

Summary of Conferences held March-November 1963

Reference: Operation ZIPPAN

Date: 22 DEC 63

Participants:

DCI McCone, James Angleton, Robert Crowley, William Harvey,
DD/FBI Sullivan, LtCol Cass, USMC

Distribution as above

Statement of Policy

1. The removal of the President and the Attorney General from their positions because of high treason has been determined.
2. by their contacts with top-level intelligence officials of the Soviet Union and the subsequent release by the President and the Attorney General of the highest level security material to a government that stands in direct opposition to the United States, these individuals cannot be permitted to occupy their official positions.
3. By treating with the enemy on the Cuban issue and actively blocking legitimate military actions against a Soviet/Cuban armed enemy in close proximity to the United States, these individuals have endangered the people of the United States and permitted enemies of this country to actively place atomic weapons within the reach of many American cities.
4. Removal by impeachment or other legal means is considered unfeasible and too protracted.
5. Therefore, an alternative solution has been found to effect this removal.
6. This removal is the result of a consensus between the various concerned official agencies.

7. This operation, codenamed ZIPPER, was under the direction of James Angleton of the Agency, assisted by Robert Crowley and William Harvey, also of the Agency.
8. The government departments directly concerned consisted of:
 - a. The Central Intelligence Agency.
 - b. The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
 - c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff.
9. Other government agencies involved but not with specific knowledge were:
 - a. The U.S. Department of the Treasury, Secret Service Division.
 - b. The National Security Agency.
 - c. The Naval Security Group.
 - d. INTERAMMO.
 - e. The U.S. Department of State, Passport Division.
10. Following the removal of the President, the new President, who had been fully briefed prior to the act, agreed "in the interest of national concerns" to appoint a special Commission chaired by the Chief Justice, for the purpose of "settling public concerns to rest." Mr. Angleton was in complete control of all evidence presented to this Committee and worked closely in conjunction with Mr. Sullivan of the FBI to ensure that nothing was brought before the Committee that it did not want to acknowledge.
11. As both the Vice President and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had been slated for replacement by the Kennedy faction, their support for this project was practically guaranteed from the outset.
12. The Vice President came to believe that an attempt would be made on his life at the same time and was greatly concerned for his own safety.
13. As the Vice President and the Director of the FBI were longtime neighbors and very friendly, the Director has repeatedly assured the President that he was not a target and that no shots

were fired at him in Dallas.

14. The President has been reassured but is still considered very leary of any possible such actions being taken against himself or members of his personal family.
15. One of the primary goals of ZIPPER, the removal of the Attorney General, has been discussed repeatedly with the President by the DCI, and the President has agreed to gradually force him out of his position. He has stated, however, that the popularity of the AG is such that this removal must be performed with care.
16. Representative Ford, R, of Michigan, a member of the Commission, is working closely with Director Hoover and reports all incoming information directly to him.
17. Full cooperation with friendly media sources has ensured that the public attention has been drawn to Oswald as the sole killer. The President feels strongly that any attempt to portray Oswald as a tool of the Soviets is liable to create "too high a level of international tension" which the President feels, might lead to direct confrontation with the Soviet Union.
18. The President is not receptive to plans of the JCS, supported entirely by the Agency, to eradicate Castro and his Marxist government from Cuba. The President states that war almost occurred as a result of the last military attempt to dislodge the Cuban dictator and he does not wish to replay that aspect of the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine.
19. The President has indicated, however, that an escalation of U.S. military involvement in French Indo China is not unreasonable. Reports given to him by the Agency as well as the JCS on this subject have been well received.
20. The President's aide, Jenkins, has also supported this idea and the Secretary of Defense has come down strongly in favor of it.
21. The President believes that his occupancy of the white House is due to the death of his predecessor and has a desperate desire to achieve a degree of legitimacy.

22. He has been advised that a war-time President is always assured of reelection (i.e., Wilson, Roosevelt) but only in the event that the war is prosecuted with vigor and has attendant military successes.
23. On a related topic, the French President, deGaulle, while in Washington for the late President's funeral, held several conferences with the new President as well as other officials to include the Agency.
24. The General stated several times and with some asperity that he had been the object of a number of assassination attempts in the past, some going back to the war, and that he had grown tired of them. He stated that the OAS attempts to shoot him or bomb him had been known to members of the Agency who had, in at least one case, assisted the OAS assassins.
25. The General also stated that he was aware through French intelligence reports, that the assassins of the President were French citizens.
26. Because it is viewed as vital that the French become involved in NATO and to assuage the concerns of the General, guarantees were given both by the President and the DCI that no further actions would be undertaken that could result in an assassination and further, that the United States would actively support French commercial interests in French Indo China in return for French cooperation with NATO.
27. The French President agreed to this but made several oblique threats to the President about his reactions in the event of future Agency "meddling" in French domestic and foreign policy.
28. The General was reassured repeatedly on these points and is now apparently in agreement with United States aims in Southeast Asia. He made several remarks about the trade in opium in that area being extremely lucrative and stated that he had his own problems with narcotics traffic in the Mediterranean area.
29. It is not believed, and electronic surveillance of the President's lines of communication while in the United States does not support, the possibility that he might have actual knowledge

of any American involvement, or projected involvement, in this sensitive area.

30. Both the Agency and the President feel that the French President has "fired a shot across our bows" but that these issues have now become resolved. The President feels, however, that the French will have to be watched carefully in the future and that if American interests become established in French Indo China, we had best consider our own interests at that time.
31. In the matter of the Soviet Union, it is evident that they were initially concerned that the removal of Kennedy might be laid at their doorstep. As this was certainly one of the objectives of the Agency as well as the JCS, it has been necessary to repeatedly reassure their leadership that there would be no such intimations in the future and, that in addition, there would be no further attempts to execute any military or overt clandestine operations against either Cuba or its leader, Castro.
32. In the matter of the public perception of the Dallas action, extensive use has been made of Agency connections with major American media organs, i.e., the New York Times and the Washington Post. The Times is strongly supporting the Commission and its findings and we are assured that they will continue to do so. The same attitude has been clearly and strongly expressed by the Post.

Synopsis of executive meetings and communications.

Note:

In most cases, the participants listed above were in attendance. In some cases, not noted, one or more of the participants were absent but subsequently fully informed of salient material discussed or were involved by telephonic participation in meetings.

In the following compendium, many meetings, conferences or telephonic communications are not fully covered.

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✓ 1 MAR 63

8:30 AM- Noon

Conference with DCI, JJA, ~~STG~~.
Implementation of ZIPPER. Presentation of RPK intercepts to DCI. Review of investigative data to date. DCI requests more data.

✓ 2 MAR 63

9:45 AM- 11:15 AM

Presentation by JJA and ~~STG~~ to DCI of evidentiary material.

2:20 PM

Request by DCI for interview with Director/FBI.

4 MAR 63

8:15 AM-10:00 AM

Conference with DCI, JJA with Director/FBI and DD/FBI Sullivan.

7 MAR 63

8:30 PM- 12:00 AM

Conference with JJA and Sullivan.