EGOISM VS. ALTRUISM
From Moral Philosophy through the Ages (2nd edition), by James Fieser
Home: https://storage.googleapis.com/jfieser/300/Index.html
2001, updated 9/1/2024, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
CONTENTS
Introduction
Types of Egoism
Hobbes's Psychological Egoism
The Argument from Natural Unsociability
The Argument from Simplicity
The Argument from Quid Pro Quo Expectations
Pufendorf's Psychological Egoism
Criticisms of Psychological Egoism
Butler's Criticism: There is No Single Motive of Self-Interestedness
Hume's Criticism: Complex Reductionist Explanations of Emotions are Not Credible
Gert's Criticism: Hobbes's Psychological Egoism is merely True by Definition
Feinberg's Criticism: Psychological Egoism is Unfalsifiable
Lingering Issues with Psychological Egoism
Egoism, Altruism and Evolution
The Disconnect between Psychological Egoism and Non-Egoistic Ethics
References
Study Questions
INTRODUCTION
A professional barber in Australia named Nasir Sobhani took a unique approach to community service through his haircutting skills. Operating under the nickname "The Streets Barber," he implemented a project he called "Clean Cut, Clean Start," where each week he would dedicate his only day off to giving free haircuts the homeless in his area. He would walk through the city streets carrying his equipment, offer his services to those he encountered, and cut their hair right in the open. There are many other examples of people performing deeds of kindness with no apparent benefit to themselves. Some people risk their lives to save strangers, or make anonymous donations to charitable causes, or donate their organs to unknown recipients, or dedicate their lives to humanitarian work in dangerous areas. There are also soldiers who sacrifice their lives to save their comrades in battle, or parents who make significant personal sacrifices for their children, or whistleblowers exposing corruption at great personal risk. The list goes on.
Cases like these make us think that human beings can do more than just look out for themselves, and are capable of acting selflessly. But the situation is not that simple, as this story about Abraham Lincoln suggests. Lincoln was once riding with some lawyers on the judicial circuit when he saw a pig stuck in a mudhole. Initially, Lincoln rode past, but later turned back to rescue the pig, getting his clothes muddy in the process. When asked why he went back, Lincoln said he did it to "take a pain out of his own mind," and that he would have felt bad all day if he hadn't (Lamon, The Life of Abraham Lincoln, 1872). This story suggests that even apparently selfless actions may ultimately be motivated by self-interest. The same goes for the Streets Barber's generous behavior. Sobhani himself was a former drug addict, and his conduct might be seen as a way of personally reconciling his former life with his new one.
In moral philosophy, questions about the possibility of selfless actions involve a dispute between two competing theories of human nature, which we may define here:
Psychological altruism: some human conduct is not motivated by self-oriented desires, and we are at least occasionally capable of acting from other-oriented desires, which are solely for the benefit of others.
Note that psychological altruism is not claiming that all human conduct is other-oriented. For, it is indisputable that we do act purely from self-oriented desires a lot of the time, if not most of the time. Rather, psychological altruism is only claiming that in at least some instances we are motivated purely from other-oriented desires, with no consideration of our own interest. For all we know, maybe that is indeed what Sobhani is doing.
Philosophers writing on the egoism-altruism debate have used other terms such as "self-love", "selfishness", "self-interest", "one's own good", "happiness", or "welfare". While these convey the basic idea of egoism, they each have their own connotation, such as "self-love" which conveys the idea of a care for oneself that goes beyond the more neutral idea of self-interest. What we need, though, is a more general term that umbrellas over all these. "Self-interest" is the most common one, but this too conveys the idea that the outcome for the person will be a positive one. This, though, would exclude motives of self-destruction or self-sabotage that people might act out on in their darkest moments, which certainly would not be in their self-interest. Accordingly, we will use the term "self-oriented" desires as the umbrella term for egoistically-directed motives.
Within the context of this debate, the theories of psychological egoism and psychological altruism are making scientific claims about theories of human psychology. That is, they are using observations about our human thoughts and actions, and theorizing about how our mental architecture might best explain them. That being so, we might ask what business is it of moral philosophers? For, whether Sobhani cuts hair of homeless people from motives of self-interest or other-interest, what he's doing is still morally good. Maybe moral philosophers should let it go at that. But there is a compelling reason why this is a moral issue. First, Immanuel Kant made the observation that we are morally obligated to do only those things that we are capable of doing. His position is often encapsulated in the expression "ought implies can" (Kant, Critique, 1788, 1.1). For example, I am under no obligation to cure cancer since I do not have the capacity to do so. That is, my obligation to cure cancer (ought) implies that I have the capacity to do so (can). If we apply this reasoning to psychological egoism, the results are startling: I am under no obligation to act selflessly towards others (ought) if I don't have the psychological capacity to do so (can). This means whatever morality does demand of me, it cannot ever require me to act solely in the interest of others. The best that morality can demand that I behave kindly towards others in ways that benefit me personally, either directly or indirectly.
This is a rather skeptical outlook on morality, and it is reflected in a distinctly moral version of egoism called "ethical egoism":
It's almost like saying that we should all be like customer service workers who do indeed help others, but only because they get paid. Ethical egoists in philosophy have been few and far between, and German philosopher Max Stirner is one possible example. Stirner argues for a form of individualism where I should act solely in my own self-interest, and reject all moral absolutes and social conventions. He writes,
I am my own only when I am master of myself, instead of being mastered either by sensuality or by anything else (God, man, authority, law, state, Church); what is of use to me, this self-owned or self-appertaining one, my selfishness pursues. [Stirner, The Ego and its Own, 1844]
The type of morality that ethical egoists suggest seems very foreign to what you and I ordinarily call "morality". In fact, one argument against ethical egoism is that it goes against the common assumption that morality must be universal and apply to everyone. For, this can't be done in a situation where two egoists are competitively seeking their own interests. If you and I are both seeking for the same job promotion, and I universalize my interest in it, then you must seek my interest in my promotion as well, and vice versa. Thus, if we accept ethical egoism, out the window goes universalization, and what is left doesn't look much like morality. Another problem is that a society based on ethical egoism might lack the cooperation necessary for a functioning social order. For, I might not always recognize when I need to perform some apparently selfless action for my long-term benefit of helping keep society intact. In any case, our focus in this chapter will be primarily on psychological egoism.
The term "psychological egoism" first gained prominence in the late 1800's, mostly in reference to Thomas Hobbes's moral and political theory. Prior to Hobbes, there were some philosophers who we could rightfully describe as psychological egoists. One is the ancient Greek philosopher Thrasymachus who, as Plato describes him, argued that people fundamentally act out of personal benefit and only act justly because of external pressures (Plato, Republic, Bk. 1). But it wasn't until the seventeenth-century that Hobbes sparked a debate about whether humans were motivated solely by self-interest. In a previous chapter we looked at Hobbes's social contract theory, in which he maintained that people are fundamentally self-interested. Here we will look specifically at this claim. Hobbes's most overt statement of psychological egoism is this: "of the voluntary acts of every man the object is some good to himself" (Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651, Ch. 14). That is, every voluntary choice I make is motivated by some self-oriented aim. Hobbes does not come right out and say something like "Here are my main arguments in defense of my view that humans are motivated only by self-oriented desires". However, we can derive three such arguments from what he does say: an argument from natural unsociability, an argument from simplicity, and an argument from quid pro quo expectations. Individually, any of these might make the case for psychological egoism, but collectively his case is even more compelling.
The Argument from Natural Unsociability
In a nutshell, Hobbes's argument for psychological egoism from natural unsociability is based on two key points: first, many of our natural inclinations direct us towards hostility, and, second, we have no natural inclinations that direct us towards sociability.
Regarding the first point, Hobbes sees humans as machines in a literal sense, where we are composed entirely of material stuff in a world governed by physics, and all of our actions result from a chain of necessary causes. In philosophical terminology, Hobbes is both a materialist and a determinist. He is a materialist since he holds that the very concept of an immaterial thing is nonsense. He is a determinist since he holds that the human actions that we would identify as willful or intentional are just the product of prior mechanical causes. For him, the will is just a mechanical switch that triggers an action based on the strongest set of motives. You can use the word "free" to describe your willful choices if that makes you happy, but your choices are still not free in the sense that your will has veto power over the prior causes of your choice. They do not (Hobbes, Of Liberty and Necessity, 1654).
In his mechanistic explanation of human nature, Hobbes argues that all human actions are motivated by only seven foundational passions: appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief. All other passions we have are just variants of these, such as "hope" which is an appetite with the view to obtain some thing, for example, my hope to go to a restaurant this evening. All of these passions are self-oriented, and this is so even with the passion of "love", which for him is essentially the same thing as "desire". The only difference is that with desire the object of our interest is absent from us at that moment, whereas with love the object is present with us (Leviathan, Ch. 6).
Hobbes builds upon these foundational passions to explain the more complex thoughts we have that determine how we interact with others in society. But all of this behavior is self-oriented. For example, we all have a restless desire of power over others and we compete for goods that are in scarce supply. While wealth makes us obey common power to protect what we have, poverty inclines us to war. The desire of praise and fame makes us do good deeds (Ibid. Ch. 11).
Turn now to the second point in his argument, which is that we have no natural inclinations that direct us towards sociability. All of the anti-social tendencies in human nature listed in the first point above do not necessarily lead to psychological egoism by themselves. Rather, he needs to show further that humans have no psychological faculty of kindness or benevolence that might offset these more self-oriented tendencies. The argument here is one from silence. For example, he does not mention any instinct of sociability in the way that earlier natural law philosophers like Aristotle and Grotius do. He does not mention any natural inclination towards friendship like Cicero does. He does not mention any natural brotherhood of humanity like Epictetus does. Further, when we look at later philosophers who stand out as rejecting psychological egoism, we find clear references to natural psychological capacities that are other-oriented, such as instinctive benevolence or sympathy. Hobbes has none of this. Also, Hobbes gives an extensive explanation why humans cannot live harmoniously in society like ants. For example, ants do not compete for honor the way that humans do, and, unlike humans, the common good for ants is the same as each ant's private good. Also, ants cannot see fault in the governance of societies, while we can and do all the time. Ants can't distinguish between accidental damage and intentional injury the way that we can (Ibid. Ch. 17).
Thus, our natural human tendencies are self-oriented and lead to conflict, while at the same time we have no other-orientation for counterbalance. More formally, Hobbes's argument for psychological egoism from natural unsociability as this:
1. Human motivations are either self-oriented or they are not.
2. The human motivations that we can identify are self-oriented.
3. There are no obvious other-oriented motivation that we have.
4. Willful human actions are produced by human motivations.
5. Therefore, it is likely that all willful human actions are self-oriented.
Let's consider the truth of each of these premises. Premise 1 lays out the two main options for human motivation. Logically speaking, self-oriented and other-oriented motivations are not the only two options for human behavior. For example, it is theoretically possible that at least some human motivations are neutral and directed neither towards self nor others. However, the assumption in this debate is that egoism and altruism are the most plausible options. Further, by dealing with only these two options from the start, it makes it easier to move the discussion along. If need arises during the discussion, we may certainly introduce the possibility of neutral motivations or any other plausible alternative. For now, let's tentatively grant the truth of 1. Premise 2 also seems plausible based on Hobbes's mechanistic model of human nature and the examples he provides that fit this model. Premise 3 lends support to premise 2 by ruling out obvious other-oriented motivations. Premise 4 is true by definition of the human will and how it functions. This too, though, may be up for dispute, which we re-examine later if the need arises. The conclusion then follows from premises 1, 2 and 4 by the logical rule of disjunctive syllogism. This argument follows the structure of a logically deductive proof. However, because of all the unknown factors that we've noted in the premises, it is best to interpret this as an inductive argument that shows the high likelihood of the conclusion rather than the certainty of it. For example, the truth of premises 2 and 3 depend upon how thoroughly we have investigated examples of human motivation in the hunt for other-oriented ones. No such investigation can be 100% exhaustive, and the best we can conclude that it is likely (but not certain) that all willful human actions are self-oriented. Casting the argument as inductive rather than deductive is an important safeguard against accusations that psychological egoism is not a truly scientific theory, as we shall later see.
The next argument from Hobbes in support of psychological egoism is that from simplicity, which, stated briefly, is this: natural self-oriented motives sufficiently explain every type of human conduct, and there is no need to postulate any natural other-oriented ones. This argument is not one directly offered by Hobbes himself, but rather is attributed to him by eighteenth-century critic Joseph Butler and, more recently, by American philosopher James Rachels. However, I believe this argument is true to the spirit of Hobbes, and for our purposes we will consider it his.
According to the argument from simplicity, Hobbes uses two test cases to show how conduct that we ordinarily belief is selfless is actually motived by self-interest. One is the feeling of pity and the other charity. Now, we might think that, of all human feelings and conduct that arises from them, these, at least, are ones that are directed towards others, not towards oneself. But Hobbes does not think so. As to pity, he says the following:
Grief for the calamity of another is pity; and arises from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himself; and therefore is called also compassion, and in the phrase of this present time a fellow-feeling: and therefore for calamity arriving from great wickedness, the best men have the least pity; and for the same calamity, those have least pity that think themselves least obnoxious to the same. [Leviathan, Ch. 6]
His point is that when we experience pity for someone, we are actually projecting ourselves into that situation and imagining how we ourselves would feel. If I see someone painfully stub their toe, I wince, cringe and tighten my muscles as though it's happening to me. Similarly, if I see someone mourning from the death of their spouse, I imagine what that would be like if my spouse died. This observation is one that Hobbes originally derived from Aristotle and incorporated it into two of his later works (Hobbes, The Art of Rhetoric; Of Human Nature 9.17). He analyzes the feeling of charity differently:
There is yet another passion sometimes called love, but more properly good-will or charity. There can be no greater argument to a man, of his own power, than to find himself able not only to accomplish his own desires, but also to assist other men in theirs: and this is that conception wherein consists charity. [Of Human Nature, 9.17]
Here, when we experience a feeling of charity towards someone and act out on it, we are not acting selflessly but instead are on a power trip by exercising our ability to advance other's lives.
With pity and charity alone, we can cover most of our other-oriented feelings and actions. Even if humans have other distinct ones, such as mercy, solidarity, compassion and benevolence, we could easily create plausible self-oriented explanations of them. For that matter, we don't even need to accept Hobbes's self-oriented explanations of pity and charity, and can easily create some self-oriented explanations of these on our own. For example, other-oriented behaviors might be that they help reduce my own sense of guilt, as was the case with Lincoln; they improve my social status; they help me avoid social criticism. Here, now is the point: if we can explain all of our apparent other-oriented attitudes and behaviors through a few self-oriented feelings, there is no benefit to postulating any additional other-oriented instinct like sociability or benevolence. More formally, the argument is this:
1. Generally speaking, if we can adequately explain some phenomenon with one principle rather than two principles, then we should reject the unnecessary principle.
2. So-called altruistic behavior can be adequately explained through the principle of self-oriented motives alone.
3. Therefore, we should reject the principle of other-oriented motives.
Premise 1 is the principle of simplicity, also known as Ockham's razor. It is an important principle used in science to favor simpler explanations over more complex ones when they are otherwise equal in their ability to explain some natural phenomenon. The most famous example is the acceptance of Copernicus's sun-centered model of the solar system over Ptolemy's earth-centered model. Scientists preferred Copernicus's simpler theory since it required fewer epicycles to explain planetary motion. While the principle of simplicity does not point us to the correct explanation in every situation, it has a strong enough track record to at least deserve consideration. Premise 2 is supported by the examples of hidden self-oriented motives discussed above. The conclusion then follows from premises 1 and 2 by the argument form of inductive syllogism, which, as the name suggests, is an inductive rather than deductive argument form.
The Argument from Quid Pro Quo Expectations
Hobbes's third argument for psychological egoism is that the sociability that we have is based only on a quid pro quo expectation, that is, the expectation that by giving something we will receive something in exchange. For example, if I transfer ownership of my car to you, I expect money in return. For Hobbes, quid pro quo expectation is the template for all social interaction. Hobbes makes this point explicitly in his work On the Citizen (1642). He states there that most philosophers who write on the origin of society assume that we are naturally suited for community-living and thus are political animals. For Hobbes, though, this assumption seriously mischaracterizes human nature. We do not come together in society because of a natural love for one another, he says, but rather by accident and personal convenience. For, he argues, if we naturally loved others simply as people, we would love everyone equally, which is clearly not the case. Instead, we seek society for personal honor or profit, not for its own sake. The connections we form with others, then, are based entirely on this. Further, when we meet for trade, our focus is on business, not personal relationships. The obligations we mutually perform create only superficial friendships, and they often involve jealousy and lead to contention rather than goodwill. Even when we meet with others for pleasure, we frequently laugh at the flaws of other people to elevate our own sense of self-worth. Hobbes sums up his point stating that "All society therefore is either for gain, or for glory; that is, not so much for love of our fellows, as for the love of ourselves" (On the Citizen, 1642, 1.2).
With a little thought, we can push Hobbes's quid pro quo thesis beyond the examples he gives and see how it accounts for all human social interaction. With career advancement, if I work diligently at my job, then I expect job security and potential promotions in return. With job mentoring, if I invest time training you, then I expect you to listen to my advice and potentially help advance my career in the future. With neighbors, if I keep my property well-maintained, then I expect them to do the same to keep up our property values. With social media, if I like or share your content, then I expect you to do the same for my posts in return. In a romantic relationship, if I prioritize my partner's emotional needs, then I expect my partner to prioritize mine.
The most commonly given evidence for psychological altruism is the sacrifices we make for our children. But even here we can find multiple ways that parent-child relationships involve quid pro quos. If your parents give love, attention, and emotional support to you, at the same time they expect you to develop into an emotionally well-adjusted person. If they invest time and resources in your education, they expect you to develop your skills and make the most of your opportunities. If they gradually give you more freedom as you grow older, they expect you to demonstrate increased responsibility. If they pass down family values, they expect you to continue these in your own life. If they dedicate their life to raising and supporting you, they expect some kind of care from you when they are elderly. It may seem callous to reduce parent-child relationships to a series of quid pro quo expectations. But consider what might happen if your parents expertly fulfill all of their child-rearing duties, but you fail to fulfill any of their expectations. For example, you reject your family values, drop out of high school, work at a dead-end job, and spend your time partying with your unsavory friends. You would not only be a disappointment to your parents, but at some point they would throw you out of the house. Even unconditional parental love has limits, and with strict parents it may not take much to cross that line. If this is how parents can be to their own children, imagine how much more fragile quid pro quo arrangements are with our friends, neighbors and business associates. The slightest infraction often sets us off in a rage and prompts us to contemplate a lawsuit against the offender.
The argument for psychological egoism from quid pro quo expectations can be more formally expressed as follows:
1. Human actions are always motivated by either self-oriented desires or by other-oriented desires.
2. If human actions were motivated by other-oriented desires, then sociability would not always be based on a quid pro quo.
3. But it appears that sociability is always a quid pro quo.
4. Therefore, it is likely that human actions are always motivated by self-oriented desires.
Again, premise 1 states the contest between psychological egoism and psychological altruism, where we are assuming there is no third type of motive behind human actions: they are either self-oriented desires, or other oriented desires. Premise 2 stipulates that quid pro quo social arrangements are not motivated by other-oriented desires. Premise 3 is supported by the wide-ranging instances of quid pro quo social arrangements that seem to even our most seemingly altruistic conduct, such as towards our children. The conclusion then follows by an inductive version of the argument form of modus tollens with some additional logical inferences implied.
Pufendorf's Psychological Egoism
We might be tempted to dismiss Hobbes's case for psychological egoism on the grounds that he was an eccentric and overly pessimistic philosopher, who was out of step with the more optimistic and other-oriented morality of his time. That is in fact how many of Hobbes's immediate critics portrayed him. However, several of the most important philosophers of his day took Hobbes seriously and embraced his position in varying degrees. One such philosopher was Samual Pufendorf (1632-1694), who we already looked at in the chapters on natural law and duty theory. Pufendorf followed Hobbes's political philosophy in many ways, including Hobbes's view that human nature is driven by self-oriented desires, not other-oriented desires.
According to Pufendorf, self-love is a fundamental aspect of human nature, common to all self-aware animals. We strive to preserve ourselves, seek what is beneficial, and avoid what is harmful. This self-love, he says, is so strong "as to supersede any inclination which a man may have" for another person (The Law of Nature, 2.3.14). He acknowledges that there are exceptions where people seem to care more for others than themselves, such as parents for their children. However, like Hobbes, he exposes possible underlying self-oriented causes for these. For example, parents know that they will get glory from others "for bringing such excellent and worthy persons into the world". There are also cases where we sacrifice ourselves for loved ones or masters, but again, on closer inspection, in these cases we are seeing ourselves as lesser parts of a greater whole. Thus, even in these situations of apparent selflessness, a person "never forgets himself". Citing the biblical quote "Skin for skin, and all that a man hath, will he give for his life" (Job 2.4), Pufendorf suggests that people will part with pretty much anything in this world to save their lives.
Pufendorf continues, though, that humans have a paradoxical nature. On the one hand, we have strong self-love and a drive for self-preservation. On the other hand, we are fundamentally weak and needy as individuals. This creates a tension: our self-love drives us to take care of ourselves, but our inherent weakness means we can't effectively do so without the help of others. It is this weakness, then, that generates our need for human sociability. As much as our need for society is pragmatically driven by our need to survive, he says, unsocial qualities in human nature make it difficult. Compared to other animals, we have a stronger predisposition to harm others, which is driven by excessive desires for food, sex, possessions, and social status, as well as unique human traits like pride, envy, and competitiveness. Further, despite lacking natural weapons like claws or horns, we can inflict great damage through the dexterity of our hands and the cunning of our minds, even to the point of causing death (The Duty of Man and Citizen, 1.3). If Hobbes's examples of self-oriented motivations were not enough to make the case for psychological egoism, Pufendorf's discussion certainly bolsters it.
CRITICISMS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM
In the decades after Hobbes, philosophers of all ranks had something to say about his pessimistic view of human nature, and his advocacy of the "selfish hypothesis" as they often called it. We will look at four important criticisms that expose potential problems with Hobbes's and many other versions of psychological egoism.
Butler's Criticism: There is No Single Motive of Self-Interestedness
Joseph Butler (1692-1752) was an Anglican bishop and moral philosopher, and in a series of sermons he reacts against Hobbes's psychological egoism. One of Butler's criticisms is directed against Hobbes's argument from simplicity. Again, that argument is that self-oriented motives sufficiently explain every type of human conduct, and there is no need to postulate any natural other-oriented inclination. But Butler argues in response that a survey of our various emotions will show that humans are motivated by a variety of inclinations, not just a single one, and self-love is only one of many. Further, he argues, there is no single motive of self-love that encompasses all other self-oriented motivations. He writes, "Everybody makes a distinction between self-love, and the several particular passions, appetites, and affections; and yet they are often confounded again" (Fifteen Sermons, Sermon 1). Some human inclinations, he says, might superficially appear to be the same as self-love, such as hunger and esteem, but they are indeed different inclinations. Suppose, for example, that I am hungry and I eat a sandwich. Suppose that I even enjoy the experience of eating the sandwich. My motivation here is simply hunger and not self-love. For, even if I have no self-love and actually hate myself, I would still be motivated to eat and enjoy the sandwich from hunger. Similarly, with esteem, even if I hate myself, I could still desire to be valued by other people. There are other cases where an act might be self-oriented, such as a drug addition, yet could not count as self-love. Suppose, he says, "one man rushes upon certain ruin for the gratification of a present desire: nobody will call the principle of this action self-love". According to Butler, Hobbes's mistake was to reduce all motives to the single theme of self-love. Hobbes's argument from simplicity fails, then, and what we are left with is a large collection of distinct motives. If, again, we survey our various emotions, Butler says that among them we will find a motive of pure benevolence that uniquely stands out among the rest, and this is the inclination to act on behalf of others such as when we act charitably.
Butler is correct that the issue of human motivation becomes tangled when we fail to properly distinguish between self-love and other inclinations, such as hunger and esteem. However, Hobbes did not do this. In fact, Hobbes meticulously analyzes a range of human desires, showing their unique characteristics. At most, Hobbes appears to say that all actions arise from a large set of self-oriented motives, but not that they all arise from a single foundational motive such as self-love. For him this set would include pleasure, pride, vanity, glory, fear, self-love, and a variety of desires that incline us to survive and make the best of our lives. Even so, Butler's point remains to be addressed: if Hobbes concedes that human nature is motivated by so many different desires, why not just accept pure benevolence as one more? We already accept so many, and one more won't hurt the effort at simplification.
In reply to Butler, it is not merely a question of excluding benevolence since it unnecessarily clutters an already large set of motives. Rather, we can recast the argument from simplicity as a battle between two competing sets of motives: self-oriented ones and other-oriented ones. There is a difference in kind between the set of self-oriented and the set other-oriented motives, which still adds to conceptual clutter if we unnecessarily retain the set of other-oriented motives. When understood this way, we can recast the argument from simplicity presented earlier about sets of motives, rather than isolated motives, and the argument retains its force:
1. Generally speaking, if we can adequately explain some phenomenon with one set of motives rather than two sets of motives, then we should reject the unnecessary set of motives.
2. So-called altruistic behavior can be adequately explained through the set of self-oriented motives alone.
3. Therefore, we should reject the set of other-oriented motives.
Just to be clear, even if we reject the set of other-oriented motives, we can still use words like "benevolence" and "sympathy" if we choose, but that doesn't mean that they are instinctively grounded. It only means that we must redefine their meanings in terms of underlying self-oriented motives, such as quid pro quos. This is similar to how, as we noted earlier, a determinist might still use the term "free choice" out of convenience, even though such choices cannot override the determined machinery of our mental operations.
While the argument for psychological egoism from simplicity can withstand Butler's criticism, we must recall a built-in vulnerability to any argument from simplicity. That is, simplicity is only a convenient rule that works some of the time when selecting the better of two competing hypotheses. However, it most certainly does not work all the time, and it is best used as a secondary or supportive argument in conjunction with a stronger one.
Hume's Criticism: Complex Reductionist Explanations of Emotions are Not Credible
Butler's overall approach to philosophy and religion was conservative, and it is no surprise that he sided with psychological altruism over psychological egoism. Hume, however, is different since he was at least as skeptical as Hobbes in areas of philosophy and religion, and, like Hobbes, he was a materialist and determinist. Yet, like Butler, Hume comes down against Hobbes's psychological egoism. His criticism is this: just because the egoist can reduce all conduct to some self-oriented motive doesn't mean it is the correct explanation, and it likely isn't since those explanations are overly complex. We have seen that Hobbes and Pufendorf attempt to reduce apparently altruistic behavior to self-interested motivations such as quid pro quos. In his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), Hume argues that this is bad science within the field of human psychology, where the most obvious explanation of mental phenomena is usually the true one. That is, the appearance of genuine friendship is best explained by the person's underlying feeling of actual genuine friendship, not some elaborate self-oriented quid pro quo. Hume contrasts the methodologies of physics and psychology. In physics we often find that reality is more complex than it first appears, in which case complex explanations are justified. However, when it comes to scientifically investigating human emotions and motivations, the reverse is the case, and the most obvious explanation is usually the best one. In short, psychological egoists like Hobbes, he says, are driven by the love of simplicity to use elaborate reasoning to reduce all human feelings to a single principle of self-interest. In doing so, they fall back on overly complex reasoning to explain outlier feelings such as friendship. These complex explanations, though, are unconvincing. Hume writes,
The simplest and most obvious cause which can there be assigned for any [psychological] phenomenon, is probably the true one. When a philosopher, in the explication of his system, is obliged to have recourse to some very intricate and refined reflections, and to suppose them essential to the production of any passion or emotion, we have reason to be extremely on our guard against so fallacious an hypothesis. [An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Appendix 2]
Hume continues that the most casual observer of human behavior would recognize mental dispositions and feelings that are clearly distinct from self-love, such as benevolence, generosity, love, friendship, compassion, and gratitude. These are clearly differentiated through both language use and observation. This, Hume says, is the obvious appearance of things, and we should accept it as such until we discover some hypothesis that it is otherwise. But all such attempts "have hitherto proved fruitless, and seem to have proceeded entirely from that love of simplicity which has been the source of much false reasoning in philosophy" (Ibid.). Their complex reductionist explanations are so strained, he says, "We may as well imagine that minute wheels and springs, like those of a watch, give motion to a loaded wagon" (Ibid.).
As examples of genuine other-oriented feelings and behaviors, Hume argues that we observe that animals can be kind to both their own species and to humans. In these cases, there's no reason to suspect they're faking it or trying to deceive. It would be illogical to explain all animal feelings as cleverly disguised self-interest. Thus, if we're willing to accept that animals can be genuinely altruistic, we should apply the same logic to humans. Hume continues that romantic love creates a sense of contentment and goodwill that goes beyond just satisfying a physical urge. The care that all conscious beings show for their young is often strong enough to overpower even the strongest self-interested motives, and it does not depend on self-love at all. Regarding parental love, he says that no selfish motive can adequately explain a devoted mother who ruins her health looking after a sick child, and then wastes away from grief after the child dies, even though she's now free from the burden of care. Further, Hume argues, gratitude is a real and meaningful human emotion, not just an empty word. We genuinely enjoy some people's company more than others, and we want our friends to be happy, even if we won't be around to see it or benefit from it. When they are present, it is our affection and care for them that allows us to share in their happiness. For Hume, all this sufficiently shows that humans have a natural propensity towards benevolence and other social virtues such as meekness, charity, and generosity.
Hume is not denying that people often act from self-oriented motives, such as quid pro quo rationales. Rather, he would likely say that, for example, when I am friendly towards a wealthy or influential person, I am aware of exactly what I am doing and are conscious of a least a hint of a self-oriented desire within me. The problem with psychological egoism, for Hume, is its insistence that seemingly genuine acts of friendship are motivated by hidden self-oriented desires in a convoluted way. The science of psychology does not work like this, and, when a motive seems to be obviously other-oriented, we should accept it at face value.
What might we say about Hume's theory? One problem is that Hume's conception of the science of the human mind involved an outmoded methodology of introspection, where I can understand my mental operations by simply reflecting on it. It is as though I am holding a mirror up to my mind's eye and reporting what I see. Hume was the master of introspection, where most if not all of his philosophy of the mind was based on that approach. However, by the early 1900s, introspection lost favor in the field of psychology because of concerns about its reliability as a scientific tool. Today's methods restrict the study of the mind to publicly observable phenomena, such as outward behavior, brain studies, and standardized psychological tests. Thus, the scientific aspect of Hume's critique of psychological egoism has lost its weight. However, in defense of Hume, at least within the field of ethics today, the intuitive and introspective approach to inquiry into the human mind remains valid. We may never know all the hidden components of human motivation at lower levels of biochemical processes or neural pathways. However, Hume seems correct that I can still recognize through my own introspective experience when I act out of genuine concern for others, not merely from self-interest. If I convey my self-analysis to other people, it is good enough for them to make ethical judgments about my motives and conduct. Also, if my action crosses over into legal misconduct, it is good enough for judges and juries to make legal judgments about me based on the introspective reflections I provide them. Thus, while Hume's approach to human psychology is not cutting edge science, it is still valid for understanding human morality.
Gert's Criticism: Hobbes's Psychological Egoism is merely True by Definition
A more recent criticism of Hobbes's theory of psychological egoism is that it is merely true by definition, and thus rests on no external evidence to support it. For some background, a statement as "true by definition" when its truth depends solely on the meanings of the words or concepts involved. For example, the statement "all bachelors are unmarried men" is true because the definition of "bachelor" is an unmarried man. The statement "all squares have four sides" is true because the concept of a square includes the property of having four sides. We call statements that are true by definition like these "tautologies". We've already looked at Hobbes famous statement of psychological egoism that "of the voluntary acts of every man the object is some good to himself" (Leviathan, Ch. 14). American philosopher Bernard Gert (1934-2011) argues that this statement by Hobbes is merely true by definition, and thus Gert calls Hobbes's theory "tautological egoism". Gert writes,
Tautological egoism is a direct consequence of Hobbes's definitions of "voluntary act" and "will." "... a voluntary act is that, which proceedeth from the will, and no other". "Will therefore is the last appetite in deliberating." Thus for Hobbes it is simply a matter of definition that all voluntary acts are done in order to satisfy our desires. . . . Hobbes's tautological egoism is made more complex by his incorporating "good" into it. According to Hobbes ". . . whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that it is which he for his part calleth good." [Bernard Gert "Hobbes and Psychological Egoism." Journal of the History of Ideas. 1967, Vol. 28, No. 4 pp. 503-520.
There are two steps to Gert's claim in the above. First, for Hobbes, a voluntary act is by definition something that satisfies a desire. Second, Hobbes defines good as whatever someone desires or calls good for themselves. Thus, "voluntary acts", "desire satisfaction", and "good" are all integrated. Accordingly, when we decode Hobbes's statement it reduces to simply this: "the acts that satisfy desire are ones that satisfy desire".
Gert's point is that, while it seems that Hobbes is saying something scientific or empirical about human motivation, his evidence for egoism has no empirical consequences. That is, it is based only on definition, not observable facts about human behavior. Gert himself did not think this was necessarily a bad thing. However, other critics do think it is bad that Hobbes's statement is tautological. For, if a justification of psychological egoism is merely true by definition, then it has no external proof and it reduces to just a hypothesis. It is merely stipulating the statement of psychological egoism without offering any evidence in its defense. Here are two more recent wordings of psychological egoism which, like Hobbes's statement, need interpreting to see how they are true by definition. The first is this: "Every voluntary action is prompted by a motive of the agent's own" (Feinberg, "Psychological Egoism, 1965). Here, built into the notion of a "voluntary action" is that it is the result of the person's own motive. Decoded, then, it is just saying "voluntary acts prompted by the person's own motive are prompted by the person's own motive". The second is this: "the person is merely doing what he most wants to do" (Rachels, Elements, 2003, Ch. 5). The tautology becomes evident when we see that "merely doing" and "most wants to do" both are implicitly defined as "what motivates action". Once decoded, the statement reduces to simply "the person's motivated actions are motivated actions". In all of these examples, statements about human motivation that are true by definition cannot function is factual evidence for psychological egoism.
Is the critic of psychological egoism correct about the evidentiary uselessness of these tautological statements? The answer is yes, assuming that these are the only such statements that an egoist makes: their statement is empty and do not serve as meaningful evidence. However, this is not the case with Hobbes, even if the statement of his that we analyzed is merely true by definition. As we have seen, he offers three distinct empirical arguments to support psychological egoism independently of his tautological statement. First, there is the evidence from the pervasiveness of our asocial natural inclinations and absence of social ones. Second, there is the fact that it is a simpler theory than the altruistic alternative. Third, there is evidence from the pervasiveness of quid pro quo social interactions. Philosophers are correct to point out the tautological nature of claims that are misleadingly presented as empirical, and if that is all a defender of psychological egoism does, then that is indeed a problem. But the best philosophical defenses of psychological egoism, like Hobbes's, are detailed and draw on empirical evidence.
Feinberg's Criticism: Psychological Egoism is Unfalsifiable
Another recent criticism is that psychological egoists defend their position in such a way that nothing will count against it; that, though, is not how genuine science is done. The issue rests on an important criterion for scientific inquiry called "falsifiability". For a claim to be scientific, it must be possible, at least in principle, for an observation or experiment to prove it wrong. This does not imply the claim is actually false, but just that it could be shown false if some new evidence was discovered that contradicted it. Falsifiability is important because it helps differentiate between true scientific claims, which rely on testing and empirical evidence, from pseudo-scientific claims that are not open to being tested at all. The concept of falsifiability is the brainchild of Austrian philosopher of science Karl Popper (1902-1994), and his motivation was specifically to debunk the claims of fortunetellers. Suppose, for example, a fortune teller predicts "you will face challenges in the near future." This type of vague prediction would hold true regardless of what happens. If you encounter difficulties at work, the prediction is confirmed. If you have a minor disagreement with a friend, it's also confirmed. The prediction simply cannot be proven wrong, since it fits with any scenario, which is exactly what Popper sought to expose as non-scientific (Popper, "Philosophy of Science" 1957").
Popper did not apply his test of falsifiability to psychological egoism, but Joel Feinberg did. Suppose I object to psychological egoism by offering an example of seemingly unselfish behavior, such as my Aunt Emma giving her last cent to a beggar and going hungry as a result. The psychological egoist might reply that Aunt Emma's true motive was still selfish since perhaps she gave the money to avoid feeling guilty or to feel better about herself. Suppose I then present the psychological egoist with extreme cases like saints, martyrs, or heroes who sacrifice themselves for others. The egoist could always interpret the motives behind these acts as self-serving. According to Feinberg, if the psychological egoist refuses to accept any conceivable behavior as genuinely unselfish, then their theory becomes unfalsifiable. By redefining "selfish" in a way that fits every possible situation, the theory is no longer an empirical hypothesis open to disproof, but it's simply a matter of definition (Feinberg, 1965).
This is potentially the most damaging of all the criticisms of psychological egoism, since, for egoists to prove their point, they feel compelled to give a self-oriented explanation of any situation that an altruist might give them. In some sense this is unfair, since the altruist is in a sense requesting such never-ending selfish explanations from the egoist. But the fairest way to test the psychological egoism for falsifiability is to ask the egoist something like this: is there even any theoretical situation where you would concede that a person's action was fully other-oriented and not at all self-oriented? If the egoist says "no", then Feinberg is right that the egoist fails the test of falsifiability, and their theory is not a scientifically empirical one.
In response, the egoist doesn't need to say "no". Psychological egoism may indeed be unfalsifiable as a vague theory about human psychology, but not if the parameters of human motivation are carefully defined. For example, if we confine the claims of psychological egoism to what we can empirically experience through introspection, then Hume's criticism constitutes a meaningful and plausible set of other-oriented counterinstances. Suppose, for example, that, after a sincere and impartial introspective analysis, Aunt Emma concludes that her acts of kindness towards the beggar was pure and untainted with any hopes of benefit or a quid pro quo. In theory, then, if enough people like Aunt Emma do this, then that should count as a valid other-oriented counter instance to psychological egoism, even if such a group test never actually took place. Further, and more interestingly, suppose that psychological egoists like Hobbes are correct that, at a subconscious neurological level, human psychology is indeed mechanistically self-directed. This would be irrelevant to our theoretical falsifiability test case. For, in our Aunt Emma test case, we are ignoring that lower unconscious level of human psychology, and dealing only with the higher conscious level that we and Aunt Emma can introspectively investigate. Science is about methodology at least as much as it is about truth. And what is important about the Aunt Emma falsifiability test case is that it is restricted to a methodology of introspective reports. Thus, if Aunt Emma and others could introspectively see that their motives were purely other-oriented, then the claim of psychological egoism would be theoretically falsifiable.
LINGERING ISSUES WITH PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM
On the whole, there seems to be no slam-dunk refutation of psychological altruism, and the best reason we might have to reject it is Hume's suggestion that if a motive seems purely other-oriented, then it probably is. But this is no guarantee, and the debate goes on. Indeed, the scholarly literature on the egoism-altruism debate over the past few centuries is vast, and there are always new angles from which to view it, especially as science advances. We will look at two such instances here.
Egoism, Altruism and Evolution
In recent years, biologists have investigated the issue of egoism versus altruism by considering our evolutionary background. In a later chapter we will look more closely at the link between evolution and human morality, but some highlights here will show what is at issue. It's clear that humans sometimes display kindness towards each other, a fact that even psychological egoists like Hobbes and Bentham acknowledge. Biologists similarly recognize this apparent altruism in human behavior, but are skeptical that it is purely other-oriented in the way that Butler held. For all we know, maybe it is ultimately self-oriented, and it may be impossible to definitively prove the ultimate source of human motivation. The safe scientific approach is to suspend judgment on the issue of psychological egoism vs psychological altruism. Nevertheless, the challenge to the biologist lies in identifying the evolutionary process that led self-oriented humans to behave in seemingly altruistic ways. One explanation is that this tendency is ingrained in our nature, much like with certain animals. Ants, for example, instinctively act for the benefit of their colony, regardless of the risks or sacrifices involved. However, this analogy falls short when applied to humans, since we are much more individualistic and don't appear to be hardwired solely for the good of society in the same way as ants are.
A more compelling evolutionary theory connects apparent altruism with the drive to ensure the survival of my genes. The idea here is not that I am biologically programmed to pursue all of my personal desires, but rather that I'm inclined to protect and extend my genetic lineage. This often leads me to behave altruistically toward my children where I'm willing to make great sacrifices for them since they carry my genes. This is known as kin selection. Additionally, this instinct may extend to my broader community, since my genetic success depends in part on cooperation with others. Helping friends, neighbors, and even strangers increases my chances of passing on my genetic legacy. This is referred to as reciprocal altruism. Together, kin selection and reciprocal altruism explain how acts that seem altruistic can still be rooted in self-interest, driven by the desire to ensure my genes' survival, even if it means making significant sacrifices for my family or community. A third evolutionary mechanism is called group selection, whereby apparently altruistic traits can genetically evolve because they benefit the group as a whole, even if they might be slightly disadvantageous to individuals within the group. An example is alarm calls in animals, which benefit the group but may put the caller at risk. Even here, though, these apparently altruistic behaviors are not necessarily the result of conscious other-oriented motivations. For, the alarm caller may feel at the time that it is acting in its own self-interest, and not necessarily in the interest of others.
The Disconnect between Psychological Egoism and Non-Egoistic Ethics
For the sake of argument, let's grant that psychological egoism is a better account of human motivation than is psychological altruism. Does that then force us into being ethical egoists? Recall again the following distinction that we made at the outset:
Psychological egoism: all human conduct is motivated by self-oriented desires, and we are incapable of performing actions from any other motive.
Ethical egoism: right actions are those that maximize my self-interest, and I should never advance the interests of others unless it benefits me.
It does seem that psychological egoism restricts me into ethical egoism. For, if I am psychologically incapable of acting out of other-oriented motivations, then ethical egoism is the only moral theory that is within my reach. English utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) considered this problem and thought he had a solution. Bentham was a committed psychological egoist, and a statement by him on this is that "It is impossible that your pleasures should be better to me than my own, as that your eye-sight should be better to me than my own" (Deontology, 1834, Ch. 11). At the same time, though, Bentham held that I must equally take into account both my interest and those of others when determining what is morally right. He argues that there are multiple ways to bridge the gap between our psychological self-orientation and our ethical inclusion of others.
First, Bentham argues, if I focus on my long-term interests, rather than my short-term ones, my conduct will have less negative impact on others. Using drunkenness as an example, he argues that if I choose sobriety over drunkenness, not only will I avoid personal health issues and social disgrace, but I will be a positive influence on my family and community. For Bentham, the role of true ethics is to provide us with a calculating tool by which we can make assessments in cases such as drunkenness. He writes,
Deontology [i.e., utilitarian cost-benefit analysis] asks no ultimate sacrifice; her lessons propose a balance of enjoyment to the man with whom she reasons. He is in search of pleasure; she encourages him in the search, she allows it to be wise, honorable, and virtuous; but she entreats him not to err by an erroneous arithmetic. [Ibid.]
For Bentham, then, the harm I do to others arises through a faulty calculation, such as when I fail to see the full negative impact of excessive drinking. Further, if I become aware of how my actions affect others, I will also see how those effects loop back to affect me. All combined, this creates a strong incentive for me to consider general welfare when I decide how to behave.
However, while my interests might often be compatible with the interests of others as Bentham suggests, this compatibility is not guaranteed, and even Bentham recognizes that sometimes individual and collective interests might conflict. For example, I might personally benefit from evading taxes, while the collective interest lies in everyone paying their fair share. Thus, it seems that there is no completely clean movement from self-oriented motivations to other-oriented moral obligations. This tension persists not just in Bentham's theory, but any that similarly attempts to bridge that gap. John Stuart Mill, for example, argues that "each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, [is] a good to the aggregate of all persons" (Utilitarianism, 1861, Ch. 4). Like Bentham, Mill implies that when I pursue what's good for me, I am contributing to the overall good. But the problem with Mill's solution is that "the aggregate of all persons" is only an abstraction, and, even if I try to focus on that abstraction of all people, that won't necessarily help me move beyond my interest in my own happiness. Thus, there remains a tension between my individual interests and my obligation to the whole.
These are just two suggestions on how to move from self-oriented psychological egoism to non-egoistic ethics, but both illustrate how challenging it is to bridge that gap. This fact alone may incline us to at least provisionally favor psychological altruism over psychological egoism. For, many of us do indeed place a high value on other-oriented ethical theories, such as virtue theory, duty theory, rights theory and utilitarianism. That being so, why muddy the waters by trying to show how these ethical theories are compatible with the underlying self-oriented motives that psychological egoism describes? This holds even more so if the debate between psychological egoism and psychological altruism is unsettled. It thus is more convenient for advocates of other-oriented ethical theories to at least speak the language of ethical altruism when attempting to explain why our moral obligations are as other-oriented as they are.
REFERENCES
Bentham, Jeremy. Deontology (1834). Various Editions.
Butler, Joseph. Fifteen Sermons (1726). Various editions.
Feinberg, Joel. "Psychological Egoism", in Reason and Responsibility, ed. Joel Feinberg, (1965) Wadsworth.
Gert, Bernard. "Hobbes and Psychological Egoism." Journal of the History of Ideas. 1967, Vol. 28, No. 4 pp. 503-520.
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan (1651). Various editions.
Hobbes, Thomas. Of Liberty and Necessity (1654). Various editions.
Hobbes, Thomas. On Human Nature (1650). Various editions.
Hobbes, Thomas. The Art of Rhetoric (1681). Various editions.
Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751). Various editions.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason (1788). Various editions
Lamon, Ward Hill. The Life of Abraham Lincoln (1872).
Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism (1863). Various editions.
Popper, Karl, "Philosophy of Science: A Personal Report" in British Philosophy in Mid-Century, ed. C. A. Mace (London: Routledge, 1963).
Rachels, James. "Psychological Egoism" in Elements of Moral Philosophy, fourth edition, (2003), McGraw Hill.
STUDY QUESTIONS
Please answer all of the following questions.
1. Define psychological egoism, psychological altruism, and ethical egoism.
2. Explain the phrase "ought implies can".
3. What is Hobbes's view of materialism and determinism?
4. What are the two main points of Hobbes's argument from natural unsociability?
5. What is Hobbes's argument from natural unsociability?
6. What is Hobbes's explanation of pity?
7. What is Hobbes's explanation of charity?
8. What is Hobbes's argument from simplicity?
9. What is one of Hobbes's examples of a quid pro quo?
10. What is Hobbes's argument from quid pro quo expectations?
11. What is Butler's criticism of Hobbes's argument for simplicity, and what is the response to this criticism given in the chapter?
12. For Hume, what are some examples of other-oriented motivations?
13. What is Hume's criticism of psychological egoism, and what is the response to this criticism given in the chapter?
14. What is a tautology?
15. What is Gert's criticism of psychological egoism, and what is the response to this criticism given in the chapter?
16. What is falsifiability?
17. What is Feingberg's criticism of psychological egoism, and what is the response to this criticism given in the chapter?
18. Define kin selection, reciprocal altruism and group selection.
19. What is Bentham's explanation for moving from psychological egoism to a non-egoistic ethical theory like utilitarianism?
20. What is Mill's explanation for moving from psychological egoism to a non-egoistic ethical theory like utilitarianism?
21. Short essay: pick any one of the following views in this chapter and criticize it in a minimum of 100 words. One of his three arguments for psychological egoism; criticisms by Butler, Hume, Gert, or Feinberg; Bentham's or Mill's explanation for moving from self-oriented psychological egoism to other-oriented utilitarian ethics