MACHIAVELLI, BRUTUS, GROTIUS
From Classics in Political Philosophy, by James Fieser
Home: https://storage.googleapis.com/jfieser/410/Index.html
2008, updated 1/1/2024, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
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CONTENTS
Niccol Machiavelli: Political Survival (from The Prince)
Stephen Junius Brutus: Against Tyrants (from Vindication against Tyrants)
Hugo Grotius: Just War (from The Laws of War and Peace)
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NICCOL MACHIAVELLI: POLITICAL SURVIVAL
Born in Florence Italy, Niccol Machiavelli (1469 1527) was a statesman during a turbulent period of Italian history when its city-state governments were continually shifting. At one point he was accused of conspiracy and tortured, after which he retired from political life and devoted himself to writing political, historical and literary works. The selections below are taken from his two most important books, both published only after his death. First is his Discourses on Livy, written in 1517, which covers early Roman history, particularly during the Republic. In the selections below, he explains how the three main forms of government are monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, which all degenerate into a cycle of tyranny. He also describes the impact that religion has on the stability of governments. He argues that, while religious practices are important for uniting a country, corrupt religious institutions can disunite it, as the Catholic Church did within Italy. Further, he argues, the values of Christian meekness made Christian countries more susceptible to tyrannical governments, whereas the ferocity and energy of ancient Roman religions made it less susceptible to tyrants and inclined more towards liberty.
The second group of selections are from his infamous work, The Prince (1532). Its central theme is that rulers should use any means of retaining power that they can, including conduct that we ordinarily think is immoral or inappropriate for a leader. What matters, for Machiavelli, is what successful rulers actually do to survive, not how we think that an ideal ruler ought to behave. This approach is often called "realpolitik" (German for "the politics of reality") and it is so much associated with Machiavelli that the term "Machiavellian" is used synonymously with it. For Machiavelli, human nature does not allow us to always be virtuous, and, in fact, some virtues will lead to a ruler's destruction while some vices will allow him to survive. Cases in point are the virtues of generosity, mercy, and honesty: the successful ruler will in fact need to have the opposing vices of stinginess, severity, and dishonesty on at least some occasions. With stinginess, people will appreciate the ruler even more if they see that he is financially efficient and won't burden them with expenses. With severity, death sentences affect only a few criminals, but they deter crimes that affect many people. With deception, rulers should know when to be deceitful when it suits their purposes. According to Machiavelli, the best thing that a ruler can do is to avoid being hated, even if he is not loved, since this will keep him from being overthrown. He concludes that there is no guarantee that any specific approach that the ruler takes will lead to success, and the ruler must be prepared to adapt to change.
FORMS OF GOVERNMENT (Discourses, 1.2)
Monarchy, Aristocracy, Democracy, and their Contraries
Desiring, therefore, to discuss the nature of the [republican] government of Rome, and to ascertain the accidental circumstances which brought it to its perfection, I say, as has been said before by many who have written of Governments, that of these there are three forms, known by the names Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, and that those who give its institutions to a State have recourse to one or other of these three, according as it suits their purpose. Others, and, as many have thought, wiser teachers, will have it, that there are in total six forms of government, three of them utterly bad, the other three good in themselves, but so easily corrupted that they too are apt to become harmful. The good are the three above named; the bad, three others dependent upon these, and each so like that to which it is related, that it is easy to pass imperceptibly from the one to the other. For a Monarchy quickly becomes a Tyranny, an Aristocracy an Oligarchy, while a Democracy tends to degenerate into Anarchy. Thus if the founder of a State should establish any one of these three forms of Government, he establishes it for a short time only, since no precaution he may take can prevent it from sliding into its contrary, by reason of the close resemblance which, in this case, the virtue bears to the vice.
Origin of Governments and the Cycle of Tyranny
These differences in the form of Government spring up among men by chance. For in the beginning of the world, its inhabitants, being few in number, for a time lived scattered about just like the animals. But afterwards, as they increased and multiplied, gathered themselves into societies, and, the better to protect themselves, began to seek who among them was the strongest and of the highest courage, to whom, making him their head, they gave obedience. Next arose the knowledge of such things as are honorable and good, as opposed to those which are bad and shameful. For, observing that when a man wronged his benefactor, hatred was universally felt for the one and sympathy for the other. The ungrateful were blamed, while those who showed gratitude were honored. Reflecting that the wrongs they saw done to others might be done to themselves, to escape these they resorted to making laws and establishing punishments against any who should transgress them. In this way grew the recognition of Justice. From this it followed that, in choosing their rulers, men no longer looked about for the strongest, but for him who was the most prudent and the most just.
But, presently, when sovereignty grew to be hereditary and no longer elective, hereditary sovereigns began to degenerate from their ancestors. Abandoning worthy courses, they took up the notion that princes had nothing to do but to surpass the rest of the world in lavish display and indecency, and whatever else ministers to pleasure. Thus the prince coming to be hated, and therefore to feel fear, and passing from fear to infliction of injuries, a tyranny soon sprang up. Immediately there began movements to overthrow the prince. Plots and conspiracies against him undertaken not by those who were weak, or afraid for themselves, but by such as being notable for their birth, courage, wealth, and station [i.e. aristocrats], so that they could not tolerate the shameful life of the tyrant. The multitude, following the lead of these powerful men, took up arms against the prince. Once deposed, they obeyed these others as their liberators, who, on their part, holding in hatred the name of sole ruler, formed themselves into a government. At first, while the recollection of past tyranny was still fresh, they observed the laws they themselves made, and setting aside personal advantage to the common welfare, administered affairs both publicly and privately with the utmost diligence and zeal. But this [aristocratic] government passed afterwards to their descendants who, never having been taught in the school of Adversity, knew nothing of the changes of Fortune. Not choosing to rest content with mere civil equality, but abandoning themselves to avarice, ambition, and lust, they converted, without respect to civil rights what had been a government of the best into a government of the few. Very soon, then, they met with the same fate as the tyrant.
The multitude, loathing its rulers, then followed any who attempted, in whatever way, to attack them [i.e., the aristocratic rulers]. Thus some one man quickly arose who overthrew them with the aid of the people. Since the recollection of the tyrant and of the wrongs suffered at his hands were still fresh in the minds of the people, they thus felt no desire to restore the monarchy, and alternatively set up a popular government [i.e., democracy], which they established on such a footing that neither king nor nobles had any place in it. Because all governments inspire respect at first, this government also lasted for a while, but not for long, and rarely after the generation which brought it into existence had died out. For, immediately, liberty passed into excess, wherein neither private worth nor public authority was respected, but, everyone living as he liked, a thousand wrongs were done daily. At this point, whether driven by necessity, or on the suggestion of some wiser man among them and to escape anarchy, the people reverted to a monarchy, from which, step by step, in the manner and for the causes already assigned, they came around once more to excess. For this is the circle revolving within which all States are and have been governed. However, in the same State the same forms of Government rarely repeat themselves, because hardly any State can have such vitality as to pass through such a cycle more than once, and still together. For it may be expected that in some sea of disaster, when a State must always be lacking prudent counsels and in strength, it will become subject to some neighboring and better-governed State. But, assuming this not to happen, it might well pass for an indefinite period from one of these forms of government to another.
Benefits of Combining Monarchy, Aristocracy, And Democracy
I say, then, that all these six forms of government are harmful: the three good kinds, from their brief duration the three bad, from their inherent badness. Wise legislators therefore, knowing these defects, and avoiding each of these forms in its simplicity, have made choice of a form which shares in the qualities of all the first three, and which they judge to be more stable and lasting than any of these separately. For where we have a monarchy, an aristocracy, and a democracy existing together in the same city, each of the three serves as a check upon the other.
RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT (Discourses 1.12, 2.2)
Uniting Countries through Religion
Princes and republics who wish to keep themselves free from corruption, must above all things preserve the purity of all religious observances, and treat them with proper reverence. For there is no greater indication of the ruin of a country than to see religion held in contempt. This is easily understood when we know upon what the religion of a country is founded; for the essence of every religion is based upon some main principle.
The religion of the Gentiles had for its foundation the responses of the oracles, and the tenets of the augurs and auspices. Upon these alone depended all their ceremonies, rites, and sacrifices. For they easily believed that the Deity which could predict their future good or ill, was also able to bestow it upon them. After this arose their temples, their sacrifices, their supplications, and all the other ceremonies. For the oracle of Delphos, the temple of Jupiter Ammon, and other famous oracles, kept the world in admiration and devoutness. But when these afterwards began to speak only in accordance with the wishes of the princes, and their falsity was discovered by the people, then men became doubtful, and inclined to overturn all sacred institutions. It is therefore the duty of princes and heads of republics to uphold the foundations of the religion of their countries, for then it is easy to keep their people religious, and consequently well conducted and united. Thus, everything that tends to favor religion (even if they believe it is false) should be received and advanced to strengthen it. This should be done even more the wiser the rulers are, and the better they understand the natural course of things. Such was, in fact, the practice observed by wise men; which has given rise to the belief in the miracles that are celebrated in religions, however false they may be. For the wise rulers have given these miracles increased importance, no matter where or how they originated, and their authority afterwards gave them credence with the people.
Rome had many such miracles, and one of the most remarkable was that which occurred when the Roman soldiers sacked the city of Veii. Some of them entered the temple of Juno, and, placing themselves in front of her statue, said to her, "Will you come to Rome?" Some imagined that they observed the statue make a sign of assent, and others pretended to have heard her reply, "Yes." Now these men, being very religious (as reported by Titus Livius) and having entered the temple quietly, they were filled with devotion and reverence, and might really have believed that they had heard a reply to their question, such as perhaps they could have presupposed. But this opinion and belief was favored and magnified by Camillus and the other Roman chiefs.
Negative Impact of the Catholic Church upon Italy
Certainly, if the Christian religion had from the beginning been maintained according to the principles of its founder, the Christian states and republics would have been much more united and happier than what they are. Nor can there be a greater proof of its corruption than to witness the fact that the nearer people are to the Church of Rome, which is the head of our religion, the less religious they are. Whoever examines the principles upon which that religion is founded, and sees how widely different from those principles its present practice and application are, will judge that her ruin or punishment is near.
But since there are some of the opinion that the well-being of Italy depends upon the Church of Rome, I will present such arguments against that opinion as occur to me. Two of these are most important, and cannot according to my judgment be refuted.
The first is, that, through the bad example of the Roman Court, the country has lost all religious feeling and devoutness, a loss which draws after it infinite harms and disorders. For, as the presence of religion implies every excellence, so the contrary is involved in its absence. To the Church, therefore, and to the priests, we Italians owe this first debt, that through them we have become wicked and irreligious.
[Second], there is a still greater debt we owe them for what is the immediate cause of our ruin, namely, that by the Church our country is kept divided. For no country was ever united or prosperous which did not yield obedience to someone prince or commonwealth, as has been the case with France and Spain. The Church is the sole cause why Italy stands on a different footing, and is subject to no one king or commonwealth. For though she holds here her seat, and exerts her temporal authority, she has never yet gained strength and courage to seize upon the entire country, or make herself supreme. Yet it never has been so weak that, when in fear of losing her temporal dominion, she could not call in some foreign power to aid her against any Italian State by which she was overmatched. We find many instances of this. In early times, for example, by the intervention of Charles the Great she drove the Lombards, who had made themselves masters of nearly the whole country, out of Italy. In recent times, with the help of France, she first stripped the Venetians of their territories, and then, with the help of the Swiss, expelled the French.
The Church, therefore, never being powerful enough herself to take possession of the entire country, while, at the same time, preventing any one else from doing so, has made it impossible to bring Italy under one head. This has been the cause of her always living subject to many princes or rulers, by whom she has been brought to such division and weakness as to have become a prey, not to Barbarian kings only, but to any who have thought fit to attack her. For this, I say, we Italians have none to thank but the Church. Were any man powerful enough to transplant the Court of Rome, with all the authority it now exercises over the rest of Italy, into the territories of the Swiss (the only people who at this day, both as regards religion and military discipline, live like the ancients,) he would have clear proof of the truth of what I affirm. He would find that the corrupt manners of that Court had, in a short time, created greater harm in these territories than any other disaster which could ever happen to them. . . .
The Meekness of Christian Values result in Tyrannical Governments
Reflecting now as to how it occurred that in ancient times the people were more devoted to liberty than in the present, I believe that it resulted from the following. Men were stronger in those days, which I believe to be attributable to the difference of education, founded upon the difference of their religion and ours. For, as our religion teaches us the truth and the true way of life, it causes us to attach less value to the honors and possessions of this world. By contrast, the Pagans, who valued those things as the highest good, were more energetic and ferocious in their actions. We may observe this also in most of their institutions, beginning with the grandeur of their sacrifices as compared with the humility of ours, which are gentle solemnities rather than grand ones, and have nothing of energy or ferocity in them. By contrast, in theirs there was no lack of pomp and show, to which was added the violent and bloody nature of the sacrifice by the slaughter of many animals, and the familiarity with this terrible sight assimilated the nature of men to their sacrificial ceremonies. Besides this, the Pagan religion deified only men who had achieved great glory, such as commanders of armies and chiefs of republics, while ours glorifies more the humble and contemplative men than the men of action. Our religion, moreover, places the supreme happiness in humility, lowliness, and a contempt for worldly objects. By contrast, the other places the supreme good in grandeur of soul, strength of body, and all such other qualities as made men formidable. If our religion claims of us fortitude of soul, it is more to enable us to suffer than to achieve great deeds.
These principles seem to me to have made men weak, and caused them to become an easy prey to evil-minded men, who can control them more securely. For, we see that the great body of men, for the sake of gaining Paradise, are more disposed to endure injuries than to avenge them. And although it would seem that the world has become effeminate and Heaven disarmed, yet this arises unquestionably from the baseness of men, who have interpreted our religion according to the promptings of idleness rather than those of virtue. For if we were to reflect that our religion permits us to exalt and defend our country, we should see that according to it we ought also to love and honor our country, and prepare ourselves so as to be capable of defending her. It is this education, then, and this false interpretation of our religion, that is the cause of there not being so many republics nowadays as there were anciently; and that there is no longer the same love of liberty amongst the people now as there was then.
REPUBLICS AND MONARCHIES (Prince, Ch. 1)
All states and governments that have held and hold rule over people have been and are either republics or monarchies. Monarchies are either hereditary, in which the family has been long established, or they are new. The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or they are like members annexed to the hereditary state of the prince who has acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples to that of the King of Spain. Such dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under a prince, or to live in freedom, and are acquired either by the arms of the prince himself, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability.
I will leave out all discussion of republics, since in another place I have written on them at length [i.e. in The Discourses], and will address myself only to monarchies. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated above, and discuss how such monarchies are to be ruled and preserved.
QUALITIES OF PRAISE AND BLAME IN A RULER (Prince, Ch. 15)
Imaginary vs. Real Virtues of a Ruler
It remains now to see what should be the rules of conduct for a prince towards subject and friends. As I know that many have written on this point, I expect I will be considered presumptuous in mentioning it again, especially since my discussion will depart from the methods of other people. But, since it is my intention to write something which will be useful to those who grasp it, it appears to me more appropriate to follow up with the real truth of a matter rather than the imagination of it. For many describe republics and monarchies which in fact have never been known or seen. This is because how one actually lives is so far removed from how one ought to live. Thus, he who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, more quickly causes his destruction rather than his preservation. For a person who wishes to act entirely according to his declarations of virtue soon meets with an array of evils which destroy him.
Alleged Qualities of a Good Ruler
Thus, if a prince wishes to keep his position, it is necessary that he knows how to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity. Therefore, let us set aside imaginary things concerning a prince, and discuss those which are real. Accordingly, I say that when all people are spoken of (and especially princes since they are more visible) they are distinguished based on specific qualities which bring them either blame or praise. Because of this one person is said to be generous, another miserly, using a Tuscan term (because an avaricious person in our language is still he who desires to own things through theft, whereas we call one miserly who deprives himself too much of the use of what he owns). One is reputed to be generous, another greedy; one cruel, one compassionate; one dishonest, another honest; one weak and cowardly, another bold and brave; one friendly, another arrogant; one lustful, another chaste; one sincere, another cunning; one hard, another easy; one solemn, another frivolous; one religious, another unbelieving, and the like. I know that everyone will acknowledge that it would be most admirable for a prince to exhibit all the above qualities that are considered good. But these good qualities can neither be entirely possessed nor observed, since human conditions do not permit it. It is then necessary for a prince to be sufficiently careful so that he may know how to avoid the negative effects of those vices which would make him lose his state. If possible, he must also take care to keep himself from those which would not lose him it. If this is not possible, he may give himself to them with less hesitation. Again, he need not worry about subjecting himself to criticism for those vices which, if he lacked, would make saving his state difficult. For considering everything carefully, we see that something which looks like virtue would lead to his destruction if followed; alternatively, something else, which looks like vice, will bring him security and prosperity if followed.
GENEROSITY VS. STINGINESS (Prince, Ch. 16)
Better to be Stingy than Generous
Starting then with the first of the above-named characteristics, suppose I say that it is best if one is thought to be generous. However, generosity injures you when exercised in a way that does not bring you the reputation for it. For if one exercises it honestly, as it should be exercised, people will not know about it, and you will not avoid the criticism of its opposite. Therefore, it seems that if anyone wishes to maintain a reputation of generosity among people, one should adopt the attribute of lavishness. However, by doing so a prince will consume all his property in such acts and, if he wishes to keep the reputation of generosity, he will unjustly burden his people, and tax them, and do everything he can to get money. This will soon make him despised by his subjects, and becoming poor he will be little valued by anyone. Thus, having offended many and rewarded few with his generosity, he is impacted by every trouble and threaten by every danger. Recognizing this himself, and wishing to draw back from it, he runs immediately into criticism for being miserly.
Therefore, a prince is not able to visibly exercise this virtue of generosity, except at great cost. If he is wise, then, he should not worry about having a reputation of being stingy. For in time he will be considered generous when people see that, with his economizing, his income is sufficient to defend himself against all attacks, and he is able to engage in enterprises without burdening his people. In this way he shows generosity towards the countless people from whom he does not take, and stinginess only towards the few people to whom he does not give.
We have not seen great things done in our time except by those who have been considered stingy. The rest have failed. Pope Julius the Second was assisted in reaching the papacy by a reputation for generosity, yet he did not try afterwards to keep it up when he made war on the King of France. He also made many wars without imposing any extraordinary tax on his subjects, for he supplied his additional expenses out of his long thriftiness. The present King of Spain would not have undertaken or succeeded in so many efforts if he had a generous reputation. Thus, a prince should not worry about having a reputation for being stingy, provided that he does not have to rob his subjects, that he can defend himself, that he does not become poor and abject, that he is not forced to become greedy. For it is one of those vices which will enable him to govern.
Reply to Counter Examples
Suppose someone says that Caesar obtained his empire through generosity, and many others have reached the highest positions by having been generous, and by being considered so. To this I answer that either you are currently a prince, or are in the process of becoming one. In the first case this generosity is dangerous, in the second it is very necessary to be considered generous. Caesar was one of those who wished to become preeminent in Rome. But if he had survived after becoming so, and had not moderated his expenses, he would have destroyed his government. Suppose someone replies that there have been many princes who have done great things with armies, and yet have been considered very generous. To this I reply that either a prince spends that which is his own or his subjects', or else that of others. In the first case he should be sparing, and in the second case he should not neglect any opportunity for generosity. Regarding the prince who advances with his army, supporting it by pillage, destruction, and extortion, handling that which belongs to others, this generosity is necessary, otherwise he would not be followed by soldiers. You can be a willing giver of that which is neither yours nor your subjects' (as Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander were) because it does not take away your reputation if you squander that of others, but adds to it. It is only squandering your own that injures you.
There is nothing that dissipates so rapidly as generosity. For even while you exercise it, you lose the power to do so, and become either poor or despised. Alternatively, in avoiding poverty you become greedy and hated. Above everything else, a prince should guard himself against being despised and hated, and generosity leads you to both. Therefore, it is wiser to have a reputation for stinginess which brings criticism without hatred, than to be compelled through seeking a reputation for generosity to incur a reputation for greed which results in disapproval with hatred.
SEVERITY VS. MERCY, BEING LOVED VS. FEARED (Prince, Ch. 17)
Better to be Severe in Punishment than Merciful
Turning now to the other qualities mentioned above, suppose I say that every prince should desire to be considered merciful and not cruel. Nevertheless, he should try not to misuse this mercy. Cesare Borgia was considered cruel. Despite his cruelty, he reconciled the Romagna, unified it, and restored it to peace and loyalty. If this is properly considered, we will see that he was much more merciful than the Florentine people, who, to avoid a reputation for cruelty, permitted [the northern Italian city of] Pistoia to be destroyed. Therefore, so long as a prince keeps his subjects united and loyal, he should not mind the criticism of cruelty. With a few examples of cruelty, he will be more merciful than princes who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to arise, from which result murders or robberies. For these typically injure the whole people, whereas those executions which originate with a prince harm the individual only.
Of all princes, it is impossible for a new prince to avoid the accusation of cruelty, since new states are full of dangers. Hence Virgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her reign because of its newness, saying,
Against my will, my fate,
A throne unsettled, and an infant state,
Bid me defend my realms with all my powers,
And guard with these severities my shores.
Nevertheless he should be slow to believe and to act. He should also not display fear, but act calmly with thought and humanity so that too much confidence does not make him incautious and too much distrust make him intolerable.
Better to be Feared than Loved
From this issue another question arises: is it better to be loved than feared, or feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish to be both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person, it is much safer to be feared than loved, when one of the two must be dispensed with. For we can generally say of people that they are ungrateful, inconsistent, deceitful, cowardly, and selfish. But as long as you benefit them, they are yours entirely. They will offer you their blood, property, life and children (as I noted above) when the need is far off. But when the need approaches, they turn against you. The prince is ruined who relies only on their promises and has neglected other precautions. This is because friendships that are obtained by payments, and not by greatness or nobility of mind, may indeed be earned, but they are not secured, and in time of need cannot be counted on. Further, people have less scruple in offending someone who is beloved rather than someone who is feared. For love is preserved by the link of obligation which, because of the corruption of people, is broken at every opportunity for their advantage. But fear preserves you by a fear of punishment which never fails.
Nevertheless, a prince should create fear in such a way that, if he does not win love, he avoids hatred. For, he can survive very well being feared so long as he is not hated. Further, he will not be hated as long as he abstains from the property of his citizens and subjects and from their women. But when it is necessary for him to take someone's life, he must do it on proper justification and for clear cause. Above all, though, he must keep his hands off the property of others, because people more quickly forget the death of their father than the loss of their inheritance. Besides, excuses abound for taking away property. For he who begins to live by robbery will always find excuses for seizing others' possessions. But reasons for taking life, on the contrary, are more difficult to find and sooner lapse. When a prince is with his army and in control of many soldiers, then it is absolutely necessary for him to disregard the reputation of cruelty, for without it he would never keep his army united or willing to follow their duties.
The Severity of Hannibal better than the Tolerance of Scipio
Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I conclude that, people loving according to their own will and fearing according to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish himself on that which is in his own control and not in that of others. Thus, he must try only to avoid hatred, as is noted.
HONESTY VS. DECEPTION (Prince, Ch. 18)
Imitate both the Deceitful Fox and the Powerful Lion
Everyone admits how good it is in a prince to be honest, and to live with integrity and not with deceit. Nevertheless, our experience has been that those princes who have done great things have had little regard for honesty, and have known how to circumvent the intellect of people by deceit, and in the end have overcome those who have relied on their word. You must know that there are two ways of contesting, the one by the law, the other by force. The first method is proper to humans, the second to animals. But because the first is frequently not sufficient, it is necessary to have recourse to the second. Therefore, it is essential for a prince to understand how to make use of both the animal and the human. This has been figuratively taught to princes by ancient writers. It is described how Achilles and many other past princes were given to Chiron, the Centaur, to nurse and be raised in his discipline. The meaning of this story is that, just as they had for a teacher one who was half animal and half human, so it is necessary for a prince to know how to make use of both natures, and that one without the other cannot survive. Since a prince is therefore compelled to consciously adopt the persona of animal, he should choose both the fox [for its deceitfulness] and the lion [for its powerfulness]. This is because the lion cannot defend himself against snares, and the fox cannot defend himself against wolves. Thus, it is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares, and a lion to terrify the wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion do not understand what they are about. Accordingly, a wise ruler cannot nor should he be honest when such observance may be turned against him, and when the reasons that caused him to pledge it no longer exist. If people were entirely good, this rule would not hold. But because they are bad, and will not be honest with you, you too are not bound to observe it with them. Nor will a prince ever be lacking good reasons to excuse this nonobservance. Endless modern examples of this could be given, showing how many treaties and engagements have been made void and ineffective because of the dishonesty of princes. But he who has known best how to employ the fox has succeeded best.
Importance of Appearing to be Virtuous and Religious
But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic, and to be a great pretender and deceiver. People are so simple and so subject to present needs, that anyone who seeks to deceive will always find someone who will allow himself to be deceived. There is one recent example which I cannot pass over in silence. [Pope] Alexander VI did nothing but deceive people, nor ever thought of doing otherwise, and he always found victims. For there never was a person who had greater ability in asserting, or who with greater oaths would affirm something, yet would observe it less. Nevertheless, his deceits always succeeded according to his wishes, because he well understood this side of human nature.
Therefore, it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the virtuous qualities I have enumerated. But it is very necessary for him to appear to have them. I will dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe them is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful. Thus, one should appear merciful, honest, humane, religious, upright, and also be that way. But your mind should be framed so that if you are required not to be so, you may be able and know how to change to the opposite.
You must understand that a prince, especially a new one, cannot follow all those things for which people are respected. For, to maintain the state, he is often forced to act contrary to honesty, friendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore, it is necessary for him to have a mind ready to turn itself with the winds and as changes of fortune force it. Yet, as I have said above, he should not diverge from the good if he can avoid doing so, but, if compelled to go against the good, he should know how to set about it.
For this reason, a prince should take care that he never lets anything slip from his lips that is not overflowing with the above-named five qualities, so that he may appear to those who see and hear him altogether merciful, honest, humane, upright, and religious. There is nothing more necessary to appear to have than this last quality [of religiousness]. For, people generally judge more by the eye than by the hand, and everybody is capable of seeing you, and few can come in touch with you. Everyone sees what you appear to be, few really know what you are, and those few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion of the many, who have the majesty of the state to defend them. In the actions of all people, and especially of princes which it is not prudent to challenge, one judges by the result.
For that reason, let a prince aim at conquering and keeping his state, and the means of attaining it will always be considered honest, and he will be praised by everybody. This is because the common people are always taken by what a thing seems to be and by what comes of it, and there are only common people in the world. For the few who are not common people find a place in the world only when the many have no ground on which to.
One prince of the present time, whom it is not best to name [i.e., Maximilian I, Holy Roman Emperor], never preaches anything else but peace and honesty, and to both he is most hostile, and either, if he had kept it, would have deprived him many times of reputation and kingdom.
BEING HATED AND OVERTHROWN (Prince, Ch. 19)
How to Avoid being Hated
Now, concerning the characteristics of which I have mentioned above, I have spoken of the more important ones. The others I wish to discuss briefly under this generality, that the prince must consider, as has been in part said before, how to avoid those things that will make him hated or contemptible. As often as he succeeds, he will have fulfilled his part, and he won't need to fear any danger in other condemnations.
To be greedy, as I have said, makes him hated above everything, and he must abstain from violating both his subjects' property and women. When neither their property nor honor is touched, most people live content, and he has only to contend with the ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease in many ways.
It makes him contemptible to be considered indecisive, frivolous, weak, mean-spirited, irresolute, from all of which a prince should guard himself as from a rock. In his actions he should try to show greatness, courage, gravity, and fortitude. In his private dealings with his subjects, let him show that his judgments are irrevocable, and maintain himself in such reputation that no one can hope either to deceive him or to get around him.
That prince is highly respected who conveys this impression of himself, and he who is highly respected is not easily conspired against. For, provided it is well known that he is an excellent person and revered by his people, he can only be attacked with difficulty. For this reason a prince should have two fears, one from within, because of his subjects, the other from without, because of external powers. From the latter he is defended by being well armed and having good allies, and if he is well armed he will have good friends, and affairs will always remain quiet within when they are quiet without, unless they should have been already disturbed by conspiracy. Even if affairs outside are disturbed, if he has carried out his preparations and has lived as I have said, as long as he does not despair, he will resist every attack, as I said Nabis the Spartan did.
How to Avoid being Overthrown.
Concerning his subjects, when affairs outside are disturbed he has only to fear that they will conspire secretly. But a prince can easily protect himself from this by avoiding being hated and despised, and by keeping the people satisfied with him, which it is most necessary for him to accomplish, as I said above at length. One of the most effective remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is not to be hated and despised by the people. For those who conspire against a prince always expect to please people by his removal. But when the conspirator can only look forward to offending people, he will not have the courage to take such a course, for the difficulties that confront a conspirator are infinite. As experience shows, many have been the conspiracies, but few have been successful. This is because he who conspires cannot act alone, nor can he take a companion except from those whom he believes to be malcontents, and as soon as you have opened your mind to a malcontent you have given him the material with which to content himself, for by denouncing you he can look for every advantage. Thus, seeing the gain from this course to be assured, and seeing the other to be doubtful and full of dangers, he must be a very rare friend, or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to keep faith with you.
To reduce the matter into a small range, I say that, on the side of the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, and prospect of punishment to terrify him. But on the side of the prince there is the majesty of the monarchy, the laws, the protection of friends and the state to defend him. Adding to all these things the popular goodwill, it is impossible that anyone should be so rash as to conspire. For whereas in general the conspirator must fear before the execution of his plot, in this case he must also fear what will occur after his crime. Because of this he has the people for an enemy, and thus cannot hope for any escape.
WHAT FORTUNE CAN AFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS, AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER (Prince, Ch. 25)
Outcome Controlled Half by Destiny, Half by Ourselves
I am aware of how many men have had, and still have, the opinion that the affairs of the world are in such ways governed by fortune and by God, that men with their wisdom cannot direct them, and that no one can even help them. Because of this, they would have us believe that it is not necessary to labor much in affairs, but to let chance govern them. This opinion has been more credited in our times because of the great changes in affairs which have been seen, and may still be seen every day, beyond all human conjecture. Sometimes pondering over this, I am in some degree inclined to their opinion. Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I believe it to be true that Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions, but that she still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little less.
I compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood overflows the plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, carrying away the soil from place to place. Everything flies before it, all submit to its violence, without being able in any way to withstand it. Yet, while this is the river's nature, we nevertheless see that, when the weather becomes pleasant, people will still make provisions, both with defenses and barriers. In this way, when the river rises again, the waters may pass away through canals, and their force is neither as unrestrained nor as dangerous. So too with fortune, who shows her power where valor has not prepared to resist her, and to which she turns her forces where she knows that barriers and defenses have not been raised to constrain her.
If you will consider Italy, which is the seat of these changes, and which has given to them their impulse, you will see it to be an open country without barriers and without any defense. For if it had been defended by proper valor, as are Germany, Spain, and France, either this invasion would not have made the great changes it has made, or it would not have come at all. This I consider enough to say concerning resistance to fortune in general.
Importance of Adapting to Change
But confining myself more to the issue at hand, I say that a prince may be seen happy today and ruined tomorrow without having shown any change of disposition or character. This, I believe, arises firstly from causes that have already been discussed at length, namely, that the prince who relies entirely upon fortune is lost when it changes. I believe also that he will be successful who directs his actions according to the spirit of the times, and that he whose actions do not accord with the times will not be successful. For we see that, through various methods, men achieve the same goal in their affairs that every man has reached before him, namely, glory and riches. One does so with caution, another with haste; one by force, another by skill; one by patience, another by its opposite. Each one succeeds in reaching the goal by a different method. One can also see that, between two cautious men, the one will attain his end, the other will fail. Similarly, two men by different observances are equally successful, the one being cautious, the other impulsive. All this arises from nothing else than whether or not they conform in their methods to the spirit of the times. This follows from what I have said, that two men working differently bring about the same effect, and of two working similarly, one attains his object and the other does not.
Changes in estate also result from this, for if, to one who governs himself with caution and patience, times and affairs converge in such a way that his administration is successful, his fortune is made. But if times and affairs change, he is ruined if he does not change his course of action. But a man is not often found sufficiently circumspect to know how to accommodate himself to the change, both because he cannot deviate from what nature inclines him to, and also because, having always prospered by acting in one way, he cannot be persuaded that it is well to leave it. Therefore, the cautious man, when it is time to turn adventurous, does not know how to do it, hence he is ruined. But had he changed his conduct with the times, fortune would not have changed. . . .
I conclude therefore that, since fortune changes and people are stuck in their ways, so long as the two agree, men are successful, but unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I consider that it is better to be adventurous than cautious, because fortune is a woman, and if you wish to keep her under it is necessary to beat and ill-use her. It is seen that she allows herself to be mastered by the adventurous rather than by those who go to work more coldly. She is, therefore, always, woman-like, a lover of young men, because they are less cautious, more violent, and command her with more boldness.
Source: Niccol Machiavelli, The Prince (1532), Ch. 1, 15-19, 25, tr. W.K. Marriott.
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STEPHEN JUNIUS BRUTUS: AGAINST TYRANTS
"Stephen Junius Brutus" is a pseudonym for the unidentified author of the sixteenth-century political work titled Vindication Against Tyrants (1579), which is an allusion to the legendary founder of the Roman Republic "Junius Brutus" (sixth-century BCE). Possibilities for the work's authorship are French statesman Hubert Languet (1518 1581), or French theologian Philippe de Mornay (1549 1623). While unsure about its author, scholars do know its historical context. It was composed by a French protestant who was reacting against the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre in 1572 in which, upon the order of the King, tens of thousands of Protestants were killed throughout France by Catholics. The work addresses four questions regarding resisting kings, the third and longest is "Whether it is lawful to resist a prince who oppresses or ruins a public state," from which the selections below are taken. The central theme here is that the people are superior to the king, and have put the king in power to perform specific tasks on behalf of the country. If the king fails to uphold his part of the contract, then the people, under the guidance of government officials, can rightfully overthrow the king. The author begins arguing that God establishes kings, but it is the people who confirm the selection of the king through their vote, either by electing kings individually or electing a hereditary bloodline. All kings are put in power to be servants of the people, and, thus, the people are above the king. In addition to the king, there are other ministers and officers of the country who are appointed by the people for the benefit of the commonwealth and to guard it. These officers' primary loyalty lies with the people, not to the king, and one of their functions is to assure that the king performs his twofold task: to maintain justice among individuals and to protect the country from enemies. Kings are thus under the law and need to accept their subordinate role. All authority that the king possesses comes from two distinct contracts. One is between God and the king, which requires the king to glorify and obey God. The other is between people and the king, which requires the king to secure the welfare of the people. If the king does not fulfill his contract with the people, then the people are freed from their duty towards the king and can revolt against him. The author warns that no human is perfect, including kings, and it is only the tyrannical ones that can be removed. In such cases, diplomacy should be tried first through the reprimands of government officials. If that fails, government officials with the aid of the people can remove the king, even through armed conflict if necessary.
KING MADE BY THE PEOPLE (from Vindication Against Tyrants)
People Elect the King
We have shown above that it is God who establishes kings, choosing them and conferring kingdoms upon them. Now we are to show that the people set up kings, commit kingdoms to them, and confirm the election by their vote. Indeed, God has willed that it should be done in this manner, in order that kings should acknowledge that whatever authority and power they possess have been received from the people, and that they should, therefore, devote all their thought and efforts to the interests of the people. Nor should kings think that they excel other men through some superiority of nature in the way that men stand above flocks of sheep or herds of cattle. Let them remember that they are born of the same stuff as other men and have been raised from the ground to their high station by the vote and, as it were, upon the shoulders of the people, in order that the burden of the commonwealth should thereafter rest in great part upon their own shoulders. . . .
In a word, all kings were in the beginning elected. Those who today appear to succeed to their kingdoms by inheritance were necessarily first established by the people. Although the people of certain countries are accustomed to choose their kings from a particular bloodline because of its unusual merits, nevertheless, it is the bloodline and not the branch that they choose. Nor do they so choose but that if that stock should degenerate they may select another. Those who are next in line for the kingship are not born kings; they rather become such: they are not deemed kings so much as candidates for the kingship.
PEOPLE ABOVE THE KING
Kings are Servants of the People
Since kings are established by the people, it certainly seems to follow that the whole body of the people are superior to the king. For it is evident that he who is established by another is accounted less than he that has established him, and that he who receives his authority from another is inferior to him from whom he derives his authority. Potiphar, the Egyptian, thus established Joseph above all his household; Nebuchadnezzar, Daniel over the province of Babylon; Darius, the hundred and twenty governors over his kingdom. Masters are said to establish their servants; kings, their ministers. Similarly, the people establish the king as "minister of the commonwealth" a designation which good kings have not scorned, and bad ones have only pretended to assume. Thus, for several generations no Roman emperor (except perhaps some obvious tyrant, such as Nero, Domitian, or Caligula) wished to be called "lord".
Moreover, it is clear that kings were instituted for the benefit of the people. You could not say that for the sake of some hundred men, inferior to most of the rest of the community, that the whole community was created for them. Rather it is that the former were created for the latter. Reason requires that he on whose account another exists should be deemed superior to that other. Thus for the sake of the ship the owner appoints a captain, who sits at the helm to see that she is not dashed to pieces upon the rocks or follow the wrong course. Relying upon him in that work, the others serve him; even the owner obeys him. Nevertheless, the captain is only a servant of the ship, differing from the common drudges only in type of work. In the commonwealth the king has the place of captain, the people that of owner. As long as the king is attentive to the public good the people properly submit to him, yet in such a way that he is considered, as he should be, the servant of the commonwealth, in the same capacity as a judge or tribune who differs from the rest of the people only insofar as he is expected to have greater burdens and expose himself to greater dangers. Thus, that which the king acquires through war, as when he occupies territory by right of conquest, or through payments into the treasury in the administration of justice, he acquires not for himself, but for the kingdom that is, for the people who have established the kingdom, just as a servant makes acquisitions for his master. Nor can any obligation be contracted with the king except by the authorization of the people. . . . Since, therefore, the king exists through, and for the sake of, the people, and without the people cannot stand, who will wonder at our conclusion that the people are greater than the king?
Officers of the King vs. Officers of the Kingdom
Now, what we have said concerning the whole body of the people we wish also to be said concerning those who in every kingdom or city lawfully represent the body of the people, and who are commonly deemed officers of the kingdom and not of the king. For officers of the king are created and discharged by him at his pleasure, and when he is dead they no longer have any authority; they are themselves counted as dead. Officers of the kingdom, on the other hand, receive their authority from the people (at least they were formerly accustomed to do so) in public assembly, and can be discharged only by that same power. The former, therefore, depend upon the king, the latter upon the kingdom. The former should be responsible to the supreme officer of the kingdom to the king; the latter, to the supreme sovereign the people, upon whom the king himself, and through him his officers, must depend. The function of the former is to guard the king; of the latter, to see that no harm occurs to the commonwealth. The former are to aid and serve the king, like domestic servants of a master; the latter are to preserve the rights and privileges of the people and to take diligent care that the king commit or omit nothing to their damage. In short, the former are ministers, servants, domestics of the king, instituted only to obey him. The latter, as associates of the king in the administration of justice and as partakers of royal authority, are bound, like the king himself, to administer the affairs of the commonwealth. He, as chief among them, holds first place only in degree. As the whole people is superior to the king, so their representatives, though individually inferior to him, should in the aggregate be counted superior to him.
Why Kings were first Established
We must now inquire why kings were established in the first place, and what their principal duty was. For a thing is considered good only when it fulfills the purpose for which it was instituted. In the first place, it is clear that men are by nature free, impatient of servitude, born rather to command than to obey. Thus, except for the sake of some great profit, men would not have chosen subjection to another person and have renounced their own natural right, so to speak, to submit to the right of another. . . . Nor let us think that kings were chosen to convert to their own uses the goods obtained by the sweat of the many; for everyone loves and cherishes his own. Nor were they created that they might squander the public power to their own pleasure; for ordinarily anyone hates, or at least envies, his superior. They were established to protect individuals from each other by the administration of justice, and to defend everyone from dangers from without by repelling force with force. Thus, Augustine says that those who care for the interests of others are properly said to rule, as the husband rules the wife, or parents their children. Those whose interests are cared for are said to obey; although those who thus rule really serve those whom they are said to command. For, as Augustine also says, they command not for the sake of ruling but because of their duty to care for whom they are responsible; not for the glory of domination, but out of pity to guard those committed to their protection. . . . To govern, then, is simply to give counsel. The only end of government is the good of the people. The sole duty of governors and kings is to take care of the people. Royal dignity is, properly speaking, not an honor, but a burden; not a privilege, but a calling; not an exemption from responsibility, but a duty; not a freedom, but a public service. Some honor indeed is attached to the position; one would hardly be willing to take on such troubles unless they were flavored with some relish of honor. The common saying is true that if everyone knew with how great annoyances the royal crown was surrounded, no one would pick it up if he found it at his feet along the road.
When the words "mine" and "yours" had entered into the world, conflicts arose among citizens concerning ownership of things, and between neighboring peoples over boundaries. It then became customary to rely on someone who would justly and effectively see that the poor suffered no violence from the rich, or the whole nation from their neighbors. When such contests and wars became more violent, a permanent choice was made of someone for whose valor and diligence all had high regard. Thus kings were first established to administer justice at home and lead the army abroad. . . . Kings were ordained by God and established by the people for the benefit of the citizens. This benefit consists principally in two things: in the maintenance of justice among individuals and of security against enemies.
Kings are Under the Law
We must proceed a little further. Does the king, because he presides in the administration of justice, administer justice according to his own free will? Does the king depend on law, or law on the king? . . . The Spartan [geographer] Pausanias answers concisely: "Authority pertains to laws as against men, not to men as against laws." . . . We must carry the matter further yet. Since the people were seeking justice through law, if this could be obtained from a single good and just man, they were satisfied with him. But this was hardly possible, and indeed rarely happened. In fact as long as the judgments of kings were received as the equivalent of laws, it turned out that certain things were declared as laws at one time and others at another time. It thus became the function of magistrates and other wise men to discover, as it were, laws which could speak with one and the same voice to all men. Kings were then entrusted with the duty of guarding, administering and conserving laws. Because laws were not capable of providing in advance for every contingency, kings might determine certain cases by the same natural justice from which the laws themselves were derived. But unless in these cases the kings should do violence to the law, those superior men, concerning whom we have just spoken, were soon associated with the kings by the people.
Kings themselves should be obedient to law and acknowledge it as their superior. ... Nor should they consider that they govern any less because they submit to law. For law is a kind of instrument by means of which human societies are best ruled and directed to a happy end. Thus, kings are foolish who think it is dishonorable to submit to law, just as a geometrician would be who would consider it unbecoming to use the rule and other instruments ordinarily employed by those most expert in making measurements, or as a mariner would be who would prefer to wander recklessly rather than direct the course of his ship by the nautical compass. Who will hesitate to say that it is more expedient and honorable to obey the law rather than a man? Law is the soul of the good king; in it is his inspiration, feeling, and life. The king is the organ of the law, the body through which the law exercises its power, fulfils its function and expresses its meaning. Now it is more reasonable to obey the soul than the body. Law is the concentrated reason and wisdom of many sages. The many are more clear-sighted and far-seeing than the one; it is, therefore, safer to follow the law than a man, however insightful he may be. Law is reason or calm intelligence, and free from the influence of anger, greed, hate, or prejudice. Nor is it deflected by tears or threats. Man, on the other hand, however gifted with reason, is seized and overcome by wrath, vengeance and other passions. He is so disturbed by these emotions that he is not master of himself; he is composed of both reason and passion, and he cannot always prevent the latter from gaining the upper hand. . . . Law is the blending of a multitude of minds, and mind is a part of the divine spirit. Thus, he who obeys the law seems to obey God and to make God his judge.
ROYAL AUTHORITY BASED ON CONTRACT
Two Contracts with the King
We have said that in establishing a king a two-fold pact was entered into. The one, concerning which we have already spoken, is between God, on the one hand, and the king and people, on the other. The other pact is between the king and the people. We must examine the latter now. After Saul was appointed the royal law was delivered to him, according to which he was to govern. David, also, in Hebron made a covenant in the presence of the Lord that is, God being present as witness with the elders of Israel, who represented the whole people; after that he was anointed king. . . . Likewise Josiah promised to observe the commandments, testimonies and precepts comprised in the book of the covenant; by these words are to be understood the laws, which relate in some places to piety, and in others to justice. In all of these passages the covenant is said to have been made with all the people, or with the entire multitude, all the elders, or all the men of Judea. From this we know that not only the chiefs of the tribes but also the captains, centurions and inferior magistrates were present, representing the towns, so that all might individually make a pact with the king. In this pact it was a matter of creating a king; for the people made the king, not vice versa. It cannot be doubted that in this contract the people had the part of stipulator, the king that of promisor. And the part of stipulator is considered the more advantageous at law. The people, as stipulator, ask the king whether he will govern justly and according to the laws; the king promises that he will. The people then respond that they will faithfully obey him while he governs justly. The king, therefore, promises absolutely, the people conditionally. If the condition is not fulfilled the people are lawfully absolved from every obligation. In the first pact or contract there is an obligation to piety, in the second, to justice. In the former, the king promises dutifully to obey God, in the latter, that he will rule the people justly; in the one that he will provide for the glory of God, in the other, that he will secure the welfare of the people. In the first contract the condition is "if you observe my law". In the second it is "if you give to each his due." Failure to fulfill the first pact is duly punished by God; failure to fulfill the second is legitimately punishable by the whole people or by those magistrates whose function it is to protect the people. . . .
The civil law permits a freedman to bring an action against his patron for any grievous injury, and under similar circumstances the same law frees a slave from his master (though these obligations are natural, not civil). If all these things are true, is it not even more certain that the people should be absolved from the oath which they have taken to the king, if he, who first swore solemnly to them, as an agent to his principal, has broken his oath?
Even if the formalities of a contract have never taken place, are we not sufficiently taught by nature herself that kings are established by the people with the condition that they govern well; judges, that they judge justly; military leaders, that they lead forth the army against the enemy? . . .
But, you may ask, what if the people, subdued by force, are compelled by a prince to swear allegiance according to his own terms? I reply, what if a robber, pirate, or tyrant, with whom there is considered to be no bond of justice, should, with an uplifted sword, extort a promissory note from anyone? Is it not well known that a promise demanded through violence is not binding, especially if anything is promised against good morals or contrary to the law of nature? What is more repugnant to nature than that the people should fasten their own chains and shackles? Or that they should promise the king to throw themselves upon the sword or lay violent hands upon themselves? There is, therefore, between king and people a mutual obligation which, whether it is civil or natural, tacit or express, cannot be abolished by agreement, violated by any law, or rescinded by force. So great is the strength of this obligation that the prince who obstinately violates it may be truly called a "tyrant", and the people who willfully break it called "seditious".
OPPOSING TYRANTS
Two Types of Tyrants
So far we have examined kings. It now remains for us to describe somewhat more accurately the tyrant. We have said that the king is he who rules and governs a kingdom, attaining his position either through heredity or through election confirmed by the appropriate rites. In contrast to this, it follows that he is a tyrant who either has seized the government by civil means or, ruling in a regular manner, does so in a manner that is contrary to right and justice, and in violation of the laws and pacts to which he has solemnly bound himself. Both characters of tyrant may exist in one and the same person. The former is commonly called the tyrant without title, the latter the tyrant by practice. It may easily happen that he who gains a kingdom by violence should rule justly, or that he upon whom a kingdom descends lawfully should rule unjustly. To the extent that the kingship is a law-created right rather than inherited property, an office rather than a possession, he would seem more deserving of the name of tyrant who performs his duty badly than he who enters upon his duty in irregular manner. . . .
Legal Justifications for Opposing Tyrants
Now finally we have come to the principal point of our question. . . . It remains now for us to determine whether, by whom, and by what means a tyrant may be lawfully resisted. . . .
In the first place, the law of nature teaches us to preserve and defend our life and our liberty without which life is hardly worth while, against every violence and wrong. Nature has implanted this instinct in dogs against wolves, in bulls against lions, in doves against hawks, in young fowl against kites, and yet more strongly in man against man himself when a man becomes a wolf to his fellow-man. Therefore, he who questions whether it is permissible to resist seems to challenge nature herself. The law of nations teaches the same: by this dominions are defined and boundaries established which everyone is obligated to defend against all invaders. It is thus no less lawful to resist Alexander when, without right and provoked by no wrong, he invades a country with a powerful fleet, than to resist Diomedes the pirate, when he with one vessel renders dangerous the sea. In such case Alexander surpasses Diomedes not in his right but only in his security from punishment. It is as proper to oppose Alexander in ravaging the country as it is to oppose a pickpocket in stealing a watch, or a man who would subvert the city by trickery as a robber who would break into a private house.
Furthermore, there is a civil law whereby societies of men are established under a fixed system, some being governed in one manner, some in another. Thus some are ruled by one or a few, others by the people as a whole. Some exclude women from the government, others admit them. Some choose their kings from a single family, others select them indiscriminately. If anyone attempts to violate this law by force or fraud we are all bound to resist him, because he wrongs society (to which he owes everything) and would undermine his country, to which we are all devoted by nature, law, and solemn oath. If we neglect this duty we are traitors to our country, deserters from human society, condemners of the law.
As thus the law of nature, the law of nations, and civil law command us to take up arms against tyrants, no other reason can properly deter us. No oath or other pact, public or private, interposes to prevent us. It is, therefore, permitted to any private person to eject an intruding tyrant. Nor does the Julian law of treason which punishes those who rebel against their country or prince, apply here. For he is no prince who without lawful title invades the commonwealth or confines of another, nor he a rebel who defends his country with arms. ... To as little purpose can the laws of sedition be appealed to here. He is seditious who undertakes to sustain the people in resisting public discipline. But he who restrains the subverter of the country and of public discipline does not create sedition; he prevents it. . . .
Identifying a Tyrant
Concerning those who practice tyranny, whether having first acquired their authority lawfully or by force, it is important for us to make a careful examination. In the first place, we should consider that all princes are born men and that their reason can as little be made free from passion as the mind can be separated from the body. Therefore, we should not hope to have only perfect princes; we should rather deem ourselves fortunate if we find mediocre ones. If in certain cases the prince does not observe moderation, if now and then he does not yield to reason, if he looks carelessly to the public welfare, if he becomes less diligent in administration of justice or less zealous in warding off war, he must not immediately be called a tyrant. For he rules not as man over animals or God over men, but as a man born of the same condition as other men. As a prince would be considered arrogant who sought to abuse men as if they were animals, so the people are unjust if they expect a god in a prince or look for divinity in his imperfect nature. But if he deliberately upsets the commonwealth, if he recklessly perverts lawful rights, or has no regard for oaths and covenants, for justice or piety, then indeed he should be declared a tyrant that is, an enemy of God and man. We are thus not speaking of a prince who is less good, but one who is absolutely bad; not one who is less wise, but of one who is malicious and treacherous; not of him who is ignorant of the law, but of the condemner of law; not of an unwarlike prince, but of a prince who is enemy of the people and ravager of the kingdom. The weak prince might be disposed to employ the wisdom of the senate, the praetor's knowledge of the law, the tribune's military skill; but the tyrant would be happy if the nobility, the senators and the commanders had only one neck which he might take off with one swipe, for no others does he regard with more hatred than these. Although the weak prince might rightly be deposed, nevertheless he can be endured; but the longer the tyrant is tolerated the more insufferable he becomes.
It is not always convenient for the people to do that which they may lawfully do. It often happens that a remedy which is applied is worse than the disease. So it is wise for men to try all means before taking up the sword. If those officers who represent the people perceive that anything is being done, through force or fraud, against the common well-being, they should at once reprimand the prince, not waiting until the evil becomes graver and acquires greater strength. For tyranny is like a hectic fever, which, at first easily cured but detected with difficulty, later becomes easily recognizable but almost incurable. Therefore, the representatives should withstand the prince, and not allow the smallest beginning of tyranny to be made. If the prince persists in his tyrannous course and, though often reprimanded, does not reform but attempts to bring matters to the point where he may with no penalty do whatever he pleases, then indeed the crime of tyranny is complete. Thus, whatever might be done against a tyrant through the law or through just resistance, can be done against him. For tyranny is not merely a crime, but the highest crime, and the embodiment of all crimes. The tyrant subverts the commonwealth, pillages everyone and lays snares for their lives, violates any promise, despising the sanctity of a solemn oath. Therefore, he is much more vicious than the ordinary bandit, murderer or oath-breaker, as it is more serious to offend against the many or all than against particular individuals. If these private offences are deemed villainous and are punishable by death, is it possible to devise a penalty worthy of a crime so atrocious as tyranny?
The Duty of Officers of the Kingdom to Oppose Tyrants
Moreover, we have already proved that kings receive their royal dignity from the people, that the whole people are greater than and superior to the king, and that the king or emperor is merely the highest minister and agent of the kingdom or empire. It follows that the tyrant commits a felony against the people who are the lord of the land. He is guilty of treason against the kingdom or empire; he is a rebel. He has thus violated the same laws that the ordinary criminal violates and merits far severer punishment. Therefore, as Bartolus says, he may be either deposed by his superior or punished under the Julian law against public violence. The superior is the whole people, or those who represent them the electors, palatines, patricians, assembly of estates, etc. If the tyranny has proceeded so far that it cannot be destroyed except by armed force, then it is lawful for the representatives to call the people to arms, enroll an army, and employ not only the valiant strength of the nation, but even strategy and deceit, against the enemy of their country. . . . The officers of the kingdom will not thereby incur the charge of sedition. For in sedition, two opposing parties are necessary one pursuing a just course, the other an unjust course. That party is right which defends the laws, supports the common welfare and preserves the kingdom. That party is wrong which violates laws, or protects violators of law, and defends the destroyers of the country. . . . Whatever tends to the public good is lawful. Thus, Thomas [Aquinas] says that since tyrannical government is unjust (being established not for the public good but for the private good of him who rules), consequently its overthrow does not have the nature of sedition. Nor can the officers of the kingdom be charged with the crime of treason. . . .
Everywhere there is between prince and people a mutual and reciprocal obligation: he promises that he will be a good prince; the people promise that if he is such they will obey him. The people are thus obligated to the prince conditionally, he to them absolutely. If the condition is not fulfilled, the people are released, the contract revoked, the obligation ipso jure void. The king is faithless if he governs unjustly; the people are faithless if they neglect to obey him while he rules justly. The people are entirely innocent of the crime of disloyalty if they publicly renounce an unjust ruler or try to overpower by force of arms one who without lawful right attempts to hold the kingdom.
It is not merely permissible to the officers of the kingdom to repress a tyrant; it is obligatory for them as a part of their duty. If they do not fulfill this duty, they can plead no contract as an excuse. The electors, patricians, peers and other nobles should not think that they were instituted to exhibit themselves, clothed in their robes of state, at the coronation of the king, according to the ancient custom. It is not as if they are acting in a Greek interlude, or playing the parts of Roland, Oliver, Renaldo and other stage personages representing the knights of King Arthur's table. Nor after the assembly has been dismissed should they think that they have fulfilled their parts excellently. Such ceremonies are not intended to be executed as a matter of routine, or designed for sport as in children's games when, as Horace describes, they make a king in play. Instead, these leaders should know that they are called to a place of work as well as of honor, and that the commonwealth is entrusted to the king as its first and principal guardian and to them as co-guardians. Just as other guardians are appointed to observe the acts of him who holds the place of chief guardian, to demand constant accounting of his administration and watch carefully how he fulfills his responsibility; so likewise officers are appointed to watch the king (who is master only in the sense of having the care of a ward), to see that he does nothing to the detriment of the people. The conduct of the principal guardian is assigned to the co-guardians if (when they ought and can) they do not discover his fault, especially where he neglects to communicate the affairs of administration to them, or executes his guardianship faithlessly, or practices deceit, acts selfishly or ruinously for his ward, or seizes anything from the property of the ward. In short, they are held to account if he acts stupidly, indifferently or unskillfully.
In like manner the chief officers are held responsible for the conduct of the king, if they do not suppress tyranny or prevent its appearance, or supplement his inefficiency by their own vigilance and industry. . . . The commonwealth is entrusted as much to their care as to his; their official assignment is not only to serve the public interest through their particular offices, but also to hold the king to his proper function. Both he and they have promised to secure the welfare of the commonwealth. If he violates his oath they are not to imagine that they are thereby absolved from their pledge, any more than are bishops released from their vows if the Pope defends heresy or seeks to destroy the church. The more the king becomes an oath-breaker, the more should the officers consider themselves bound to keep their faith. If they act deceptively, they are to be accounted liars. If they conspire with him, they are deserters and traitors. If they neglect to deliver the commonwealth from tyranny, they are tyrants themselves. On the other hand, if they undertake to save the commonwealth and defend it with all their powers, they are protectors, guardians, and, in a sense, kings themselves.
Source: Stephen Junius Brutus (pseud.), Vindication against Tyrants (Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos, 1579), Question 3, tr. Francis Coker.
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HUGO GROTIUS: JUST WAR
Born in Delf, Holland, Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) was a statesman in the Dutch government. Imprisoned for three years for his role in a religious controversy, he dramatically escaped with the help of his wife by hiding in a book case. While taking refuge in France until the Dutch political climate became safer, Grotius wrote his most famous work The Law of War and Peace (1625), from which selections below are taken. The work is an analysis of international relations and the justification of wars and as founded on principles of natural law. He begins with an account of natural law, which, he argues, is rooted in our human instinct to be sociable and live peacefully among other humans. From this general principle he deduces five more specific principles of natural law: (1) do not take things that belong to others; (2) restore to other people anything that we might have of theirs; (3) fulfill promises; (4) compensate for any loss that results through our own fault; (5) punish people as deserved. These principles of natural law have a rational order to them that cannot be contradicted any more than we can contradict mathematical principles. Thus, even God cannot alter natural law. Grotius next discusses the just causes for going to war, and the conduct of warfare that we can justly engage in once war begins. He argues that there are three possible just causes for declaring war. First and foremost is defense of life and property, which stems from our natural right of self-defense. Second is reparation for damages inflicted by a rival country. Third is the punishment of a rival country for harm it has inflicted. Regarding just conduct in warfare, he holds to what is now called "the principle of discrimination" that wars should not be unnecessarily cruel, and the lives of innocent people should be protected. He also holds to what we now call "the principle of proportionality" that destruction in war should not extend any further than is necessary to make aggressors pay for their offence.
NATURAL LAW (from The Law of War and Peace)
Sociability and the Principles of Natural Law
Prolegomena, 6. Man is an animal indeed, but an animal of an excellent kind, differing much more from all other species of animals than they differ from each other, which appears by the evidence of many actions unique to the human species. Among these characteristics which are unique to humans, is a desire for society. That is, it is a desire for a life spent in common with fellow men, but not merely spent in any way. Rather, it is one spent in tranquilly and in a manner corresponding to the character of his intellect. This desire the Stoics called "sociability", the domestic instinct, or feeling of kindred. Accordingly, we cannot accept the assertion that, by nature, every animal is impelled only to seek its own advantage or good, if it is stated so generally as to include humans.
7. Indeed even in other animals, as well as in humans, their desire of their own individual good is moderated by a consideration partly for their offspring, partly for others of their own species. Even in animals we see that this desire proceeds from some external intelligent principle. But with other acts that are no more difficult than those [directed towards their offspring and species], we do not see an equal degree of intelligence. The same is to be said of infants in which, prior to any education, we see a certain disposition to do good to others. This is just as Plutarch wisely remarked: "as, for example, compassion spontaneously breaks out at that age." A grown man has knowledge which enables him to act similarly in similar cases, and along with that, a unique and admirable desire for society. He also has language, an instrument of this desire, which is given to him alone among the animals. From this it is reasonable to assume that humans have a faculty of knowing and acting according to general principles. The tendencies that correspond with this faculty do not belong to all animals, but are unique attributes of human nature.
8. This tendency to the preservation of society (which we have now roughly expressed) agrees with the nature of human intellect and is the source of law, properly so called. To this law belongs the rules of abstaining from that which belongs to other persons; restoring anything we have in our possession that belongs to another, or of any gain which we have made from it; fulfilling of promises; repairing any damage done by our fault; and recognizing that certain things deserve punishment among men. . . .
God and Natural Law
Prolegomena, 11. What we have said would still have great weight, even if we were to grant what we cannot grant without wickedness, namely, that there is no God, or that he has no concern for human affairs. We are, though, assured of the contrary of this . . . .
12. Here we are lead to another origin of law, besides its natural source, namely, the free will of God, to which, as our reason irresistibly tells us, we are bound to submit ourselves. But even that natural law of which we have spoken (whether it is that which binds together communities, or that looser kind [which requires duties]) although it proceeds from the internal principles of man, may yet be rightly ascribed to God. This is because it was by his will that such principles came to exist in us. In this sense, Chrysippus and the Stoics said that the origin of law or natural law was not to be found in any other place than in Jove himself, and it may be conjectured that the Latins took the word "jus" [i.e., "law"] from the name Jove.
13. To this we must add that these principles God has made plainer by the [divine] laws which he has given, so that they may be understood by those whose minds have a weaker power of drawing inferences. He has prohibited the perverse deviations of our affections which draw us this way and that, contrary to our own interest and the good of others, thereby putting a bridle upon our more violent passions, controlling and restraining them within due limits.
Natural Law and Reason
Book 1.1.10. Natural law is the dictate of right reason, and it shows the moral impermissibility, or moral necessity, of any act from its agreement or disagreement with a rational nature. Consequently, such an act is either forbidden or commanded by God, the author of nature. The actions upon which such a dictate is given, are either binding or unlawful in themselves, and therefore necessarily understood to be commanded or forbidden by God. This mark distinguishes natural law not only from human law, but also from what some call the voluntary natural law, which God himself has been pleased to reveal. These latter laws do not command or forbid things in themselves as either binding or unlawful, but make them unlawful by its prohibition, and binding by its command. . . .
We must further remark that natural law relates not only to those things that exist independent of the human will, but to many things which necessarily follow the exercise of that will. Thus property, as now in use, was at first a creature of the human will. But, after it was established, one man was prohibited by the law of nature from seizing the property of another against his will. . . .
Now, the law of nature is so unalterable, that it cannot be changed even by God himself. For although the power of God is infinite, yet there are some things to which it does not extend. This is because the things so expressed would have no true meaning, but imply a contradiction. Thus two and two must make four, nor is it possible to be otherwise; nor, again, can what is really evil not be evil. . . .
Natural Law Unique to Humans
1.1.11. The distinction found in the books of the Roman Law assigns one unchangeable law to animals in common with man, which in a more limited sense they call the "law of nature" [i.e., instinctive natural law], and they designate another to humans, which they frequently call the "law of nations" [i.e., rational natural law]. However, this [first type of natural law to animals] is hardly of any real use. For no beings, except those that can form general rules, are capable of possessing a law. Hesiod has made this clear stating "that the Supreme Being has appointed laws for men, but permitted wild animals, fishes, and birds to devour each other for food." For they have nothing like justice, the best gift, given to men. Cicero, in his first book of Offices, says that we do not talk about the justice of horses or lions. Similarly, Plutarch observes in The Life of Cato the Elder that we are formed by nature to use law and justice towards men only. In addition to the above, Lactantius may be cited who, in his fifth book, says that in all animals that lack reason we see a natural bias of self-love. For they hurt others to benefit themselves, and they do so because they do not know the evil of doing willful harm. But it is not so with man, who, possessing the knowledge of good and evil, refrains from doing harm to others, even when it involves an inconvenience to himself. Polybius, relating the manner in which men first entered into society, concludes that the injuries done to parents or benefactors inevitably provoke the indignation of mankind. As an additional reason he states that since understanding and reflection form the major difference between men and other animals, thus it is evident men cannot go beyond the bounds of that difference like other animals, without arousing universal abhorrence of their conduct. But if ever justice is attributed to brutes, it is done improperly, from some shadow and trace of reason they may possess. But it is not essential to the nature of law, whether the actions appointed by the law of nature, such as the care of our offspring, are common to us with other animals or not, or, like the worship of God, are unique to man.
JUST CAUSES FOR WAR
Self-Preservation and War as Rights of Nature
1.2.1. After examining the sources of right, the first and most general question that occurs, is whether any war is just, or if it is ever lawful to make war. But this question like many others that follow, must in the first place be compared with the rights of nature. In the third book of his Ends of Good and Evil (and in other parts of his works), Cicero proves with great skill from the writings of the Stoics, that there are certain first principles of nature, called by the Greeks the first natural impressions, which are succeeded by other principles of obligation superior even to the first impressions themselves. Cicero calls a principle of nature that care which every animal, from the moment of its birth, feels for itself and the preservation of its condition, its abhorrence of destruction, and of everything that threatens death. Hence, he says, it happens, that if left to his own choice, every man would prefer a sound and perfect to a mutilated and deformed body. So Thus, is the first duty is this preserving of ourselves in a natural state, and holding to everything conformable, and averting everything repugnant to nature.
But from the knowledge of these principles, a notion arises of their being agreeable to reason, that part of a man which is superior to the body. Now that agreement with reason, which is the basis of propriety, should have more weight than the impulse of appetite; because the principles of nature recommend right reason as a rule that ought to be of higher value than bare instinct. As the truth of this is easily assented to by all men of sound judgment without any other demonstration, it follows that, in inquiring into the laws of nature, the first object of consideration is, what is agreeable to those principles of nature, and then we come to the rules, which, though arising only out of the former, are of higher dignity, and not only to be embraced, when offered, but pursued by all the means in our power. . . .
The general object of divine and human laws is to give the authority of obligation to what was only praiseworthy in itself. It has been said above that an investigation of the laws of nature implies an inquiry into whether any particular action may be done without injustice. Now by an act of injustice is understood that, which necessarily has in it anything repugnant to the nature of a reasonable and social being. So far from anything in the principles of nature being repugnant to war, every part of them indeed rather favors it. It is most suitable to those principles of nature to preserve our lives and persons, which is the end of war, and the possess or acquire things that are necessary and useful to life. If necessary, it is no way inconsistent with the principles of nature to use force for those occasions, since all animals are endowed with natural strength, sufficient to assist and defend themselves.
Public and Private wars
1.3.1. The first and most necessary divisions of war are into one kind called private, another public, and another mixed. Now public war is carried on by the person holding the sovereign power. Private war is that which is carried on by private persons without authority from the state. A mixed war is that which is carried on, on one side by public authority, and on the other by private persons. But since private war is the oldest type, it is the first subject for inquiry. . . .
2.1.2. The justifiable causes generally assigned for war are three: defense, reparation, and punishment. All of these are comprised in the declaration of Camillus against the Gauls, which lists all things for which it is right to defend, to recover, and the encroachment on which it is right to punish. . . .
Defense of Life and Property
2.1.3. It has already been proved that when our lives are threatened with immediate danger, it is lawful to kill the aggressor, if the danger cannot otherwise be avoided; it is a situation, as it has been shown, upon which the justice of private war rests. We must observe that this kind of defense derives its origin from the principle of self-preservation, which nature has given to every living creature, and not from the injustice or misconduct of the aggressor. Accordingly, though he may be free from guilt, as for instance a soldier in actual service, mistaking my person for that of another, or a madman in his frenzy, or a man walking in his sleep, none of these cases deprive me of the right of self-defense against those persons. For I am not bound to submit to the danger or harm intended, any more than to expose myself to the attacks of a wild animal.
2.1.4. It is doubtful whether those who unintentionally obstruct our defense or escape, which are necessary to our preservation, may be lawfully maimed or killed. There are some, even Theologians, who think they may. Certainly if we look to the law of nature alone, according to its principles, our own preservation should have much more weight with us, than the welfare of society. But the law of charity, especially the evangelical law, which puts our neighbor upon a level with ourselves, does not permit it.
Thomas Aquinas, if properly understood, has justly observed that in actual self-defense no man can be said to be purposely killed. Indeed, it may sometimes happen that there is no other way for a person to save himself, than by intentionally doing an act, by which the death of an aggressor must inevitably ensue. Yet here the death of anyone was not the primary object intended, but employed as the only means of security, which the moment supplied. Still, it is better for the party assaulted, if he can safely do it, to repel or disable the aggressor than to shed his blood.
2.1.5. The danger must be immediate, which is one necessary point. Though it must be confessed, that when an assailant seizes any weapon with an apparent intention to kill me, I have a right to anticipate and prevent the danger. For in the moral as well as the natural system of things, there is no point without some leeway. But they are themselves much mistaken, and mislead others, who maintain that any degree of fear ought to be a ground for killing another, to prevent his supposed intention. It is a very just observation made by Cicero in his first book of Offices, that many wrongs proceed from fear; as when the person, who intends to hurt another, perceives some danger to himself unless he took that method. Clearchus, in Xenophon, says, I have known some men, who partly through misrepresentation, and partly through suspicion, dreading each other, in order to prevent the supposed intentions of their adversaries, have committed the most enormous cruelties against those who neither designed, nor wished them any harm....
2.1.11. The next object to be considered relates to damage affecting our property. In strict justice, it cannot be denied that we have a right to kill a robber, if such a step is inevitably necessary to the preservation of our property. For the difference between the value of life and property is overbalanced by the horror which a robber excites, and by the favorable inclination felt by all men towards the injured and innocent. From this it follows that, regarding that right alone, a robber may be wounded or killed in his flight with the property, if it cannot otherwise be recovered. Demosthenes in his speech against Aristocrates, exclaims, "By all that is sacred, is it not a dreadful and open violation of law, not only of written law, but of that law which is the unwritten rule of all men, to be debarred from the right of using force against the robber as well as against the enemy; who is plundering your property?" Nor is it forbidden by the precepts of charity, apart from all consideration of divine and human law, unless where the property is of little value, and beneath notice; an exception, which some writers have very properly added. ...
2.1.16. What has been already said of the right of defending our persons and property, though regarding chiefly private war, may nevertheless be applied to public hostilities, allowing for the difference of circumstances. For private war may be considered as an instantaneous exercise of natural right, which ceases the moment that legal redress can be obtained. Now as public war can never take place, but where judicial remedies cease to exist, it is often lengthened, and the spirit of hostility inflamed by the continued increase of losses and injuries. Besides, private war extends only to self-defense, whereas sovereign powers have a right not only to prevent, but to punish wrongs. From this they are authorized to prevent a remote as well as an immediate aggression. Though the suspicion of hostile intentions, on the part of another power, may not justify the start of actual war, yet it calls for measures of armed prevention, and will authorize indirect hostility. ...
Reparation for Damages
2.17.1. The next point to which we proceed is an inquiry into the rights resulting to us from injuries that we receive. Here the name of crime or misdemeanor is applied to every act of commission or neglect contrary to the duties required of all men, either from their common nature or particular calling. For such offences naturally create an obligation to repair the loss or injury that has been sustained. . . .
2.17.4. The loss or reduction of anyone's possessions is not confined to injuries done to the substance alone of the property, but includes everything affecting the production of it, whether it has been gathered or not. If the owner himself had produced it, the necessary expense of production, or of improving the property to raise a product, must also be taken into the account of his loss, and form part of the damages. For it is an established principle that no one ought to derive benefit from the loss of another.
2.17.5. Damages are also to be calculated, not according to any actual gain, but according to the reasonable expectation of it. In the case of a growing crop, this may be judged by the general abundance or scarcity of that particular season. . . .
2.17.19. But to connect the preceding cases and arguments with public and national concerns, an observation is necessary to observe. It is a principle introduced and established by the consent of all nations that only those wars that are declared and conducted by the authority of the sovereign power on both sides are entitled to the name of "just wars". The enemy has no right to demand restitution for what the prosecution of such wars has reduced him to abandon through fear. It is upon this principle we accept the distinction which Cicero has made between an enemy, towards whom the consent and law of nations oblige us to observe many common rights, and between robbers and pirates. For anything given up to pirates or robbers through fear is no lawful prize, but, instead, it may be recovered, unless a solemn oath of renunciation has been taken. This is not the case with the things seized in just war. . . .
2.17.20. Sovereign Princes and States are answerable for their neglect, if they fail to use all the proper means within their power for suppressing piracy and robbery. For this reason, the Scyrians were formerly condemned by the Amphictyonic council.
Punishment
2.20.38. It has been shown before, and it is a truth founded upon historical fact, that wars are undertaken as acts of punishment. This motive, added to that of redress for injuries, is the source from which the duties of nations arise relating to war. But it is not every injury that can be translated into a just ground of war. For laws, whose vengeance is meant to protect the innocent and to fall upon the guilty, do not regard every case as a sufficient warrant for their exertion. Thus, that there is much truth in the opinion of Sopater, who says that there are trivial and common offences, which it is better to pass over unnoticed than to punish.
2.20.39. In his speech in defense of the Rhodians, Cato laid down the principle that it is not right that anyone should be punished upon the mere suspicion of his having intended to commit aggression or injury. This was well applied in that situation, since no clear order of the people of Rhodes could be alleged against them, nor was there any other proof beyond the conjecture of their wavering in their policy. But this principle is not universally true.
For where intention has proceeded to any outward and visible signs of insatiable ambition and injustice, it is deemed a proper object of resentment, and even of punishment. Upon this principle, the Romans (as may be seen from Livy's account) . . . thought themselves justified in declaring war against Perseus, King of Macedon, unless he gave satisfactory proof, that he had no hostile intentions against them, in the naval and military armaments, which he was preparing. We are informed by the same historians, that the Rhodians urged it as a rule established by the laws and customs of all civilized states; that if anyone wished the destruction of an enemy, he could not punish him with death, unless he had actually done something to deserve it.
Unjust Wars
2.37.2. There are some who have neither apparent reasons, nor just causes to justify their hostilities, in which, as Tacitus says, they engage from the pure love of enterprise and danger. Aristotle gives this disposition the name of ferocity, and in the last book of his Nicomachaean Ethics, he calls it a horrible cruelty to convert friends into enemies, whom you may slaughter.
2.37.3. Most powers, when engaging in war, desire to color over their real motives with justifiable pretexts. Yet some, totally disregarding such methods of excuse, seem able to give no better reason for their conduct than the story told by the Roman Lawyers. A robber was asked what right he had to a thing that he had seized; he replied that it was his own because he had taken it into his possession. Aristotle in the third book of his Rhetoric, speaking of the promoters of war, asks, if it is not unjust for a neighboring people to be enslaved, and if those promoters have no regard to the rights of unoffending nations? Cicero, in the first book of his Offices, speaks in the same strain, and calls "the courage, which is conspicuous in danger and enterprise, if devoid of justice, absolutely undeserving of the name of valor. It should rather be considered as a brutal fierceness outraging every principle of humanity."
2.22.4. Others make use of pretexts, which though plausible at first sight, will not bear the examination and test of moral rightness, and, when stripped of their disguise, such pretexts will be found filled with injustice. In such hostilities, says Livy, it is not a trial of right, but some object of secret and incontrollable ambition, which acts as the chief motivation. Plutarch said that most powers use the relative situations of peace and war as a currency to purchase whatever they deem useful.
By having before examined and established the principles of just and necessary war, we may form a better idea of what constitutes the injustice of war. As the nature of things is best seen by contrast, and we judge what is crooked by comparing it with what is straight. But for the sake of clarity, it will be necessary to consider main points.
It was shown above that fear of a neighboring power is not a sufficient ground for war. For, to authorize hostilities as a defensive measure, they must arise from the necessity which just fear creates. This involves fear not only of the power, but of the intentions of a formidable state, and a fear that amounts to a moral certainty. For this reason, we cannot approve of those who say that there are just grounds for war when a neighboring country constructs fortifications which may at some future time prove a means of trouble, while, at the same time, there is no existing treaty to prohibit such constructions, or their securing of a strong hold. . . .
JUST CONDUCT IN WAR
The Just Means and Ends of War
3.1.1. In the preceding books we considered by what persons, and for what causes, war may be justly declared and undertaken. This subject necessarily leads to an inquiry into the circumstances under which war may be undertaken, into the extent, to which it may be carried, and into the manner in which its rights may be enforced. Now all these matters may be viewed in the light of privileges resulting simply from the law of nature and of nations, or as the effects of some prior treaty or promise. But the actions which are authorized by the law of nature are those that first require attention.
3.1.2. In the first place, as it has occasionally been observed, the means employed in the pursuit of any object must, in a great degree, derive the complexion of their moral character from the nature of the end to which they lead. It is evident therefore that we may justly use those means, provided they be lawful, which are necessary to the attainment of any right. Right in this place means what is strictly so called, signifying the moral power of action, which anyone as a member of society possesses. On this account, a person, if he has no other means of saving his life, is justified in using any forcible means of repelling an attack, though he who makes it, as for instance, a soldier in battle, in doing so, is guilty of no crime. For this is a right resulting not properly from the crime of another, but from the privilege of self-defense, which nature grants to everyone. Besides, if anyone has sure and undoubted grounds to apprehend imminent danger from anything belonging to another, he may seize it without any regard to the guilt or innocence of that owner. Yet he does not by that seizure become the proprietor of it. For that is not necessary to the end he has in view. He may detain it as a precautionary measure, until he can obtain satisfactory assurance of security.
Discrimination
3.11.1. Cicero, in the first book of his Offices, has accurately observed, that "some duties are to be observed even towards those, from whom you have received an injury. For even vengeance and punishment have their due bounds." And at the same time he praises those ancient periods in the Roman government when the events of war were mild, and marked with no unnecessary cruelty. . . .
3.11.8. Though there may be circumstances in which absolute justice will not condemn the sacrifice of lives in war, yet humanity will require that the greatest precaution should be used against involving the innocent in danger, except in cases of extreme urgency and utility.
3.11.9. After establishing these general principles, it will not be difficult to decide upon particular cases. Seneca says that "in the calamities of war children are exempted and spared, on the score of their age, and women from respect to their sex." In the wars of the Hebrews, even after the offers of peace have been rejected, God commands the women and children to be spared. . . .
3.11.10. The same rule may also be laid down with respect to males, whose ways of life are entirely removed from the use of arms. In the first class of this description may be placed the ministers of religion, who, among all nations, from times of the most remote antiquity have been exempted from bearing arms. . . . In addition to these, there are those who devote their labor to honorable literary studies that are useful to mankind.
3.11.11. The catalogue of those exempt also includes farmers. Diodorus praises those of India, who, in all their wars with each other, refrained from destroying or even hurting those employed in agriculture, as being the common benefactors of all. Plutarch relates the same of the ancient Corinthians and Megarensians, and Cyrus sent a message to the king of Assyria to inform him that he was willing to avoid molesting all who were employed in tilling the ground.
3.11.12. To the above catalogue of those exempted from sharing in the calamities of war, may be added merchants, not only those residing for a time in the enemy's country, but even his natural-born, and regular subjects. Artisans too, and all others are included, whose subsistence depends upon cultivating the arts of peace.
3.11.13. More civilized manners have abolished the barbarous practice of putting prisoners to death. For the same reason, one should not reject the surrender of those who do so for the preservation of their lives, either in battle or in a siege.
Proportionality
3.12.1. One of the three following cases is required to justify anyone in destroying what belongs to another. (1) There must be either such a necessity, where an exemption is formed as must be supposed upon the original institution of property. For example, someone throw the sword of another into a river to prevent a madman from using it to his destruction. Still, he will be required to repair the loss, according to the true principles maintained in a former part of this work. (2) Or there must be some debt arising from the non-performance of an engagement, where the thing destroyed is considered as a repayment for that debt. (3) Or there must have been some aggressions for which such destruction does not go beyond the punishment deserved.
Now, if someone drives off some of our cattle, or burns a few of our houses, this can never be appealed to as a sufficient and justifiable motive for destroying the entirety of an enemy's kingdom. Polybius saw this in its proper light, observing, that vengeance in war should not be carried to its extreme, nor extend any further than was necessary to make an aggressor justly make amends for his offence. It is upon these motives, and within these limits alone, that punishment can be inflicted. It is foolish, and even worse than foolish, to needlessly hurt another, except where prompted to it by motives of great utility.
But upon properly and impartially weighing the matter, such acts are more often regarded in a detestable light, rather than considered as the dictates of careful and necessary guidance. For the most urgent and justifiable motives are seldom of long continuation, and are often succeeded by weightier motives of a more humane type.
Source: Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace (1625), translated by William Whewell (Prolegomena) and Archibald C. Campbell (Books 1-3).
STUDY QUESTIONS
Please answer all of the following questions.
[Machiavelli]
1 In the section on "forms of government" from Machiavelli's Discourses, explain the cycle of tyranny with monarchies, aristocracies and democracies.
2. In the section on "religion and government" from Machiavelli's Discourses, what are the two ways that the Catholic Church has made Italy disunified?
3. In the section on "religion and government" from Machiavelli's Discourses, describe the features of Roman religion and Christian religion that make governments either more prone or less prone to liberty.
4. In the section on "qualities of praise and blame" in Machiavelli's Prince, what are the alleged qualities of a good monarch, and what are the vices that will actually allow him to survive?
5. In the section on "generosity and stinginess" in Machiavelli's Prince, why is it better to be stingy than generous, and what is his response to the criticism that Caesar obtained his empire through generosity?
6. In the section on "severity and mercy" in Machiavelli's Prince, how does he answer the question about whether it is better to be loved of feared, and what is his reasoning?
7. In the section on "honesty vs. deception" in Machiavelli's Prince, he argues that rulers should be like both the fox and the lion. In which ways should the ruler emulate these two animals?
8. In the section on "the appearance of virtue" in Machiavelli's Prince, what are the five virtues that rulers should at least appear to have, and why is being religious and easy one to fake?
9. In the section on "being hated and overthrown" in Machiavelli's Prince, how should a ruler avoid each of these?
[Brutus]
10. According to Brutus in the section "officers of the king vs. officers of the kingdom," what is the difference between these two classes of officers?
11. According to Brutus in the section "why were kings first established," what is the origin of kings?
12. According to Brutus in the section "two contracts with the king," what are the terms of the two contracts?
13. According to Brutus in the section "two types of tyrants," what are the two kings of tyrants, and what is the difference between them?
14. According to Brutus in the section "identifying a tyrant," what are the marks of a genuine tyrant, as opposed to a mere weak king?
[Grotius]
15. According to Grotius, what is the highest principle of natural law and the five more specific ones?
16. In the section on defense of life and property, why, according to Grotius, is killing in self-defense not done on purpose?
17. In the same section, what does Grotius say about attacking a country out of fear?
18. In the section on unjust wars, what does Grotius say about pretexts that countries commonly offer for going to war?
19. According to Grotius in the section on discrimination, which types of people should be protected during wars?
20. According to Grotius in the section on proportionality, what are the only three justifications for destroying property in war?
21. Short essay: please select one of the following and answer it in a minimum of 100 words.
[Machiavelli]
a. Plato argued that the perfect ruler is a philosopher who understands universal truths, particularly justice. Machiavelli, by contrast, is not concerned with moral issues like true justice, but rather with what is necessary for a ruler to survive. Which of these two views is preferable and why?
b. Machiavelli argues that generosity will lead to a ruler's ruin, and stinginess preferable. Is he right? Examine his arguments and explain.
c. Machiavelli argues that it is better for a ruler to be feared than loved, as long as he isn't hated. What is his reasoning for this and what, if anything, is wrong with his position?
d. Machiavelli argues that it is important for leaders to appear to be religious, and that religious belief is easy to fake. Analyze his reasoning and explain whether you agree.
[Brutus]
e. Brutus argues that the people establish the king through a type of election or vote. Explain the author's point, and discuss whether this is a realistic or accurate account of a king's authority.
f. A central line of argument in Brutus's work is that the king (and other government officials) are servants of the people. Explain Brutus's reasoning and discuss whether this is a realistic way of looking at governmental authority.
g. A second major line of argument in Brutus's is that the people have a contract with the king, and if the king violates the contract he can be overthrown. Explain Brutus's reasoning and discuss whether the notion of such a contract is an accurate or effective means of establishing governmental authority.
h. Brutus contrasts kings that are merely weak with kings that are genuine tyrants. Describe the distinction between the two and evaluate what the central difference is.
i. A common contemporary criticism of Brutus's view of revolution is that it does not go far enough. That is, according to Brutus, the people can revolt only under the guidance of government officials who are defending justice. But the people also need the ability to revolt without the guidance of other government officials. Is this a valid criticism? Explain.
[Grotius]
j. Grotius argues that even if God didn't exist, natural law would still be valid, and, assuming that God exists, God himself cannot change natural law. Explain his point and whether you agree.
k. Grotius grounds the justification of public war upon the natural rights that we have to declare private war. Do these two types of war sufficiently parallel each other as he implies, or are they instead distinct?
l. Grotius writes that "most powers, when engaging in war, desire to color over their real motives with justifiable pretexts." Is it possible for someone to distinguish between the real motives and the justifiable pretexts?"
m. Regarding proportionality, Grotius writes "if someone drives off some of our cattle, or burns a few of our houses, this can never be appealed to as a sufficient and justifiable motive for destroying the entirety of an enemy's kingdom." What would be modern equivalents of this, and do you agree that it is unjustifiable.