THOMAS HOBBES
From Modern Philosophy: Essential Selections, by James Fieser
Home: https://storage.googleapis.com/jfieser/315/Index.html
2008, updated 1/1/2024, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
CONTENTS
Introduction
Human Nature
Human Inclinations That Influence Living Together in Peace
Natural Cause of Religion
The Natural Condition
First and Second Laws of Nature
Other Laws of Nature
Miracles, Hell, Head of the Church
Volitional Determinism
Controversial Religious and Moral Doctrines
Study Questions
INTRODUCTION
Born in Wiltshire, England, Thomas Hobbes (1588 1679) was the son of a scandalous clergyman, and, through the generosity of a wealthy uncle, was able to attend Oxford University. Throughout most of his life Hobbes worked as a tutor for a distinguished British family, which enabled him to travel throughout Europe and meet influential politicians and intellectuals, including Descartes. At around age 50 he devoted himself to philosophy and composed a series of philosophical and political works. Hobbes died at age 91 at a home of the family for whom he worked. Many of Hobbes's theories sparked controversy and even outrage in his own day, especially on religious issues. Hobbes's personal religious views are unclear. While he does not appear to be a complete atheist, as some of his contemporaries had accused him, he was by no means a traditional believer. At minimum, he hoped to limit the influence and authority of traditional religion within modern societies that were increasingly becoming scientific and secular.
The most famous of Hobbes's writings is The Leviathan (1651), from which the bulk of the selections below are taken. Here and in his other writings, he paints a mechanistic picture of the human mind that emphasizes three key features: (1) materialism in that we are composed purely of material stuff, (2) determinism in that our actions result from a chain of necessary causes, and (3) egoism in that we are driven largely by selfish motivations. He opens the Leviathan with innovative theories that form his mechanistic view of the mind. First is a discussion of thoughts and sensations. All thoughts originate from sensations, and sensations themselves result from external things exerting pressure on our sense organs, as when my hand touches a table. Our imagination is just a decaying sensation, as when I see a table and the sensation of it lingers in my mind. The thoughts in our understanding result from words triggering our imagination, such as when the word "table" produces a type of sensation of the table in my mind. Second is an account of the function of human language, and here Hobbes espouses a nominalist view of universals: general terms such as "table" only signify the recollected consequences of past experiences with tables, such as when we sit at them and place items upon them. Some words, he argues, signify nothing by being either undefined or contradictory, for example, the notion of a "round square" or an "incorporeal body". Hobbes is credited with offering on of the first computational theories of the human mind, insofar as he argues that human reasoning involves only the operation of addition or subtraction. For example, mathematicians add and subtract numbers, logicians add and subtract words, lawyers add and subtract facts.
Third, a large portion of Hobbes's mechanistic account of the human mind focuses on the passions, that is, emotions, how they arise and what they make us do. He argues that there are only seven foundational passions and all others are variations of these; they are appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief. The passions and other mental mechanisms psychologically predispose us towards both sociability and unsociability. For example, we all have a restless desire of power over others, and we compete for goods that are in scarce supply, which leads to conflict. Religion is yet another aspect of human society that has a foundation in human psychology, and Hobbes discusses various natural causes of religion.
For Hobbes, all these mechanistic aspects of the human mind are important in their own right, but they also form the background of his social contract political theory. In a nutshell, to rise above our natural warring condition and thus preserve our lives, we mutually agree to set aside our hostilities and live in peace under the authority of a government that punishes lawbreakers. He describes the natural condition of humans, prior to the creation of governments. In that natural state, humans are essentially equal, both mentally and physically, and this puts everyone on the same level in the struggle to survive. There are three natural causes of quarrel among people: competition for limited supplies of material possessions, distrust of each other, and glory insofar as people remain hostile to preserve their powerful reputations. The natural condition of humans is thus a state of perpetual war of all against all, where nothing is unjust, and our lives are "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." As we all fear death and desire to live adequately, we are thus motivated to rise above this state of war and we do this through a social contract with others.
Hobbes lays out the steps towards peace in a series of laws of nature. The first law is that we should seek peace as the most reasonable way of preserving our lives. The second is that we should mutually set aside our hostilities towards others so that we can achieve peace more easily. I, thus, agree to give up my right to steal from you, if you give up your right to steal from me. Through this mutual divesting of our hostile rights we form a contract. The third law of nature is that we should keep contracts, and this is accomplished by establishing a political authority who will punish us if we violate our contracts. He lists eleven other laws of nature which are important for preserving a peaceful society once it is established, such as showing gratitude towards others, being accommodating to the interests of others, and pardoning those who commit past offences. He stresses that people are naturally unsociable, and a sovereign power is necessary to make people follow the laws and hold to their contract with others. We thus create a commonwealth and give up our right to govern ourselves individually.
Over half of Hobbes's Leviathan is devoted to the role that religion and Christianity play in society and government. His general position is that, in Christian countries, the political ruler is also head of the church and, as such, the church is under the ruler's authority. His arguments for this view are elaborate and draw from his unique interpretation of scriptural passages. An important issue that arises in this context is the authority that we should give to reports of miracles. He warns that uneducated people are easily deceived by false miracles, and that we should first look for natural explanations. Ultimately, he believes that miracle reports in his time are not believable, but, in the interest of civil unity, we must set aside our private judgments concerning them and follow what our political ruler says about miracles in his position as head of the church.
The remaining selections from Hobbes are from four of his other works. In Of Liberty and Necessity (1656), he defends a view that scholars now call "volitional determinism": our willful actions are causally determined by the strongest motives. Suppose that I am deciding between buying a minivan or a sports car. I have motivations on both sides, such as the need to drive my children around on the one hand, and the need for speed on the other. I weigh the consequences of each, and ultimately make the decision that has the stronger set of motivations: buy the minivan. My will is "free" only in a very loose sense: my will is influenced by my deliberations, but I am still determined since I will of necessity choose that action that has the strongest motives, and I cannot do otherwise. The concluding brief selections are ones that provoked religious and moral controversy. These include his religious views that atheism only a sin of imprudence, rather than injustice, it is a sin to not worship God according to the laws of the state, that the only article of faith for salvation is that Jesus is the messiah, and that God is a corporeal spirit, not incorporeal. In moral matters he argued that the humane feelings of pity and charity are motivated merely by self-interested desires.
Human Beings and Societies as Machines (Introduction)
Nature, the art whereby God has made and governs the world, is by the art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an artificial animal. For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part within; why may we not say, that all automata (engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as does a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the heart, but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the joints, but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the artificer?
Art goes yet further, imitating that rational and most excellent work of nature, man. For by art is created that great Leviathan called a Commonwealth, or State, in Latin Civitas, which is but an artificial man; though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defense it was intended; and in which the sovereignty is an artificial soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body; the magistrates, and other officers of judicature and execution, artificial joints; reward and punishment, by which fastened to the seat of the sovereignty every joint and member is moved to perform his duty, are the nerves, that do the same in the body natural; the wealth and riches of all the particular members, are the strength; salus populi, the people's safety, its business; counsellors, by whom all things needful for it to know are suggested unto it, are the memory; equity, and laws, an artificial reason and will; concord, health; sedition, sickness; and civil war, death. Lastly, the pacts and covenants, by which the parts of this body politic were at first made, set together, and united, resemble that fiat, or the let us make man, pronounced by God in the creation.
To describe the nature of this artificial man, I will consider, First, the matter thereof, and the artificer; both which is man. Secondly, how, and by what covenants it is made; what are the rights and just power or authority of a sovereign; and what it is that preserves or dissolves it. Thirdly, what is a Christian commonwealth. Lastly, what is the kingdom of darkness.
Concerning the first, there is a saying much usurped of late, that wisdom is acquired, not by reading of books, but of men. Consequently whereunto, those persons, that for the most part can give no other proof of being wise, take great delight to show what they think they have read in men, by uncharitable censures of one another behind their backs. But there is another saying not of late understood, by which they might learn truly to read one another, if they would take the pains; that is, nosce teipsum, read thyself: which was not meant, as it is now used, to countenance, either the barbarous state of men in power, towards their inferiors; or to encourage men of low degree, to a saucy behavior towards their betters; but to teach us, that for the similitude of the thoughts and passions of one man, to the thoughts and passions of another, whosoever looks into himself, and considers what he does, when he does think, opine, reason, hope, fear, etc. and upon what grounds; he shall thereby read and know, what are the thoughts and passions of all other men upon the like occasions. I say the similitude of passions, which are the same in all men, desire, fear, hope, etc.; not the similitude of the objects of the passions, which are the things desired, feared, hoped, etc.: for these the constitution individual, and particular education, do so vary, and they are so easy to be kept from our knowledge, that the characters of man's heart, blotted and confounded as they are with dissembling, lying, counterfeiting, and erroneous doctrines, are legible only to him that searches hearts. And though by men's actions we do discover their design sometimes; yet to do it without comparing them with our own, and distinguishing all circumstances, by which the case may come to be altered, is to decipher without a key, and be for the most part deceived, by too much trust, or by too much diffidence; as he that reads, is himself a good or evil man.
But let one man read another by his actions never so perfectly, it serves him only with his acquaintance, which are but few. He that is to govern a whole nation, must read in himself, not this or that particular man; but mankind: which though it be hard to do, harder than to learn any language or science; yet when I shall have set down my own reading orderly, and perspicuously, the pains left another, will be only to consider, if he also find not the same in himself. For this kind of doctrine admits no other demonstration.
Thoughts are Representations of Sensations (Chapter 1)
Concerning the thoughts of man, I will consider them first singly, and afterwards in train, or dependence upon one another. Singly, they [i.e., thoughts] are every one a representation or appearance, of some quality, or other accident of a body without us, which is commonly called an object. Which object works on the eyes, ears, and other parts of a man's body; and by diversity of working, produces diversity of appearances.
The original of them all, is that which we call sense, for there is no conception in a man's mind, which has not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense. The rest are derived from that original.
To know the natural cause of sense, is not very necessary to the business now in hand; and I have elsewhere written of the same at large. Nevertheless, to fill each part of my present method, I will briefly deliver the same in this place.
Sensations the Result of Pressure from External Things upon Sense Organs
The cause of sense, is the external body, or object, which presses the organ proper to each sense, either immediately, as in the taste and touch; or mediately, as in seeing, hearing, and smelling; which pressure, by the mediation of the nerves, and other strings and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the brain and heart, causes there a resistance, or counter-pressure, or endeavor of the heart to deliver itself, which endeavor, because outward, seems to be some matter without. And this seeming, or fancy, is that which men call sense; and consists, as to the eye, in a light, or color figured; to the ear, in a sound; to the nostril, in an odor; to the tongue and palate, in a savor; and to the rest of the body, in heat, cold, hardness, softness, and such other qualities as we discern by feeling. All which qualities, called sensible, are in the object, that causes them, but so many several motions of the matter, by which it presses our organs diversely. Neither in us that are pressed, are they any thing else, but divers motions; for motion produces nothing but motion. But their appearance to us is fancy, the same waking, that dreaming. And as pressing, rubbing, or striking the eye, makes us fancy a light; and pressing the ear, produces a din; so do the bodies also we see, or hear, produce the same by their strong, though unobserved action. For if those colors and sounds were in the bodies, or objects that cause them, they could not be severed from them, as by glasses, and in echoes by reflection, we see they are; where we know the thing we see is in one place, the appearance in another. And though at some certain distance, the real and very object seem invested with the fancy it begets in us; yet still the object [3]is one thing, the image or fancy is another. So that sense, in all cases, is nothing else but original fancy, caused, as I have said, by the pressure, that is, by the motion, of external things upon our eyes, ears, and other organs thereunto ordained.
Imagination is Decaying Sense (Chapter 2)
When a body is once in motion, it moves, unless something else hinder it, eternally; and whatsoever hinders it, cannot in an instant, but in time, and by degrees, quite extinguish it; and as we see in the water, though the wind cease, the waves give not over rolling for a long time after: so also it happens in that motion, which is made in the internal parts of a man, then, when he sees, dreams, etc. For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it, the Latins call imagination, from the image made in seeing; and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it fancy; which signifies appearance, and is as proper to one sense, as to another. Imagination therefore is nothing but decaying sense; and is found in men, and many other living creatures, as well sleeping, as waking.
Memory same as the Decaying Sense of Imagination
The decay of sense in men waking, is not the decay of the motion made in sense; but an obscuring of it, in such manner as the light of the sun obscures the light of the stars; which stars do no less exercise their virtue, by which they are visible, in the day than in the night. But because amongst many strokes, which our eyes, ears, and other organs receive from external bodies, the predominant only is sensible; therefore, the light of the sun being predominant, we are not affected with the action of the stars. And any object being removed from our eyes, though the impression it made in us remain, yet other objects more present succeeding, and working on us, the imagination of the past is obscured, and made weak, as the voice of a man is in the noise of the day. From whence it follows, that the longer the time is, after the sight or sense of any object, the weaker is the imagination. For the continual change of man's body destroys in time the parts which in sense were moved: so that distance of time, and of place, has one and the same effect in us. For as at a great distance of place, that which we look at appears dim, and without distinction of the smaller parts; and as voices grow weak, and inarticulate; so also, after great distance of time, our imagination of the past is weak; and we lose, for example, of cities we have seen, many particular streets, and of actions, many particular circumstances. This decaying sense, when we would express the thing itself, I mean fancy itself, we call imagination, as I said before: but when we would express the decay, and signify that the sense is fading, old, and past, it is called memory. So that imagination and memory are but one thing, which for divers considerations has divers names.
Understanding is Imagination Triggered by Words
The imagination that is raised in man, or any other creature endued with the faculty of imagining, by words, or other voluntary signs, is that we generally call understanding; and is common to man and beast. For a dog by custom will understand the call, or the rating of his master; and so will many other beasts. That understanding which is peculiar to man, is the understanding not only his will, but his conceptions and thoughts, by the sequel and contexture of the names of things into affirmations, negations, and other forms of speech; and of this kind of understanding I shall speak hereafter.
Language Transfers thoughts into Words for Four Uses (Chapter 4)
The general use of speech, is to transfer our mental discourse, into verbal; or the train of our thoughts, into a train of words; and that for two commodities, whereof one is the registering of the consequences of our thoughts; which being apt to slip out of our memory, and put us to a new labor, may again be recalled, by such words as they were marked by. So that the first use of names is to serve for marks, or notes of remembrance. Another is, when many use the same words, to signify, by their connection and order, one to another, what they conceive, or think of each matter; and also what they desire, fear, or have any other passion for. And for this use they are called signs. Special uses of speech are these; first, to register, what by cogitation, we find to be the cause of anything, present or past; and what we find things present or past may produce, or effect; which in sum, is acquiring of arts [i.e., technical skills]. Secondly, to show to others that knowledge which we have attained, which is, to counsel and teach one another. Thirdly, to make known to others our wills and purposes, that we may have the mutual help of one another. Fourthly, to please and delight ourselves and others, by playing with our words, for pleasure or ornament, innocently. . . .
Universals are Names that Signify the Recollected Consequences of Particular Things
Of names, some are proper, and singular to one only thing, as Peter, John, this man, this tree; and some are common to many things, man, horse, tree; every of which, though but one name, is nevertheless the name of divers particular things; in respect of all which together, it is called an universal; there being nothing in the world universal but names; for the things named are every one of them individual and singular.
One universal name is imposed on many things, for their similitude in some quality, or other accident; and whereas a proper name brings to mind one thing only, universals recall any one of those many. . . . And thus the consequence found in one particular, comes to be registered and remembered, as a universal rule, and discharges our mental reckoning, of time and place, and delivers us from all labor of the mind, saving the first, and makes that which was found true here, and now, to be true in all times and places.
Some Words Signify Nothing by being Either Undefined or Contradictory
Another, when men make a name of two names, whose significations are contradictory and inconsistent; as this name, an incorporeal body, or, which is all one, an incorporeal substance, and a great number more. For whensoever any affirmation is false, the two names of which it is composed, put together and made one, signify nothing at all. For example, if it be a false affirmation to say a quadrangle is round, the word round quadrangle signifies nothing, but is a mere sound. So likewise, if it be false to say that virtue can be poured, or blown up and down, the words inpoured virtue, inblown virtue, are as absurd and insignificant as a round quadrangle. And therefore you shall hardly meet with a senseless and insignificant word, that is not made up of some Latin or Greek names. A Frenchman seldom hears our Saviour called by the name of parole, but by the name of verbe often; yet verbe and parole differ no more, but that one is Latin, the other French.
Reason as an Operation of Addition and Subtraction (Chapter 5)
When a man reasons, he does nothing else but conceive a sum total, from addition of parcels; or conceive a remainder, from subtraction of one sum from another; which, if it be done by words, is conceiving of the consequence of the names of all the parts, to the name of the whole; or from the names of the whole and one part, to the name of the other part. And though in some things, as in numbers, besides adding and subtracting, men name other operations, as multiplying and dividing, yet they are the same; for multiplication, is but adding together of things equal; and division, but subtracting of one thing, as often as we can. These operations are not incident to numbers only, but to all manner of things that can be added together, and taken one out of another. For as arithmeticians teach to add and subtract in numbers; so the geometricians teach the same in lines, figures, solid and superficial, angles, proportions, times, degrees of swiftness, force, power, and the like; the logicians teach the same in consequences of words; adding together two names to make an affirmation, and two affirmations to make a syllogism; and many syllogisms to make a demonstration; and from the sum, or conclusion of a syllogism, they subtract one proposition to find the other. Writers of politics add together pactions [i.e., agreements] to find men's duties; and lawyers, laws and facts, to find what is right and wrong in the actions of private men. In sum, in what matter soever there is place for addition and subtraction, there also is place for reason; and where these have no place, there reason has nothing at all to do.
An Endeavor is a Small Beginning (or impulse) that Triggers Motions within the Body (Chapter 6)
There be in animals, two sorts of motions peculiar to them: one called vital; begun in generation, and continued without interruption through their whole life; such as are the course of the blood, the pulse, the breathing, the concoction, nutrition, excretion, etc. to which motions there needs no help of imagination: the other is animal motion, otherwise called voluntary motion; as to go, to speak, to move any of our limbs, in such manner as is first fancied in our minds. That sense is motion in the organs and interior parts of man's body, caused by the action of the things we see, hear, etc.; and that fancy is but the relics of the same motion, remaining after sense, has been already said in the first and second chapters. And because going, speaking, and the like voluntary motions, depend always upon a precedent thought of whither, which way, and what; it is evident, that the imagination is the first internal beginning of all voluntary motion. And although unstudied men do not conceive any motion at all to be there, where the thing moved is invisible; or the space it is moved in is, for the shortness of it, insensible; yet that doth not hinder, but that such motions are. For let a space be never so little, that which is moved over a greater space, whereof that little one is part, must first be moved over that. These small beginnings of motion, within the body of man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly called endeavor.
Appetite and Aversion are Endeavors Towards or Away from Something
This endeavor, when it is toward something which causes it, is called appetite, or desire; the latter, being the general name; and the other oftentimes restrained to signify the desire of food, namely hunger and thirst. And when the endeavor is fromward something, it is generally called aversion. These words, appetite and aversion, we have from the Latins; and they both of them signify the motions, one of approaching, the other of retiring. So also do the Greek words for the same, which are "opmh" and "aphorme". For nature itself does often press upon men those truths, which afterwards, when they look for somewhat beyond nature, they stumble at. For the Schools find in mere appetite to go, or move, no actual motion at all: but because some motion they must acknowledge, they call it metaphorical motion; which is but an absurd speech: for though words may be called metaphorical; bodies and motions cannot.
Seven Simple Passions: Appetite, Desire, Love, Aversion, Hate, Joy, and Grief
These simple passions called appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief, have their names for divers considerations diversified. As first, when they one succeed another, they are diversely called from the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what they desire. Secondly, from the object loved or hated. Thirdly, from the consideration of many of them together. Fourthly, from the alteration or succession itself.
Hope. For appetite, with an opinion of attaining, is called hope.
Despair. The same, without such opinion, despair.
Fear. Aversion, with opinion of hurt from the object, fear.
Courage. The same, with hope of avoiding that hurt by resistance, courage.
Anger. Sudden courage, anger.
Confidence. Constant hope, confidence of ourselves.
Diffidence. Constant despair, diffidence of ourselves. . . .
Religion. Superstition. True religion. Fear of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publicly allowed, religion; not allowed, superstition. And when the power imagined, is truly such as we imagine, true religion. . . .
Pity. Grief, for the calamity of another, is pity; and arises from the imagination that the like calamity may befall [i.e., occur to] himself. And therefore is called also compassion, and, in the phrase of this present time, a fellow-feeling [i.e., sympathy]. And therefore for calamity arriving [i.e., resulting] from great wickedness, the best men have the least pity. And for the same calamity, those hate pity, that think themselves least obnoxious [i.e., liable] to the same.
HUMAN INCLINATIONS THAT INFLUENCE LIVING TOGETHER IN PEACE (Chapter 11)
We All have a Restless Desire of Power
So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceases only in death. And the cause of this, is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he has present, without the acquisition of more. And from hence it is, that kings, whose power is greatest, turn their endeavors to the assuring it at home by laws, or abroad by wars: and when that is done, there succeeds a new desire; in some, of fame from new conquest; in others, of ease and sensual pleasure; in others, of admiration, or being flattered for excellence in some art, or other ability of the mind.
Competition for Goods leads to Contention
Competition of riches, honor, command, or other power, inclines to contention, enmity, and war: because the way of one competitor, to the attaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repel the other. Particularly, competition of praise, inclines to a reverence of antiquity. For men contend with the living, not with the dead; to these ascribing more than due, that they may obscure the glory of the other.
Wealth makes us Obey Common Power, Poverty inclines us to War
Desire of ease, and sensual delight, disposes men to obey a common power: because by such desires, a man does abandon the protection that might be hoped for from his own industry, and labor. Fear of death, and wounds, disposes to the same; and for the same reason. On the contrary, needy men, and hardy, not contented with their present condition; as also, all men that are ambitious of military command, are inclined to continue the causes of war; and to stir up trouble and sedition: for there is no honor military but by war; nor any such hope to mend an ill game, as by causing a new shuffle.
Desire for Knowledge and Art makes us Obey Common Power
Desire of knowledge, and arts of peace, inclines men to obey a common power: for such desire, contains a desire of leisure; and consequently protection from some other power than their own.
Desire of Praise and Fame makes us do Good Deeds
Desire of praise, disposes to laudable [i.e., praiseworthy] actions, such as please them whose judgment they value; for of those men whom we condemn, we condemn also the praises. Desire of fame after death does the same. And though after death, there be no sense of the praise given us on earth, as being joys, that are either swallowed up in the unspeakable joys of Heaven, or extinguished in the extreme torments of hell: yet is not such fame vain; because men have a present delight therein, from the foresight of it, and of the benefit that may redound thereby to their posterity: which though they now see not, yet they imagine; and anything that is pleasure to the sense, the same also is pleasure in the imagination. . . .
Scientifically Uneducated People are Gullible
Ignorance of natural causes, disposes a man to credulity, so as to believe many times impossibilities: for such know nothing to the contrary, but that they may be true; being unable to detect the impossibility. And credulity, because men like to be hearkened unto in company, disposes them to lying: so that ignorance itself without malice, is able to make a man both to believe lies, and tell them; and sometimes also to invent them.
Anxiety for the future time, disposes men to inquire into the causes of things: because the knowledge of them, makes men the better able to order the present to their best advantage. Curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man from the consideration of the effect, to seek the cause; and again, the cause of that cause; till of necessity he must come to this thought at last, that there is some cause, whereof there is no former cause, but is eternal; which is it men call God. So that it is impossible to make any profound inquiry into natural causes, without being inclined thereby to believe there is one God eternal; though they cannot have any idea of him in their mind, answerable to his nature. For as a man that is born blind, hearing men talk of warming themselves by the fire, and being brought to warm himself by the same, may easily conceive, and assure himself, there is somewhat there, which men call fire, and is the cause of the heat he feels; but cannot imagine what it is like; nor have an idea of it in his mind, such as they have that see it: so also by the visible things in this world, and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is a cause of them, which men call God; and yet not have an idea, or image of him in his mind.
And they that make little, or no inquiry into the natural causes of things, yet from the fear that proceeds from the ignorance itself, of what it is that has the power to do them much good or harm, are inclined to suppose, and feign unto themselves, several kinds of powers invisible; and to stand in awe of their own imaginations; and in time of distress to invoke them; as also in the time of an expected good success, to give them thanks; making the creatures of their own fancy, their gods. By which means it has come to pass, that from the innumerable variety of fancy, men have created in the world innumerable sorts of gods. And this fear of things invisible, is the natural seed of that, which everyone in himself calls religion; and in them that worship, or fear that power otherwise than they do, superstition.
And this seed of religion, having been observed by many; some of those that have observed it, have been inclined thereby to nourish, dress, and form it into laws; and to add to it of their own invention, any opinion of the causes of future events, by which they thought they should be best able to govern others, and make unto themselves the greatest use of their powers.
THE NATURAL CAUSE OF RELIGION (Chapter 12)
This perpetual fear, always accompanying mankind in the ignorance of causes, as it were in the dark, must needs have for object something. And therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse, either of their good, or evil fortune, but some power, or agent invisible: in which sense perhaps it was, that some of the old poets said, that the gods were at first created by human fear: which spoken of the gods, that is to say, of the many gods of the Gentiles, is very true. But the acknowledging of one God, eternal, infinite, and omnipotent, may more easily be derived, from the desire men have to know the causes of natural bodies, and their several virtues, and operations; than from the fear of what was to befall them in time to come. For he that from any effect he sees come to pass, should reason to the next and immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause, and plunge himself profoundly in the pursuit of causes; shall at last come to this, that there must be, as even the heathen philosophers confessed, one first mover; that is, a first, and an eternal cause of all things; which is that which men mean by the name of God: and all this without thought of their fortune; the solicitude whereof, both inclines to fear, and hinders them from the search of the causes of other things; and thereby gives occasion of feigning of as many gods, as there be men that feign them.
Cause 1 of Religion: Invisible Causes Presumed to be Incorporeal
And [firstly,] for the matter, or substance of the invisible agents, so fancied; they could not by natural cogitation, fall upon any other conceit, but that it was the same with that of the soul of man; and that the soul of man, was of the same substance, with that which appears in a dream, to one that sleeps; or in a looking-glass, to one that is awake; which, men not knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but creatures of the fancy, think to be real, and external substances; and therefore call them ghosts; as the Latins called them imagines, and umbra [i.e., shadow]; and thought them spirits, that is, thin aerial bodies; and those invisible agents, which they feared, to be like them; save [i.e., except] that they appear, and vanish when they please.
Divine Incomprehensibility arises from the Unintelligibility of the Concept of Incorporeality
But the opinion that such spirits were incorporeal, or immaterial, could never enter into the mind of any man by nature; because, though men may put together words of contradictory signification, as spirit, and incorporeal; yet they can never have the imagination of anything answering to them: and therefore, men that by their own meditation, arrive to the acknowledgment of one infinite, omnipotent, and eternal God, chose rather to confess he is incomprehensible, and above their understanding, than to define his nature by spirit incorporeal, and then confess their definition to be unintelligible: or if they give him such a title, it is not dogmatically, with intention to make the divine nature understood; but piously, to honor him with attributes, of significations, as remote as they can from the grossness of bodies visible.
Cause 2: Superstition Arises from remembering Chance Correlations
Then [secondly], for the way by which they think these invisible agents wrought [i.e., created] their effects; that is to say, what immediate causes they used, in bringing things to pass, men that know not what it is that we call causing, that is, almost all men, have no other rule to guess by, but by observing, and remembering what they have seen to precede the like effect at some other time, or times before, without seeing between the antecedent and subsequent event, any dependence or connection at all. And therefore from the like things past, they expect the like things to come; and hope for good or evil luck, superstitiously, from things that have no part at all in the causing of it: as the Athenians did for their war at Lepanto, demand another Phormio; the Pompeian faction for their war in Africa, another Scipio; and others have done in divers other occasions since. In like manner they attribute their fortune to a stander by, to a lucky or unlucky place, to words spoken, especially if the name of God be amongst them; as charming and conjuring, the liturgy of witches; insomuch as to believe, they have power to turn a stone into bread, bread into a man, or anything into anything.
Cause 3: We Honor Invisible Powers the way we Honor People
Thirdly, for the worship which naturally men exhibit to powers invisible, it can be no other, but such expressions of their reverence, as they would use towards men; gifts, petitions, thanks, submission of body, considerate addresses, sober behavior, premeditated words, swearing, that is, assuring one another of their promises, by invoking them. Beyond that reason suggests nothing; but leaves them either to rest there; or for further ceremonies, to rely on those they believe to be wiser than themselves.
Cause 4: We Assume that Chance Correlations are Divine Signs
Lastly, concerning how these invisible powers declare to men the things which shall hereafter come to pass, especially concerning their good or evil fortune in general, or good or ill success in any particular undertaking, men are naturally at a stand; save [i.e., except] that using to conjecture of the time to come, by the time past, they are very apt, not only to take casual things, after one or two encounters, for prognostics [i.e., divine signs] of the like encounter ever after, but also to believe the like prognostics from other men, of whom they have once conceived a good opinion.
These Four Causes of Religion lead to a Variety of Religious Ceremonies
And in these four things, opinion of ghosts, ignorance of second causes, devotion towards what men fear, and taking of things casual for prognostics, consists the natural seed of religion; which by reason of the different fancies, judgments, and passions of several men, has grown up into ceremonies so different, that those which are used by one man, are for the most part ridiculous to another.
Religion Enforced to Make People more Obedient and Civil
For these [four] seeds have received culture from two sorts of men. One sort have been they, that have nourished, and ordered them, according to their own invention. The other have done it, by God's commandment, and direction. But both sorts have done it, with a purpose to make those men that relied on them, the more apt to obedience, laws, peace, charity, and civil society. So that the religion of the former sort, is a part of human politics; and teaches part of the duty which earthly kings require of their subjects. And the religion of the latter sort is divine politics; and contains precepts to those that have yielded themselves subjects in the kingdom of God. Of the former sort, were all the founders of commonwealths, and the law-givers of the Gentiles: of the latter sort, were Abraham, Moses, and our blessed savior; by whom have been derived unto us the laws of the kingdom of God. . . .
Gentile Rulers Reinforced Obedience through Three Aspects of Religion
And therefore the first founders, and legislators of commonwealths among the Gentiles, whose ends were only to keep the people in obedience, and peace, have in all places taken care; first, to imprint in their minds a belief, that those precepts which they gave concerning religion, might not be thought to proceed from their own device, but from the dictates of some god, or other spirit; or else that they themselves were of a higher nature than mere mortals, that their laws might the more easily be received. So Numa Pompilius pretended to receive the ceremonies he instituted amongst the Romans, from the nymph Egeria: and the first king and founder of the kingdom of Peru, pretended himself and his wife to be the children of the Sun; and Mahomet, to set up his new religion, pretended to have conferences with the Holy Ghost, in form of a dove. Secondly, they have had a care, to make it believed, that the same things were displeasing to the gods, which were forbidden by the laws. Thirdly, to prescribe ceremonies, supplications, sacrifices, and festivals, by which they were to believe, the anger of the gods might be appeased; and that ill success in war, great contagions of sickness, earthquakes, and each man's private misery, came from the anger of the gods, and their anger from the neglect of their worship, or the forgetting, or mistaking some point of the ceremonies required. And though amongst the ancient Romans, men were not forbidden to deny, that which in the poets is written of the pains, and pleasures after this life: which divers of great authority, and gravity in that state have in their harangues openly derided; yet that belief was always more cherished, than the contrary.
And by these, and such other institutions, they obtained in order to their end, which was the peace of the commonwealth, that the common people in their misfortunes, laying the fault on neglect, or error in their ceremonies, or on their own disobedience to the laws, were the less apt to mutiny against their governors; and being entertained with the pomp, and pastime of festivals, and public games, made in honour of the gods, needed nothing else but bread to keep them from discontent, murmuring, and commotion against the state. And therefore the Romans, that had conquered the greatest part of the then known world, made no scruple of tolerating any religion whatsoever in the city of Rome itself; unless it had something in it, that could not consist with their civil government; nor do we read, that any religion was there forbidden, but that of the Jews; who, being the peculiar kingdom of God, thought it unlawful to acknowledge subjection to any mortal king or state whatsoever. And thus you see how the religion of the Gentiles was a part of their policy.
The True Revealed Religion contains laws of God's Temporal and Spiritual Kingdom
But where God himself, by supernatural revelation, planted religion; there he also made to himself a peculiar kingdom: and gave laws, not only of behavior towards himself, but also towards one another; and thereby in the kingdom of God, the policy, and laws civil, are a part of religion; and therefore the distinction of temporal, and spiritual domination, has there no place. It is true, that God is king of all the earth: yet may he be king of a peculiar, and chosen nation. For there is no more incongruity therein, than that he that has the general command of the whole army, should have withal a peculiar regiment, or company of his own. God is king of all the earth by his power: but of his chosen people, he is king by covenant. But to speak more largely of the kingdom of God, both by nature, and covenant, I have in the following discourse assigned another place (Chapter 35).
THE NATURAL CONDITION (Chapter 13)
Equality of People
Nature has made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind, as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger with himself.
And as to the faculties of the mind . . . I find yet a greater equality among men than that of strength. For prudence is but experience, which equal time equally bestows on all men in those things they equally apply themselves to. That which may perhaps make such equality incredible [i.e., unbelievable], is but a vain conceit of one's own wisdom which almost all men think they have in a greater degree than the vulgar, that is, than all men but themselves and a few others whom by fame, or for concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is the nature of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned, yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves; for they see their own wit at hand, and other men's at a distance. But this proves rather that men are in that point equal, than unequal. For there is not ordinarily a greater sign of the equal distribution of anything, than that every man is contented with his share.
Three Causes of Quarrel
From this equality of ability arises equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies. And in the way to their end (which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their own delectation only), [they] endeavor to destroy or subdue each other. And from hence it comes to pass that where an invader has no more to fear than another man's single power, if one plants, sows, builds, or possesses a convenient seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossess and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labor, but also of his life or liberty. And the invader again is in the like danger of another.
And from this diffidence [or distrust] of each other, there is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonably as [through] anticipation. That is, by force or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long till he sees no other power great enough to endanger him. And this is no more than his own conservation requires, and is generally allowed. Also because there be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest (which they pursue farther than their security requires); if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able [for any] long time (by standing only on their defense) to subsist. And by consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men, being necessary to a man's conservation, it ought to be allowed him.
Again, men have no pleasure (but on the contrary a great deal of grief) in keeping company where there is no power able to over-awe them all. For every man looks that his companion should value him at the same rate he sets upon himself. And upon all signs of contempt or undervaluing, [he] naturally endeavors, as far as he dares . . . to extort a greater value from his condemners [or scorners] by damage, and from others by example.
So that in the nature of man, we find three principle causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence [or distrust]; thirdly, glory.
The first makes men invade for gain, the second for safety, and the third for reputation. The first uses violence to make themselves masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second to defend them; the third for trifles, [such] as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons, or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name.
State of War
Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man. For war consists not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but [also] in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known; and therefore the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of war, as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather lies not in a shower or two of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many days together; so the nature of war consists not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is peace.
Whatever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man, the same is consequent to the time wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition, there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no culture of the earth, no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building, no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.
Proof of the Natural Condition
It may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these things, that nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade and destroy each other. And he may therefore (not trusting to this inference made from the passions) desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by experience. Let him therefore consider with himself [that], when taking a journey, he arms himself and seeks to go well accompanied. When going to sleep, he locks his doors. When even in his house, he locks his chests, and this when he knows there be laws and public officers armed, to revenge all injuries [which] shall be done [to] him. [Consider] what opinion he has of his fellow subjects when he rides armed; of his fellow citizens when he locks his doors; and of his children and servants when he locks his chests. Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions as I do by my words? But neither of us accuse man's nature in it. The desires, and other passions of man, are in themselves no sin. No more are the actions, that proceed from those passions, till they know a law that forbids them; which till laws be made they cannot know, nor can any law be made till they have agreed upon the person that shall make it.
It may perhaps be thought [that] there was never such a time nor condition of war as this, and I believe it was never generally so over all the world. But there are many places where they live so now. For the savage people in many places of America (except the government of small families the harmony whereof depends on natural lust) have no government at all and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before. However, it may be perceived what manner of life there would be, where there were no common power to fear; [and] by what manner of life, which men that have formerly lived under a peaceful government, . . . [would] degenerate into in a civil war.
But though there had never been anytime wherein particular men were in a condition of war one against another; yet in all times, kings and persons of sovereign authority (because of their independence) are in continual jealousies and in the state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing and their eyes fixed on each other. That is, their forts, garrisons, and guns [are fixed] upon the frontiers of their kingdoms, and continual spies [are fixed] upon their neighbors, which is a posture of war. But because they uphold thereby the industry of their subjects, there does not follow from it that misery which accompanies the liberty of particular men.
Nothing is Unjust
To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent, that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice. Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice and injustice are none of the [instinctive] faculties, neither of the body nor mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his senses and passions. They are qualities that relate to men in society, not in solitude. It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine distinct; but only that to be every man's that he can get, and for so long as he can keep it. And thus much for the ill condition which man by mere nature is actually placed in; though with a possibility to come out of it consisting partly in the passions [and] partly in his reason.
The passions that incline men to peace are fear of death, desire of such things as are necessary to commodious [i.e., comfortable] living, and a hope by their industry to obtain them. And reason suggests convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles are they which otherwise are called the laws of nature, whereof I shall speak more particularly in the two following Chapters.
FIRST AND SECOND LAWS OF NATURE (Chapter 14)
First Law of Nature: Seek Peace
The right of nature, which writers commonly call jus naturale, is the liberty each man has to use his own power as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature (that is to say, of his own life, and consequently of doing anything which, in his own judgment and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto).
By liberty is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of external impediments; which impediments may often take away part of a man's power to do what he would, but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, according as his judgment and reason shall dictate to him.
A Law of Nature (lex naturalis) is a precept, or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life, or takes away the means of preserving the same; and to omit that by which he thinks it may be best preserved. For though they that speak of this subject use to confound jus, and lex, right and law; yet they ought to be distinguished. Because, right consists in the liberty to do or to forbear, whereas law determines and binds to one of them, so that law and right differ as much as obligation and liberty, which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.
And because the condition of man (as has been declared in the precedent chapter) is a condition of war of everyone against everyone, in which case everyone is governed by his own reason (and there is nothing he can make use of that may not be a help to him in preserving his life against his enemies), it follows that in such a condition, every man has a right to everything, even to each other's body. And therefore, as long as this natural right of every man to everything endures, there can be no security to any man (how strong or wise soever he be) of living out the time which nature ordinarily allows men to live. And consequently it is a precept, or general rule of reason, That every man ought to endeavor peace as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war; the first branch of which rule contains the first and fundamental Law of Nature, which is, To seek peace and follow it; the second, the sum of the right of nature, which is, By all means we can, to defend ourselves.
Second Law of Nature: Mutually Divest Hostile Rights
From this fundamental Law of Nature, by which men are commanded to endeavor peace, is derived this second Law, That a man be willing, when others are so too (as far-forth as for peace and defense of himself he shall think it necessary), to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself. For so long as every man holds this right of doing anything he likes, [then] so long are all men in the condition of war. But if other men will not lay down their right as well as he, then there is no reason for anyone to divest himself of his. For that were to expose himself to prey (which no man is bound to) rather than to dispose himself to peace. This is that law or the gospel: Whatever you require that others should do to you, that do you to them. And that law of all men: Do not do to others what you would not want done to yourself.
To lay down a man's right to anything, is to divest himself of the liberty of hindering another of the benefit of his own right to the same. For he that renounces or passes away his right, gives not to any other man a right which he had not before. Because, there is nothing to which every man had not [a] right by nature; but [a person] only stands out of his way, that he may enjoy his own original right, without hindrance from him, [though] not [necessarily] without hindrance from another [person]. So that the effect which redounds [or accumulates] to one man by another man's defect of right, is but so much diminution of impediments to the use of his own right original. . . .
Rights to Resist Cannot be Divested
Whensoever a man transfers his right, or renounces it; it is either in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself; or for some other good he hopes for thereby. For it is a voluntary act: and of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some good to himself. And therefore there be some rights, which no man can be understood by any words, or other signs, to have abandoned, or transferred. As first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them, that assault him by force, to take away his life; because he cannot be understood to aim thereby, at any good to himself. The same may be said of wounds, and chains, and imprisonment; both because there is no benefit consequent to such patience; as there is to the patience of suffering another to be wounded, or imprisoned: as also because a man cannot tell, when he sees men proceed against him by violence, whether they intend his death or not. And lastly the motive, and end for which this renouncing, and transferring of right is introduced, is nothing else but the security of a man's person, in his life, and in the means of so preserving life, as not to be weary of it. And therefore if a man by words, or other signs, seem to despoil himself of the end, for which those signs were intended; he is not to be understood as if he meant it, or that it was his will; but that he was ignorant of how such words and actions were to be interpreted.
OTHER LAWS OF NATURE (Chapter 15)
Third Law of Nature: Keep Contracts by Establishing a Governing Power to Punish Contract Breakers
From that Law of Nature, by which we are obliged to transfer to another such rights as being retained hinder the peace of mankind, there follows a third, which is this: That men perform their covenants made, without which, covenants are in vain, and but empty words. And the right of all men to all things remaining, we are still in the condition of war.
And in this Law of Nature consists the fountain and original of justice. For where no covenant has preceded, there has no right been transferred, and every man has right to everything, and consequently no action can be unjust. But when a covenant is made, then to break it is unjust. And the definition of injustice is no other than the not performance of covenant. And whatever is not unjust, is just.
But because covenants of mutual trust [are invalid] where there is a fear of not performance on either part . . . , though the original of justice be the making of covenants; yet injustice actually there can be none, till the cause of such fear be taken away, which while men are in the natural condition of war, cannot be done. Therefore before the names of just and unjust can have place, there must be some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror of some punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant. And [this coercive power serves] to make good that propriety, which by mutual contract men acquire, in recompense of the universal right they abandon. And such power there is none before the erection of a commonwealth. And this is also to be gathered out of the ordinary definition of justice in the schools: for they say that Justice is the constant will of giving to every man is own. And therefore where there is no own, that is, no propriety, there is no injustice. And where there is no coercive power erected (that is, where there is no commonwealth), there nothing is unjust. So that the nature of justice consists in [the] keeping of valid covenants. But the validity of covenants begins not but with the constitution of a civil power, sufficient to compel men to keep them. And then it is also that propriety begins.
The Irrationality of Sneaky Contract Breakers
The fool has said in his heart, there is no such thing as justice. . . [and that] to make or not make, keep or not keep covenants [is] not against reason when it conduces to one's benefit. [The fool] does not therein deny that there are covenants, and that they are sometimes broken, [and] sometimes kept. . . . But he questions whether injustice may not sometimes stand with that reason which dictates to every man his own good. . . . This specious reasoning is nevertheless false. ... Therefore, he which declares he thinks it reason to deceive those that help him, can in reason expect no other means of safety than what can be had from his own single power. Therefore, he that breaks his covenant, and consequently declares that he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received into any society that unite themselves for peace and defense, but by the error of them that receive him. Nor [can he] be retained in it when he is received, without seeing the danger of the error, which errors a person cannot reasonably reckon upon as the means of his security. And therefore if he be left or cast out of society, he perishes. And if he lives in society, it is by the errors of other people which he could not foresee, nor reckon upon, and consequently against the reason of his preservation.... Justice, therefore (that is to say keeping of covenant), is a rule of reason by which we are forbidden to do anything destructive to our life, and consequently a law of nature. . . .
Fourth Law: Gratitude
As justice depends on antecedent covenant, so does gratitude depend on antecedent grace (that is to say, antecedent free gift); and is the fourth Law of Nature, which may be conceived in this form: That a man which receives benefit from another of mere grace, endeavors that he which gives it, have no reasonable cause to repent him of his good will. For no man gives, but with intention of good to himself. Because, gift is voluntary, and of all voluntary acts, the object is to every man his own good; of which if men see they shall be frustrated, there will be no beginning of benevolence or trust; nor consequently of mutual help; nor of reconciliation of one man to another; and therefore they are to remain still in the condition of war, which is contrary to the first and fundamental Law of Nature, which commands men to seek peace. The breach of this law is called ingratitude, and has the same relation to grace that injustice has to obligation by covenant.
Fifth Law: Accommodation
A fifth Law of Nature is complaisance. That is to say, That every man strive to accommodate himself to the rest. For the understanding whereof, we may consider that there is in men's aptness to society a diversity of nature, rising from the diversity of affections, not unlike to that we see in stones brought together for [the] building of an edifice. For as that stone (which by the asperity and irregularity of figure, takes more room from others than itself fills -- and for the hardness cannot be easily made plain, and thereby hinders the building) is by the builders cast away as unprofitable and troublesome, so also a man (that by asperity of nature will strive to retain those things which to himself are superfluous, and to others necessary -- and for the stubbornness of his passions cannot be corrected) is to be left, or cast out of society as cumbersome thereunto. For seeing [that] every man, not only by right but also by necessity of nature, is supposed to endeavor all he can to obtain that which is necessary for his conservation; he that shall oppose himself against it, for things superfluous, is guilty of the war that thereupon is to follow; and therefore does that which is contrary to the fundamental Law of Nature, which commands to seek peace. The observers of this Law may be called sociable (the Latins call them commodi). The contrary, stubborn, unsociable, forward, intractable.
Sixth Law: Pardoning
A sixth Law of Nature is this, That upon caution of the future time, [i.e., if someone is conscientious about changing his future behavior] a man ought to pardon the past offences of them that repenting, deserve it. For pardon is nothing but granting of peace. [But if pardon is] . . . granted to them that persevere in their hostility, [this] be not peace, but fear; yet [if] not granted to them that give caution of the future time, is sign of an aversion to peace, and therefore contrary to the Law of Nature.
Seventh Law: Against Cruel Punishment
A seventh is, That in revenges (that is, retribution of evil for evil), men look not at the greatness of the evil past, but the greatness of the good to follow. Whereby we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other design, than for correction of the offender, or direction of others. For this Law is consequent to the next before it, that commands pardon upon the security of the future time. Besides, revenge without respect to the example and profit to come, is a triumph or glorying in the hurt of another, tending to no end (for the end is always somewhat to come). And glorying to no end is vain glory, and contrary to reason. And to hurt without reason tends to the introduction of war, which is against the Law of Nature, and is commonly styled by the name of cruelty.
Eighth Law: Against Showing Contempt
And because all signs of hatred, or contempt, provoke to fight, insomuch as most men choose rather to hazard their life, than not to be revenged, we may in the eighth place, for a Law of Nature, set down this precept, That no man by deed, word, countenance, or gesture, declare hatred or contempt of another. The breach of which Law is commonly called Contumely.
Ninth Law: Natural Equality
The question, "Who is better than man?" has no place in the condition of mere nature, where (as has been shown before) all men are equal. The inequality that now is, has been introduced by the laws civil. I know that Aristotle, in the first book of his Politics, for a foundation of his doctrine, makes men by nature some more worthy to command, meaning the wiser sort (such as he thought himself to be for his philosophy); others to serve (meaning those that had strong bodies, but were not philosophers as he); as if master and servant were not introduced by consent of men, but by difference of wit, which is not only against reason, but also against experience. For there are very few so foolish, that had not rather govern themselves, than be governed by others. Nor when the wise in their own conceit, contend by force with them who distrust their own wisdom, do they always (or often, or almost at anytime) get the victory. If nature therefore have made men equal, that equality is to be acknowledge -- or [likewise acknowledged] if nature have made men unequal. Yet because men that think themselves equal will not enter into conditions of peace, but upon equal terms, such equalities must be admitted. And therefore for the ninth Law of Nature, I put this, That every man acknowledge another for his equal by nature. The breach of this precept is pride.
Tenth Law: Against Arrogance
On this law depends another, That at the entrance into conditions of peace, no man [shall] require to reserve to himself any right, which he is not content should be reserved to every one of the rest. As it is necessary for all men that seek peace, to lay down certain rights of nature (that is to say, not to have liberty to do all they list), so is it necessary for man's life to retain some [rights], as [the] right to govern their own bodies; enjoy air, water, motion, ways to go from place to place; and all things else without which a man cannot live, or not live well. If in this case, at the making of peace, men require for themselves that which they would not have to be granted to others, they do contrary to the precedent law, that commands the acknowledgment of natural equality, and therefore also against the Law of Nature. The observers of this law are those we call modest, and the breakers arrogant men. The Greeks call the violation of this law pleonexia, that is, a desire of more than their share.
Eleventh Law: Equity and Fairness
Also if a man be trusted to judge between man and man, it is a precept of the Law of Nature, That he deal equally between them. For without that, the controversies of men cannot be determined but by war. He, therefore, that is partial in judgment, does what in him lies to deter men from the use of judges and arbitrators; and consequently (against the fundamental Law of Nature) is the cause of war.
The observance of this law, from the equal distribution to each man of that which in reason belongs to him, is called equity, and (as I have said before) distributive justice. The violation [is] acception of persons, [or in Greek] prosopolepsia.
Twelfth Law: Possession
And from this follows another law, That such things as cannot be divided be enjoyed in common (if it can be and if the quantity of the thing permit) without stint; otherwise proportionably to the number of them that have right. For otherwise the distribution is unequal and contrary to equity.
But some things there be, that can neither be divided nor enjoyed in common. Then, the Law of Nature which prescribes equity requires, That the entire right, or else (making the use alternate) the first possession, be determined by lot. For all equal distribution is of the Law of Nature, and other means of equal distribution cannot be imagined. . . .
Thirteenth Law: Mediation and Arbitration
It is also a Law of Nature, That all men that mediate peace, be allowed safe conduct. For the law that commands peace as the end, commands intercession as the means, and to intercession the means is safe conduct. . . .
And seeing [that] every man is presumed to do all things in order to his own benefit, no man is a fit arbitrator in his own cause. And if he were never so fit (yet equity allowing to each party equal benefit), if one be admitted to be judge, the other is to be admitted also. And so the controversy (that is, the cause of war) remains against the Law of Nature.
The Laws of Nature and Morality
These are the Laws of Nature dictating peace, for a means of the conservation of men in multitudes, and which only concern the doctrine of civil society. There be other things tending to the destruction of particular men, as drunkenness, and all other parts of intemperance, which may therefore also be reckoned among those things which the Law of Nature has forbidden. But [these] are not necessary to be mentioned, nor are pertinent enough to this place.
And though this may seem too subtle a deduction of the Laws of Nature to be taken notice of by all men (whereof the most part are too busy in getting food, and the rest too negligent to understand), yet to leave all men inexcusable, they have been contracted into one easy sum, intelligible even to the meanest capacity. And that is, Do not [do] that to another, which you would not have done to yourself, which shows him that he has no more to do in learning the Laws of Nature, but, when weighing the actions of other men with his own ([and] they seem too heavy), [he is] to put them into the other part of the balance, and his own into their place, [so] that his own passions and self-love may add nothing to the weight. And then there is none of these Laws of Nature that will not appear to him very reasonable. . . .
The Laws of Nature are immutable and eternal. For injustice, ingratitude, arrogance, pride, iniquity, acception of persons, and the rest, can never be made lawful. For it can never be that war shall preserve life, and peace destroy it.
The laws, because they oblige only to a desire and [an] endeavor (I mean an unfeigned and constant endeavor) are easy to be observed. For in that they require nothing but [an] endeavor, he that endeavors their performance, fulfills them. And he that fulfills the law is just.
And the science of them is the true and only moral philosophy. For moral philosophy is nothing else but the science of what is good and evil in the conservation and society of mankind. Good and evil are names that signify our appetites and aversions, which in different tempers, customs, and doctrines of men, are different. And diverse men differ not only in their judgment on the senses of what is pleasant and unpleasant to the taste, smell, hearing, touch, and sight, but also of what is conformable or disagreeable to reason in the actions of common life. Nay, the same man in diverse times differs from himself, and one time praises (that is, calls good) what another time he dispraises and calls evil, from whence arise disputes controversies, and at last war. And therefore so long a man is in the condition of mere nature (which is a condition of war) as private appetite is the measure of good and evil. And consequently all men agree on this, that peace is good, and therefore also the way or means of peace (which, as I have shown before, are justice, gratitude, modesty, equity, mercy, and the rest of the laws of nature) are good. That is to say, moral virtues [are good], and their contrary vices evil. Now the science of virtue and vice is moral philosophy, and therefore the true doctrine of the Laws of Nature is the true moral philosophy. But the writers of moral philosophy, though they acknowledge the same virtues and vices (yet not seeing wherein consisted their goodness, [and] not [seeing] that they come to be praised, as the means of peaceable, sociable, and comfortable living), place them in a mediocrity of passions. [Thus, they treat virtue] as if, not the cause but the degree of daring made fortitude -- or, not the cause but the quantity of a gift made liberality.
These dictates of reason men use to call by the name of laws, but improperly. For they are but conclusions, or theorems concerning what conduces to the conservation and defense of themselves. Whereas law properly is the word of him that by right has commanded over others. But yet if we consider the same theorems as delivered in the word of God that, by right, command all things, then they are properly called laws.
MIRACLES, HELL, HEAD OF THE CHURCH
Verbally Assent to Legally Authorized Miracles Even when Not Believable (Chapter 37)
[T]he ground of my discourse must be, not only the natural word of God, but also the prophetical.
Nevertheless, we are not to renounce our senses, and experience; nor, that which is the undoubted word of God, our natural reason. For they are the talents which he has put into our hands to negotiate, till the coming again of our blessed Savior; and therefore not to be folded up in the napkin of an implicit faith, but employed in the purchase of justice, peace, and true religion. For though there be many things in God's word above reason; that it is to say, which cannot by natural reason be either demonstrated, or confuted; yet there is nothing contrary to it; but when it seems so, the fault is either in our unskillful interpretation, or erroneous ratiocination.
Therefore, when anything therein written is too hard for our examination, we are bidden to captivate our understanding to the words; and not to labor in sifting out a philosophical truth by logic, of such mysteries as are not comprehensible, nor fall under any rule of natural science. For it is with the mysteries of our religion, as with wholesome pills for the sick; which swallowed whole, have the virtue to cure; but chewed, are for the most part cast up again without effect.
But by the captivity of our understanding, is not meant a submission of the intellectual faculty to the opinion of any other man; but of the will to obedience, where obedience is due. For sense, memory, understanding, reason, and opinion are not in our power to change; but always, and necessarily such, as the things we see, hear, and consider suggest unto us; and therefore are not effects of our will, but our will of them. We then captivate our understanding and reason, when we forbear [i.e., avoid] contradiction; when we so speak, as by lawful authority we are commanded; and when we live accordingly; which, in sum, is trust and faith reposed [i.e., placed] in him that speaks, though the mind be incapable of any notion at all from the words spoken.
Miracles are Astonishing, Signify God's Intention, Rare, Done Outside of Nature (Chapter 37)
By miracles are signified the admirable works of God: and therefore they are also called wonders. And because they are for the most part, done, for a signification of his commandment, in such occasions, as without them, men are apt to doubt, (following their private natural reasoning,) what he has commanded, and what not, they are commonly, in holy Scripture, called signs, in the same sense, as they are called by the Latins, ostenta, and portenta, from showing and fore-signifying that, which the Almighty is about to bring to pass. And must therefore be rare, and whereof there is no natural cause known. . . .
From that which I have here set down, of the nature and use of a miracle, we may define it thus: a miracle is a work of God, (besides [i.e., outside] his operation by the way of nature, ordained in the creation) done, for the making manifest to his elect, the mission of an extraordinary minister for their salvation.
And from this definition, we may infer, first, that in all miracles, the work done, is not the effect of any virtue in the prophet; because it is the effect of the immediate hand of God; that is to say God has done it, without using the prophet therein, as a subordinate cause.
Secondly, that no devil, angel, or other created spirit, can do a miracle. For it must either be by virtue of some natural science, or by incantation, that is, by virtue of words. For if the enchanters do it by their own power independent, there is some power that proceeds not from God; which all men deny: and if they do it by power given them, then is the work not from the immediate hand of God, but natural, and consequently no miracle.
Uneducated People are Easily Fooled by Contrived Miracles (Chapter 37)
For such is the ignorance and aptitude to error generally of all men, but especially of them that have not much knowledge of natural causes, and of the nature and interests of men; as by innumerable and easy tricks to be abused. What opinion of miraculous power, before it was known there was a science of the course of the stars, might a man have gained, that should have told the people, this hour or day the sun should be darkened? A juggler by the handling of his goblets and other trinkets, if it were not now ordinarily practiced, would be thought to do his wonders by the power at least of the devil. A man that has practiced to speak by drawing in of his breath, (which kind of men in ancient time were called ventriloqui), and so make the weakness of his voice seem to proceed, not from the weak impulsion of the organs of speech, but from distance of place, is able to make very many men believe it is a voice from Heaven, whatsoever he please to tell them. And for a crafty man, that has inquired into the secrets, and familiar confessions that one man ordinarily makes to another of his actions and adventures past, to tell them him again is no hard matter; and yet there be many, that by such means as that obtain the reputation of being conjurers. But it is too long a business, to reckon up the several sorts of those men, which the Greeks called thaumaturgi, that is to say, workers of things wonderful: and yet these do all they do, by their own single dexterity. But if we look upon the impostures wrought by confederacy, there is nothing how impossible soever to be done, that is impossible to be believed. For two men conspiring, one to seem lame, the other to cure him with a charm, will deceive many: but many conspiring, one to seem lame, another so to cure him, and all the rest to bear witness, will deceive many more.
Precautions when Assessing Miracles: Consult Religious Authorities, Look for Natural Explanations (Chapter 37)
In this aptitude of mankind, to give too hasty belief to pretended miracles, there can be no better, nor I think any other caution, than that which God has prescribed, first by Moses, as I have said before in the precedent chapter, in the beginning of the 13th and end of the 18th of Deuteronomy; that we take not any for prophets, that teach any other religion, than that which God's lieutenant, which at that time was Moses, has established; nor any, though he teach the same religion, whose prediction we do not see come to pass. Moses therefore in his time, and Aaron and his successors in their times, and the sovereign governor of God's people, next under God himself, that is to say, the head of the Church, in all times, are to be consulted, what doctrine he has established, before we give credit to a pretended miracle or prophet. And when that is done, the thing they pretend to be a miracle, we must both see it done, and use all means possible to consider, whether it be really done; and not only so, but whether it be such, as no man can do the like by his natural power, but that it requires the immediate hand of God.
Example of the Miracle of Transubstantiation (Chapter 37)
And in this also we must have recourse to God's lieutenant, to whom in all doubtful cases, we have submitted our private judgments. For example; if a man pretend, after certain words spoken over a piece of bread, that presently God has made it not bread, but a god, or a man, or both, and nevertheless it looks still as like bread as ever it did; there is no reason for any man to think it really done, nor consequently to fear him, till he inquire of God, by his vicar or lieutenant, whether it be done, or not. If he say, not, then follows that which Moses says (Deut. 18:22) he has spoken it presumptuously, thou shalt not fear him. If he say, it is done, then he is not to contradict it. So also if we see not, but only hear tell of a miracle, we are to consult the lawful Church; that is to say, the lawful head thereof, how far we are to give credit to the relators of it.
Miracle Reports Today are Not Believable (Chapter 37)
And this is chiefly the case of men, that in these days live under Christian sovereigns. For in these times, I do not know one man, that ever saw any such wonderous work, done by the charm, or at the word, or prayer of a man, that a man endued but with a mediocrity of reason would think supernatural: and the question is no more, whether what we see done, be a miracle; whether the miracle we hear, or read of, were a real work, and not the act of a tongue, or pen; but in plain terms, whether the report be true, or a lie.
Private Judgments about Miracles must Give Way to Public Judgement by God's Lieutenant (Chapter 37)
In which question we are not everyone, to make our own private reason, or conscience, but the public reason, that is, the reason of God's supreme lieutenant, judge; and indeed we have made him judge already, if we have given him a sovereign power, to do all that is necessary for our peace and defense. A private man has always the liberty, because thought is free, to believe or not believe in his heart those acts that have been given out for miracles, according as he shall see what benefit can accrue by men's belief, to those that pretend or countenance them, and thereby conjecture whether they be miracles or lies. But when it comes to confession of that faith, the private reason must submit to the public; that is to say, to God's lieutenant. But who is this lieutenant of God, and head of the Church, shall be considered in its proper place hereafter.
Hell understood Metaphorically as a Grief from Loss of Resurrection (Chapter 38)
Seeing now there is none, that so interprets the Scripture, as that after the day of judgment, the wicked are all eternally to be punished in the Valley of Hinnon; or that they shall so rise again, as to be ever after underground or under water; or that after the resurrection, they shall no more see one another, nor stir from one place to another: it follows, methinks, very necessarily, that that which is thus said concerning hell fire, is spoken metaphorically; and that therefore there is a proper sense to be inquired after, (for of all metaphors there is some real ground, that may be expressed in proper words,) both of the place of hell, and the nature of hellish torments, and tormenters. . . .
The torments of hell, are expressed sometimes, by weeping, and gnashing of teeth (as Matth. 8:12). Sometimes by the worm of conscience (as Isaiah 46:24, and Mark 9:44, 46, 48): sometimes, by fire, as in the place now quoted, where the worm dies not, and the fire is not quenched, and many places beside: sometimes by shame and contempt (as Dan. 12:2), And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth, shall awake; some to everlasting life; and some to shame, and everlasting contempt. All which places design metaphorically a grief and discontent of mind, from the sight of that eternal felicity in others, which they themselves through their own incredulity and disobedience have lost. And because such felicity in others, is not sensible but by comparison with their own actual miseries; it follows that they are to suffer such bodily pains, and calamities, as are incident to those, who not only live under evil and cruel governors, but have also for enemy the eternal king of the saints, God Almighty. And amongst these bodily pains, is to be reckoned also to every one of the wicked a second death. For though the Scripture be clear for an universal resurrection; yet we do not read, that to any of the reprobate is promised an eternal life. For whereas St. Paul (1 Cor. 15:42, 43) to the question concerning what bodies men shall rise with again, says, that The body is sown in corruption, and is raised in incorruption; it is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory; it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power. Glory and power cannot be applied to the bodies of the wicked: nor can the name of second death be applied to those that can never die but once: and although in metaphorical speech, a calamitous life everlasting, may be called an everlasting death, yet it cannot well be understood of a second death.
No Universal Church, Temporal and Spiritual Government the Same (Chapter 38)
It follows also, that there is on earth, no such universal Church, as all Christians are bound to obey; because there is no power on earth, to which all other commonwealths are subject. There are Christians, in the dominions of several princes and states; but every one of them is subject to that commonwealth, whereof he is himself a member; and consequently, cannot be subject to the commands of any other person. And therefore a Church, such a one as is capable to command, to judge, absolve, condemn, or do any other act, is the same thing with a civil commonwealth, consisting of Christian men; and is called a civil state, for that the subjects of it are men: and a Church, for that the subjects thereof are Christians. Temporal and spiritual government, are but two words brought into the world, to make men see double, and mistake their lawful sovereign. It is true, that the bodies of the faithful, after the resurrection, shall be not only spiritual, but eternal; but in this life they are gross, and corruptible. There is therefore no other government in this life, neither of state, nor religion, but temporal; nor teaching of any doctrine, lawful to any subject, which the governor both of the state, and of the religion forbids to be taught. And that governor must be one; or else there must needs follow faction and civil war in the commonwealth, between the Church and State; between spiritualists and temporalists; between the sword of justice, and the shield of faith: and, which is more, in every Christian man's own breast, between the Christian, and the man. The doctors of the Church, are called pastors; so also are civil sovereigns. But if pastors be not subordinate one to another, so as that there may be one chief pastor, men will be taught contrary doctrines; whereof both may be, and one must be false. Who that one chief pastor is, according to the law of nature, has been already shown; namely, that it is the civil sovereign: and to whom the Scripture has assigned that office, we shall see in the chapters following.
King is the Head of the Church (Chapter 42)
From this consolidation of the right politic and ecclesiastic in Christian sovereigns, it is evident, they have all manner of power over their subjects, that can be given to man, for the government of men's external actions, both in policy and religion; and may make such laws as themselves shall judge fittest, for the government of their own subjects, both as they are the commonwealth, and as they are the Church; for both State and Church are the same men.
If they please, therefore, they may, as many Christian kings now do, commit the government of their subjects in matters of religion to the Pope; but then the Pope is in that point subordinate to them, and exercises that charge in another's dominion jure civili [by civil law], in the right of the civil sovereign; not jure divino [divine law], in God's right; and may therefore be discharged of that office, when the sovereign, for the good of his subjects, shall think it necessary. They may also, if they please, commit the care of religion to one supreme pastor, or to an assembly of pastors; and give them what power over the Church, or one over another, they think most convenient; and what titles of honor, as of archbishops, bishops, priests, or presbyters, they will; and make such laws for their maintenance, either by tithes or otherwise, as they please, so they do it out of a sincere conscience, of which God only is the judge. It is the civil sovereign that is to appoint judges and interpreters of the canonical Scriptures; for it is he that makes them laws. It is he also that giveth strength to excommunications; which but for such laws and punishments, as may humble obstinate libertines, and reduce them to union with the rest of the Church, would be contemned. In sum, he has the supreme power in all causes, as well ecclesiastical as civil, as far as concerns actions and words, for those only are known and may be accused; and of that which cannot be accused, there is no judge at all but God, that knows the heart. And these rights are incident to all sovereigns, whether monarchs or assemblies: for they that are the representants of a Christian people, are representants of the Church: for a Church, and a commonwealth of Christian people, are the same thing.
VOLITIONAL DETERMINISM (Of Liberty and Necessity)
Summary of Positions debated by Hobbes and Bramhall ("To the Reader")
You shall find in this little volume the questions concerning necessity, freedom, and chance, which in all ages have perplexed the minds of curious men, largely and clearly discussed, and the arguments on all sides, drawn from the authority of Scripture, from the doctrine of the Schools, from natural reason, and from the consequences pertaining to common life, truly alleged and severally weighed between two persons [i.e., Hobbes and Bramhall], who both maintain that men are free to do as they will and to forbear as they will. The things they dissent in are, that the one [i.e., Hobbes] holds, that it is not in a man's power now to choose the will he shall have anon [i.e., presently]; that chance produces nothing; that all events and actions have their necessary causes; that the will of God makes the necessity of all things. The other [i.e., Bramhall] on the contrary maintains, that not only the man is free to choose what he will do, but the will also to choose what it shall will; that when a man wills a good action, God's will concurs with his, else not ; that the will may choose whether it will will, or not; that many things come to pass without necessity, by chance; that though God foreknow a thing shall be, yet it is not necessary that that thing shall be, inasmuch as God sees not the future as in its causes, but as present. In sum, they adhere both of them to the Scripture; but one of them [i.e., Bramhall] is a learned School-divine, the other a man [i.e., Hobbes] that doth not much admire that kind of learning.
Necessity is Evident when we Know the Strength of our Motives (Reply 20)
[When] the strength of temptation to do an evil action, being greater than the motives to abstain, necessarily determines him to the doing of it, yet he deliberates whilst sometimes the motives to do, sometimes the motives to forbear, are working on him, and consequently he elects which he will. But commonly, when we see and know the strength that moves us, we acknowledge necessity; but when we see not, or mark not the force that moves us, we then think there is none, and that it is not causes, but liberty that produces the action. Hence it is that they think he does not choose this, that of necessity chooses it; but they might as well say fire does not burn, because it burns of necessity.
Voluntary (Spontaneous) Actions Follow from the Last Remining Appetite (Reply 25)
First, I conceive, that when it comes into a man's mind to do or not to do some certain action, if he have no time to deliberate, the doing it or abstaining necessarily follow the present thought he has of the good or evil consequence thereof to himself. As for example, in sudden anger, the action shall follow the thought of revenge; in sudden fear, the thought of escape. Also when a man has time to deliberate, but deliberates not, because never anything appeared that could make him doubt of the consequence, the action follows his opinion of the goodness or harm of it. These actions I call voluntary, my Lord [i.e., Bramhall], if I understand him aright that calls them spontaneous. I call them voluntary, because those actions that follow immediately the last appetite, are voluntary, and here where is one only appetite, that one is the last. Besides, I see it is reasonable to punish a rash action, which could not be justly done by man to man, unless the same were voluntary. For no action of a man can be said to be without deliberation, though never so sudden, because it is supposed he had time to deliberate all the precedent time of his life, whether he should do that kind of action or not. And hence it is, that he that kills in a sudden passion of anger, shall nevertheless be justly put to death, because all the time, wherein he was able to consider whether to kill were good or evil, shall be held for one continual deliberation, and consequently the killing shall be judged to proceed from election.
Deliberation about an Action involves Weighing its Good or Bad Consequences
Secondly, I conceive when a man deliberates whether he shall do a thing or not do it, that he does nothing else but consider whether it be better for himself to do it or not to do it. And to consider an action, is to imagine the consequences of it, both good and evil. From whence is to be inferred, that deliberation is nothing else but alternate imagination of the good and evil sequels of an action, or, which is the same thing, alternate hope and fear, or alternate appetite to do or quit the action of which he deliberates.
The Will is Influenced by Deliberations and Triggers Actions
Thirdly, I conceive that in all deliberations, that is to say, in all alternate succession of contrary appetites, the last is that which we call the will, and is immediately next before the doing of the action, or next before the doing of it become impossible. All other appetites to do, and to quit, that come upon a man during his deliberations, are called intentions and inclinations, but not wills, there being but one will, which also in this case may be called the last will, though the intentions change often.
Free Agents are People who are in the Process of Deliberation
Fourthly, I conceive that those actions, which a man is said to do upon deliberation, are said to be voluntary, and done upon choice and election, so that voluntary action, and action proceeding from election is the same thing; and that of a voluntary agent, it is all one to say, he is free, and to say, he has not made an end of deliberating.
Liberty is the Absence of External Constraint upon an Action
Fifthly, I conceive liberty to be rightly defined in this manner: Liberty is the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent. As for example, the water is said to descend freely, or to have liberty to descend by the channel of the river, because there is no impediment that way, but not across, because the banks are impediments. And though the water cannot ascend, yet men never say it wants the liberty to ascend, but the faculty or power, because the impediment is in the nature of the water, and intrinsical. So also we say, he that is tied, wants [i.e., lacks] the liberty to go, because the impediment is not in him, but in his bands [i.e., constraints]; whereas we say not so of him that is sick or lame, because the impediment is in himself.
Chain of Necessary Causes: Actions are Caused by the Will, which itself has Prior Necessary Causes
Sixthly, I conceive that nothing takes beginning from itself, but from the action of some other immediate agent without itself. And that therefore, when first a man has an appetite or will to something, to which immediately before he had no appetite nor will, the cause of his will, is not the will itself, but something else not in his own disposing. So that whereas it is out of controversy, that of voluntary actions the will is the necessary cause, and by this which is said, the will is also caused by other things whereof it disposes not, it follows, that voluntary actions have all of them necessary causes, and therefore are necessitated.
Voluntary Actions are produced by Necessary Causes
Seventhly, I hold that to be a sufficient cause, to which nothing is wanting [i.e., lacking] that is needful to the producing of the effect. The same also is a necessary cause. For if it be possible that a sufficient cause shall not bring forth the effect, then there wants [i.e., lacks] somewhat which was needful to the producing of it, and so the cause was not sufficient; but if it be impossible that a sufficient cause should not produce the effect, then is a sufficient cause [also] a necessary cause, for that is said to produce an effect necessarily that cannot but produce it. Hence it is manifest, that whatsoever is produced, is produced necessarily; for whatsoever is produced has had a sufficient cause to produce it, or else it had not been; and therefore also voluntary actions are necessitated.
A Free Agent cannot do Otherwise than it is Caused
Lastly, that ordinary definition of a free agent (namely, that a free agent is that which, when all things are present which are needful to produce the effect) can nevertheless not produce it, implies a contradiction, and is nonsense. [This] being as much as to say, the cause may be sufficient, that is to say, necessary, and yet the effect shall not follow.
Rationale for the Above Points
For the first five points, wherein it is explicated (1) what spontaneity is; (2) what deliberation is; (3) what will, propension, and appetite are; (4) what a free agent is; (5) what liberty is; there can no other proof be offered but every man's own experience, by reflection on himself, and remembering what he uses in his mind, that is, what he himself means when he says an action is spontaneous, a man deliberates; such is his will, that agent or that action is free. Now he that reflects so on himself, cannot but be satisfied, that deliberation is the consideration of the good and evil sequels of an action to come; that by spontaneity is meant inconsiderate action, or else nothing is meant by it; that will is the last act of our deliberation; that a free agent is he that can do if he will, and forbear if he will; and that liberty is the absence of external impediments. But to those that out of custom speak not what they conceive, but what they hear, and are not able, or will not take the pains to consider what they think when they hear such words, no argument can be sufficient, because experience and matter of fact are not verified by other men's arguments, but by every man's own sense and memory. For example, how can it be proved that to love a thing and to think it good is all one, to a man that does not mark his own meaning by those words? Or how can it be proved that eternity is not nunc stans [i.e., the eternal now] to a man that says those words by custom, and never considers how he can conceive the thing in his mind?
Also the sixth point, that a man cannot imagine anything to begin without a cause, can no other way be made known, but by trying how he can imagine it; but if he try, he shall find as much reason, if there be no cause of the thing, to conceive it should begin at one time as another, that he has equal reason to think it should begin at all times, which is impossible, and therefore he must think there was some special cause why it began then, rather than sooner or later; or else that it began never, but was eternal. . . .
The last thing, in which also consists the whole controversy, namely that there is no such thing as an agent, which when all things requisite to action are present, can nevertheless forbear to produce it; or, which is all one, that there is no such thing as freedom from necessity, is easily inferred from that which has been before alleged. For if it be an agent, it can work [i.e., act]; and if it work, there is nothing wanting [i.e., lacking] of what is requisite to produce the action, and consequently the cause of the action is sufficient; and if sufficient, then also necessary, as has been proved before.
CONTROVERSIAL RELIGIOUS AND MORAL DOCTRINES
Atheism only a Sin of Imprudence (De Civi, 14.19)
Criticism of Hobbes: If Atheism is only a Sin of Imprudence (bad judgment) then it Cannot be Punished, which is Absurd
But seeing there is no sin which is not against some Law, and that there is no Law which is not the command of him who has the supreme power, and that no man has a supreme power which is not bestowed on him by our own consent; in what manner will he be said to sin, who either denies that there is a God, or that he governs the world, or casts any other reproach upon him? For he [i.e., the atheist] will say, that he never submitted his will to Gods will, not conceiving him so much as to have any being. And granting that his opinion were erroneous, and therefore also a sin, yet were it to be numbered among those of imprudence or ignorance, which by right cannot be punished. This speech [of the atheist] seems so far forth to be admitted, that though this kind of sin be the greatest and most hurtful, yet is it to be referred to sins of imprudence; but that it should be excused by imprudence or ignorance, is absurd. For the atheist is punished either immediately by God himself, or by kings constituted under God; not as a subject is punished by a king, because he keeps not the laws, but as one enemy by another, because he would not accept of the laws; that is to say, by the right of war, as the giants warring against God: For whosoever are not subject either to some common Lord, or one to another, are enemies among themselves.
Hobbes's Response: Atheism is only a Sin of Imprudence, but it still Can be Punished
[Against the critic, I respond that it nevertheless should be considered a sin of imprudence.] Many find fault that I have referred atheism to imprudence, and not to injustice; yea by some it is taken so, as if I had not declared myself an enemy bitter enough against Atheists: They object farther, that since I had elsewhere said that it might be known there is a God, by natural reason, I ought to have acknowledged that they sin at least against the law of nature, and therefore are not only guilty of imprudence, but injustice too. But I am so much an enemy to atheists, that I have both diligently sought for, and vehemently desired to find some law whereby I might condemn them of injustice; but when I found none, I inquired next what name God himself did give to men so detested by him. Now God speaks thus of the Atheist: The fool has said in his heart, there is no God. Therefore I placed their sin in that rank which God himself refers to; next, I shew them to be enemies of God. But I conceive the name of an enemy to be sometimes somewhat sharper, than that of an unjust man. Lastly, I affirm that they may under that notion be justly punished both by God, and supreme magistrates, and therefore by no means excuse or extenuate this sin. Now that I have said that it might be known by natural reason that there is a God, is so to be understood, not as if I had meant that all men might know this, except they think that because Archimedes by natural reason found out what proportion the circle has to the square, it follows thence, that everyone of the vulgar could have found out as much. I say therefore, that although it may be known to some by the light of reason that there is a God, yet men that are continually engaged in pleasures, or seeking of riches and honor, also men that are not wont [i.e., inclined] to reason aright, or cannot do it, or care not to do it, lastly, fools, in which number are atheists, cannot know this.
It is a Sin to Not Worship God according to the Laws of the State (De Civi, 15.19)
From what has been said may be gathered, that God reigning by the way of natural reason only, subjects do sin, First, if they break the moral laws, which are unfolded in the second and third chapters. Secondly, if they break the laws, or commands of the city in those things which pertain to justice. Thirdly, if they worship not God, kata ta nomika [i.e., "lawfully"]. Fourthly, if they confess not before men, both in words, and deeds, that there is one God most good, most great, most blessed, the Supreme king of the world, and of all worldly kings; that is to say, if they do not worship God. This fourth sin in the natural Kingdom of God, by what has been said in the foregoing chapter, in the second article, is the sin of treason against the divine majesty; for it is a denying of the divine power, or atheism. For sins proceed here, just as if we should suppose some man to be the sovereign king, who being himself absent, should rule by his viceroy; against whom sure they would transgress who should not obey his viceroy in all things, except he usurped the kingdom to himself, or would give it to some other; but they who should so absolutely obey him, as not to admit of this exception, might be said to be guilty of treason.
The Only Article of Faith for Salvation is that Jesus is the Messiah (De Civi, 18.6)
Faith and obedience both necessarily concurring to salvation, what kind of obedience that same is, and to whom due (has been showed above in the third article). But now we must inquire what articles of faith are requisite: And I say, that to a Christian there is no other article of Faith requisite as necessary to salvation, but only this, "that Jesus is the Christ". But we must distinguish (as we have already done before in the forth Article) between faith, and profession. A profession therefore of more articles (if they be commanded) may be necessary. For it is a part of our obedience due to the laws; but we inquire not now what obedience, but what faith is necessary to salvation. And this is proved first out of the scope of the evangelists which was by the description of our saviors' life to establish this one article.
God is a Corporeal Spirit, not Incorporeal (Answer to Bishop Bramhall)
[Bishop Bramhall] accuses me first of destroying the existence of God; that is to say, he would make the world believe I were an atheist. But upon what ground? Because I say, that God is a spirit, but corporeal. But to say that, is allowed me by St. Paul, that says (1 Cor. 15:44): There is a spiritual body, and there is an animal body. He that holds there is a God, and that God is really somewhat, (for body is doubtlessly a real substance), is as far from being an atheist, as it is possible to be. But he that says God is an incorporeal substance, no man can be sure whether he be an atheist or not. For no man living can tell whether there be any substance at all, that is not also corporeal. For neither the word incorporeal, nor immaterial, nor any word equivalent to it, is to be found in Scripture, or in reason. But on the contrary, that the Godhead dwelleth bodily in Christ, is found in Colos. ii. 9; and Tertullian maintains that God is either a corporeal substance or nothing. Nor was he ever condemned for it by the church. For why?
Not only Tertullian, but all the learned, call body, not only that which one can see, but also whatsoever has magnitude, or that is somewhere; for they had greater reverence for the divine substance, than that they durst think it had no magnitude, or was nowhere. But they that hold God to be a phantasm, as did the exorcists in the Church of Rome, that is, such a thing as were at that time thought to be the sprites, that were said to walk in churchyards and to be the souls of men buried, do absolutely make God to be nothing at all. But how were they atheists? No. For though by ignorance of the consequence they said that which was equivalent to atheism, yet in their hearts they thought God a substance, and would also, if they had known what substance and what corporeal meant, have said he was a corporeal substance. So that this atheism by consequence is a very easy thing to be fallen into, even by the most godly men of the church.
The Self-interested Origins of Pity and Charity (Of Human Nature, 9.10, 17)
Pity is imagination or fiction of future calamity to ourselves proceeding from the sense of another man's calamity. But when it lights on such as we think have not deserved the same, the compassion is greater, because then there appears more probability that the same may happen to us: for, the evil that happens to an innocent man, may happen to every man. But when we see a man suffer for great crimes, which we cannot easily think will fall upon ourselves, the pity is the less. And therefore men are apt to pity those whom they love: for, whom they love, they think worthy of good, and therefore not worthy of calamity. Thence it is also, that men pity the vices of some persons at the first sight only, out of love to their aspect. The contrary of pity is hardness of heart, proceeding either from slowness of imagination, or some extreme great opinion of their own exemption from the like calamity, or from hatred of all or most men. . . .
There is yet another passion sometimes called love, but more properly good-will or charity. There can be no greater argument to a man, of his own power, than to find himself able not only to accomplish his own desires, but also to assist other men in theirs: and this is that conception wherein consists charity. In which, first, is contained that natural affection of parents to their children, which the Greeks call storge, as also, that affection wherewith men seek to assist those that adhere unto them. But the affection wherewith men many times bestow their benefits on strangers, is not to be called charity, but either contract, whereby they seek to purchase friendship; or fear, which makes them to purchase peace.
STUDY QUESTIONS
Please answer all of the following questions.
1. In Chapter 1 of Hobbes's Leviathan, what are the main features of sensations?
2. In Chapter 2 of Hobbes's Leviathan, what are the main features of imagination and how it relates to memory and understanding?
3. In Chapter 4 of Hobbes's Leviathan, what are the three uses of language, how are universals formed and what are examples of words that signify nothing?
4. In Chapter 5 of Hobbes's Leviathan, what are examples of how reasoning involves addition and subtraction
5. In Chapter 6 of Hobbes's Leviathan, what is an endeavor, and what are the main features of the passions?
6. In Chapter 11 of Hobbes's Leviathan, what are some of the human inclinations that affect living together in peace?
7. In Chapter 12 of Hobbes's Leviathan, what are the four causes of religion, and what are the three aspects of religion that gentile rulers used to reinforce obedience?
8. In Chapter 13 of Hobbes's Leviathan, what are the three causes of quarrel in the state of nature?
9. In Chapter 13 of Hobbes's Leviathan, what is his proof that the natural condition is so hostile, and what are our motivations towards peace?
10. In Chapter 14 of Hobbes's Leviathan, what are the main points of the first two laws of nature?
11. In Chapter 15 of Hobbes's Leviathan, what is the third law and nature, and why are sneaky contract breakers irrational?
12. In Chapter 15 of Hobbes's Leviathan, what are laws of nature 4-13?
13. In Chapter 15 of Hobbes's Leviathan, what is the connection between moral virtue and the laws of nature?
14. In Chapter 37 of Hobbes's Leviathan, what are the main features of his view of miracles and of hell?
15. In Chapter 38 of Hobbes's Leviathan, why is there no single or "universal" church that all Christians are obligated to obey?
16. In Chapter 42 of Hobbes's Leviathan, why is the King the head of the church?
17. In Hobbes's Of Liberty and Necessity, what are the main points of Hobbes's view of determinism and free action?
18. According to Hobbes's De Civi, why is atheism only a sin of imprudence (i.e., bad judgment), and why is it a sin to not worship God according to the laws of the state?
19. According to Hobbes's Answer to Bishop Bramhall, what are his reasons for denying the incorporeality of God?
20. According to Hobbes in Of Human Nature, what are the self-interested origins of pity and charity?
21. Short essay: please select one of the following and answer it in a minimum of 100 words.
a. David McGregor Means makes the following criticism of Hobbes's nominalist account of universals: "I wish Hobbes were alive to reply to this dilemma: If there is no likeness in our conscious states, why do we apply the same word to several of them? and if there is likeness in them, what is meant by saying that universal is not the name of anything existent in nature, or of any idea in the mind?" ("Nominalism", Mind, 1879) Discuss Hobbes's theory of universals (Leviathan, 4) and how he might respond to Means.
b. Contemporary philosopher John Haugeland calls Hobbes the "grandfather" of artificial intelligence insofar as Hobbes reduced human thinking to matter in motion and held that human reasoning is a computational process of addition and subtraction (Artificial Intelligence, 1985). Discuss how Hobbes's computational theory of the mind in Leviathan Chapter 5 might be a kind of artificial intelligence.
c. Hobbes states that "I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceases only in death" (Leviathan, 11). Reginald Rogers interprets Hobbes's position as follows: "This desire for power is not original or primitive; it is derived from the fundamental desires for self-preservation and self-gratification, the former being generally the stronger. When it is recognized that my desires conflict with those of other persons, there grows the secondary desire to control the actions of other persons" (Short History of Ethics, 1922). Discuss Hobbes's position and whether Rogers' interpretation is correct.
d. In his account of the natural causes of religion, Hobbes states "these four things, opinion of ghosts, ignorance of second causes, devotion towards what men fear, and taking of things casual for prognostics, consists the natural seed of religion" (Leviathan, 12). Edward Stillingfleet criticized Hobbes on the grounds that reason is the true cause of religion: "How comes the natural reason of mankind to be left out? If by that men may be convinced of a first and eternal cause of things, does not that dispose men to a fear and reverence towards a divine majesty? And is not that religion? Then the best and truest seed of religion lies in that which most disposes the mind to fear God. What is the meaning then, that the seed of religion is placed by him in things without reason? If men by reason are brought to own or acknowledge one God eternal, infinite, omnipotent; does not the same reason oblige them to pay him that reverence, and fear, and duty, which is owing to him?" (Origins Sacrae, 1.1, 1663). Discuss Hobbes's account of the causes of religion and how he might respond to Stillingfleet?
e. Thomas Tenison makes the following criticism of Hobbes's political theory and its foundation in the warring state of nature: "It is a very absurd and unsecure course to lay the groundwork of all civil polity and formed religion, upon such a supposed state of nature, as has no firmer support than the contrivance of your own fancy. . . . The faithful records of time give us another account of the origin of nations; and common sense, whereby one apprehends in another's birth, the manner of his own, does sufficiently instruct us in this truth, that we are born, and grow up under government; our parents being before the institution of commonwealth, absolute sovereigns in their own families. . . . So that, to talk of such a state of nature as supposes an independency of one person upon another, is to lay aside not only the history of Moses, but also of experience" (Tenison, The Creed of Mr. Hobbes, 1670). How might Hobbes respond to Tenison?
f. One of the central components of Hobbes's social contract theory is whether people will be properly motivated to uphold their part of the contract. In Leviathan Chapter 15, Hobbes speculates about a "fool" who thinks he's sneaky enough to get away with breaking the rules of the social contract without anyone knowing about it. Evaluate Hobbes's response to the fool and whether you agree with his solution.
g. Hobbes argues that there is no morality in the state of nature; in his words, the "notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place" (Leviathan, 13) There are two ways of understanding this. First, it might mean that human beings are entirely without the concept of morality in the state of nature. Second, it might mean that people have suspended the rules of morality in the state of nature. Which of these two views seems best? Explain.
h. For Hobbes, there is no successful social contract without the looming authority of the government to punish us if we violate the terms of the contract. Are governments really as important for maintaining the social contract as Hobbes argues? Explain.
i. According to Hobbes, morality simply involves developing the right kinds of virtuous character traits that ensure adherence to the laws of nature surrounding the social contract (Leviathan, 15). From your experience, are there any moral obligations that would have nothing whatsoever to do with the social contract? Explain.
j. Hobbes defines a miracle as a work of God done outside nature which gives credence to the mission of a prophet. He also holds that reports of miracles are not particularly believable. Samuel Harris makes the following criticism of Hobbes's view: "[This] rests on the false assumption that every miracle is an event entirely isolated. This implies that it has no unity with other events in the universal system and no intrinsic connection with its progressive development; and that it has no design but to excite the wonder of the observers and to accredit the miracle-worker as a messenger from God. . . . This progressive development we trace through the physical system to the spiritual; thence onward in higher and higher development of the spiritual. They constitute together one all-comprehending system in which God is continuously and progressively revealing himself. . . . Where the evolution of the physical system ends the progress of the rational, moral and spiritual system begins. Nature itself has carried us upward to the supernatural" (The Self-Revelation of God, 1887). Discuss Harris's criticism and how Hobbes might respond.
k. Hobbes rejects the notion of an "incorporeal substance" and argues instead that God is a corporeal spirit with three-dimensional existence. Richard Bentley criticized that Hobbes is in fact an atheist and his notion of a "corporeal god is a mere sham to get his book printed" (Letter to Bernard, May 28, 1692). Discuss Hobbes's view of atheism (De Civi, 14.19) and God as corporeal spirit (Answer to Bishop Bramhall), and how Hobbes might respond to Bentley.
l. Hobbes argues that charity and goodwill reduces to the delight in having power over another person (Human Nature, 9.17). Joseph Butler gives the following two criticisms of Hobbes's position. "Is there not often the appearance of one man's wishing that good to another, which he knows himself unable to procure him; and rejoicing in it, though bestowed by a third person? And can love of power any way possibly come in to account for this desire or delight? . . . Again, suppose good-will in the mind of man to be nothing but delight in the exercise of power . . . they would have a disposition to, and delight in, mischief as an exercise and proof of power: and this disposition and delight would arise from, or be the same principle in the mind, as a disposition to and delight in charity. Thus cruelty, as distinct from envy and resentment, would be exactly the same in the mind of man as good-will: that one tends to the happiness, the other to the misery, of our fellow-creatures, is, it seems, merely an accidental circumstance, which the mind has not the least regard to" (Fifteen Sermons, 1). Discuss Butler's point and how Hobbes might respond.