THE NESTORIAN TREATISE PRESERVED IN LEONTIUS OF JERUSALEM'S
CONTRA NESTORIANOS (CPG 6918): INTRODUCTION, EDITION AND ENGLISH
TRANSLATION

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Abstract

The Nestorian treatise preserved in Leontius of Jerusalem’s Contra Nestorianos (CPG 6918) is the only surviving Nestorian Christological text in the Greek language that was written after the condemnation of Nestorius. It consists of self-contained arguments, mostly in the form of syllogisms, which are organised in eight books. The content can be easily reconstructed since Leontius of Jerusalem quotes each argument in full before refuting it. Only the last book is missing, either because Leontius did not get round to tackling it or because the manuscript containing Leontius’ work was mutilated. This article will present an introduction, critical edition and English translation of the Treatise with annotations.

Keywords

Leontius of Jerusalem – Nestorian Treatise – Contra Nestorianos – Christology

Introduction

In the year 381 the Second Ecumenical Council declared that the godhead was three hypostases who shared one single nature and were therefore one God. This put an end to the controversies about the relationship between the divine Father and his Son and Spirit that had raged for more than half a century.\(^1\) The number of those who rejected the settlement declined sharply in the following decades. Thus it could seem that the church was finally at peace. Yet this impression was deceptive because a new problem had arisen. The leading theologians of the time asked how one should conceive of the relationship between the second divine hypostasis, the Son or Word, and the human being Jesus, the flesh, that had been established through the incarnation. Two different approaches were developed, which have traditionally been called the Antiochene and Alexandrian Schools because in the late fourth and early fifth centuries most of their respective proponents were found in Syria and Egypt.\(^2\)

The Antiochenes insisted on the difference between the Word and the flesh. They considered them to be two agents, which guided their reading of the Bible. They attributed ‘high things’ such as miracles to the Word and ‘low things’ such as sufferings to the flesh.

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\(^1\) See e. g. L. Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology, New York 2004.

By contrast, the Alexandrians claimed that both ‘high things’ and ‘low things’ must be predicated of a single agent, the Word. Accordingly, they would say that God suffered on the cross. This was dangerous ground since it appeared to negate the common notion that God was impassible by nature. Apart from a few extremists, nobody was prepared to go so far. Yet even so the Antiochenes were shocked. They came to the conclusion that the Alexandrians had to be blasphemers because they denied the transcendence of God. A second bone of contention was the status of the flesh. By attributing the ‘low things’ to it the Antiochenes accorded it a will of its own. This gave the impression as if sinlessness was an achievement of the flesh. The Alexandrians complained that such a belief nullified the salvation of humankind. For them no human being could be sinless. Accordingly, they argued that the Word did not permit the flesh to make moral judgements.

In the late 420s matters came to a head when the Syrian monk Nestorius was appointed patriarch of Constantinople. Due to his Antiochene background, he was greatly upset by the term ‘God-bearer’ that had come to be widely used for the Virgin Mary. He claimed that God could not have been born from a human being because he had an eternal existence. His criticism irked the powerful patriarch of Alexandria, Cyril, who came to the defense of the term. In the course of the controversy the two men developed conceptual frameworks that could support their views. Nestorius spoke of two separate human and divine natures and hypostases and declared that the incarnation had resulted in a prosopon of union, which was based on will and grace. By contrast, Cyril stated several times that there was only one nature and one hypostasis and that the union affected the being of the two components.

At the Third Ecumenical Council in 431 Nestorius’ position was declared heretical. This meant that it could no longer be held with impunity. Yet this did not mean that the Antiochene School disappeared. In 451 it gained a new lease of life when the Fourth Ecumenical Council defined the Word and the flesh as two natures, which were united in one hypostasis. This formula was accepted by the majority of Antiochenes because it left room for interpretation. One could focus on the two natures and emphasise their difference, in particular since a synodal document, the so-called Tome of Leo, claimed that each nature did what was its own. Accordingly, Antiochenes such as the patriarch Gennadius of Constantinople felt justified in attacking Cyril. Yet by the beginning of the sixth century the situation had begun to change. Those who followed Cyril in speaking of one nature and one hypostasis, the Monophysites, claimed that the formula of Chalcedon was a vindication of Nestorius’ position. Stung by this criticism, some Chalcedonians


For the following see S. WESSEL, Cyril of Alexandria and the Nestorian Controversy: The Making of a Saint and a Heretic, Oxford 2004, esp. 130-131.


However, see H. VAN LOON, The Dyophysite Christology of Cyril of Alexandria, Leiden–Boston 2009.


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proceeded to interpret their creed in the light of Cyril’s teachings. They were met with fierce opposition by the Antiochenes. One of their number, Basil of Cilicia, wrote a lengthy treatise against John of Scythopolis whose theology was influenced by the Alexandrian patriarch. Yet eventually the Cyrillianists, or Neochalcedonians as they are often called, gained the upper hand. Now the emphasis was firmly on the one hypostasis. The culmination of this trend was the Fifth Ecumenical Council in the year 553. There the two foremost Antiochene theologians, Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia, were condemned although they had already been dead for more than a century. This decision spelt the end of Antiochene Chalcedonianism. Its proponents, such as the monks of Palestine, had no choice but to distance themselves from their beliefs. It goes without saying that those Antiochenes who continued to subscribe to the teachings of Nestorius were in an even worse position. They had been persecuted by the Roman state and the official church ever since the year 431. Some of their number sought refuge in the Persian Empire where the situation was radically different. In the second half of the fifth century the Christians there adopted Theodore of Mopsuestia as their main Christological authority. At the end of the sixth century one of their leaders, Babai the Great, spoke openly of two natures and two hypostases in the incarnated Word. Yet this does not mean that there were no longer any Nestorians in the Roman Empire. Although most of their writings have disappeared we still have a lengthy treatise, which has survived in a refutation by the Chalcedonian theologian Leontius of Jerusalem where it is extensively quoted. Like Babai, its author defends a specifically Nestorian Christology and rejects the formula of Chalcedon. Since he also polemicises against the Fifth Ecumenical Council we can be certain that he was active after 553. His floruit can be inferred from a reference to a contemporary practice. In chapter III.8 he declares that the womb of the empress is crowned before she gives birth in the purple chamber, and adds that this is often the case. This rules out a date before 582 because Justinian, Justin II and Tiberius II had no children while they were in office. The reigns of Maurice (582-602) and Heraclius (610-641) are equally possible since both men had numerous offspring. Yet it can be argued that the treatise was written during the Persian occupation of the Eastern provinces of the Roman Empire in the second and third decades of the seventh century when there was no fear of persecution. This is all the more likely since Leontius of Jerusalem once refers to the sack of the holy city by the Persians.

9 See A. Rigolo, Christians in Conversation, Oxford 2019, 197-199.
The Nestorian Treatise

The treatise is of the utmost significance since it is the only surviving Nestorian Christological text in the Greek language that was written after the condemnation of Nestorius. It consisted of self-contained arguments, mostly in the form of syllogisms, which were organised in eight books. The content can be easily reconstructed since Leontius of Jerusalem quotes each argument in full before refuting it. Only the last book is missing, either because Leontius did not get round to tackling it or because the manuscript containing Leontius’ work was mutilated. In his introduction Leontius gives a short summary of the topics.

First, that we (i.e. the Chalcedonians) do not correctly confess a composition of the divine and human natures.

Second, that while there are two hypostases of Christ we wrongly say that a union according to hypostasis took place and recognise one hypostasis of him.

Third again, that while there are two sons, we wrongly confess that Christ is one son.

Fourth, that we wrongly call the holy Virgin ‘God-bearer’.

Fifth, that we know that Christ is not just a mere human being by nature but that he is also God.

Sixth, that we know that the Word (sic) is not a God-bearing human being but God who has become a human being.

Seventh, that we proclaim unlawfully that one of the Trinity has suffered through the flesh.

In the eighth (sc. book) of impiety, they deny the union according to hypostasis and conjure up some others that are inexistent.

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17 See Codex Marcianus graecus Z.69, fol. 298v-299r.

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A Nestorian Christology

Through his insistence that the divine Word and the human being Jesus are two hypostases the author of the treatise reveals himself to be not just an Antiochene but a follower of Nestorius. Like Nestorius, he advocates a weak link between the Word and the flesh. In chapter II.34 and elsewhere he speaks of the one prosopon of union, which does not affect the two natures but is based on will and love. Thus it is not surprising that he fights the same battles.

In chapter IV.1 the Nestorian criticises his adversaries for claiming that Mary was God-bearer ‘strictly and in truth’. This qualification, which was added at the Council of Ephesus, had become necessary because the term ‘God-bearer’ was not unequivocal. As the Nestorian states in chapter IV.2 he could have accepted it since human beings can be called ‘gods’ because of the divine image. Yet it was clearly problematic since it gave the impression as if Mary was mother of God by nature. In chapters IV.7 and IV.8 the Nestorian declares that offspring must be of the same substance as the parent and then concludes that there are only two possible scenarios: either Mary was a goddess, which would be blasphemous, or she was a human being in which case the Word born from her was not God.

In chapter III.10 the Nestorian defends himself against the accusation that he teaches two sons. He objects that one can only count sons when they are born from the same parents. This, however, is not the case with the incarnation because the Word is son by nature and Christ is son by adoption. In chapter III.11 he illustrates his point with the case of Rachel. Rachel had adoptive sons from her servant-woman Bilha and sons that she herself had given birth to. Yet when the sons of Jacob are listed in Genesis only Rachel’s true sons are mentioned as hers.

In chapter I.44 the Nestorian counters the claim that he venerates a mere human being. He contends that Christ was a special case because he was accorded a higher honour than other members of the human race. In order to support this claim he offers two arguments. In chapter III.7 he states that a gnat and an angel are both creatures but we would for this reason not say that they have the same honour. In chapter III.9 different types of sons of God are distinguished on a rising scale. All human beings are sons of God because of the divine image, the Israelites were more specifically sons of God because God had made a covenant with them and gave them the law, Christians are sons of God to an even greater degree since they are recipients of divine grace and promised sinlessness, and Christ is son of God in the same sense as other Christians but has additional honours since he was chosen from all human beings and given an incomparable name. This understanding of Christ’s status is radically different from the Chalcedonian and Monophysite view that Jesus was assumed into the divinity and therefore participates in the sonship of the Word.

In chapter I.19 the Nestorian author seeks to show that a connection through the will, love, grace and good pleasure of the Word can account for all that was known about Christ and that there was therefore no need for a union according to hypostasis as it was proposed by his adversaries. He avers that Christ’s miracles could not be considered proof of such a union since Jesus promised that greater ones would be performed by his Apostles who were mere human beings. Likewise, the Virgin birth and the sinlessness were no valid

18 See R. PRICE, “The Virgin as Theotokos at Ephesus (AD 431) and Earlier,” in Ch. MAUNDER, The Oxford Handbook of Mary, Oxford 2019, 67-77.
19 See WESSEL, Cyril of Alexandria, 157-158.
20 See WESSEL, Cyril of Alexandria, 191.

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arguments because in Matthew 1:8 Mary is said to have become pregnant from the Holy Spirit and in 1 Timothy 3:16 Jesus is said to have been justified in the Spirit. This may give the impression that the Nestorian author simply substitutes the operations of the Spirit for the effects of hypostatic union. Yet this is not quite the case. Whereas Chalcedonians and Monophysites give the human being no share in the achievement of sinlessness the Nestorian author states clearly in chapter I.19 and once more in chapter I.47 that it was Jesus himself who avoided sinning while the Holy Spirit only provided support. Significantly, he exclaims that otherwise it would be meaningless to speak of sinlessness as an achievement. For him Jesus has an autonomous personality that developed over time. In chapter II.6 he considers entirely unproblematic the claim in Luke 2:52 that Jesus grew in wisdom, which had greatly incommodated Cyril. In chapter II.32 he says that only the Word is omniscient whereas Jesus is ignorant as it is attested in the Bible.

In other respects, too, the Bible is the Nestorian author’s most potent weapon. He has a marked preference for the oldest layer of Christological statements. In chapter V.5 he quotes Acts 2:36 where Christ is said to have been made Lord and Christ by God. This allows him to argue that the lordship of Jesus is an honorary title for a creature and can therefore not be identified with the natural lordship of the divine Word. In chapters II.48 and V.3 he points out correctly that according to the Bible Christ was raised by God and did not raise himself as it was claimed by the Chalcedonians.

The Nestorian Contribution to the Christological debate

The issues that we have discussed so far were first raised around the time of the Council of Ephesus. Yet this does not mean that the Nestorian only rehashes old arguments. He shows himself fully au fait with more recent developments. In order to contextualise his contribution to the mature Christological discourse it is necessary to consider not only the Chalcedonians but also the Monophysites. The debate between these two sects began in earnest in the early sixth century when the Chalcedonian John of Caesarea clashed with the Monophysite Severus of Antioch. It then continued with contributions by Leontius of Byzantium and John Philoponus. It has already been suggested that the Chalcedonians modified their position in response to Monophysite criticism. What has not yet been assessed is the impact of Nestorian arguments. In what follows I will show that they were trenchant enough to trouble Chalcedonian authors. Apart from the Nestorian who wrote in Greek and lived in the Roman Empire we need to consider the contribution of his contemporary Babai the Great. Although Babai lived in the Persian Empire and wrote in Syriac he was aware of the discussions going on across the border and responded to them.

The Independent Existence of the Flesh

The Chalcedonians had to show that the flesh was not an independent individual besides the Word because this would have destroyed the oneness of the incarnated Word,

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21 See WESSEL, Cyril of Alexandria, 133-134.
which they sought to defend. The most popular, and least sophisticated, argument was to claim that the flesh could not have a hypostasis of its own because it only came into existence at the moment of its union with the Word. It is first attested in John of Caesarea’s treatise and is repeated in all later Chalcedonian texts (with the exception of Leontius of Byzantium who considers such a scenario to be at least possible). Here, there was no disagreement with the Monophysites. Severus and his followers also denied the pre-existence of the flesh because they were if anything even more concerned about maintaining the oneness of the incarnated Word. The Nestorian challenges this consensus. In chapter II.20 he distinguishes between two ways in which the incarnation could have taken place. Either the human body was fashioned first, the soul was breathed into it afterwards, and the Word united himself with both body and soul in third place. Or the Word united himself first with the body and then breathed the soul into the body and into himself. He contends that only the first option can be correct because in the second option the body would mediate between the soul and the Word. Such a scenario would be impossible since a mediator must take a middle position between two extremes. This, however, could only be the soul, which is closer to the Word than the body. Both options presuppose a particular understanding of the formation of the embryo where the soul appears only after the body has been fully formed. We encounter it in Syriac Christianity but also in Aristotelian philosophy. The Nestorian recognises its potential for anti-Chalcedonian polemic. According to the first option, the body existed before the union with the Word, which means that it had a hypostasis of its own. The Nestorian concludes that one can therefore only speak of a looser union based on the good pleasure of the divinity. It might be said that this is a weak argument because the Chalcedonians could simply deny that in the embryo the body comes into existence before the soul. There was indeed an alternative theory, first proposed by Gregory of Nyssa, according to which the soul is present in the body from the moment of conception. Applied to the incarnation, it meant that the Word created both body and soul simultaneously when he united himself with them. Thus, it is not surprising that it was accepted by Chalcedonian authors and also by Severus. Yet matters were less straightforward than they might first seem. In the sixth century there were also Chalcedonians who claimed that in the embryo the body comes into existence before the soul. They thought that the presence of the soul at the moment of conception would imply that it had already existed before the body, which was a tenet of the Origenist heresy. This made it difficult for them to maintain a Chalcedonian Christology. Leontius of Jerusalem declared that the incarnation was categorically different from the coming-to-be of ordinary human beings and should be considered a miracle. The Nestorian was probably already aware of this ‘solution’ and had found a way to refute it. He quotes Hebrews 4:15 where Christ is said to be like us in all respects apart from sin. The excluded second option is also interesting. It is likely that some Chalcedonians believed that the Word united himself first with the body and then with the soul because it ruled out an independent pre-existence of the body. Significantly, however, the only text in which it is attested today is a treatise by Babai the Great. Babai considered the Nestorian’s position to be heretical because it minimised the effects of the incarnation. There can be no doubt that the Nestorian brushed away such concerns because his sole aim was to destroy the Chalcedonian position.

24 For the following see D. Krausmüller, “Where embryology intersects with Christology: the viewpoints of Nestorian, Monophysite and Chalcedonian authors of the sixth to tenth centuries,” Byzantinische Zeitschrift 113 (2020): 853-878.
Dirk Krausmüller, “The Nestorian Treatise Preserved in Leontius of Jerusalem’s Contra Nestorianos (CPG 6918),” Journal for Late Antiquity Religion and Culture 17 (2023) 59-130; DOI: https://doi.org/10.18573/jlarc.141
No hypostatic idioms

Denying that the flesh existed before the union with the Word was no doubt a popular argument. Yet it soon turned out that it alone could not prevent the human nature from becoming a separate hypostasis. The problems surfaced when John of Caesara applied to the incarnation the conceptual framework of a common nature/substance and individual hypostases that the Cappadocians had developed for the Trinity. In principle, this was a clever move. It highlighted the fact that for the Monophysites the term ‘nature’ had different meanings in Trinitarian theology and in Christology: in the former case it denoted the species whereas in the latter case it denoted an individual. This made it easy to accuse them of inconsistency. Yet there were also serious drawbacks. According to the Cappadocians, the ‘addition’ of individual characteristics to a set of common properties constituted a hypostasis within a species. If the human nature had such characteristics it would have become a separate hypostasis even within the hypostasis of the Word. Significantly, this point is not made by Severus who in his Christological statements showed no interest in individual characteristics. In secondary literature it is therefore assumed that the Chalcedonians themselves became aware of the problem. Yet it is equally possible that others forced them to acknowledge it. In chapter II.21 the Nestorian pits Trinitarian theology against Christology. He states that the idiom ‘begotten’ distinguishes the Word from the Father and the Spirit and thus constitutes him straightway as a separate hypostasis. Then he points out that the birth from a Virgin distinguishes Jesus from all other human beings and must therefore also straightway constitute him as a hypostasis.

John’s solution was simply to deny that the flesh had individual characteristics. Leontius of Byzantium, too, once expresses this view. He compares the incarnated Word both with the other divine persons and with other human beings. He states that the Word is distinguished from the Father through the characteristic ‘begotten’ but he does then not say that the flesh is distinguished from his mother Mary through its characteristics. Instead, he juxtaposes Mary with the incarnated Word as a whole. This strange asymmetry becomes even odder when we see that Leontius creates an analogy with the human being. Here we find an exact parallel. Both the body and the soul of a human being are hypostases because they differ from the bodies and souls of other human beings. Significantly, in chapter II.15 the Nestorian makes the same point. He states that the body of Peter differed from the body of Paul, just as their souls differed from one another. This can only mean that both body and soul had hypostases of their own. Predictably, he then concludes that the same must then also apply to the incarnated Word. This remained a weakness of Chalcedonianism throughout the sixth century. A solution of sorts was only found after the Nestorian’s time. Then it was claimed that individuation alone did not bring about hypostases but that a further component was needed that gave reality to the individuated nature. Interestingly, Severus never criticised the absence of individual characteristics in the flesh. By contrast, the Nestorian pounced on it. In chapter II.6 he points out that it flies in the face of the Biblical accounts, which present Jesus as an individual, and he adds that Mary was an individual and could therefore only have given birth to an individual.

27 See ZACHHUBER, Rise of Christian Theology, 289, 310.
Universal Natures in Christ

John made a distinction between the Word who was a hypostasis and the human nature, which lacked this status. Yet at the same time he declared that the incarnation was a union of two universal or common natures. This led to conceptual problems because it was not clear what ‘common nature’ meant. Severus avers that it could only refer to the sum-total of all members of a species. Accordingly, he concludes that the entire divinity would have become incarnate in the entire human race. John complains that Severus wilfully misunderstood him. When he spoke of the whole nature he meant that the Word possessed the sum-total of properties that constitute the divinity. This is evidently a deflection from the actual problem. The real crux was that according to the Cappadocians the set of divine properties is found in all three persons without being divided up among them. This made it difficult to explain why the incarnation did not involve the three divine persons and in addition also the entire human race.

The Nestorian deals with this topic in chapter II.7. There he grants his Chalcedonian adversaries that they do not speak of the incarnation of the entire Trinity. Accordingly, his focus is exclusively on the human dimension. He distinguishes between a union of the Word with a particular human being and a union of the Word with the universal human being. In the former case he concludes that a particular human being is nothing else but a human hypostasis as the Nestorians had said all along. The latter case is, of course, the solution proposed by John. The Nestorian claims that if it were true the Word would have become incarnate in all human beings, including the Jews who sentenced and killed Jesus. Here we can see clearly that Monophysites and Nestorians used the same arguments when they attacked the Chalcedonians. Yet this is not all the Nestorian has to say. He mentions a second meaning of ‘universal human being’. It could denote a set of common human properties that the mind abstracts from the individuals and that therefore only exists as a concept in the mind. This was a potent argument because it gave the impression that the Chalcedonians were docetists who sought to nullify the reality of the incarnation.

This second argument was summed up in the formula ‘there is no nature that is anhypostatos’. Here anhypostatos has two meanings, ‘inexistent’ and ‘without hypostasis’. It is claimed that a nature can only be real when it is instantiated in a hypostasis. Significantly, the formula is quoted both by Severus and by the Nestorian. This confirms Leontius of Byzantium’s claim that both sects used it in their polemic against the Chalcedonians. It seems likely that it had originally been coined by the Nestorians since they alone spoke of a human nature and a human hypostasis. In response to it John had claimed that the universal human nature was not anhypostatos because it existed so-to-speak parasitically in the Word, which was constituted as a hypostasis through the idiom ‘begotten’. This argument, however, was rejected by both Monophysites and Nestorians. Therefore the Chalcedonians felt the need to shore up the ontological status of the human nature itself. One popular strategy was to reinterpret the formula ‘there is no nature that is anhypostatos’. It was claimed that the antonym of anhypostatos was not hypostasis but enhypostatos, which conferred reality on the human nature.

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30 See DALEY, Leontius of Byzantium, 28-29.
nature without turning it into a fully fledged hypostasis.\footnote{For the following see B. Gleede, The Development of the Term ἐνυπόστατος from Origen to John of Damascus, Leiden-Boston 2012, 127-131.} This line of reasoning was known to the Nestorian who inveighs against it in chapter II.13. There he explains how the Chalcedonians defended their use of the term enhypostatos. Their first argument is a comparison with Trinitarian theology. They pointed out that in the Trinity one can speak of three substantial hypostases (enousios hypostaseis) without assuming the existence of three substances (ousiai), and they concluded that one one should then also be able to speak in Christology of two hypostatic substances (enhypostatoi ousiai) without speaking of two hypostases. The second argument is an analogy. A body can be called coloured (enchromati\textit{t}\textit{os}i) but is not colour (\textit{chroma}) and in the same way a substance can be called enhypostatos but is not hypostasis. The Nestorian complains bitterly that these are paralogisms based on a superficial similarity of terms, which are meant to confuse ordinary Christians. In the second case he presents a counter-argument: if colour equals hypostasis and it is found in a body a hypostasis is also found in a substance. The Nestorian ascribes these arguments to a group of Chalcedonians who called themselves ‘Cherubim’. Unfortunately, we do not know who these people were. Yet we can be certain that the two arguments already existed in the second quarter of the sixth century because Leontius of Byzantium juxtaposes enousios and enhypostatos on the one hand and shape (schema) and shaped (enschemat\textit{t}i\textit{t}o\textit{s}) on the other.\footnote{See D. Krausmüller, “Making sense of the formula of Chalcedon: the Cappadocians and Aristotle in Leontius of Byzantium’s Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos,” Vigiliae Christianae 65 (2011): 484-513.} Significantly, however, Leontius does not develop the two arguments but adds a new definition of enhypostatos, which is borrowed from the philosophical discourse. This suggests that Nestorian criticism forced the Chalcedonians to rethink their arguments.

Composition and the Anthropological Paradigm

In order to show that the incarnated Word cannot be a single hypostasis, the Nestorian juxtaposes properties of the Word and of the flesh, such as uncreated and created in chapter I.26, or infinite and finite in chapter I.25, and then claims that they cannot co-exist in one and the same being. This is a traditional argument, which is already found in Nestorius’ writings and which had been passed down through the decades, eventually also making an appearance in Babai’s writings.\footnote{See P. Bruns, “Finitum non capax infiniti. Ein antiochenisches Axiom in der Inkarnationslehre Babais des Grossen,” Oriens Christianus 83 (1999): 46-71.} Yet it plays a relatively minor role in the Nestorian’s treatise. The focus is instead on the concept of ‘composition’, which had been employed by Cyril of Alexandria and later also by Severus.\footnote{For the following see D. Krausmüller, “What is a Composite Hypostasis? Leontius of Jerusalem, Maximus the Confessor and the Nestorian Challenge,” forthcoming in Scrinium.} In Chalcedonian texts it first appears in the first quarter of the sixth century. There the Monophysite formula of the ‘one composite nature’ is replaced with its Chalcedonian equivalent of the ‘one composite hypostasis’. The Nestorian declares that this was the official dogma of the Chalcedonian church. This can only be a reference to the Fifth Ecumenical Council of 553 where the concept of composition had been introduced as an orthodox alternative to looser types of union preferred by the Nestorians, such as ‘relation’ and ‘equality of honour’, which were condemned as heretical. This produced a Nestorian backlash. Babai the Great polemics against Emperor Justinian, declaring him to be the worst heretic of all times. Moreover, he seeks to show that defining the incarnation as a composition is
not reconcilable with common notions about the divinity. Significantly, the Nestorian takes the same approach in the first book of his treatise. Both authors claim that in order to determine what ‘composition’ means one must consider all cases of compounds in the created order. They assert that from all these compounds one can derive a general rule to which there are no exceptions. Then they list the properties of the parts. In chapter I.2, for example, the Nestorian avers that all parts are circumscribed and that the Word can therefore not be a part since he is uncircumscribed. An almost identically worded argument is employed by Babai, which leaves no doubt that both authors make use of earlier texts. In fact, the earliest known source predates the Fifth Ecumenical Council. In the 520s the Chalcedonian author John Maxentius had claimed that only composition could prevent a Nestorian interpretation of the formula of Chalcedon. In his treatise he provides clear evidence for a debate even at this point. He lets a Nestorian say that every composition consists of parts and that parts are necessarily lesser than the whole, which would mean that the Word is lesser than the composite of Word and flesh. Significantly, the same argument is employed both by Babai and by the Nestorian. Thus we can conclude that there was a Nestorian discourse stretching through the whole sixth century and encompassing the Roman and Sasanian empires, despite the difference in language. The Chalcedonians found it difficult to respond. They could argue that composition in the case of the incarnation was of a different type from that in the created order. But then they could be accused of making arbitrary statements.

As we have seen the Nestorian and Babai formulate a general rule and then apply it to the specific case of the incarnation. Most arguments of the two authors, however, contain a further step. The general rule is illustrated with an example, the human compound. The result is that the incarnated Word cannot be compared with the human being.35 This is not just an illustration. The way in which the general rule is phrased shows clearly that the Nestorian and Babai had the human being in mind all along. The Nestorian claims that the soul by necessity ceases to function when the body turns to sleep, and that it needs the body to learn and to do good deeds. The anthropology behind this statement is clear: the soul is dependent on the body, just as the body is dependent on the soul. This is an anthropology that goes back to the Syrians and possibly also to Aristotle.

Of course, these arguments could be countered through recourse to a different anthropology where the soul is not dependent on the body and can therefore be used as an analogy for the Word. Leontius of Byzantium, for example, makes this point with reference to Platonic philosophy. Yet the historical context must again be considered. At the Fifth Ecumenical Council in 553 Origenism, which had once been tolerated, was officially declared to be heretical. As a consequence, many people were suspicious of Platonic notions about the soul. The Nestorian capitalises on this development. In chapter I.51 at the end of the first book he plays the heresiological card. He claims that according to ‘us’ Christians the soul is lesser than the whole human being whereas according to the pagans and Manichaeans it is greater. This juxtaposition is not as innocuous as it first may seem. Significantly, John Philoponus holds the view that is here attributed to the pagans and Manichaeans. The polemical character of the argument becomes even clearer when we consider how the Nestorian makes his case. He says that according to the Christians the soul remains the same after its separation from the body, being incapable of functioning without the organs of the body and therefore being in a deep sleep. By contrast, the pagans and Manichaeans claim that the soul is better on its own and perfectly self-sufficient, both before it is imprisoned in a body and also afterwards. The Nestorian

35 For the following see D. KRAUSMÜLLER, “Conflicting anthropologies in the Christological discourse at the end of Late Antiquity: the case of Leontius of Jerusalem’s Nestorian adversary,” The Journal of Theological Studies 56 (2005): 413-447.

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insinuates that whoever believes in an active afterlife of the soul also believes in its pre-existence and is therefore not a Christian. Here again we need to consider the context, the witchhunt against the Origenists who were claimed to be pagans and Manichaeans. It is clear that enough people in the Chalcedonian church believed that the soul was dependent on the body, sharing an anti-Origenist outlook. The Nestorian could therefore give the impression that those who used the anthropological paradigm were in reality heretics and pagans. Significantly, later Chalcedonian authors such as Maximus rejected the anthropological paradigm as unsuitable. Normally it is thought that he himself came to this conclusion but it seems likely that he was pushed into that direction by the Nestorian objections.

**Edition**

The edition is based on the Codex Marcianus gr. Z.69 (coll. 501), 298v-400v (Diktyon 69540), which dates to the late thirteenth century. Three further witnesses, the Monacensis gr. 67 (Diktyon 44511), the Parisinus Suppl. Grec 1288 (Diktyon 53952), and the Vaticanus Pal. gr. 342 (Diktyon 66047), which date to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, are not considered as they are apographa of the Codex Marcianus. I have retained Mai’s and Migne’s numbering of the chapters although not all start with a quotation from the Nestorian treatise. This means that in a few cases the numbering is discontinuous.

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β’. Πάν ὁτι δι δι φυσικά καταγόμενον ἐπήρω, περιγραττόν ἐστι καὶ ἐμμερέσι, καθ’ ὑποκαταραίαν ἑνώτερον. Πάν δὲ περιγραττόν καὶ ἐμμερέσι ἐπηροσουσίον ἐστὶ τῷ ἄπλῳ καὶ ἄπεργαράφῳ. Εἰ δὲ τούτῳ, οὐ συνετέθη ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος τῷ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπῳ, ὁμοούσιος ἔν τῷ ἄπλῳ καὶ ἄπεργαράφῳ Πατρὶ ἡ συνετέθεις, ἐπηροσουσίος ἐστὶ τῷ ἄπλῳ καὶ ἄπεργαράφῳ Πατρὶ, ὅπερ ἀσεβές.

γ’. Πάν ὁτι δι δι συντιθέμενον ἐπηρω ἐπηροσουσίον ἐστὶ τῷ ἄπλῳ καὶ ἄπεργαράφῳ Πατρὶ. Πάν δὲ ἐπηροσουσίον τῷ ἄπλῳ καὶ ἄπεργαράφῳ Πατρὶ, οὐκ ἐστι κυρίως ύπός τοῦ ἄπλου καὶ ἄπεργαράφου Πατρὸς. Πάν τὸ ἄρα συντιθέμενον ἐπηρω οὐκ ἐστι κυρίως ύπός τοῦ ἄπλου καὶ ἄπεργαράφου Πατρὸς. Εἰ δὲ πάν συντιθέμενον ἐπηρω οὐκ ἐστι κυρίως ύπός τοῦ ἄπλου καὶ ἄπεργαράφου Πατρὸς, οὐ συνετέθη ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος τῷ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπῳ, κυρίως ὑπάρχουν ὡς καὶ Πατρὸς ἡ συνετέθεις, οὐ κυρίως ὑπάρχει τοῦ Πατρὸς ύπός ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος, ὅπερ ἀσεβές.

δ’. Πάν ὁτι δι δι συντιθέμενον ἐπηρω καταγρατικῶς ποι ὑπέταις, ἐπερ καὶ λέγεται, ὡς τοῦ ἄπλου καὶ ἄπεργαράφου Πατρὸς. Πάν δὲ το καταγρατικῶς ποι καταγρατικῶς τοῦ ἄπλου καὶ ἄπεργαράφου Πατρὸς, κυρίως κτίσα τοῦ ἄπλου καὶ ἄπεργαράφου Πατρὸς ὑπάρχει. Πάν οὐν ἄρα το συντιθέμενον ἐπηρω κυρίως κτίσα τοῦ ἄπλου καὶ ἄπεργαράφου Πατρὸς ὑπάρχει. Εἰ δὲ τούτῳ ἢ, οὐ συνετέθη ὁ Θεὸς <Λόγος> τῷ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπῳ, κτίσα ὑπάρχουν τοῦ παντὸς καὶ οὕτωσι κτίσα τοῦ Πατρὸς ἡ συνετέθεις, κτίσα ἐστι τοῦ ἄπλου καὶ ἄπεργαράφου, καὶ οὕτως κυρίως, ὅπερ ἀσεβές.

2: Everything whatsoever that is composed with something else is composed and consists of parts, as has been taught above. But everything that is composed and consists of parts is of a different substance from that which is simple and uncircumscribed. But if this is the case, the God Word has not been composed with the human being taken from us, since he is of the same substance as the simple and uncircumscribed Father, or he has been composed, in which case he is of a different substance from the simple and uncircumscribed Father, which is impious.

3: Everything whatsoever that is composed with something else, is of a different substance from the simple and uncircumscribed Father. But everything that is of a different substance from the simple and uncircumscribed Father, is not strictly a son of the simple and uncircumscribed Father. Consequently, everything that is composed with something else is not strictly son of the simple and uncircumscribed Father. But if everything that is composed with something else is not strictly son of the simple and uncircumscribed Father, the God Word has not been composed with the human being taken from us, since he is strictly Son of the Father; or he has been composed, in which case the God Word is not strictly son of the Father, which is impious.

4: Everything whatsoever that is composed with something else is somehow abusively called son of the simple and uncircumscribed Father, if it is called thus at all. But everything that is somehow abusively called son of the simple and uncircumscribed Father, is strictly a creature of the simple and uncircumscribed Father. Everything, then, that is composed with something else is strictly a creature of the simple and uncircumscribed Father. But if this is the case, the God <Word> has not been composed with the human being taken from us, since he is the creator of the universe and not a creature of the Father; or he has been composed, in which case he is a creature of the simple and uncircumscribed one and not strictly a son, which is impious.
Every uncircumscribed substance is *qua* substance incomprehensibly everywhere, both in each thing and in itself according to identity and sameness, since this is the property of the uncircumscribed. But everything that is in all things according to identity and sameness, cannot *qua* substance be in something in one way and in something else in another way, because sameness eliminates being in one way and in another way. Consequently, every uncircumscribed substance cannot *qua* substance be in something in one way and in something else in another way. But if this is the case, one must enquire: Do we say that the substance of the God Word is circumscribed or that it is uncircumscribed? And if we say that it is circumscribed, *<it is>* uncircumscribed, *<it is either the case that* the substance of the God Word is composed with all things or *<it is the case that* the substance of the God Word is composed with nothing, because *qua* substance it cannot be in something in one way and in something else in another way, since it is uncircumscribed. But it is agreed that he is not composed with all things. Consequently, he is also not composed with one thing; and impious are those who say that the substance of the God Word is composed with the flesh that he has taken from us for his own manifestation.

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7: Everything whatsoever that is composed with something else in order to constitute one living nature or also hypostasis is shown to be a part of the resulting nature or also hypostasis. But every part of a living nature or also hypostasis absolutely needs the part with which it has been composed, for its own benefit. For the soul needs the body and the body the soul, each one the other for its own benefit. For <the soul> needs <the body> in order to learn the divine commandments and to please God, and <the body> needs <the soul> in order to have life with it and a greater honour than all other visible things. But it is not lawful to assume that the God Word needs something for his own benefit. Consequently, he has not been composed with the human being taken from us so as to constitute one living nature or also hypostasis. But if he has been composed, he also needs <the human being> for his own benefit, which is impious.

8: Everything whatsoever that is composed with something else of a different substance so as to constitute one nature or also hypostasis is shown to be a part of the nature that has resulted from them. But every part of a different substance is not called by the name of that with which it is composed. This is also the case with the human being, even if its parts are called by the name of the whole with the addition of ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ or not without such an addition. But even if the whole is sometimes indicated by the part, the parts are nevertheless not deemed worthy of the names of the other parts. For neither is the soul called flesh nor the flesh soul. Consequently, everything that is composed with something else of a different substance so as to constitute one nature or also hypostasis, is not deemed worthy of the name of the other part. But if this is the case, the God Word has either not been composed with the human being taken from us, as he is called son of man; or he has been composed, in which case he himself is not called son of man and that which is taken from us is not called Son of God, which is impious.

9: Everything whatsoever that is composed with something else so as to constitute one nature or also hypostasis, is shown to be a part of the one
mēroς deiktoutai tīs ex autōn ἀποτελομένης mias φύσεως ἢ καὶ υπόστάσεως. Πᾶν δὲ mēroς mias φύσεως ἢ καὶ υποστάσεως οὐκ οἶδε πῶς ἢ ποῦ ἢ πότε συνετέθη τῷ ἑπερ συνετέθη, μήτι γε μετὰ ταῦτα ἀμύδρος ποὺς μᾶθοι. Πᾶν ἀρα συντεθέμενων ἑτέρῳ εἰς τὸ ἀποτελέσα τινὰ φύσιν ἢ καὶ υπόστασιν οὐκ οἶδε πῶς ἢ ποῦ ἢ πότε συνετέθη τῷ ἑπερ συνετέθη, μήτι γε μετὰ ταῦτα ἀμύδρος ποὺς μᾶθοι. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἢ οὐ συνετέθη ὁ Θεός Ὅγος τῷ ἑς ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπῳ, πάντα ἐπιστάμενος καὶ μηδέποτε μηδὲν μανθάνων· ἢ συνετεῖς, οὐκ οἶδε πῶς ἢνωθεν τὸ ἑς ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπῳ, ὑπὲρ ἀσεβεῖς.

10: If the Lord Christ is composite, as they say, the God Word is a part, as the law of composites requires. But every part is in some respect lesser than its own whole. Consequently, the God Word would be in some respect lesser than something. For there cannot be a part if it is not lesser than the whole. But if this is the case, the God Word would also not be true God, since one cannot say that the true God is lesser than something. For God is entirely incomparable and matchless. Either let them declare openly that they are opposed to those who know that the God Word is true God; or let them desist from introducing a substance that is a composite of the God Word and the ensouled flesh taken from us.
by himself in any way – for ‘cannot’ has two meanings in divine Scripture and in common usage, either that God cannot lie because of his being uncircumscribed, or that gifts and sacrifices that cannot give the worshippers a perfect conscience, because of the weakness and insufficiency of any such operation, if they will concede it – that the God Word could not fulfill by himself and would therefore accomplish through the operation of the human being. Then they show either that the God Word is weak, or that he has done something inappropriate. In the first case the Father would even now be too weak to perform such operations, since he is not composed with the human being taken from us, and in this respect the Son would be greater than the Father, which is impious. But in the second case the blasphemy is obvious. For God never does anything inappropriate, neither by himself nor together with something else. But if neither of the options is pious, it follows that the composition of the God Word with the human being taken from us did not happen.

12: Everything whatsoever that is composed with something else is composed either for its own benefit or for the benefit of something else. And it is composed for its own benefit, as the soul with the body, or for the benefit of something else, as the parts of the house, for they are for the benefit of the human being. The God Word will not be composed for his own benefit, for he does not lack anything; nor will he be composed for the benefit of something else, for he is not worse than something else, since everything that is composed with something else, not for its own benefit but for the benefit of something else, is lesser than that for the benefit of which it is composed. But if the God Word will be composed neither for his own benefit nor for the benefit of something else, it follows that he is in composite and never comes together with something else for the purpose of a composition.

13: Everything whatsoever that is composed with something else either remains indissolubly in the composition with that with which it has been composed, or it does not remain. And it does not remain, like the parts of the irrational animals, or it remains, like the <parts> of the house, for they are for the benefit of the human being. The God Word will not be composed neither for his own benefit nor for the benefit of something else, it follows that he is in composite and never comes together with something else for the purpose of a composition.

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en tê prôs tôn oû synetêthi synthêsei, ouûtê ár' éautôu mênê, allâ kata tòn énteledanta tê fóusi dòron upò tòu òmpourygou diâlêgetai, ouûtê tê oikeia dunáumei mênê, allâ tê kreipóntos tînos kai ἥπερβεβηκότος. Toû de Theôu Logou einai tûn kreiptînous dûnumin, ouû òmêrû eitein. Oûk ára synetêthi oû Theôs Logos tê òs hèmôn ánthrôpou: eî de synetêthi, ò ouû mênê òðiallatôlos òn tê prôs auûtên synthesê. Ïn Ïn, kreiptînous tînos dunáumei mênê, Ïpêr Ïsèbêzês.

14: If the God Word is composed with the ensouled flesh taken from us, as the rational soul is composed with our body, and the ensouled flesh taken from us sleeps, the God Word will be prevented from performing his own operations against his will, just as the soul necessarily stops operating when the body turns to sleep. But if the God Word is not composed with the ensouled flesh taken from us, as the soul is composed with our body, but is composed nevertheless, let them give us an example of the composition according to which they wish the God Word to be composed with the human being taken from us. But if they cannot produce one, let them corroborate what they say through the witness of Scripture, because it is more trustworthy than all natural proof. But if they have neither the one nor the other, it follows that what they say is without witness, and an empty declaration, because it is unproven. For which that is not shown through the law of nature and not corroborated through the witness of Scripture would be a fabrication of the speaker, and this is unconvincing as well as impious.

15: Everything whatsoever that is composed with something else so as to constitute one living nature or also hypostasis loses something of what it had before the composition. But everything that loses something of what it had becomes either greater than itself as regards that thing, which it had and then has lost, or worse. But it is not lawful to say that the God Word has become greater or worse than himself. Consequently, the God Word has not been composed with the human being taken

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16: Everything whatsoever that is composed with something else either leads that with which it is composed, as the soul the body, or is led by it, as the body by the soul, or neither leads nor is led, as the parts of the house. But everything which is led in a composition, or which leads nor is led, is obviously without reason and without intellect, as the body and the parts of the house. If, then, the God Word has been composed with the human being taken from us, he either leads or is led or does neither the one nor the other. And if he leads, the human being taken from us will be without reason and without intellect, which is impious and the offspring of Arius and Apollinarius. But if he is led, the consequent blasphemy be on the head of those who say that the God Word is composed with the human being taken from us. For everything that is composed with something else either leads or is led or does neither the one nor the other, as we have said.

17: That which cannot suffer by nature cannot be composed with something that can suffer. For of those which appear to be in the composite, we will either say that that which cannot suffer partakes <of suffering> or that even that which can suffer does not suffer, but we surmise that it only seems <to suffer>. If, then, a divine nature were in the suffering body, it would follow that it, too, did not remain free from suffering, or that even the flesh did not truly suffer.

18: The composition of the God Word with the human being taken from us, which you posit, has benefited either him alone, or the human being with which he has been composed, or
ἐκεῖνον, ἀλλ’ ἡμᾶς αὐτοῖς μόνους, ἢ θεόν καὶ θείας τὸν δὲ εἶ ἡμῶν εαυτῷ συνετεθέντα ἀνθρώπον οὐδέποτε, ἢ αὐτοῦ τε καὶ θείας άμα, ἢ θεῖας τὸν εἶ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπον, θεόν δὲ οὐδὲ ὄλας. Ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν τὸν θεόν εὑρήχησαν, ἤ τὸν συνετεθή ἀνθρώπον μόνου, ἢ τὸν θεόν καὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπον κοινῶς, ἡμᾶς δὲ οὐκέτι, πῶς οὐ ψευδεῖς τὸ δι’ ήμας καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν σασαρκώσατε καὶ εὐνυποσκέψατε τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν; Εἰ δὲ ήμᾶς αὐτοῖς μόνου, θεόν καὶ θείας τὸν δὲ εἶ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπον οὐδέποτε, πὼς οὐκ κρείττους ἡμῖν βελτιώθηντες ἃν ἣμα τοῦ εἶ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπου, μηδὲ τὰς εἰς τὸ δι’ αὐτοῦ σιωπόμαι εὔφραγητήνας. Οὐ γὰρ ἁνενδέξας σοῦ οὗ δὲ εἶ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπου παντεσπασίν, ἐπεὶ καὶ κτιστός, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ παθητὸς καὶ φαράγνης ἴνα κατὰ τοι τοὺς σοφοὺς. Εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸν θεόν καὶ τὸν εἶ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπον καὶ θείας αὐτοῖς, πὼς οὐ προσδέξης ὁ θεός Λόγος καθ’ ἡμᾶς, καὶ κατὰ τὸν εἶ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπου αὐτῷ συνετεθέντα; Εἰ δὲ ήμᾶς τε καὶ τὸν εἶ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπου εὑρήχησαν τὸ συνετεθήναι τὸν θεόν Λόγον τὸ εἶ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπος καθ’ ἡμᾶς, θεόν δὲ οὐδ’ ὄλας, ἐπεὶ καὶ πάντη ἁνενδέξας, ὁ βουλόμενος παρελθὼς λεγέτω ἡμῖν τί τὸ προσγενόμενον εὐφράγεται, ἡ τὸ εἶ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπος ἢ τινὸς τοις κτισμάτοις εἰς τὸν συνθέσεας τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου καὶ τοῦ εἶ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπου, ὅπερ ἢ ἴδοντο διαβαίνει εἰς ταῦτα καὶ θείας, ἀνευ τῆς οὐσίως αὐτῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλων συνθέσεως. Εἰ δὲ οὐδέν ξούσαν εἶπεν – ἢ ἱκέε γὰρ η μεσπεία τοῦ εἶ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπον ἢ τε εὐδοκία τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης συνθέσεως δῆγα, καὶ ἡμῖν παραίτω γενεάθη παντὸς ὀστινοσσον εὐφράγεται, καὶ αὐτών ἀποδείξι πάλιν κρίτενα καὶ δεσπότην ἀπάσης ἀμοῦ τῆς κτίσεως, εἰς πρόσωπον τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου, οὔπερ οὐδέν τιμώτερον εἰς κτιστὴ φύσιν διαβαίνειν δυνάμενον –, πὼς οὐκ ἔσται περιττή καὶ εἰκαία τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου πρὸς τὸν εἶ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπον ἢ ἑπιφυμομενὴν συνθέσεις; Ἀλ’ εἰ μέτω τε καὶ εἰκῇ ποιεὶ ὁ θεός οὐδέν, οὐδ’ ἄρα συνετεθῇ ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος τὸ εἶ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπω.
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The body that is substantially composed with the soul, gains from it life and sense perception. But the body of the Lord that according to you is substantially composed, tell us what it gained. Sense perception or incorruptibility? But you say that it had these from the resurrection, as all human beings will once have them. How, then, is the substance of God not worse than that of the soul, if indeed the latter imparts to it many things whereas the former <imparts to it> no greater characteristic? Do you not say that it was fashioned without seed? But this is a sign of the operation of the Holy Spirit, and not an indication of the substantial intertwining of the Word. For before they came together, she was found pregnant from the Holy Spirit. Signs and powers? But the apostles performed greater ones than these, as the Lord himself had promised them. Rank and lordship and the name greater than all names that was given to it? And to whom has this been given through the substantial union, which brings about improvement? To the God Word? And with what greater being has the Word been united? But to the flesh, that is, the human being taken from us? Look! First of all, when you hear of the name of honour that was given to him, you introduce the nature instead. Second, you oppose those who say that the union of the flesh taken from us with the God Word is an incomparable honour and not natural composition. Third, if the honour and lordship of the human being taken from us does not accrue to it from its own substance, it follows that it is necessarily a grace of willing, love and good pleasure and not a gift of substantial union, since none of the things that are substantially united bestows some honour and lordship on that with which it is united. But do they not say that the sinlessness of the Lordly human being is a sign of the substantial union with the Word? And how is it that divine Scripture attributes this to the Spirit when it says: Who through the eternal Spirit offered up himself without blemish to God, and the Spirit of Jesus will purify our conscience from the dead works? And elsewhere: He was justified in the Spirit. Therefore, <it was justified> through the Spirit in which it was justified and not through the Word in which it is by substance. Otherwise the achievement would
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Ὁ Λόγος ὁ θεός ἀτρεπτός ἐστὶν τὴν ὑπόστασιν ὡς καὶ τὴν φύσιν, ἕνοχη: Εἰ μὲν οὖν οὐχὶ, οὐδὲ πάντα ἄλλως οὐδὲ ἄρθρατος, φασὶ, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ θεός. Ἐτι μὴν καὶ ὁ Πατέρας καὶ τὸ Πνεύμα τὸ ἄτομον, εἴ μὴ δράκεται ὑφεστάκησα, τού ἄυτος ὑπενεχθέσθω: ὑπονάσκεται ὑποθέσεις τοῖς ἀυτοίς καθ’ ὑποστάσεις. Εἰ δὲ γε δίᾳ τὸ ἑναρχῆς τῆς ἀσεβείας πάς τις ὑμολογεῖ ἀτρεπτον καὶ καθ’ ὑπόστασιν τὸν Λόγον, πῶς ἔξ ἀπλῆς σύνθετον ἐξει τὴν ὑπόστασιν;

κβ’

Εἰ οὖν, φασὶ, καὶ ὕποκεισθαι τῇ ἐνοσιν ὄμολογετίν, τί διαφέρεσθε πρὸς τοὺς περὶ Σεβήδων μίνας φύσιν λέγοντας Χριστοῦ; Ἡσαία γὰρ φυσικὴ ἐνοσιν φύσιν τινὰ μίαν παρὰ τὰς ἐνοθέσιας ἀνθρωποῦ: φύσις γὰρ ὁ ἀνθρώπος μία ὡς ἀνθρώπου καὶ οὐκ πλείους, οὔτε ψυχὴς οὔτε σώματος μόνου, οὔτε ἀμφό τούς λόγους μόνους ἑξοσα τοὺς φυσικοὺς: τὸ γὰρ τοντὶ ἐν ἀνθρωποί μὲν, οὔτε ἐν ἄνθρωποι μὲν, οὔτε ἐν σώματι ιδίᾳ ἐστὶ.

κγ’

Ἡ καθ’ ὑπόστασιν σύνθεσιν, εἴτε τοῦ θεοῦ πρὸς ἀνθρώπον, ἢ ύπερ φύσιν ἐστὶ τῆς θεότητος, ἢ παρὰ φύσιν, ἢ κατὰ φύσιν, εἰ γε ἄνωτος ἐστιν. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ύπερ φύσιν αὔτη ἐστιν, μείζονος τε δυνάμεως ἔργων εἰς αὐτὴν γέγονε, καὶ εἰς τὸ ύπερ αὐτὴν μυγηθῆ, καὶ οὐκ ἀλληλος παντοδύναμος αὔτη, οὔτε πάντα λόγων ὑπέρεχουσα. Εἰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν αὐτὴ ἐστί, χειρὸν τε αὐτής γέγονε, καὶ τρεπτὴ δεδείκται, καὶ πρὸς ύπεραν παραγενήθη. Εἰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν αὕτη ἐστὶν, οὔτε χάριτι ἢ σάρκωσίς τοῦ Λόγου, οὔτε μόνον τοῦ Υἱοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ Πνεύματος τοῦ

not derive from an act of willing but from substance.

20:

Is the divine Word unchangeable in his hypostasis just as in his nature, or is he not? If, then, he is not, he is not completely simple or incorruptible [they say] but not even God. Furthermore, the Father and the Holy Spirit will be subjected to the same things if indeed they do not have another mode of hypostasis. For one will think that they, too, are potentially changeable as regards their hypostases. But if because of the obviousness of the impiety everyone confesses that the Word is unchangeable in his hypostasis, too, how would he have a hypostasis <that had changed> from simple to composite?

21:

Every whole that is composed from different parts is seen to be different and is named differently from the things from which it is. If, then, Christ is a composite of God and human being, he is neither truly God nor <truly> human being.

22:

If, then [they say] you, too, confess that the union is natural, how do you differ from the Severians who speak of one nature of Christ? For every natural union shows a nature besides the <natures> that have been united. For the human being qua human being is one nature and not many since it does not only have the natural definitions of the soul <alone> and of the body alone or of both alone. For “mortal” is in the human being but is not specifically in the soul or in the body.

23:

The composition according to hypostasis, that is, of God with the human being, is either beyond the nature of the divinity or against its nature or according to its nature, if indeed it exists at all. But if <the composition> is beyond its nature, a greater power has acted upon it, and it has increased to what is beyond it, and it is not truly almighty, nor beyond all thought. But if <the composition> is against its nature, it has become worse than itself and been shown to be changeable and been brought down to a lower station. But if <the composition> is according to its nature, the incarnation of the Word is not an act of grace,
and has not only happened to the Son, but also to the Father and the Holy Spirit. What then? Being according to nature, <the composition> had once not come to be but has now been produced, as if the nature had once been incomplete and has now been brought from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality. But if all this is absurd in the case of God, and the natures cannot be united without them [he says], the divine nature is either united with another nature in an absurd manner or not united with it.

24:
The Word is true God, having a simple substance according to the substance of the Father. If, then, he has the flesh as substance, as the Egyptian argues, he has ceased being true <God> both as regards the nature and as regards the name.

25:
The Word is immeasurable in his hypostasis, the flesh is measurable in its hypostasis. Who puts forward the doctrine that God and the flesh have been united in a hypostasis either bends down God to the measurable flesh or stretches out the flesh to make it immeasurable like God. As neither this nor that happens, it is impossible for God to have been united with the flesh.

26:
The hypostasis of the Word is uncreated, the hypostasis of the flesh is created. Neither can the flesh have been united with the Word in an uncreated fashion nor can the Word have been united with the flesh in a created fashion. In what hypostasis has the union according to hypostasis then taken place?

27:
The difference between that which is uncreated and that which is created naturally prevents the union according to hypostasis. The union according to hypostasis of the flesh eliminates the difference between that which is uncreated and that which is created. It follows that whoever anathematises those who do not confess the union according to hypostasis, anathematises those who confess the difference between that which is uncreated and that which is created.
κη'
Ei ἐνε ἔχειν ὁ Θεός Λόγος χωρὶς ἐνώσεως ἴδιαν ὑπόστασιν νῦν οὐκ ἔχει ὁ Λόγος. Ἐτράπη ἄρα ἡ τοῦ Λόγου ὑπόστασις. Τῆς δὲ τοῦ Λόγου ὑπόστασεως τραπείσῃ, εἰς ἀνάγκης καὶ ο ὁ τῆς Τριάδος τραπήσεται λόγος.

κθ'
Κ… τῶν θείων ὑποστάσεων ἀ… εἰ δὲ σαρκικά… ὥστε ο Λόγος οὐκέτι ἐξ…

λη'
Εἰ ἢλλη ἦν ἡ ὑπόστασις τοῦ Λόγου χωρὶς σαρκός, καὶ ἢλλῃ τοῦ Λόγου ἡ ὑπόστασις μετὰ τῆς ἴδιας σαρκός, καὶ ὁ Λόγος ἢς ἄναγκης ἢλλος ἦν ποτὲ, καὶ ἢλλος μετὰ ταῦτα. ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῇ ἐναλλαγῇ τῆς ὑποστάσεως ἡ ἐναλλαγὴ τοῦ ἐχοντος τῆς ὑπόστασειν.

λα'
Εἰ ἠμφότερα ἦστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἄνθρωπος καὶ θεός, ὡσπερ οὖν καὶ ὁ Θεός Λόγος ἄμφοτερα ἦστιν, δήλου ὅτι ὡσπερ οὖ ἦστι θεός ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὕτως οὐδὲ ο Λόγος φύσει ἄνθρωπος. Εἰ δὲ μὴ φύσει, οὐδ' ἀρὰ ὑπόστασεί.

λβ'
Ἐγὼ εἰμι καὶ οὐκ ἡλλοίοιμαι (Mal. 3:6), βοᾷ ὁ θεός, σαρκὶ καθ' ὑπόστασιν ζητοῖ ο Λόγος, βοᾷ ὁ Αιών ἡμῶν. Ὅ δεχόμενος τὸν Κύριλλον ἀληθεύσαντα, νεείσθην ποιεῖ τὸν θεόν. Ὁ οὖν Λόγος ἃρα ἐνομίκης σαρκός, κἂν μένοι Λόγου, ἄλογούτα, οὐ μὲν Λόγος, κἂν οὐχ ἐνομίκης σαρκί, τότε ἡλλοίοιμαι.

λγ'
Σὺ εἶ ὁ αὐτός (Ps. 102:27), βοᾷ ὁ προφήτης περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀντίβαδ ο Αιών τοῦ προφήτη τοῖς δόγμασιν, ὁ αὐτός οὐκ εἰ- γένονας γὰρ καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἔτερος, ο οὐκ ἦς.

λδ'
Εἰ κατὰ τὴν ἃσαρκον ὑπόστασιν ἰμνουσίος ο Λόγος τοῦ Πατρί, δήλον ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ἃσαρκον ὑπόστασιν ἔτεροούσιος ο Λόγος τοῦ Πατρί.

28:
If the Word now does not have his own hypostasis, which the God Word had without the union, it follows that the hypostasis of the Word has changed. But when the hypostasis of the Word has changed the definition of the Trinity will necessarily also have changed.

29:
... of the divine hypostases ... but if fleshly ... so that the Word no longer the one ...

30:
If the hypostasis of the Word without the flesh is different from the hypostasis of the Word with his own flesh, the Word, too, was necessarily different once from what he was afterwards. For from the change of the hypostasis follows the change of the one who has the hypostasis.

31:
If the human being is both, human being and God, just as the God Word is also both, it is evident that as the human being is not God by nature, so the Word, too, is not a human being by nature. But if he is not by nature he is consequently also not by the hypostasis.

32:
God shouts: ‘I am and have not changed.’ The Egyptian shouts: ‘The Word is united with the flesh in hypostasis.’ Whoever accepts that Cyril spoke the truth, makes God a liar. Consequently, the Word, when he is united with the flesh, either is made word-less even if he remains Word, or he does not remain Word in which case he is changed even if he is not united with the flesh.

33:
The prophet shouts about God: ‘You are the same’. The Egyptian shouts down the prophet with his doctrines: ‘You are not the same. For you have become another in hypostasis, what you had not been.’

34:
If the Word is of the same substance as the Father as regards his fleshless hypostasis, it is obvious that the Word is of a different substance from the Father as regards his fleshly hypostasis.

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35: If the Word does not have the hypostasis, which he had, he is consequently also not the same as he was.

36: The human being can have the rank and the authority and the power of the God Word, and the hypostasis cannot have the position of the entire God Word, for the human being is created whereas the God Word is uncreated.

37: God and soul and body are in a natural union neither God nor human being.

38: The Egyptian puts forward the doctrine about nature, which is impossible, and anathematises the dispensation, which is possible.

39: If the helplessness of nature does not let the human being have the hypostasis of the God Word in an uncreated manner, and the Egyptian does not let the human being have the rank of the God Word in the manner of the dispensation, it follows that between nature and the Egyptian the human being has nothing of the God Word, neither the hypostasis nor the rank.

40: If the Son is one son through the merging of the substances of divinity and flesh it is obvious that before the merging of the substances the Word was not one, neither God nor Son.

41: The God Word can be united with the created nature through will but cannot <be united> through nature. For he did not create his own nature nor can he transpose it into another nature.

42: If when God wishes his nature receives an addition, it can also receive a diminution when he wishes. But if the second is impossible, it follows that the first is also impossible.
μῆρι
Εἰ ὁμοῦ θεὸς καὶ ἀνθρωπος ὁ Χριστός, δῆλον ὅτι ὁμοῦ δεσποζεῖ καὶ δεσποζέται ὁ Χριστός.
Εἰ δὲ ἡ διαφορά τοῦ δεσποζεῖ καὶ τοῦ δεσποζέσθαι ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ οὐκ ἔστι, καὶ θεόν ἁρα καὶ ἀνθρωποῦ ἀναρέται ἡ διαφορά.

μῷ
Εἰ ὁμοῦ θεὸς καὶ ἀνθρωπος ὁ Χριστός, ὁμότιμος ἢρα ὁ ἀνθρωπος τῷ θεῷ. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ὁμότιμος ὁ ἀνθρωπος τῷ θεῷ, δικαίως διαβάλλει ὁ Αἰγύπτιος τὴν συμπροσκυνήσιν. Εἰ δὲ ὁμότιμως, εἰς ἀνάγκης συμπροσκυνεῖται, καὶ ἀστεβεῖ ὁ Αἰγύπτιος ταύτην ἀναθεματίζον.

μερὶ
Εἰ ἡ φύσει σάρξ οὐκ ἔστιν ἑτέρου τινὸς παρὰ τὸν Θεόν Λόγον φύσι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου, δῆλον ὅτι ἑτέρου Λόγου ἔστιν η σάρξ παρὰ τὸν φυσικὴ θεότητι Λόγου.

μέρει
Εἰ ὁλως ἁποδέχη, ὁ Αἰγύπτιε, θεοῦ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ θεῖαν ἐνοικίσασθαι, πάντα θεοῦ καὶ σαρκὸς δοματίζειν τὴν καθ᾽ ὑπόστασιν ἔνοσιν, ἀλλήλων γὰρ εἰς ἀναιρετικὴ ἢ ἐνοικίσεως καὶ ή καθ᾽ ὑπόστασιν φυσικὴ ἔνοσις.

μέρος
Εἰ τὸν παντοδύναμον φύσει Λόγου καὶ ἀναμάρτητον κοινωνόν ἔσχεν ἡ σάρξ τῆς ίδιας ὑπάρξεως, ποὺ αὐτή ἢ ἀναμάρτητος λεγομένην: "Ἡ ποία νίκη τῆς πρὸς τὴν κακίαν τοιώνυμε λαβούσην<ζ> βοηθῶν, ὃν οὐδὲ ἐστὶ νικηθήναι; Τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν καὶ οὗ τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ κατάρθημα.

μήρι
Πᾶν ἀπειρον φύσει περατος φύσει καθ᾽ ὑπόστασιν ἐνοικίσασθαι ἀδύνατον. Εἰτε γὰρ ἀπειροῦ ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ἐκ τῶν ἀμφοτέρων ὑπόστασις, δι’ ὅλης διήκειν το περατόν, ἠγος η σάρξ, οὐ δύναται, εἰτε περατε ή, ὅλον περιείχειν ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ φύσε ἀπειρον, ἠγος τὸν Λόγον, οὐκ ἰσχύει.

43: If Christ is at the same time God and human being, it is evident that Christ rules and is ruled at the same time. But if the difference between ruling and being ruled does not exist in Christ, it follows that the difference between God and the human being is eliminated.

44: If Christ is at the same time God and human being, it follows that the human being has the same honour as God. But if the human being does not have the same honour as God, the Egyptian justly maligns the co-veneration. But if it has the same honour, it is by necessity co-venerated, and the Egyptian is impious when he anathematises <co-veneration>.

45: If the flesh by nature does not belong to another one besides the God Word by nature, but to the God Word, it is obvious that the flesh belongs to another word besides the one who is Word by natural divinity.

46: If you accept at all, Egyptian, the divine inhabitation of God in a human being, desist from putting forward the doctrine that God and the flesh are united in a hypostasis. For inhabitation and natural union in a hypostasis eliminate one another.

47: If the flesh had the Word who is almighty by nature and sinless as a companion of its own existence, how would it be called sinless? Or what victory of it over evil would there be if it took such a helper who cannot be vanquished? For it would be the achievement of him and not of it.

48: Everything that is infinite by nature cannot be united with what is finite by nature. For if the hypostasis from the two is infinite, what is finite, that is, the flesh, cannot pervade it completely. And if it is finite, it would not be able to contain in itself what is infinite by nature, that is, the Word.
The composition [he says], of which you speak, has brought about either a novel nature, and why do you not accept the Mixers of Natures? Or a newer hypostasis, and why do you reject us? Or neither nature nor hypostasis, and it has happened in vain.

49:

50:

51:

It is necessary for them to say that this Christ of theirs is in some respect either greater or lesser than God alone and the human being alone, that is, when his own parts are considered apart and by themselves. For the parts of the products when considered by themselves and without the composition with each other, are definitely found to be in some respect either greater or lesser than the result from them. For example, stones and wood are parts of a house or of the church, or of the temple that was founded by Solomon, and it is obvious that each one by itself is lesser than the whole house. Again hyacinth, purple, scarlet, sparrow, purple are parts of the curtain of the tabernacle, and each of them alone is obviously lesser than the curtain. Thus it is also the case with the human being. According to the Christians the human being, this whole living being, is greater than both the soul and the body, since after the departure of the soul from the body the soul, too, is incapable of self-moving operation, persevering as if in a very deep sleep, and not even knowing itself, and waiting for the requital of the deeds <that it performed> together with the body according to Scripture, which it will not escape through the separation from the body, neither progressing to what is better nor being reduced to what is worse, lest Scripture be given the lie. From this, I mean, from changing neither for the better nor for the worse, it follows either that that utterly perfect and blessed state, which is expected in the resurrection, is already now in the nature, or

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But the faculty of reasoning is completely at rest since there is nothing that is moved through self-willed counsel that has no sense perception of anything at all. But the former has not yet been introduced, since God has envisaged something greater for us lest our forebears be perfected without us. Consequently, the second is the case.

Accordingly, they say to us Christians, then, the human being is shown to be greater than its own parts when they are considered by themselves. But according to the pagans and Manicheans the human being is greater than the body but less than the soul, for the following reason. For they know that the soul pre-exists the body and is not in need of the senses of the body and, as they say, knows everything before the fall into the body, but also after the departure from it likewise. Therefore they know that the human being is less than <the soul>, since as they say <the soul> also becomes worse than itself through the imprisonment in the body, as they say. Since the body itself is seen to be dead after the separation of the soul it is obvious that the human being is greater, since the body itself, too, is seen to be greater than itself before the separation from the soul when compared with its state after the separation from the soul. Consequently, it has been established that the result of its own parts when seen by themselves is in some respect either greater or lesser. Therefore it is necessary for them to say that that Christ of theirs is in some respect either lesser or greater than his own parts when considered by themselves, if at all Christ is according to them one living being that has resulted from God and the human being. But if they say that he is greater, they have admitted an impiety, since they imagine that there is something more perfect than God, which one must say is also higher than the Father and the Spirit. For if according to them the living being resulting from the God Word and the flesh is in some respects greater than the God Word when seen by himself, this same one is evidently greater than the Father and the Spirit who are not composed with the flesh, if indeed the Son is like the Father and the Spirit. And he who is greater than him is evidently also <greater> than the Father and the Holy Spirit. But if they say that this living being is lesser than the God Word when seen by himself, they are again impious. For they show that the God Word has become lesser than himself according to the myth about the soul of
the pagans and Manichaens. For the living being from God and flesh would not be found lesser than God alone, if the God Word himself had not before become lesser than himself.

[Book II]

Refutation of the second impiety of them who say that the hypostasis, which results from the dispensation through the incarnation of the Word, is two and not one.

1: ‘Hypostasis’ [they say] means sometimes something that has substance, as in: Remember what is my hypostasis, and: Imprint of his hypostasis, sometimes something that does not have substance, as in: In this hypostasis of my boasting, and sometimes the gathering of some people who are of like mind, as in: Men went out from the hypostasis of the gentiles. If, then, opting for the last meaning, they use ‘hypostasis’ instead of unity of will and likeness of mind of the natures, they obviously permit us to speak of two hypostases of the two natures in the first sense. But if they opt for the second meaning, wishing to show that the result from both natures is something without substance, they do not even deserve a reply. But if <they opt for> the first meaning, let them say: With which <hypostasis> is <the hypostasis of the Son> of like substance? With <the hypostasis> of David about which he said: Remember what is my hypostasis’, or with that of the Father about which is said: Imprint of his hypostasis’? But if <the hypostasis of the Son> is of like substance > with <the hypostasis> of the Father, how is it constituted from two natures, when that of the Father is simple, for the hypostases that are called substances must have the same definition of substance and share the same concept. So let them say what is that which is of like substance. If <the hypostasis of the Son> is not <of like substance > with <the hypostasis> of the Father but with that of David, do those who say that it is from two natures not wish that it is constituted from soul and body, for such is <the hypostasis> of David? And if it is neither this nor that, the Son whom you introduce differs in substance from all, and is neither of like substance with us nor of like substance with the holy Trinity. But if you say that he is of like substance partly with
δύονται εἶναι υἱός, ἐπεὶ δεξιάτετι τι ἐκ μέρους ὑπάρχουν ὁμοούσιον διαφόρους, καὶ γινόμενον τούτου κάκεινον υἱόν.

β'
Ο Θεός Λόγος ἢ μέρος ἐστὶ ταύτης τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἢ υἱόν. Εἰ μὲν οὖν μέρος, αὐτὴ δὲ υἱός, μέρος τοῦ υἱοῦ ὁ Θεός Λόγος. Οὐκοῦν δώο ἢμισυ πρὸ τῆς ἐνανθρωπῆσεως ἢ Τριᾶς. Εἰ δὲ τὸ υἱόν, οὔκ ἢν ἢρα πρὸ τῆς ἐνανθρωπῆσεως ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος, ἐπεὶ τὸ υἱόν πρὸ τῶν μερῶν γενήσεται· μέρος γὰρ τοῦ υἱοῦ ἢ γενομένη προσφάτως σὰρξ.

γ'
Εἰ υἱόν ταυτησὶ τῆς ὑποστάσεως ὁ Θεός Λόγος, φησὶ, ἐκ τίνος ἢρα συναναπληροῦται, εἴπατε. Τοῦ γὰρ θεοῦ λόγου Θεός Λόγος οὔκ ἐσται μέρος, ἐπεὶ μηδὲν ἐαυτοῦ μέρος εἰναι λέγεται.

δ'
Εἰ ἐκ μερῶν τῷ Πατρὶ καὶ τῇ μητρὶ ὁμοούσιος ἢ υπόστασις Χριστοῦ, τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς ταῦτα ἐνούσια ἢριν ἢ ἀνούσια; Ἀλλὰ εἰ μὲν ἀνούσια, πῶς ἢρις ὁμοόυσια τοῖς ἐνούσιοις; Εἰ δὲ ἐνούσια, πῶς οὐκ ὁμοόυσιας μέρη καθέστηκε; Πάν γὰρ μέρος ἐνούσιον, οὐσίας μέρος κυρίως καὶ οὐ υπόστασες, ἐπείραρ οὐκ ἢν τῶν ὑσιών ἢ υπόστασις ὃς ὑπόστασις χαρακτηρίζεται, ἀλλὰ ἢπὶ μὲν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἢ λευκότητος, συμότητος καὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἢπὶ δὲ τῆς θείας οὐσίας ἀπὸ τρόπου ὑπάρχεις, καθὼς ὢν ἢ γεγεννημένης, ἢ δὲ ἐκπορευτικῶς. Πῶς οὖν καὶ δύο τελείως λέγοντες τὰς οὐσίας, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ὁμοόυσιας μέρη λέγετε, ὡς ἢκ μερῶν φατε τὴν υπόστασιν;

2:
The God Word is either a part of this hypostasis of Christ, or the whole. If, then, he is a part, and <the hypostasis> is the Son, the God Word is a part of the Son. Therefore, the Trinity is two and a half before the inhumanation. But if he is the whole, it follows that the God Word did not exist before the inhumanation, since <otherwise> the whole would come to be before the parts. For a part of the whole is the flesh that has recently come to be.

3:
If the God Word is the whole of this hypostasis [he says], tell us by what it is completed. For the God Word will not be part of the God Word, since nothing is said to be a part of itself.

4:
If the hypostasis of Christ is of like substance partly with the Father and <partly> with the mother, are these parts of it substantial or without substance? But if they are without substance, how can they be of like substance with those that are substantial? But if they are substantial, how can they not be parts of substance? For each substantial part is strictly speaking a part of substance and not of hypostasis, since the hypostasis qua hypostasis is not characterised through substantial <properties> but in the case of human beings through whiteness, snubnosedness and other things of that kind, and in the case of the divine substance through the mode of existence, according to which one <exists> as begetter, one <exists> as begotten and one <exists> as proceeding. How, then, do you speak of two complete substances, when you do not call them parts of substance, and say that the hypostasis is <constituted> from parts?
Ei έκ μέρους ὁμοούσιος τῷ Πατρὶ καὶ έκ μέρους ὁμοούσιος τῷ Δαυίδ ἠ παρ’ ὑμῖν ὑπόστασις, εἰπέ τὸ μέρι ταῦτα, καθ’ αὐτὸ καὶ τῷ Πατρὶ καὶ τῷ Δαυίδ ἦστιν ὁμοούσια: θεὸς ἐστι καὶ ἄνθρωπος, ἦ ἐτερόν τι; Αλλ’ εἰ μὲν ἐτερόν τι, εἰπέ τί τούτῳ. Εἰ δὲ θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἦστι οὗ ἄνθρωπος ἦξεν ἐκδίκητι ὑπόστασιν παρὰ τὸν Δαυίδ ὁ ἦστιν ὁμοούσιος, ὡσπερ καὶ ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος ἦξεν ἐκδίκητι ὑπόστασιν παρὰ τὸν Πατέρα ὁ ἦστιν ὁμοούσιος· τὸ γὰρ ἀνυπόστατον τὸ ἑνύποστάτῳ ὁμοούσιον ποτέ οὐκ ἀν λεγθείη. Εἰ τοῖνυν μῖα ὑπόστασις τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου, καὶ αὐτὴ τελεία καὶ ὁμοούσιος τῷ Πατρὶ, ὁ εἰ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος ἦ συνυπόστατος ἐστί καὶ μέχρι ψυλής τῆς φωνῆς λεγόμενος, ἢ ἑνύποστασις καὶ αὐτῶς τελείαν ἔχειν τὴν ὑπόστασιν καθό ἄνθρωπος. Αλλ’ εἰ μὲν ἀνυπόστατος, περιττὸν τὸ ὁμοούσιον αὐτὸν εἶναι τῷ Δαυίδ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀνυπόστατον ἑνύποστατον καθέστηκεν ὁμοούσιον. Εἰ δὲ ἑνύποστατον, δικαίως μὲν ὁμοούσιος λεγομένος· τῷ Δαυίδ· καθόλου γὰρ ὑπόστασις ὑπόπτευσι λέγεται ὁμοούσιος, οὐχὶ οὖν δὲ ὡμῖν τὸ σύρισμα τὸ μὴ λέγειν δύο ὑπόστασις βουλομένων τὰς δύο φύσεις τοῦ τῷ Θεῷ Λόγου καὶ τοῦ εἰ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπον λέγειν.

σ’ Ἑρωδίου πάλιν, διακρίνατε τὸ λεγόμενον ἡμῖν. Ἐπιστε τί τὸ σημαίνόμενον ὑπ’ ὑμῖν ὃ έκαστής φύσεως τοῦ παρ’ ὑμῖν λεγόμενον θεοῦ καὶ ἄνθρωπου· τοῦ τί; τίς ἄνθρωπος καὶ θεος; Θεός Λόγος, ἢ ὁ καθόλου ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἡ ἄγια Τριάς, ἢ ὁ καθόλου ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος, ἢ ὁ τῆς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἡ ἄγια Τριάς. Ἀλλ’ ὅτι Τριάδα μή βούλεσθε σημαίνειν μετὰ τοῦ καθόλου λεγόμενον ἄνθρωπον, οὔτε μὴ μετὰ τοῦ ἰδικοῦ τινος, προδῆλου καθεστήκατε, ἐκ τοῦ καὶ ὡμᾶς ἑνα λέγειν τῆς ἄγιας Τριάδος τὸν σταυροθέντα καὶ παθόντα. Λειταρίαν οὖν λέγειν ὡμᾶς τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον καὶ ἡ τοῦ καθόλου λεγόμενον ἄνθρωπον ἢ ἰδικὸν τινα ἄνθρωπον λέγοντες σημαίνειν διὰ τῆς μιᾶς φύσεως καὶ μὴ πάντα ἄνθρωπον. Εἰπάτε οὖν τίνι διαφέρει τοῦ ἰδικοῦ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ παντὸς ἄνθρωπου; Ἡ πρόβλημα ὃ μὴν τῇ ὑπόστασίς καὶ τῷ προσώπῳ. Πῶς οὖν οὐ δύο

5: If your hypostasis is partly of like substance with the Father and partly of like substance with David, name these parts through which it is of like substance with the Father and with David? Are they God and the human being, or something else? But if they are something else, state what they are. But if they are God and the human being, the human being will not have its own hypostasis besides David with whom it is of like substance, just as the God Word, too, has his own hypostasis besides the Father with whom he is of like substance. For what is without hypostasis could never be said to be of like substance with that which is hypostatic. If, then, there is one hypostasis of the God Word and it is complete and of like substance with the Father, the human being being taken from us is either without hypostasis and is spoken of as a mere utterance, or it is hypostatic and has itself a complete hypostasis qua human being. But if it is without hypostasis, it is superfluous <to say> that it is of like substance with David, for generally it is said that a hypostasis is of like substance with <another> hypostasis. And gone will the sophism of you who do not wish to speak of two hypostases but speak of two natures of the God Word and of the human being taken from us.

6: We ask again: Distinguish for us what you say, tell us what you mean by each nature of your so-called God and human being! Is it the individual human being and the God Word, or the universal human being and the holy Trinity, or the universal human being and the God Word, or an individual human being and the holy Trinity? But it is clear that you do not want it to mean the Trinity with the so-called universal human being or indeed with an individual one, because you call the one who has been crucified and has suffered one of the Trinity. It, then, remains for you to say that by the one nature you mean the God Word and either the so-called universal human being or an individual human being and not every human being. Tell us, then, in what does the individual human being differ from every human being? It is obvious that <it differs> only in the hypostasis and the person. Why, then, do you not say that there are two persons

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Among the presuppositions, two fundamental suppositions, which if accepted, make it impossible to say that the Lordly human being is one of us. For it says: Book of the genealogy of Jesus Christ, son of David, son of Abraham. And: It is obvious that the Lord has risen from Judah. And: The husband of Mary from whom was born Jesus the so-called Christ. And: Jesus of Nazareth, a man who was shown to us from God, through powers and portents and signs, which God performed through him in our midst, as you, too, know. Having overlooked the days of ignorance, God now announces to all everywhere to repent. Because he has appointed a day on which he will judge the world in righteousness, through a man whom he appointed, giving assurance to all, having raised him from the dead. And: As through one human being death, through a human being resurrection of the dead. For as we all die in Adam, we will all be vivified in Christ. And: One God, one mediator between God and human beings, the human being Jesus of Nazareth, having been shown to us from God, through powers and portents and signs, which God performed through him in our midst, as you, too, know. Having overlooked the days of ignorance, God now announces to all everywhere to repent. Because he has appointed a day on which he will judge the world in righteousness, through a man whom he appointed, giving assurance to all, having raised him from the dead. And: As through one human being death, through a human being resurrection of the dead.

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will be priest forever according to the order of Melchisedec. All this, then, and uncountable other passages of the kind in holy Scripture you can quote, which are said about a particular human being of the individuals. And how can one say that all human beings are from the seed of Abraham, and not from all of it but from the tribe of Judah, and not from all of it but from the house of David, and not from all of it but from Mary the Virgin? Would you perhaps say that Caiaphas, too, was born from Mary the Virgin? For he is also one of the individuals.

Would you call Mary, too, a human being or not a human being? But if <she is> not a human being, tell us what she is by substance? But if <she is> a human being, how could she have given birth to the universal human being when there were many generations of human beings before her, and many have come after her. But you cannot even call the entire nature ‘man’, since <one cannot call it> woman either. The term ‘human being’ is common to the ones and the others, whereas ‘man’ and ‘woman’ distinguish the difference in the common nature. How is the other <point> not also clear: Just as Adam through whom we have all become mortal as regards our nature, is one of all and first of the mortal condition, so Christ through whom we all acquire immortal life like him, is one of all as regards the flesh and leader of the conduct in immortality. And one human being is mediator between human beings and God. For how would all be their own mediators? Or how would all by themselves advance in grace and wisdom? For many die before their time, and do not advance to the complete age, and others again are full of madness and impiety, but not wisdom and grace of God over them. But indeed nor are all prophets like Moses or priests like Melchisedec. Have a care that you do not call the priesthood of the idolaters and the magic of the pagans Mosaic prophecies and Christian priesthoods, which is impious.
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ζ′
Εἴ έπειθῇ ἐν τῷ Θεῷ Λόγῳ ὑπάστησθι ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἔχει ὑπόστασιν ἰδίαν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, πῶς εἰ ἐν αὐτῷ ἔρι, ἔχει φύσιν ἰδίαν ὁ ἄνθρωπος; Καὶ εἰ ἔχει φύσιν ἰδίαν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, πῶς οὐκ ἔχει καὶ ὑπόστασιν; "Ἡ ἔστιν φύς ἔξος ποιου τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου, ὑποστάσει δὲ ἅπαν ἐν αὐτῷ, πῶς δὲ καὶ φύσις τοῦ ἕμων ἄνθρωπου πρὸ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τῆς ἰδίας;

Η′
Εἴ ὅλος ὑπάστησθι ὁ ἐξ ἕμων ἄνθρωπος ἐν τῷ θεῷ, πῶς οὐκ ἔρρωται καὶ ἔστιν ἡ ὑπόστασις τοῦ ἐξ ἕμων ἄνθρωπου ἐν τῇ ὑπόστασις τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου; Καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔρρωται καὶ ἔστιν ἡ ὑπόστασις τοῦ ἐξ ἕμων ἄνθρωπου ἐν τῷ Θεῷ Λόγῳ, πῶς οὐχ ἀπόλυτος ὑποστάσαι ἡ οὐδὲ ὅλος τὴν ἀρχὴν ὑπάστησι;

Θ′
Εἴ ἐν τῷ Θεῷ Λόγῳ λέγεις ὑφεστάναι τὸν ἔξ ἕμων ἄνθρωπον, πῶς αὐτὸ τῷ ὑφεστάναι, οὐχ ὑπόστασιν ὑπολοίς ἔχειν τὸν ὑποστάντα;

Ι′
Εἴ ὑπάστησθι μὲν ὁ ἐξ ἕμων ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἔχει δὲ ὑπόστασιν, πῶς οὐκ ἐναντία δογματίζεται, ἀνυπόστατον τὸν ὑφεστηκότα λέγων;

ΙΑ′
Εἴ ἢ Πέτρου ψυχή ἐτέρα ἐστὶ παρὰ τὴν Παύλου, τὸ δὲ ἐτέρον ἡ φύσει καὶ ὑποστάσει ἐτέρον, ὡς ὁ εὐρύνος τῆς γῆς, ἢ ὑποστάσει πάντως, ὡς ὁ Πατήρ τοῦ Υἱοῦ, πῶς οὐχὶ τῇ φύσει καὶ τῇ ὑποστάσει, ἢ πάντως τῇ ὑποστάσει, διαφέρει ἡ ψυχὴ Πέτρου τῆς Παύλου; Ἔδε τότε, πῶς οὐκ ἔχει ὑπόστασιν ἐκάστου τῇ ψυχῇ καθ’ ἧν διαφέρει τῆς ἐτέρου, ἢ τῶν τῆς αὐτῆς ὑπόσιας ἢ οὐ τῆς αὐτῆς;

7:
If the human being does not have its own hypostasis because the human being gained hypostasis in the God Word, how <can it be that> the human being has its own nature if it gained nature in <the God Word>? And if the human being has its own nature, how will it not also have its hypostasis? If we put the case that it gained nature outside the God Word, but gained hypostasis in him, how does the nature of the human being taken from us exist before its own hypostasis?

8:
If the human being gained hypostasis in God at all, how is the hypostasis of the human being taken from us not alive and well in the hypostasis of the God Word? And if the hypostasis of the human being taken from us is not alive and well in the God Word, how <is it> not <the case> that it has disappeared after it had gained hypostasis or that it has not at all gained hypostasis in the first place?

9:
If you say that the human being taken from us gained hypostasis in the God Word, how do you not indicate that that which has gained hypostasis has a hypostasis through the very fact of its gaining hypostasis?

10:
If the human being taken from us gained hypostasis but does not have a hypostasis, how do you not put forward contradictory doctrines, calling without hypostasis the one that has gained hypostasis?

11:
If the soul of Peter is different from that of Paul, and what is different is different in nature and in hypostasis, as the heaven <differs> from the earth, or at least in hypostasis, as the Father <differs> from the Son, how does the soul of Peter not differ from that of Paul in nature and hypostasis or at least in hypostasis? But if this is so, why does the soul of each <human being> not have a hypostasis through which it differs from <the soul> of another <human being>, either of those that have the same substance, or <of those> who do not have the same substance?
If the body of Peter differs in nothing from the body of Paul as regards nature, how would it not differ as regards hypostasis? And if it does not differ as regards hypostasis, and that which differs neither in nature nor in hypostasis is in all respects identical, how would Peter and Paul not have in all respects one and the same body, which is impossible?

Since they babble and seem to say something to those who stand by, when they are asked to show a nature without hypostasis, their backs to the bystanders. See for yourself how they mislead them through the such matters, and not have in all respects one and the same body, which is impossible?

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καὶ λέγουσιν ἐνυποστάτος τὰς φύσεις, ὅσπερ οὖν τὰ σῶματα ἐγχροματίστα, ἀνάγκη ἕνα ἐστὶν ἐνυποστάστου φύσις, καὶ υπόστασιν εἶναι, ὅσπερ οὖν καὶ χρώμα ἕνα σῶμα ἐγχροματίστων; οὕτε γὰρ ἔνδεχεται νοσήσαι φύσιν ἐνυποστάτον ἄνευ υποστάσεως. Εἰ οὖν τῇ φύσει ἀναγκαῖοι διεννυηοῦ τι καὶ τῇ υποστάσει, ἐπειδεικτώσαν μοι τὶ διαφέρον μὲν τῇ φύσει, μὴ διαφέρον δὲ τῇ υποστάσει, καὶ μὴ βουκολετέσθαν τοὺς ἀπλοστέρους, ὀμοίωτίτη φύσεων αὐτοῖς παραλογιζόμενοι, τὸ λέγειν εἰ ἐστὶν υπόστασιν ἐνυσίος μὲν οὐκ ἐπερούσιος δὲ, ἐστὶ καὶ φύσες ἐνυποστάτους μὲν οὐκ ἐπερούσιτας δὲ· γενικῶς γὰρ τὸ τελευταῖον, ἐπείπερ εἰ τὶ ἐπερούσιον, τοῦτο πάντος καὶ ἐπερούσιτας. Εἰ τοῖνυν διαφέρονσιν αἱ φύσεις ἀλλήλων, κατὰ φύσιν διαφέρονσιν, διαφέρονσι δηλονόντι καὶ καθ’ υπόστασιν, καὶ εἰ διαφοράν φύσεων ἐπὶ μίας φύσεως λέγεσθαι ἀδύνατον, ἁμαρτήματι ἁμαρτάνοντι καὶ διαφοράν υποστάσεων εἶναι ἐπὶ μίας καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς υποστάσεως.

14: But [they say], look, the human being is two natures but one hypostasis. And from this it is obvious that there can be two natures in one hypostasis. Again verbal hair-splitting, again struggle about doctrines, again contradiction of terms, and sophisms of an obviously ill-judging soul! They say that the same human being is both two natures and one hypostasis, and again no hypostasis, and we would be blessed if we heard of two natures and one hypostasis rather than now being taught to say two natures and no hypostasis. For again they say that Christ is three natures and two hypostases. And not having managed to say two natures and one hypostasis they put forward the doctrine that there are three natures in one hypostasis. And hear how this is so! If the human being <consists> of two natures and one hypostasis, and it has been taken and united with the God Word, how are there not three natures, two that are assumed and one that assumes? And how are there not two hypostases, one that assumes and one that is assumed? If Christ <consists> of two natures and one hypostasis, how is the human being not one nature, and the human being is without hypostasis, of whom they have similarity of the terms. For if nature corresponds to body, and hypostasis to colour, and they say that the natures are hypostatic, just as the bodies are coloured, it is necessary that there is a hypostasis where there is a hypostatic nature, just as <there is> also colour where there is a coloured body. For one cannot conceive of a hypostatic nature without a hypostasis. If, then, something necessarily differs in nature and in hypostasis, let them show me something that is different in nature but not different in hypostasis. And let them not beguile the simpler ones and mislead them through the similarity of the phrases, by saying that if there is a hypostasis, which is substantial but not of a different substance, there is also a nature, which is hypostatic but not of a different hypostasis. For the last is wrong, since something that is of a different substance, is definitely also of a different hypostasis. If, then, the natures differ from one another, they differ in nature and they obviously also differ in hypostasis. And if it is impossible to speak of a difference of natures in one nature, it follows that it is also impossible for a difference of hypostases to exist in one and the same hypostasis.

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δύο φύσεις έλεγον πρώην; Καὶ τίς υποίσει τοσαύτην ἐναντίοτητα δοματίζειν;

ιε’
Εἰ διαφέρει καθ’ ὑπόστασιν τὸ σῶμα Πέτρου τοῦ σώματος Παύλου, πῶς οὐκ ἔσται καὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ ἄνθρωπον ὑπόστασιν ἔχων; Εἰ ἡ ψυχή Πέτρου ἔχει ὑπόστασιν ὡς Πέτρου καὶ φύσιν, καὶ τὸ σῶμα Πέτρου ἔχει ὑπόστασιν ὡς Πέτρου καὶ φύσιν, δύο δὲ φύσεις οὐ Πέτρου δια ψυχήν καὶ σῶμα, πῶς οὖ δύο καὶ ὑπόστασις ὁ Πέτρος δια ψυχήν καὶ σῶμα; Εἰ δὲ δύο φύσεις ἡ ψυχή Πέτρου καὶ τὸ σῶμα, καὶ δύο ὑπόστασις ἡ ψυχὴ Πέτρου καὶ τὸ σῶμα, πῶς οὐ ψευδές τὸ δύο φύσεις λέγειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν;

ις’
Τριῶν οὖν ὁμολογομένων προσώπων τῶν θεῶν, τὸ ραπισθέν, φησί, ποιὸν εἶναι λέγετε; Εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τοῦ Λόγου, ἐπεὶ ὁμοούσιον τῷ Πατρὶ, ἔσται καὶ ὁ Πατὴρ καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα ὡς υἱὸς καὶ ἀπό Πατρὸς καὶ έγχρωνος καὶ παθητός ἀπλῶς, καὶ οὐδὲν διαφέρουν ἤμων τῇ φύσιν οὕτως τοιοῦτον γὰρ τὸ ραπισθέν πρόσωπον. Ἐπεὶ δὲ έπερών ἐστὶ τὸ ραπισθέν, ἔποιεν τὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ πρόσωπον, παρὰ τὰ τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος τρία, πῶς οὖ δύο πρόσωπα τὸ τε Λόγου τοῦ ἐνὸς ὄντος τῆς Τριάδος καὶ τοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἐν θεολογία καὶ οὐκ ἐν διδασκαλίᾳ;

ις’
Εἰ ο Θεὸς Λόγος, φησὶ, τὰ πάντα πληροὶ καὶ τοῖς πᾶσιν πάρεστιν ἀράτο ὑποστάσει, ὃς ὁ ραμφικός ἐστις μὴρ τοι καὶ φάτνη καὶ οἴκον περιώριστο τὴν ὑπόστασιν πρὸ τῆς ἁγίας ἀναστάσεως αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἁλόν ἐπεργάζεται τόποις, κατὰ τοῦ Ἐπορευθήσεται εἰς σώματα (cf. Mk. 16:19), καὶ ὃν δὲ ραμφικὸν δεξιάσθαι (Acts 3:21) καὶ ὁθὸν ἐλεύθερος, ὁράσειν ἐδίκαιασθεν ἐκ τῆς ραμφικῆς εἰς τὸν σώματα (Acts 1:11), πῶς οὐ θατέρα μὲν ὡς υἱὸς καὶ περιγραμματίζον ὑπόστασις, θετέρα δὲ ἀράτος καὶ ἀπεριγραμματίζον ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πρῶην; Καὶ τίς υποίσει τοσαύτην ἐναντίοτητα δοματίζειν;

said before that it has two natures. And who will bear to put forward such contradictory doctrines?

15: If the body of Peter differs from the body of Paul as regards hypostasis, how will it not be <the case> that the body of the human being, too, has a hypostasis? If the soul of Peter has a hypostasis and a nature insofar as it is Peter’s, and the body of Peter has a hypostasis and a nature insofar as it is Peter’s, and Peter is two natures because of the soul and the body, how will Peter not also be two hypostases because of the soul and the body? But if the soul and the body of Peter are two natures, and the soul and the body of Peter are two hypostases, how is it not a lie that the human being is two natures and one hypostasis?

16: Since it is agreed that there are three divine persons (here in the sense of ‘faces’), which one [he says] do you say is the one that has been beaten? If it is that of the Word who is of like substance with the Father, it follows that the Father and the Spirit can also be seen and touched and beaten and be subjected to time and in short <they can> suffer, and they differ in nothing from our nature. For such is the face that has been beaten. But if that which has been beaten is a different person, that is, that of Christ, besides the three <persons> of the holy Trinity, how will you not concede that there are two persons, of the Word who is one of the Trinity, and of Christ?

17: The God Word [he says] fills everything, and is near all things invisibly in his hypostasis, and the visible Christ is circumscribed as regards his hypostasis in the womb and in the manger and in the house before his holy resurrection, and is circumscribed by places even after it, according to the verses: He went to heaven, and: The heaven must receive him, and: He will come thus, in the way you have seen him go to heaven. If this is so, how is not one a visible and circumscribed hypostasis whereas the other is an invisible and not circumscribed one?
96

DIRK KRAUSMÜLLER

10’
Πάσα φύσις, φασί, διά τῶν ὑποστάσεων αὐτῆς ξεγνωσται· οὐδεὶς γὰρ οἶδεν ἵπποτητα μὴ γνοὺς ἵδικάς τόνδε τινὰ καὶ τόνδε τόν ἵππον, ὤμεος οὐδὲ ἀγγίστημα, ἢ ἑτερον εἶδος κοινὸν ἢ ἴδικόν. Εἰ οὖν δοῦ τὰς φύσεις ἵστε Χριστοῦ, δῆλον ὡς τὰς ὑποστάσεις τούτων προςεγκατε.

κ’
Πάντα τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἤμιν καὶ ἐν Χριστῷ ὁροῦνται· ὁμοιωθεν γὰρ ἤμιν κατὰ πάντα χωρίς ἄμαρτίας (Hebr. 4:15). Ἡ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν γέννησις ἦμιν κατὰ πάντα τοῦ κυριακοῦ πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ ἰδιαίτεραν ὑπόστασιν, εἶτα ἐμπνευσθείσῃ αὐτοῦ ψυχῆ, ἐν τριτοῖς καὶ τὸ λόγον καθ’ ὑπόστασιν ἐνωθήσατο, δύο ὑπόστασες συναρθισθέναι ἀλλάξαι, ὅπερ ζητήθηκεν πῶς ἦσση, καὶ τίνι τρόπῳ μόνον γίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλῳ πλὴν τῷ κατ’ εὐδοκίαν μόνην, ἢ τῷ σῶματι προῆρησεν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ἔστερον ἑπετέται σαρκὶ καὶ τῇ σαρκὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ζωσαν, οὐ διὰ μέσης ψυχῆς σαρκί ὁ λόγος ἤγοιτα, ἀλλὰ διὰ μέσης σαρκός μᾶλλον τῇ ψυχῇ ἡμῶθη, ὅπερ ἀθεσμον· διὰ γὰρ τῶν οἰκειοτέρων καὶ ἑγγυτέρων τοὺς πορρωτέρω συνάπτεται τι.

κβ’
Εἰ τοῖς ἱδίωμασιν αὐτοῦ ὁ Θεός Λόγος διακρίνομενα τοῦ ὁμοιουσίου αὐτοῦ Πατρός καὶ Πνεύματος ὑπόστασις εὐθὺς νοεῖται, καὶ τοῖς ἱδίωμασιν αὐτῆς ἁρα ἢ σάρις αὐτοῦ τυχόν τῷ ἄνω ἄμαρτίας ἐκ Παρθένου προλήθεται καὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοι τῶν ὁμοιουσίων αὐτῆς πάντων διακεκριμένη εὐθὺς καὶ ἴδια ὑπόστασις νοηθεῖν. Ἐπεὶ οὖν μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ τοῦ Λόγου τε καὶ τῆς σαρκός τὰ ἱδίωματα, οὐδὲ αἱ ὑποστάσεις ἁρα. Πῶς οὖν μία ὑποστάσας ὑμῖν ἢ τῶν δοῦ τὰ φύσεων καὶ ὀρθῶς διακεκριμένων ἐκ τῶν ὀμοφυών λελόγισται;

19:
Every nature [they say] is known through its hypostases, for no-one knows horseness if he does not know individually this or that horse, and the same applies to goatness, or another common or specific species. If, then, you know two natures of Christ, it is evident that you have known their hypostases before.

20:
All that makes up our nature is also seen in Christ, for he became like us in all respects apart from sin. In our natural birth the formation <of the body> precedes the union with the soul. Since the Lordly body gained hypostasis before the soul, it is necessary <that one of two things happened>. Either it had a hypostasis of its own, and then the soul was breathed into it, and in third place it was united with the Word in hypostasis, so that two hypostases were connected with one another. <In this case> one must ask how this will be, and in what way it can only happen, for it can happen in no other way than through good pleasure alone. Or the Word united itself with the body beforehand and later breathed the living soul into himself and the flesh. <In this case> the Word would not have been united with the flesh through the mediation of the soul but would rather have been united with the soul through the mediation of the flesh, which is unlawful, for something is connected with that which is further away from it through that which is closer and nearer.

21:
When the God Word is distinguished through his properties from the Father and the Spirit who are of like substance with him, he is immediately thought of as a hypostasis. If this is so, it follows that the flesh, too, is immediately thought of as a hypostasis, when it is distinguished from all that are of like substance, for example, through the coming-forth from a Virgin without sin. Since, then, the properties of the Word and the flesh are not the same, it follows that neither are their hypostases. How, then, can you conceive of one hypostasis, which <consists> of two natures that are doubly distinguished from those of like nature?

22:
If since the human nature of Christ [he says] is lacking in nothing when compared with the
nature of the individual human beings, you count it separately from the nature of the divinity, why do you not count the human hypostasis separately from the hypostasis of the Word when it is lacking in nothing when compared with the hypostases of individual human beings, and do not say that there are also two hypostases of the Word?

23: The temporal nature [they say] will not have an eternal hypostasis, just as the opposite is also true. It is, then, necessary that either the human nature of Christ is without hypostasis, or it is necessary that the hypostasis is temporal. Consequently, there would be two <hypostases> in <Christ>, the eternal one of the Word, and the temporal one of the flesh.

24: Either there is nothing composite in Christ [they say] or both nature and hypostasis <are composite>, or the nature is simple, but the hypostasis is composite, or vice versa the nature is composite but the hypostasis is simple. If, then, everything in him is simple, you speak fraudulently about composition in his case, but if both nature and hypostasis are composite, why do you reject the Severians? If you are of the opinion that the natures are simple but the hypostasis is composite, since it is agreed that the hypostasis of the Word is simple, and you say that that of Christ is composite, it follows that there are clearly two hypostases, that of the Word and that of Christ.

25: He who does not divide the hypostases of Christ, cannot say that in Christ some things belong to the divinity and some things belong to the flesh, but <must say that> all that belongs to the divinity will also belong to the flesh and all that belongs to the flesh must also belong to the divinity.

26: If the hypostases are not separated by nature, and united as regards hypostasis, when I hear Scripture say that Christ is one human being, what should I think: one substance and one hypostasis, or half of one substance and of one hypostasis?
κ’
Εἰ οὐκ εἰσὶ δημημέναι θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ φύσιν αἱ ὑπόστασες, δήλον ὅτι οὐ σχετικός ἄνθρωπος θεός ὁ θεός, οὐτε χωρίς θεοῦ ἀνθρώπος ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

κη’
Ὡς εν τῇ ἐνώσει οὐ μένουσιν αἱ ὑπόστασες φυσικὸς δημημέναι, τότεν ἢ ἐνωσις φυσικῶς ἐστίν ἀλλοιώσεις.

κθ’
Ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκουσίων ἠνωμένων οὐδαμῶς ἐναντίωνται τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς ἐνώσεως ἢ διαίρεσις τῶν ὑπόστασεων.

λ’
Ο μὴ διαιρῶν τοῦ Χριστοῦ κατὰ φύσιν τὰς ὑπόστασες, ἐκ τῆς Τριάδος διαιρεῖ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τὴν μονάδα· Τριάδα γὰρ ὁμολογούμενες τριῶν ἀπλῶν ὑπόστασεων, οὐ δύο ἠμείν ὑπόστασεον.

λα’
Εἰ τὴν διαίρεσιν τῶν ὑπόστασεων οὐκ ἐφύλαττεν ἢ φυσικὴ ἐνώσης, οὐδὲ ἢρα τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον ἐφύλαττεν ὅπερ ἦν, οὐδὲ τὸν ἀνθρώπον ὅπερ γέγονε.

λβ’
Εἰ μένει ἡ γνώση τῆς θείας ὑπόστασεως τῇ θεσπίτι, καὶ μένει ἡ ἄγνωση τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τῇ σαρκί, πῶς τὰ τῶν ὑπόστασεων μένει δημημέναι, καὶ αἱ ὑπόστασες οὐ μένουσι δημημέναι.

λγ’
Ἐν πρόσωπον ἀπρόσωπον θεοῦ ἐκ φύσεως· Οὐ δεῖς γάρ, φησί, ὅγεται τὸ πρόσωπον μου καὶ ζήσαι (Ex. 33:20), καὶ ἐν πρόσωπον ἐμπυκνωμένον ἀνθρώπων· Καὶ ἐνέπτυσαν γάρ, φησί, εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ (Mt. 26:67). Εἰ ἐν πρόσωπον Χριστοῦ ἐστίν εἰς ἐνώσεως, ἢρα ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἀπρόσωπον πρόσωπον καὶ τὸ ἐμπυκνωμένον πρόσωπον.

λδ’
Τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου οὐκ ἐστίν ἐκ τῆς ἐνώσεως ἐν, ἀλλὰ ἐκ φύσεως, τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐκ τῆς ἐνώσεως.

27: If the hypostases of God and the human being are not separated by nature, it is obvious that God is not God without the human being, and the human being is not human being without God.

28: If the hypostases do not remain naturally separated in their union, their union is a change of nature.

29: In the case of those that are voluntarily united the separation of the hypostases in no way contradicts the mode of union.

30: He who does not separate the hypostases of Christ as regards nature, separates the monad of the Son from the triad, for we confess a triad of three simple hypostases, not of two and a half hypostases.

31: If the natural union does not preserve the separation of the hypostases, it follows that it also does not preserve the God Word, what he had been, nor the human being, what he became.

32: If the knowledge of the divine hypostasis remains with the divinity and the ignorance of the human being remains with the flesh, how can <it be the case that the characteristics> of the hypostases remain separated and the hypostases do not remain separated?

33: There is one inaccessible person (here in the sense of ‘face’) of God from nature, for he says: No-one will see my face and live, and there is one person of the human being that is spat on, for he says: And they spat on his face. If there is one person of Christ from the union, it follows that it has in itself the person that is inaccessible and the face that is spat on.

34: The person of the God Word is one not from the union but from nature, the person of Christ is one from the union, for if the one person of the God Word were from the union, as is that of
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μα’
Еι ὅταν ἦθελ γραφῆ τὸν Χριστόν ἐνα καλὴ ἀνθρώπων (cf. Rom. 5:19), μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ καλεὶ αὐτὸν ἑνα ἀνθρώπων, δῆλον ὅτι ἦμεν τοῦ ἕνος ἀνθρώπου ἑστιν ὁ θεός.

μβ’
Ὁ ὁμολογῶν τὸν Χριστὸν ὁμοίον θεον καὶ ἀνθρώπων, καὶ μὴ λέγων τὸν Χριστόν ὁμοίον ἐτέρων καὶ ἐτέρων, τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἀναπετρο ὁμολογίαν.

μγ’
Εἰ γέγονεν ἀνθρώπως ὁ Λόγος, δῆλον ὅτι τὶς ἀνθρώπως: οὐκ ἐστὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώπως, μὴ ὁν τὶς ἀνθρώπως. Ὅ δε τὶς ἀνθρώπως ἀνθρώπου ὑπόστασις. Ἡ οὐν δύο ὑποστάσεις Χριστοῦ, ἡ ἡ τοῦ Λόγου ἐξελίσσετε.

μδ’
Εἰ ἔμεινεν ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος δὴ ἦν, καὶ γέγονεν ὁ οὐκ ἦν, δῆλον ὅτι ἔμεινεν ἂσαρκος τὴν οὐσίαν ὁ καὶ ἦν.

με’
Ἡ σάρξ εἰ μὴ ἐστὶν τινὸς ἀνθρώπου φύσει παρὰ τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον ἑτέρων ὑπόστασισ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, δῆλον ὅτι ὁ τῆς σαρκὸς ὑποστάσεις καὶ θεοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου ἑστὶ ὑμισυμφορός καὶ θεος.

μζ’
Ὁ σάρκα μὲν ἔχων καὶ ψυχήν λογικῆν, ἀνθρώπων δὲ μὴ ἔχων, ἀνθρώπος ἑστὶν μόνως. Ὅ δὲ ἔχων σάρκα καὶ ψυχῆν, ἔχων δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπερῶς ἑστὶν παρὰ τὸν ἀνθρώπων. Καὶ ὁ Θεὸς σὺν Λόγος, εἰ σάρκα ἔχει ἑνυγχωμένην ψυχῆν λογικῆ, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔχει καὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπων.

μη’
Εἰ ἐν ἄτομον, φησὶ, ἐστὶν ὁ Χριστός μόνων, ἡ μονοειδὲς τι ἡ τῶν ὑπὸ εἴδος πάντως· ἄλλως γὰρ οὐκ ἐν, ἡ οὐν τι ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ τὸ εἴδος, ἡ ὑπὸ ποιῶν εἴδος ἑστὶ νεκροῦ; οὐκ αὐτὸν ἔχει καὶ ἑγερθής, ἔχει αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν.

41: If when divine Scripture calls Christ one human being, it calls him one human being together with God, it is obvious that God is half of one human being.

42: He who confesses that Christ is at the same time God and human being, and does not say that at the same time Christ is one and another, destroys his own confession.

43: If the Word became human being, it is obvious that it is a certain human being, for a human being does not exist if it is not a certain human being. But a certain human being is a hypostasis of a human being. There are, then, either two hypostases of Christ, or the hypostasis of the Word has disappeared.

44: If the God Word remained what he was, and became what he was not, it is obvious that he remained fleshless in <his> substance, what he also was.

45: If the flesh is not of a certain human being, which is something else by nature besides the God Word, but is of God, it is obvious that the creator and God of the flesh is also the creator and God of the God Word.

46: He who has flesh and a rational soul but does not have a human being, is only a human being. But he who has flesh and soul and also has a human being, is other than the human being. The God Word, then, has by necessity also the human being, if he has a flesh that is endowed with a rational soul.

47: If [he says] Christ is one individual only, he is definitely either a species consisting of one <item>, or belongs to those that fall under a <common> species, for it cannot be otherwise. Tell us, then, either what is his species, or under which species he falls.

48: If [he says] Christ is one who has raised himself from the dead and was raised, he
μή’

Ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ κατοικεῖ πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικὸς (Col. 2:9), δηλονίζει ἐν τῷ προονομασθέντι Χριστῷ, εἰρήκει τὸ Ἀποστόλῳ. Πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἔτερον φύσις τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος παρά Χριστόν, εἴπερ ἔτερον τὸ ἐν τίνι τοῦ ἐν ὑμῖν τε καὶ τὸ κατοικοῦν πρὸς τὸ κατοικοῦμενον; Τοιοῦτον γοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ Ἑθὸς ἤν ἐν Χριστῷ (2 Cor. 5:19).

[Λόγος Γ’]

Τρίτης ἀπεβίας αὐτῶν ἔλεγχος δύο υἱῶν εἰδέναι κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομίαν θεουλομένων.

α’

Εἰ μή τὸν Θεόν Λόγον ἡμιυιόν ἔστε, φασί, καὶ ἀτελῆ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι υἱόν, ἐπὶ δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐξ ἡμῶν ἐμισθοῦν σάρκας εἰ μή πρὸς τὸ εἶναι υἱόν ἀπλήθον τομοῦ. Τούτῳ γὰρ ὡς ἐλλιπὸς ὄντος ἐκατέρυγκός πρὸς τὸ εἶναι υἱόν, ὅραται, καὶ ὡς τελειοθέντος τοῦ τὸ Λόγου ὑπὸ τῆς σαρκὸς εἰς τὸ εἶναι υἱόν, καὶ τελειώσατο καὶ αὐτοῦ ταύτην εἰς τὸδέ. Διὸ καὶ δεόμενον αὐτὸς πρὸς τὸδέ, καὶ δεομένον αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸδέ, ὅμοιος παριστάνετας· μέρος γὰρ μέρους, καθὸ μέρους, οὐδὲν διαφέρει. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁμότιμο ἐστὶν ὑμῖν τάδε, τὰ ἐπίσης ἄλλακαν πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ δεόμενα σαρκὸς.

β’

Ὁ κυρίος υἱὸς δόλος ἐστὶ τοῦ γεννήσαντος υἱός· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐκ μέρους ἕν ἐκ τινὸς λέγεται τοιοῦτοι υἱός, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ πατήρ ἐστὶν ὁ μέρους, καὶ οὔ τοῦ δόλου. Ἀμέλει οὕτω τοῦ ἐκ φυσῆς λογικῆς καὶ σύμματος ζώου λεγομένου υἱοῦ ἀνθρώπου, εἰ συμβῇ τούτῳ τὸ ἐν μέρος χωρὶς θατέρου τῆς μητέρας ἐξελέθην, ἔξωμίνια καὶ οὐ υἱὸν ἔδω ἡμῖν ὑμῖν οἰκονομίας, ἐκτροποῦτα καὶ οὐ καὶ οὐ γέννησαν ἐπὶ τοῦ δόλου. Εἰ οὖν ἐκ μέρους Υἱόν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ εἰκόνας υἱοῦ ἀνθρώπου φατέ τὸν Χριστὸν, ἰδίον ὡς οὐδὲν τοῦ πατρὸς κυρίος οὐδὲ τῆς μητέρας. Τίνος οὖν ἐστι φύσις υἱός, λέγετε ἡμῖν.

should have said: Destroy this temple, and I will be raised in three days.

49:
The Apostle said that the whole fullness of the divinity resides in him bodily, that is, in the aforementioned Christ. How, then, is the fullness of divinity not different in nature from Christ, if indeed that which is in something is different from that in which it is, and residing is different from being residence? Such, then, is <the saying>: God was in Christ.

[Book III]

Refutation of the third impiety of them who wish to know two sons in the dispensation.

1:

If you know that the God Word is not a half-man [they say] and is not incomplete as regards his being Son, and if you furthermore think that the ensouled flesh taken from us is not incomplete as regards its being son, how do you say that only one Son resulted from these two through composition? For this can be seen when either one is incomplete as regards being son, and when the Word is completed by the flesh so as to be Son, and completes <the flesh> so as to be <son>. Therefore, you make the case that <the Word> needs <the flesh> in order to be this, and likewise <the flesh> needs <the Word> in order to be that. For a part quia part does not differ from another part. Therefore, you consider them to be of like honour, since they clearly need one another in like manner for the same <reason>.

2:

A son in the strict sense is wholly the son of him who has begotten him, for nothing that is partly from something is called its son, and <it is> also not <the case that> a father is cause of a part and not of a whole. Indeed, the whole living being, which is made up of rational soul and body, is called son of a human being. And if it happens that one part of it leaves the womb without the other, it is in such a case customary to speak of a dead fetus and not a son, and of a miscarriage and not of a birth. If, then, you say that Christ is partly Son of God and partly Son of Man, it is obvious that he is in the strict sense <son> neither of the father nor of the mother. Tell us, then, whose son he is by nature?

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If your Christ is Son of God, it clearly follows that he is partly God and not wholly. Consequently, he is a half-God.

When we do not say that there is one and the same living being and only one whole of a son, from a divine and a human nature together, it is for this reason: It is necessary that every son is seen to be of like substance with his parents and to have a similarity of substance with the parents, where there is nothing missing and nothing superfluous. But your Christ who is Son of God and Man has <something> more than God and something more than the human being. How will he, then, truly be their son if he is not completely like them in nature?

If Christ is by nature Son of God and not deemed worthy of adoption according to grace [they say], how is it said: How much more did God’s grace and gift, in the grace of one human being, Jesus Christ, overflow to the many, and: God bestowed on him a name above all names, and: Who took the honour not for himself but was called by God just as also Aaron? Tell us what this Christ is?

But [they say] if it does not denote the dispensation, as you might say in order to avoid an exact examination of the meanings, and if it does not have an outcome in the strict sense, <but happened> through a parable or allegory or in imagination or seeming, and <if> what is said is idle talk and only creates an impression in the listeners, who is the son who learned obedience through his sufferings, he who also offered up entreaties and supplications with crying and tears, and was heard because of his piety, and who has been completed and crucified and buried, and whom God raised from the dead and who was elevated and glorified and the like? For no-one who is not possessed would say that these are either the properties of the Word <alone> or of <the Word> when he is together with something else.
We call ‘Son of God by nature’ [he says] the God Word alone who is of like substance with the Father, and we say that Christ is called Son of God by grace <and> is like <us> by nature. But we do not for this reason already present the Son as <one who> is of like honour with us, insofar as we, too, have received the grace of adoption from God, and are by grace children of God and inheritors of God and co-inheritors of Christ himself. For often there is found an ineffable difference between things that are said to be alike. Strictly speaking, the great and the angel are both likewise called creatures and they are not alike beyond that, for there is a great difference between them. Thus, then, one must also think in the case of the different sons of God by adoption and by grace. For Christ is deemed worthy of a greater honour, compared with Moses who is great among prophets, insofar as the one who has built the house has greater honour than it.

For all human beings [they say] have been called sons of God, in the verse: I have said: You are gods and sons of the most high, because of the divine image. But the Jews have again been called sons of God according to the verse: I have begotten sons and have elevated them but they have rejected me, because of their familiarity with God. And they have been educated to be sinless more than the other nations and have been taught to be pious. For Scripture bears witness to that: For his testament, it says, is to tell them, and: You are light for my feet, and: He announces, it says, his word to Jacob, righteousnesses and judgements to Israel. He has not done so to every people. Even if they did what is right out of fear of the law and not willingly, they nevertheless enjoyed the fitting help that comes to those who live in righteousness. And in short, they were guided by <the law> to imitate God on earth as far as it was possible, through a righteous and sinless life, and were thus called sons of God. Nevertheless, they were again capable of sinning, since they had a changeable

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ἐκ τοῦ ἀμαρτείν ἐπεδέχοντο πάλιν, τρεπτικὴ ἐνίκησε ὑπάρχοντες. Όπερ οὖν καὶ πολλάκις ἐγείρον ἥλεγχθησαν κατὰ τὸ εἰρήμαν: Αὐτοὶ ἰδίᾳ ἤλεγχτοσαν. Καὶ ἰδιαίτερα δὲ ἤλεγξαν καὶ πληγάς καὶ τιμωρίας ἐνεπέκειντο. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ κέντρον τοῦ πάντων ή ἀμαρτία (1 Cor. 15:56), καὶ Μάστεις πολλαὶ τοῦ ἀμαρτολοῦ (Ps. 32:10). Οὕτως μὲν οὖν καὶ οὗτοι. Ἐλεήσαμέν τι καὶ οἱ Χριστιανοί υἱὸι θεοῦ, κατὰ τὸ· Πάντες γὰρ υἱὸι θεοῦ ἐστί, διὰ τῆς πίστεως ἐν Χριστῷ Ημών (Gal. 3:26). Ἡμεῖς οὖν πρὸς τὸ διὰ τῶν λόγων πανεξεσθάν τὸ ἀναμάρτησαν, καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ τὸ γράμμα διὰ Πνεύματος δικαίωσαν διδακτέμεθα θεοῦ, καὶ ἐπὶ εὐθυπαθία καὶ θεωραία εὐκλήσαμεν καὶ ἀρνείς ἐς ἀναστάσεως νεκρῶν, τιμωρίαν οὐκέτι δεδότας, οὐ μεταβολὴ τῆς διαδεξομένης μακαρίας ζωῆς, πάνω εὐλογεῖ καὶ τὸν ἀρχόντον τοῦ ἁϊδοῦς τοῦ σκότους ἐδόμεννος, ἐν οὐρανῷ τὸ πολλεῖα, εἰς γὰρ τὸ εἶναι ἡμᾶς ἁγίους καὶ ἀμώμους κατευνύνων αὐτοῦ (cf. Col. 1:22) ἐν ἀγάπῃ προοριζόμεθα εἰς υἱοθέτησιν θεοῦ, καὶ τὴν ὑμεῖς ἔχεις τὴν πρὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἡμῶν Πατέρα, εἰ τῇ ἐπιλήψῃ τῆς υἱοθεσίας ἐς ἐκείνους, ἢ τῇ ἐπιλήψῃ τῆς ἀπολυτρώσεως τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν, τὸ ἀμαρτάνει ἐνευθείᾳ τρόπῳ ἔχοντες, διὸ οὐκ ἦν θησαυρὸς περισκότες λυπών, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ μηδὲ δυνάμει εἰναι ἀναπτεύεται τοὺς κακοὺς ἐν ὑμῖν ὑπεραρθέντες. Οὕτως οὖν ἐξωμολογήθησαν ἡμῖν κατὰ τάδε παρὰ τὸν ποτὲ Ἰσραήλ, ὑών καὶ αὐτῶν κληθόμεθα, δήλον. Τοσοῦτον γονών ἡ ἡμετέρα υἱοθεσία τῆς ἐκείνων προέχει καὶ ἐν τοσοῦτος, όσα καὶ πνεύμα δοῦλες ἐκείνης λέγοντας εἰς φόβον (Rom. 8:15α) καὶ ζωοῦ δουλείας ἐνοχῆς, ταύτῃ δὲ πνεύμα υἱοθεσίας εἴ τις κράζῃ· Ἀββά ὁ Πατήρ (Rom. 8:15β), ὅπερ ἐκλείνῃ λέγων οὐ τετολήμη πόστα: καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴ λέγεται ἵδιος ἐλευθερία ἧς Χριστός ἡμῖν ἡλευθέρωσεν. Οὕτως μὲν οὖν καὶ οὗτος ἐκλήθη δὲ, φησι, καὶ ὁ κυριακὸς ἀνθρώπος υἱὸς θεοῦ, κατὰ τό· Καὶ υἱὸς εὐγενῶς κληθῆσαται (Lc. 1:32). Οὕτως δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἡμετέρους παίαν ἐξαρπότας, ἐν ὧν ὄμοιος ἡμῖν ὁν καὶ λέγεται εἶναι οἱ πρωτότοκοι ἐν πολλοῖς αἰδέφοις (Rom. 8:29) τὸ κοινὸν πάντων Πατρὶ θεὸ, καὶ ἕτερα ἔχει ἰδία χαρισμάτα, εἴ ὁν καὶ μονογενῆς τῷ Πατρὶ ἑρήμῃ (cf. Jn. 1:18). Ἔστι δὲ ταύτα, πρῶτον μὲν, ὅτι ἐκ πάντων nature. For this they were often rebuked in deeds, according to the word: But they have rejected me. And therefore they were obviously subjected to death and plagues and punishments for sin is the good of death, and: Many lashings for the sinner. Thus, then, is their case. But we Christians, too, have been called sons of God, according to the verse: You are all sons of God because of your faith in Christ Jesus. We, then, are not only taught sinlessness through words but are also taught through the Spirit the righteousness of God that goes beyond the word, and we have been called to freedom and immortality and unchangeability from the resurrection of the dead, no longer fearing punishment nor change of the blessed life that will receive us, free from toils and the rulers of the world of darkness, as we will live a heavenly life. For we have been preordained for adoption by God in love so as to be holy and blameless before him, and to have likeness to our heavenly Father, in receiving adoption which we await, that is, redemption of our body, and we will be in no way capable of sinning any more. Therefore, dying is not in our nature but we will not even have the potential to perform evil deeds as we have overcome the nature. It is thus obvious that in that respect we become like God to a greater degree than Israel of old, which was also called son. Our adoption, then, excels theirs so much and in so many things. Theirs was called a spirit of servitude through fear and the subjection to the yoke of servitude, whereas ours is a spirit of adoption, so that we can cry: Abba, Father, which theirs never dared. And this is specifically called freedom through which Christ has set us free. Thus, then, is this. But [he says] son of God was also called the Lordly human being, according to the verse: And he will be called a son of the most high. He not only had all our privileges in which he was similar to us and is said to be the first-born among many brothers of God, the common father of all, but he also had other special graces, for which he was also called only-begotten by the Father. And these are, first, that he was chosen and selected from all visible and invisible creatures and at the moment of his coming-to-be received by grace the rank of being son, just as a son of an emperor who was born in the purple or while still being an embryo is crowned in the womb when the crown is wrapped around the mother, as it often happens. And thus he was united with the God
Word from the first moment of his creation, and was called son, not because of adoption like us, but because he was conjoined with the Word for his own manifestation, and had his person, and bore his honour, his rank. And: He sat at the right hand of God, above all authority and dominion and power, having received a name that is greater than all names that are being given, not only in this world but <also> in that to come, so that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow in heaven and on earth and under the earth. For in sum, he laid everything at his feet, both from this one through the divine Word, whose person he bears, and from that one through the Father who is inseparable from him, together with the Holy Spirit. And thus he mediates between God and human beings. Those who say that Christ gained hypostasis through the composition of the Word and the human being cannot ever give him anything more. The comparison of these adoptions is incomparable, how do they say that we say that Christ is of like honour with us? Because we confess that he is not Son of God by nature but that he has been adopted by grace. For the fact that all human beings and the Jews and the Christians and Christ are called sons and that they are adopted by grace, <shows that there is-> not a little difference according to a higher and a lower degree, as has been shown.

10: If we said [he says] that there are two sons from God by nature, or that both are <sons> by grace, you would justly conclude for us that we speak of two sons of God. For holy Scripture speaks of two or more sons then when all who are counted together are from the same <parents> in the same way and manner, that is, when both have come to be theirs by nature or by adoption, so that one can call them brothers of each other. Thus, then, one speaks of the mother of the two sons of Zebadeus, and in Genesis: Joseph had two sons, and Ruben said to his father: Kill my two sons if I do not bring
him back to you, that is, Benjamin. And the Apostle writes again: Abraham had two sons. Where, then, mention is made of two or more sons and brothers, we speak of both first-born and later-born as in the case of Esau and Jacob. If, then, we had said that the Word and Christ are from God, both by nature or <both> by grace, you would present us with a valid argument. For they would need to be called brothers when they are two and one would need to be called first-born and older, if they are not twins. But if the one is <son> by adoption and the other <is son> by nature and Christ is son of one by nature and son of the other by adoption, it is obvious that there is no room for the counting together of the two sons.

11: But see [he says], in the two causes the sons by nature of Bilha the servant-woman of Rachel are sons of Rachel by adoption, and they do not add to the number, as has been said by her to Jacob: Go in to my servant-woman and she will give birth on my knees and I will have a child from her. And again: God judged me and heard my voice, and he gave me a son, for this reason she called him Dan by name. But she also gave birth to Joseph and Benjamin by nature. And there are not for this reason four sons of Rachel among the twelve patriarchs, because the sons by adoption are not counted.

12: Those that are different by nature are often called with one single name, and are deemed worthy of one honour, but they are not at all thought to be two. For we believe that the church and the holy bread and what has been crucified is a body although each of them is different, and nevertheless we are for this reason not forced to speak of three bodies of Christ.

13: Nor [he says] do we call the archetype and the imprint two seals but one, although they are different in number.

14: What, then [he says]? Are the spoken and the heard word two words?
The Nestorian Treatise

[ἀυτὸν ἀσεβείας ἐλέγχος παραπτυχοῦσαν λέγειν θεοτόκον τῇ ἀγίαν Παρθένον.]

α’
Θεὰ γονὸς αὐτός καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔξοδος τοῦ αὐτὸ ἐνθύμημα κεκριμένον τῶν μιᾶς λεγόντων τὴν ὑπόστασιν Χριστοῦ, καὶ σύνθεσιν τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου πρὸς τὴν σάρκα. Τὰ γὰρ ἔστιν εὕρειν ἐν τῇ θεοτόκῳ φωνῇ, προσταθεμένου μάλιστα αὐτοῦ τοῦ χυρίων καὶ κατὰ ἀλλήλων ἤ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐν τῇ συνθέσει κεχορισμένον εὑρήκαμεν· ἀποσυνυδρίστος γὰρ λεγομένου τοῦ θεοτόκου, ὡς τοῦ θεοῦ ὀνόματος πολλάχως λεγομένου, σχέσει ποὺ τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ εὐσεβῆς διασφάρησιν ἔχει, νυνὶ δὲ τοῦ χυρίων καὶ κατὰ ἀλλήλως προσκεκριμένου τῇ φωνῇ, πάσης αἰσθησίας καὶ ἀπερικαλύπτου ὑποτροφίας αὐτὴν ἀνεπλήρωσεν. Ὅμως ἐροτητέον αὐτοῦ, τὶ βούλεται αὐτὸς ἢ τοιῶδε ἀνομίας, καὶ κατὰ ποιὰν αὐτοῖς ἔννοιαν ἡγεῖται· Ἄρα, ὡς φαμέν, ἀρρενότοκον ἢ θηλυτόκον γυναῖκα, τὴν εἰσοδημάὶ ἀρρενας ἢ θήλεα τίκτειν, οὕτως αὐτοὶ λέγουσι θεοτόκον τὴν ἀγίαν Μαριάν, θεὸς αὐτὴν περικυκλῶν τίκτειν διὰ τῆς τοιῶδε λέξους σημαίνοντες· Καὶ ποιοῦσας ἐγένησθαι, εἰπάτωσαν, καὶ τὸ ἄγνοον διδασάτωσαν· ᾗ ὅτι θεὸς ἐγένησθαι· Εἰ καὶ πρὸς ἅπαν τοῦτο ἐθέλουσι σημαίναν, διὰ τοῦ οὕτως ὀνομάζων τὴν Παρθένον, ἀλλ’ οὐκ οἴδαμεν εἰ δύναται τοῦτο διηλύσατι τὸ τοιοῦτον σχῆμα τοῦ ὀνόματος.

β’
Τοῦ θεοῦ ὀνόματος, φασί, πολλαχῶς λεγομένου παρὰ τῇ θείᾳ γραφῇ, οἶνον· Ἐπείπερ εἰς θεοὺς δὲ δικαιοῦσιν περιτομὴν ἢ πίπτομαι καὶ ἀκροβυτίσαν διὰ τῆς πίπτομας (Rom. 3:30), καὶ πάλιν· ὁ θεός ἔστιν ἐν συναγωγῇ θεοῦ, ἐν μέσῳ δὲ θεοῦς διακρινεί (Ps. 81:1), καὶ αὐτῆς· Ὁσπέρ θεοὶ πολλοὶ καὶ κύριοι πολλοὶ (1 Cor. 8:5), κατὰ ποιοῦν ἐξήλισται σημαίνοντες αὐτοῖς ἐναρθήσει τὸ θεὸς ὀνόματι ἐπὶ τῆς θεοτόκους; Κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον ὅπερ ἔστι φύσει λέγειν θεον, ἢ κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον τοῦτο ἔστις θεός, ἢ κατὰ τὸ τρίτον ὅπερ ἔστι τῷ φυσικῷ. Ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ὅστεν οὐκ ἂν εἴπομεν, οὐδὲ ἐὰν δείκνυον τὸ τέλος. Ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῷ δεύτερον λέγοντον, ἰστοσιαν

[Book IV]
Refutation of the fourth impiety of them who refuse to say that the holy Virgin is God-bearer.

1: Look for yourself that in what follows, too, there is concealed the same argument of those who say that the hypostasis of Christ is one and that the God Word is composed with the flesh. For what can one find in the term ‘god-bearer’, especially when ‘strictly and in truth’ is added by them, but this very thing, which we have found to be separated in the composition? For when one speaks of ‘god-bearer’ without qualification, it can through some kind of relation be given a clarification that makes it orthodox, since the term ‘god’ has many meanings. But now that ‘strictly and in truth’ is added to the term, they have filled it with impiety and barefaced blasphemy. Nevertheless, one must ask them what they wish such a term to mean, and in what sense it is understood by them. Do they call the holy Mary ‘god-bearer’ as we say that a male-bearing and female-bearing woman is one who is wont to give birth to males and females, and indicate by such a term that she habitually gives birth to gods? And let them say what manner of gods she gave birth to and teach us what we do not know! Is it that she has given birth to God? Even if they wish it to indicate this once and for all by their naming the Virgin in this way, we do not know if such a manner of speech can express this.

2: The term ‘god’ [they say] has different meanings in divine Scripture, as for example: Since there is one God who will justify the circumcised by faith and the foreskin through faith, and: God stood in the assembly of gods, he will judge gods in their midst, and again: As there are many gods and many lords. In what sense do they understand the term ‘god’ here in the case of ‘god-bearer’? In the first sense, which is to speak of God by nature, or in the second sense, which is to speak of god by adoption, or in the third sense, which is a lie? But in the last sense they would not call her thus, not even if they became demons. But if they call her thus in the second sense, let them know that god by adoption has been called in

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γέγεννη τὴν γενέσεως, αὐτὴ καὶ γεννήσα τὸν Ἱνδρόν, ὃς ἦν θεός ήθελημάτος σαρκὸς ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ τὸν κόσμον, κατὰ τὸν θεόν, κατὰ τὸν Νικηφόρον κατὰ τὸν Βασίλειον, κατὰ τὸν Αποστόλον κατὰ τὸν Πατρίδα, κατὰ τὸν Κορινθίους, κατὰ τὸν Κολοσσαίους, κατὰ τὸν Καθαρίδα, κατὰ τὸν Κλεοπάτραν, κατὰ τὸν Καίσαρα, κατὰ τὸν Παύλου. Θεοτόκος οὐκ ἦν ἄλλος ἀπὸ τὸν θεόν, ἀλλὰ δέχθηκεν τὴν γενέσεως τῆς γενέσεως καὶ καθόλου τὰ προσόντα αὐτοῦ καὶ ὡς τὸν θεόν καὶ τὰς ἱματίας τῆς σοφίας. Ὅμως καθότι μὴ ἦν τὸν θεόν, οὐκ ἦν ἄλλος ἀπὸ τὸν θεόν, ἀλλὰ καθότι ἦν τὸν θεόν, οὐκ ἦν ἄλλος ἀπὸ τὸν θεόν, ἀλλὰ ἦν ἀλλότριος κατὰ τὴν γενέσεως, ἀλλὰ δέχθηκεν τὴν γενέσεως καὶ καθόλου τὰ προσόντα αὐτοῦ καὶ ὡς τὸν θεόν καὶ τὰς ἱματίας τῆς σοφίας.
γεννωμένον; Οὕκοιν οὐκ ἄδιος ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος· οὐδέμια γὰρ τοιαύτη γέννησις προφάρχειν οἶδε τὸν γεννώμενον τοῦ γεννόντος, τὸ δὲ μὴ προφάρχειν τοῦ μὴ ἄδιον οὐκ ἄδιον, ἀπρός ἀσβέσις λέγειν ἐπὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου. Ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν μὴ τὸ εἶναι διόδουσι τὸ γεννωμένον φασι γεγεννηθήναι; Τρεπτὸς οὐκοῦν ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος καὶ οὐκ ἀναλλοίωτος, ἐπεὶ πάσα τοιαύτη γέννησις ἢ κρείττων ἢ χειρόν εἰκονίζεται ὅν καὶ ἀλλοιοτός. Εἰ δὲ [οὐ] τρεπτὸς ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος, οὐτε οὐκ ἄδιος. Οὐκ ἄρα κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἀλλήλους ἐγεννήθην ἐκ γυναίκος οὐδὲ ὁ λόγος κατηγορεῖται δίναται γέννησις ἐκ γυναίκος κατὰ τὴν γραφικήν διάνοιαν.

4:
If the begetting of the God Word from the Father happened ‘strictly and in truth’, the supposed birth of the God Word from a woman did not happen ‘strictly and in truth’, since they are not alike. But if the former is the case, the latter is not.

5:
If the begetting of the God Word from the Father, which happened ‘in truth’, differs from his supposed <birth> ‘in truth’ from a woman, and it is necessary that those whose birth ‘in truth’ is different are also different in substance, it follows that the God Word himself differs from himself in substance, because in him the births ‘in truth’ are different. But if the God Word himself differs from himself in substance, he will be similar in substance to nobody. Consequently, he will also not <be similar> to the Father and the Holy Spirit, which eliminates their being of like substance.

6:
If it is impossible that that, which has come to be insofar as it has come to be, comes to be again, it is also impossible that that which is eternal <comes to be> again from a woman. But the former is true, and consequently also the second.
ζ’
Εἰ ὥσις τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου ἐπέχθη κατὰ ἀλῆθειαν ἐκ τῆς ὥσιας τῆς παρθένου, ἀνάγκη δὲ τὰ τικτομένα ὅτι ὅμοια εἶναι κατ’ ὥσιαν τοῖς τίκτουσιν, ἢ ὁ θεὸς λόγος ἄνθρωπος τῆς ὥσιαν, ἢ ἡ παρθένου θεὸς τῆς ὥσιαν. Ἀλλὰ ἐκτάρειν ἐπίσης ὁσίβις καὶ ἀδύνατον. Οὐκ ἄρα ὥσις τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου ἐπέχθη κατὰ ἀλῆθειαν ἐκ τῆς ὥσιας τῆς παρθένου.

η’
Εἰ μήτηρ τοῦ θεοῦ κατ’ ἀλῆθειαν ἡ παρθένου, ὥσις κατ’ ἀλῆθειαν τῆς παρθένου ὁ θεὸς. Εἰ ωῆς τῆς παρθένου κατ’ ἀλῆθειαν ὁ θεὸς, ἢ ὅμοιος τῇ μητρὶ ὥσις ὅμοιος. Καὶ εἰ μὲν ὅμοιος, οὐθεὶς, εἰ δὲ οὐθὲ ὅμοιος, οὔχ ωῆς.

θ’
Ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου ἐκ παρθένου κατ’ ἀλῆθειαν γέννησις ἢ πάθος ὅμου ἔστιν, ἢ ἐνέργεια, ἢ πάθος καὶ ἐνέργεια, ἢ οὔτε πάθος οὔτε ἐνέργεια. Ἀλλὰ εἰ μὲν πάθος φαίνεται, πρόδηλος ἢ ἀσβεῖα: τὸ γὰρ γεγεννημένου τὸ πάθος, γεγέννηται δὲ ὥσις τοῦ θεοῦ καθ’ ὑμᾶς, τῆς ὥσιας ἅρα τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ πάθος. Εἰ δὲ ἐνέργεια, ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ὁ θεὸς ύπὸ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸ, τούτῳ τίμεται ὅμοιος ἐν τῇ ὥσιαν ἅλλο μόνον τοῦ θεοῦ, τοῦ θεοῦ ἅρα τῆς ὥσιας τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ γέννησις. Εἰ δὲ πάθος καὶ ἐνέργεια, πεπομένος μὲν τῇ ὥσια, ἐνεργήσας δὲ τὸ θέλειν γεγέννηται. Γεγέννηται ἅρα καὶ ὥσις καὶ τὸ θέλειν τοῦ θεοῦ, ἢ μὲν παθοῦσα, τὸ δὲ ὅρισαν. Εἰ δὲ οὔτε πάθος οὔτε ἐνέργεια, οὔτε ὥσις οὔτε τὸ θέλειν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐγεννηθῆ, εἰπέ τι τοῦ θεοῦ ἐγεννηθῆ, οὐ γεγεννηθῆναι, κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἀλῆθειαν ὁ θεὸς ἐγεννηθῆ.

τ’
Εἰ κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἀλῆθειαν ἐπέχθη ὁ θεοῦ λόγος ἐκ τῆς παρθένου, καὶ κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἀλῆθειαν ἐπέχθη ἐξ ὅς εἶ ὁ σάρξ ἡ θνητὴ καὶ φθαρτή καὶ ἐγκαθημένη ψυχή λογική καὶ νοερα, ἢ ἡ σάρξ προϋπάρχει τῆς παρθένου, ἢ ὁ θεὸς λόγος μεθυπάρχει τῆς παρθένου, ὅπερ ἄτοπον ἐκάτερον.

7:
If the substance of the God Word has been born ‘in truth’ from the substance of the Virgin, and it is necessary that those who have been born in this way are human beings in substance or the Virgin is a god in substance. But both is equally impious and impossible. Consequently, the substance of the God Word has not been born ‘in truth’ from the substance of the Virgin.

8:
If the Virgin is ‘in truth’ mother of God, God is ‘in truth’ son of the Virgin. If God is ‘in truth’ son of the Virgin, he is either similar to the mother or he is not similar. And if he is similar, he is not God, but if he is not similar, he is not son.

9:
The birth ‘in truth’ of the God Word from the Virgin is either something he suffers, or an activity of his, or both something he suffers and an activity of his, or neither something he suffers nor an activity of his. But if it appears to be a suffering, the impiety is obvious, for the suffering belongs to him who has been born, and according to you the substance of God has been born, which means that the suffering belongs to the substance of God. But if it is an activity, and God acts not through his being, that is, not through his substance, but only through his will, it follows that the birth of the substance of God is from the will. But if it is both a suffering and an activity, he has been born suffering through his substance but acting through his will. Consequently, both the substance and the will of God have been born, the one suffering and the other acting. But if it is neither suffering nor activity, neither the substance nor the will of God have been born. Tell me what of God has been born, through whose birth God has been born ‘strictly and in truth’.

10:
If the God Word has been born from the Virgin ‘strictly and in truth’, and the flesh has been born from her ‘strictly and in truth’, which is mortal and corruptible and endowed with a rational and intellectual soul, <it is> either <the case that> the flesh exists before the Virgin or <it is the case that> the God Word exists after the Virgin, both of which is absurd.

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11: If the birth of the flesh is ‘in truth’ a birth of
God, the being of the flesh is also ‘in truth’ the
being of God. But if <to speak of> being and
being such-like is impious and impossible, it
follows that the birth of the flesh is not ‘in
truth’ a birth of God.

12: If the parents are different from each other in
substance, it is necessary that their offspring
also differs in substance from each other. And
if this is so, how <is it> not <the case that>
when the Father and the Virgin differ in
substance from one another, the God Word
necessarily also differs in substance from
himself, as he would be son ‘in truth’ of both?
But to say that he who is utterly simple differs
in substance from himself is utter madness.

13: If the substance of the God Word has been
begotten ‘strictly and in truth’ from the
substance of the Father, and is by substance
completely of like substance with him, and the
substance of the God Word has been born
‘strictly and in truth’ from a woman, and she is
completely unlike <him> in substance, <it is>
not <the case that> the substance is born
‘strictly and in truth’ from the substance, which
makes the offspring completely alike to the
parents, but <it is> something else, which one
cannot even imagine.

14: If the Son has been begotten from the Father as
regards his divinity, and preserves the
similarity in substance to him, and according to
you the Son has likewise been born from the
Virgin as regards his divinity, he must preserve
the similarity with her in substance as regards
his divinity. But if this is the case, the Virgin,
too, will have similarity in substance with the
God and Father. For those that are similar to the
same thing are also similar to each other.

15: Everything that gives birth ‘strictly and in
truth’ is cause of the offspring, but no cause of
the offspring is younger than the offspring.
Nothing, then, that is not younger than its
offspring is a creature of its offspring.

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δημιουργημα του τικτομενου. Ουδεν άρα κυριος και κατα αληθειαν τικτον
dημιουργημα του τικτομενου.

ις' Παν το κυριος και κατα αληθειαν τικτομενον
to einai eche ek to tiktontos. Ουδεν δε το
einai exon ek to tiktontos, pro to oikeiou
tokou estin. Ουδεν άρα κυριος και κατα
αληθειαν τικτομενον προ το oikeiou
tokou esti.

ις' Το κυριος και κατα αληθειαν τικτομενον ει
ev chrono tiktetai, dynamae monon estin en to
τικτοντι προ της ιδιας συλληψεως, ως εν τη
του Αβρααμ όσφυι ο Λεπυ (cf. Hebr. 7:10).
Το δε dynamae monon en to tiktonti an arqhen
lambanea to einai en to tiktonti. Το κυριος
αρα και κατα αληθειαν τικτομενον ει en
chrono tiktetai, arqhen to einai lambanea en
to tiktonti.

η' Ει κυριος και κατα αληθειαν ετεχθη ο Θεος
Λογος εκ γυναικος, ή τεχθες υπο χρονον ή
η γυνη υπερ χρονον. Αλλα μην ουτε θεος υπο
χρονον ουτε γυνη υπερ χρονον. Ουκ άρα
κυριος και κατα αληθειαν ετεχθη ο θεος εκ
gynaikos.

θ' Ει κατα αληθειαν ειδος της Παρθενου ο Θεος
Λογος, τοθο εται κατ εις ουσια, υπερ εστιν
η τεκουσα, αυτη δε εστι ζονον λογικον
θητον. Και ο θεος αρα καθ υμαι ζονον
λογικον θητον εται.

κ' Αλλα, φησιν, ου ψυχοτοκον, άλλα άνθρωπο-
tοκον φαμεν την γεννωσιν άνθρωπον. Τι
ον μη και υμαις Χριστοτοκον μαλλων
λεγετε;

κα' Αλλα δια τι ον, φησι, μη άνθρωποτοκος
υμαι ηπερ θεοτοκος δοκει;

κβ' Ει ο Θεος Λογος ετεχθη εκ της Παρθενου, εν
χρονο ετεχθη, παν δε το εν χρονον

Consequently, nothing that gives birth ‘strictly
and in truth’ is a creature of the offspring.

16: Everything that is born ‘strictly and in truth’
has its being from its parent. But nothing that
has its being from its parent exists before its
own birth. Consequently, nothing that is born
‘strictly and in truth’ exists before its birth.

17: Everything that is born ‘strictly and in truth’, if
it is born in time, is only potentially in the
parent before its conception, as Levi was in the
loins of Abraham. But that which exists only
potentially in its parent, has the beginning of its
existence in its parent. Consequently, that
which is born ‘strictly and in truth’, if it is born
in time, has the beginning of being in its parent.

18: If the God Word has been born ‘strictly and in
truth’ from a woman, <it is> either <the case
that> he who has been born is subjected to time
or <it is the case that> the woman is beyond
time. But indeed, God is not subjected to time
nor is the woman beyond time. Consequently,
God is not born ‘strictly and in truth’ from a
woman.

19: If the God Word is ‘in truth’ son of the Virgin,
he will be in substance what is the one who
has given birth to him. But she is a rational
mortal animal. Consequently, God, too, will according
to you be a rational mortal animal.

20: But [he says], we call <a woman> who has
given birth to a human being not a soul-bearer
but a human-bearer. Why, then, do you, too,
not rather call her Christ-bearer?

21: But why [he says] are you not of the opinion
that she is a human-bearer rather than a god-
bearer?

22: If the God Word has been born from the
Virgin, he has been born in time, but
thank you to the Virgin, who by your will, so as to the womb of the Virgin, it follows that the Trinity was in the womb of the Virgin.

κ’

If the Trinity was in the womb of the Virgin as regards its substance, and the God Word has been born from the Virgin as regards his substance, it follows that the Trinity has been born from the Virgin.

κ’

Every birth known to divine Scripture, which gives birth to those that are unlike, from those that are completely unlike, shows the parent to be worthy of praise or blame, of praise as in: Because of the fear of you, Lord, we have conceived in the womb and given birth, and of blame as in: See, he was in travail with unrighteousness, he conceived toil and gave birth to lawlessness. And all that is praised or blamed in giving birth gives birth to its offspring from the will and not from the substance. Consequently, every birth known to divine Scripture, which gives birth to those that are unlike, from those that are completely unlike, gives birth to the offspring from the will and not from the substance.

κ’

If the God Word was born from the Virgin, and everything that is born is born either from the substance of the parent, or from the will, and that which is born from the substance certainly has its being from the parent, whereas that which is born from will has from the parent sometimes its being, and sometimes a certain manner of being, tell us: From what do you wish God to have been born, from the substance of the Virgin or from the will? Whichever of them you say, the conclusion is clear.

κ’

If the God Word has been begotten ‘strictly and in truth’ from the Father, and is like him in...
αὐτῷ κατ’ οὐσίαν, καὶ εἰ ἐγεννηθή ὁ αὐτὸς ἐκ μητρὸς κυρίου καὶ κατὰ ἄλληθειαν, καὶ ἦστιν αὐτὴ ἁνόμοιος κατ’ οὐσίαν, οὐδὲν διαφέρει ὑπὸ ομοίων κατ’ οὐσίαν ἢ ἀνομοίων γεννάσθαι. Εἰ δὲ τούτῳ, οὐδὲ τὰ ἁνόμοια διενεχθῆσται πρὸς ἄλληθα κατ’ οὐσίαν.

Ἐνδεχόμενον δὲ ἢν, καὶ τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς κατὰ ἄλληθειαν γεννηθέντα, εἶναι αὐτῷ κατ’ οὐσίαν ἁνόμοιον, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἀδύνατα καὶ τῆς ὑποθέσεως αὐτῶν ἀξιά.

κη’
Εἰ τὸ ἁνδίως ὡς ὑστερον γεννάται κατὰ ἄλληθειαν, καὶ τὸ μηδὲ ὅλος ὄν ἐνεργεία μὴ ἢν γίνεται κατὰ ἄλληθειαν. Εἰ δὲ τὸ δεύτερον ἀδύνατον, καὶ τὸ πρότοτον ἀρα.

κθ’
Εἰ τὸν οὐρανόν καὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτῶι ἢν ὅταν γεννήθαι νῦν ἀδύνατον, τὸν τοῦτον δημιουργόν πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων ἐκ Πατρὸς γεγεννημένον ἐπ’ ἐσχάτων γεννηθῆναι ἀδύνατώτατον.

λ’
Εἰ ἐνδέχεται τὴν χθές γενέσθαι αὕριον, ἐνδεχεσθαὶ καὶ τὸν ὅταν ἁνδίως τεχθῆναι ἐπ’ ἐσχάτων. Αὐλα τὸ πρῶτον ἀμήχανον, καὶ τὸ δεύτερον κατ’ ἐπίτασιν.

λα’
Εἰ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρῶτον μὴ ὡς ὑστερον εἶναι μὴ γεννηθὲν ἢ ποιηθὲν, ἐνδεχέσθω καὶ τὸ ἁνδίως ὡς ὑστερον κατ’ ἄλληθειαν γεννηθῆναι. Ἀλλὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἀμήχανον, καὶ τὸ ὑστερον ἀρα.

λβ’
Τὸ ἀνωθέν γεννόμενον (εφ. Ἰν. 3:3), τούτεστι δευτέρα γεννήσει, ἐξ ἴδιαν ἀπὸ και Πνεύματος (Ἰν. 3:5) ἢ καὶ διὰ διδασκαλίας γεννᾶται, τὸ δὲ ὅταν γεγεννημένον εἰς υιοθεσίαν γεννᾶται, τὸ δὲ εἰς υιοθεσίαν γεγεννημένον ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας οὐ γεννᾶται τοῦ γεννώτος. Τὸ ἀνωθέν ἀρα γεγεννημένον οὐκ ἢκ τῆς οὐσίας γεννᾶται τοῦ γεννώτος.

λγ’
Εἰ κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἄλληθειαν ἐγεννήθη ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος ἐκ τῆς Παρθένου, καὶ ἦστιν αὐτὴ substance, and if the same one has been born ‘strictly and in truth’ from the mother, and she is unlike <her> in substance, there is no difference between birth from those that are like in substance and <birth from> those that are unlike. And if this is the case, not even those that are unlike will differ from one another in substance. If this were possible, the God Word, too, who has been begotten ‘in truth’ from the Father would in substance be unlike him. But all this is impossible and worthy of their supposition.

28: If that which exists eternally is born ‘in truth’, that which never existed at all in actuality comes to be ‘in truth’. But if the second is impossible so is consequently also the first.

29: If it is impossible that the heaven and the earth and all that is in them, which already exist, now come to be, it is completely impossible that their creator who was born from the Father before the ages has been born in the last days.

30: If it is possible that yesterday becomes tomorrow, let it also be possible that the one who exists eternally has been born in the last days. But the first is impossible and the second is even more impossible.

31: If it is possible that that which was not before, exists afterwards, without being born or made, let it also be possible that that which exists eternally has been born later ‘in truth’. But the former is impossible, and consequently also the latter.

32: That which has been born from above, that is, through a second birth, is born from water and Spirit, or through teaching, and that which is born thus is born to adoption, and that which is born to adoption is not from the substance of the parent. Consequently, what is born from above is not born from the substance of the parent.

33: If the God Word has been born ‘strictly and in truth’ from the Virgin, and she is unlike <him>,

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θεοτόκος, καὶ κυρίως καὶ κατὰ ἄλληθειαν ἐγέννηθε ο ἀυτὸς ἐκ Πατρός, τι κολλεῖ εἰναι αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ Πατρὶ ἀνόμιοι, μὴ τῶν γεννήσεων κατ᾽ ἐδός παραλλαθούσων μὴ τὸ γεννομένου καθάπαξ.

λδ’
Εἰ ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος ἐγέννηθη κατὰ ἄλληθειαν ἐκ τῆς Παρθένου, πάσα δὲ γέννησις μὴ ψευδομενή, ἢ τε τὸ εἶναι διδοῦσα τῷ τικτομένῳ καὶ ἢ μὴ διδοῦσα, ἵσον κατ᾽ οὕσιν τῶν γεννώντως ἔχει τὸ γεννόμενον, ἢ ἔλαττον, ἵσον μὲν ὡς τῇ Ἐγέννησις κατὰ τὴν ίδιὰν αὐτοῦ (Gen. 5:3), καὶ Ἰδων Χριστῷ Ἱησοῦ διὰ τοῦ εὐσαγαγέον ἐγὼ ἡμᾶς ἐγέννησα (1 Cor. 4:15), ἔλαττον δὲ ὡς τῶν πιστῶν ἐκ θεοῦ γέννησις, κρείττον δὲ οὐδέμεια, ἢ ἵσος ἄρα κατ᾽ οὕσιν ὁ θεὸς τῆς Παρθένου, ἢ ἔλαττον. Ἀλλ᾽ ἐκάτερα δυσεξῆθη, οὐκ ἄρα ὁ θεὸς κατὰ ἄλληθειαν εγέννηθη ἐκ τῆς Παρθένου.

λε’
Εἰ τὸ κόσμον ἐκ τῶν πάντων ὡμοίων ἄλληθινός, δὲς κατ᾽ οὕσιν τίκτων ὡμοίων τῶν πικτοῦντων κατὰ ἄλληθειαν ἐστιν, ὁ παντὶ ἀνόμιοι τίκτων κατ᾽ οὕσιν ἐκ τῶν ὡμοίων οὐκ ἔστι κατὰ ἄλληθειαν τόκος: τὰ γὰρ ἔννοια οὐ συναληθεύοντες ποτέ.

λς’
Εἰ ἂσπαρκός τε καὶ ἄτρεπτος ὁ Λόγος κατὰ φυσικὸν αὐτοῦ λόγον, φησὶ, πῶς ἔσται σεσαρκωμένοις ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ μὲν ἄτρεπτος. Οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τρεπόμενοις λέγεσθαι ἐν ἐτί ἄτρεπτος μεῖναι. Εἴπτε ὅπως οὐχ ὁ θεὸς σάρξ γέγονεν, οὐκ θεότοκος ἢ τεκνισθή τὴν σάρκα, εἴπτε αὐτὸς γέγονεν, οὐκ θεός λοιπὸν ὁ μὴ ἄτρεπτος, οὐδ’ ἄρα θεοτόκος οὐδόμιος ἤ τοῦ τρεπτοῦ μήτηρ.

λς’
Ἰδὼν καὶ κατὰ τὰς ὑμετέρας ὑποθέσεις, καὶ κατασκευάζει, καὶ ἐκ μέρους καὶ κατὰ τι ἔξεστιν ὡμοίως εἶναι τὸν τινὰ μητέρα. Πῶς οὖν εἰ μὴ ἂσπαρκός γεννηθηκών θεὸς εξ αὐτῆς δοξάζεται, λέγουσιν ἡμῖν ἄνθρωποτόκον καὶ ἐκ μέρους ταύτην Παρθένον ἀντιφέρεσθε, τὸ θεοτόκος ὡμοίως μόνον αὕτη κατ’ ἐξαιρέσεις ἄποκληρώσαντες, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ Χριστοτόκον ἐκ and the same one has been begotten ‘strictly and in truth’ from the Father, what prevents him from being unlike the Father as well, since the births do not differ in kind nor indeed does the one who has been born once and for all.

34: If the God Word has been born ‘strictly and in truth’ from the Virgin, and in every blameless birth, which either gives being to the offspring or does not give it, the offspring is the same in substance as the parent, or lesser, the same as in: Ηεγακ αντίς τον άλληθειαν ἐκ τῆς Παρθένου, ἢ ἔλαττον. Αλλ’ ἐκάτερα δυσεξῆθη, οὐκ ἄρα ὁ θεὸς κατὰ ἄλληθειαν εγέννηθη ἐκ τῆς Παρθένου.

35: If the birth from those that are completely alike is a true <birth>, which gives birth in substance to those that are like those who give birth ‘in truth’, the <birth> that gives birth to those that are unlike from those that are alike is not a birth ‘in truth’. For the opposites are not equally true.

36: If the Word is fleshless and unchangeable according to his natural definition [he says], how will the same one become enfleshed when he remains unchangeable? For he would be said to remain still unchanged when he is changed. Either God has not become flesh <in which case> the one who gave birth to the flesh is not a god-bearer, or he himself became flesh., <in which case> he is henceforth not God since he is not unchangeable, nor is then the mother of the changeable one in any way a god-bearer.

37: See, according to your supportings and supporting arguments, it is permissible to call someone a mother of someone in part and in one respect. If you do not confess that a fleshless God has been born from her, why, then, do you object when we say that the Virgin is human-bearer in part, and <why do you> attribute specifically to her only the name ‘god-bearer’, and do not accept those who say that...
The Word was God, he became a human being. If the Virgin is 'god-bearer' it is obvious that the Virgin is mother of what the Word was and not of what he became. But if he has a mother because of the human being, and the human being does not have a mother, it follows that the Word, too, cannot have a mother.

According to the prophet the name 'Emmanuel' is a name of the sign of the one who has been born and given from the Virgin to the house of David, but according to the Egyptian 'Emmanuel' is the name of God, the giver of the sign.

The nature of the offspring is never indicated through conventional names. For the conventional names are indicators of that which accedes to the nature. Such is also the name 'Emmanuel' because it is a conventional name. The appellation 'Emmanuel', then, does not indicate the nature of the one who took it, as the Egyptian thinks, but <it indicates> that the help of God is with those who have taken 'Emmanuel' as its sign.

If the Virgin is god-bearer for the reason that she has given birth to the true God, the true God would for the same reason be true God because he is Virgin-born.

If the Word became flesh by changing into the flesh, it is evident that the Word has a creator and a mother, but if the Word became flesh without change, how is the Word who is not changed fashioned and born as if he were changed?

That which does not belong to the divinity of the Word also does not belong to the Word. How, then, does the Egyptian not attribute a second beginning through birth to the divinity of the Word but does attribute it to the God Word?
The Egyptian who separates the God Word from the divinity, puts forward the doctrine that he was born fleshly from the Virgin but does not subject his divinity to a fleshly birth whereas he subjects the God Word <to it>, which [he says] is the utmost madness.

If the Word is God through the divinity and the Word is human being through the humanity, how is the Word not born as that which he is through the flesh, but as that which he is through the divinity? For the Egyptian puts forward the doctrine of the ‘god-bearer’ and anathematises those who say ‘human-bearer’.

Read the command of the law about the purification of those who have been born, which the Virgin fulfilled, and learn! Did the law, which orders what it has said, and the Virgin who fulfilled it purify God or a human being? If a woman has conceived seed, says the law, and born a male child, she shall be unclean seven days; according to the days of her menstrual blood. And she shall sit in her pure blood for thirty-three days; she shall touch no holy thing nor come into the sanctuary, until the days of her purification are fulfilled. And when the days of her purification are fulfilled she shall bring a spotless lamb or two young pidgeons to the door of the tabernacle of the witness. And the priest shall make a sin offering and a burnt offering, and he shall purify her from the source of her blood, and afterwards she shall enter the holy. That the Virgin fulfilled this command is testified by the Evangelist Luke who says: And having completed the days of their purification, Joseph and Mary took him to Jerusalem to present him to the Lord and to give two young pigeons.

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[Δόγος Ε’]
Πέμπτης αὐτῶν ἁσβείας ἐκφάνας ἀνέδην τὴν φυσικὴν θεότητα ἀρνομένουν Χριστοῦ τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ θεοῦ ἡμῶν.

α’
Ποτὲ οὖν, φασί, τὸ ὄλον ἵστε Χριστοῦ θεόν; Εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ τόκου; Ἡ μετὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν; Εἰ γὰρ ἀπὸ γεννήσεως εὐθὺς, καὶ ἀπαθή ἄρα καὶ αὐθάνατον ἂν ἵστε τὸν Χριστὸν. Τίς οὖν ἔπαθε καὶ ἐπέθανε καὶ ἐτάφη καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἀνθρώπινα ὑπέστη, εἰ μὴ φαντασία ἢ τὰ λεγώμενα περὶ Χριστοῦ. Εἰ δὲ οὖν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄλον Χριστοῦ θεοῦ εἰς ἄρχης, ἦν καθ’ υμᾶς ὅτε οὖκ ἦν ὄλος θεὸς ὁ Δόγος.

β’
Καὶ πῶς εἰ ἐν Χριστῷ ὁ ζῴον Δόγος τοῦ θεοῦ ἐστιν, εἴρηται τὸ ἀποστόλωρ περὶ Χριστοῦ δι᾿ καὶ ἐπέθανε καὶ ἐτάφη, καὶ ὅτι ἀνέστη ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ κατὰ τὰς γραφάς (1 Cor. 15:3-4); Ἡμῖν τε πῶς παραβάλλεται πάλιν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτός; Ἐἰ γὰρ νεκροὶ οὖκ ἐγέρονται, οὖδὲ Χριστὸς and newly-called is also God, he is necessarily also a new God. And divine Scripture shouts: Let there be for you no recent God, whereas the Egyptian shouts in turn: ‘Let there be!’, and anathematises those who do not say that there is a recent God.

48:
He who does not confess that the Virgin is a ‘Christ-bearer’ does not confess what Christ is either. For the birth from the Virgin is the beginning of the words about Christ.

49:
We will not call the mother of Jesus ‘god-bearer’ from our own authority, since holy Scripture nowhere calls her thus, nor the 318 fathers, but in keeping with the uttering of the angel who says to the shepherds: Today the Lord Christ has been born, and according to the verses: Book of the genealogy of Jesus Christ, and: Now you want to kill me, a human being who has told you the truth, we say that she is Christ-bearer in nature and rank, and do not rashly legislate what we have not received, as you do.

[Book V]
Demonstration of the fifth impiety of them who straightway deny the natural divinity of Christ, our true God.

1:
When [he says] do you know that the whole of Christ is God? After the resurrection? For if immediately from birth, you know Christ to be always impassible and immortal. Who, then, suffered and died and was buried and endured the rest of the human condition, if that which is said about Christ is not <merely> imagined? But if the whole of Christ is not God from the birth from the beginning there will according to you have been a time when the Word was not the whole God.

2:
And if the living Word of God is in Christ how is it that the Apostle said about Christ that he died and was buried, and that he rose on the third day according to Scripture? How is he not again compared with us in the verse: If the dead are not raised Christ, too, has not been raised. This is an obvious testimony that he

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γ’

Τί οὖν, φησίν, οὐ προφανέστατα εἶρηται περὶ Χριστοῦ, ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀνέστη, καὶ οὐκ ἄρ’ ἐαυτοῦ, καὶ διὶ διὰ τὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος γενομένην αὐτοῦ ἀνάστασιν ἐκ νεκρῶν ὥσπερ Υἱὸς Θεοῦ; Πώς οὖν λέλεκται: Ὅν δὲ ὁ θεὸς ἠμείρησεν, οὐκ εἶδε διαφθοράν (Acts 13:37), καὶ: Τοῦ ὀρισθέντος Υἱοῦ Θεοῦ κατὰ Πνεῦμα ἀχρισινής εἰς ἀναστάσεως νεκρῶν (Rom. 1:4);

d’

Αλλ’ οἱ τὸν ἀπόστολον καὶ ἀρχιερέα, φησί, τῆς πίστεως ἡμῶν μὴ κατανοοῦντες, καθὼς Παῦλος ἐντελέστηκεν ὑμῖν (cf. Hebr. 3:1), εἶπατε. Ποῦν ἤστε ἑρεία ταυτοτοπία τῷ ἑρατευμένῳ ποτὲ; Ἡ τίνα ἀπόστολον οὐχ ὑποτεθηκομένων τὸ ἀποστειλόντα αὐτόν; Ἡ οὖν ὁ Λόγος ὑπέρ τούτου τὰ ὁποῖα εἰρηναίον, αὐτῶς ἤτοιν ἐστίν καὶ τὰξεί τοῦ θεοῦ, ὡς Ἀρείος δοκεί; Ἡ ἐφ ἐκείνος μὴ ἐστίν, ἐπερευναὶ τίνα παρὰ τὸν Λόγον αὐτόν εἶναι δεήσει, τὸν λειτουργὸν τὲ καὶ διάκονον θεοῦ (cf. Hebr. 8.2) νοοῦμεν ἐνεργείᾳ τοῦ Λόγου.

e’

Δεδόσθω γὰρ, φησί, κατά συνδρομὴν εἶναι καθ’ ὑμᾶς καὶ θεὸς ὁ αὐτὸς Χριστὸς, ὁ δὲ ήσος τί ὑμῖν εἶναι δοκεί: Οὐ γὰρ δὴ καὶ αὐτὸν Λόγον καὶ σάρκα ἔφεστε: εἰ γὰρ καὶ αὐτῶς ὅμοιως θεὸς, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν ὁ Χριστὸς θεὸς τὸν γάρ ήσον, ὅν φατε θεόν, τοῦτον καὶ κύριον καὶ Χριστὸν ὁ θεὸς ἐποίησε (Acts 2:36), σάρως εἰρήτητα. οὐχ ὃν οὖν ὁ ήσος εἴπον κύριος, τοῦτο γέγονε ποιήσεις Ἰησοῦς καὶ κύριος-οὐδὲς γάρ γίνεται ὁ ἐστίν. Οὐδ’ ἄρα οὖν θεὸς ἂν ἐστίν ὁ ήσοις, ἐπει μὴν κύριος ἐστίν. Εἰ δὲ ὁ μὲν ήσοις ἀνθρωπος, ὁ δὲ Χριστὸς θεὸς ὑμῖν νοεῖται, ὁ μόνον θεὸς ἠστάν ὅλος Λόγος, καὶ ἠστάν καὶ οὗτος Χριστός καὶ πρὸ τῆς σαρκόσεως, ἡ θεὸς καὶ ἀνθρωπος τῆς ἐπερος παρὰ τὸν ήσοιν καὶ ἐσται διὸ ἀνθρωπος, μετὰ τὴν ποίησιν τοῦ ήσοιν εἰς Χριστὸν ἐν αὐτῷ φαινομένην, ὁ μὲν σύνθετος τὴν ὑπόστασιν, ὡς φατε, ὁ δὲ ήσοις ποιήσεις Χριστὸς. Εἰ δὲ Χριστός, θεὸς καὶ ἀνθρωπος ὁντως νοεῖται, καὶ οὕτως ὁ ήσοις ἐπίκτητον himself died as we do and <experienced> the rest.

3: What then [he says]? Is it not said most clearly about Christ that he rose by God, and not by himself, and that he was appointed Son of God because of his resurrection from the dead, which happened through the Holy Spirit? How, then, is it said: He whom God raised did not see corruption, and: Of the Son of God who has been appointed through a spirit of holiness from the resurrection from the dead.

4: But you [he says] who do not recognise the apostle and archpriest of our faith as Paul enjoin us, tell us: What priest do you know who is ever of the same nature as that which is officiated? Or what apostle who is not subjected to the one who has sent him? Or is it the Word, then, about whom this is said, <which would make him> lesser in nature and rank than God, as Arius opines? If it is not him, it will be necessary that there is another one besides the Word, who is considered to be a minister and servant of God through the operation of the Word.

5: Let us concede [he says] that the same Christ is also God through a coming together as you think, but who do you think Jesus is? For you will not say that he is Word and flesh. For if he is likewise God, it is obvious that Christ is not always God. For the Jesus whom you call God is the one whom this is said, <which would make him> lesser in nature and rank than God, as Arius opines? If it is not him, it will be necessary that there is another one besides the Word, who is considered to be a minister and servant of God through the operation of the Word.
Christ, and Christ will show himself to have become three human beings and two Gods, or it will be thought that Jesus is divided into God and a human being, as a Christ who has been made.

6: Divine Scripture calls Christ one God and one human being and one Christ. But the one God is one by nature, and likewise also the one human being. But the one Christ is one Christ according to the voluntary union of God with the human being.

7: God made Jesus Lord and Christ. Where do you put the God Word, Egyptian? Is he a Lord who makes or a Lord who is made? Answer the question without making distinctions of your own!

8: If Christ participated in flesh and blood as we do, it is obvious that Christ is a human being through our nature. If, then, he participates in the same and in like manner, he is definitely entirely of the same nature only, as the others who participated in the same.

9: If the Father is once Father of the God Word alone and once Father and God, it follows either that the Father has a minister in a higher state, or that the Son has been reduced to a lesser state.

10: If Christ is at the same time God and human being, and God is not God of the human being, it is evident that they are not to one another what they are said to be, that is, neither is God a God for the human being nor is the human being a human being for God.

11: Holy Scripture calls Christ minister of the saints, and each minister of God evidently serves his God. And if the matters of the law are a shadow of the matters of grace, and the law had a minister in the shadow, it is evident that it also has a minister in grace.

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12: If the God Word does not rule over the head, he does not rule over the whole body either. If the God Word is Lord of the church, he is by necessity also Lord of the head of the church.

13: If the God Word is not God and ruler of Christ, it is evident that Christ is also not the temple of the God Word. But if Jesus is the temple of the God Word, it is necessary that the God Word is also his God and ruler.

14: If everything has not only come to be through the Word but still comes to be, it is obvious that Jesus, too, has become Lord and Christ through the God Word, and that the Word is the God and ruler over all things through him.

15: Without being ruled by God a human being cannot fulfill the obedience <owed to him> or become sinless through the keeping of the law.

16: If the verse: The Lord your Lord anointed you does not refer to the human being, which is honoured through the anointing of the Spirit, but to the God Word, his anointer would have anointed him to dishonour, since he has greater things in his own nature than he has received through the anointing. For everyone who is anointed is anointed so as to receive some things that he cannot have in his nature.

17: Those who say that the God Word is the God and ruler of Christ do not say this from themselves but when they say it they obey the teaching of the Holy Spirit <which has been revealed> through prophets and apostles, and also of Christ himself. For [they say] David and Peter the Apostle said to him: I have seen the Lord always before me, and the Saviour himself <said>: My God, my God, why have you forsaken me, and: The Spirit of the Lord over me, and the prophet <said>: The God, your God has anointed you.
Ἐν ὑμνίων τῶν Ῥηματίδων τῶν Ἱερότων παρά τοῦ Πνεύματος δεδοξάσθαι (cf. Jn. 16:14), ἀναθεματίζει τοὺς λέγοντας τὸν Ἱερότον κερισθαι τῷ Πνεύματι.

Εἰ μὴ ἠρα ἐκ τοῦ Πνεύματος ἔλαβεν ὁ Ἱερός, καθὼς διδάσκει ὁ Ἀιγύπτιος, τὸ ἑνεργεῖν δύνασθαι, τίνος ἕνεκεν δέδοκεν αὐτῷ ὁ Πατὴρ τὸ Πνεῦμα. Οὗ μέτρῳ γὰρ, φησί, δίδουσιν ὁ Πατὴρ τὸ Πνεῦμα· ὁ γὰρ Πατὴρ ἀναπαύει τὸν Υἱὸν καὶ πάντα δέδοκεν ἐν τῇ χειρὶ αὐτοῦ (Jn 3:34-35).

Τὸν κύριον ἡ σάρξ πιστεύεται ὁ πάντως λόγος Λόγου εξοικοπήθη· ἄλλως γὰρ οὐκ ἦσαν ζωοποίος.

ἀριστοκρατεῖ ὁ ἄγνωστος, ἀγίων Χριστός, καὶ οἱ ἀγνωστοί εἰς ἕνας πάντες (Hebr. 2:11), δηλαδή ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, δι’ ἵνα ἀνθρωποί ἐπαισχύνεται αὐτοί ἀδελφοίς καὶ καλεῖ γιὰν λέγειν· Ἀπαρχεῖν τὸ ὄνομα σου τῷ ἀδελφῷ σου (Hebr. 2:12), καὶ πάλιν· Ἐπει οὖν τὰ παραπλησίων αἰματος καὶ σαρκός, καὶ αὐτὸς παραπλησίος μετέσχε τῶν αὐτῶν (Hebr. 2:14).

Εἰ αὐτὸς ὁ ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ἦσαν ἀνηρίζων ἐπαρεπίδευθε κυνόσας ἀπαρχάς τόν τοῦ ὀνόματος μοι (cf. Phil. 2:5-8), αὐτὸς ἦσαν ὁ ὑπερψωθεὶς καὶ δι’ ἐχαρίστου ὁ θεος ὄνομα τῷ ὑπὲρ πάν ὄνομα (cf. Phil. 2:9), ἀρα γε ὁ κατα φύσιν εἶχεν ὁ Λόγος, υπέρων κατὰ χάριν ἔσχε.

Συνεργασία τοῦ Λόγου τὸν τῆς ἀμαρτίας πάντως τίνος ἐν τῷ Κυρίῳ Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ. Εἰ οὖν ὁ ἐπὶ γῆς ὁρθής ὄντος τῆς ἀμαρτίας ἀναπαύει τῷ θεῷ, αὐτὸς ἦσαν ὁ πάντως ὄνομα· δεδοξάσθαι τῷ Λόγῳ τῷ πνεύματι (Jn. 1:18). Εἰ οὖν ὁ ἐπὶ γῆς ὁρθής ὄντος τῆς ἀμαρτίας ἀναπαύει τῷ θεῷ, αὐτὸς ἦσαν ὁ πάντως ὄνομα· δεδοξάσθαι τῷ Λόγῳ τῷ πνεύματι (Jn. 1:18).

18: He who anathematizes those who say that Jesus was glorified by the Spirit, anathematizes those who say that Jesus was anointed by the Spirit.

19: If Jesus has not taken the ability to operate from the Spirit, as the Egyptian teaches, for what purpose did the Father give him the Spirit? For he says: The Father gives the Spirit without measure. For the Father loves the Son and has given everything in his hand.

20: The flesh of the Lord is believed to be life-giving because it was made life-giving by the God Word. For otherwise it cannot be life-giving.

21: There is no human being if it is not a certain human being, and God who assumes the human being assumes a certain human being, who is a human being by nature and beyond a human being because of the assumption.

22: It is written that the sanctifier, that is, Christ, and those who are sanctified are all from one, namely from God, for which reason he is not ashamed to call them brothers, when he says: I will announce your name, and again: Since the children have partaken of blood and flesh he, too, has participated in the same likewise.

23: If he who was in the form of God lowered and emptied himself into the form of the servant is the same as the one who was exceedingly elevated and to whom God gave the name above all names, it follows that the Word has afterwards by grace what he had by nature before.

24: Nobody has ever seen God. If, then, the one who was seen on earth whose glory they have seen as of an only-begotten from the Father, is himself God by nature, how is true what has been confessed before?

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If the Word appropriates all the <properties> of the flesh and the flesh is deemed worthy of all the <properties> of the Word, it follows <that he appropriates> being from nothing, which is a natural <characteristic> of the flesh, and being changeable and visible and being contained in a place. But even if someone conceded this, how would the flesh partake of the opposites. For what is visible is not invisible and what is changeable is not unchangeable.

If Christ is God by nature, how does he say on the cross: My God, my God, why have you forsaken me? For he is not God of him who is thought of as God. It, then, follows clearly that he who says that God is his God is a human being by nature.

If the demons knew that Jesus was God by nature [he says], why did they say: I adjure you by God that you do not torment us.

If the flesh is flesh and not divinity, since the divinity has not been changed into flesh, nor again completes the substance of the flesh, how is the human being, too, not for the same reason human being and not the divinity?

If the flesh is flesh and not the divinity, the human being is human being and not the divinity.

If the flesh is flesh and not the divinity, and the human being is no longer a human being and not the divinity, tell me what of the flesh is the divinity and what of the human being is the divinity?

If the divinity is that of the human being, what the divinity is of the flesh, and the flesh is different from the divinity, for it is flesh and not the divinity, how is the human being not also different from the divinity, since he is human being and not the divinity?
λβ’
Εἰ τῆς σαρκὸς μὲν μέρος οὐκ ἦν ὁ Θεός Λόγος, τοῦ δὲ ἀνθρώπου μέρος ἦν, πῶς οὐκ ἀρειπανθῇς ἢ ἀπολιναρίζεις?

λγ’
Εἰ ὁσπερ μέρος οὐκ ἦστι τῆς σαρκὸς ὁ Θεός Λόγος, οὐτος οὐδὲ μέρος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, πῶς οὐχ ἐτέρους ὁ ἀνθρώπος παρὰ τὸν Θεόν Λόγον, ὡσπερ οὖν καὶ ἐτέρος ὁ Θεός Λόγος παρὰ τὴν σάρκα· ὁ Λόγος γὰρ θεὸς ἦστι καὶ οὐ σάρξ, ὡσπερ οὖν καὶ ἡ σάρξ σάρξ ἦστι καὶ οὐ θεότης;

[Λόγος Σ’]
Τὸ Κύριον ἤσιμον ἱματίαν τῆς σαρκοῦν θεόν; ὅταν διὸ τὸν προπλήν ἐφοροῦσαν λεγόντων τὸν Κύριον ἤμον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν.

α’
Εἰ στολήν ἔχει ὁ Λόγος τὴν σάρκα, κατὰ τὸ εἰρημένον αὐτῷ διὰ τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ περί εαυτοῦ· Πληνὲι ἐν οἴνῳ τὴν στολὴν αὐτοῦ (Gen. 49:11), δῆλον ὅτι ὁ ἀναθεματίζει τὸν λέγοντα θεοφόρον ἄνθρωπον τὸν Χριστόν, πρὸ τοῦ λέγοντος τὸν φοροῦντα ἀναθεματίζει.

β’
Εἰ Θεὸς ἦν ἐν τῷ Γεν. 5:11,

γ’
Τὸ Αρχόν τῆς ἐκουσίου ἐνώσεως τὴν ἐνσώματιν οὐκ ἀναρέω· εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἐνσώματι, οὐδὲ ἦν θεός.

δ’
Εἰ μὴ εἰς ναὸν ἢ φόρμη ἔχει ὁ Λόγος τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἰς οὐσίαν ἔχει, ὁ δὲ λαμβάνων τὴν σάρκα εἰς οὐσίαν τοῦ Χριστοῦ, αὔξησιν ποιεῖ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Χριστοῦ, τρέπον καὶ ἀλλοιῷν αὐτῆς εἰς ἐτέρων.

ε’
Εἰ θεοφόρον ἄνθρωπον εἰπέν τοῖς Χριστοῦ ἄτοπον, διδαξαν ἡμᾶς πῶς χρῆ ὁ νομὸς Χριστοῦ ἄνθρωπον, θέσαρκον άνθρωπον ἢ ἀνθρωπόσταρκον θεόν;

32: If the God Word was not a part of the flesh, but was a part of the human being, how are you not a follower of Arius and Apollinaris?

33: If as the God Word is not a part of the flesh he is also not a part of the human being, how is the human being not different from the God Word, just as the God Word is different from the flesh, for the Word is God and not flesh, just as the flesh is also flesh and not the divinity?

(Book VI)
Demonstration of the sixth impiety of them who say that our Lord Jesus Christ is not God who has been inhumanated.

1: If the Word has the flesh as a garment, according to what is said by him about himself through his words: He will wash his garment in wine, it is obvious that he who anathematises those who say that Christ is a God-bearing human being, anathematises before them him who wore it.

2: The <statement>: God was in the Son † says that† the Word is † not † in a human being, as he who wears is in that which is worn. It follows that God cannot be in Christ in any other way.

3: The manner of the voluntary union does not eliminate being-in. For if he is not in <something>, he has not been united either.

4: If the Word does not have the human being as temple or garment, he has it necessarily as substance, but he who takes the flesh to mean the substance of Christ, increases the substance of the Son, changing and altering it into something else.

5: If it is absurd to call Christ a God-bearing human being, teach us how one must call Christ a human being? A human being whose flesh is divine or a God whose flesh is human?
The Nestorian Treatise


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6: If the Word is one God and one Son after the incarnation as he is before the incarnation, it is obvious that he has the flesh as garment and temple, and not as a part of <his> substance.

7: If Christ is not a God-bearing human being, it follows that Christ who hears the truth from God is not a human being. For he says: What do you seek to kill me, a human being who has told you the truth which I heard from the Father?

8: He who prevents the God Word from acting in Jesus, prevents the human being from being seen as the God Word.

9: If the one who acts as God and is acted upon as a human being is not Christ, it follows that Christ is either only one who acts or <only> one who is acted upon.

10: But Athanasius [he says] whom you do not reject, says in <his treatise> about the inhumanation: He fashions the body as a temple for himself, and makes it his own as an instrument, being recognised in it and dwelling in <it>, and again: He who offers his temple and salvic instrument as ransom for all.

[Book 7]
Seventh demonstration of the impiety of them who rebuke those who say that the one of the Trinity suffered through the flesh.

1: How do you say [he says] that one (masculine) of the holy Trinity suffered through the flesh? If you do not speak of three Gods but of <three> hypostases, it follows that you speak of one (neuter) or one (feminine) of the Trinity, taking into view the hypostasis (feminine) or the person (neuter), and not of one (masculine). For the masculine refers to gods or fathers or sons, for which reason you do not bear to speak
λέγειν τὸν Χριστὸν ὃν ὁμολογεῖτε ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο, ἀνέχεσθε.

β′
Εἰ ἡ ἄγια Τριάς ἀπαθής, ὃ δὲ Χριστός παθήτος, εἰς δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ Χριστός τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος, ἢ καὶ ἡ ἁγία Τρίας παθητή, ἢ ὁ Χριστός ὑμᾶς ἐς τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος. Εἰ δὲ προσήθητε τὸ σαρκὶ πέπονθε, τὸ τοιῶσδε πάσχειν ὡς ἑαυτοὶ πάθους, ὡσπερ ἂν καὶ εὑρίζετι τὸ πάσχειν εἰς τὸν πεπνήσας τινα, ὡς ἑαυτοὶ πάθεροι τοῦ πάσχειν ἢ τοῦ πεπνήχαι τὸν περὶ ὧν ἐίρηται.

γ′
Εἰ φάσκοιν τὸ ἐπάθει σαρκὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ ὧν εἰς τὴν οἰκεῖαν σύστασιν, ἐναντίως ἑαυτοὶς τούτῳ λέγουσιν· εἰ γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκείνην καθ’ ἑν ἐπαθὲν ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος καθ’ αὐτοῦ, οὐκ ἑδικά αὐτοῦ λέγουσιν, ἵνα μὴ παθητὸν καθ’ οὐσίαν ὁμολογήσωσιν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὑιόν ἄλλοτρον, τὸ δὲ ἄλλοτρον ἄλλον τίνος παρ’ ἑκέινο οὐχ ἑκέιν ἔστιν ὑιόν, οὐ μόνον ὑδρικαὶ λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δύο πρόσωπα, τὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου ἐν, καὶ ἐν ἑκέινοι ὑμεῖσις ἑστὶν ὡς θαυμάτητο καθ’ ἑν πάσχειν ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος· τίνος γὰρ ἢ δηλοῦντι ἄνθρωπον; Ὠ δὲ τίς ἄνθρωπος πρόσωπον.

δ′
Εἰ τὸ εἰς τῆς Τριάδος λεγόμενον, κοινὸν τῆς θεότητος καὶ τῆς ἄνθρωποτητος Χριστοῦ ἐστίν, ἢ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἐστὶν κοινὸν τῷ Πατρὶ καὶ τῷ Πνεύματι, ἢ καθ’ ἐπανόρθωσαν καὶ ἐπανύνωσαν ὑπὸ ἑκάστην ἕμφορον ἀποτελουμένου Λόγου ἑνός. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἢ κοινοσύνη, πρῶτον πὸδόν οὖν ὑμοῦσαν ἢ σάρξ τοῦ Λόγου, εἴτε δὲ καὶ τετράς ὁ Πατὴρ τὸ θεόν. Εἰ δὲ καθ’ ἐπανόρθωσαν κοινοσύνην οὗ Λόγος καὶ καθ’ ἐπανύνωσαν ἢ σάρξ τῷ Πατρὶ καὶ Πνεύματι, πὸς ὡς δύο τὰς φύσεις τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος εἰσάγετε; Εἰ δὲ ὡς ὅλον ἐκ μερῶν τὸ εἰς τῆς Τριάδος λέγετε, ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος καθ’ ἑαυτὸν, ἡμιστὸν ἑνός τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος ἔσται. Εἰ δὲ ἄρα καὶ ὁμολογοῦσιν δὲν λέγετον ἐκ δύο, καὶ τὸν Πατέρα καὶ τὸ Πνεύμα λέγοντες, εἴ μονάδων εἶναι τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος τὸν λόγον δεδοκάτε. of one and the other (masculine) without reservation in reference to Christ whom you confess to be one and another (neuter).

2: If the holy Trinity is impassible and Christ is possible, and Christ is one of the holy Trinity, (it follows that) either the holy Trinity is possible, or Christ is not one of the holy Trinity. But if you add ‘he suffered through the flesh’, suffering in such a manner does not free him from suffering, just as when one says that someone was strangled in a particular manner, this does not free the one about whom this is said from suffering or being strangled.

3: If they say that he suffered through the flesh instead of in his own substance, they contradict themselves with their statements. For if they say that according to them that substance in which the God Word suffered is not his own <substance>, lest they confess that he is possible in his nature, and <if> what is not one’s own is that of another, and what is of another belongs to another one besides that of which it is not its own, they speak not only of two substances but also of two persons, one of the God Word, and one of that to which the substance belongs in which the God Word suffered. Of whom if not obviously the human being? But a certain human being is a person.

4: If what is called ‘one of the Trinity’ is common to the divinity and the humanity of Christ, it is according to the same account either common with the Father and the Spirit, or it is according to different accounts †how of the one Word that has resulted from both.† And if the commonality is according to the same <account>, how is the flesh first of all not of like substance with the Word, and the divinity is then <not> a tetrad? But if the Word shares according to one <account> and the flesh according to another with the Father and the Spirit, how do you not introduce two natures of the holy Trinity? But if you say that ‘one of the Trinity’ is a whole from parts, the God Word by himself will be half of one of the holy Trinity. If, then, one must call him of like substance from two, you concede that the holy Trinity consists of six monads, when you speak of the Father and the Spirit.
If ‘one of the Trinity’ is indicated from the divinity and the flesh, how will the flesh not belong to the Trinity, but if the holy Trinity is in one respect a monad, the flesh will not also belong to the monad, but if the flesh belongs to the monad, and it is created, how is the monad uncreated?

If ‘one of the Trinity’ is made up of the divinity and the flesh, and the Trinity is confessed to be impossible, how will the divinity and the flesh not be impossible? But if it is impossible, who is it that has suffered for us? And what is that which is called possible before the resurrection?

According to this logic lets us examine also the expression ‘God suffered through the flesh’, and the Word and Christ and the Son. For either these names include the two in their meaning, or not. If, then, they do not include them, they will posit that the flesh is without substance, or that the Word <is without substance>, or that either one is instrument or agent. But if each of the natures includes the two, the aforementioned absurdities will be attributed to them.

If the Word did not suffer through the flesh according to substance, it is obvious that he suffered insubstantially, but if <he suffered> insubstantially, he did not suffer, for the sufferings are strictly of the substance.

See [they say] when your father Cyril who says that the God Word suffered through the flesh...
toύτο πός φησί δυνατόν εἶναι ἀπαιτηθεῖσα, κατ᾿ ὁμοίεωσιν τῆς πεπονθύσας φύσει σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ ἄνω καὶ κάτω ἀπολογεῖται. Εἰ οὖν τῇ ὁμοίεωσι τοῦ παθὸντος ὑπὸ Ἰουδαίων παθῆτός ὁ θεὸς ὁ ἐν αὐτῷ μένον ἄληθος, ἢ ἄρα καὶ τῇ ὁμοίεωσι τοῦ γεννηθέντος ἐκ γυναικὸς γεννητός ἐξ αὐτῆς ὁ ἐν αὐτῷ θεὸς μόνον. Ὡς ἄρα οὖν ἄληθος νοεῖται θεοτόκοιν Ἰουδαίοι (ἐφ. 1 Cor. 2:8), εἰ καὶ λέγονται, οὐδὲ θεοτόκος ἤ Παρθένος, εἰ καὶ λέγηται· οὐ γὰρ τὸ ὁμοίωσθαι τὸ πάσχον ἢ τὸ γεννώμενον ἢδὲ παθεῖν ἢ γεννηθῆναι ἠστί.

11: Suffering through another one [he says] who suffers it not even possible in the case of those who are passible by nature. For the suffering is only seen in the one in which it has happened, not through the one through which it happened nor in which it was. <It is not> much more <the case that> the Word who is impassible is not said correctly by those who are pious to have suffered through the flesh?

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