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INTRAPARTY AND INTERPARTY POLITICS: FACTIONS, FRACTIONS, PARTIES, AND COALITIONS IN URUGUAY (1985-1999)

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I. INTRODUCTION

A vast majority of the studies in coalition formation and survival, either in parliamentary or presidential regimes, take political parties as the critical units of analysis. Political parties are crucial organizations in contemporary democracies. Although there is an important literature on intra-party politics, little research has been done on how differences in party organization affect party's willingness to engage in coalition politics. The body of coalition theory, especially those works made from a rational choice perspective, treats parties as unitary actors that bargain over a set of well-defined gains—usually, office or policy. In this assumption there is some truth, but more error. It is not that parties do not pursue offices or policies, but rather the idea of parties as unitary actors. Parties are complex organizations, where internal divisions and structures affect how they and their leaders politically behave.

In analyzing the motivations of political parties to join an executive coalition we frequently focus our attention on their electoral, office, and policy gains. While some scholars stress one of these motivations, i.e. office and vote (Downs 1957); policy (Wittman 1973); office (McCubbins y Rosenbluth 1995), other scholars combine them in one way or another (Altman 2000, Strøm 1990, Strøm y Müller 1999). Although some scholars seek to capture the complexity of political parties' goals, a broad body of the literature on inter-party politics treats parties as unitary actors. Perceiving parties as unitary actors has its advantages in terms of research resources, and that in some instances it is indeed legitimate to study inter-party politics assuming parties are unitary actors. Nonetheless, it is a rather simplistic view of political parties and there are important works in the literature that have already underlined the problems attached to considering

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parties as such (Coppedge 1994, Katz y Mair 1992, Laver y Shepsle 1999). In fact, "although many interesting political phenomena can be described by treating parties as if they were unitary actors, we clearly do need to consider what goes on inside parties if we want to include an account of party decision making in a model of some political process" (Laver y Shepsle 1999:23).

Moreover, "the scholarly literature that examines political parties is enormous, and yet our systematic knowledge of party objectives and behavior is still quite modest" (Strøm y Müller 1999:5). Thus, if we are aware that political parties are rather complex organizations, why is there so little research on how intra-party politics affect coalition bargaining? As Druckman remarks,

> This gap has two explanations. First, despite the large amount of theoretical knowledge of intra-party functioning, little empirical data have been historically available for testing propositions. Second, the theoretical literature on inter-party competition often starts from the premise that parties are unitary, allowing for more parsimonious models (Druckman 1996:398).

Most case-studies on coalition formation and survival tend to assume internal party organization as a constant variable and therefore, these institutions are usually not empirically studied. If there is not variation among party internal institutions, it would be methodologically correct to leave them aside and to concentrate in inter-party bargaining, as usually happens. Yet, given that inter-party relations are extremely complex to be captured in one or several indicators, statistical cross-national analyses of coalitions almost always give priority to structural characteristics of political parties (legislative size, ideological positions, age of parties, etc.), rather than inter-party relations, which are at best, inadequately defined.

This paper tries to shed light on the connection between intra-party politics and inter-party relations, especially on those issues concerning executive coalition formation and survival using the Uruguayan case. It is clear that intra-party politics affect inter-party politics as important pieces of research have shown. There is a group of intra-party characteristic that determine parties relations, among them: control over nominations, control order of election, pooling of votes, candidate selection, internal competition, entry barriers, etc (See for instance: Amorim Neto y Santos 2001, Colomer y Negretto 2003, Levitsky 1999, Mainwaring y Pérez-Liñán 1997, Mainwaring y Shugart 1997, Morgenstern y Nacif 2002, Shugart y Carey 1992, Strøm y Müller 2001). My interest is to explore how these two aspects, internal politics of political parties and the relations among them could be combined. Nonetheless, before entering to the subject of study let

me briefly refer to some basic characteristics of Uruguayan parties and party system.

II. Intra-Party Politics in Uruguay

Some intra-party characteristics affect the relations among political parties. Many of these characteristics are determined by the electoral system, such as: control over nominations, district magnitudes, pooling of votes, internal competition, or entry barriers (see Chasquetti 2002, Cheibub 2002). It is clear that "without understanding recruitment procedures the study of legislative and executive institutions is incomplete, because we lack the whole picture of the incentives operating on elected officials" (Siavelis y Morgenstern 2004). In these lines, there is no doubt that from 1942 up to the elections of 1999, the electoral system in Uruguay produced strong effects on the party system, especially through its impact on party organization and executive-legislative relations.

Uruguay has currently four political parties with legislative representation. Two of them are called traditional parties, the Colorado and the Blanco, and two belong to the left and center-left ideological spectrum (the Frente Amplio and the Nuevo Espacio respectively). The origins of the traditional parties could be traced back to the Carpintería Battle in 1836 (Pivel Devoto 1942). The other two parties in congress are the heritage of what Uruguayans called "partidos de ideas" that with combinations and transformations have been present in the legislature since 1910. In Table 1 I present the percentage each party hold in the Chamber of Deputies since 1942.[1]

In general terms, Uruguayan parties are hard to characterize with a single category. The traditional parties are not Duverger/mass parties (Duverger 1954), they have weakly institutionalized structures of party leadership selection, stable career paths, or tenure security. Although traditional parties were defined as "notoriously loosely structured and informally organized" (Gillespie 1991:5), they have yet survived for more than 160 years (Sotelo Rico 1999). On the contrary, using Kirchheimer categories (1966), they have been defined as catch-all parties (Bottinelli 1993, Gillespie 1991, González 1991). And lately, at least the traditional parties, it is possible to see some characteristics of cartel parties such as state subventions and stratarchy (Katz y Mair 1995).[2]

Table 1 - Party Percentage of Seats at the Lower Chamber 1942-2004

Party	1942	1946	1950	1954	1958	1962	1966	1971	1984	1989	1994	1999	2004
Colorado	58.5	47.4	53.5	51.5	38.3	44.4	50.5	41.5	42.3	30.0	33.3	32.7	10
Blanco	23.2	31.3	31.3	35.3	50.5	47.4	41.4	40.3	35.4	40.0	31.3	22.2	36
PNI	11.1	9.0	7.0	3.0	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	
U. Cívica	4.0	5.0	4.0	5.0	3.0	***	***	--	2.0	--	--	--	
Comunista	2.0	5.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	3.0*	5.0*	--	--	--	--	--	
Socialista	1.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	3.0	**	0.0	--	--	--	--	--	
PDC	--	--	--	--	--	3.0	3.0	--	--	--	--	--	
U. Popular	--	--	--	--	--	2.0*	0.0	--	--	--	--	--	
F. Amplio	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	18.2	20.8	21.5	30.3	40.3	52
N. Espacio	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	8.5	5.1	4.6	--
Others	0.0	--	0.0	0.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1

* Since 1962 the Communist Party votes were within the lema "Frente Izquierda de Liberación" (FIDEL).
** Since 1962 the Socialist Party votes were within the lema "Unión Popular".
*** Since 1962 the name of the lema becomes "Partido Demócrata Cristiano" (PDC).
Source: Author's Data and Bacigalupe and Marius (1998) and Buquet, Chasquetti, and Moraes (1998).

As a matter of fact, it is also difficult to define the Uruguayan party system in terms of institutionalization. If we define institutionalization, as Mainwaring (1999), as a process by which rules and procedures become widely known, accepted, and complied with, it then becomes crucial where we look for these attributes. From a procedural perspective, Uruguay has an institutionalized party system given that political change follows expected norms (i.e. votes in congress, a significant amount of horizontal accountability, etc.). However, if we stress regime type (which Uruguayans have changed several occasions), it would be rather difficult to claim that Uruguay has an institutionalized regime as some western democracies have. Indeed, no regime in Uruguay had survived more than 17 years without important changes on the rules of the game.[3] Despite the changes in the political regime, a constant game between changing executive coalitions opposed by legislative coalitions remain almost untouched.

Nonetheless, despite these changes in the regime every 17 years, Uruguay has been regarded as one the most institutionalized party system in Latin America, along with Chile and Costa Rica, having the lowest party electoral volatility of the continent (Coppedge 1998, Mainwaring y Scully 1995: 8). The Uruguayan electoral system up to the elections of 1999 was characterized by four major features: 1) concurrent elections for all elective offices every five years; 2) closed lists; 3) double simultaneous vote (DSV) and simple majority for the presidency; and 4) proportional representation (PR) in both legislative chambers and triple simultaneous vote (TSV) for the House (Altman 2000, Bottinelli 1993, Buquet 1997, Buquet, Chasquetti y Moraes 1998, González 1991, González y Gillespie 1994).[4] PR and DSV were one way in which fractions within each party could compete among themselves without hurting their party's chances of winning elections (Buquet y Castellano 1995:18). This combination of PR and DVS was also intended to allow competition among fractions without harming the two-party system. DSV created a strong incentive for cooperation among fractions, while nationwide PR, assuring fractions a 'fair' representation, acted as a strong incentive for competition among them.

Moreover, because of the dynamics of the Uruguayan electoral system, political parties' fractions controlled the nomination process and thus were the most prominent political agents of aggregation and legislative cohesion (Altman 2000, Chasquetti 2003, Morgenstern 1996, Morgenstern 2001, Morgenstern 2004). In several occasions fractions' leaders did not attempt to change the rules and procedures of their own parties and fractions in order to minimize internal dissent or win internal disputes, but instead they tried to change the whole national electoral system and regime of government to fulfill their political desires. Usually changes in electoral

system or regime of government were produced by coalition of fractions that belong to different parties and at the same time they are opposed by a contra-coalition of different fractions from the same parties.

One of the most relevant consequences was that the elected president was no more than another fraction leader (Buquet y Chasquetti 2004, Buquet, Chasquetti y Moraes 1998) since he was only able to control the internal competition and nominations within his fraction. Thus, he had no capabilities to control the nominations and competition of other fractions even in his own party (Morgenstern 2001). Second, political parties' fractions control the nomination process and thus were the most prominent political agents. These fractions presented a high level of legislative cohesion (Moraes y Morgenstern 1995) and they were the most important actors when building political agreements in order to govern (Altman 2000, Buquet 1997, Buquet y Castellano 1995, Chasquetti 2003, González 1991, Moraes 2004, Morgenstern 1996, Morgenstern 2001). While parties are macro-electoral organizations that seldom behave as unitary actors, fractions have been responsible for decisions such as deciding if they integrate a cabinet, to join the opposition, which offices in the public administration they will take, and even what kind of political lines they are going to promote (Altman 2000).

The Uruguayan electoral system produces a clear differentiation among legislators, and it would not be hard to divide them in three main groups. First, the senators, who are elected in a national single district, tend to be concerned with the general problems of the country. On the other hand, deputies from the countryside, who are elected in very small regional districts (*departamentos*), far away form the decision-making center, tend to act in order to defend and represent several interest groups from their own district within the labyrinths of Montevideo's bureaucracy. Finally, Montevideo's (MVD) representatives are a somehow in between the first two types, because Montevideo, despite being only one in nineteen electoral districts, elects nearly half of the country's deputies. This fact, in combination with a close-list PR system, produces that MVD deputies do not have the feeling they are representing certain group of people specifically. The size of each electoral district also affects party machines. The smaller and the further away from MVD a deputy's constituency is, the more she or he will be involved with her/his constituencies. (More than 85% of Uruguayan deputies agree that there is a significant difference between the work deputies from Montevideo and countryside do, see Table 2).[5]

Table 2 - There is a significant difference between the work that a deputy from the countryside does and the one from a Montevideo's deputy

	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	NS/NC	Total
Montevideo	55.6%	27.8%	13.9%	--	2.8%	100.0%
	(20)	(10)	(5)		(1)	(36)
Other Departments	67.3%	20.0%	5.5%	7.3%	--	100.0%
	(37)	(11)	(3)	(4)		(55)
Total	62.6%	23.1%	8.8%	4.4%	1.1%	100.0%
	(57)	(21)	(8)	(4)	(1)	(91)

Source: Author's data.

Political parties in Uruguay differ in their degree of political centralization and in their way of decision-making. The weights of the legislative party and the machine party depend on whether fraction and party leaders are members in Congress or the executive in a given time. At the same time, the degree of centralization and capacity of disciplining legislators depends of the internal correlation of forces within each party. Only during certain periods parties had a unique central authority. Traditional parties have had some secretaries but they were relatively innocuous. And obviously, there is also a tension about the prerogatives such authority might have. In fact, leadership in parties has been more a de facto role than a matter of central authorities, being central authorities only relevant in order to electoral politics. To be member in one of the central authority bodies of parties—either the National Executive Committee of the Colorado Party, Directorate of the Blanco Party, or the Secretariat of the Frente Amplio—has a lower political status than to be legislator in one of these parties, unless someone is a party or fraction leader.

Up to the constitutional reform of 1996, fractions in both traditional parties were the ultimate unit of political decision. Party decisions were, as a matter of fact, the product of intense negotiations among fractions of the same party. Party authorities had power in as much as all fractions of a party had the same position. If this did not occur, party authorities did not function as party authorities. However, traditional parties were and still are not mere coalitions among fractions. They have identity elements that tie them as parties. Nonetheless, when it comes the time to take decisions, they rarely act as a unique structure. A different process happened within the left. Although it is formally a coalition of several parties and fractions, it has central authorities. Let me move to the next section, inter-party relations, and explain how these above-mentioned characteristics affect them.

III. Inter-Party Politics: Evidence from Uruguay (1985-2000)

Maor does not consider centralization as a factor that promotes parties' capabilities in the process of political bargaining. On the contrary,

he concludes that: "Everything being equal, when intraparty conflicts occur, the strength of a party in the parliamentary bargaining arena (i.e. its relative bargaining power) lies in its organizational decentralization" (Maor 1998:145, emphasis in the original). Following Maor, I argue that, other things being equal, parties with informal and weakly institutionalized internal structures may increase their ability to resolve internal conflicts successfully, allowing their fractions to decide independently their relationship with the executive (traditional parties).[6] Contrarily, highly centralized parties have difficulties in channeling conflicts without a major crisis or imposing discipline on the rebels. If a strong internal conflict occurs in these types of parties, it finishes when the rebel group leaves the party or when discipline is forced upon it (i.e. Frente Amplio/Encuentro Progresista). Therefore, in this section I address different dimensions of the bargaining process of coalition formation and I show how internal tensions impact on inter-party politics.

Once a new president is elected, he starts to negotiate with other groups of his own party and other political parties looking for the desired legislative majorities. Given that presidential elections in Uruguay, during this period of analysis occurred during the last Sunday of November of the year in question, and that the new government assumes office on March 1st of the next year, presidents have three months for intensive work to prepare for the new administration. In general, they work along two parallel tracks: first, establishing formal multiparty workshops on specific issues; and second, direct bargaining with other political leaders.

For the first track, the elected president chooses a public place, such as a convention center, as the headquarters for the new administration. In it, several workshops are assembled and they work, as a general rule, simultaneously with members of all political parties that obtained representation in the new Congress. Usually, these workshops are organized in such a way they have a clear thematic correspondence with the ministries of the cabinet; for example: economy, public health, security, and so on. Sometimes, through the map of these committees, it is also possible to foresee the most important policy-issues that the new administration will pursue, given the ad-hoc nature of these commissions, such as reform of the social security system, constitutional reform, or MERCOSUR. In any case, only a handful of party leaders are involved in the crucial negotiations over portfolios and government policies. As Strøm argues,

> "It is true that these individuals are constrained by previous party policies and commitments, but such constraints rarely go beyond the specification of an acceptable set of coalition partners and a small set of nonnegotiable issues.

> Fundamentally, the process of cabinet formation is a game played by a *very small and select set of party leaders*" (Strøm 1990:27, Italics are mine).

Several members from each fraction, in general one or two delegates, compose each workshop (Chasquetti 2000). What seems interesting is that the probability that a member of a specific commission will be the minister in the corresponding ministry is pretty high. For instance in 1984 Sanguinetti formed his economic advisory group around Luis Faroppa, Ricardo Zerbino, and Luis Mosca. At this opportunity Zerbino was elected Minister of Economy. In 1994, Sanguinetti again formed his committees around what he called "priority issue-areas": education, constitutional reform, reglementation and legislation for political parties, public security, and economy. In each workshop a laborious process of negotiation takes place. Sometimes a consensus or a broad support for a specific measure was impossible to reach. However, in case enough support is reached, the outputs of these committees are virtually bills ready to be launched during the first sessions of congress the following March. In the last administration of Sanguinetti, the education and social security reforms are examples of this.

For the second track, the new president negotiates directly with other political leaders. These leaders are in general those who competed for the presidency. This negotiation has two avenues. The first is the direct bargaining process with each leader separately. The second avenue, the reaction to the presidential offer, usually involves a coordinated response from fractions belonging to the same party. This is because, as Morgenstern says, "factions have interests that push them to work together for the good of the party, but at the same time they have interests in distinguishing themselves for electoral purposes. Further, the electoral cycle drives the weights of these competing pressures, leading factional cooperation to break down as elections near" (Morgenstern 2001: 235).

In 1990 "the three Colorado leaders (Jorge Batlle, Jorge Pacheco, and Enrique Tarigo) met in order to see if they could give a joint answer to Lacalle" (Búsqueda : January 25 1990). But in 1994 the Blanco leaders (Alberto Volonté, Andrés Ramírez and Carlos Julio Pereira) transmitted to Sanguinetti their intention of adopting a unique and coordinated position (El Observador : December 7 1994). Moreover, the Blanco leaders presented to the elected government a document setting negotiation guidelines. They agreed that some points of the economic opening were "not-negotiable" (El Observador : December 9 1994). This phenomenon of coordinating responses towards a coalition agreement by opposition fractions did not occur in 1985 because Wilson Ferreira qualitatively and quantitatively dominated the Blanco Party.

The president negotiates with fractions, while at the same time he negotiates with leaders. However, it does not mean parties could not give a collective response if all fractions reached an agreement—as Morgenstern described (1996, Chapter 5, section IV). Presidents think on both levels — party and fraction — simultaneously. The basic rule is that leaders of the same political status do most political negotiations in Uruguay. "The President of the Republic cannot negotiate with deputies. He negotiates with the sectors, with the leaders" (Lacalle, personal interview, Montevideo, July 21 1997). As Secretary of the Presidency Elías Bluth explained:

> "The president negotiates with the heads of the sectors, or exceptionally, with a legislator when he operates like the great political articulator of a *caudillo*. If this is the case, this negotiation is going to be done with the prior knowledge of the *caudillo*. Examples: Sanguinetti talks much with Volonté, a lot. But once in a while he speaks with Walter Santoro, because the president knows that Santoro is the most important political sustenance of the group. He also talks with Lacalle with enough frequency; less than with Volonté, but once in a while the president has spoken with Ignacio de Posadas [Lacalle's former Minister of Finance]. In other cases he speaks with the *caudillos*: Carlos Julio Pereira, Juan Andrés Ramírez, etc. (Personal Interview, Montevideo: November 3 1998)."

This norm of horizontal bargaining endures throughout the presidential period and it is not limited only to the period of coalition formation. Former President Lacalle fully confirms this norm:

> "I have no desire to involve myself in the internal affairs of another party -'in another henhouse'- to talk to a deputy without his leader's knowledge. We have certain norms of political behavior that we must respect. I would not like somebody to talk with a deputy from Herrerismo without my prior knowledge, either. There is a certain sense of hierarchy that one must keep, firstly because of politeness and secondly, because it is unnecessary to irritate people in vain. Look, the tribal chiefs meet, not the indians (President Lacalle, personal interview, Montevideo: July 21, 1997)."

Figure 1 simplifies the major avenues of negotiation among political leaders. As seen in the figure, all lines run either vertically or horizontally. The vertical lines are "loyalty" lines, while the horizontal ones represent a relationship of equality in status. Only in exceptional situations, such as those expressed by Elías Bluth, may some of these lines be drawn diagonally. This tendency is consistent with that described in the legislative arena by Morgenstern (1996). As he explains it, "House members elected under a given Senator will vote with that Senator and Senators elected under a given Presidential candidate will vote with that Presidential candidate".



Figure 1 - Horizontal Negotiation
Source: Altman 2001

But the pattern of negotiation is not random. Leaders' preferences determine with whom they are to bargain first, second, and so on. As we saw during Lacalle's administration his strategy consisted of three concentric circles of negotiation. He said: "The first round of conversations will be held with the members of the Blanco party. Then, we will bargain with the Colorado party, with the Frente Amplio party, and with Senator Hugo Batalla [leader of the PGP party]. I have to follow the hierarchy of the suffrage" (quoted by Mancebo 1991:31).

Lacalle gave more weight to the electoral support of the forces with which he negotiated than he did to other variables. However, this is not the only aspect taken into consideration by a president in his negotiations with other political groups. Ideological proximity plays a significant role in this selection process and its potential success.[7] For instance, during the process of negotiating of Sanguinetti's second government, the first senator elected by the president's fraction, Hugo Fernández Faingold, was asked which role the UCB[8] would have within the Colorado Party given its weak electoral support. He said:

> "We have not drawn up a line [for political cooperation] based on the weight of the parliamentary representation of each group. The line is based on the group's intention to contribute its forces" (El Observador : December 19, 1994).

Thus, for some leaders proclivity to support a government is not just a matter of legislative size. But what other factors are relevant? I asked

senators and fraction leaders to weight the priorities a president has in mind when selecting a group for bargaining. In their average opinion, the president weights the ideological distance between him and the group in question 65%, while the share that the considered fraction has in the legislature is weighed 26%.[9] Although the legislative size is less important in the eyes of senators and party leaders, it still is a considerable variable to take into account in this process of negotiation. Senator and also former minister of Public Health and Education, Guillermo García Costa, mentioned that:

> "Potential allies tend to make agreements effective. It might be that one is negotiating with a genius, but if this genius has his capacity reduced to a single vote, his own, I can not ask him to get into the coalition. I would ask for his advice, or that he support any measures. He has to have real capacity to really translate his thoughts into effective votes. (Guillermo García Costa, personal interview, Montevideo: March 18, 1999)."

Once the presidential term is 'on the road,' there is no specific site for these political contacts; however, they regularly take place in the executive office itself, or over a cup of coffee in the living rooms of the residences of the president or other leaders. Through these contacts presidents rebuild the broad agreements that sustain their governments and it seems that this is the location where the "distribution of the administration" takes place.

This "distribution" gives us a relevant clue about what the objects of negotiation among the president and political groups are. The distribution is mainly of administrative posts in the state apparatus: first ministers, then directors of publicly-owned companies, and so on.[10] I asked Elías Bluth, Secretary of the Presidency during the second government of Sanguinetti, about what the cards are on top of the table when negotiation takes place. He answered:

> "I believe that two explicit things and a tacit one are negotiated. The two explicit things are: the general lines of the government, in other words 'we are going to make a political reform, a reform of the social security system, etc.' and along with that, the participation of the different political groups in positions of responsibility. In this country, the cabinet, national public owned companies and decentralized services, and possibly, some key embassies are understood to be positions of responsibility. These two things are negotiated in an explicit way. The one negotiated in a tacit way, or so that it is implicitly understood, is that there will be an equitable participation in the appointments for all sectors in the agreement: public officials, directors of hospitals, in the technical positions that must be filled, in special hirings. And lastly, also negotiated in a tacit way, is the real participation in the process of decision-making, something like a right of

consultation before certain government measures." (Personal interview, Montevideo: November 3rd, 1998).

How does this process of post allocation occur? Is it maybe that leader x offers the support for a policy y in exchange for two ministries, three embassies, and one director of a public company? Or for instance, is it that the Economy Ministry weighs the same as three Tourism Ministers? This is a delicate moment for the coalition agreement, with many secrets involved, and thus, it is more complex to formalize. For instance, in late January 1990 Lacalle went overseas "and compelled all legislators and advisors from the Blanco Party to maintain absolute secrecy about the negotiations to form a governing coalition with the Colorado party" (El Día : February 4 1990).[11]

Thus, what are the elements on which negotiations are based? Is it ideological affinity between the president and his ally? Is it also the legislative backup that a party or fraction assures for the coalition? Strøm argues that "votes are the currency of democratic politics: they can be used to purchase power as well as policy influence" (Strøm 1990:45). In every government since 1985, we can see this in the first days. Form example, in 1985, Senator Lacalle from the Blanco Party was the one who claimed unfair treatment given the number of votes obtained by his fraction.

"Sanguinetti retained the list of designations of the [boards of] publicly-owned companies and services when he prepared to send it to the Senate. Sanguinetti asked Wilson to fix the situation with the group of Lacalle, the *Consejo Nacional Herrerista (CNH)*. Lacalle communicated to Wilson that his group would not join the boards of the public agencies because the two positions offered did not reflect the political reality of the party. The CNH requested three of the 13 positions given by Sanguinetti to the Blanco Party. Unable to reach an agreement with Wilson, Lacalle visited Sanguinetti to inform him about the situation" (Búsqueda : 273, March 21, 1985: p.5).

Another good example comes from 1990, when the elected vice-president of the Republic, Gonzalo Aguirre (Renovación y Victoria – RenoVi), claimed that:

"It is clear that RenoVi will be present at all the levels of the government. It is going to be present in the executive power, in police headquarters, in the independent public companies and decentralized services, in the diverse political offices of responsibility and trust, in the Electoral Court and also in the National Audit Office. In which way? In the way that corresponds to its votes!" (Búsqueda: 524, February 15, 1990: p.5).[12]

But policies are also a major object of negotiation. And they may even weigh more than offices depending on the presidential cycle. How to analyze policy bargains among political sectors is a complicated task

because of the secrecy involved. Also, it is hard to systematize who proposes legislation beyond the distinction between bills proposed by the executive and those proposed by the legislature. This distinction between executive and legislative bills may become blurred itself given the fact that many proposals are presented jointly by legislators of several parties and that some bills might have been proposed by the executive through legislators from its sector, and so on.

Although many issues are negotiated among the members of the coalition, other issues are absolutely nonnegotiable. In September 1995 the Subsecretary of the Ministry of Public Health, Laura Albertini (Colorado Party), argued that the depenalization of abortion should be put to popular vote. Based on Albertini's statement, Blanco leaders threatened to interpellate the Minister of Health, Aldo Solari, if Colorados promoted such referendum. Even the President of the Blanco Directorate, Volonté, said "would not consider—under any circumstances—the eventual legalization of abortion. [...] This is an issue of principle and for that there is no coalition!" (Búsqueda: 810, September 21, 1995: pp.4-5).

In general, when we think about policies we tend to imagine examples like abortion, a case of a proactive law that tries to change the status quo. However, there are other decisions that do not involve any kind of distribution of offices or policies and that must be included on the bargaining table. These are reactive measures rather than proactive. For instance, during the second administration of Sanguinetti some corruption scandals arose in the public domain, most of them denounced by legislators of the Frente Amplio. In two of these cases, the FA worked with one of the traditional parties to uncover cases of corruption affairs involving members of the other traditional party (Lasalvia case and FOCOEX). In both cases, the legislature named two "investigative commissions." For the Lasalvia affair, the commission included legislators of the Blanco Party with the Frente Amplio, while for the FOCOEX affair, it included the Frente Amplio and the Colorado Party. The seduction of uncovering cases of corruption was big enough to lead each of the traditional parties to take turns undermining the other with the support of the leading opposing party.[13]

Thus, not only are policies traded for offices, but also policies for policies. This is hard to analyze, because most of these exchanges are private. For example, a legislator of the Frente Amplio believes that the Herreristas supported the Colorados' legislation on State Reform in exchange for the "Hair Trigger Law," (which did not succeed due to its very low popularity). He also believes that the rural interior municipal governments, many of them Blanco, were (secretly) exempted from their

social security debts in exchange for their approval of the budget law in Congress (Personal interview, anonymity requested, Chamber of Deputies, March 15, 1999).

Policies are not the only things that are relevant. The search for offices and votes also matters, and it follows a cycle that repeats in each presidential term. As President Sanguinetti said, "things not done during the first year of government cannot be done in the remaining four years. [...] The farther away we are form March 1st, and the closer we are to November, the more difficult agreements will be" (Búsqueda : 788, 4/20/95, p.3).[14] Moreover, he also said that "it is in the first year of government that sensitive political issues must be faced. Normally, what happens is that the urgent issues displace the important ones, even if they are not so transcendental. In this field we have the reform of the pension system, the reform of the education system, and the reform of the State" (Sanguinetti; Tiempo de Elecciones Observador: 11/18/94: 2).

Uruguay, as most democracies with free and fair elections, cannot escape from the cycles of government—see cycles in Uruguay in relation with coalition survival: Chasquetti (1998), Chasquetti (2000) Altman (2000); direct democracy: Altman, (1995); and executives vetoes: Moraes and Morgenstern (1995). The governing cycles in Uruguay are a consequence of cycles on party leaders' political preferences. I asked 21 party and fraction leaders in Uruguay to weight their political interests based on the electoral calendar. Their answers were conclusive. On average, politicians in Uruguay shift their objectives in synchronization to the electoral calendar. Before a national election they are principally concerned with obtaining votes. After elections, they positioned themselves in search of office, and it is only at mid-term where police-seeking behavior ranks first in their preferences (Figure 2).



Figure 2 - Senator and Fraction Leaders' Average Preferences at Three Different Moments of a Presidential Administration (N=21)
Source: Author's Data

Figure 2 is informative about politicians' preferences along presidential mandate. As assumed, Figure 2 shows that the three models of party preference (vote, office, and policy) are relevant to all parties at any one time, although more so at some times than at others (Altman 2000).

Immediately after the elections the highest preference of senators and fraction leaders' is office (with an average of 48.67%), followed by policy (39.58%), and in a remote third place the search for votes (11.75%). At midterm the raking changes, when policy becomes the highest priority, followed by votes, and then by office. Before an election the preferences are notably clear: the search for votes ranks first with an average of 77.08%, followed far away by policy (14.58%) and then office (8.33%).

IV. Faction, Fractions, Parties and Coalitions in Uruguay

Since reinstallation of democracy in 1985 every administration had succeeded in building a political agreement with one or more fractions from different party than the executive one. These coalitions varied in scope and intensity (Altman 2000, Amorim Neto 1998, Chasquetti 1998, Koolhas 2004). Nonetheless, the common denominator among these governments was the fact that not only did the winning fraction within the elected party not attain enough seats to govern independently of all other fractions from its own party, but also, in some occasions, the winning

fractions did not obtain enough seats in the legislature to even maintain presidential vetoes.

As it is well known, the advent of multiparty system in 1971 changed the dynamics of political cooperation (González 1991). First, as presidents were farther away from the required majorities to govern, they needed to give up some state resources in exchange for support in congress. Second, it was not enough for parties to be in the opposition and wait for their turn as they had been used to. If they wanted access to offices and policies, they had to adapt their strategies to the new environment.

The main players involved in the process of coalition formation are on the one hand, the elected presidents, and on the other hand, the other fractions' leaders. Although the fractions of a party (different than the presidential) try to coordinate their entrance into a coalition government (as happened during the government of Lacalle 1990-1995 and the second government of Sanguinetti 1995-2000), they decide independently when to leave the government. Parties may take collective action only when the diverse fractions' interests coincide; it usually does not happen because the electoral system and a fixed electoral calendar encourage each fraction to maximize its own benefits. Morgenstern describes this process as:

> "Electoral incentives drive factions to act independently from their co-partisans, and thus party organizations are not well developed, profligate candidacies are common, and legislators do not follow the party line when voting. This does not imply, however, that parties are always irrelevant to the policy process. The open question then is, to what extent and when are the parties important actors in the Uruguayan system? The answer, according to the fourth prediction, is that parties are salient when electoral cycles raise collective incentives of factions within a party, thereby overriding the factions' individualistic incentives that generally drive dissension" (Morgenstern 1996).

If we pay attention to the overall number of deputies each party has in the legislature 1985-1999, we can conclude that parties are extremely successful in retaining their legislators. However, this is not the whole story to tell. Internal fraction switching is common, although to make sense of all the changes in the legislature is a pretty complex task. Also looking a little bit more closely, we recognize that the changes from one fraction to another or even to form a new one almost never mean changes from one lema to another lema in the same legislature.[15]

Important studies have shown that fractions have a much higher disciplined legislative behavior than parties (Moraes y Morgenstern 1995, Morgenstern 2001, Morgenstern 2004, Pérez Antón 2000). Figure 3 shows the evolution of vetoes and the approval of important laws for the period 1985-2000, and Figure 4 shows the Rice Index of legislative



Figure 3 - Evolution of Vetoes and approval of Important Laws 1985-2000
Source: Chasquetti 2003, Chasquetti y Moráes 2000



Figure 4 - Parties' Legislative Discipline (Rice Index, 1985-1994)
Source data: Morgenstern (2004)

cohesion for the first two administrations after the military regime (For the methodological aspects of classifying a law as "important" see Buquet, Chasquetti y Moraes 1998: 116-117). While in Figure 3 it is clear that presidents face increasing reticent legislatures as time goes by, Figure 4 shows that parties present a less cohesive behavior with the same temporal pattern.

Obviously, the high level of legislative discipline that fractions show does not mean that they are free of internal political tensions among their members, as it was so clear within the Blanco Party during the 1995-1999 administration see (Chasquetti y Garcé 2000). As in any group there are resentments, affinities, envies, and solidarity ties that tension in one way or the other. We should call these circumstantial subgroups factions. Certainly, most fractions have a factional origin. But this does not mean that any faction has enough momentum to detach from the original fraction and become a new one.

Legislators' interests in being re-elected have undermined fractions' cohesion. Given the possibilities of accumulation of votes that the multiple simultaneous vote offers, it is rational for some politicians to present their lists when they do not obtain the place they wanted, and for others to form a political-electoral cooperative (Buquet, Chasquetti y Moraes 1998).[16] Morgenstern (1996) shows that generally House members elected under a given Senator will vote with that Senator and Senators elected under a given Presidential candidate will vote with that Presidential candidate. This implies a top down perspective of nomination control.

However, politicians at all levels are constantly bombed with demands from different sectors and therefore there are circumstances of bottom-up connections: of deputies selling their votes to the highest bidding senator and senators doing the same with presidents. It is exactly at this point when the two worlds, the one of intra-party and the other of inter-party politics, juxtapose. How this connections works? A prominent political actor, who requested anonymity, argued that:

> "In general terms, the contribution that a group makes to the coalition is proportional to its votes. For example, if the OPP[17] needs to hire 20, 30, or 40 technicians in diverse domains, I can tell you that the partner tacitly hopes to have an equitable participation in those designations. How is this manifested? Well ... it may be that Lacalle [partner of coalition] calls Davrieux [Director of OPP], who is building a team of economists, and says 'look, I have x and y to fill these posts'. We try to contemplate in the designation or in the hiring of technicians, especially of technicians, and even in the admission to public administration in certain areas. For example: civil guards in the countryside, nurses or supervisory personnel in public hospitals, etc. They [the coalition allies] feel they have the right to be able to bring the power to make

appointments closer to their political group, which is an important power in a country like ours". (Personal interview)

Although the relevance of a top-down perspective in Uruguay is evident, I do not consider that this is the unique type of political articulation. As we saw, in certain occasions, legislators change their fractional belonging (see Table 3).

Table 3 - Distribution of Deputies by Fractions during the 1995-1999 Legislature

	March 1995 (Elections of 1994)	March 1998	December 1998
Colorado Party	*32*	*32*	*32*
Foro Batllista	25	25	25
Cruzada 94	4	2	2
Nueva Fuerza Colorada	-	2 (1)	2
Lista 15	2	3 (2)	3
UCB	1	0	0
Blanco Party	*31*	*31*	*31*
Manos a la Obra	15	11 (3)	5
Propuesta Nacional	-	-	6
Herrerismo	14	17 (4)	15
MNR	2	2	1
Desafio nacional	-	-	3 (5)
Alianza Nacional	-	-	-
Independents		1	1
Frente Amplio	*31*	*31*	*31*
Asamblea Uruguay	16	11 (6)	11
Izquierda Abierta	-	3	3
Socialists	7	8	8
Communists	1	1	1
Vertiente Artiguista	2	2	2
Espacio Renovador	1	1	1
MPP (Tupamaros)	2	2	2
Independents	1	2	2
Nuevo Espacio	*5*	*5*	*5*
List 99000	5	5	3
List 1999	-	-	2
Total	*99*	*99*	*99*

(1) Rodino and Garcia-Pintos (2) Alberto Iglesias, substitute Pacheco-Klein, became a supporter of Jorge Batlle. (3) Pica, Lara, and Raffo went to Herrerismo. Machiñena declared himself independent. (4) Herrerismo won four deputies (the three previously mentioned and Borsari-Brena from MNR). (5) Herrerismo lost three (Sedarri, Alonso, and Nuñez). (6) Nicolini, Gamou, and Palacios, formed "Izquierda Abierta" one negotiated with the Socialist Party, Silvana Charlone, obtaining the sixth place on their deputies list, and one became independent (Dario Pérez).
Source: Author's Data.

Thus, through a rational calculation, based on the political weight and the place in the list a legislator occupies and expects to occupy, congressmen decide which is the best alternative to gain reelection as legislator or election in other public office, such as Mayor candidate. I found that these mechanisms could be captured by the Hirschman's

categories: exit, voice and loyalty (1970). The most common type of relationship between senators and deputies is loyalty. For deputies, loyalty towards fraction leaders is essentially to behave as "good kids" following directives of their leaders. In this way, they maximize the probabilities of maintaining (or obtaining) a top-secure-place in the list. However, fulfilling legislator's ambitions sometimes requires them not to behave as "good kids." Sometimes the leader already has a close group of legislators around him that it makes harder to include another one. In these cases, legislators have only two options left: voice or exit. In this context voice represents the strategy that maximizes the possibility of becoming exchanged for another legislator. With this objective in mind the legislator has to emphasize either some expertise in a specific policy area or to highlight some personal characteristics, such as gender or age; in other words, to become irreplaceable. The last option, as mentioned, is to exit the fraction.

When a legislator can not get into the leader's chosen circle, the first option he has is to exercise the voice mechanism: namely, vote with the fraction, but making a public statement that she votes against her will for whatever reason. Essentially, this mechanism has many advantages for legislators: the most important is that they get in to the media, which consequently can be used as a springboard to improve their situation in the fraction's internal competition, or because it advances their potential for being incorporated into another fraction.

If voice does not work, the second way to increase their chances of being reelected is to apply the exit mechanism. This alternative, which involves many more risks, has two variants. The first variant, which is frequently used, is defection to another fraction. The other variant, more costly but with a higher potential utility, is building a new fraction. Hirschman accurately considers that "the decision whether to exit will often be taken in the light of the prospects for the effective use of voice" (1970: 37).[18]

All calculations to be made by the legislator and the fraction's leader are highly sensitive to the political power—the resources—that each has. For instance, the legislator could be a 'strong' deputy. In Uruguay, the strength of a deputy may come from his or her ability to capitalize upon the voice mechanism. Second, as we saw, he or she might have a significant mass of supporters (this is normal in the countryside, where relations between legislators and citizens are very close), or the legislator may be an expert in a specific policy area.

V. Final Remarks

Uruguayan political parties and fractions constitute a rich environment to test theories of party organizations and their impact in inter-party politics. This article has sought to explain how intra-party and inter-party politics are related in the last decade of the century. Along with the lines of Levistsky (2000), who claims that "parties with low levels of internal routinization may be better equipped than well-routinized parties to adapt and survive in the context of environmental shocks," I argued that party centralization and routinization has an impact on parties as coalition actors. It must be said, however, albeit a "poorly routinized party structure does not ensure that party leaders will choose appropriate strategies, it provides leaders with greater room for maneuver in searching for and implementing alternative strategies, which makes adaptation more likely" (Levitsky 2000).

The lack of internal centralization and routinization of the Uruguayan traditional parties provided the government enough resource to build and sustain coalitions even when important fractions of these parties were reticent to support the government. If Maor is correct, in centralized parties such as the Frente Amplio, conflicts are more likely to be manifested by 'exit' or 'voices' outside the parliamentary arena--as it is clear in the constant use of direct democratic devices by the coalition; (see Altman 2001). Although the Frente Amplio was much more successful in maintaining its discipline than the traditional parties, it has less elasticity than the traditional parties when dissent appears within it. Not in vain a major rupture happened when the PGP tried to impose its electoral majority within the coalition on order to have a proportional weigh in the decision process of the coalition (action that was immediately vetoed by the minority groups). The internal organization of the Frente Amplio plays a significant role in shaping its relationship the government, and in fact, some fractions that were supportive of certain measures of government were force by their fellow fractions to maintain the traditional monolithic discipline in congress.

There is enough evidence that internal party structures are critical to understand inter-party relations. Therefore, party structures and institutions must be considered as independent variables of any analysis of coalition. The problem so far is that we are still lacking unified criteria for which indicators to use with this objective in mind. More systematic research is needed to reach more stable and generalizable hypotheses.

Notes

1 1942 is considered by the Uruguayan specialist the year in which the Uruguayan electoral system acquired its maturity in political terms (see Bottinelli 1993, Buquet 1997, Buquet, Chasquetti y Moraes 1998, Caetano, Rilla y Pérez 1987).

2 I am not suggesting neither entering to the discussion whether "each period in time apparently has its 'own' party type which best fits into the changed environment," as Koole (1996: 520) discusses with Katz and Mair (1995).

3 The evidence is clear just looking the basic characteristics of the several constitutions the country had since 1917. In this constitution the executive was bicephalous and a semi-collegial. In the constitution of 1934 the dichotomous character of the Executive Power ends, and the presidency was composed only by one person elected every four years, (by simple majority of suffrages and with double simultaneous vote). The Senate was integrated by 30 members, corresponding 15 positions to the most voted list of the winning lema and the other 15 to the most voted list to the second lema in number of votes. The Carta of 1942 finishes with the senate of the "half and half," and adopts proportional representation for this chamber. In 1952 Uruguayans go back to the Collegiate (National Council of Government). This constitution also provided formal representation of minorities, based on the formula 2/5, in the Directories of the Publicly-owned companies. After 15 years of collegial government, in 1967 a new constitution was adopted and went back to the direct election of a single person executive by simple majority. Although representation in congress was not changed, it did changed the requisite of given minorities representation in the publicly-owned companies. During 1973 and 1985 Uruguay had a military government and 11 years after the transition a new constitution is approved in 1996. In it the plurality system for the presidency was substituted with a majority runoff system, which involves mandatory primaries for all parties competing for congress and presidency at the same day. Each party is forced to elect one presidential candidate. See next footnote.

4 In Uruguay citizens used to elect simultaneously both at the intra-party and inter-party levels. For the presidential election, the double simultaneous vote permitted party tickets (*lemas*) to divide into competitive fractions (*sub-lemas*). The votes for these fractions were then accumulated according to a party ticket without any possibility of making alliances among them. Thus, the winner of the presidency was the candidate of the fraction that receives the most votes within the party that received the most votes. For the Congress election, the triple simultaneous vote enabled the citizens to choose at three levels: first for a lema, then for a fraction, and lastly for a list of candidates.

5 During the months of June and July, 1997, I interviewed 91 deputies in Montevideo. The Department of Government and International Studies of the University of Notre Dame financed the design and implementation of my research. The objective was to survey all 99 deputies of the Republic. This objective was almost achieved, as 91 deputies acceded to nearly one hour of questions and answers. I also wish to thank the deputies for their participation

6 For Levitsky, "routinization may be said to affect the speed and degree to which reformers are able to modify both party *structure* and party *strategy* in response to environmental change" (Levitsky 2000).

7 In fact, ideological distance between the president's fraction and the rest of fractions is highly statistical significative as an independent variable for coalition formation and survival not

only for Uruguay (Altman 2000), but also, considering parties, for the other multiparty presidential regimes in Latin America (Altman 2001, Amorim Neto 1998, Amorim Neto 1998).

8 Unión Colorada y Batllista, the right-wing fraction of the Colorado party led by Pacheco.

9 As Sanguinetti emphasized: "With Dr. Vázquez, the differences are not only political, but unfortunately, also philosophical. He believes in another type of society. In other words, he believes in the Cuban system, and we in the Spanish, French, or Italian type of Western democracy" (País : February 28, 1999: p.19). For elites' ideological perceptions see: (Altman 2001, Moreira 1997).

10 Although in most studies of coalitions take into consideration only the distribution of cabinet posts among coalition partners, in Uruguay there are at least 300 formal additional posts that are at the core of the bargaining process involved in forming a government. These are a) 12 ministries and 12 sub-ministries; b) 85 posts on the boards of public companies and decentralized services; c) 17 offices in comptroller agencies; d) 115 posts in the central administration; and e) 25 positions in the foreign service (Chasquetti 1998).

11 "It is very difficult to maintain issues under secrecy in Uruguay. Generally things are known. Furthermore, presidents make invitations public, even for political reasons, to prompt a degree of compromise on the other side. That means that the specific details of the negotiation are not known, but who is negotiating and the general bargaining framework is public." (Personal Interview with Ignacio de Posadas, former Minister of Economy and Senator, Montevideo, December 1998).

12 With the same reasoning leaders of the fraction PGP of the Colorado Party acknowledge that the poor performance at the polls will limit the amount of offices for their fraction in 1994 (El Observador : November 30 1994).

13 See also Martínez (1997) and García Costa (1997).

14 As previously told, March 1st refers to the inauguration of the new administration, while November refers to the end of the term.

15 Nonetheless, there were two such cases since 1984. Carlos Pita, who was elected for the Blanco Party by the COPONA (Corriente Popular Nacionalista) in 1984, jointed the Frente Amplio in 1986. In 1989 he helped to form the fraction Vertiente Artiguista. Another example was Francisco Rodriguez Camusso, who might receive an Olympic medal by making the broadest jump from one sector to another: from the sublema conformed by the Communist Party and some allies, he jumped to the most extreme rightist fraction: the Herrerismo (Blanco Party). There were other cases where political leaders changed lemas. Perhaps, one of the most remembered was Juan María Bordaberry, who was elected senator by the Blanco sublema Herrero-ruralismo in 1962, then in 1967 was Minister of Livestock under the Colorado government of Pacheco, and was elected president with the sublema "Unión Colorada y Batllista" of the Colorado party in 1971. For this reason Bordaberry was popularly called "rabanito" (little radish)—red outside, white inside. I have to thank Antonio Cardarello for helping me to keep track with all switchings.

16 Electoral cooperative is an expression used to denominate purely circumstantial alignments among fractions, with the only objective of maximizing electoral benefits among partners.

17 Office of Planning and Budget.

18 There is a third *exit* option, but it contradicts the assumption of reelection wills of legislators. It is defection from the legislative arena, leaving the seat to their alternate, or simply to

wait until the end of the mandate and go home. This is seldom used, confirming once more the accuracy of the assumption.

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