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POLITICAL WAVES IN LATIN AMERICA, 1940–1988

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INTRODUCTION

To talk about waves, phases or cycles of democracy and dictatorship is a common way to generalize about Latin American political development, especially about the post Second World War development. Mitchell Seligson, for example, considers that a prevailing view among scholars is that there is a Latin American pattern consisting of political cycles of roughly twenty years' duration.[1] Karen Remmer emphasizes that the recent political development is a redemocratization of the region, forming one of the "cyclical shifts away from authoritarians."[2] In a similar way, Harold Blakemore generalizes about modern Latin American politics:

> It is significant that the recent history shows a certain regional swing from the one form of government to the other, in cycles of dictatorship followed by democracy. In the 1970s, for example, the characteristic form of rule was military dictatorship, as in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Uruguay, Bolivia, Paraguay, and with the notable exception of Costa Rica, much of Central America. In the early 1980s, however, there was a swing back to democratic forms in many countries, and there is no doubt that example is infectious.[3]

Another example of the cycle- or wave-discussion is found in John Martz's recent survey of Latin American political regimes, where he speaks of the "cyclical process (which) has been evident for some years."[4] Although

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Alain Rouquié does not use the democracy–dictatorship dichotomy, but rather a military–civil classification, he also underlines the regional alternations between different regimes. According to Rouquié, twelve out of twenty Latin American republics were military regimes in 1954, but only one was left by the middle of 1961 (Paraguay).[5] After observing the military wave (or waves) in the 1960s and the 1970s, Rouquié then concludes that:

> As of 1976–77, democracy seemed to be making some headway once again...If one judges merely on the basis of figures, in 1978 twelve electoral consultations took place on the continent. This intense electoral activity seemed to augur a return to representative procedures.[6]

Samuel Huntington has also paid attention to the regional political trend in Latin America which he sees as a result either of one of three possible factors, or of a combination of them. These three factors are: simultaneous parallel socioeconomic development; the impact of one "pace-setting" society on its neighbors; or a common external factor.[7]

Huntington provides a good starting point for analysis of the causes of the cyclical shifts. However, before a political phenomenon can begin to be explained it must be properly described. A fundamental criterion when labeling a regional political change as, for example, a wave of democracy, is that most of the countries in the region are washed over by this wave.

The aim of this paper is to make a systematic exploration of the proposition that modern political development of Latin American is characterized by swings between dictatorship and democracy. The result of such an exploration is, of course, highly dependent upon the definition of each form of regime or political system. Here an important guiding principle is that the definitions should be useful for comparative empirical analysis. Accordingly, this paper follows in the tradition of Schumpeter and also Huntington.

> A political system is defined as democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision-makers are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote.[8]

For the sake of simplicity, dictatorship or rather authoritarianism, is seen as the negation of democracy, i.e. a political system without free and competitive elections. These two simple definitions will be used when testing the wave-proposition by studying, over time, the existence of one of the most crucial components of political democracy — the presidential elections.

The motive for such a study is simply that no systematic examination of the "veracity" of this proposition has been found.

ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRACY

In this paper elections are regarded as a prerequisite for democracy, a view that is not uncontested. With a less instrumental and more "principal" definition of democracy, voting could be seen as just one out of many methods of participation — neither better nor worse than any other.[9] Nevertheless, voting is by far the most common method of measuring and aggregating individual preferences in advanced societies and when elections are free, fair and competitive they normally meet the requirements of a democratic method.

However, non-free, unfair and non-competitive elections are also very common around the world, e.g. in Latin America. Such "elections without choice" do not qualify a regime for being classified as democratic.[10] An effort will be made in this work to identify such elections. Moreover, holding an election which does not allow freedom of choice for voters and/or competition between the candidates, i.e. holding a non-classical election,[11] is one way of breaking down a democracy. In that case, a non-classical election is a regime-shifting election.

Yet, the most common method used to end a period of democracy is the coup d'état. Nevertheless, it is quite common for the resulting non-democratic regime to hold elections. Guy Hermet identifies four functions of such state-controlled and non-classical elections:

1. They provide an occasion for the authoritarian government to communicate with the people;
2. They give the government the opportunity to educate and socialize the people;
3. They provide a means for the government to legitimize itself both nationally and internationally;
4. They provide a means for the government to "give public sanction to the rivalries of the different factions of the élite," to "capture new elements whose support is sought by the rulers," or "to weaken the influences of traditional forces such as the religious forces."[12]

When elections fill only these four functions they are at best held in a context of liberalization of the authoritarian regime. However, as long as they

Figure 1

Regimes in Latin America with elected chief executives, 1940–1988



A =	Argentina	Ec =	Ecuador	P =	Panama
Bo =	Bolivia	ES =	El Salvador	Pa =	Paraguay
Br =	Brazil	G =	Guatemala	Pe =	Peru
Ch =	Chile	H =	Honduras	U =	Uruguay
Co =	Colombia	M =	Mexico	V =	Venezuela
CR =	Costa Rica	N =	Nicaragua		

do not determine who governs and with what policies they do not lead to democracy. The effect of the election on government policies is the third variable distinguishing classical from non-classical elections, the other two being freedom of voters and competition between candidates.[13] If an authoritarian regime holds an election that meets all of these three requirements, then the election is a democratization one.[14]

To sum up, elections are held in both authoritarian and democratic regimes, although with different functions. In a democracy the election actually determines who governs while in a dictatorship it does not, and therefore it cannot be free and competitive. Elections in an authoritarian regime, however, could form part of a liberalization process leading to a stage where they also determine who governs, i.e. they form democratization elections.

Since this study concentrates on the shifts between democracy and dictatorship it would be important to identify elections within this latter context. In this paper, however, lack of data and information mean that the concept of democratization-election is simply defined as a free and competitive election which marks the end of rule by a non-elected government.[15]

In order to investigate the wave-proposition, every government since 1940 in the seventeen Latin American republics on the American mainland will be classified as democratic or non-democratic. The classification will be exclusively based on the method used to come to power. When non-electoral successions or non-free and non-competitive elections of the national political leadership are used the regimes are classified as non-democratic.

Since the political systems of Latin America traditionally are very strong presidential systems, the elections that are studied are those of the chief executive. An exploration of the governments and presidents of Latin America since 1940 shows that most of them have been appointed through national elections.

In Figure 1, no regard is paid to the election being competitive, semi-competitive or non-competitive and it is evident that basing a classification of regimes on these results would be very misleading. Notwithstanding this self-evident objection, the figure hints at the wave-character of Latin American political development. The number of elected governments increased after 1945, decreased after 1954, increased rather dramatically 1956 to 1959, decreased slowly until 1972 and increased steadily after 1982.

ELECTORAL COMPETITION

Obviously, there is much room left for further criteria in this classification. The first one to be included is the indicator of competitiveness: the mere existence of political parties and the existence of one or more opposition candidates participating in the election. Moreover, periods in which the constitution is disregarded although the elected chief-executive remains in office are considered as non-democratic periods.

Before any further discussion of the political waves in Latin America is undertaken, a few words need to be said about electoral abstention. The elimination from the classification of regimes coming to power through uncontested elections could be very misleading, since abstention by opposition parties might be political tactics. In such a case a non-competitive election is not the result of a non-democratic system, but rather a result of a less than fully institutionalized democratic system.[16] However, all except one of the cases of one-candidate-elections seem to be cases of "continuismo" rather than "retraimiento," i.e. the incumbent regime uses greater or lesser force to see to it that it stays in power after the election.

The exception is the presidential election in Colombia 1949 which led to the breakdown of the "oligarchical democracy" and instead paved the way for the Gómez dictatorship. No legal restrictions were put on the Liberal party's participation but, nevertheless, it decided to abstain. There are many possible reasons for this decision, one of which could be that party members were persecuted by the police and army.[17] Thus, the election which was held during a state of siege was not a sign of "continuismo," though it cannot be classified as democratic.

Many political regimes which come to power through elections allow no political opposition, except from marginal electoral competition. Although, the question of real political competition includes more than counting votes, one would be very suspicious of the competitiveness of a regime, if one and the same party or candidate gets an overwhelming majority in many elections in a row. In order for opposition parties to be a real challenge to the ruling élite, they should win close to 50 percent of the vote. However, many scholars use a 30-percent limit when identifying competitive regimes.[18] Table 1 shows the minimally competitive elections (two candidates) in which the opposition parties together won less than this proportion of the vote.

Three different types of political regimes are identified in Table 1. The first one includes, above all, the states with long-lasting and extensive political control under one political party or one small political élite. These states are Mexico, Nicaragua and Paraguay. In Mexico, Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) and its predecessor, have dominated and controlled political life since the 1930s, to such an extent that the elections have never been held in order to decide who is going to rule. However, the latest presidential election (1988) was an exception to that rule, since PRI's candidate Carlos Salinas de Gortari only received around 50 percent of the vote.

In Nicaragua, the Somoza family controlled politics through the Partido Liberal Nacionalista (PLN) for more than 40 years (1936–1979). The PLN candidate won less than 70 percent of the vote (61,7%) in only one of the six presidential elections held during that period (1947). However, this election had no political effect, since "Tacho" Somoza ousted the winning candidate a few months after the election.[19]

Similarly, in Paraguay Alfredo Stroessner has controlled politics through a totally dominating political party — Partido Colorado. Presidential elections with at least one legal opposition candidate have been held every five years since 1958. On every occasion Stroessner has won more than 70 percent of the vote.

Table 1

Presidential elections in which the winning candidate received more than 70% of the vote, 1940–1988

Country	Year	Votes (%)
Bolivia	1956	82.2
	1960	74.5
Colombia	1958	79.9
	1966	71.4
El Salvador	1956	93.8
	1962	92.2
Guatemala	1944	87.1
Mexico	1940	93.9
	1946	77.8
	1952	74.3
	1958	90.4
	1964	87.7
	1970	83.2
	1976	94.4
	1982	74.4
Nicaragua	1950	90.0
	1957	89.2
	1963	90.5
	1967	70.3
	1974	>80
Paraguay	1958	76.8
	1963	87.3
	1968	71.1
	1973	75.4
	1978	89.6
	1983	90.0
	1988	88.6
Peru	1939	77.5
Venezuela	1947	74.5

Sources: K. Ruddle & P. Guillette, eds., *Latin American Political Statistics* (Los Angeles: Latin American Center, University of California, 1972); *Statistical Abstract of Latin America*, vol. 19, 1978; *Record of World Events*, Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1974–1988.

El Salvador 1956–1967 can also be added to these cases of regimes with closely restricted political competition. During this period the country was governed by the military and its party, PRUD (Partido Revolucionario de Unificación Democrática), which in 1960 became PCN (Partido de Conciliación Nacional). In the 1956 presidential election the "official" candidate won more than 90 percent of the vote. The election held six years later (1962) was even more non-competitive, although the regime tried to prove the existence of competition by presenting the number of blank votes to the public.[20]

The second type of semi-competitive regime includes Bolivia 1956–1964, Guatemala 1944–1950, and Venezuela 1947. The elections in

Guatemala in 1944 and in Venezuela in 1947 were held after the overthrow of long-lasting dictatorships. The overwhelming majority won by Gallegos in Venezuela and Arévalo in Guatemala should, therefore, be ascribed to widespread political support and the lack of opportunity of choice, rather than political repression.[21]

The elections in Bolivia 1956 and 1960 were also characterized by lack of alternatives. The revolutionary-populist party MNR (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario), which led the revolution in 1952, kept a strong grip on the Bolivian society for a long time, until internal party splits paved the way for a new military coup in 1964.[22]

The elections in Peru, 1939, and Colombia, 1958, constitute a third type of semi-competitive elections. On both occasions the political élite arranged a controlled and smooth transition from military to civilian rule, characterized by limited political competition under formal democracy. In Colombia, the two dominating parties — the Liberals and the Conservatives — reached a historic compromise, in that they went to the presidential election with one joint candidate, representing the Frente Nacional.[23] This compromise explains the winning candidate's large proportion of the votes in the 1958, 1962, and 1966 elections.

In the light of the above, it is difficult to determine a given proportion of electoral competition above which an election and, consequently, a regime, unmistakably, can be identified as democratic. However, the 30 percent limit, which has been used here, serves as a guide when describing the political swings in Latin America. Among those regimes coming to power through support of over 70 percent of the voters, El Salvador 1956–1967, Nicaragua 1951–1979, Paraguay from 1958, and Mexico 1940–1988 are defined as non-competitive regimes. In other words, the elections in El Salvador 1956, Nicaragua 1950, Paraguay 1958 and Mexico 1940 are not seen as democratization elections.

ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION

The second dimension of the democracy definition guiding this study is political participation. In a political system with periodic elections this dimension is often operationalized as electoral participation. A prerequisite for extensive electoral participation is universal suffrage. Consequently, a regime that does not give as many as possible the opportunity to vote is non-democratic.

Table 2

Female suffrage in Latin America

Country	Female suffrage achieved	Year in which women voted for the first time in a presidential election
Ecuador	1929	1940
Brazil	1932	1945
Uruguay	1932	1938
El Salvador	1939	1950
Panama	1946	1948
Venezuela	1947	1947
Argentina	1947	1951
Chile	1949	1952
Costa Rica	1949	1953
Bolivia	1952	1956
Mexico	1953	1958
Colombia	1954	1958
Peru	1955	1956
Nicaragua	1955	1957
Honduras	1956	1957
Paraguay	1961	1963
Guatemala	1965 *	1966

*Literate women enfranchised 1945

Sources: W. Pierson & Gil, *Governments of Latin America* (New York: MacGraw Hill, 1957), p. 345; K. Ruddle & P. Guillette (see Table 1); T. Skidmore & P. Smith, *Modern Latin America* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 66.

Common factors which regulate enfranchisement in Latin America are sex, literacy and age.[24] Since age is in some sense a necessary regulation, existing in every democracy, this factor is left aside. However, requirements concerning literacy and gender can not be seen as necessary in order to elect political representatives. Accordingly, an electoral system which eliminates half the national population from voting because of its sex is considered as non-democratic.

The literacy requirement is also a non-democratic control, although with very variable effects. Ecuador before 1979, for example, eliminated

Figure 2

Regimes in Latin America with chief executives appointed through competitive elections under male and female suffrage, 1940–1988



For abbreviations see Figure 1

half of its potential electorate through the use of this control, whereas Chile before 1970 eliminated only ten to fifteen percent using the same requirement.[25]

Electoral control through the use of literacy requirements is not included in Figure 2 owing to the different effect this measure has across countries. This means that especially Ecuador until 1979 and Guatemala until 1966, but also Peru until 1980 and Brazil until 1982, are treated generously in this classification. When voting participation figures are analyzed in the next section, however, the undemocratic effect of this requirement will be revealed.

Figure 2 shows a different picture of the political waves than the earlier one. The figure indicates a long and almost steadily growing wave of democracy from the end of the Second World War to 1958. Within this fourteen-year period thirteen Latin American regimes guaranteed women the right to vote and also gave them the opportunity to use their right. All of the states, except Paraguay, Nicaragua, and Mexico, were democratized at some time during this period. From the year 1945 to the year 1959 the total number of formal democracies increased from one to thirteen. If democracy is viewed from an electoral competition and limited participation perspective, it is obvious that the 1950s and the 1980s are the heydays of democratization in Latin America.

Table 3

Voter participation in presidential elections: the first election with participation rates above 20%, and participation rates in the previous election (% of total population)

Country	First election >20%	Participation	Previous election	Participation
Argentina	1951	42.3	1946	17.2
Bolivia	1956	28.2	1952	4.0
Brazil *	1974	21.7	1969	18.7
Chile	1964	29.6	1958	16.9
Colombia	1958	21.5	1949	10.3
	1974	22.7	1970	19.0
Costa Rica	1953	20.7	1948	12.7
Ecuador	1979	20.1	1968	15.1
El Salvador	1950	32.8	1946	17.9
	1984	31 †	1972 ‡	17.7
Guatemala	1985	24.1	1982	14 †
Honduras	1971	22.9	1954	15.7
Mexico	1958	22.2	1952	13.1
Nicaragua	1957	27.5	1951	17.0
Panama	1952	25.3	1948	18.9
Paraguay	1954	20.0	1953	15.0
Peru	1980	25.7	1963	17.8
Uruguay	1942	26.0	1938	17.8
Venezuela	1947	26.6	1897	17.3

* Congressional elections † Own estimation

‡ Data from the 1977 presidential election not available

Sources: E. Ochoa, "The Rapid Expansion of Voter Participation in Latin America: Presidential Elections, 1845–1986," in *Statistical Abstract of Latin America*, vol. 25, 1987; *Statistical Abstract of Latin America*, vol. 24, 1986; *The Europa Yearbook*, 1988; *Record of World Events*, Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1982.

VOTER PARTICIPATION

The mere existence of universal suffrage does not reveal how effective the electoral participation is, or, in other words, how inclusive the regime is.[26]

Usually this dimension of democracy is measured by, for example, the proportion of registered voters, voting age population, or total population, voting in different elections.

Participation data from Latin America is often presented as percentages of registered voters or total population. Since the registration procedure as such is an effective method of electoral control, often used by Latin American regimes, this study focuses on the latter indicator.[27] Figures showing the proportions of the total population also throw light on regimes using literacy requirements in the elections. Voting participation statistics from Guatemala, Ecuador an Peru, for example, show that this requirement has been a tremendously effective method for depriving the majority of the people of their right to vote.

Political statistics of Latin America show that the proportion of registered voters voting in presidential elections is often fairly large. The pattern is changed, however, when the proportion of the whole population is measured.

Table 3 shows the first election in each Latin American country in which voting participation figures reached above 20 percent. The 20 percent limit is arbitrarily chosen, but it is hard to imagine how to identify "rule by the people" when "the people" consists of *less* than one fifth of the total population.

The table illustrates that the voter participation breakthrough in many Latin American countries is related to the introduction of female suffrage. Yet, in at least Peru and Ecuador the crossing of the 20 percent threshold did not occur until the literacy requirement was also abandoned (1979 and 1980 respectively). In only one of the Latin American states — Paraguay — did voter participation exceed 20 percent before women were enfranchised. Data from the non-competitive and strictly controlled presidential elections in that country, however, hardly reflect deliberate voting. One could also suspect that, in addition to unreliable statistics, severe political repression together with compulsory voting have modified the Paraguayan figures considerably.[28]

In both Colombia and El Salvador, voter participation figures once again sank below the 20 percent threshold, shortly after the increase caused by the first women votes. Besides institutional restrictions, a primary cause of this decrease is probably the violent political culture of these two countries, resulting in political apathy among the majority of the people.

Figure 3

Regimes in Latin America with chief executives appointed through competitive elections under male and female suffrage, and with voter participation rates above 20% of the total population, 1940–1988



For abbreviations see Figure 1

THE DEVELOPMENT OF FORMAL DEMOCRACY, 1940–1988

When both dimensions of democracy are included in the analysis the picture of Latin America's political development since 1940 changes. Figure 3 shows that, before 1947, Uruguay was the only Latin American nation whose government built its power on effective political competition and participation. Venezuela experienced a short period of democracy during 1947 and 1948, but during the following three years, the regime in Montevideo was once again the only competitive-participatory regime. During the 1950s, democracy developed along the two dimensions in many Latin American countries. However, there was no dramatic change, since only seven out of the seventeen countries under study were qualified formal democracies at the end of the decade. The wave of democracy, pronounced when only the competition dimension was considered, is more difficult to detect when the concept of democracy is qualified.

Furthermore, the regional political development during the 1960s and 1970s can be identified as a gradual change rather than a sudden wave of dictatorship. This implies that the military coups d'état in El Salvador 1960, Ecuador 1961, Peru 1962 and 1968, Guatemala and Honduras 1963, Brazil

1964,[29] Panama 1968, and Bolivia 1969 did not sweep away qualified democratic political systems, even if the coups more or less defeated some of the democratic principles. The military takeovers in Honduras 1972, Uruguay[30] and Chile 1973, and Argentina 1976, on the other hand, seriously hit competitive-participatory political regimes.[31]

Viewed from a democracy perspective, including the competition as well as the qualified-participation dimension, the 1980s stand out as the great period of democracy in Latin American post World War II history. At the end of the last decade, only Venezuela, Costa Rica, and with a bare margin Colombia, met the four democracy requirements used here (elected president, universal suffrage, 30% opposition, 20% voter participation), while at the time of writing (May 1989) the requirements are met by at least thirteen states.

Brazil is still a doubtful case to some extent, since the president is not elected directly by the people. However, the congressional election in 1982, upon which the composition of the electoral college was founded, was competitive and involved a high participation rate. Panama was an uncertain case between September 1985, when president Barletta resigned and was replaced by Eric Delvalle, and March 1988, when the military, headed by General Noriega, ousted Delvalle and replaced him by another civilian (Solís Palma).

The number of institutional democracies in Latin America increased to thirteen (or fourteen, depending on the classification of Brazil) in December 1988, when Carlos Salinas de Gortari took over as president of Mexico. Salinas is the first president in Mexico appointed through elections meeting all the requirements of democratic elections used in this study.[32]

CONCLUSIONS

In this paper an effort is made to describe the regional political development in Latin America since 1940, often depicted as a cyclical alternation between democracy and dictatorship. A pure electoral definition of democracy, borrowed from Huntington and Schumpeter is used, resulting in different classification schemes (Figures 1–3) depending on how the concept of democracy is operationalized.

If competitiveness is considered to be the most important aspect of democracy, then Latin America has experienced two marked waves of democracy since World War II — one in the 1950s and one in the 1980s. On

the other hand, if electoral participation is considered to be as important a dimension as competition, then only the latter period could be characterized as a wave of democracy in Latin American political history.

Consequently, one simple conclusion drawn from this study is that scholarly descriptions of Latin American political development as regional shifts between democracy and authoritarianism do not stand up against a close scrutiny using a universal and two-dimensional definition of democracy. Previous democratic periods have, in most of the countries, been "democratic" in a much more narrow sense than the present one.

If more criteria of democracy had been included, the "graphs" of Latin American political history since 1940 would probably have changed a little. As already mentioned, it is impossible to identify which elections have been totally free and which elections have actually determined who governs, since important questions about electoral fraud, the degree of civilian supremacy over the military, the degree of political violence, etc. are not asked in this study. Until further systematic research of Latin American political development shows something else, however, a last cautious conclusion is that an incremental political development seems to run parallel with the quite superficial cyclical shifts. From a regional and an "electoral" point of view, Latin American democracy is more widespread and firmly based on the people in the 1980s than it was in previous democratic periods.

To suggest an incremental development, however, is not to say that democracy is the determined goal of Latin American political history. Such predictions are too risky in the light of the breakdowns of the old democratic regimes in Chile and Uruguay in the 1970s as well as the abundance of deep political, economic, and social problems which continuously threatens the consolidation of the "new democracies."

Notes

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2 Karen Remmer, "Redemocratization and the Impact of Authoritarian Rule in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 17, 1985, pp. 257–258.

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4 John D. Martz, "Latin America and the Caribbean," in Robert Wesson, ed., *Democracy: A Worldwide Survey* (New York: Praeger, 1987), p. 50.

5 Alain Rouquié, "Demilitarization and the Institutionalization of Military-dominated Polities in Latin America," in G. O'Donnell, P. Schmitter and L. Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 109 in part III.

6 Ibid., p. 195.

7 Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?", *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 99, no. 2, 1984, p. 207.

8 Ibid., p. 195.

9 See Richard Kimber, "The Concept of Democracy," paper for the conference on 'Advances in Comparative Institutional Analysis,' Inter-University Centre of Postgraduate Studies, Dubrovnik, 1987, pp. 9–10.

10 See G. Hermet, R. Rose & A. Rouquié, eds., *Elections without Choice* (London: Macmillan, 1978).

11 The concepts of classical and non-classical elections are from Guy Hermet, "State-controlled Elections: A Framework," in G. Hermet, R. Rose & A. Rouquié, op. cit.

12 Ibid., pp. 13–16.

13 Ibid., p 3.

14 See Paul W. Drake & Eduardo Silva, eds., *Elections and Democratization in Latin America, 1980–85* (San Diego: Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies, University of California, 1986), pp. 5–7.

15 The data on elections are from: Kenneth Ruddle and Philip Gillette, eds., *Latin American Political Statistics* (Los Angeles: Latin American Center, University of California, 1972); *Statistical Abstract of Latin America*, vol. 19, 1978, vol. 23, 1984, and vol. 24, 1986 (Los Angeles: Latin American Center Publications, University of California); Enrique Ochoa, "The Rapid Expansion of Voter Participation in Latin America: Presidential Elections, 1845–1986," in *Statistical Abstract of Latin America*, vol. 25 (Los Angeles: Latin American Center Publications, University of California, 1987) ; and *Record of World Events*, Keesing's Contemporary Archives.

16 Alexander W. Wilde, "Conversations among Gentlemen: Oligarchical Democracy in Colombia," in Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 32 in part III.

17 Ibid., pp. 57–58.

18 See Tatu Vanhanen, "The Emergence of Democracy: A Comparative Study of 119 States, 1850–1979," *Commentationes Scientiarum Socialum* 24 (Helsinki: The Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters, 1984), p. 32.

19 Ronald MacDonald, *Party Systems and Elections in Latin America* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1971), p. 233.

20 K. Ruddle & P. Gillette, op.cit., p. 41.

21 On Venezuela, see John A, Peeler, *Latin American Democracies: Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela* (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1985), p. 86.

22 Laurence Whitehead, "Bolivia's Failed Democratization, 1977–1980," in G. O'Donnell, P. Schmitter & L. Whitehead, op. cit., part II.

23 J. Peeler, op. cit., p. 57–58.

24 Ronald McDonald, "Electoral Fraud and Regime Controls in Latin America," *The Western Political Quarterly* 25, 1972, p. 86.

25 Ibid., pp. 86–87.

26 Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971).

27 See R. McDonald, 1972, op. cit., p. 88.

28 See Enrique C. Ochoa, "The Rapid Expansion of Voter Participation in Latin America: Presidential Elections, 1845–1986," in James W. Wilkie & David Lorey, eds., *Statistical Abstract of Latin America*, vol. 25 (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center Publications, University of California, 1987), p. 866.

29 The military coup d'état in Brazil 1964 put an end to the rule by the competitive, but non-participatory, Goulart regime. The civilian governments between 1945 and 1964 based their rule on 13 to 18 percent of the total population. See E. Ochoa, op. cit., p. 872.

30 The elected president Bordaberry did not resign until 1976 although effective political power lay in the hands of the National Security Council since 1973.

31 The coup in Bolivia in November 1964 swept away the MNR government under Víctor Paz Estenssoro, appointed the same year after non-competitive elections. Paz was president also between 1960 and 1964, after he had won an election, probably with the help of fraud, and in which the opposition parties together won around 25 percent of the votes, and 24 percent of the total population voted.

32 Mexico is not included in Figure 3 for the year 1988 since Salinas de Gortari was inaugurated in December that year.