# Acts of thought

# Philip Cam

School of Humanities and Languages, University of New South Wales p.cam@unsw.edu.au

#### Abstract

While the Community of Inquiry centres on a form of discussion that is meant to improve the ability of students to think, only a fraction of the thinking that occurs in a discussion makes its appearance in speech. We therefore need to consider students' mental acts in addition to their speech acts to understand how the Community of Inquiry is meant to function. This paper explores the connections between speech acts and mental acts in the Community of Inquiry and the broader classifications of these acts of thought. It also considers the role of teacherly interventions in promoting appropriate acts of thought and the ways in which teachers can improve students' metacognitive awareness of them.

## **Key words**

Community of Inquiry, mental acts, metacognition, speech acts, teacherly interventions

The classroom Community of Inquiry centres on a form of discussion that is meant to improve the ability of students to think—meaning such things as to problematise, question, hypothesise, conceptualise, infer, and evaluate. Although the focus is on thinking, only a fraction of it makes an appearance in the speech acts that occur in the discussion. After all, in any well-run discussion, only one person speaks at a time, and yet all the students are meant to be thinking. Even when a student speaks, what they put into words is going to be but an extract of their thoughts. So, we need to consider students' mental acts in addition to their speech acts to understand how the Community of Inquiry is meant to function.

Let me do some groundwork. In the Community of Inquiry, we both think to ourselves and express our thoughts in speech. In doing so, we engage in mental acts and speech acts. In the briefest terms, mental acts are the process by which we generate our thoughts, while speech acts are a means of communicating them. <sup>1</sup>To say that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The distinction between mental acts and speech acts is presented here as a purely functional one. Talk about speech acts stems from the work of John Austin. See 'Performative Utterances' in JO Urmson and GJ Warnock (1961) and Austin (1962). A performative utterance is a speech act that

mental acts have a generative function is not to deny that thoughts can be shaped in the process of giving voice to them. Rather, it is to point to the fact that such shaping depends on mental activity. Nor is it to ignore the central role played by the speech of others in shaping our thoughts. It is simply to acknowledge that what others say will have no such effect unless it influences our mental activity.

I will use the term 'acts of thought' to cover both mental acts and speech acts. The act of conveying a thought in speech is an act of thought every bit as much as formulating one that is unspoken. I acknowledge that this talk of acts may seem artificial. Thinking is a complex activity. While I am thinking about what you are saying, momentary intuitions, half-formed suggestions, and other fragments, may come to mind, for example. Then, while I am responding to you, I may have second thoughts and begin to falter, perhaps because I am troubled by the look on your face, or by growing concern as to whether I am on the right track. Having acknowledged this, we can still discern the underlying acts of thought in all this clutter, if we take the trouble to analyse it.

That it is useful to identify acts of thought for pedagogical purposes I take to be obvious. In the educational context of the Community of Inquiry, we also need to pay particular attention to the interplay of acts of thought. This includes the kinds of mental acts that underlie its speech acts, their relationship to those speech acts, and the ways in which ensembles of mental acts and speech acts operate in discussion.

Let me illustrate this with a couple of examples. Let's imagine that Rena is troubled by an assertion that Robert has just made, because it occurs to her that it is inconsistent with something he maintained earlier. This depends on a logical observation, such as seeing that, if one statement is true, then the other is not. We may assume that Rena has performed some such mental act. It may lead her to contest what Robert has said, by pointing out the inconsistency. That's a speech act. Again, Chloe may have formed an opinion about something, only to be confronted by classmates who express a contrary one. This may bring her to question her own view of the matter. That is a mental act. As a result, she may ask them to explain why they think as they do. Asking a question is a speech act.

brings something about, such as having made a promise by saying that I promise, or having offered you my congratulations by saying that I congratulate you. More generally, speech acts include all the actions that we perform by saying things, such as stating, questioning, agreeing, explaining, and so on.

Along with speech acts and mental acts, it will also be useful to include reference to mental states. Holding a belief or an opinion, and being puzzled or confused, are mental states, just as considering an opinion, or thinking about why one is puzzled, are mental acts. Although they are not our focus here, mental states are implicated in the act of thinking about things. Thinking about why I doubt something, for instance, involves the act of searching for reasons as to why I am in a state of doubt. Similarly, I may act to address my state of confusion by retracing my steps and carefully rethinking the whole thing through.

As with mental acts, mental states can lead to speech acts and vice versa. Someone's doubt about another's claim may lead them to contest it, just as the other's belief in it led them to assert it. You may request an explanation because you are puzzled, but the response you receive may drive you into a state of total confusion.

## Connecting speech acts with mental acts

When we engage in speech acts, we use our utterances to do things. If I say that Aristotle was a better philosopher than Plato, then I am making an assertion. If I add that by 'better' I mean more systematic, then I am offering a clarification by defining my terms. Asserting and clarifying are the things done through these speech acts. Here is a list of some of the kinds of speech acts associated with the Community of Inquiry:

Suggesting Comparing
Asserting Distinguishing
Agreeing Explaining
Disagreeing Inferring
Questioning Arguing
Justifying Concluding

Clarifying

Speech acts of these kinds relate to underlying mental acts in ways that qualify them. Someone may make a suggestion after mulling it over, for instance, or they might do so impulsively. They might use the same form of words,<sup>2</sup> but the presence or absence of such underlying acts makes the difference between a considered suggestion and a spontaneous one. It modifies the way in which the speech act is to be characterised.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> They also very well may not. Speech acts tend to vary in language choice depending on the mental acts that underlie them.

While spontaneous responses have a place in the Community of Inquiry, we generally want its speech acts to be characterised in other ways. We are looking for considered suggestions, ones to which the student has given some thought. We value insightful questions, ones that allow us to probe a problem or issue more deeply. We appreciate careful distinctions with their attention to detail. We applaud measured arguments that pay attention to the relative import of the contending factors. We want students to come to justified conclusions that are reached through a proper consideration of the case. That students' contributions are considered, insightful, careful, measured, justified—these are indicators of the kinds of speech acts to be encouraged in the Community of Inquiry. To facilitate speech acts of that calibre, it is obvious that we need to attend to the underlying mental acts that result in them.

Speech acts with these kinds of characteristics not only bear the mark of the thought that underlies them. They help to stimulate that kind of thought in others. Attending to a classmate's carefully made distinction, for example, presents the opportunity to consider the matter more carefully. To follow the presentation of a measured argument is to be brought to weigh up the matter yourself. In encouraging scrutiny of what is being said, acts of these kinds also invite further thoughts and replies, engendering the kind of dialogue that lies at the heart of the Community of Inquiry.

#### The motivational role of mental states

As John Dewey (1910/1991) notes, inquiry begins with a felt difficulty, such as puzzlement or doubt. The Community of Inquiry uses such states to motivate students. When one student is puzzled by what another says, or is left in doubt as to what to think, it motivates them to respond. To be puzzled is to be in a state that we seek to resolve. The same is true when one student hears another express an opinion that they don't share. It creates a feeling of conflict that calls for attention.

What psychological states motivate us to do varies with the context. Feelings of conflict, perplexity, and doubt about what other people say, are all too often a recipe for discord. In the Community of Inquiry, however, they help to stimulate the kinds of mental activity and speech acts that I have outlined. So, instead of differences of opinion being a source of conflict, they motivate thoughtful engagement. Through the examination of one another's opinions in the Community of Inquiry, students come to think more carefully about opinions with which they may not agree and learn to be more reasonable in the face of disagreement. In tandem with this, they become more prepared to examine their own views and modify them on the basis of reason and evidence.

It is worth adding that, in general terms, progress in the Community of Inquiry involves a movement from one state to another—from ignorance to knowledge and from incomprehension to understanding. While this advance may be partial and piecemeal, in leading students from one kind of state to the other, the whole ensemble of mental acts and speech acts incorporated in the Community of Inquiry is a model of that transformative process known as education.

## Some broader classifications of acts of thought

Earlier, I listed some of the kinds of speech acts that occur in the Community of Inquiry—such things as agreeing, suggesting, questioning, clarifying, and inferring. These acts of thought fall into broader categories that form modes of thought. Let us take a brief look at some of them.

The assertoric mode: This includes making an assertion and such things as stating one's agreement or disagreement with some proposition or statement. Expressions of agreement and disagreement are a familiar ingredient of discussion in the Community of Inquiry. Expressions of disagreement are particularly important and are to be encouraged rather than avoided. They signpost matters that need to be discussed in the hope of coming to agreement by inquiring into them. Agreement is not always to be expected, of course, but there is all the world of difference between reasoned disagreement and merely controverting one another.

The speculative mode: This includes such acts as suggesting, hypothesising, and imagining. In the Community of Inquiry, it is important to distinguish between asserting something and suggesting it. To make an assertion is to stake a claim, whereas to suggest something is to put it forward for consideration, as something worth thinking about. Suggestions are therefore of a piece with the inquiry process and something to encourage. In speaking of the speculative mode of thought, I want to particularly draw attention to acts of the imagination. The student who introduces their contribution with phases such as 'Just suppose ...' or 'Imagine that ...', for example, is using their imagination to construct a circumstance or scenario that may be instructive. Thought experiments, as they are called, have a role to play in both philosophical and scientific inquiry, and should be nurtured.

The interrogative mode: Broadly speaking, inquiry is thought in its interrogative mode. To inquire into something is to interrogate it to obtain answers by appropriate means. More narrowly, we come down to the speech act of asking a question. To probe around and alight on a question that needs to be addressed lies at the core of thought

in its interrogative mode. In the Community of Inquiry, asking questions is the standard means of forming an agenda for discussion. Supporting these speech acts are all those mental acts in which students cast their minds over the subject matter in search of problematic aspects of it. This includes looking for things about which they are not clear, that puzzle them, need explanation, conflict with their opinions, or otherwise contrary to what they think they know. Asking appropriate questions is also a recurrent means of clearing up matters as the inquiry progresses, as just about anything that is said may raise questions in the minds of participants.

The analytic mode: The analytic mode of thought and speech includes such acts as clarifying, comparing, distinguishing, and defining. What students say may be vague, ambiguous, or not understood by members of the class. That is likely to result in mental states and acts that play back into the discussion. It may cause confusion and consequent requests for clarification, or it may produce a misunderstanding that becomes apparent in students' responses. Again, an idea expressed rather vaguely may set students thinking about how they may better define it. An ambiguous statement may bring students to think of cases that should be distinguished. When the relevance of some point seems obscure, students may search around for comparisons to throw light on the matter.

The logical mode: Here we find elementary acts of giving a reason or making an inference all the way up to building a case for some claim by sorting out the evidence and engaging in complex arguments. It should be noted that inference and logical justification are counterparts of one another. Inference involves a movement in thought from a proposition to what is supposed to follow from it, whereas justification moves from a claim to reasons given in support of it. Our education system tends to be too much focussed on conveying information and pays too little attention to what it implies. When we don't treat students as inference-makers, we can hardly complain if they fail to think about what is taught. Fortunately, we are better at encouraging reason-giving, but we need to develop proficiency in both reason-giving and inference-making, as well as the ability to move freely between inference and justification, given the logical relationship between the two. With its roots in philosophy, and logic in particular, the Community of Inquiry provides a much-needed means of developing these capacities through an emphasis on mental acts and speech acts in the logical mode.

### **Teacherly interventions**

Using discussion in the Community of Inquiry to develop students' abilities to think in these ways, requires teachers to intervene at certain points. The art of intervention turns on two things: (1) knowing what acts of thought need to be performed to progress the discussion, and (2) being aware of what acts are occurring and how well they are being carried out. The first of these requirements depends, in turn, on the teacher's familiarity with the tools and procedures of inquiry and their knowledge of the subject matter in relation to the discussion as the inquiry proceeds. The second rests on paying careful attention to the speech acts occurring in discussion and making judgments about the mental acts that lie behind them. It is the latter of these two requirements that calls for attention here.

This requirement does not present as difficult a task as it may at first appear. After all, we often try to discern what people are thinking to judge what they are saying. We may ask ourselves what they are implying, or whether they know something that we don't know. We may wonder how they came to their opinion, or what has motivated them to express it. We may also wonder whether they have really thought about what they said and whether it would be worth going into the matter with them. In these and other familiar ways, the situation facing the teacher is not so different.

To explore this further, let us consider a couple of opportunities for teacherly interventions in the Community of Inquiry, first with older and then with younger students. Suppose that in a discussion of what it means to act freely, we have the following brief exchange:

Kiara: To be free to do something is to be able to do what you want.

*Jesse:* You can't do just whatever you want, Kiara. That's not what it means to be free.

We will imagine this exchange is followed by a silence in which the teacher can see that no one else is ready to speak. Various teacherly interventions are possible at this point, but first let us think about these speech acts. Kiara begins by offering us a definition. In reply, Jesse expresses disagreement with what Kiara has said. While these are the kinds of speech acts that we are looking for, we need to examine them more closely.

Notice that Kiara's definition has to do with two senses of ability in relation to desire. To be free to do something, you must have the ability required to do what you want to do, as well as being able to do it in the sense that there is nothing preventing you

from exercising your ability. It takes careful thought to work that out. Even if the teacher has taken note of this, it would be a brave assumption to suppose that the students have done so. It would be well worth spending some time on explicating these conditions in Kiara's proposal and careful teacher interventions will be needed to assist the class to tease them out.

How are we to interpret Jesse's response? We might see her as objecting to Kiara's definition because it conflates freedom with license. To trample all over other people in the pursuit of your own desires, for example, is to be reckless and lack self-control, rather than to express your autonomy. In simpler terms, when she says that you can't do just whatever you want, she means that it is not acceptable to do so; and it would be wrong to think that's what freedom involves. If necessary, the teacher might check with Jesse to be sure that's what she had in mind.

How might Kiara or others reply? Well, it might be said that Kiara never suggested that we should be free to do whatever we like. She was only saying what it was to act freely, not suggesting that people should be able to do whatever they want without restraint. It is entirely possible that no one will think of this. If it doesn't come up in discussion, then the teacher might explore it with Kiara and the class.

Enough has been said to show that this snippet of exchange between Kiara and Jesse would repay careful attention. It provides an example of the general rule in the Community of Inquiry that, rather than racing along, or simply moving on, we need to slow down and reflect. Helping students to identify speech acts and analyse what was said, checking to see whether the interpretation being put upon a student's words is what they had in mind, and putting suggestions to students where necessary—these are among the interventions that teachers can use to ensure that students learn to think carefully about the matters they discuss. It doesn't presuppose that the teacher has thought it all out in advance, of course, but only that they have a fair idea of how to work with the students in these ways.

Here is a second case to help us think about teacherly interventions, this time beginning with the teacher setting up an issue for discussion by asking a question:

*Teacher:* We began by agreeing that the wild things were creatures in Max's dream. Why do you suppose that he dreamt about them?<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The sample of discussion refers to the classic picture book by Maurice Sendak (1970).

Oliver: I think it was because he had been behaving like a wild thing.

*Mia*: I agree with Oliver. He hammered a nail into the wall and chased the dog with a fork.

*Noah:* Yes, and his mother called him a wild thing.

Here we have the expected kinds of speech acts: giving an explanation, expressing agreement, and providing evidence. A 'hands up' at this point would probably reveal general agreement with what these students have said, based as it is on what happened in the story before Max was sent to bed without any supper. Beyond that, of course, are other considerations that might come up were the discussion to turn to deeper questions about the dream.


How might the teacher assist the class to go there? The most obvious way is for the teacher to ask further questions about Max's dream. After all, if we are going to engage in the interpretation of dreams, then we need to have examined them for clues. Here are some questions that might help:

- 1. When Max came to where the wild things are, why might he have wanted to be in control?
- 2. As King of all the wild things, Max ordered there to be a wild rumpus. Why might he have done that?
- 3. After Max sent the wild things off to bed without their supper, he felt lonely and wanted to be where someone loved him best of all. Why might he have felt that way?
- 4. The wild things wanted to eat Max up, they loved him so. How might the love of the wild things be different from the love that Max receives from his mother?
- 5. Do you think that Max's dream had some deeper meaning? If so, what might it be?

This is the familiar device of a discussion plan. Together with the initial question that started this discussion, it provides a means of orchestrating all the mental acts and speech acts involved. Notice that the questions move between seeking possible explanations, making distinctions, and thinking about the meaning or significance of things. While all manner of mental and speech acts might find their way into just about any part of the proceedings, the questions obviously vary in their response

demands. As the class makes their way through them, the teacher's interventions should reflect that fact.

Consider the kinds of thought processes and teacherly interventions involved in searching for explanations, for example. It includes imagining possibilities and developing them into a range of alternatives to consider. Thus, Max might have wanted to take control of the wild things because he felt threatened by them, say, or because then he could bring on as much wild rumpus as he desired, or (to go a little deeper) because at some level he felt the need to gain control of his own wild impulses. This has the following structure:



Teacher interventions are likely to involve asking students whether they can imagine any other possibilities, and ensuring that students come to evaluate their respective plausibility through an examination of reasons and evidence. Notice that, while we begin by generating alternative possibilities, the strategy soon becomes eliminative, discarding the less plausible explanations along the way.

The above procedure is unlike that involved in, say, making distinctions. We might bring two things to mind and note their differences, for instance, as in the love of the wild things for Max and his mother's love for him. That kind of activity may be represented like this:

 Differences	
D1	
D2	
D3	

Here the strategy is cumulative, and the teacher's main task is to encourage students to keep exploring differences and adding them to the list.

Beyond this, the teacher can encourage students to make the right kinds of moves in their thinking by using other familiar strategies. We might make special mention here of the use of further questions. Take the case of trying to come up with an explanation for Max's desire to be in control, for example. It involves projecting our understanding of human motivation onto what we know about Max and his situation. The natural starting-point for this is to imagine ourselves in his position. The teacher might prompt this by asking: 'If you were Max, why do you think that you might want to be able to control the wild things?' Similarly, in the comparison of the love of wild things with that of Max's mother, the teacher might ask: 'How did the wild things express their love for Max?' and 'In what ways did Max's mother show that she loved him?'

In addition to planning for a lesson that focuses on acts of thought, and being ready for interventions in that direction, there is a great deal of value in engaging students in exercises and activities that target specific kinds of acts of thought outside of class discussion. Doing so increases students' familiarity with them while developing proficiency through practice. They may be exercises to be completed individually or designed for pairs or small groups. Here is an illustration that exercises judgment of logical consistency.

#### Odd One Out4

Below you will find groups of three statements. Together with your partner, you need to decide which one of the three does not agree with the other two. Don't worry about whether you agree with the statements or not. Your task is to decide which statement is the odd one out.

Some boys have wild imaginations. No boys have wild imaginations. Max is a boy with a wild imagination.

All dreams make you unhappy. Some dreams make you happy. Max's dream made him happy.

No monsters are friendly.
All monsters are friendly.
Max's monsters are friendly.

Some monsters are not dangerous. All monsters are dangerous.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Adapted from Cam et al. (2007).

Max's monsters are not dangerous.

Max's monsters have large teeth.

No monsters have large teeth.

All monsters have large teeth.

# Acts of thought and metacognition

I have so far said nothing explicitly about the thinker's awareness of acts of thought in the Community of Inquiry. While speaking generally involves some level of awareness of the thoughts that we are trying to express, and listening requires us to pay attention to the thoughts being expressed by others, students need to raise the level of cognitive surveillance of the acts of thought being employed when they engage in the Community of Inquiry. They need to be aware of the moves being made as well as mindful of ones that might help them to make progress as the discussion proceeds. To pay this level of attention to acts of thought involves what educationalists know as metacognition.

Students can be taught to acknowledge the moves being made by prefacing or otherwise tagging their speech acts with an introductory statement. Here are some examples:

I have a suggestion.

I agree with Oliver.

I have a question.

I reckon that I can explain it.

Here is our argument for that.

The same applies when the teacher or students request these things. Here is a rerun of the same examples in that context:

*Teacher:* Who would like to make a suggestion?

Oliver: Do you agree with me?

*Teacher:* What questions could we ask about that?

*Jesse:* Does anyone have a different explanation?

*Teacher:* Which group would like to present their argument first?

Teachers can also help students to keep their minds on the main moves made in a discussion by mapping them on the board. Among other things, this means having the question up, briefly noting suggestions and the reasons given for and against, as well as keeping track of attempts at conceptual exploration, and setting out significant arguments with their conclusions. Discussion mapping is also good practice for other reasons. It helps the class to stay on track and provides a record of the work they have done. In addition to that, however, tracking acts of thought in this way is an aid to metacognition. It helps to ensure that students keep an eye on the moves they make in thinking about their subject matter.

In a late essay entitled 'Thinking as self-teaching', Gilbert Ryle (1972) suggested that when someone is trying to think something out for themselves, they are 'trying out on [themselves] expedients, routines, procedures, exercises, curbs, and dodges of types that teachers do employ, not always successfully, when they want to teach things that they know to pupils who do not' (pp. 118-119). This insight provides a useful reminder that, in drawing attention to the acts of thought that constitute the moves in an inquiry-based discussion, teachers are making their students familiar with its procedures and manoeuvres, which students can then begin to try out on themselves, metacognitively incorporating their own inner teacher.

#### Summary

The Community of Inquiry involves the orchestration of acts of thought. This includes not only the speech acts through which students express their thoughts, but also the mental acts that underlie them. What is said is but the tip of the iceberg of thought, and teachers need to be particularly mindful of this in conducting discussion. Nothing more is needed to underscore its importance than to acknowledge that the quality of speech acts depends on the character of the mental acts from which they result.

To think about thinking in terms of acts of thought is to pay attention to what students are doing, or attempting to do, when they think, and for teachers to support and encourage appropriate acts of thought through their interventions. When, for example, students identify a problem, make a distinction, or draw an inference, the teacher should be cognisant of the fact. When, by contrast, students' contributions do not appear to be supported by the kinds of mental acts that we are trying to encourage, because they ignore problems, are vague or ambiguous, or stand in need of justification, then the teacher should be on the alert and ready to intervene.

We can bring further order to these acts of thought by classifying them under their various modes. There is a question-mark hanging over the matters into which we inquire, so that the interrogative mode of thought plays a leading role. For this, teachers need to present subject matter in a way that stimulates students' curiosity. To be curious about something is to be in a mental state that naturally leads us to ask questions and probe around—and so, to inquire. Questions require answers, of course, but in inquiry they begin as suggestions or hypotheses, whether informed by a survey of the evidence to hand, or conjured up in the imagination. This is thought in its speculative mode. That is not to deny the role of assertion in inquiry, as in stating the facts or expressing an opinion, which is thought in its assertoric mode. As with suggestions, however, such claims and declarations are not exempt from challenge by appeal to evidence, reason and analysis. They need to be properly understood and evaluated. In doing so, we encounter thought in its analytic and logical modes, as when we attend to such things as clarification and the examination of ideas, on the one hand, and justification and inference, on the other.

Nothing could be more important in conducting discussion than knowing when and how to intervene. Here we have put this in terms of seeing students' contributions as speech acts, and whether they give evidence of the kinds of mental acts that an appropriate level of inquiry demands in a particular educational context. The leading move here is the well-placed question, one that helps uncover the thought behind the question, or encourages students to examine a contribution by engaging in the requisite acts of thought. This does not exclude teachers from also making suggestions for students to consider, but it should be done sparingly and never in such a way as to undercut or replace the requirement on students to engage in thought in its speculative mode.

Being prepared to intervene during discussion is one thing. Preparing the ground for such acts of thought in advance is another. As in all lessons, preparation is the mainstay of success for those that involve inquiry. I particularly mentioned the lesson plan as a set of questions that provide a scaffold for inquiry and help to set the task-demands that belong to is various phases. It provides a way of focussing on a topic, issue, or problem, while opening it up for inquiry. A well-constructed sequence of questions can provide staging-posts along the route of inquiry and keep the lesson on track. Such questions can be designed to facilitate all sorts of assertoric, speculative, interrogative, analytic, and logical acts of thought that make the task of teacher intervention during discussion more focussed and manageable. They are only one

adjunct at the disposal of the teacher, of course, but one that will certainly repay the effort involved in their construction.

I should also reinforce the point of introducing exercises outside of general discussion that target particular kinds of acts of thought. Whether it be formulating questions, making distinctions, identifying criteria, drawing inferences, or any other acts of thought associated with the Community of Inquiry, students will gain greater familiarity with them and strengthen their use by that means. Such exercises are like practice sessions in sport or in learning to play a musical instrument. You need to spend time shooting at the hoop, if you are going to be any good at basketball, just as you will need to practice your scales, if you are going to progress at the piano. The same applies here.

Finally, we come to metacognition. A handy way of thinking about metacognition in connection with acts of thought in the Community of Inquiry is by analogy with learning to use the tools of a trade. To be apprenticed to a trade involves getting to know its tools and how to use them to do the job. This means knowing what a tool does and recognising when it is needed, as well as becoming proficient in its use. When it comes to the Community of Inquiry, we are looking at an array of generalpurpose thinking tools. Rather than physical action upon concrete materials, we use these tools to inquire into problems and issues through acts of thought. In learning to do this work, students are apprentices. They need to be instructed in the use of their tools and made constantly mindful of what they are doing when using them to deal with subject matter. As their proficiency develops, there will be less need for this level of intervention and more reliance upon their own cognitive surveillance. Operations painstakingly undertaken by a beginner, and consciously attended to as their skills develop, will become all but automatic with expertise. Insofar as they are dealing with the apprenticeship phase, however, teachers need to see to it that students are ever mindful of their acts of thought.

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