HOBBES, PUFENDORF, LOCKE

From Classics in Political Philosophy, by James Fieser

Home: https://storage.googleapis.com/jfieser/410/Index.html

2008, updated 1/1/2024, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

 

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CONTENTS

Thomas Hobbes: The State of Nature and Social Contract (from Leviathan)

Samuel Pufendorf: Natural Law and Society (from The Duty of Man and Citizen)

John Locke: Natural Rights (from Two Treatises of Government)

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THOMAS HOBBES: THE STATE OF NATURE AND SOCIAL CONTRACT

 

Born in Wiltshire, England, Thomas Hobbes (1588 1679) worked as a tutor for several distinguished British families, travelled extensively throughout Europe, and at around age 50 devoted himself to philosophy. His most famous work, The Leviathan (1651), presents the social contract theory that, to preserve our lives, we mutually agree to set aside our hostilities and live in peace. The selections below are from this work. Hobbes begins describing the natural condition of humans prior to the creation of governments. In that natural state, humans are essentially equal, both mentally and physically, and this puts everyone on the same level in the struggle to survive. There are three natural causes of quarrel among people: competition for limited supplies of material possessions, distrust of each other, and glory insofar as people remain hostile to preserve their powerful reputations. The natural condition of humans is thus a state of perpetual war of all against all, where nothing is unjust, and our lives are "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." As we all fear death and desire to live adequately, we are thus motivated to rise above this state of war and we do this through a social contract with others. Hobbes lays out the steps towards peace in a series of laws of nature. The first is that we should seek peace as the most reasonable way of preserving our lives. The second is that we should mutually set aside our hostilities towards others so that we can achieve peace more easily. I, thus, agree to give up my right to steal from you, if you give up your right to steal from me. Through this mutual divesting of our hostile rights we form a contract. The third law of nature is that we should keep contracts, and this is accomplished establishing a political authority who will punish us if we violate our contracts. Hobbes lists 10 other laws of nature which are important for preserving a peaceful society once it is established, such as showing gratitude towards others, being accommodating to the interests of others, and pardoning those who commit past offences. Hobbes stresses that people are naturally unsociable, and a sovereign power is necessary to make people follow the laws and hold to their contract with others. We thus create a commonwealth and give up our right to govern ourselves individually. Hobbes discusses reasons why ants naturally live in society whereas humans only do so through contracts. He further lists six rights that sovereign rulers have, and four reasons why monarchies are better than aristocracies or democracies.

THE NATURAL CONDITION (Leviathan, Chapter 13)

Equality of People

Nature has made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind, as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger with himself.

And as to the faculties of the mind . . . I find yet a greater equality among men than that of strength. For prudence is but experience, which equal time equally bestows on all men in those things they equally apply themselves to. That which may perhaps make such equality incredible, is but a vain conceit of one's own wisdom which almost all men think they have in a greater degree than the vulgar, that is, than all men but themselves and a few others whom by fame, or for concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is the nature of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned, yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves; for they see their own wit at hand, and other men's at a distance. But this proves rather that men are in that point equal, than unequal. For there is not ordinarily a greater sign of the equal distribution of anything, than that every man is contented with his share.

Three Causes of Quarrel

From this equality of ability arises equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies. And in the way to their end (which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their own delectation only), [they] endeavor to destroy or subdue each other. And from hence it comes to pass that where an invader has no more to fear than another man's single power, if one plants, sows, builds, or possesses a convenient seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossess and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labor, but also of his life or liberty. And the invader again is in the like danger of another.

And from this diffidence [or distrust] of each other, there is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonably as [through] anticipation. That is, by force or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long till he sees no other power great enough to endanger him. And this is no more than his own conservation requires, and is generally allowed. Also because there be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest (which they pursue farther than their security requires); if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able [for a] long time (by standing only on their defense) to subsist. And by consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men, being necessary to a man's conservation, it ought to be allowed him.

Again, men have no pleasure (but on the contrary a great deal of grief) in keeping company where there is no power able to over-awe them all. For every man looks that his companion should value him at the same rate he sets upon himself. And upon all signs of contempt or undervaluing, [he] naturally endeavors, as far as he dares . . . to extort a greater value from his condemners [or scorners] by damage, and from others by example.

So that in the nature of man, we find three principle causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence [or distrust]; thirdly, glory.

The first makes men invade for gain, the second for safety, and the third for reputation. The first uses violence to make themselves masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second to defend them; the third for trifles, [such] as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons, or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name.

State of War

Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man. For war consists not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but [also] in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known; and therefore the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of war, as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather lies not in a shower or two of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many days together; so the nature of war consists not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is peace.

Whatever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man, the same is consequent to the time wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition, there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no culture of the earth, no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building, no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.

Proof of the Natural Condition

It may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these things, that nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade and destroy each other. And he may therefore (not trusting to this inference made from the passions) desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by experience. Let him therefore consider with himself [that], when taking a journey, he arms himself and seeks to go well accompanied. When going to sleep, he locks his doors. When even in his house, he locks his chests, and this when he knows there be laws and public officers armed, to revenge all injuries [which] shall be done [to] him. [Consider] what opinion he has of his fellow subjects when he rides armed; of his fellow citizens when he locks his doors; and of his children and servants when he locks his chests. Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions as I do by my words? But neither of us accuse man's nature in it. The desires, and other passions of man, are in themselves no sin. No more are the actions, that proceed from those passions, till they know a law that forbids them; which till laws be made they cannot know, nor can any law be made till they have agreed upon the person that shall make it.

It may perhaps be thought [that] there was never such a time nor condition of war as this, and I believe it was never generally so over all the world. But there are many places where they live so now. For the savage people in many places of America (except the government of small families the harmony whereof depends on natural lust) have no government at all and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before. However, it may be perceived what manner of life there would be, where there were no common power to fear; [and] by what manner of life, which men that have formerly lived under a peaceful government, . . . [would] degenerate into in a civil war.

But though there had never been anytime wherein particular men were in a condition of war one against another; yet in all times, kings and persons of sovereign authority (because of their independence) are in continual jealousies and in the state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing and their eyes fixed on each other. That is, their forts, garrisons, and guns [are fixed] upon the frontiers of their kingdoms, and continual spies [are fixed] upon their neighbors, which is a posture of war. But because they uphold thereby the industry of their subjects, there does not follow from it that misery which accompanies the liberty of particular men.

Nothing is Unjust

To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent, that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice. Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice and injustice are none of the [instinctive] faculties, neither of the body nor mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his senses and passions. They are qualities that relate to men in society, not in solitude. It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine distinct; but only that to be every man's that he can get, and for so long as he can keep it. And thus much for the ill condition which man by mere nature is actually placed in; though with a possibility to come out of it consisting partly in the passions [and] partly in his reason.

The passions that incline men to peace are fear of death, desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living, and a hope by their industry to obtain them. And reason suggests convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles are they which otherwise are called the laws of nature, whereof I shall speak more particularly in the two following Chapters.

FIRST AND SECOND LAWS OF NATURE (Chapter 14)

First Law of Nature: Seek Peace

The right of nature, which writers commonly call jus naturale, is the liberty each man has to use his own power as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature (that is to say, of his own life, and consequently of doing anything which, in his own judgment and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto).

By liberty is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of external impediments; which impediments may often take away part of a man's power to do what he would, but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, according as his judgment and reason shall dictate to him.

A Law of Nature (lex naturalis) is a precept, or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life, or takes away the means of preserving the same; and to omit that by which he thinks it may be best preserved. For though they that speak of this subject use to confound jus, and lex, right and law; yet they ought to be distinguished. Because, right consists in the liberty to do or to forbear, whereas law determines and binds to one of them, so that law and right differ as much as obligation and liberty, which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.

And because the condition of man (as has been declared in the precedent chapter) is a condition of war of everyone against everyone, in which case everyone is governed by his own reason (and there is nothing he can make use of that may not be a help to him in preserving his life against his enemies), it follows that in such a condition, every man has a right to everything, even to each other's body. And therefore, as long as this natural right of every man to everything endures, there can be no security to any man (how strong or wise soever he be) of living out the time which nature ordinarily allows men to live. And consequently it is a precept, or general rule of reason, That every man ought to endeavor peace as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war; the first branch of which rule contains the first and fundamental Law of Nature, which is, To seek peace and follow it; the second, the sum of the right of nature, which is, By all means we can, to defend ourselves.

Second Law of Nature: Mutually Divest Hostile Rights

From this fundamental Law of Nature, by which men are commanded to endeavor peace, is derived this second Law, That a man be willing, when others are so too (as far-forth as for peace and defense of himself he shall think it necessary), to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself. For so long as every man holds this right of doing anything he likes, [then] so long are all men in the condition of war. But if other men will not lay down their right as well as he, then there is no reason for anyone to divest himself of his. For that were to expose himself to prey (which no man is bound to) rather than to dispose himself to peace. This is that law or the gospel: Whatever you require that others should do to you, that do you to them. And that law of all men: Do not do to others what you would not want done to yourself.

To lay down a man's right to anything, is to divest himself of the liberty of hindering another of the benefit of his own right to the same. For he that renounces or passes away his right, gives not to any other man a right which he had not before. Because, there is nothing to which every man had not [a] right by nature; but [a person] only stands out of his way, that he may enjoy his own original right, without hindrance from him, [though] not [necessarily] without hindrance from another [person]. So that the effect which redounds [or accumulates] to one man by another man's defect of right, is but so much diminution of impediments to the use of his own right original. . . .

We Divest ourselves of Rights Only for Some benefit, and the Right to Resist Cannot be Divested

Whensoever a man transfers his right, or renounces it; it is either in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself; or for some other good he hopes for thereby. For it is a voluntary act: and of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some good to himself. And therefore there be some rights, which no man can be understood by any words, or other signs, to have abandoned, or transferred. As first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them, that assault him by force, to take away his life; because he cannot be understood to aim thereby, at any good to himself. The same may be said of wounds, and chains, and imprisonment; both because there is no benefit consequent to such patience; as there is to the patience of suffering another to be wounded, or imprisoned: as also because a man cannot tell, when he sees men proceed against him by violence, whether they intend his death or not. And lastly the motive, and end for which this renouncing, and transferring of right is introduced, is nothing else but the security of a man's person, in his life, and in the means of so preserving life, as not to be weary of it. And therefore if a man by words, or other signs, seem to despoil himself of the end, for which those signs were intended; he is not to be understood as if he meant it, or that it was his will; but that he was ignorant of how such words and actions were to be interpreted.

OTHER LAWS OF NATURE (Chapter 15)

Third Law of Nature

From that Law of Nature, by which we are obliged to transfer to another such rights as being retained hinder the peace of mankind, there follows a third, which is this: That men perform their covenants made, without which, covenants are in vain, and but empty words. And the right of all men to all things remaining, we are still in the condition of war.

And in this Law of Nature consists the fountain and original of justice. For where no covenant has preceded, there has no right been transferred, and every man has right to everything, and consequently no action can be unjust. But when a covenant is made, then to break it is unjust. And the definition of injustice is no other than the not performance of covenant. And whatever is not unjust, is just.

Justice Depends on the Commonwealth

But because covenants of mutual trust [are invalid] where there is a fear of not performance on either part . . . , though the original of justice be the making of covenants; yet injustice actually there can be none, till the cause of such fear be taken away, which while men are in the natural condition of war, cannot be done. Therefore before the names of just and unjust can have place, there must be some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror of some punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant. And [this coercive power serves] to make good that propriety, which by mutual contract men acquire, in recompense of the universal right they abandon. And such power there is none before the erection of a commonwealth. And this is also to be gathered out of the ordinary definition of justice in the schools: for they say that Justice is the constant will of giving to every man is own. And therefore where there is no own, that is, no propriety, there is no injustice. And where there is no coercive power erected (that is, where there is no commonwealth), there nothing is unjust. So that the nature of justice consists in [the] keeping of valid covenants. But the validity of covenants begins not but with the constitution of a civil power, sufficient to compel men to keep them. And then it is also that propriety begins.

The Irrationality of Sneaky Contract Breakers: The Consequence is Too Great if Caught

The fool has said in his heart, "there is no such thing as justice... [and that] to make or not make, keep or not keep covenants [is] not against reason when it conduces to one's benefit." [The fool] does not therein deny that there are covenants, and that they are sometimes broken, [and] sometimes kept. . . . But he questions whether injustice may not sometimes stand with that reason which dictates to every man his own good. . . . This specious [i.e., misleading] reasoning is nevertheless false. . . . [H]e which declares he thinks it reason[able] to deceive those that help him, can in reason expect no other means of safety than what can be had from his own single power. He, therefore, that breaks his covenant, and consequently declares that he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received into any society that unite themselves for peace and defense, but by the error of them that receive him. Nor [can he] be retained in it when he is received, without seeing the danger of the error, which errors a person cannot reasonably reckon upon as the means of his security. And therefore if he be left or cast out of society, he perishes. And if he lives in society, it is by the errors of other people which he could not foresee, nor reckon upon, and consequently against the reason of his preservation.... Justice, therefore (that is to say keeping of covenant), is a rule of reason by which we are forbidden to do anything destructive to our life, and consequently a law of nature. . . .

Fourth Law: Gratitude

As justice depends on antecedent covenant, so does gratitude depend on antecedent grace (that is to say, antecedent free gift); and is the fourth Law of Nature, which may be conceived in this form: That a man which receives benefit from another of mere grace, endeavors that he which gives it, have no reasonable cause to repent him of his good will. For no man gives, but with intention of good to himself. Because, gift is voluntary, and of all voluntary acts, the object is to every man his own good; of which if men see they shall be frustrated, there will be no beginning of benevolence or trust; nor consequently of mutual help; nor of reconciliation of one man to another; and therefore they are to remain still in the condition of war, which is contrary to the first and fundamental Law of Nature, which commands men to seek peace. The breach of this law is called ingratitude, and has the same relation to grace that injustice has to obligation by covenant.

Fifth Law: Accommodation

A fifth Law of Nature is complaisance. That is to say, That every man strive to accommodate himself to the rest. For the understanding whereof, we may consider that there is in men's aptness to society a diversity of nature, rising from the diversity of affections, not unlike to that we see in stones brought together for [the] building of an edifice. For as that stone (which by the asperity and irregularity of figure, takes more room from others than itself fills -- and for the hardness cannot be easily made plain, and thereby hinders the building) is by the builders cast away as unprofitable and troublesome, so also a man (that by asperity of nature will strive to retain those things which to himself are superfluous, and to others necessary -- and for the stubbornness of his passions cannot be corrected) is to be left, or cast out of society as cumbersome thereunto. For seeing [that] every man, not only by right but also by necessity of nature, is supposed to endeavor all he can to obtain that which is necessary for his conservation; he that shall oppose himself against it, for things superfluous, is guilty of the war that thereupon is to follow; and therefore does that which is contrary to the fundamental Law of Nature, which commands to seek peace. The observers of this Law may be called sociable (the Latins call them commodi). The contrary, stubborn, unsociable, forward, intractable.

Sixth Law: Pardoning

A sixth Law of Nature is this, That upon caution of the future time, [i.e., if someone is conscientious about changing his future behavior] a man ought to pardon the past offences of them that repenting, deserve it. For pardon is nothing but granting of peace. [But if pardon is] . . . granted to them that persevere in their hostility, [this] be not peace, but fear; yet [if] not granted to them that give caution of the future time, is sign of an aversion to peace, and therefore contrary to the Law of Nature.

Seventh Law: Against Cruel Punishment

A seventh is, That in revenges (that is, retribution of evil for evil), men look not at the greatness of the evil past, but the greatness of the good to follow. Whereby we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other design, than for correction of the offender, or direction of others. For this Law is consequent to the next before it, that commands pardon upon the security of the future time. Besides, revenge without respect to the example and profit to come, is a triumph or glorying in the hurt of another, tending to no end (for the end is always somewhat to come). And glorying to no end is vain glory, and contrary to reason. And to hurt without reason tends to the introduction of war, which is against the Law of Nature, and is commonly styled by the name of cruelty.

Eighth Law: Against Showing Contempt

And because all signs of hatred, or contempt, provoke to fight, insomuch as most men choose rather to hazard their life, than not to be revenged, we may in the eighth place, for a Law of Nature, set down this precept, That no man by deed, word, countenance, or gesture, declare hatred or contempt of another. The breach of which Law is commonly called Contumely.

Ninth Law: Natural Equality

The question, "Who is better than man?" has no place in the condition of mere nature, where (as has been shown before) all men are equal. The inequality that now is, has been introduced by the laws civil. I know that Aristotle, in the first book of his Politics, for a foundation of his doctrine, makes men by nature some more worthy to command, meaning the wiser sort (such as he thought himself to be for his philosophy); others to serve (meaning those that had strong bodies, but were not philosophers as he); as if master and servant were not introduced by consent of men, but by difference of wit, which is not only against reason, but also against experience. For there are very few so foolish, that had not rather govern themselves, than be governed by others. Nor when the wise in their own conceit, contend by force with them who distrust their own wisdom, do they always (or often, or almost at anytime) get the victory. If nature therefore have made men equal, that equality is to be acknowledge -- or [likewise acknowledged] if nature have made men unequal. Yet because men that think themselves equal will not enter into conditions of peace, but upon equal terms, such equalities must be admitted. And therefore for the ninth Law of Nature, I put this, That every man acknowledge another for his equal by nature. The breach of this precept is pride.

Tenth Law: Against Arrogance

On this law depends another, That at the entrance into conditions of peace, no man [shall] require to reserve to himself any right, which he is not content should be reserved to every one of the rest. As it is necessary for all men that seek peace, to lay down certain rights of nature (that is to say, not to have liberty to do all they list), so is it necessary for man's life to retain some [rights], as [the] right to govern their own bodies; enjoy air, water, motion, ways to go from place to place; and all things else without which a man cannot live, or not live well. If in this case, at the making of peace, men require for themselves that which they would not have to be granted to others, they do contrary to the precedent law, that commands the acknowledgment of natural equality, and therefore also against the Law of Nature. The observers of this law are those we call modest, and the breakers arrogant men. The Greeks call the violation of this law pleonexia, that is, a desire of more than their share.

Eleventh Law: Equity and Fairness

Also if a man be trusted to judge between man and man, it is a precept of the Law of Nature, That he deal equally between them. For without that, the controversies of men cannot be determined but by war. He, therefore, that is partial in judgment, does what in him lies to deter men from the use of judges and arbitrators; and consequently (against the fundamental Law of Nature) is the cause of war.

The observance of this law, from the equal distribution to each man of that which in reason belongs to him, is called equity, and (as I have said before) distributive justice. The violation [is] acception of persons, [or in Greek] prosopolepsia.

Twelfth Law: Just Possession

And from this follows another law, That such things as cannot be divided be enjoyed in common (if it can be and if the quantity of the thing permit) without stint; otherwise proportionably to the number of them that have right. For otherwise the distribution is unequal and contrary to equity.

But some things there be, that can neither be divided nor enjoyed in common. Then, the Law of Nature which prescribes equity requires, That the entire right, or else (making the use alternate) the first possession, be determined by lot. For all equal distribution is of the Law of Nature, and other means of equal distribution cannot be imagined. . . .

Thirteenth Law: Mediation and Arbitration

It is also a Law of Nature, That all men that mediate peace, be allowed safe conduct. For the law that commands peace as the end, commands intercession as the means, and to intercession the means is safe conduct. . . .

And seeing [that] every man is presumed to do all things in order to his own benefit, no man is a fit arbitrator in his own cause. And if he were never so fit (yet equity allowing to each party equal benefit), if one be admitted to be judge, the other is to be admitted also. And so the controversy (that is, the cause of war) remains against the Law of Nature.

Other Laws

These are the Laws of Nature dictating peace, for a means of the conservation of men in multitudes, and which only concern the doctrine of civil society. There be other things tending to the destruction of particular men, as drunkenness, and all other parts of intemperance, which may therefore also be reckoned among those things which the Law of Nature has forbidden. But [these] are not necessary to be mentioned, nor are pertinent enough to this place.

And though this may seem too subtle a deduction of the Laws of Nature to be taken notice of by all men (whereof the most part are too busy in getting food, and the rest too negligent to understand), yet to leave all men inexcusable, they have been contracted into one easy sum, intelligible even to the meanest capacity. And that is, Do not [do] that to another, which you would not have done to yourself, which shows him that he has no more to do in learning the Laws of Nature, but, when weighing the actions of other men with his own ([and] they seem too heavy), [he is] to put them into the other part of the balance, and his own into their place, [so] that his own passions and self-love may add nothing to the weight. And then there is none of these Laws of Nature that will not appear to him very reasonable.

CAUSES OF THE COMMONWEALTH (Chapter 17)

Commonwealth needed for Protection

The final cause, end, or design of men (who naturally love liberty, and dominion over others) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, in which we see them live in Commonwealths, is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby. That is to say, [it is the desire] of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of war which is necessarily consequent, as has been shown, to the natural passions of men when there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants, and observation of those laws of nature set down in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters.

For the laws of nature (as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and, in sum, doing to others as we would be done to) of themselves, without the terror of some power to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like. And covenants, without the sword, are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore, notwithstanding the laws of nature (which everyone has then kept, when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely), if there be no power erected, or not great enough for our security, every man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art for caution against all other men. And in all places, where men have lived by small families, to rob and spoil each other has been a trade, and so far from being reputed against the law of nature that the greater spoils they gained, the greater was their honor. And men observed no other laws therein but the laws of honor; that is, to abstain from cruelty, leaving to men their lives and instruments of husbandry. And as small families did then, so now do cities and kingdoms, which are but greater families (for their own security), enlarge their dominions upon all pretences of danger, and fear of invasion, or assistance that may be given to invaders; endeavor as much as they can to subdue or weaken their neighbors by open force, and secret arts, for want of other caution, justly; and are remembered for it in after ages with honor. . . .

Nor is it enough for the security, which men desire should last all the time of their life, that they be governed and directed by one judgment for a limited time; as in one battle, or one war. For though they obtain a victory by their unanimous endeavor against a foreign enemy, yet afterwards, when either they have no common enemy, or he that by one part is held for an enemy is by another part held for a friend, they must needs by the difference of their interests dissolve, and fall again into a war amongst themselves.

Why People are Unsociable

It is true that certain living creatures, as bees and ants, live sociably one with another (which are therefore by Aristotle numbered amongst political creatures), and yet have no other direction than their particular judgments and appetites; nor speech, whereby one of them can signify to another what he thinks expedient for the common benefit. And therefore some man may perhaps desire to know why mankind cannot do the same. To which I answer,

First, that men are continually in competition for honor and dignity, which these creatures are not; and consequently amongst men there arises on that ground, envy, and hatred, and finally war; but amongst these not so.

Secondly, that amongst these creatures the common good differs not from the private; and being by nature inclined to their private, they procure thereby the common benefit. But man, whose joy consists in comparing himself with other men, can relish nothing but what is eminent [i.e., greater than what others have].

Thirdly, that these creatures, having not, as man, the use of reason, do not see, nor think they see, any fault in the administration of their common business: whereas amongst men there are very many that think themselves wiser and abler to govern the public better than the rest, and these strive to reform and innovate, one this way, another that way; and thereby bring it into distraction and civil war.

Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice in making known to each other their desires and other affections, yet they want [i.e., lack] that art of words by which some men can represent to others that which is good in the likeness of evil; and evil, in the likeness of good; and augment or diminish the apparent greatness of good and evil, discontenting men and troubling their peace at their pleasure.

Fifthly, irrational creatures cannot distinguish between injury and damage; and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not offended with their fellows: whereas man is then most troublesome when he is most at ease; for then it is that he loves to show his wisdom, and control the actions of them that govern the Commonwealth.

Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is natural; that of men is by covenant only, which is artificial: and therefore it is no wonder if there be somewhat else required, besides covenant, to make their agreement constant and lasting; which is a common power to keep them in awe and to direct their actions to the common benefit.

Creating a Commonwealth

The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of each other, and thereby to secure them in such sort as that by their own industry and by the fruits of the earth they may nourish themselves and live contentedly, is to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will. Which is as much as to say, to appoint one man, or assembly of men, to bear their person; and everyone to own and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so bears their person shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern the common peace and safety; and therein to submit their wills, everyone to his will, and their judgments to his judgment. This is more than consent, or concord. It is a real unity of them all in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner as if every man should say to every man: I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition; that thou give up, thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner. This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a commonwealth; in Latin, civitas. This is the generation of that great Leviathan, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that mortal god to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and defense. For by this authority, given him by every particular man in the Commonwealth, he has the use of so much power and strength conferred on him that, by terror thereof, he is enabled to form the wills of them all, to peace at home, and mutual aid against their enemies abroad. And in him consists the essence of the Commonwealth, which, to define it, is: one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves everyone the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all as he shall think expedient for their peace and common defense.

And he that carries this person is called sovereign, and said to have sovereign power; and everyone besides, his subject.

THE SOVEREIGN

Rights of the Sovereign (Chapter 18)

A commonwealth is said to be instituted when a multitude of men do agree, and covenant, every one with every one, that to whatsoever man, or assembly of men, shall be given by the major part the right to present the person of them all, that is to say, to be their representative; every one, as well he that voted for it as he that voted against it, shall authorize all the actions and judgements of that man, or assembly of men, in the same manner as if they were his own, to the end to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men.

From this institution of a Commonwealth are derived all the rights and faculties of him, or them, on whom the sovereign power is conferred by the consent of the people assembled.

First, because they covenant, it is to be understood they are not obliged by former covenant to anything repugnant hereunto. And consequently they that have already instituted a Commonwealth, being thereby bound by covenant to own the actions and judgements of one, cannot lawfully make a new covenant amongst themselves to be obedient to any other, in anything whatsoever, without his permission. And therefore, they that are subjects to a monarch cannot without his leave cast off monarchy and return to the confusion of a disunited multitude; nor transfer their person from him that bears it to another man, other assembly of men. . . . [i.e., subjects owe sole loyalty to the monarch.]

Secondly, because the right of bearing the person of them all is given to him they make sovereign, by covenant only of one to another, and not of him to any of them, there can happen no breach of covenant on the part of the sovereign; and consequently none of his subjects, by any pretense of forfeiture, can be freed from his subjection. . . . [i.e., subjects cannot be freed from their obligation to the sovereign.]

Thirdly, because the major part has by consenting voices declared a sovereign, he that dissented must now consent with the rest; that is, be contented to avow all the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by the rest. For if he voluntarily entered into the congregation of them that were assembled, he sufficiently declared thereby his will, and therefore tacitly covenanted, to stand to what the major part should ordain: and therefore if he refuse to stand thereto, or make protestation against any of their decrees, he does contrary to his covenant, and therefore unjustly. And whether he be of the congregation or not, and whether his consent be asked or not, he must either submit to their decrees or be left in the condition of war he was in before; wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever. [i.e., dissenters must consent with the majority in declaring a sovereign.]

Fourthly, because every subject is by this institution author of all the actions and judgements of the sovereign instituted, it follows that whatsoever he doth, can be no injury to any of his subjects; nor ought he to be by any of them accused of injustice. For he that doth anything by authority from another doth therein no injury to him by whose authority he acts: but by this institution of a Commonwealth every particular man is author of all the sovereign doth; and consequently he that complains of injury from his sovereign complains of that whereof he himself is author, and therefore ought not to accuse any man but himself; no, nor himself of injury, because to do injury to oneself is impossible. It is true that they that have sovereign power may commit iniquity, but not injustice or injury in the proper signification. [i.e., the sovereign cannot be unjust or injure any subject.]

Fifthly, and consequently to that which was said last, no man that has sovereign power can justly be put to death, or otherwise in any manner by his subjects punished. For seeing every subject is author of the actions of his sovereign, he punishes another for the actions committed by himself. . . . [i.e., the sovereign cannot be put to death.]

Sixthly, it is annexed to the sovereignty to be judge of what opinions and doctrines are averse, and what conducing to peace; and consequently, on what occasions, how far, and what men are to be trusted withal in speaking to multitudes of people; and who shall examine the doctrines of all books before they be published. For the actions of men proceed from their opinions, and in the well governing of opinions consists the well governing of men's actions in order to their peace and concord. And though in matter of doctrine nothing to be regarded but the truth, yet this is not repugnant to regulating of the same by peace. [i.e., the sovereign can censor opinions that threaten peace.]

Benefits of Monarchy over Other Forms of Government (Chapter 19)

The difference of Commonwealths consists in the difference of the sovereign, or the person representative of all and every one of the multitude. And because the sovereignty is either in one man, or in an assembly of more than one; and into that assembly either every man has right to enter, or not everyone, but certain men distinguished from the rest; it is manifest there can be but three kinds of Commonwealth. For the representative must needs be one man, or more; and if more, then it is the assembly of all, or but of a part. When the representative is one man, then is the Commonwealth a monarchy; when an assembly of all that will come together, then it is a democracy, or popular Commonwealth; when an assembly of a part only, then it is called an aristocracy. Other kind of Commonwealth there can be none: for either one, or more, or all, must have the sovereign power (which I have shown to be indivisible) entire.

There be other names of government in the histories and books of policy; as tyranny and oligarchy; but they are not the names of other forms of government, but of the same forms misliked. For they that are discontented under monarchy call it tyranny; and they that are displeased with aristocracy call it oligarchy: so also, they which find themselves grieved under a democracy call it anarchy, which signifies want of government; and yet I think no man believes that want of government is any new kind of government: nor by the same reason ought they to believe that the government is of one kind when they like it, and another when they mislike it or are oppressed by the governors. . . .

The difference between these three kinds of Commonwealth consists, not in the difference of power, but in the difference of convenience or aptitude to produce the peace and security of the people; for which end they were instituted. And to compare monarchy with the other two, we may observe:

First . . . where the public and private interest are most closely united, there is the public most advanced. Now in monarchy the private interest is the same with the public. The riches, power, and honor of a monarch arise only from the riches, strength, and reputation of his subjects. For no king can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure, whose subjects are either poor, or contemptible, or too weak through want, or dissension, to maintain a war against their enemies; whereas in a democracy, or aristocracy, the public prosperity confers not so much to the private fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth many times a perfidious advice, a treacherous action, or a civil war.

Secondly, that a monarch receives counsel of whom, when, and where he pleases; and consequently may hear the opinion of men versed in the matter about which he deliberates, of what rank or quality soever, and as long before the time of action and with as much secrecy as he will. But when a sovereign assembly has need of counsel, none are admitted but such as have a right thereto from the beginning; which for the most part are of those who have been versed more in the acquisition of wealth than of knowledge, and are to give their advice in long discourses which may, and do commonly, excite men to action, but not govern them in it. For the understanding is by the flame of the passions never enlightened, but dazzled: nor is there any place or time wherein an assembly can receive counsel secrecy, because of their own multitude.

Thirdly, that the resolutions of a monarch are subject to no other inconstancy than that of human nature; but in assemblies, besides that of nature, there arises an inconstancy from the number. For the absence of a few that would have the resolution, once taken, continue firm (which may happen by security, negligence, or private impediments), or the diligent appearance of a few of the contrary opinion, undoes today all that was concluded yesterday.

Fourthly, that a monarch cannot disagree with himself, out of envy or interest; but an assembly may; and that to such a height as may produce a civil war.

Source: Adapted from Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651), Chapters 13-15, 17-19. Spelling and punctuation have been modernized,

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SAMUEL PUFENDORF: NATURAL LAW AND SOCIETY

Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694) was born into a Lutheran family in Dorfchemnitz, Germany. He was a jurist, statesman, historian and professor. He was imprisoned for eight months during a war and, without access to any books, he composed his first work by recalling key themes in the writings of Grotius and Hobbes. Pufendorf's most important work in political philosophy is Of the Law of Nature and Nations (1672). The next year he published a shorter and less technical version of this titled The Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law (1673), from which the selections below are taken. Pufendorf's theory draws both on Grotius's views of natural law and Hobbes's theory of the state of nature and the social contract. According to Pufendorf, natural laws are fixed rules of moral and social conduct that God has created and imbedded in human nature through our instinctive drive for self-preservation. As isolated individuals, we would scarcely survive in the wild, and our survival depends entirely on living in a society with others. Thus, the main principle of natural law is the mandate to be sociable: "Every person ought to preserve and promote society, that is, the welfare of humankind." From this main principle three sets of moral duties arise: duties to God, to oneself, and to others. Despite our instinctive knowledge of natural law and its duties to others, many of us will still harm others. Thus, we protect ourselves by forming communities that are large enough to overpower those who might attack us. But human nature is inconsistent, and people won't always agree on the best plan to achieve public safety. To force the issue, we create governments that unify our separate wills. In the process of creating our society and government, we form two covenants and a constitution. The first covenant is for people to come together and form society. The constitution establishes the form of government that we will follow. The second covenant obligates the ruler to secure public safety, and the people to obey the ruler. Ultimately, formation of a government is willed by God since it is the principal mechanism for having us follow the mandate of natural law to be sociable. Once a functioning government is established, it is helpful to form alliances with neighboring countries.

NEED FOR SOCIETY (from The Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law)

Types of Law

1.2. With respect to their authors, laws are distinguished into divine and human; the first proceeds from God, and the second from people. But if laws are considered as they have a necessary and universal harmony with humankind, they are then distinguished into natural and positive. The former is that which is so conducive with human rational or social nature that honest and peaceful society could not be kept up among humankind without it. Hence it is that this may be sought out and the knowledge of it acquired by the light of that reason which is born with every person and by the consideration of human nature in general. The latter is that which does not take its rise from the common condition of human nature, but only from the good pleasure of the legislator. This ought not to be without its reason, but should carry with it advantage to those people or that society for which it is designed. Now the divine law is either natural or positive, but all human laws, strictly taken, are positive.

Self-Preservation

1.3. Whoever thoroughly examines human nature and disposition may plainly understand what the natural law is, its necessity, and which precepts it proposes and commands to us mortals. People are greatly assisted in their precise knowledge of the polity of any community if they first understand the condition of it and the manners and dispositions of the members who constitute it. Similarly, those who study well the common nature and conditions of humans will easily discover those laws which preserve our universal safety.

Humans have a feature in common with all other animals that have a sense of their own existence. We account nothing dearer than our individual selves. We study all manners and ways of self-preservation. We try to procure for ourselves those things which are good for us, and avoid and keep off those that are harmful. This desire of self-preservation is typically so strong that all our other appetites and passions give way to it. Thus, whenever an attempt is made on the life of any person, even though he escapes the danger threatened, nevertheless, he usually resents it and continues to hold a hatred and desire for revenge on the aggressor.

But in one way humans seem to be set in a worse condition than that of animals. Hardly any other animal comes into the world in so great a weakness so that it would be almost a miracle if anyone could reach a mature age without the aid of someone else. For even now after receiving so much help for the necessities of human life, many years of careful study are still required before a person can of himself get food or clothes. Let us suppose that a person comes to his full strength without any oversight or instruction from other people. Suppose that he has no manner of knowledge but what arises of itself from his own natural intelligence, and thus is placed in some solitude which is destitute of any help or society of all humankind beside. Certainly a more miserable creature cannot be imagined. He is no better than dumb and naked. He has nothing left but herbs and roots to pluck and the wild fruits to gather; to quench his thirst at the next spring, river or ditch; to shelter himself from the injuries of weather by creeping into some cave or covering himself with any sort of moss or grass; to pass away his tedious life in idleness; to jump at every noise, and be afraid at the sight of any other animal. In a word, he will ultimately die either by hunger or cold or some wild beast. It must then follow that whatever advantages accompany human life all owe to the mutual help people give each other. Thus, next to divine providence, there is nothing in the world more beneficial to humankind than humans themselves.

Unsociable Human Qualities

Yet, as useful as this creature is or may be to others of its kind, it has many faults and is capable of being equally destructive. This makes mutual society between person and person more than a little dangerous, and makes it necessary to use great caution unless harm grows from it instead of good. First, we observe in humans a stronger predisposition to injure others than in any other animal. For animals seldom become enraged except through hunger or lust, both of which appetites are satisfied without much difficulty. When that is done, they are not apt to grow furious or to hurt their fellow creatures without some provocation. Humans, on the other hand, are animals that are always prone to lust, by which we are more frequently activated than what appears necessary to the conservation of our species. The human stomach also is not only to be satisfied, but to be pleased, and it often desires more than nature can well digest. As for clothes, nature has taken care of the rest of the creatures so that they don't want any. But humans require not only those that will address their necessity, but also their pride and ostentation. Besides these, there are many passions and appetites found in humankind which are unknown to other animals. We have an unreasonable desire of possessing much more than is necessary, and earnest pursuit after glory and preeminence, envy, emulation, and intellectual competition. A proof of this is that most of the wars with which human kind is harassed are raised for causes completely unknown to animals. Now all these are able to provoke people to hurt each other and they frequently do so. To this we may add the great arrogance that is in many people, and the desire to insult others, which will only anger even those who are naturally timid enough and excite them to resist (for concern of preserving themselves and their liberty). Sometimes also wants set people at each other's throats, or because their present stockpile of necessities seems not sufficient either for their needs or appetites.

Moreover, people are more able to do each other harm than animals. For although we don't look fierce with teeth, claws or horns, as many animals do, yet the activity of our hands are very effective instruments of harm. The quickness of our intelligence gives us the skill and capacity to attempt something by treachery which cannot be done by open force. Thus, it is very easy for one person to bring upon another the greatest of all natural evils, namely, death itself.

Besides all this, we must consider that there is a vast diversity of dispositions among humans, which is not found among animals. For all animals of the same kind have the same inclinations and are led by the same inward motions and appetites. With humans, on the other hand, there are as many minds as there are heads, and everyone has his unique opinion. Nor are we all motivated by simple and uniform desires, but instead with a variety, and variously mixed together. No, we often see one and the same person differ from himself and desire something at one time, and extremely abhor it at another. Nor is the variety less noticeable which is not found in the almost infinite ways of living, managing our studies, our course of life, and our methods of making use of our wits. Now, to prevent us from crashing into each other by these circumstances, we need reasonable limitations and careful management.

FOUNDATION OF NATURAL LAW

Fundamental Law of Nature

Human beings are animals that are very desirous of their own preservation. We are liable to many wants, unable to support ourselves without the help of others of our kind, and yet wonderfully fit in society to promote a common good. But then we are malicious, insolent, and easily provoked, and not less prone to do harm to our fell humans than we are cable of executing it. From this it must be inferred that to attain our self-preservation, it is absolutely necessary that we be sociable. That is, we should join with those of our kind, and also conduct ourselves towards them so that they may have no justifiable cause to do us harm, but instead to promote and secure for us all our interests.

The rules then of this fellowship are called the laws of nature, and are the laws of human society, by which people are directed to make themselves useful members of it, and without which it falls to pieces.

From what has been said, it appears that this is a fundamental law of nature: to the extent that we can, every person ought to preserve and promote society, that is, the welfare of humankind. He who designs the end cannot but be supposed to also design those means without which the end cannot be obtained. It follows from this that all actions commanded by the law of nature which tend generally and are absolutely necessary to the preservation of this society. This is just as, on the contrary, those that disturb and dissolve it are forbidden by the same. All other precepts are to be accounted as only subsumptions or consequences of this universal law. The evidence of this is made out by the natural light which is engrafted in humankind.

Natural Laws Authored by God

These [moral and political] rules do plainly contain that which is for the general good. But so that these rules may obtain the force of laws, it must necessarily be presupposed that there is a God who governs all things by his providence, and that he has commanded us mortals to observe these dictates of our reason as laws, proclaimed by him to us by the powerful mediation of that light which is born with us. Otherwise we might perhaps pay some obedience to them when we consider their usefulness, similar to how we observe the directions of physicians in regard to our health. But this would not have us view them as "laws", to the composition of which it is necessary to suppose a superior, and that such a superior as has actually undertaken the government of the other.

It is demonstrated as follows that God is the author of the Law of Nature (considering humankind only in its present state, without inquiring whether the first condition of us mortals were different from this, nor how the change was brought about). Our nature is so framed that humankind cannot be preserved without a sociable life. It is also plain that the human mind is capable of understanding all those notions which are subservient to this purpose. Finally, it is also clear that people, like other creatures, not only owe their origin to God, but that God governs them (let their condition be as it will) by the wisdom of his providence. It follows that it must be the will of God that humans should make use of those faculties with which he is peculiarly endowed beyond the animals to the preservation of his own nature. Consequently, human life should be different from the lawless life of the irrational creatures. Since this cannot otherwise be achieved except through observing the natural law, it must be understood that there is from God an obligation laid upon humans to pay obedience to it. This law is not a means invented by human intelligence or imposed by the human will, nor is it capable of being changed by their physical constitution and inclinations. Instead, it is expressly ordained by God himself in order to accomplish this end. For he who obliges us to pursue such an end must be thought to oblige us to make use of those means which are necessary to the attainment of it. And that the social life is positively commanded by God to us, we find proof in the fact that in no other animal do we discover any sense of religion or fear of a Deity. This does not seem to fall within the understanding of the ungovernable animal, and yet it has the power to excite in people's minds (not altogether corrupt) the most delicate sense. This sense convinces them that, by sinning against this natural law, they offend him who is lord of the human, and who is to be feared even where we are secure of any punishment from our fellow creatures.

It is usually said that we have the knowledge of this law from nature itself. However, this is not to be taken to mean that plain and distinct notions concerning what is to be done or avoided were implanted in the minds of newborn people. Instead, nature is said to teach us, partly because the knowledge of this law may be attained by the help of the light of reason. It is also partly because the general and most useful points of it are so plain and clear that, at first sight, they force assent. In this way, they get such root in people's minds that nothing can eradicate them afterwards, let wicked people take ever so many pains to blunt the edge and numb themselves against the stings of their consciences. In this sense we find in holy scripture that this law is said to be "written in the hearts of man." Accordingly, from our childhood a sense of it was instilled into us together with other learning in the usual methods of education. Although we are not able to remember the precise time when they first took hold of our understandings and professed our minds, we can have no other opinion of our knowledge of this law except that it was native to our beings, or born together and at the same time with ourselves. The cause is the same with every person in learning his mother tongue.

Duties to God, Self, and Others Arising from Natural Law

The duties from the law of nature which are obligatory to people seem to be appropriately divided according to the objects about which we are conversant. Thus, they are arranged under three principal headings. The first of these gives us directions as to how by the single dictates of right reason people ought to behave themselves towards God. The second contains our duty towards ourselves. The third is that towards other people. The precepts of the natural law which have a relation to other people may primarily and directly be derived from the sociality which we have laid down as a foundation. But even people's duties towards God may be indirectly deduced from that, based on the reasoning that the strongest obligation to mutual duties between person and person arises from religion and a fear of the Deity. This is because people could not become sociable creatures if we were not colored with religion, and because reason alone can to no further in religion than what is useful to promote the common tranquility and sociality or reciprocal union in this life (although insofar as religion secures salvation of souls, it proceeds from extraordinary divine revelation). The duties a person owes to himself arise jointly from religion and from the necessity of society. Thus, no person is completely lord of himself, but, instead, there are many things relating to himself which are not to be disposed altogether according to his will. This is partly because of the obligation he lies under for being a religious worshiper of the Deity, and partly so that he may keep himself a useful and beneficial member of society.

1.4 The duty of man towards God, so far as it can be discovered by natural reason, encompasses these two duties. The first is that we have true notions concerning him, or know him properly. The second is that we conform our actions to his will, or obey him as we should. And, so, natural religion consists of two sorts of propositions, specifically, theoretical or speculative, and practical or active. . . .

1.5 [Concerning the duty towards himself] a human being are not born for himself alone, but being therefore furnished with so many excellent endowments that he may set forth his Creator's praise, and be rendered a fit member of human society. It follows from this that it is his duty to cultivate and improve those gifts from his creator that he finds in himself, that they answer to the end of their donor. It is also his duty to contribute all that lies in his power to the benefit of human society. . . . Since human nature consists of two parts, a soul and a body, then the first gives us the part of a director, and the other that of an instrument or subordinate minister. So, our actions are all performed by the guidance of the mind, and by the ministration of the body. We are hence obliged to take care of both, but especially the former. That part is, above all things, to be formed and accommodated to support an adequate part of social life, and to be instilled with a sense and love of duty and decency. Then we are to devote ourselves to learning that is somewhat proper to our capacity and our condition in the world. Otherwise, we will become a useless burden to the earth, cumbersome to ourselves, and troublesome to others. . . .

1.6 We come now to those duties that are to be practiced by one person towards another. Some of these proceed from that common obligation which it has pleased the creator to lay upon all people in general. Others have their origin in some certain human institutions or some particular invented or accidental state of humans. The first of these are always to be practiced by every person towards all people. The latter obtain only among those who are in such peculiar condition or state. Hence the former may be called absolute, and the latter conditional. . . .

 

CREATION OF COMMUNITIES

Large Communities not Necessitated by Human Nature

2.5. There is hardly any happiness or benefit except that which may be obtained from those duties of which we have already discussed. Nevertheless, it remains that we inquire into the reasons why people, not content with those primitive and small societies, have found those which are larger, which are called "communities." From these grounds and foundations is to be deduced the reason of those duties which merely relate to this civil state of humankind.

Here, therefore, it is not sufficient to say that people are by nature inclined to civil society so that they neither can nor will live without it. For it is indeed evident that humans are such kinds of creatures as have a most delicate affection for themselves and their own good. Given this, it is clear that when a person so earnestly seeks after civil society, he acknowledges some particular advantage that will accrue to himself for it. Without society with our fellow creatures, people would be the most miserable of all beings. Yet the natural desires and necessities of humans are abundantly satisfied by those primitive kinds of societies, and by the duties to which we are obliged either by humanity or contract. Consequently, it cannot immediately be concluded from this natural society between person and person that our nature and disposition directly inclines us to the forming of civil communities.

Difficulties of Living in Large Communities

This will more evidently be seen if we consider (1) what condition people are placed in by the constitution of civil communities, (2) what is required so that it may be truly said of us to be good patriots and subjects, and (3) what aversion may be discovered in human nature to living in such civil community.

[First,] Whoever becomes a subject immediately loses his natural liberty, and submits himself to some authority which is vested with the power of life and death. He further submits to command to do many things which otherwise he would in no way be willing to do, and many things must be let alone to which he had a strong inclination. Besides most of his actions must terminate in the public good, which in many cases seems to clash with a person's private advantage. But people carried by their natural inclinations to be subject to no one, to do all things as they are inclined, and in everything to consult their single advantage.

[Second,] But we call a person a true patriot, and good subject if he readily obeys the commands of his governors; if he tries his utmost to promote the public good, and after that regards his private affairs; no, even more if he values nothing profitable to himself unless the same is likewise profitable to the community; and lastly if he carries himself fairly towards his fellow subjects. But there are few people to be found whose tempers are naturally thus well inclined. The greater part of us is restrained merely for fear of punishment, and many continue their entire life to be bad subjects and unsociable creatures.

[Third,] Furthermore, there is no creature at all more fierce or untamable than a human, or which is prone to more vices that are apt to disturb the peace and security of the public. For besides his inordinate appetite to eating, drinking, and sexual intercourse (to which animals are likewise subject), people are inclined to many vices to which animals are complete strangers. This is so with the insatiable desire and thirst after those things which are completely superfluous and unnecessary, and above all with that worst of evils, ambition. This is also the case with a too lasting resentment and memory of injuries, and a desire of revenge increasing more and more by length of time. Besides these there is an infinite diversity of inclinations and affections, and a certain stiffness and obstinacy in everyone to indulge his own particular whim or imagination. Moreover, humans takes so great delight in exercising cruelty over their fellow creatures, that the greatest part of the evils and harms to which humankind is repulsed owes completely to the merciless rage and violence of other people.

Civil Society the Remedy for Human Evil

Therefore, the genuine and principal reason that induced masters of families to give up their own natural liberty and to form themselves into communities was that they might provide for themselves a security and defense against the evils and harms that occur to people from each other. For as (next under God) one person is most capable of being helpful to another, so the same person may be no less prejudicial and hurtful to another. And people hold a proper notion of both human malice, and the remedy to the problem, if they accept the following as a common maxim and proverb: if there were no courts of judicature, one person would devour another. But after that (by the constituting of communities) people were reduced into such an order and method, so that they might be safe and secure from mutual wrongs and injuries among themselves. It was by that means that they might better enjoy those advantages which are to be reaped and expected from each other. Specifically, from their childhood, they could be raised and instructed in good manners and they could invent and improve several kinds of arts and sciences by which people's lives might be better provided and furnished with necessary conveniences.

The reason for constituting communities will be even more forceful if we consider that human malice could not be curbed by other means. Although we are obligated by the law of nature not to injure each other, respect and reverence to that law is not common enough to be a sufficient security for people to live completely tranquil and undisturbed in their natural liberty.

By accident we may find a few people of such moderate quiet temper and disposition that they would not injure others [who harm them], even though they [i.e., the offenders] might escape unpunished. There may likewise be others who to some degree control their disorderly inclinations through fear of some harm that might otherwise result. Nevertheless, on the contrary, there are a great number of people who have no regard at all for law or justice; this is so whenever they have any prospect of advantage, or any hopes by their own subtle tricks and schemes of creating difficulties for and deluding the injured party. It benefits everyone concerned with their own safety to try to protect themselves against this sort of person. No better care and provision can be made for this than by means of communities and civil societies. Some particular people may mutually agree together to assist each other. But they need to discover some way by which their opinions and judgments may be unified and their wills more firmly bound to perform what they have agreed to. Otherwise it will be in vain for anyone to expect and rely with certainty on any relief or assistance from them.

Finally, the laws of nature sufficiently suggest to us that people who do violence or injury to others will not escape unpunished. Nevertheless, neither the fear and dread of a divine being, nor the strings of conscience are found sufficiently effective to restrain the malice and violence of all people. For through the prejudice of custom and education, many people are altogether deaf, so to speak, to the force and power of reason. From this it happens that they are only intent about present things, taking very little notice of those things which are future; they are affected only with those things which make a present impression on their senses. But divine vengeance usually proceeds only slowly, and, accordingly, many suffering people take occasion to refer their evils and misfortunes to other causes. This is especially so since they very often see immoral people enjoy a plenty and abundance of those things which typical people see as constituting their happiness and pleasure. Besides, the checks of conscience, which precede any immoral action, seem to be less forceful and efficient as punishment which follows commission of the act (when that which we do cannot be undone). Therefore the most available and effective remedy, for the subduing and suppressing the evil desires and inclinations of people, is to be provided by the constituting of civil societies.

THE FOUNDATION OF GOVERNMENT

Safety in Numbers

2.6. The next inquiry we are to make is upon what grounds civil societies have been erected, and wherein their internal constitution consists. For, in the first place, it is evident that neither any place, nor any sort of weapons, nor any kind of brute creatures can be capable of providing any sufficient and safeguard or defense against the injuries to which all people are liable, by reason of the corruption of human nature. From such dangers, people alone can provide an agreeable remedy by joining their forces together, by interweaving their interests and safety, and by forming a general confederacy for their mutual assistance. So that this end might be obtained effectively, it was necessary that those who sought to bring it about should be firmly joined together and associated into communities.

It is just as evident that the consent and agreement of two or three particular persons cannot afford this security against the violence of other people. For, it may easily happen that such a number may conspire the ruin of those few persons, as may be able to assure themselves of a certain victory over them; and it is very likely they would with the greater boldness go about such an enterprise, because of their certain hopes of success and exemption from punishment. Thus, to this end it is necessary that a very considerable number of people should unite together, so that an extra few people among the enemies may not be of any great significance to determine the victory to their side.

Government Needed to Enforce the Social Contract

Among those many who would join together in order to achieve this end, it is absolutely necessary that there be a perfect consent and agreement concerning the use of such means as are most conducive to that end. For even a great multitude of people, if they do not agree among themselves and are divided and separated in their opinions, will be capable of accomplishing very little. Or, although they may agree for a certain time, they may soon afterwards divide into groups because of some present inclination or disposition of the mind, since the tempers and inclinations of people are very variable. Although by compact they engaged among themselves, that they would employ all their force for the common defense and security; yet neither by this means is there sufficient provision made, that this agreement of the multitude will be permanent and lasting. But something more than all this is required, namely, that those who have once entered into a mutual league and defense for the sake of the public good should be prohibited from separating themselves afterwards, when their private advantage may seem in any way to clash with the public good.

But there are two faults that chiefly occur within human nature, and which are the reason that many who are at their own liberty, and independent one upon the other, cannot long hold together for the promoting of any public design. The one is the contrariety of inclinations and judgments in determining what is most conducive to such an end. In many, there is joined to this a dullness of apprehending which, of several means proposed, is more advantageous than the rest, a certain stubbornness in defending whatever opinion we have embraced. The other is a certain carelessness and abhorrence of freely doing that which seems to be convenient and needed, whenever there is no absolute necessity to compel them to perform or not perform their duty. The first of these defects may be prevented by a lasting uniting of all their wills and affections together. The latter may be remedied by the constituting of such a power as may be able to inflict a present and sensible penalty upon those who refuse to contribute to the public safety.

The wills and affections of a great number of people cannot be united by any better means, than when everyone is willing to submit his will to the will of one particular person, or one assembly of people. Thus, afterwards whatever he or they shall will or determine concerning any matters or things necessary for the public safety, shall be considered the will of all and every particular person.

Now such a kind of power, as may be formidable to all, can have no better means for being constituted among a great number of people, than when all and everyone will oblige themselves, to make use of their strength after that manner, as he will command, to whom all persons must submit and resign the ordering and direction of their united forces. When there is a union made of their wills and forces, then this multitude of people may be said to be animated and incorporated into a firm and lasting society.

Two Covenants and a Constitution

Further, so that any society may grow together in a normal manner, there are required two covenants, and one decree, or constitution. First, of all those many, who are supposed to be in a natural liberty, when they are joined together for the forming and constituting of any civil society, every person enters into a covenant with each other, that they are willing to come into one and the same lasting alliance and fellowship, and to carry on the methods of their safety and security by a common consultation and management among themselves. In a word, they are willing to be made fellow members of the same society. It is necessary that each and every person consents and agrees to this covenant, and he that does not give his consent remains excluded from such society.

After this covenant, it is necessary that there should be a constitution agreed on by a public decree, setting forth what form of government is to be imposed upon. For, until this is determined, nothing can be transacted with any certainty that may contribute to public safety.

After this decree concerning the form of government, there is the need for another covenant, when he or they are nominated and constituted upon whom the government of this rising society is conferred. By this covenant, the persons that are to govern obligate themselves to take care of the common safety, and, in like manner, the other members obligate themselves to submit obedience to them. Also, through this all persons submit their will to the will and pleasure of him (or them), and at the same time they convey and hand over to him (or them) the power of making use of, and applying their united strength, as will seem most convenient for the public security. When this covenant is duly and rightly executed, then, finally, there arises a complete and regular government. . . .

Governments Ordained By God

What we have said concerning the origin of civil societies in no way contradicts the fact that civil government is truly said to be from God. For it is his will that human practices should be ordered according to the laws of nature. Yet, given the multiplication of people, human life would become so horrid and confused that hardly any room would be left for natural law to exert its authority. Since the exercise of natural law would be greatly improved by instituting civil societies, and since he who commands the end must be supposed to command likewise the means necessary to the said end, we conclude the following. God also by the mediation of the dictates of reason is to be understood previously to have willed that people (when they were multiplied) should construct and constitute civil societies that are, as it were, animated with supreme authority. The degrees of this he explicitly approves of in divine law, ratifying their divine institution by particular laws, and declaring that God himself takes them into his special care and protection. . . .

Alliances

2.17. Alliances that interchangeably passed between sovereign governments are of good use both in times of war and peace. They may be divided, in respect of their subject, either into those that reinforce the duty already required of us from the law of nature, or those that add something extra to the precepts of the law (at least they determine their obligation to such or such particular actions, which before seemed indefinite).

By the first sort are meant treaties of peace, wherein nothing more is agreed upon than the simple exercise of humanity towards each other, or avoidance of harm and violence. Or, perhaps, they may establish a general sort of friendship between them, not mentioning particulars. Or, they may fix the rules of hospitality and commerce, according to the directions of the law of nature.

The others of the latter sort, are called leagues, and are either equal or unequal. Equal leagues are so far composed of the same conditions on both sides, that they not only promise what is equal absolutely, or at least in proportion to the abilities of the person; but they stipulate in such a manner too, that neither party is to the other harmful, or in a worse condition.

Unequal leagues are those, wherein conditions are agreed upon that are unequal, and render one side worse than the other. This inequality may be either on the part of the superior, or else of the inferior confederate. For if the superior confederate engages to send the other help, unconditionally, not accepting of any terms from him, or engages to send a greater proportion of them than he, the inequality lies upon the superior. But if the league requires of the inferior confederate the performance of more things towards the superior than the superior performs towards him, the inequality there no less evidently lies on the side of the inferior.

Among the conditions required of an inferior ally, some contain a diminution of his sovereign power, restraining him from the exercise thereof in certain cases without the superior's consent. Others impose no such prejudice upon his sovereignty, but oblige him to the performance of those we call transitory duties, which once done, are ended altogether. Some of these are to discharge the pay of the other's army; to restore the expenses of the war; to give a certain sum of money; to demolish his fortifications, deliver hostages, surrender his ships, arms, etc. Yet neither do some perpetual duties diminish the sovereignty of a prince. As, to have the same friends and enemies with another, though the other be not reciprocally engaged to have the same with him: to be obliged to erect no fortifications here, nor to sail there, etc. To be bound to pay some certain friendly reverence to the other's majesty, and to conform with modesty to his pleasure.

Both these sorts of leagues, as well equal as the unequal, are commonly contracted upon various reasons so that they especially produce effects of the strongest and most binding nature, and tend to join many nations in a league that is to last forever. However, the common subject of the leagues most in use is either the preservation of commerce, or the furnishing of help in a war (either offensive or defensive).

Source: Samuel Pufendorf, The Duty of Man and Citizen (1673), tr. Andrew Tooke.

 

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JOHN LOCKE: NATURAL RIGHTS

Born near Bristol, England into a puritan family, John Locke (1632-1704) was one of Britain's most influential philosophers during the 18th century. He worked as a personal physician to a prominent politician, Anthony Ashley Cooper, who influenced Locke's political views in a direction against absolute monarchy. Fearing for his safety in the political turmoil of the time, Locke left England for Holland in 1683, and returned in 1688 after the Glorious Revolution which decisively shifted England's balance of power away from the monarchy towards the parliament. In his Two Treatises of Government (1690), he develops a notion of natural rights that had profound impact on political institutions throughout the world. In the selections below from this work, he argues that in the state of nature God created people free and equal, and the fundamental law of nature is that no one should harm another person's life, health, liberty or possessions. Accordingly, we have natural rights to life, health, liberty and possessions. The state of nature, Locke argues, is not necessarily a state of war since war is declared only when someone violates our rights. When that happens, the offender deserves to be punished, and even killed. One of our principal rights is to acquire property, which land and other types of wealth, and we first obtain an item of property by mixing our labor with it. For example, when I cut down a tree that no one owns and make it into a boat, I thereby own the boat. To reduce conflicts and rights violations within the state of nature we make contracts with each other, thereby creating a civil society, but in exchange for this we give up some of our liberty. Through such social contracts we authorize our governments to both defend our natural rights and punish those who violate them. We must also follow the will of the majority, which is the only basis of lawful government. Governments, however, do not have absolute authority over us and, if necessary, we may dissolve them through revolution when, through their ineffectiveness, they violate laws and threaten the life, liberty and property of the individual.

AGAINST THE DIVINE RIGHT OF KINGS (from Two Treatises of Government, Chapter 1)

Against Filmer's View of the Divine Right of Kings

1. It having been shown in the foregoing discourse, (1) That Adam had not, either by natural right of fatherhood, or by positive donation from God, any such authority over his children, or dominion over the world, as is pretended: (2) That if he had, his heirs, yet, had no right to it: (3) That if his heirs had, there being no law of nature nor positive law of God that determines which is the right heir in all cases that may arise, the right of succession, and consequently of bearing rule, could not have been certainly determined: (4) That if even that had been determined, yet the knowledge of which is the eldest line of Adam's posterity, being so long since utterly lost, that in the races of mankind and families of the world, there remains not to one above another, the least pretence to be the eldest house, and to have the right of inheritance.

All these premises having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is impossible that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or derive any the least shadow of authority from that, which is held to be the fountain of all power, Adam's private dominion and paternal jurisdiction; so that he that will not give just occasion to think that all government in the world is the product only of force and violence, and that men live together by no other rules but that of beasts, where the strongest carries it, and so lay a foundation for perpetual disorder and mischief, tumult, sedition and rebellion, (things that the followers of that hypothesis so loudly cry out against) must of necessity find out another rise of government, another original of political power, and another way of designing and knowing the persons that have it, than what Sir Robert Filmer has taught us.

Political Power different than Other Powers

2. To this purpose, I think it may not be amiss, to set down what I take to be political power; that the power of a magistrate over a subject may be distinguished from that of a father over his children, a master over his servant, a husband over his wife, and a lord over his slave. All which distinct powers happening sometimes together in the same man, if he be considered under these different relations, it may help us to distinguish these powers one from wealth, a father of a family, and a captain of a galley.

3. Political power, then, I take to be a right of making laws with penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties, for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the community, in the execution of such laws, and in the defense of the commonwealth from foreign injury; and all this only for the public good.

THE STATE OF NATURE (Chapter 2)

Natural State of Freedom to Act with Reciprocal Equality for Others

4. To understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.

A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty. . . .

Law of Nature Restricts our Liberty in the Natural State

6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of license: though man in that state have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about his business; they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another's pleasure: and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another's uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for ours. Everyone, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station willfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.

Power to Execute the Law of Nature through Punishment for Reparation and Restraint

7. And that all men may be restrained from invading others rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be observed, which wills the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law of nature is, in that state, put into every man's hands, whereby everyone has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree, as may hinder its violation: for the law of nature would, as all other laws that concern men in this world be in vain, if there were no body that in the state of nature had a power to execute that law, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders. And if anyone in the state of nature may punish another for any evil he has done, everyone may do so: for in that state of perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another, what any may do in prosecution of that law, everyone must needs have a right to do.

8. And thus, in the state of nature, one man comes by a power over another; but yet no absolute or arbitrary power, to use a criminal, when he has got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats, or boundless extravagancy of his own will; but only to retribute to him, so far as calm reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint: for these two are the only reasons, why one man may lawfully do harm to another, which is that we call punishment. In transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common equity, which is that measure God has set to the actions of men, for their mutual security; and so he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tie, which is to secure them from injury and violence, being slighted and broken by him. Which being a trespass against the whole species, and the peace and safety of it, provided for by the law of nature, every man upon this score, by the right he has to preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary, destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on anyone, who has transgressed that law, as may make him repent the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and by his example others, from doing the like mischief. And in the case, and upon this ground, every man has a right to punish the offender, and be executioner of the law of nature. . . .

THE STATE OF WAR (Chapter 3)

State of war as a Right to Destroy others who Threaten Absolute Power over Me

16. The state of war is a state of enmity and destruction: and therefore declaring by word or action, not a passionate and hasty, but a sedate settled design upon another man's life, puts him in a state of war with him against whom he has declared such an intention, and so has exposed his life to the other's power to be taken away by him, or anyone that joins with him in his defense, and espouses his quarrel; it being reasonable and just, I should have a right to destroy that which threatens me with destruction: for, by the fundamental law of nature, man being to be preserved as much as possible, when all cannot be preserved, the safety of the innocent is to be preferred: and one may destroy a man who makes war upon him, or has discovered an enmity to his being, for the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion; because such men are not under the ties of the common law of reason, have no other rule, but that of force and violence, and so may be treated as beasts of prey, those dangerous and noxious creatures, that will be sure to destroy him whenever he falls into their power.

17. And hence it is, that he who attempts to get another man into his absolute power, does thereby put himself into a state of war with him; it being to be understood as a declaration of a design upon his life: for I have reason to conclude, that he who would get me into his power without my consent, would use me as he pleased when he had got me there, and destroy me too when he had a fancy to it; for nobody can desire to have me in his absolute power, unless it be to compel me by force to that which is against the right of my freedom, i.e. make me a slave. To be free from such force is the only security of my preservation; and reason bids me look on him, as an enemy to my preservation, who would take away that freedom which is the fence to it; so that he who makes an attempt to enslave me, thereby puts himself into a state of war with me. He that, in the state of nature, would take away the freedom that belongs to anyone in that state, must necessarily be supposed to have a design to take away everything else that, freedom being the foundation of all the rest; as he that in the state of society would take away the freedom belonging to those of that society or commonwealth, must be supposed to design to take away from them everything else, and so be looked on as in a state of war.

18. This makes it lawful for a man to kill a thief, who has not in the least hurt him, nor declared any design upon his life, any farther than, by the use of force, so to get him in his power, as to take away his money, or what he pleases, from him; because using force, where he has no right, to get me into his power, let his pretence be what it will, I have no reason to suppose, that he, who would take away my liberty, would not, when he had me in his power, take away everything else. And therefore it is lawful for me to treat him as one who has put himself into a state of war with me, i.e., kill him if I can; for to that hazard does he justly expose himself, whoever introduces a state of war, and is aggressor in it.

State of Nature as Community without Common Judge, State of War as Force without Right

19. And here we have the plain difference between the state of nature and the state of war, which however some men have confounded, are as far distant, as a state of peace, good will, mutual assistance and preservation, and a state of enmity, malice, violence and mutual destruction, are one from another. Men living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth, with authority to judge between them, is properly the state of nature. But force, or a declared design of force, upon the person of another, where there is no common superior on earth to appeal to for relief, is the state of war: and it is the want of such an appeal gives a man the right of war even against an aggressor, though he be in society and a fellow subject. Thus a thief, whom I cannot harm, but by appeal to the law, for having stolen all that I am worth, I may kill, when he sets on me to rob me but of my horse or coat; because the law, which was made for my preservation, where it cannot interpose to secure my life from present force, which, if lost, is capable of no reparation, permits me my own defense, and the right of war, a liberty to kill the aggressor, because the aggressor allows not time to appeal to our common judge, nor the decision of the law, for remedy in a case where the mischief may be irreparable. Want of a common judge with authority, puts all men in a state of nature: force without right, upon a man's person, makes a state of war, both where there is, and is not, a common judge.

20. But when the actual force is over, the state of war ceases between those that are in society, and are equally on both sides subjected to the fair determination of the law; because then there lies open the remedy of appeal for the past injury, and to prevent future harm: but where no such appeal is, as in the state of nature, for want of positive laws, and judges with authority to appeal to, the state of war once begun, continues, with a right to the innocent party to destroy the other whenever he can, until the aggressor offers peace, and desires reconciliation on such terms as may repair any wrongs he has already done, and secure the innocent for the future; nay, where an appeal to the law, and constituted judges, lies open, but the remedy is denied by a manifest perverting of justice, and a barefaced wresting of the laws to protect or indemnify the violence or injuries of some men, or party of men, there it is hard to imagine anything but a state of war: for wherever violence is used, and injury done, though by hands appointed to administer justice, it is still violence and injury, however colored with the name, pretences, or forms of law, the end whereof being to protect and redress the innocent, by an unbiased application of it, to all who are under it; wherever that is not bona fide done, war is made upon the sufferers, who having no appeal on earth to right them, they are left to the only remedy in such cases, an appeal to heaven.

21. To avoid this state of war (wherein there is no appeal but to heaven, and wherein every the least difference is apt to end, where there is no authority to decide between the contenders) is one great reason of men's putting themselves into society, and quitting the state of nature: for where there is an authority, a power on earth, from which relief can be had by appeal, there the continuance of the state of war is excluded, and the controversy is decided by that power. . . .

SLAVERY (Chatper 4)

Natural Liberty, as Freedom from Arbitrary Power, Can be Forfeited

22. The natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of nature for his rule. The liberty of man, in society, is to be under no other legislative power, but that established, by consent, in the commonwealth; nor under the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, but what that legislative shall enact, according to the trust put in it. Freedom then is not what Sir Robert Filmer tells us (Observations, A. 55): "a liberty for everyone to do what he lists, to live as he pleases, and not to be tied by any laws," but freedom of men under government is, to have a standing rule to live by, common to every one of that society, and made by the legislative power erected in it; a liberty to follow my own will in all things, where the rule prescribes not; and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man: as freedom of nature is, to be under no other restraint but the law of nature.

23. This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, is so necessary to, and closely joined with a man's preservation, that he cannot part with it, but by what forfeits his preservation and life together: for a man, not having the power of his own life, cannot, by compact, or his own consent, enslave himself to anyone, nor put himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of another, to take away his life, when he pleases. Nobody can give more power than he has himself; and he that cannot take away his own life, cannot give another power over it. Indeed, having by his fault forfeited his own life, by some act that deserves death; he, to whom he has forfeited it, may (when he has him in his power) delay to take it, and make use of him to his own service, and he does him no injury by it: for, whenever he finds the hardship of his slavery outweigh the value of his life, it is in his power, by resisting the will of his master, to draw on himself the death he desires.

Drudgery involves being under Limited Power, not Absolute Power

24. This is the perfect condition of slavery, which is nothing else, but the state of war continued, between a lawful conqueror and a captive: for, if once compact enter between them, and make an agreement for a limited power on the one side, and obedience on the other, the state of war and slavery ceases, as long as the compact endures: for, as has been said, no man can, by agreement, pass over to another that which he hath not in himself, a power over his own life. I confess, we find among the Jews, as well as other nations, that men did sell themselves; but, it is plain, this was only to drudgery, not to slavery: for, it is evident, the person sold was not under an absolute, arbitrary, despotical power: for the master could not have power to kill him, at any time, whom, at a certain time, he was obliged to let go free out of his service; and the master of such a servant was so far from having an arbitrary power over his life, that he could not, at pleasure, so much as maim him, but the loss of an eye, or tooth, set him free (Exod. xxi).

OF PROPERTY (Chapter 5)

Property as Mixing Labor with What is Held in Common, taking as Much as we can Use

27. Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this nobody has any right to but himself. The labor of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature has provided, and left it in, he has mixed his labor with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state nature has placed it in, it has by this labor something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men: for this labor being the unquestionable property of the laborer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others.

28. He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to himself. Nobody can deny but the nourishment is his. I ask then, when did they begin to be his? when he digested? or when he eat? or when he boiled? or when he brought them home? or when he picked them up? and it is plain, if the first gathering made them not his, nothing else could. That labor put a distinction between them and common: that added something to them more than nature, the common mother of all, had done; and so they became his private right. And will anyone say, he had no right to those acorns or apples, he thus appropriated, because he had not the consent of all mankind to make them his? Was it a robbery thus to assume to himself what belonged to all in common? If such a consent as that was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had given him. We see in commons, which remain so by compact, that it is the taking any part of what is common, and removing it out of the state nature leaves it in, which begins the property; without which the common is of no use. And the taking of this or that part, does not depend on the express consent of all the commoners. Thus the grass my horse has bit; the turfs my servant has cut; and the ore I have digged in any place, where I have a right to them in common with others, become my property, without the assignation or consent of any body. The labor that was mine, removing them out of that common state they were in, has fixed my property in them.

31. It will perhaps be objected to this, that if gathering the acorns, or other fruits of the earth, etc. makes a right to them, then anyone may engross as much as he will. To which I answer, Not so. The same law of nature, that does by this means give us property, does also bound that property too. God has given us all things richly (1 Tim. vi. 12) is the voice of reason confirmed by inspiration. But how far has he given it us? To enjoy. As much as anyone can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labor fix a property in: whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy. And thus, considering the plenty of natural provisions there was a long time in the world, and the few spenders; and to how small a part of that provision the industry of one man could extend itself, and engross it to the prejudice of others; especially keeping within the bounds, set by reason, of what might serve for his use; there could be then little room for quarrels or contentions about property so established.

Acquiring Land by Cultivating and Using Common Land

32. But the chief matter of property being now not the fruits of the earth, and the beasts that subsist on it, but the earth itself; as that which takes in and carries with it all the rest; I think it is plain, that property in that too is acquired as the former. As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property. He by his labor does, as it were, enclose it from the common. Nor will it invalidate his right, to say everybody else has an equal title to it; and therefore he cannot appropriate, he cannot enclose, without the consent of all his fellow-commoners, all mankind. God, when he gave the world in common to all mankind, commanded man also to labor, and the penury of his condition required it of him. God and his reason commanded him to subdue the earth, i.e. improve it for the benefit of life, and therein lay out something upon it that was his own, his labor. He that in obedience to this command of God, subdued, tilled and sowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it something that was his property, which another had no title to, nor could without injury take from him.

33. Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land, by improving it, any prejudice to any other man, since there was still enough, and as good left; and more than the yet unprovided could use. So that, in effect, there was never the less left for others because of his enclosure for himself: for he that leaves as much as another can make use of, does as good as take nothing at all. Nobody could think himself injured by the drinking of another man, though he took a good draught, who had a whole river of the same water left him to quench his thirst: and the case of land and water, where there is enough of both, is perfectly the same. . . .

45. Thus labor, in the beginning, gave a right of property, wherever anyone was pleased to employ it upon what was common, which remained a long while the far greater part, and is yet more than mankind makes use of. Men, at first, for the most part, contented themselves with what unassisted nature offered to their necessities: and though afterwards, in some parts of the world, (where the increase of people and stock, with the use of money, had made land scarce, and so of some value) the several communities settled the bounds of their distinct territories, and by laws within themselves regulated the properties of the private men of their society, and so, by compact and agreement, settled the property which labor and industry began. And the leagues that have been made between several states and kingdoms, either expressly or tacitly disowning all claim and right to the land in the others possession, have, by common consent, given up their pretences to their natural common right, which originally they had to those countries, and so have, by positive agreement, settled a property amongst themselves, in distinct parts and parcels of the earth. Yet there are still great tracts of ground to be found, which (the inhabitants thereof not having joined with the rest of mankind, in the consent of the use of their common money) lie waste, and are more than the people who dwell on it do, or can make use of, and so still lie in common; though this can scarce happen amongst that part of mankind that have consented to the use of money.

OF THE BEGINNING OF POLITICAL SOCIETY (Chapter 8, 11)

Divesting Natural Liberty for Safety in a Community, Consenting to the Will of the Majority

95. Men being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent. The only way whereby anyone divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any, that are not of it. This any number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are left as they were in the liberty of the state of nature. When any number of men have so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest.

96. For when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual, made a community, they have thereby made that community one body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority: for that which acts any community, being only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being necessary to that which is one body to move one way; it is necessary the body should move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority: or else it is impossible it should act or continue one body, one community, which the consent of every individual that united into it, agreed that it should; and so everyone is bound by that consent to be concluded by the majority. And therefore we see, that in assemblies, empowered to act by positive laws, where no number is set by that positive law which empowers them, the act of the majority passes for the act of the whole, and of course determines, as having, by the law of nature and reason, the power of the whole.

Original Contract Creates Political Society, Constrains us to the Will of the Majority

97. And thus every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic under one government, puts himself under an obligation, to everyone of that society, to submit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it; or else this original compact, whereby he with others incorporates into one society, would signify nothing, and be no compact, if he be left free, and under no other ties than he was in before in the state of nature. For what appearance would there be of any compact? What new engagement if he were no farther tied by any decrees of the society, than he himself thought fit, and did actually consent to? This would be still as great a liberty, as he himself had before his compact, or anyone else in the state of nature has, who may submit himself, and consent to any acts of it if he thinks fit.

98. For if the consent of the majority shall not, in reason, be received as the act of the whole, and conclude every individual; nothing but the consent of every individual can make any thing to be the act of the whole: but such a consent is next to impossible ever to be had, if we consider the infirmities of health, and avocations of business, which in a number, though much less than that of a common-wealth, will necessarily keep many away from the public assembly. To which if we add the variety of opinions, and contrariety of interests, which unavoidably happen in all collections of men, the coming into society upon such terms would be only like Cato's coming into the theatre, only to go out again. Such a constitution as this would make the mighty Leviathan of a shorter duration, than the feeblest creatures, and not let it outlast the day it was born in: which cannot be supposed, till we can think, that rational creatures should desire and constitute societies only to be dissolved: for where the majority cannot conclude the rest, there they cannot act as one body, and consequently will be immediately dissolved again.

99. Whosoever therefore out of a state of nature unite into a community, must be understood to give up all the power, necessary to the ends for which they unite into society, to the majority of the community, unless they expressly agreed in any number greater than the majority. And this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one political society, which is all the compact that is, or needs be, between the individuals, that enter into, or make up a commonwealth. And thus that, which begins and actually constitutes any political society, is nothing but the consent of any number of freemen capable of a majority to unite and incorporate into such a society. And this is that, and that only, which did, or could give beginning to any lawful government in the world. . . .

123. If man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no body, why will he part with his freedom? why will he give up this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of others: for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, property. . . .

134. The great end of men's entering into society, being the enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety, and the great instrument and means of that being the laws established in that society; the first and fundamental positive law of all commonwealths is the establishing of the legislative power; as the first and fundamental natural law, which is to govern even the legislative itself, is the preservation of the society, and (as far as will consist with the public good) of every person in it. . . .

THE DISSOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT (Chapter 19)

When the Legislative or Executive Power Creates a State of War through Arbitrary Rule

212. Besides this over-turning from without, governments are dissolved from within. First, when the legislative is altered.

221. There is therefore, secondly, another way whereby governments are dissolved, and that is, when the legislative, or the prince, either of them, act contrary to their trust. First, the legislative acts against the trust reposed in them, when they endeavor to invade the property of the subject, and to make themselves, or any part of the community, masters, or arbitrary disposers of the lives, liberties, or fortunes of the people.

222. The reason why men enter into society, is the preservation of their property; and the end why they choose and authorize a legislative, is, that there may be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to the properties of all the members of the society, to limit the power, and moderate the dominion, of every part and member of the society: for since it can never be supposed to be the will of the society, that the legislative should have a power to destroy that which everyone designs to secure, by entering into society, and for which the people submitted themselves to legislators of their own making; whenever the legislators endeavor to take away, and destroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with the people, who are thereupon absolved from any farther obedience, and are left to the common refuge, which God has provided for all men, against force and violence. Whenever therefore the legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society; and either by ambition, fear, folly or corruption, endeavor to grasp themselves, or put into the hands of any other, an absolute power over the lives, liberties, and estates of the people; by this breach of trust they forfeit the power the people had put into their hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the people, who have a right to resume their original liberty, and, by the establishment of a new legislative, (such as they shall think fit) provide for their own safety and security, which is the end for which they are in society. What I have said here, concerning the legislative in general, holds true also concerning the supreme executor, who having a double trust put in him, both to have a part in the legislative, and the supreme execution of the law, acts against both, when he goes about to set up his own arbitrary will as the law of the society. He acts also contrary to his trust, when he either employs the force, treasure, and offices of the society, to corrupt the representatives, and gain them to his purposes; or openly pre-engages the electors, and prescribes to their choice, such, whom he has, by solicitations, threats, promises, or otherwise, won to his designs; and employs them to bring in such, who have promised before-hand what to vote, and what to enact.

Civil War Justified, and Arbitrary Rules are to Blame

228. But if they, who say it lays a foundation for rebellion, mean that it may occasion civil wars, or intestine broils, to tell the people they are absolved from obedience when illegal attempts are made upon their liberties or properties, and may oppose the unlawful violence of those who were their magistrates, when they invade their properties contrary to the trust put in them; and that therefore this doctrine is not to be allowed, being so destructive to the peace of the world: they may as well say, upon the same ground, that honest men may not oppose robbers or pirates, because this may occasion disorder or bloodshed. If any mischief come in such cases, it is not to be charged upon him who defends his own right, but on him that invades his neighbors. If the innocent honest man must quietly quit all he has, for peace sake, to him who will lay violent hands upon it, I desire it may be considered, what a kind of peace there will be in the world, which consists only in violence and rapine; and which is to be maintained only for the benefit of robbers and oppressors. Who would not think it an admirable peace betwixt the mighty and the mean, when the lamb, without resistance, yielded his throat to be torn by the imperious wolf?

Source: John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1690), Treatise 2.

STUDY QUESTIONS

Please answer all of the following questions.

[Hobbes]

1. According to Hobbes in the section on the natural condition, why are people equal, and what are the three causes of quarrel?

2. According to Hobbes in the section on nothing is unjust, what are the two key "virtues" in the state of nature, and what is the advantage of possessing them?

3. In the section on proof of the natural condition, what evidence does Hobbes provide for his position?

4. According to Hobbes in the section "nothing is unjust", what are the two cardinal virtues in the state of nature and what are the motivations for attaining peace?

5. Briefly what are Hobbes's 13 laws of nature?

6. According to Hobbes in the section on why people are unsociable, what are the six reasons that he gives for this?

7. According to Hobbes, what are the six rights of the sovereign?

8. According to Hobbes, what are the four reasons why monarchy is superior to other forms of government?

[Pufendorf]

9. According to Pufendorf in the section on unsociable human qualities, what are the qualities that he describes?

10. According to Pufendorf in the section on the "foundation of natural law", what is the fundamental law of nature, and in what way are natural laws authored by God?

11. According to Pufendorf in the section on "duties to God, oneself and others", how do each of these sets of duties connect with the highest principle of natural law to be sociable?

12. According to Pufendorf in the section on "the creation of society", what are the disadvantages and advantages of living in communities and societies with others?

13. According to Pufendorf in the section on "government needed to enforce the social contract," what are the two faults of human nature, and how does the creation of a ruler address these faults?

14. According to Pufendorf in the section on "alliances", what are the different categories of alliances that Pufendorf describes?

[Locke]

15. According to Locke in the section on "the state of nature and its laws", what is the fundamental law of nature, and what are the two justifications for punishing others?

16. According to Locke in the section on "the state of war", what type of punishment is justified in the state of nature and what is his justification for this?

17. According to Locke in the section on "slavery", which type of slavery is permissible and which impermissible?

18. According to Locke in the section on "property", how is property created, and what is his reasoning for why we don't need permission from everyone else to take and use those things that are held in common?

19. According to Locke in the section "original contract creates political society", what are the constraints of the original contract?

20. According to Locke in the section on "dissolution of government", what governmental actions put the government in a state of war with the people, and what is Locke's justification of civil war?

21. Short essay: please select one of the following and answer it in a minimum of 100 words.

[Hobbes]

a. Hobbes has an especially dismal view of the natural condition. Discuss the aspects of human nature that, according to Hobbes, put us at war with others and whether you agree with his assessment of human nature.

b. In the second law of nature, which establishes the foundation of the social contract, Hobbes essentially says that we should mutually divest ourselves of hostile rights to achieve peace. Explain what the hostile rights are that he's talking about, and whether giving up that group of rights would go far enough in securing a peaceful society.

c. One of the central components of Hobbes's social contract theory is whether people will be properly motivated to uphold their part of the contract. In the section on the third law, Hobbes speculates about a "fool" who thinks he's sneaky enough to get away with breaking the social contract without anyone knowing about it. Evaluate Hobbes's response to the fool and whether you agree with his solution.

d. Explain how Hobbes's account of natural law differs from that of Aquinas or Grotius.

e. Explain how Hobbes's account of the social contract differs from what Plato presents (in either Crito or The Republic) or what is presented in Vindication against Tyrants.

[Pufendorf]

f. In the section on self-preservation, Pufendorf describes the natural condition of humans in a very dismal way. How does this differ from Hobbes's equally gloomy account of the state of nature?

g. In the section on natural laws authored by God, describe the relation between God and natural law as Pufendorf describes it, and discuss how it differs from Grotius's view of God and natural law.

h. In three sections Pufendorf describes the unsocial aspects of human nature (i.e., in "self-preservation," "disadvantages of living in large communities," and "government needed to enforce the social contract"). List these and discuss whether his theory adequately explains how we can rise above these to form a peaceful society.

i. In the section on two covenants and a constitution, Pufendorf describes the three types of alliances that we need to form in order to create a functioning community and government. Discuss whether all of these alliances are really needed, or whether he has even left out other types of alliances that are necessary.

j. In the section on governments ordained by God, Pufendorf discusses the relation between God and government. Dante also addresses this issue in On Monarchy, particularly in the section on the separate domains of temporal and spiritual powers. Are Pufendorf's and Dante's views the same? Explain.

[Locke]

k. Locke's four natural rights are those of life, health, liberty and possessions. Jefferson's list of rights consists of life, liberty and happiness. Is one of these lists more fundamental or better than the other? Explain.

l. Locke argues that when we form political societies for the benefit of protection, we must give up some of our liberty. Describe the kinds of freedoms that we relinquish.

m. Might Locke's conception of property acquisition justify the exploitation of land inhabited by indigenous tribal people?

n. Criticize Locke's defense of revolution.

o. How does Locke's defense of revolution differ from that of Brutus's, and which is better?