

Suffering has no answer, only questions. Everything depends, as the neo-Kantians said, on the way ^{we} phrase the question. The challenge to God of suffering must be properly wielded.

There is a reverse attitude: the challenge is flung at God, as it were: Abraham, ^{אברהם} . Rabbis on ^{רבנים} say: ^{אין} An insult, a scandal and blasphemy -- that was all right for a Moses, or an Abraham or a Berditchever -- or the victims of the Holocaust themselves. But the problem is that all the by-standers, and those who were born after the Holocaust, also ask such questions. There is an element of self-righteousness about the person who, living in an economy of affluence, and never pious, asks, how can I believe in God after Auschwitz? There is something simply phony about the attitude. I remain unimpressed by the obese, cigar-chumping philosopher who excuses all his failings by blaming God for suffering of the Holocaust. Too much of what is written in our contemporary literature, and that passes on the lecture podium, is no more than preposterous posturing. W

אמר הקב"ה, כבינתי ושרה האמת ואלהי ישרא'ל,
והאבות לישראל אלהי. לשבת אלהי, אלהי חלום חלום
גדול, ואקב"ה למה ה' יחיה אמן ברוך.

So, one question without the other is invalid. To challenge and blame only man and the victim is insensitive; only God is -- arrogant and silly.

When we combine both questions, as Moses did, then we are asking the great question from the point of proper balance.