lie signification, that is, moments in which the network of signifiers does 
not mediate the “I” as a transparent subject. In displacement (metonymy), 
Lacan describes, identification is halted as the connection between signifiers
fails, because the other—as the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father—lacks the ability to resolve the subject's desire (164). In negation, on the other hand, the signifier (the other) is declared nonexistent; according to Lacan, it is "the avowal of the signifier itself that it annuls, that is to say the subject affirms the very thing it denies (201). Each exemplifies Lacan's rewriting of the subject, his critique of the Cartesian and the Hegelian renderings of the I, which describes how the subject of the enunciated—to the extent that speech announces the (im)possibility of (an immediate) signification (of transparency)—and its others, as the effects of signification, emerge simultaneously in a given arrangement of signifiers. What interests me here is that, in Lacan's rendering of these signifying structures, failure itself has a productive effect. It institutes not only the subject but also the other, which, in order to misrepresent the Name-of-the-Father has to be brought into representation (articulated) in its failure (disavowed). Moreover, the subject instituted by the signifying bar that interrupts/produces signification emerges in the Symbolic as a haunted I. Not because an expelled (gendered, cultural, racial) other threatens to return in the real but because, as Žižek (2000) nicely describes it, the "subject itself is nothing but the failure of symbolization, of its own symbolic representation—the subject is nothing beyond this failure, it emerges through this failure, and the object petit a ['other'] is merely a positivization/embodiment of this failure" (179-20, italics in the original). Incidentally, this reading of Lacan's symbolic structures follows Žižek's (2000) argument, contra Butler (2000), that rather than suggesting that the form is rooted in a particular content, the moment of exclusion presupposes already existing particulars. Lacan writes sexual difference as impossible, not "as a firm set of 'static' symbolic opposition and inclusion/exclusion...", but the name of a deadlock, of a trauma, of an open question, of something that resists every attempt at its symbolization" (110). With this he renders Lacan's account of signification closer to Derrida's (1976). Still, I think because, unlike Lacan, he does privileges speech, in his rendering of the unstable trace Derrida more successfully accentuates how its irreducibility renders transparency a troublesome ontological presupposition.

3. THE PLAY OF REASON

Many have acknowledged his ingenuity, how his rewriting of self-consciousness appropriates previous statements and yet constitutes a unique accomplishment while at the same time grounding it on early foundations of modern thought. Certainly Hegel's genius appears in how with the notion of spirit he provides the moral ground lacking in liberal many different and sometimes contradictory purposes. To the extent that my project here is also a repetition of the desire to exercise this spectre, I envision it not as another denouncement or rejection of the thinking thing, but more along the lines of Žižek's (1999) project, in which he argues that postmodern critics of modern thought are haunted by the Cartesian ghost and explicitly returns to it to seek to unearth the "forgotten obverse, the excessive kernel of the cogito" (2). Unlike Žižek, however, I am not interested in the psychological or analytic implications or effects of resituating the subject in the scene of death.

6. In Greek formulation, the body has already been introduced as a useful but not indispensable tool of knowledge; in his Physics, Aristotle states that "scientific knowledge" results from the uncovering of "principles, conditions, or elements"; already "sense-perception" is seen to deal with generalities.

7. The language and a use of the early scientific discourse and that of the European colonial project—particularly the emphasis on movement, discovery, and control—can only support Foucault's claim of the fundamental relationship between modern knowledge and conception of the political. And yet, for about two hundred years, scientific knowledge would not be deployed to account for the differences between Europeans and other inhabitants of the global space.

8. Though I am sure there is no need to justify my choice of Locke to chart liberal ontology and the refashioning of self-consciousness in the scene of regulation, something must be said regarding why I do not engage Locke's (and other) statements in light of the colonial project about which their formulations are indirect commentaries and in which some (as in the case of Locke actively) participated. Unlike Fitzpatrick (1992), Goldberg (1995), and Eze (2001), I locate the emergence of the notion of the racial as configuring the present global space later, in the nineteenth century. Even if, as Goldberg (1995) argues, Locke's statement that links rationality and equality presupposed a correlation between color and (ir)reasonability, which would justify African slavery, such correlation cannot be equated with the connection the racial produces between mind, body, and global location because, as will be discussed in Part 3, the latter required the deployment of the tools of scientific reason to support ideas and practices that kept non-Europeans outside the scope of modern moral principles. That is, I recognize, as Fitzpatrick (1992) argues, that the rational thing—in the guise of the legal subject—necessitated the articulation of a domain of savagery (unconstrained or unregulated violence), which the law addressed and where "natives" were located, up to the nineteenth century, when Europeans and "natives" were apprehended by categories of racial difference, and that later, when the latter came to be called "primitive," traditional,
and so on, legal decisions regarding the relationships between Europeans and their others could not rely on statements that presume the necessity (in the Kantian sense) of racial subjection. As Forbes (1993) nicely demonstrates, pre-nineteenth-century usage of certain terms, such as "mulatto," "colored," "black," and so on, does not give us license to assume that they already carried the meanings they would later acquire.

9. By choosing Leibniz to illustrate how a critique of scientific reason highlights morality, temporality, and productivity (as the power to actualize the possible and the potential), I am not suggesting that he was the first modern philosopher to engage these qualities of the mind. As Negri (1991) points out, these themes also appear in Spinoza's metaphysics when he addresses the relationship between freedom and time (196).

10. Leibniz does more than recuperate that which had been forfeited in the scene of regulation. By returning to metaphysics, he introduces the themes of contingency and infinity, which cannot but write force as a boundless creative force—the reason I think they disappear in later versions of universal poesis. Because my discussion of Leibniz's statements has to do with how the central themes of the modern philosophical conversation postpone affectability, I will not discuss his notions of contingency and infinity, for they would lead to a distinct venue for a critique of reason that would focus on the notion of power or force itself.

11. This has been called the "disenchantment of the world," the moment in which "matter would at last be mastered without any illusion of ruling or inherent powers, of hidden qualities" (Horkheimer and Adorno 2001, 6).

12. "Reason," Cassirer (1951) observes in his classic analysis of the Enlightenment, is now "the original intellectual force which guides the discovery and determination of truth... . The whole eighteenth century understands reason in this sense; not as a sound body of knowledge, principles, and truths, but as a kind of energy, a force which is fully comprehensible only in its agency and effects. What reason is, and what it can do, can never be knowledge by its results but only by its function" (13).

13. Kant's attempt should not be overstated. For Taylor (1975), this marks Kant's break with the classical conceptions of space as a "property of things" and as "a substantial reality" (355). Incidentally, later I return to Taylor's comments on the differences between Hegel's and Kant's appropriation of space to indicate how the negation of exteriority occurs in Kant's formulations. "Kant," Taylor argues, "is right in his own way that [space] is a simple form, but he is wrong as usual to think of this in a subjective manner. Space is not just subjective; but it is a form in the sense of pure abstraction, the pure abstract reality of the natural, the external; hence it must be filled" (355). What distinguishes Hegel's notion of space, Taylor suggests, is precisely the recuperation of externality, of exteriority, of space (and time, for that matter) "as conditions of things," which, as we will see in chapter 4, was crucial for his own refashioning of universal reason. Deleuze (1984), on the other hand, suggests that Kant inaugurated a phenomenology which negates that which has all along been the grounds of man, the immediate experience of interiority itself. "For Kant," he argues, "it is a question of the form of time in general, which distinguishes between the act of the I, and the ego to which this act is attributed... . Time moves into the subject, in order to distinguish the Ego [Moi] from the I [Je] in it. It is the form under which the I affects the ego that is, the way in which the mind affects itself.... Form of interiority' means not only that time is internal to us, but that our interiority constantly divides us from ourselves, splits us in two; a splitting in two which never runs its course, since time has no end" (xx).

14. The late eighteenth century saw a proliferation of critiques of the Enlightenment that, like Rousseau's for instance, advanced versions of man that sought a basis for morality and a social ontology outside the prevailing liberal account. My choice of Herder's critique results not from a dismissal of his contemporaries' views but from the fact that his formulations address the most crucial aspects of the Enlightenment. Herder, Taylor (1975) reminds us, "reacts against the anthropologism of the Enlightenment" with its objectified view of human nature, its reliance on scientific reason, and so on (13).

15. He writes human "intrinsic difference" according to scientific reason's rendering of nature. Herder identifies four "laws of human being's nature": (a) "The human being is a freely thinking, active being, whose
forces operate forth progressively. Therefore let him be a creature of lan-
guage” (127); (b) “The human being is in his destiny a creature of the
herd, of society. Hence the progressive formation of a language becomes
natural, essential, necessary for him” (139); (c) “Just as the whole human
species could not possibility remain a single herd, likewise it could not
retain a single language. So there arises a formation of different national
languages” (147); and (d) “Just as in all probability the human species
\[Geschlecht\] constitutes a single progressive whole with a single origin in a
single great household-economy, likewise all languages too, and with them
the whole chain of civilization” (154).

4. TRANSCENDENTAL POESIS

1. As Taylor (1975) suggests, with this gesture, the recuperation of exter-
iority, Hegel does not emancipate spatiality from the Kantian interiority.
It is just a necessary moment before Hegel resolves space into time. “But,”
Taylor notes, “this immediate external existence has negativity in it be-
cause it cannot exist as just external, hence it is in contradiction. Hegel
sees negation first in the point . . . , the attempt to get out of externality to
singular self-identity. But the nature of space is such that this is a negation
of it, to have no extension, so the point goes into the line, the line into the
surface, and this into the whole space. But this negativity has real existence
as time. So space is no longer at rest, its parts just coexisting. Now it is in
movement. Time is the side of Nothing, of becoming. It is the negation of
the exteriority of space, but also in a purely exterior way” (356).

2. According to Habermas (1987), Hegel’s critique of the Enlightenment
targets precisely what I attempt to capture with the notion of an interior-
ized nomos, which is the fact that “it had falsely put understanding \[Ver-
stand\] or reflection in the place of reason \[Vernunft\]” (24), which is also
another way of naming the account of universal reason as form. Why I do
not use these terms should become more evident in this chapter as I indi-
cate how Hegel’s version of universal reason, though it privileges the scene
of representation, cannot and should not be incarcerated in the series of
distinctions that communicate the two versions of the play of reason I have
identified. Not surprisingly, Hegel’s first solution to what Habermas (1987)
calls “the problem of unification” (25–27) was a return to the divine author
and ruler, which he quickly abandoned. In any case, though I recognize, as
Habermas (1987) and Taylor (1975) seem to suggest, Hegel’s rejection of
the interiorized nomos as the proper modern ontoepistemological ground, I
think that reducing it to a critique of the liberal “individual” captured with
the notion of the subjective prevents us from exploring the (dis)continuities
between Hegel’s and previous statements, ones that Hegel himself spells out
as he rewrites modern philosophy as or in the trajectory of Spirit. Whether
his reconciliation is only partially successful, as Habermas argues, or, as I
argue, is successful (productive) only because it avoids the kind of un-
reflected unity the figure of the divine produces, it is undeniable that it
has displaced neither the universality of regulation nor the universality of
representation. That is, Hegel’s formulations have been crucial in enabling
the coexistence of the two scenes, indicated by the themes of (legal and
scientific) universality and historicity, in which self-consciousness could
remain protected from universal nomos.

3. This, I think, is missed in attempts to signal the erasure of the other
of Europe produced in modern texts without engaging the conditions of
production of the themes, universality and historicity, that institute this
place of silence, the place where the language of man is mute. For instance,
Spivak’s (1999) suggestion that an alternative to Hegel’s reading of the
\[Gita\] would acknowledge that “the \[Gita\] itself can also be read as another
dynamic account of the quenching of the question of historical verifica-
tion . . . . The \[Gita\] is a tightly structured dialogue in the middle of the gi-
gantic, multiform, diversely layered account of the great battle between two
ancient and related lineages . . . . All around the \[Gita\] is myth, history, story,
process, ‘timing.’ In the halted action of the text is the unfurling of the
Laws of Motion of the transcendence of timing, the Time of the Universe”
(45). Of course, Spivak offers this alternative reading against Hegel’s ver-
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