

SOME ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF HAITIAN MIGRATION TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

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I. INTRODUCTION

Nobody knows with any degree of accuracy how many Haitians there are at any given time in the Dominican Republic. Estimates range between a few hundred thousand and two million. Presumably, the truth is closer to the former than to the latter, but we do not know.¹ No exhaustive survey has ever been undertaken and it is not even clear who should count as 'Haitian'. Thousands have lived in the Dominican Republic for many years without any kind of identity documents. Many 'Haitians' were born on the Dominican side of the border and have never visited their 'home country'.

While the number of Haitians in the Dominican Republic is a matter of considerable dispute, their place in the economic and social hierarchy is not. It is at the very bottom. Haitians perform work that the Dominicans refuse. In particular, the environment in which they work and live on the Dominican sugar plantations has become a matter of notoriety during the past thirty years.² The publication of such documents as *Migrant Workers in the Dominican Republic*, by the Anti-Slavery Society for the Protection of Human Rights, in 1979,³ *'Sold Like Cattle': Haitian Workers in the Dominican Republic*, by the World Council of Churches in 1980,⁴ *Sucre amer: Esclaves aujourd'hui dans les Caraïbes*, by Maurice Lemoine, the following year,⁵ the Report of Commission of Inquiry of the ILO, in 1983,⁶ the two books by Dominican lawyer Ramón Antonio Veras, *Inmigración*,

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haitianos, esclavitud (1983)⁷ and *Migración caribeña y un capítulo haitiano* (1985),⁸ the massive El Batey (1986), by a team headed by Frank Moya Pons,⁹ Roger Plant's *Sugar and Modern Slavery: A Tale of Two Countries* (1987),¹⁰ and *Haitian Sugar Cane Cutters in the Dominican Republic*, published jointly in 1989 by Americas Watch, National Coalition for Haitian Refugees and Caribbean Watch,¹¹ all contributed to exposing slavery-like conditions on the plantations: undernourishment, tremendous overcrowding, lack of water, absence of sanitary facilities, lack of medical attention, extremely long working days, military discipline, arbitrary treatment by overseers, physical abuse, restricted freedom of movement, extremely low wages, cheating with payments, deprivation of human rights, etc., etc.

The indignation of the international community upon learning the fate of the Haitians was not diminished when, in addition, it was revealed that the legal part of the temporary migration was organized as a money-making racket by the Haitian and Dominican governments.¹² The Dominican president, Rafael Trujillo, had instigated a major massacre on Haitians in 1937,¹³ but as he gradually took an interest in sugar production, after World War II, he also needed workers, and in 1952 the Dominican government signed an agreement with its Haitian counterpart with respect to the seasonal migration of sugar cane cutters. This agreement was renewed in 1959 and 1966, and in 1971 the first of a series of contracts between the Dominican *Consejo Estatal del Azúcar* (CEA) and the Haitian government was signed. These contracts were not discontinued until the fall of Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1986. The agreements quickly degenerated into a vehicle for money-making for the various Haitian governments. Not only were the latter paid a sum to set up recruitment centers in Haiti, but part of the wages of the migrants was withheld as well, officially to be paid to the workers at the end of their stay, but in practice it was sent to Haiti, where it ended up in the pockets of the governing Duvaliériste clique.¹⁴

The appalling conditions facing the Haitians in the Dominican Republic immediately leads to the question of why the workers emigrate there in the first place. In the present essay we will make an attempt to provide at least a partial answer to this question. As we will demonstrate, the migration from Haiti to the Dominican Republic, as it emerges from field studies, is essentially an economic phenomenon and hence amenable to analysis with the aid of economic theory. In the first section we will briefly survey some of the main theories of migration in the Third World.¹⁵ This will be followed by an examination of the characteristics of Haitian migrants, as these emerge from the most important field surveys. Next, we

will pay attention to some ‘push’ factors. The fact that the conditions that the Haitians meet on the other side of the border are extremely bad is an indication that the situation prevailing in Haiti itself may be an important part of the explanation. We will then present some statistics describing poverty in rural areas and provide an explanation of why poverty seems to be increasing. On the basis of this we will, finally, apply some simple economic principles to shed light on the migration decision. Throughout the essay, the emphasis will be on the ‘traditional’ type of Haitian migrant to the Dominican Republic: the agricultural worker who sooner or later returns to Haiti. We will deal only marginally with those who stay permanently and not at all with the recent phenomenon of migration to urban areas across the border.¹⁶

II. ECONOMIC THEORIES OF MIGRATION

Migration from one rural area in the Third World to another is a phenomenon which has attracted only a fraction of the interest that has for several decades pertained to rural-urban flows of people. This does, however, not mean that intra-rural migration is an insignificant phenomenon. On the contrary, according to a recent survey of migration in developing countries: “Where analysis proves possible, the rate of rural-rural migration typically proves far higher than of rural-urban migration ...”¹⁷ In Haiti, we find both types of migration, both inside the country and out of it. The present essay will not make any attempt to determine the relative importance of the two types of currents. Its scope is far more limited. We will deal only with the part that takes Haitians across the border, into the neighboring Dominican Republic, mainly, but not exclusively, on a temporary – seasonal – basis as cane cutters during the *zafra* [sugar harvest].

That most of the available analyses deal with the movement from country to town is due partly to a lack of data, partly to a lack of interest, but partly also to the fact that

... intra-rural migration may have many properties in common with rural-urban migration: it can enhance income opportunities, may involve a transition from family to wage labor, may involve a shift from one line of production to another (between subsistence and cash crops, or simply between crop types), and may offer many opportunities for fairly risk-spreading, no less than does rural-urban migration ...¹⁸

Here, we are forced to concentrate on the literature on rural-urban migration. We will then, however, emphasize precisely those aspects that appear to be relevant also for the case of rural-rural labor migration from

Haiti to the Dominican Republic. The discussion will also be selective in the sense that it will deal mainly with the determinants of migration and not with the consequences.¹⁹

One of the earliest attempts to explain migration is based on the gravitation theory, a direct analogy with physics,²⁰ where migration is a positive function of the population in the areas of origin and destination and a negative function of the distance between them. This theory, however, fails to specify the elements that govern the decision to migrate. It is altogether devoid of behavior. In contrast, most modern theories of migration that include explicit modeling of the decision to migrate (made either by individuals or families) income differences between the point of origin and the point of destination play the central role.²¹ The simplest way to model this is to regard migration as a form of investment.²² The individual compares the present value of earnings if he moves with what he would earn if he stays where he is, and, if the difference is positive, subtracts the costs of moving. Possibly, psychic benefits and costs enter the picture as well.

It is, however, often not the case that the prospective migrants know with certainty what they will earn if they move to a new location. They simply have some kind of notion of the probable earnings, based, for example, on the going wage rate and the probability of getting a job.²³ Hence, information matters and individuals may migrate even if they will not obtain employment immediately. The search for jobs is easier to carry out at the new location than at the place of origin,²⁴ and the probability of being employed may increase with the number of periods of residence at the new location. Possibly, taking less well-paid jobs may help sustain the migrants while they search for better opportunities, but presumably at the cost of a lower probability of finding the latter than if they had remained unemployed and spent all their time looking for jobs. Those who choose to do the search from the point of origin, on the other hand, will not move until they have secured a job.

The decision to migrate may not be just in the hands of the migrants themselves. In many rural areas in the Third World the relevant decision unit is that of the family, since the prospective migrants also constitute a source of labor and income for their respective families.²⁵ However, the total income of a peasant family is often derived from a number of different activities, some of which may not be related to agriculture at all.²⁶ In a setting where incomes are close to the subsistence level, capital is a scarce resource, nature is harsh and prices are subject to fluctuations, strategies that opt for a diversification of activities may be preferred to

putting all the eggs in the same basket. Especially if the risks connected with migration are not positively correlated with those of agriculture at the point of origin, sending one or more family members away may reduce the variance of family income and hence contribute to minimizing the probability that the latter will fall short of the subsistence level – an important consideration for poor, risk-averse families. Conversely, migration could be supported by other types of income that, for example, will allow for a longer search for jobs. The family may finance both migration and job search in return for future remittances.²⁷

Family and friends may play another role as well. Both the pecuniary and mental costs of migration may be reduced considerably if migrants have contacts when they arrive. Those who have already migrated are integrated in various types of networks at the place of destination and therefore have more reliable information about job availability and working conditions than new migrants. They also frequently provide those who come after with food and shelter for some time and help shorten their search for suitable employment.²⁸ Thus, the risk element that is always present in the migration process may be reduced, which in turn means that those whose friends and relatives have migrated are more likely to migrate than those who lack contacts.

There is also a third way in which people other than the migrants themselves may enter as a determinant of the migration decision. The community from which the migrant comes may act as a reference group for the migrant:²⁹

A person who is poor relative to his home village reference group may elect to migrate ... in order to improve his ranking relative to the home group. On the other hand, a person who is even poorer, yet relatively well off compared to others from his particular village, may not move for the same level of gain, if his utility is strongly influenced by his ranking relative to his reference group. This framework offers an interesting dynamic feature; removal of the relatively deprived from a community lowers the relative position of those remaining, which may consequently engender further migration. Over time, also, the reference group of migrants is likely to shift to their ... [new] setting, but this may not worsen the migrant's sense of well-being if the reference group is formed from other ... migrants from a similar setting, for which the continued inflow of migrants earlier migrants are usually those who are better off. Nonetheless the change in reference group could leave the migrant more deprived relative to this new group ...³⁰

All migration is not permanent. Much of it is temporary. The migrants stay at the place of destination for a limited period and then either return to where they came from or move on to some other place. What is it that induces this type of behavior? One of the main explanations advanced

in the literature runs in terms of the target worker hypothesis. Those who migrate temporarily do so in order to earn enough to make a given investment possible or to buy a certain commodity. (Migration acts as a substitute for borrowing in situations where the credit market is imperfect.) Hence they never intend to stay but from the very outset plan to leave at some future point in time.³¹ Their savings are often higher than the savings of those who plan to stay on or those who were born in the area.³²

Another explanation is that something may have gone wrong. Most models of migration stress risks and uncertainties with respect to employment and/or wages. The migrant may not get what he or she expects, and if the outcome diverges too much from the expectations returning or moving on will become attractive. That things turn out to be harder than expected may also be true for target workers, and this may then induce them to stay longer than intended, in the extreme case for the rest of their lives.³³ These workers as well, may accumulate more savings than the natives of the host country.

Temporary intra-rural migration may also be a function of the characteristics of agriculture. The cropping pattern may vary between different localities in such a way that the peak periods in terms of demand for labor do not coincide. Often, however, seasonality is not sufficient. If the income generated on the plots of the prospective migrants is deemed sufficient for the needs of the family (given the costs of migration), migration may be rare.³⁴

III. CHARACTERISTICS OF HAITIAN MIGRANTS

The main conclusion to be drawn from our brief survey of migration theories is that there is no single theory that explains all the population movements that take place in the Third World. People may migrate for many different reasons. It is thus necessary to know more in detail who the Haitian migrants to the Dominican Republic are, if we want to explain why they migrate, above all which their economic characteristics are.

The terminology employed to describe the Haitian migrants to the Dominican Republic who work in the sugar fields or elsewhere in the agricultural sector is slightly confusing. Sometimes all of them are referred to as *braceros* [day laborers], but the term is also used to denote only seasonal migrants or seasonal migrants that have been recruited legally, on a labor contract. Illegal immigrants are known as *anba fil*, i.e. they have entered the Dominican Republic clandestinely, 'below the wire'. Immigrants who reside permanently (legally or illegally) in the country are

known as *viejos*. Finally the somewhat derogatory term *congoses* (*kongo* in Haitian kreyòl) is often used for the seasonal immigrants, possibly only those who have a labor contract. (Sometimes it refers to all migrants, including the *viejos*.) In the following we will look at the main conclusions from four field surveys carried out between 1981 and 2001. We will then try to avoid this terminological mess and clearly indicate which category we are dealing with.

1981

In 1981, Martin Murphy interviewed a sample of 75 legal immigrants and 45 *anba fil*.³⁵ The vast majority of the former (90 per cent) could be classified as peasants back in Haiti. Of these, 88 per cent claimed to ‘own’ land in Haiti but only 26 per cent held land of ‘their own’. About half of them were single, their average age was below 30 years, 68 per cent of them had no formal schooling and the average number of years of education was 1.3. The average legal immigrant was working his third *zafra* in the Dominican Republic and over 70 per cent had worked there before. Around 25 per cent claimed to speak French, which probably was an exaggeration.

The *anba fil* shared these characteristics. Close to 90 per cent were peasants, 82 per cent claimed that they ‘owned’ land, but only 14 per cent had land of ‘their own’. On average, they were about ten years older than the *braceros* and slightly more than half of them were ‘married’. Like the legal immigrants they had no formal education, and the vast majority spoke no French. On average they had spent almost 14 years in the Dominican Republic and Murphy concluded that they seldom returned.

Financially, states Murphy, it is “irrefutable” that “these immigrants (both *braceros* [legal immigrants] and *anba fil*) are poor, using whatever scale to determine poverty ...”³⁶ In particular, they came from an environment characterized by a general shortage of cash. Many of the legal immigrants appeared to be target workers, resorting to migration as a way of diversifying their income sources. They were spending 25 per cent of their earnings in the Dominican Republic, bringing the rest back home:

... to pay off previously incurred debts, to make structural improvements of ... housing, or to make capital investments in the purchase of agricultural parcels, and most commonly of all, to purchase young livestock-animals which ... [they hope] to raise to slaughter age, turn a profit, and reinvest that capital in the purchase of more livestock or land.³⁷

Murphy concludes that as far as the legal migrants are concerned, the possibility of extra earnings (the income gap postulated in most economic

theories of migration) is what drives the flow of people into the Dominican Republic:

Braceros [legal immigrants] work the five to seven month sugar harvest to accumulate needed capital. Even considering that the wages they are paid are extremely low, that they are cheated out of their wages at so many points, and that the living and working conditions in the cane fields are sub human; work in the Dominican sugar industry is viewed as a somewhat viable economic option.³⁸

The situation of the *anba fil* was slightly different, although the same basic factors seemed to be at work. Some were peasants who owned land and who were in the Dominican Republic basically for the same reason as the legal immigrants. However, many were 'surplus' family members not needed on the farms or unemployed non-peasants. The economic position of these groups appeared to be more desperate than that of the legal immigrants, since they had nothing to return to in Haiti. Possibly an element of relative deprivation also entered the picture: "The *anba fil* cannot return to the community without large sums of money, for he left Haiti under the illusion and with the promise that he would return a rich man."³⁹

1983

Two years later, in 1983, Franc Báez Evertsz conducted another survey among Haitian sugar workers.⁴⁰ More than half were between 26 and 45 years of age, 35 years on average, but the temporary migrants were markedly younger (28 years on average and more than four-fifths between 15 and 35) than the permanent emigrants (40 years). The typical temporary pattern is that the first round of migration takes place between 15 and 25 years of age (66 per cent) and the last around 45.⁴¹ Comparing the age at the time of migration it was found that permanent migrants as a rule had been younger when they left (23 years) than the temporary ones (slightly over 25), which probably means that more of those who are young when they leave for the first time tend to stay permanently in the Dominican Republic.⁴² About 60 per cent of the first-time migrants were single, and it was not until after five or more trips that this figure fell notably, to 27 per cent. (The intermediary figure was 55 per cent.)⁴³ Almost 80 per cent of the permanent emigrants had stayed in the Dominican Republic already after the first trip.⁴⁴

Báez Evertsz' data indicate that the typical Haitian emigrant (70 per cent) did not possess any land, but that 90 per cent of the landless had fathers who did so. Of those who owned land 78 per cent had less than 0.5

carreaux (0.65 hectares).⁴⁵ Close to one-third of the migrants had been unpaid workers on their fathers' land before leaving Haiti, another fifth had been agricultural wage laborers (about two-thirds of these owned some land), more than ten per cent had been openly unemployed and 6.5 per cent had worked in the (non-agricultural) informal sector.⁴⁶

1985

In 1985, Wilfredo Lozano and Franc Báez Evertsz interviewed Haitian workers on Dominican coffee plantations.⁴⁷ As it seems, sugar and coffee to some extent complement each other from the point of view of labor demand. Two years earlier Báez Evertsz had found that once the *zafra* had finished, the demand for labor was reduced with almost 60 per cent, and while the vast majority of the surplus Haitian workers then returned home, about 8 per cent of the total moved on to work in the coffee harvest.⁴⁸ In 1985, three-fourths of the labor force used there came from the sugar plantations, more or less the same percentage planned to return to the sugar fields after the end of the coffee harvest and almost 90 per cent of the temporary migrants employed in coffee production had been sugar workers before moving to the coffee plantations.⁴⁹

Given this, it hardly comes as a surprise that the characteristics of the Haitian coffee workers resemble those of the workers interviewed by Murphy and Báez Evertsz. More than 60 per cent were young (below 30). The average education amounted to 1.5 years and a minimum of 65 per cent were illiterate.⁵⁰ Three-fourths owned no land in Haiti (84 per cent in the case of the temporary migrants) but close to two-thirds reported that their fathers were landowners. Lozano and Báez Evertsz conclude that the Haitian migrants to the Dominican Republic are basically "peasant sons".⁵¹ Over a third of them reported to have been wage laborers at home and one-fourth stated that they were occupied in agriculture. The rest were either unemployed or working in the informal sector.⁵² Close to 70 per cent had no access to land.⁵³

Almost 40 per cent stated that they had come to the Dominican Republic to seek work and another 27 per cent were looking for 'more money'.⁵⁴ The vast majority were well informed about wages and working conditions, either through their own previous experience (16 per cent) or through friends (60 per cent).⁵⁵ Thus, again the conclusion to be drawn is that the migration is triggered by economic factors.

1985-87

Next, there is the evidence gathered by Samuel Martínez during 1985-87 on both sides of the border, from interviews with 70 men on the Ingenio Santa Ana, in the southeastern Dominican Republic and 31 returned migrants in the Cayes-Jacmel area in Haiti.⁵⁶ His data are not quite comparable with those of the other surveys, mainly because the political situation in Haiti immediately after the fall of Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1986 “hindered the collection of quantitative data, particularly concerning the sensitive issue of land tenure ...”⁵⁷ However, the evidence provided by Martínez by and large confirms the earlier findings.

Among the men who were 35 years or older (including the absentees) two-thirds had made at least one trip to the neighboring country, the first one usually at the age of 23. Most had made more than one trip, the median number being four, and as many as ten trips in a lifetime was not unusual. Martínez estimated that between 1955 and 1986 on average 14 per cent of all the men between 15 and 60 had gone to the Dominican Republic. Within a year 88 per cent had returned and within two years 91 per cent, i.e migration was mainly a temporary phenomenon.⁵⁸ The desire to return was confirmed by the interviews on the Dominican side: “Nearly all Haitians in the Dominican *bateyes* [sugar company compounds] insisted that they would return to Haiti tomorrow if given the money to do so ...”⁵⁹

This indicates that migrants desire to use whatever money the migrants may earn in the Dominican Republic for expenditure in their home country. That this is the case is also borne out by the living conditions of the migrants on the sugar estates. Martínez quotes Báez Evertsz’ findings that the Haitian cane cutter on average displayed a nutritional deficit, both in terms of calories, proteins, vitamins and minerals and that (in 1983) he had to spend about 80 per cent of his budget on food:⁶⁰

... the Haitian *bracero* [day laborer] knows that, no matter how hard he works, he will gain nothing in long-term income security by remaining on the sugar estates. Only by returning to Haiti can he convert his Dominican money into assets of his own, with which to meet future family health, ceremonial, and educational needs.⁶¹

Martínez stresses the need to meet ‘obligations’ back in Haiti. These ‘obligations’ vary across the life cycle. Young men often leave in order to get the means to establish a conjugal union. Thus, between one-third and one-half of the houses in the areas investigated by Martínez had been financed by money earned on the other side of the border. More than 60 per cent of those interviewed stated that this was what motivated their first

trip to the Dominican Republic.⁶² Establishing oneself as an adult, however, requires other investments as well:

Dependent young men in households of humble means cannot rely on their guardians to provide them with anything more than basic food, clothing, and shelter. They have to fend for themselves, for instance, to acquire the one pair of dress shoes and good change of clothing deemed appropriate for important trips to town and other serious occasions, or to buy a piece of jewelry, a wristwatch, or some other prestige item to hold as a symbol of adulthood and urbanity.⁶³

Martínez found that the first trip was an event that resulted “not from the orders or advice of his guardians but from the migrant’s own initiative”,⁶⁴ i.e. the relevant decision unit was not the household but the individual. Not even the cost of transportation involved the family:

... the cost of going to the Dominican Republic is nowhere near as great an obstacle to departure as the cost of relocating to an urban area or of traveling to North America. Therefore, a man who contemplates crossing the border as a cane worker generally finds little use in mobilizing the financial support of relatives at home.⁶⁵

When returning, the migrants contributed to some extent to the household economy, but far less than during the 1960s or 1970s, because the size of their savings did not allow them to, and they were certainly not expected to become ‘economic leaders’ (like those who migrate to North America). On the contrary:

People in rural southeastern Haiti understand that a man rarely brings home much money from the Dominican Republic. Relatives and neighbors sooner view *Sêndomêg* migrants [migrants to the Dominican Republic] as people in need of assistance than as individuals who are in a position to disburse aid to others.⁶⁶

This, of course, raises the question of the emigrants’ economic situation. As we have already mentioned, Martínez was unable to gather any data with respect to landowner status or any other indicators of wealth. However, having obtained the migration history of virtually all those who had returned to Haiti and settled there, he concluded that not all who went to the Dominican Republic to cut sugar cane came from the poorer strata of rural Haiti. On the contrary, “in spite of unequal access to land, men from the middle and lower peasant families seem equally prone to make at least one voyage to the Dominican Republic in their youth.”⁶⁷

However, the poorer of these were likely to make more trips: “Few men who enjoy relatively abundant access to family land in young adulthood make many voyages to the Dominican Republic, but men who lack enough land on which to subsist commonly make four or more trips.”⁶⁸ Thus, we should still expect the poor to be overrepresented among

the emigrants. Martínez is, however, careful to point out that the negative correlation between landed wealth and number of trips is “far from perfect”.⁶⁹ A poor man cannot afford to fail too many times, and one who is better off “might be in line to inherit several parcels of land but only be granted access to one or two, which leaves him for the moment almost as badly off as a son of a land-poor family”.⁷⁰

Even those who are relatively better off may have to make multiple journeys. Building a house was something that could not be accomplished through a single trip to the Dominican Republic. Typically, the money earned must be invested in something else, notably livestock, that produced earnings in Haiti, and between one and four additional trips must be made, before the necessary capital was accumulated. Less than two-thirds of the trips produced a surplus which was large enough to be invested in Haiti, but having nothing at all to show after a number of trips was not common. Less than 30 per cent of the returnees interviewed by Martínez were in that position, while more than half (at least 55 per cent, and probably more) were certain that their efforts had yielded an economic benefit in the form of land, a house or livestock.⁷¹

Once the transition into adulthood had been made, defined as the building of a house and the establishment of a conjugal union, 70 per cent emigrated again, “to earn money to buy seed, livestock, and, ultimately, land or to buy household necessities, make house repairs, and pay for their children’s education”.⁷² Once a sufficient level of income security was attained in Haiti, the trips ceased, however. Less than 15 per cent had made ten or more journeys to the Dominican Republic.⁷³

2001

Finally, we have the somewhat limited data obtained in a survey of living conditions in Haiti carried out jointly by the Norwegian research institute FAFO and the *Institut Haïtien de Statistique et d’Informatique* between March and May 2001.⁷⁴ These indicate that the emigrants going to the Dominican Republic come mainly from the départements which are geographically closest to the neighboring country. Thus, almost 75 per cent of all reported emigrants from the Département du Sud-Est were found across the border and the figures for the Centre and Nord-Est regions were 71 and 42 per cent, respectively, to be compared with 0.9 per cent for distant Grande-Anse and 2.6 and 2.9 per cent for the Ouest and Sud departments. Over 75 per cent of all households in the Sud-Est, over 63 per cent in the Centre and 42.5 per cent in the Nord-Est had one or more relatives in the Dominican Republic, to be compared with 1.7 per cent in

Grande-Anse, 4.3 per cent in the Ouest and 6 per cent in the Sud. Generally speaking emigration to the Dominican Republic is more important for rural households than for urban ones. More than 25 per cent of the emigrants from the former were found there against 18 per cent in urban areas other than the capital and a mere 2.6 per cent in the latter.

The 2001 survey also indicates that among poorer households a larger share of the emigrants are men (over 65 per cent in the two lowest income quintiles, against 57 in the highest). The reason for emigrating, not just to the Dominican Republic, but to other countries as well, was either work (ranging from 65 per cent in the lowest income quintile to over 76 in the highest) or finding work (over 26 per cent among the poorest decreasing monotonically to 12 per cent among the richest). This pattern was valid for all age groups (56-78 per cent with the peak between 30 and 60) except the very youngest one, below 15 (26 per cent).

Conclusions: The Empirical Evidence

In Haiti in Caribbean Context, David Nicholls offers the following summary of the characteristics of Haitian emigrants:

It is sometimes assumed that the Haitian migrants must have come from the poorest sections of the community. [...] On the subject of the ... recent migration to the Dominican Republic ... [Mats Lundahl] refers to 'the poorer sections' of the rural population of Haiti as those whom 'we would expect to emigrate'.⁷⁵ Economists, unlike other social scientists, are in the fortunate position of being able to deduce human behaviour from certain motives which they confidently assume to be paramount, without having to waste time on the tedious business of empirical investigation ... the conclusions of those who have actually investigated the situation is that the migrants do not in fact come from the poorest class of the landless and that the majority are landowners. The sea voyage to Cuba, the Bahamas and the USA, of course, demands more expenditure than the overland journey to the Dominican Republic, but even in the latter case a high proportion of migrant cane cutters are proprietors of land in Haiti. The migrants, then, need money for the journey and for the bribes which may be necessary to ensure employment. The poorest would not be able to raise enough; the small landowner is able to secure a loan or to sell part of his property and so have sufficient money to migrate.⁷⁶

In the light of the foregoing examination of the available systematically collected evidence it does not appear as if Nicholls' position can be sustained. This evidence points very clearly to the fact that the vast majority of those who migrate to the Dominican Republic must be classified as 'landless' or 'poor', either because the family owns no or little land, or because they are too young to get access to much of it. By the

same token they hardly sell or mortgage land to finance their trips. Such claims seem to lack empirical foundation.⁷⁷

Poverty also tends to be the central term when Haitians discuss the reason for migration. Martínez concludes that “inquiries about the reasons why someone has left Haiti could not be sustained for long without talk of *mizè* [poverty] coming to the fore.”⁷⁸ That the migrants may not be the very poorest is another, completely different, matter.⁷⁹ It is well known from other parts of the Third World that the very poorest may be more tied to their place of origin than those a bit better off, e.g. because they are unable to defray the expenses (transportation etc.) that are necessary to make the trip, or because they are “bound to the village, by law or custom, to work off old family debts they cannot repay”.⁸⁰ The general evidence, however, has to be interpreted with caution, since most of it deals with rural-urban migration, where education, skills of various kinds and contacts are of paramount importance for jobs in the modern sector, which obviously excludes the very poorest. “Instead they are increasingly pushed into the informal or traditional urban sector, or into rural-rural migration...”⁸¹

Thus, it is very difficult to avoid the conclusion that the majority of the Haitian migrants to the Dominican Republic are young peasant sons who are uneducated and poor, either permanently or during the particular phase of their life cycle when they undertake the migration trips. They make an individual decision to seek work and get a cash income which they want to spend back in Haiti. In order to do so they are prepared to subject themselves to the terrible working and living conditions that they will find in the bateyes, conditions that they have information about before they leave their home country. Many, but by no means all, are target workers with a particular type of investment in mind.

IV. RURAL POVERTY IN HAITI

What does the profile of poverty look like in Haiti? Generally speaking, the countryside is poorer than the cities in Haiti, and the vast majority is very poor. The most recent figures come from a USAID-sponsored investigation of over 4,000 rural households carried out between 1994 and 1996 and from the joint Norwegian-Haitian survey from 2001.⁸² If we define the indigency line as the local cost of reaching the FAO minimum nutritional standard of 2,240 calories per day and person with a diet that matches the composition of food expenditure of the average household, this, in 1996, in terms of annual income amounted to US\$ 160. Adding non-food expenditure to this cost, so as to make the percentage of

food expenditure in the total match the average for poor rural households (71.8 per cent), gives us the definition of the poverty line, equal to an annual figure of US\$ 220 in 1996. With these definitions about two-thirds of the rural households fall below the indigency line and over 80 per cent below the poverty line, i.e. the only rural inhabitants that are not poor are those in the top quintile.

The survey also revealed that the peasants are highly dependent on purchased food. A mere 28 per cent of the food consumption expenditure was satisfied by on-farm production. This, in combination with the general poverty, made food consumption account for two-thirds of the total expenditure, on average, with little variation between the quintiles. Agriculture was the dominant source of income, accounting for 59 per cent in the poorest quintile and 78 in the top one, the average being 72 per cent. Most of the land (almost two-thirds) was owned by the peasants themselves. The main alternative to ownership was sharecropping, a practice that was more prevalent among the poorest households (18 per cent of the total farm area) than among the richest (7 per cent). (We will come back to the interpretation of this below.) The poorest households usually had their plots twice as far away from the *kay* [houses] as the richest households. "This is not a trivial phenomenon: a walking distance of an hour or more to a plot entails a severe tradeoff between cultivation and other, concurrent (especially non-farm) labor activities, and this can be a disincentive to choosing crops requiring intensive cultivation techniques", using more cash inputs, hired labor and/or soil conservation.⁸³ Protection against soil erosion was found to increase the productivity of the land with 22 per cent.

The marginal product of labor was found to be close to zero (76 gourdes per added man-year), while increases in the use of purchased inputs yielded a 90 per cent return, Haitian farms being starved of capital. As could be expected, the low labor productivity created a pressure to leave the farms, especially among the poorest families, who, we recall, derived 41 per cent of their incomes from off-farm activities. Also, 29 per cent of all households had members who had migrated, but only 8 per cent (of all households) reported receiving any remittances from the migrants.

The findings of the 2001 survey are less detailed than those from the mid-1990s. They do, however, by and large confirm the latter. Poverty in Haiti is more common in rural than in urban areas. Living in the countryside, as opposed to the capital, reduced the expected income by 58 per cent. The extent of poverty also varies considerably between regions. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, it turned out that the Département du

Nord-Est (and not Nord-Ouest) was the poorest one. No less than 84 percent of the population there lived on less than one dollar per day. Overall, the non-poor households received more wage income and transfers than the poor and extremely poor where self-employment and self-consumption were the rule. The formal labor market was central when it came to escaping poverty. Schooling mattered as well. Around fifty per cent of the children from poor and extremely poor households were enrolled in primary education, against two-thirds of the non-poor. Also contrary to the conventional wisdom, landlessness did not seem to have much to do with poverty. 80 per cent of the rural households had access to land. The plots were small and relatively equally distributed. The existing differences did not have much impact of income.

V. THE ROOT CAUSES OF POVERTY

Since poverty appears to play a central role for the decision to migrate it becomes important to find out what causes poverty. Haiti is by far the country in the western hemisphere with the lowest per capita income, presently (2008) around US\$ 600.⁸⁴ This figure, however, hides an unequal distribution of income, with lower figures not least in rural areas.⁸⁵ The Haitian peasant attempts to make ends meet on a total land area which on average is less than one *carreau* (1.29 hectares).⁸⁶ This area furthermore has a strong tendency to shrink over time, as the population grows, and this goes hand in hand with a decreasing rural average income. For the past sixty years, at least, and probably longer than so, agricultural output per capita (of the population) has displayed a downward trend.⁸⁷

The decreasing availability of land in the Haitian countryside is not just a case of more people gathering on a given area. Unfortunately, the process contains features of cumulative causation which make it accelerate over time and hence make the situation of the peasants progressively worse.⁸⁸ The culprit of the process – its trigger – is the growth of the population. The growth rate, 2 per cent per annum or less, gross of migration, is not particularly high by Third World standards.⁸⁹ In the Haitian topographical context it is, however, fatal. The land frontier was closed some time during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Thereafter the accommodation of the expanding population has had to take place on land already occupied by somebody. Little by little, cultivation was extended from better, more accessible lands in the plains to the mountainsides. Today, peasant plots are found on *mòn* [mountainsides] that are virtually vertical in some instances.

It goes virtually without saying that cultivation cannot be extended in this way without severe ecological consequences. Haiti is notorious in this respect. How, then, does the process work? When the rural population grows, provided that no alternative employment is available that could draw people out of agriculture, all the new workers have to go into the existing area, i.e. the man/land ratio will increase in the sector as a whole. In the simple setting of Haiti, where the agricultural sector employs very little capital, two different types of activities can be discerned: those with a low man/land ratio (land-intensive activities) and those with a high one (labor-intensive activities). By and large, the former correspond to the production of the traditional export crops, notably coffee, while more labor-intensive techniques are used in the cultivation of food crops.

Provided that the production functions for the two types of crops are linearly homogeneous, i.e. economies or diseconomies of scale are unimportant, or display diseconomies of scale but the differences in man/land ratios between the two are large, the only way of accommodating a growing labor force at given relative commodity prices is to let the addition be absorbed in its entirety by labor-intensive production. In the linearly homogeneous case there is complete correspondence between relative commodity prices, relative factor prices and factor intensities in the two types of production. What this means is that if we hold relative commodity prices constant, relative factor prices must remain constant as well, as will the factor intensities employed in both types of production. Since the agricultural sector now contains more people than before, this trick can only be accomplished by increasing the relative weight of labor-intensive production. All the new workers have to go into the production of food crops, but if factor intensities are not to change, some land must also be transferred from land-intensive to labor-intensive production, i.e. the production of food crops will increase in absolute terms and that of export crops will decrease.⁹⁰

This is precisely what we observe in Haiti. Coffee trees are being uprooted on the mountainsides to leave room for the cultivation of food crops. This process has been going on for several decades, and it does not appear to have been counteracted by any increase in the relative price of export crops during this period that would make the peasants plant coffee again. On the contrary, the trend appears to have been in the opposite direction, with the relative price of food crops going up instead, reinforcing the effect of the growth of the population.

Unfortunately for the people who are caught in the logic of the interplay between factor growth and changes in the output mix, this

sequence will also have secondary effects of a most severe kind. The reason for this is that the shift from land-intensive to labor-intensive crops increases the risk of soil erosion. The most important export crop, coffee, is a tree or a bush with a canopy and a root system, both of which help to protect and bind the soil on the steep mountainsides. Once the coffee is gone, the exposure of the soil increases drastically, especially during the sowing and planting season which is also when the rains set in and wash the soil down the slopes and into plains and rivers.

Once the soil destruction is set in motion it feeds itself. Adding more people on a given area or reducing the area for a given population amount to the same thing: they both increase the man/land ratio, and it is precisely the change in the overall factor proportions that drives the process. Thus, soil erosion will lead to an increased production of food crops and a reduction of export output, which in turn will increase the extent of soil destruction, etc. Meanwhile, the population continues to grow. Thus both the numerator and the denominator of the man/land ratio are altered. The process tends to become cumulative, production more and more labor-intensive and the fields more and more eroded. As a result, peasant incomes decline over time, i.e. the peasants become poorer and poorer.

The increased poverty is, however, not shouldered alike by all. Adolescents and young adults tend to be hit harder than the older generation. Poverty in Haiti to some extent is a life-cycle phenomenon. The field surveys quoted in the present work indicate that the Haitian migrants to the Dominican Republic to a large extent are young and poor, but also that not all of them will remain at the same level of poverty their entire life. They may not become rich when they grow older (even by Haitian standards) but they may at least be earning more than when they were young.

The relation between increased life-cycle related poverty and migration receives some support from the evidence collected by Gerald Murray in Haiti.⁹¹ The traditional way for a Haitian male youth to obtain his first plot of land is through a pre-inheritance grant from his parents, usually one-fourth of a *carreau* (slightly more than 0.3 hectares), in his late teens or early twenties. The income produced with the aid of this plot accrued to the youngster. To receive the plot he had to provide work on his parents' land. Over time, however, the Haitian population has grown and the scarcity of land has increased. Since in principle all children have the same right to inherit, farms have tended to become smaller. This, in turn means that, on the one hand, the need for filial labor has decreased to the corresponding extent and, on the other hand, that the age at which the pre-

inheritance grant is received has been delayed and/or that the size of the grant has diminished. In their late teens and early twenties most peasant boys will still be working on an independent plot, but the manner in which they got access to the plots has changed. Instead of receiving a grant, the young men these days get their plots by entering into sharecropping agreements, frequently with their own parents.

What the latter pattern (if it is systematic) is due to is not entirely clear.⁹² This, however, is less of a concern in the present context. The important fact is that population growth has increased the scarcity of land in Haiti and this, in turn, has put young men in an increasingly difficult situation. Thus, teenagers and boys in their early twenties are forced to look for alternative income sources. Otherwise, they will make very little money until the time when they receive the traditional grant. Thus, migration to the Dominican Republic, in spite of all its ugliness, should stand out as an increasingly attractive alternative.

All Haitian poverty is not concentrated to certain phases of the life cycle, however. For most people it is a steady companion from the cradle to the grave, and it should go without saying that the erosion process has a negative influence on the productivity and incomes of in principle all peasants. Thus, the reasons why men migrate also when they are, say in their thirties or forties are no different from the causes as far as young boys are concerned. It is mainly the degree of poverty that differs.

VI. THE ECONOMICS OF THE MIGRATION DECISION

Which role, then, does poverty play in the decisions connected with migration? Let us proceed to examine how some of the principles suggested in the section on migration theories can be applied to the empirical findings. The interesting thing is not whether it is the poorest or the not quite so poor that emigrate but whether those who do in fact migrate do so because they think they will in some sense be better off if they go. In fact, the empirical investigations presented above point very strongly in that direction. The Haitians go to the Dominican Republic because they think they can improve their lot by doing so.

This is precisely what most orthodox migration theory centers upon. The most well-known formulation in the development context is the standard Harris-Todaro model.⁹³ In this, migration is a function of the difference in expected wages between the place of destination and the place of origin:

$$(1) \quad M = M(w_{DE} - w_{HE})$$

The prospective migrant knows relatively well how much he would earn by remaining in Haiti and, as it seems, he is also well informed about how much he is likely to get across the border. Thus, even the simplest Harris-Todaro formulation sheds considerable light on the migration decision.

It is sometimes argued that the Harris-Todaro model (and related approaches) cannot explain the phenomenon of return migration. If conditions are better on the other side of the border, the emigrants should not come back. Yet, in the Haitian case they obviously do. This feature is not difficult to accommodate, however. In the first place, the model is cast in terms of expected wages. Thus, there is always the probability that the migrant has been misinformed, that he will get cheated, shortchanged or will get less out of his trip than he thought when making the decision. This clearly happens, but the majority of the temporary migrants make more than one trip, and you cannot fool all of the people all of the time.

More interesting is that it is possible to incorporate the decision to return home in the model. Sugar growing is a highly seasonal affair. The *zafra* lasts from December to July, at most. When it is over, the majority of the Haitian workers find that their expected wage in the Dominican Republic falls to zero. Hence, they go back to Haiti. Their expected wage there may also be zero, but they are still likely to return. Why this is so can also be explained with the aid of the Harris-Todaro formulation, suitably reinterpreted. Assuming that the migrant has obtained a certain sum from his efforts and that no more is to be had either by remaining or by going back home what will guide his decision is where he thinks he will do best in terms of the utility he derives from spending (on consumption or investment):

$$(2) \quad M = M(UCHE - UCDE),$$

in the simplest case, where the entire income is consumed. Back in his own familiar environment, where he is better acquainted with the supply of goods, the available investment opportunities and the price structure, and where it is easier for him to move around, is obviously where the migrant prefers to spend his money.

In this way, for at least some (mainly early) part of the life cycle the migrant will maximize his expected income by periodically migrating to the Dominican Republic, but maximizing the utility he derives from it by spending as much as possible in Haiti. As he gets older, his income earning capacity in Haiti will presumably increase. He will get some land, either as

inheritance or by buying or leasing it, possibly financing the transaction with money earned in the Dominican Republic. This, *ceteris paribus*, should mean that the relative power of attraction of Haiti increases. As he gets older, he will normally also grow physically weaker, which may reduce his expected wage across the border. Possibly, risk aversion, combined with social factors, also has something to do with it. Life in the bateyes is never easy and the migrants are

... depending on meager and uncertain wages for ... [their] livelihood, far away from ... [their] kin. It is easy to see why returning to Haiti, pursuing a diversified subsistence strategy, and resuming one's place in kin-based and neighborhood networks of reciprocity at home might seem as a less risky option.⁹⁴

Thus, over the life cycle of the individual we would expect to find a stronger attachment to Haiti. This is presumably even more true for those who are target workers and who go to the Dominican Republic to earn money for a particular purpose. The maximization of utility over the lifetime of the individual thus requires an early period with residence periodically abroad and consumption or investment mainly at home, to be followed later in life by a more sedentary pattern of income earning and spending.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

Our knowledge of the facts and causes of migration from Haiti to the Dominican Republic is far better today than a decade or two ago. Yet, a lot remains to be done. In the present essay I have drawn a sketch which rests on a combination of empirical facts and theoretical principles of the most probable causal mechanisms. This sketch should, however, be made subject to more rigorous testing in the future. Comparatively little of the research of Haitian-Dominican migration has so far built on an explicit use of economic theories of migration when it comes to asking questions of empirical relevance. I think that it precisely here that future efforts should put the emphasis. In addition, the 'Haitian side' has been under-researched so far. With the notable exception of Samuel Martínez' study no systematic surveys have been made in the areas from which the migrants come. This is the second major lacuna to be filled out, possibly by following groups of emigrants from their point of origin in Haiti to their destination in the Dominican Republic and back again. That would provide us with a much fuller story than the ones told hitherto.

NOTES

- ¹ Amnesty International (2007), p. 1. See also e.g. Corten and Duarte (1995) and Martínez (1995), pp.6-7.
- ² The earlier history is dealt with e.g. in Lundahl (1983), Chapter 8.
- ³ Anti-Slavery Society (1979).
- ⁴ World Council of Churches (1980).
- ⁵ Lemoine (1981).
- ⁶ ILO (1983).
- ⁷ Veras (1983).
- ⁸ Veras (1985).
- ⁹ Moya Pons et al. (1986).
- ¹⁰ Plant (1987).
- ¹¹ Americas Watch, National Coalition for Haitian Refugees and Caribbean Watch (1989).
- ¹² See Cuello (1997), for the detailed contents of the agreements.
- ¹³ See e.g. García (1983), Cuello (1985), Vega (1995), for details.
- ¹⁴ Cf. e.g. Martínez (1995), pp. 46-49.
- ¹⁵ For more exhaustive surveys, see e.g. Yap (1977), Williamson (1988), Massey et al. (1993), Borjas (1994), Lucas (1997) and Gallup (1997).
- ¹⁶ For this, see Silié et al. (2002).
- ¹⁷ Lucas (1997), p. 728.
- ¹⁸ Ibid., p. 729.
- ¹⁹ The consequences in terms of wage levels are examined in Lundahl (1983), Chapter 8.
- ²⁰ See e.g. Carrothers (1956), for an overview.
- ²¹ Lucas (1997), p. 730.
- ²² Sjaastad (1962).
- ²³ Todaro (1969), Harris and Todaro (1970).
- ²⁴ Fields (1975).
- ²⁵ Mincer (1978), Stark and Levhari (1982).
- ²⁶ Cf. e.g. Bigsten (1985), Bangura (1996).
- ²⁷ Stark and Lucas (1988).
- ²⁸ Nelson (1959), Yap (1977), Taylor (1986).
- ²⁹ Stark (1984), Stark and Yitzhaki (1988).
- ³⁰ Lucas (1997), p. 754.
- ³¹ Nelson (1976), Fan and Stretton (1985).
- ³² Galor and Stark (1990).
- ³³ Beringhaus and Seifer-Vogt (1988).
- ³⁴ Connell et al. (1976) p. 79.

- ³⁵ Murphy (1986), Chapter 9. The same data appear in Moya Pons et al. (1986), Chapter 4.
- ³⁶ Murphy (1986), pp. 265-66.
- ³⁷ Ibid., pp. 266-67.
- ³⁸ Ibid., p. 271.
- ³⁹ Ibid.
- ⁴⁰ Báez Evertsz (1986).
- ⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 75-77.
- ⁴² Ibid., p. 78. Báez Evertsz hypothesizes that it is the *older* children that tend to become permanent emigrants, but strictly speaking this does not follow from his data.
- ⁴³ Ibid., p. 82.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 105.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 87-89.
- ⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 94.
- ⁴⁷ Lozano and Báez Evertsz (1992).
- ⁴⁸ Báez Evertsz (1986), pp. 316-17.
- ⁴⁹ Lozano and Báez Evertsz (1992), pp. 88, 106.
- ⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 58.
- ⁵¹ Ibid., p. 63.
- ⁵² Ibid., p. 64.
- ⁵³ Ibid., p. 69.
- ⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 71.
- ⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 143.
- ⁵⁶ Martínez (1995).
- ⁵⁷ Ibid., p. xi.
- ⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 80-81.
- ⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 85.
- ⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 86.
- ⁶¹ Ibid., p. 88.
- ⁶² Ibid., p. 93.
- ⁶³ Ibid., p. 94.
- ⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 95.
- ⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 96.
- ⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 97.
- ⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 104-05.
- ⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 105.
- ⁶⁹ Ibid.
- ⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 110.
- ⁷¹ Ibid., p. 98.
- ⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 99.

⁷⁴ The data from this are available in République d'Haïti (2003).

⁷⁵ The quotation is from Lundahl (1983), p. 138.

⁷⁶ Nicholls (1985), p. 198. Cf also *ibid.*, p. 191: "It is perhaps surprising to learn that most of the migrant workers [to the Dominican Republic] do not come from the class of landless rural proletariat but they are small landowners, particularly from the areas around Léogane and Jacmel."

⁷⁷ Priests are usually stronger believers in phenomena that have not been empirically verified than economists. Nicholls' verdict (cf. the preceding footnote) is based on data collected by André Corten (1974) (Spanish version quoted by Nicholls published in 1974, French original reprinted in Corten (1986), Chapter 4). In the article quoted by Nicholls, Corten simply mentions that "the majority of the cane cutters interviewed in the Dominican Republic declared to be landowners, instead of belonging, as would seem normal in the case of 'poverty-migration' [migration-misère], to the most impoverished category of the population: the 'landless'" (Corten (1986), p. 96), without providing any details at all. In a later work (Corten and Tahon (1985), pp. 56, 70-76, cf. also Corten (1986), Chapter 8), Corten and Tahon make reference to two sets of interviews, one carried out in 1970 (presumably the one on which the quotation is based) among 85 Haitians and another in 1981, when 51 people were questioned. During the former around half of the interviewees declared to have a piece of land of their own or a piece of family land. Eleven years later, the figure had increased to more than two-thirds. At the same time, however, almost 80 per cent in 1970 and over 70 per cent in 1981 were classified by Corten and Tahon as rural or agricultural 'proletarians', a 'proletarian' being defined as "someone who was alienated ... from his means of subsistence ..." (Corten and Tahon (1985), p. 22). These two statements are completely contradictory. Thus, it is difficult to know what to make of Corten's data. Possibly, the classification as 'proletarian' is dependent on lack of access to land in *the Dominican Republic* (Corten and Tahon (1985), pp. 76-77, (1986), p. 257), but that hardly makes any sense for people who have land, i.e. 'means of subsistence', in Haiti.

⁷⁸ Martínez (1995), p. 174.

⁷⁹ Obviously 'poorer' does not mean 'very poorest'.

⁸⁰ Lipton (1977), pp. 218-19. The quotation is from p. 218. Cf. also Connell et al. (1976), p. 197.

⁸¹ Connell et al. (1976), p. 206.

⁸² The results of the former study are summarized in Wiens and Sobrado (1997). The statistics of the latter investigation are in République d'Haïti (2003) and the main findings are reported in Sletten and Egset (2006).

⁸³ Ibid., p. 9.

⁸⁴ World Bank (2010), p. 378.

⁸⁵ Statistics on the distribution of income and wealth in Haiti are notoriously uncertain (cf. Lundahl (1996)), but few would dispute this statement.

⁸⁶ A 1994-96 USAID sponsored survey of more than 4,000 households revealed an average cultivated area of 1.23 hectares (Wiens and Sobrado (1997), p. 8).

⁸⁷ Cf. the data summarized in Lundahl (1997), p. 4.

⁸⁸ Lundahl (1979), Chapter 5.

⁸⁹ Lundahl (1997), p. 4.

- ⁹⁰ This in economics is known as the Rybczynski theorem (Rybczynski (1955)). It can be shown that if one or both sectors display decreasing returns to scale and factor intensities differ sufficiently between the two types of activities the same result will obtain (Hansson and Lundahl (1983)).
- ⁹¹ Murray (1977), Chapters 7-10.
- ⁹² Murray views it as a device used by the parents to mobilize filial labor, but as I have pointed out elsewhere (Lundahl (1983), Chapter 6), this interpretation hardly stands up to scrutiny in a situation where the price of land is increasing in terms of labor.
- ⁹³ Harris and Todaro (1970).
- ⁹⁴ Martínez (1995), p. 101.

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