

EXPRESSION AS SUCCESS: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REALITY OF MUSICAL PERFORMANCE

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Roger Scruton's ontology of sound is found wanting on two counts. Scruton removes from music the importance of the performer's manipulating of his instrument. This misconceives the phenomenology of hearing and, as a consequence, impoverishes our understanding of music. I argue that the musician's manipulations can be heard in the music; and, in a discussion of notions developed by Richard Wollheim and Jerrold Levinson, that these manipulations have psychological reality, and that it is this psychological reality which brings to life the *sui generis* musical persona of musical expressiveness.

Ausdruck als Erfolg:

Die psychologische Wirklichkeit musikalischer Aufführungen

Roger Scrutons Ontologie des Klangs ist in zweierlei Hinsicht ungenügend. Scruton reduziert Musik insofern, als er den Umgang des Musikers mit seinem Instrument unterschlägt. Das führt zu einer unrichtigen Auffassung der Phänomenologie des Hörens und verengt daher unser Verständnis von Musik. Ich betone hingegen, dass in der Musik zu hören ist, wie der Musiker mit dem Instrument manipuliert; unter Berufung auf Konzepte, die von Richard Wollheim und Jerrold Levinson entwickelt wurden, argumentiere ich, dass dieses Manipulieren psychologisch real ist und dass es diese psychologische Wirklichkeit ist, die die *sui generis* musikalische *persona* musikalischer Ausdruckskraft erst schafft.

I. INTRODUCTION

Notation supposedly emancipated music from forgery,¹ but this deliverance was acquired at a cost, as it was bound to, because the evil of forgery, to say the least, corresponds negatively to the value of the forged: an authenticity of some sort. This thought motivates my argument. Music notation removed music's expressiveness from a work's score-compliant identity and metamorphosed it into a contingency that might or might not emerge in a performance.² That result in itself is not bad, but it shows the redundancy of the metaphysical approach to art, and calls for a serious qualification of the philosophical enthusiasm about notation. If musical expression is not integrated into the work's identity, what then is its relation to the music? Surely, its emergence is not incidental? According to Jerrold Levinson, musical expressiveness consists

¹ According to Goodman, Nelson (1985). *Languages of Art*. Indianapolis: Hackett, p. 122.

² See Pearce, David (1988). 'Musical Expression. Some Remarks on Goodman's Theory.' *Acta Philosophica Fennica. Essays on the Philosophy of Music*, 43, pp. 228–43.

in the mental life the listener ascribes to personae who somehow inhere in the work.³ This persona does not have to reflect a particular person, such as the composer or the performer (more often than not it doesn't: no intentional fallacy is entailed here). Yet, the narrative of the persona, at best, provides a description of the expression. Hearing the music as expressive surpasses any such description: the persona's mind is brought to life. 'To express' is a success term, or so I argue in Section II. Flawed performances typically fail to enliven the expression, even though they may comply to the score and make us *think* of the right sort of musical persona. The explanation must not be sought in the score, but in the sound event of the music.

Some aestheticians, however, stand in the way of getting this right. Scruton, in *The Aesthetics of Music* takes a musical work to consist in an intentional structure of sounds with a specific type of spatiality, from which he explicitly excludes the physical causes of the sounds the work comprises, because those causes, according to Scruton, do not belong to the music.⁴ The way the musician interacts with his instrument – how he attacks the tones, strikes the strings, hammers the keys, his breathing, his fingering techniques, and so forth – are not heard in the music. Scruton thinks it is a causal fallacy to cite the instrument that caused a musical passage when describing the way it sounds. This fallacy, however, seems set up wrongly. Surely, we hear water running from a tap, not just some sound or other, which we then, by habit or convention, make out to be 'water running from a tap'. Even though, sometimes, some such inference may be necessary.

In Section II, I explain how and why expression as a thick term is to be conceived of as a success term. In Section III, I flesh out the art appreciator's predicament of having to experience expressive symptoms on a non-sentient object or event. I then argue that performers' bodies enter into the sound of the music to allow us to do just that and that their role within the music can be shown to account for the success, that is, the coming to life, of music's expressiveness. In section IV, I argue that it is the way in which we can hear the musician's body to have produced the sounds of the music, which brings its expression's persona to life, and provides that persona with an empathetic

³ In Levinson, Jerrold (1996). 'Musical expressiveness.' In *The Pleasures of Aesthetics* (pp. 90–128). Ithaca: Cornell UP.

⁴ Scruton, Roger (1997). *The Aesthetics of Music*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. The musical space meant here is internal to the music: whether one sound is higher than the other, etc. See the debate between Malcolm Budd and Scruton on this specific spatiality, in Budd, Malcolm (2003). 'Musical Movement and Aesthetic Metaphors.' *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, 43 (3), pp. 209–23, and Scruton, Roger (2004). 'Musical Movement. A Reply to Budd.' *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, 44 (2), pp. 184–87.

psychology and humane coherence, traceable to the music's style (Section V) and the psychological reality thereof (Section VI).

II. EXPRESSION, THICK AND THIN

Darwin gives the following description:

Infants [sometimes] utter violent and prolonged screams. Whilst thus screaming their eyes are firmly closed, so that the skin round them is wrinkled, and the forehead contracted into a frown. The mouth is widely opened with the lips retracted in a peculiar manner, which causes it to assume a squarish form; the gums or teeth being more or less exposed. The breath is inhaled almost spasmodically. It is easy to observe infants whilst screaming; but I have found photographs made by the instantaneous process the best means for observation, as allowing more deliberation.⁵

Darwin's faith in photography is well justified, of course, particularly so in his time. Yet, if photographs were the normal way for us to confront people's expression, the net result would be thin descriptions, and no interaction. Recognizing a mouth as widely opened with the lips retracted in a peculiar manner is not the same as recognizing the face's expression. Even though it makes sense, theoretically, to assume that the recognition of a facial expression presupposes the awareness of such traits as Darwin describes, seeing a face *as expressive* is not an inference. This thin conception of expression describes a response one might expect in autistic people, who, when confronted with another person, are said to find themselves often having to reason from describable traits in faces towards the feelings and attitudes that are assumably expressed in them. The difference between an 'autistic' response and a 'normal' one – that requires no such reasoning but involves immediate recognition of the expressed – is the difference between a thin (descriptive) and a thick (evaluative) conception of expression.

Reading the many approaches to expression, it is remarkable to find that most effort was devoted to finding a thin description, or definition, rather than to trying to make sense of successful immediate recognition. The evaluative moment is taken for granted, not treated as the decisive factor it is, as if keeping it neutral takes away its pertinence to the issue of expressiveness.

⁵ Darwin, Charles (1872). *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*. New York: D. Appleton, pp. 147–48. My 'sometimes' replaces Darwin's 'when suffering even slight pain, moderate hunger, or discomfort', to remove an obvious circularity in Darwin.

Some of the issues pertaining to facial expression are also found in artistic expression, but here philosophers find reason to expand on them more explicitly. Thus, according to Jerrold Levinson: 'A passage of music P is expressive of an emotion or other psychic condition E if and only if P, in context, is readily and aptly heard by an appropriately backgrounded listener as the expression of E, in a *sui generis*, "musical", manner, by an indefinite agent, the music's persona.'⁶ This conception is to be preferred to a thin (because nominal) conception like Goodman's, or, at least for the sake of my argument here, a projective (thick) one like Wollheim's.⁷

If we are to understand what it means to 'readily and aptly hear' expression as a peculiar awareness of some inherent *sui generis* persona and his *humanish* psychology, we need to find a way to compare musical expressiveness with real-life expression, in its aspect of success, including the psychological reality of the empathizer. (I return to Levinson's account of expression in the concluding Section VII.) Just *what* is expressed in a particular work may be a case for interpretation. However, *whether* the work is expressive in a thick sense or, instead, merely thin, is established interactively in perception, involving both recognitional and projective aspects.

Unlike 'emotion', 'expression' is not an activity term, but a success term. Emotions are dispositional processes, founded in desires and frustrations, sustained over the years, and brought to manifestation by particular circumstances.⁸ Whether, within a certain situation, something was expressed depends, however, on its being recognized by others. One might object to another's interpretation of one's own facial expression on account of what one feels one is really going through, but this is, in the end, wrongheaded. There is no debating the appropriateness of an expression or of its interpretation. What is *received* (by the empathizer) is part and parcel of what is *submitted* by the expresser. There seem to exist standards of correctness for success terms, but they apply transcendently, that is, in retrospect only, so these standards do little to help us predict or prescribe expressive success. How do we know which standards apply? Is there a way to circumvent the non-falsifiability of a success term – perhaps by reconceiving it as an activity?

⁶ Levinson (1996), 'Musical expressiveness', p. 107.

⁷ For the former, expression is metaphorical exemplification, Goodman (1985), *Languages of Art*, pp. 45–98; for the latter, expression contains an element of projection on behalf of the beholder, Wollheim, Richard (1993a). 'Correspondence, Projective Properties, and Expression in the Arts.' In *The Mind and Its Depths* (pp. 144–58). Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard UP.

⁸ See Wollheim, Richard (1999). *On the Emotions*. New Haven and London: Yale UP, pp. 8–11.

Suppose my son, Job, is sitting in the corner of the room crying over his broken pencil. Judging from the broken pencil and the tears on his cheeks we are all able correctly to describe Job's feeling as one of grief. Those of us, however, who are personally close to Job, like me, or physically so, will normally feel implicated in his sadness.

I propose we view the former, propositional recognition, as a third-personal access to other people's mental lives, and the latter, experiential empathy, as a second-personal one.⁹ Second-personal empathizing involves a reciprocity which need not be present in third-person understanding. We respond to what we think Job is going through, and Job responds to our soothing. This reciprocity normally makes available subtler and more personal aspects of Job's mental life. Second-personal reciprocity normally requires one's being in the same spatio-temporal context that the mental life or person empathized with is in. No third-person understanding of someone's feelings requires such presence – even though it is not incompatible with it. Expression as success involves second-personal reciprocity.

III. ARTISTIC EXPRESSION

In art, our predicament is vastly different. First of all, the mental life that is conveyed by a work will not itself be present to the beholder of the work, hence no literal second-personal reciprocity is going to be among the effects a work of art can have on its audience.¹⁰

Second, works of art put no direct moral demands on our actions. Represented worlds, although connected conceptually and emotionally to the world of the beholder, are in distinct spaces and – occasionally – times, and we are aware of this *a priori*, that is, before we recognize what is represented in an artwork. We are not to storm the stage to rescue the hero – and in film, photography, painting or literature the very idea of interfering should not even

⁹ One might construe empathy as a species of reasoning, much like theory-theorists prefer to do, but objections from simulation-theorists like Jane Heal, Gregory Currie, Alvin Goldman, and Robert Gordon, are quite convincing. For now, it makes sense to distinguish between the thin report that someone is sad, and, on the other hand, thickly perceiving his sadness. See Davies, Martin, & Stone, Tony (eds). (1995a). *Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate*. Oxford: Blackwell, and Davies, Martin, & Stone, Tony (eds). (1995b). *Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications*. Oxford: Blackwell.

¹⁰ That the mental forms the subject matter of expression is recognised by Bruce Vermazen, who argues that Goodman has – illegitimately – tried to extend the scope of the term beyond the mental. Vermazen, Bruce (1986). 'Expression as Expression.' *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 67, p. 203. Yet, artistically expressed mental life is absent to the expresser, and to the beholder. In this respect, it shares the phenomenology of representation. See van Gerwen, Rob (2001). 'Expression as Representation.' In Rob van Gerwen (ed.), *Richard Wollheim on the Art of Painting. Art as Representation and Expression* (pp. 135–50). Cambridge and New York: Cambridge UP.

arise. Third, notwithstanding these differences, in art appreciation there is the same difference between inferring that a character in a play, say, is sad because he is in tears on the one hand, and experientially ‘connecting’ with his grief on the other.¹¹ As in real life, in the context of art appreciation the distinction between thin and thick recognition brings up the problem of the psychological reality and authenticity of expression.

The artist who wants his work to *convey* the mental life (however non-specific), that it is supposed to express would want that work to make its audience empathize with it, rather than merely recognize it. However, as the mental life expressed in a work of art must, of the essence of art, be literally absent to its beholders – it may even be fictional and non-existent – artistic means must be developed to turn mere recognition into such intimated empathy:¹² the artist’s handling of the material of the work, her individual style, are called upon to do this job. What art needs if it is to be expressive are ways of introducing real psychology into its material structure. This, it is my thesis, is where the performer comes in.

Levinson defines a musical work as a ‘sound/performing-means structure’, as indicated by a composer at the time of composing.¹³ Music is more than a structure of sounds: it is also essentially brought about by a specified means of performing. Taking music as a compound whole of sound and performance-means is a major improvement on rigid notation-reduced conceptions of musical identity, which, as I have argued, excludes planned expression from the work’s identity, for lack of being notatable. Levinson provides us with arguments to see that expression *is* part of a work, since he is not committed to excluding any non-notational elements in the score as indefinite. Nor is he confronted with the uneasy problem of having to exclude all performances with minor mistakes from the work’s identity. According to Levinson, faultless performances are

¹¹ This difference is of the essence of artistic excellence. Having to address the audience to induce it to thickly empathize with – instead of thinly infer – what is going on in a work, is why artistic excellence might be conceived of as an ethical category, as I argued in van Gerwen, Rob (2004). ‘Ethical Autonomism. The Work of Art as a Moral Agent.’ *Contemporary Aesthetics*, 2. Retrieved October 22, 2006, from <http://www.contempaesthetics.org>.

¹² ‘Intimation’ has been stipulated as the artistic ‘device’ needed to make intimate (the adjective) the experiential dimensions of a work of art; it compensates for the literal absence of the expressed. See van Gerwen, Rob (1996). ‘Intimation and Tertiary Qualities.’ *Art and Experience*, Volume XIV of *Quaestiones Infnitae* (pp. 134–70). Utrecht: Dept. Philosophy. Artistic devices which intimate (the verb) range from not-showing to showing wrongly or too explicitly – in function of expectations produced by the rest of the work.

¹³ Levinson, Jerrold (2004). ‘What a Musical Work Is.’ In Peter Lamarque & Stein Haugom Olsen (eds), *Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art. The Analytic Tradition. An Anthology* (pp. 78–91). Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 79–80.

instances of a work, whereas *performances* need only intend, and succeed to a reasonable degree, to instantiate a work. They are not instances of the work.¹⁴ This loosening up of the ties that bind performances to scores allows us to appreciate that the aesthetic qualities of a piece of music originate from the indicated sound structure *in co-operation with* the performing means.¹⁵

Levinson does not, however, specify the role of the actual performance within this conjunction of performing-means and sound structures. Either he means to caution that it is relevant to *know* on what instruments the music is supposed to be played – because the composer says so –, or his position is more substantial, and views the performing-means as inhabiting the music – arguing that without the audibility of the performer in the sounds music is not an art, but decoration. The substantial reading is the stronger one, as it implies the one that takes the position as a caution.

IV. AN ECOLOGY OF SOUNDS

An account of hearing the performer in the music requires a rich phenomenology of hearing, rather unlike the one Scruton proposes in *The Aesthetics of Music*. Scruton emphasizes the intentional unity of the musical work, but argues that we cannot hear what causes its sounds.¹⁶ He thinks that we only report sounds in terms of their causes because we lack the words to describe our phenomenal awarenesses of their pitch. Such causes, for instance the instrument that produced the sound, do not belong to the sound – in fact they may be absent altogether: no contradiction is involved in claiming to be hearing the sound of a saxophone with no saxophone in sight. Scruton does not debase the phenomenal as Kant did.¹⁷ His phenomenology of music perception is an

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 86.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 78: 'a musical work consists of at least two structures. It is a compound or conjunction of a sound structure and a performing-means structure.'

¹⁶ Scruton (1997), *The Aesthetics of Music*, pp. 1–18.

¹⁷ In his insistence on the primacy of the formal structure of music over 'what pleases directly in the senses'. Kant, Immanuel (1987). *Critique of Judgement*. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, §2. Kant argued that such direct pleasure was personal and could not therefore lay claim to the universal validity that we attribute to beauty, and, more importantly, that it is based on the phenomenal, i.e. on that which does not allow for communication. We simply cannot communicate *what it is like* to have some such experience of phenomenality, let alone why we like it; all we *can* communicate are the formal relations between sounds or colours (§§39, 40 and 51). It is, however, hard to see how we could communicate relations between things that we cannot communicate. Alternatively, the argument merely rehearses Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities. See also van Gerwen, Rob (1999). 'Kant on What Pleases Directly in the Senses.' *Issues in Contemporary Culture and Aesthetics*, 9, pp. 71–83, and van Gerwen (1996), 'Intimation and Tertiary Qualities'.

improvement on any rigid prioritizing of the score over the sound of the music, and it should help us to fill in just how the performing means relate to the sound structure. But does it?

Scruton argues that the sounds in themselves, as incorporated in the musical structure, as much as how they are experienced, are what music is about (next to the music's structure), but he emptied out this experience, by arguing: 'we are not part of the world of sound as we are part of the visual world' (p. 13). This is supposed to be the case because sound is not in space as visual things are. '[The] world of sound contains events and processes only,' Scruton argues, 'and no persons or other substances. [...] The sound world [...] is metaphysically apart from us.' He then compares music to rainbows, arguing that neither takes up space: they are not in a particular place, even though, again according to Scruton, rainbows appear only when the viewer is in a particular place (with the sun behind his back, and so forth).¹⁸ That comparison is instructive, since it shows how the space of a sound is determined by the organizing powers of one's hearing, and differs from the space of the visible. But it is limited, I think.

Let us elaborate the comparison, and switch from rainbows to the shine on armour: its location depends on three places: the viewer's, the reflecting object's, the light's. Moving one's face displaces the shine. As David Hockney has argued, this accounts for the stiff manner in which it used to be painted.¹⁹ If we look at the reflection of the armour in a mirror this changes the view, but it isn't clear in exactly what sense it does: will it fix the shine? Yet, if one projects the view on the armour onto a plane, say in a camera obscura, or by a mirrored projection, this indeed fixes the shine: watching that projection, one can move about as much as one likes, but the shine will neatly stay in place. In fact, the original 'perceiver' – the lens or mirror that produces the projection – is in a fixed position, and we who view the projection are no longer the primary perceivers. With a projected view there is a clear causal chain between the light, the armour, the lens, the projection on the plane, and our perception of the projection – but our perception of the things projected is disembodied, does not depend on the placement of the body. We egocentrically perceive the plane with the projection on it (we can move around it), but our perception of the armour that is projected is non-egocentric.²⁰ For all we know, no real armour must be present in the world of vision for it to be visible.

¹⁸ Scruton (1997), *The Aesthetics of Music*, pp. 1–18.

¹⁹ Hockney, David (2002). 'The Visual Evidence.' In *Secret Knowledge: Rediscovering the Lost Techniques of the Old Masters* (pp. 18–200). London: Thames & Hudson, pp. 42–43.

²⁰ See Currie, Gregory (1998). 'The Aesthetics of Photography.' In *Image and Mind: Film, Philosophy, and Cognitive Science* (pp. 72–74). Cambridge and New York: Cambridge UP.

In a real-life, normal, direct confrontation with an object, proof of its reality is provided ultimately by the perceiver's sense of touch, not vision, but only in so far as it confirms whatever is synchronically provided for by any and all of the other senses. The relation of the perceiver to the *projected* reflection makes this very clear.²¹ Expanding on Scruton's own argument that technological means allow us to produce sounds without their normal causes, we could be seeing a hologram. Normally, shine and rainbows are linked to place, that is, the place of the beholder in respect of the place of the cause of the view, and so is music. Scruton's notion that the 'sound world [...] is metaphysically apart from us' (p. 13) applies to the visible world as well, just not to that of touch. Such 'philosophy gone on holiday' shows that metaphysics should be done on the basis of aesthetics, instead of the other way around.

What causes the shine or the rainbow to appear (the source of light) is not itself visible in them, not to an innocent eye ignorant of the refraction of light, yet it is integral to proper, thick, perception. Similarly, what caused music to sound is audible in the music. Singular sense perceptions require a certain cognitive stock, and these are acquired, not innate or automatic. But, first, that does not mean they derive from habits and are not about reality, nor, second, is this peculiar to hearing. All perceivable aspects of the world we have to learn to perceive as meaningful. Of course, sounds are not in space in quite the same way as vistas are, but Scruton misconceives the difference, by analyzing it in terms of causes and by attributing peculiarities to vision that belong to touch. It is evident that hearing the world, as much as seeing or touching it, but on a clearly different footing, helps one situate one's body, and, therefore, in the normative case, sounds could not *not* be in that same space where both its causes and its perceivers are. Sounds merely order the environment in ways different from tactile or visual aspects, and provide us with different information about it.

Scruton, however, uses his construal of sounds' spatiality to argue that the *origins* of sounds, the playing of instruments, events that *are* principally only visually accessible, are therefore irrelevant to our perceiving of music. That thesis is both wrong and aesthetically counterproductive.

V. STYLE IN PERFORMANCE

Let us now see where my ecology of perception takes us with regard to a few of the art forms, so as to allow a return to music in an informed manner. I start with

²¹ Aristotle was on the right track when declaring touch the primary sense organ of animals. Aristotle (2007). *De Anima: A Critical Commentary*. Roland Polansky (ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge UP. See also Freeland, Cynthia A. (1992). 'Aristotle on the Sense of Touch.' In Martha Nussbaum & Amélie Rorty (eds), *Essays on Aristotle's De Anima* (pp. 227–48). Oxford: Clarendon.

literature. It is evident how an author's physical manipulations are absent from a text he wrote – we don't see his fingers type the words – nor would that be very telling. We assume a similar absence of the painter from his painting – we don't actually see the painter make the moves that produce the stripes and dots of paint on the canvas. The distance between manipulations and work seems insurmountable. For all we know, an author may have rewritten a certain sentence before entering it into the resultant text, and the movements of a painter may have taken him more time than we need to take in their result. Yet, irrespective of this, we find ways to perceive an artist's individual style in his works, in poetry, prose, paintings, as well as music.²² Also, there is no necessity for the chronology in our perception of a painting, novel, or poem to track that of its production. With music, in contrast, the time it took the performer to produce the notes that we hear is the time it takes us to take them in.²³ With music we cannot but perceive the temporal reality of the performance.

In general, when we hear a sound we normally hear what causes it: the sound of water running from a tap sounds just like water running from a tap. The very concept of 'water running from a tap' contains that peculiar sound. The phenomenology of perception is intricately and reciprocally adjusted to the concepts we use in it. In contrast, persons who suffer from certain forms of autism, though perfectly capable of hearing, are nevertheless unable to hear sounds *as originating in certain events* – hence their dormant disorientation, especially in social contexts, where sounds are permeated by meanings originating in the persons who caused them. We do not normally hear the world in such disorienting ways. Nor should we be asked to, even where music is concerned. Normally, the spatio-temporal synchronicity of embodied perception allows for combinations of data of all our senses.²⁴

For a theory about the perception of music it is mandatory to include the bodily origins of the music's sounds, instead of making them unavailable to the listener, as Scruton does. It is clear that sound colour, pitch, and the attack and

²² See Wollheim, Richard (1993b). 'Pictorial Style: Two Views.' In *The Mind and its Depths* (pp. 171–84). Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard UP, for a generative notion of individual style.

²³ We abstract from temporal discontinuities or continuities produced in the studio by editing snippets of sounds. We are, now, discussing the nature of the snippets, what Scruton might have called 'ideal' music, music *qua* music. Sounds are as inherently pornographic as Scruton argues that photos are – see Scruton, Roger (1983). 'Photography and Representation.' In *The Aesthetic Understanding: Essays in the Philosophy of Art and Culture* (pp. 102–26). London and New York: Methuen, p. 126.

²⁴ Richard Wollheim thinks the limits of the visible can be stretched much further than I assume. Wollheim, Richard (2001). 'A Reply to the Contributors.' In Rob van Gerwen (ed.), *Richard Wollheim on the Art of Painting. Art as Representation and Expression* (pp. 241–63). Cambridge and New York: Cambridge UP, p. 224.

decay of tones, which depend on the very performance that causes the sounds, cannot be described in any conceivable notational system.²⁵ Yet, they are of the essence for a musical work's artistic success. If they are not heard as originating in bodily manipulations, music loses one important means of signification.²⁶ For instance, the sounds of a soprano saxophone differ from those of a tenor in that sopranos will normally produce a higher pitch than tenors. And that is not all. They also produce distinct types of attack and decay, because the keys of the instruments must be handled in different ways. The tenor player may need more *strength* in his fingers to move the keys, whereas the soprano player may need more *speed*. The respiration characteristics differ as well: the same tone requires more breath on a tenor sax than on a soprano saxophone. Saxophone players usually specialize in one such instrument. If they seem not to, they usually just *sound better* on one of the instruments they play, at the expense of the others. The material characteristics of each of these instruments calls for bodily characteristics on behalf of the instrumentalist.

To sum up: certain aspects of timing (attack and decay), or tones (specific expressive aspects), or sequences of tones sit better with one instrument than another, and certain instruments sit better with one player than another. Someone with sufficient listening experience can compare the tenor playing of Coleman Hawkins, Ben Webster, or John Coltrane, with the soprano playing of Eric Dolphy, Anthony Braxton, or Steve Lacy, and notice such differences and their relative aesthetic merits. Of course, physical limitations can be stretched – virtuosity has its own rewards – but that does not affect my thesis, which is that physical differences in the sounds' causes form part of the audible characteristics of those sounds. They can be *heard in* them. And they determine a work's success.

VI. PERFORMANCES' PSYCHOLOGICAL REALITY

The 'individual styles' of the aforementioned saxophone players form, in Wollheim's terminology, firstly, a prerequisite for our aesthetic interest, in that without it we cannot hope to fathom fully a piece of art.²⁷ Secondly, they form a prerequisite for artistic expression, and lastly, they have psychological reality.²⁸

²⁵ See Davies, Stephen (2002). 'Authenticity in Musical Performance.' In Alex Neill & Aaron Ridley (eds), *Arguing about Art. Contemporary Philosophical Debates* (pp. 57–68). London: Routledge, p. 66.

²⁶ Losing the very power to 'celebrate' what Kant calls 'the communicability of feeling'. Kant (1987 [1790]), *Critique of Judgement*, §40. See note 17.

²⁷ Kant's remarks on manner or method in the concluding section of his aesthetics prefigure Wollheim's notion of 'individual style'. Kant (1987 [1790]), *Critique of Judgement*, §60.

²⁸ Wollheim (1993b), 'Pictorial Style: Two Views', 175ff. See also Crowther, Paul (1991). 'Creativity and Originality in Art.' *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, 31 (4), pp. 301–9.

Assuming the audibility of musicians' playing established, Wollheim's third characteristic of individual style is particularly helpful: its psychological reality. An artist's individual style, if he has one, is one he will have formed, instead of having merely acquired it. If one wants to describe an individual style, one must have recourse to the art-historical and psychological factors which motivated the artist to develop it, assuming that specific considerations in the artist's mind correspond to specific interventions in the material of his choice, which result in specific traits in his works. To apply this model to music one has to make sure to start from the right distinctions. Since painting is autographic, the attribution of individual style can be based both on the products of the painter's acts of painting and on the considerations that led him there. To be explicit: the realized intentions of the artist's must be perceptually available in the work in which they are realized.

Whichever intentions are realized in music, they are realized in the audible result, and hence they are realized by the performers – it is they who sort out the means necessary for the composer's intentions to reach the audience. We cannot *directly* evaluate a composer's individual style, without feeding back from how the music sounds in specific performances, and without their taking artistic success as the standard. Alternatively, one might listen, taxonomically, to a performance *as an instance of* the score, neglecting the phenomenality of the instance, taking only structural intentions relating to harmony, rhythm, and melody into account.²⁹ These are highly abstract considerations, against which aesthetic, perceptual qualities of the performance would stand out as contingent, and irrelevant.

The individual style of the performer, in contrast, *will* be made up of *both* considerations as to how the piece is supposed to sound and physical actions which she deems proper to make it sound thus. The psychological reality and the individual style of sounding music are based in the performer's material manipulations. In contrast to score-compliance, the individual style of a performance *can* be forged. CD reproduction wards off from that.³⁰

Now what role is played by a performer within a musical work? Is she *represented* in the music? Or is the music the *expression* of her mental life? Or does she play yet another role in whatever is expressed or represented in the work? Let us take a small step backwards. How should we musically represent a cowbell? Turning its visual appearance cross-modally into music is not among

²⁹ Scruton (1997), *The Aesthetics of Music*, pp. 500–6.

³⁰ On CDs we reproduce unique performances of a work. Listeners do not merely listen to 'Bach's Goldberg Variations', but to either Glenn Gould's or Rosalyn Tureck's or whoever's 'performance of Bach's Goldberg Variations'.

the alternatives, so the easiest thing to do might be to take a cowbell and have it rung. But we would not, then, have represented a cowbell, but only *presented* an *instance* of the sound cowbells produce. There is no secured reduction of dimensions from the real world to such musical representation, as there is with depiction, which reduces three to two dimensions. This relative poverty of music's representational powers derives from the fact that the spatial and temporal dimensions of musical sounds equal those of real-life sound. Hence the tendency amongst philosophers not only to recognize music's incapacity to represent, but also, more generally, to understand music as a structure pertaining *between* sounds.

Our deeper interest in musical meaning must, however, lie in an aspect of music distinct from both structure and representation of a world disconnected from the music. We can understand how music's meaning is *in* its sounds, once we recognize how sounds are naturally meaningful in that they convey their causes. Musical meaning, I submit, is based in the characteristic of sound of betraying its cause; in the causal impact of a performer's psychology and her individual style. The rich phenomenology of our hearing will suggest the bodily origins of the sounds, thus introducing us to an implied performer: someone who listens to the tones and actively engages with them.

This real psychology informs the listener's feeling for the musical persona, the organizing principle of musical expression. In, for instance, Albert Ayler's rendition of Gershwin's 'Summertime', already in the first two bars we can hear how the performer's presence in the sound structure enlivens the expression and provides it with a soul of its own.³¹ Ayler keeps returning to themes and sequences of notes from the tune of 'Summertime', 'commenting' on them in a coherently expressive way. It is such presence that distinguishes great jazz performers from minor ones, not their alleged virtuosity.

Especially in jazz improvisation, the music cannot do without the presence of the performer in the sounds. This is not just a popular music thing. John Cage's aleatory music leaves most responsibility for the intentional structure of 'his' music to its performers,³² and the quest for authenticity in the performance of Baroque music is a further instance of the recognition of the performance's aesthetic primacy over the score.

We cannot normally make sense of the differences between two performances of one work by looking at its notation. What is different between them will pertain to timing and timbre, to how the piece sounds, and how, in this sound, they connect with their (implied) performers.

³¹ Ayler, Albert (1963). *Summertime*. On *My Name is Albert Ayler*. BLCD760211: Black Lion.

³² See Tormey, Alan (1974). 'Indeterminacy and Identity in Art.' *Monist*, 58, pp. 205–15.

VII. THE PERFORMER'S PERSONA

The reciprocity between listeners' hearing and audible performers' expression goes a long way to meeting the *immediacy-requirement* that Levinson thinks is one of the desiderata that an acceptable analysis of musical expressiveness must meet.³³ Another one of Levinson's requirements – that '[musical] expressiveness should be seen as parallel or closely analogous to expression in its most literal sense'³⁴ – seems, however, to be incomplete as it stands. We should add a *non-reciprocity-requirement*. In contrast to a full understanding of natural expression, which, because the expression is a symptom of, rather than a vehicle for, the expressed, presupposes the presence of the expressed to its perceiver, musical expressiveness presupposes its absence. Musical expressiveness must therefore derive its mental aspect from persons outside the music. This qualifies Levinson's *externality requirement* which says that musical expressiveness should be seen to belong to the music, 'not to the listener or performer or composer'.³⁵ I agree with the externality requirement: the expression must be out there, in the music, yet it must have psychological reality, and this is brought to the music by the people involved.

I insist on introducing a neglected aspect of expression: a work of art generally is fabricated, and therefore has no mind of its own. This must somehow be compensated for if the mental life it expresses is to be conveyed as real or *authentic*. Our merely inferential recognition of a persona's mental life will have to be amplified by intimated empathy if it is to form the response to a successful expression.³⁶ Actors on a stage will effect such amplification by applying certain acting techniques to the movements of their bodies, but the personae involved in musical expression are hardly as person-like as the characters in a play. It is unclear how their noncorporeality (the literal absence to the perceiver of the mental life expressed) must be compensated for in music. How is it that listeners construe musical personae?³⁷ Musical personae do not act in ways comparable to a play's characters: they do not perceive as people do, nor do they move their bodies while perceiving – even though they are supposed to feel things, and in human ways too. I argued, in Section VI, that the reality or authenticity of their psychology is introduced in the music by the performers' manipulations.

³³ Levinson (1996), 'Musical Expressiveness', pp. 91–92.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ See note 12.

³⁷ Unnecessarily, this question is turned into a criticism by Davies. See Davies, Stephen (1997). 'Contra the Hypothetical Persona in Music.' In Mette Hjort & Sue Laver (eds), *Emotion and the Arts* (pp. 95–109). Oxford: Oxford UP. Davies assumes that musical personae are full-fledged person-like things, whereas all they need to be is a set of mental events organized amongst themselves in ways we know of real-life people.

Levinson pertinently refuses to understand musical expressiveness as the expression of the mental life of the composer or the performer.³⁸ Instead, he sees musical expressiveness as the *sui generis*, that is, musical, expression of an indefinite agent in the music. I am in agreement with most of this, except that the mental lives of the composer and the performer do enter the work and its expression when not through a resemblance to the natural expression that we are acquainted with in real-life persons. *The composer* will be the one who has constituted the intentional structure that we hear the musical work as possessing, and it is *the performer* who inflects the musical product through his handling of the instrument. These contributions have psychological reality.

Levinson is also right in insisting that, although artistic expression may be the result of *conscious* activity on behalf of the artist, it need not be. However, again, this does not exclude the importance of the physical handling of the material, or, if it was meant to exclude this, it would assume a dualism of mind and body that seems to me difficult to uphold, particularly in the context of art practice. Lastly, I also agree with Levinson's idea that expression '*sounds the way a person experiencing and externalizing emotions is*'.³⁹ Yet, often enough the reason for this correspondence is that both externalizing emotions and making music presuppose a human body and a certain *psychological coherence* in that body's movements.⁴⁰ Performers provide personae with real psychology, which is one major reason we should evaluate performances in their own right, much as, by the way, music enthusiasts are already in the habit of doing.⁴¹

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³⁸ The third pre-theoretical desideratum for an acceptable account of musical expressiveness, Levinson (1996), 'Musical Expressiveness', p. 91.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

⁴⁰ Recall the persona-like coherence in Ayler's rendition of 'Summertime'. See note 31.

⁴¹ I am grateful to Jerrold Levinson for his comments and to my aesthetics students and the audience of the conference 'The Kantian Turn', at the Jan van Eyck Academie, Maastricht, especially Bas Hagemeyer and Edward Winters, and, lastly, students at the Royal Conservatory in The Hague.

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