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DOES GOD NEED OUR LOVE?

A Paradigm in the Conflict between

the Philosophers and *Amkha*

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In the view of the classical Jewish philosophers of the Middle Ages, based on much earlier sources, actions predicated of God are not to be taken literally; they are metaphors of one sort or another. Thus the conception of God is kept pure and unsullied by any intimations of divine corporeality or emotion, both indicating want or lack or need and, hence, imperfection.

But while this effort is intellectually satisfying, "ordinary" Jews--*amkha* is the Hebrew-Yiddish name for them--in their quotidian religious conduct and spiritual experience, have operated on different premises. Prayer, for instance, struggles for meaning in the context of the philosophers; it resonates comfortably with a more literal appreciation of a Deity who, while incorporeal, feels and reacts and experiences a range of emotions usually descriptive of human beings. The result is a classical conflict between the head and the heart: the intellect applauding a purified understanding of a Deity who is ontologically perfect and hence infinitely remote, and the heart yearning for a God who can experience pain and love and therefore sympathize and identify with the worshiper.

Of all the various elements of religious experience, one that lends itself most to an analysis of this clash between an ontological-metaphorical and a more literal interpretation is that of the love of God, and this special case may serve as representative of or a paradigm for all other such emotions predicated of God.

It is a truism that the love of God plays a central role in Judaism--in Halakha,¹ in the writings of the Jewish philosophers,² and in Jewish religious consciousness.³ The biblical source, which serves as an integral part of the Shema which is to be recited twice daily throughout the year, is quite explicit: "thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy might" (Deut. 6:5).

But beyond all the sophisticated legal and philosophical treatments of the theme, a nagging question often lurks in embarrassment in the darker recesses of the consciousness of the religious individual, afraid to expose itself to the glare of analysis: if indeed He commands us to love Him, does not that in some way betray a *need* in Him to be loved? And does that not imply some lack, some vulnerability or imperfection, in Him? And does not that, in turn, run counter to the whole of the Jewish tradition that God is perfect, absolute, totally autonomous, and in need of nothing or no one?

Indeed, in ancient days and in the medieval period, there was a tendency to take the words of the Torah literally. The result of this literalism or "fundamentalism" was that many pious Jews violated some of the most fundamental precepts and concepts in Judaism, such as the incorporeality of God.

In the early Tannaitic period, reacting against this widespread tendency, the proselyte Onkelos, in his classical translation of the Torah into Aramaic, eliminated each and every anthro-

pomorphism and anthropopathism by reinterpreting them. In the medieval period, Maimonides fulminated against such base literalism and dedicated a good part of the first third of the *Guide of the Perplexed* to a further reinterpretation of such terms. They were used in the Torah, he wrote, because *dibbrah Torah bi'leshon benei adam*, the Torah spoke in the language of humans, i.e., the Torah teaches great religious and philosophical ideas but expresses them metaphorically, in human language, which must not, therefore, be taken literally.

The goal of both Onkelos and Maimonides was to purify the Jewish faith from crass and unsophisticated literalisms which tended to result in the attribution of corporeality or imperfection to God. Any assumption that He possesses bodily form, or experiences human needs or wants, is pagan and must be ruthlessly banished.

Now, while any talk of a mutuality of "dependency" in the divine-human encounter undoubtedly would sound heretical and sacrilegious to the ears of as confirmed a rationalist as Maimonides, who would consider this an illegitimate anthropopathism, that would not be the case for those less committed to a rigorous rationalism, including those who subscribe to the view that no anthropomorphisms or anthropopathisms should be taken at face value. But that does not necessarily imply that they are "mere" metaphors or "only" poetic figures of speech that substitute for ideas that are too arcane or essences that are ineffable. There is a middle ground between a severely literal reading of the

divine attributes and a totally metaphoric understanding of these biblical terms, one that suggests a reality that is not literal and is yet more than a metaphor.

Hence, in addressing the divine commandment to love Him, we must establish that the question we posed is not that simple, certainly not simplistic, and that there are indeed grounds in the Jewish tradition both to suggest and to reject the existence of divine "needs" in some fashion. For the purposes of our argument, let us dispense with any credibility for anthropomorphisms, and concentrate on anthropopathisms, especially as expressed in the idea of divine sympathy for man and man's reciprocal sympathy for God--a concept troublesome for the philosophic mind but welcome to the *Homo religiosus* in the pursuit of his devotional enterprise. We shall begin with the concept of sympathy because it is the substratum and prerequisite for love: first one must have the capacity to feel for another, and only then can we speak of the more intense emotion of love. What follows is a selection, more or less at random, of such expressions of mutual divine-human sympathy in the Bible, Talmud, Midrash, Kabbalah, and contemporary literature and history.

The earliest texts already indicate divine sympathy for suffering man. The "emotional" aspect of the relationship between God and man is evident in the very beginning of the Torah where, as a result of the divine grant of freedom of the will to man and man's failure to use it properly, God experiences something akin to anxiety: "And the Lord repented that He had made man upon the

earth, and it grieved Him at His heart" (Gen. 6:6).⁴ While the verse in all its literalness can be dismissed as but another anthropopathism which should be treated no differently from all others, the obvious intent of Scripture is to indicate quite graphically that God was troubled and "upset" by man's malfeasance.

The Sages of the Mishnah are quite straightforward about such divine sympathy for man. On the verse, "In all their affliction He was afflicted" (Isa. 63:9), R. Meir is quoted as saying, "When a man suffers, what does the Shechinah say? 'My head hurts, My arm hurts.' If God suffers at the blood of the wicked that is shed, how much more so at the blood of the righteous?!"⁵

In a truly remarkable text, the Talmud⁶ offers a comment on the words "unto the Lord" in the verse concerning the sin offering on the occasion of *Rosh Hodesh*, the New Moon: "And one he-goat for a sin offering unto the Lord" (Nu. 28:15). The Talmud refers to the well known agada that at the beginning of creation the moon and the sun were equally large, but the moon complained that two sovereigns could not use one crown and, presumably, it argued for its own supremacy over the sun; whereupon God ordered it to diminish in size and luminescence. Hence, the sin offering "unto the Lord": "Said the Holy One, let this he-goat be an atonement because *I* diminished the moon." The plain sense of the text, as it comes across to the reader at first glance, is that God felt that He required atonement because of His severe deci-

sion to diminish the moon--or, alternatively, even though the moon deserved the punishment, God was sufficiently sympathetic to the moon's plight to feel that He needed atonement. Rashi relieves the heavily anthropopathic quality of the story by commenting that the sin-offering was "to appease the moon." Tosafot cites the opinion of the author of *Arukh*, that it was Israel that needed atonement (for its normal range of misdeeds) but it is up to God to set the time for such atonement and He set it on the New Moon as a way of compensating the moon for its harsh punishment; a similar explanation is given by R. Isaac Alfasi.⁷ Indeed, so disturbing is this passage that on the margin of the *Shevuot* text we read, "This is one of the secrets of the Kabbalah, and Heaven forbid that it be taken at face value." Nevertheless, if we appreciate that the incident to which this interpretation of the Numbers verse applies is itself metaphoric--surely a three-way conversation between God, sun, and moon is not meant to be taken literally--then the request for atonement for God is similarly not meant literally and, therefore, there is no need to explain away apologetically the otherwise shocking attribution of "sin" to God. Instead, one understands that the intent of the Talmud is that there are situations where one is compelled by the canons of justice to do things which, nevertheless, are unpalatable, and since one cannot both do and not do the same thing, justice prevails along with a sense of regret at the inevitable negative consequence of administering retaliatory punishment. The lesson that emerges is that the profound ambivalence in the administration of justice is so basic and universal that even God, as it were, wrestles with the problem, and His response

--asking that a sin-offering be brought for Him--is an expression of *divine sympathy for man caught in this dilemma of the just execution of justice.*

Now, such divine sympathy implies a sense of feeling, even emotional vulnerability, as it were, on the part of God. And, therefore, it invites a sympathetic reaction by man for his Maker.

An interesting illustration of this kind of thinking amongst the Sages comes from the Midrash.⁸ On the verse, "I that speak in *tzedakah*, mighty to save" (Isa. 63:1), an opinion is cited that the *tzedakah*--justice, righteousness, but usually and colloquially charity or any act of special kindness--here referred to is the one performed *by Israel for God!* Thus: "Which *tzedakah* does the verse intend?--The *tzedakah* you performed for Me when you accepted the Torah, for had you not done so, where would My kingdom be?" A truly startling thought: by accepting the Torah, Israel performed a charitable act towards the Creator! Here, human sympathy for the Creator is projected onto the Sinaitic revelation, the covenant itself--which is the very heart of the Jewish religious historical experience.

The Kabbalists too (especially R. Isaac Luria, "the Ari"), no doubt motivated by the feeling that prayer too often is taken as self-serving and egotistical, speak of prayer for the fulfillment of one's needs as a roundabout expression of *man's sympathy for God*, because prayer should be theocentric, not

anthropocentric: He suffers for us as He identifies with our pain, and so we identify sympathetically with *His* pain and pray for *His* relief (thus avoiding the embarrassment of appearing to pray for our own petty needs).

This concept has at times appeared in interesting form in contemporary literature. Thus, Sh. Y. Agnon, Israel's late Nobel Laureate, composed a moving *reshut* or introductory petition to the Kaddish, recited by the mourner (as well as several times during formal public worship) and which begins with the famous words, *Yitgadal ve'yitkadash shemeih rabba*, "May His great Name be magnified and sanctified." The Kaddish makes no mention of death, and the connection between the two has always been puzzling. Agnon's *reshut* provides an answer. It speaks of the difference between a mortal king and the divine King. A king of flesh and blood, when he goes into battle, is concerned with the overall direction of the war, winning or losing. He is indifferent to the lives of individual soldiers; they are, basically, mere cannon fodder. The divine King, however, cherishes the life of each and every one of His soldiers and considers the death of a single one of His children as a defeat, thus diminishing His greatness and desecrating His holy Name. When a human being dies, therefore, a soldier in the hosts of the Lord has been lost, and God's great Name, or reputation, suffers both diminution and desecration. We therefore console Him, as it were, by praying for the restoration of His greatness--"May His great Name be magnified"--and the sanctification of His Name --"and sanctified." The Kaddish, for Agnon, is a way of consoling the divine Mourner and

expressing our sympathy for Him.⁹

Sympathy, even pity, for God, finds not only literary expression but crops up in "real life" as well. The venerable leader of Religious Zionism, Shlomo Zalman Shragai, relates in his autobiography¹⁰ an event which touchingly illustrates this capacity for showing sympathy, even pity, for the Creator. Shortly after the end of World War II, Shragai left Warsaw by train and was asked by a friend to look after his elderly father who was taking the same train to Paris. The elderly gentleman was white, pale, nervous, and deeply melancholy. He refused to answer any of Shragai's questions, keeping silent and to himself. After a while, the old man asked him for help in opening his valise, which he did, and Shragai noticed a *shofar*, personal articles, and his *tallit* and *tefillin*. Much later, after longer periods of silence, the old man began talking to Shragai. He was a *hasid* of the Rebbe of Belz, from Galicia, and had suffered horrendously under Hitler. In the middle of the conversation, he stopped and resumed his silence. At dawn, after a fitful sleep, Shragai put on his *tallit* and *tefillin* but the old man did not. The silence continued for several hours into the afternoon, until the old man suddenly began speaking again, and said, "After all that happened to me and after all that my eyes saw, I refuse to pray to Him. Now I'll get Him angry!" After that--several more hours of silence. Just before nightfall, he turned to Shragai and asked him again to assist him with his baggage. He took out his *tallit* and *tefillin* and put them on. After finishing his prayers, he said to Shragai, "By right I shouldn't pray to Him.

But doesn't He too need and deserve pity (*rachmones*)? What does He now have left in His world? Who is left to Him? And if He had mercy on me and kept me alive, then He merits that I should take pity on Him, and that is why I finally decided to *daven*." With that, the old man broke out in deep sobbing, crying out in Yiddish, "Oy, a *rachmones oyfn Ribbono shel Olam!*" (Oh, a pity on the Master of the World!) Shragai wept with him and they parted from each other.

There is much conceptual depth as well as poetic pathos and religious boldness in this anguished cry from the broken heart of a Holocaust survivor. And it issues from a long and hoary tradition.

Another such example of piquant expression of sympathy for divine "suffering" is the reaction to His loneliness, as it were. Much has been written about the reluctance of the ancient pagan world to accept monotheism because of the invisibility of God; an incorporeal Deity who could not be seen or touched was too insubstantial for the pagan mind. Perhaps also disturbing to the ancients--and maybe even moderns as well--was the difficulty in wrestling with the idea of a Deity who existed in utter and absolute aloneness, a solitude which may be viewed as exalted and magnificent, but also as depressing, bewildering, and unthinkable. Just as primitive man, fleshy and physical, found it hard to conceive of a God without body or form, so all men, emotionally dreading loneliness and constitutionally attuned to sociability and companionship, resisted the idea of a God resplendent in

isolation and seclusion--"What does He do all day?" "Whom does He confide in?" "With whom does He share His joys and His unhappiness?"--and preferred the polytheistic notion of deities abounding, involved with each other and therefore, like man, fundamentally social beings.

Even when polytheism was overcome and monotheism triumphed, there remained a spiritually indigestible aspect of divine oneness: His utter aloneness.¹¹ And this lingering leeriness of loneliness must somehow find its expression. This expression, paradoxically, is a solution or at least palliative for human loneliness. When man discovers the painful reality of his own isolation in the world, he is comforted by his Creator, whose aloneness is of an infinitely higher order.

This encounter of lonelinesses emerges with much pathos from the following lines which were dictated by a deeply religious man a few years ago on his death bed in Los Angeles:

I am dying alone, as nobody can accompany me where I am going. I am "on my own" as never before in my life. But just in this aloneness which I am facing now, I am closer to God's identity and His alone-ness than ever before. In this true alone-ness I experience and recognize my very own divinity from within in the image of God.¹²

Divine solitude evokes from man his own sense of loneliness in the universe, and not only when he is dying. Thus, loneliness encounters loneliness, as man meets God; and as each offers his loneliness as a gift to the other, each experiences relief, as it were, from this cosmic loneliness. It is not, of course, that God

truly experiences loneliness in a human way; we are, certainly, beyond such crude anthropopathisms. Rather, man in his religious imagination projects his own loneliness upon God, conceiving of Him too as suffering from this vast and incredible loneliness, and thus allowing man and God to sympathize with each other. As the Sages of Israel put it, in the *tefillin* of Israel it is written, "Hear O Israel, the Lord is our God, the Lord is One"; and in the *tefillin* of God, as it were, are inscribed the words, "Who is like unto Thy people Israel, one nation upon the earth?" The communion of the lonely is the answer to loneliness.

This reciprocal healing of solitude is, thus, in itself an illustration of the sympathy of God for man and that of man for God. Other such instances of solicitude for divine solitude may be cited from the world of literature.¹³

Indeed, the Torah follows the proclamation of divine unity (Deut. 6:4) with the commandment to love Him: "and thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and all thy soul and all thy might" (Deut. 6:5). The injunction to do or obey does not imply a "need," but that is not true of the request or even commandment to love. There is here an assumption of a mutual "dependency" of God and man and their "need" for each other.

"The Lord is one" implies that God is, as it were, a lonely God. His loneliness and sadness are reflected in His image, man, of whom He said, "It is not good that man should be alone" (Gen.2:18). Both God and man deserve *rachmones*, pity--man for his

failure and pain and suffering, and God for being abandoned by this creature whom He created in His very own image and endowed with the gift of free will and who misuses and abuses it. And so each waits and longs for the other; and the way to each other, bridging the brooding cosmic loneliness, is through--love.

This sense of mutual sympathy gives rise to love. God reaches out for man with love--the blessing immediately preceding the Shema reads, "Blessed art Thou, O Lord, who chooses His people Israel *in love*"--and man too, recognizing that "the Lord is One," that the Creator is lonely, yearning for the companionship of His human creatures, responds with love immediately after proclaiming God's utter oneness: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart..."

The many eminent thinkers whose interpretations of the Love of God are part of the legacy of the Jewish tradition all worked on the valid premise of divine transcendence and perfection: man needs God, but God does not need man--or anyone or anything--in His utter ontological self-sufficiency. But as we speak of the divine-human relationship in psychologically human terms, it is in place to touch upon a distinction between two types of love usually referred to in theological writings by their Greek names, *eros* and *agape*.

Agape is the kind of love that a protective parent feels for his/her child. It is a selfless, one-way love, in which the parent, ideally, asks nothing in return, not even love by the

child. *Eros* is a romantic love, the kind felt by husband and wife for each other, in which not only is the love expected to be mutual, but pleasure is exchanged. Because of this distinction, the love of God (both by and for) is usually assumed to be *agape*, not *eros*.

Yet, in both the Torah and throughout the liturgy of Judaism, the metaphors for the love relationship between God and Israel do not make such hard and fast distinctions. God is depicted as Father and as King--but also as the Lover of Israel, the beloved. Thus, for instance, all of Solomon's Song of Songs, which R. Akiva considered holier than all other songs in the Bible, is unthinkable if one refuses to consider *eros* as a model for the love between God and man. Isaiah refers to Israel as God's beloved, Hosea freely uses the husband-wife metaphor for the God-Israel relationship, and throughout the prophetic writings the same occurs--and no Talmudic eyebrows are raised at this apparently bold anthropomorphism.

Hence, the inapplicability of *eros* to the love of God must be questioned. Indeed, as Michael Wyschogrod has argued,¹⁴ this bifurcation of love into these two distinct categories must be rejected or, at least, seriously questioned from a Jewish perspective. The Jewish vision of love of God must be understood as both *agape* and *eros*. It is true that such an approach leaves God, as it were, vulnerable to the vagaries of Israel's temperament and conduct. But it has the virtue of making God's love for Israel less abstract and more personal, and it accords with the

Scriptural description of God as jealous when Israel "goes awhoring" after "strange gods." The use of such terms, as well as adultery, divorce, and remarriage, implies a form of eros at least as much as *agape*.

All that having been said, our attention must again be directed to the danger of taking such images and expressions too literally. While the rigorous condemnation of any and all anthropomorphisms and anthropopathisms in the Bible and Talmud may sometimes lead to an ontologically absolute and excessively depersonalized Deity with whom it is difficult to form personal relationships, the opposite tendency is even more dangerous: it may well lead to an infantile conception of a corporeal god and the blurring of the differences between God and man.

How, then, shall we find a way out of our dilemma?

Perhaps the best way of explaining a position that satisfies both the philosophers' demands of monotheistic purity and *amkha's* psychological need for a "human face" on religious experience, is the illustration provided by the interesting Italian Rabbi Leon (Aryeh) de Modena (1571-1648) in his *Ari Nohem* in a slightly different context: A sailor approaches the pier and throws his line to those who stand on the pier. They tie the line to the pier, whereupon the sailor tugs on the line in order to pull himself and his craft so that he may climb aboard the pier. To the onlooker, the sailor is *pulling the pier towards himself*, whereas in fact *he is pulling himself to the pier*. So, in speak-

ing of God's "needs"--for compassion or companionship or love or relief from distress, etc.--we are in reality pulling ourselves to Him, i.e., expressing our own deepest feelings and needs and projecting them upon Him as an act of communion as we cleave to Him.

In a more explicit way, we might suggest the application to this perennial problem of an important distinction that engaged the attention of two eminent eighteenth century rabbinic thinkers. The first verse of the Shema, according to R. Shneur Zalman and R. Hayyim of Volozhin,¹⁵ alludes to the exclusive ontic reality of God, such that nothing else can be said to truly exist; all that is non-divine is mere illusion. The verse *Barukh shem kevod malkhuto le'olam va'ed* ("May the name of His glorious kingdom be blessed forever and ever") which, according to rabbinic tradition, is inserted between the first and second verses of the Shema for daily liturgical purposes, assures us that the world we experience and inhabit *does* exist and we must act accordingly. This apparent contradiction is resolved, R. Shneur Zalman and R. Hayyim say, borrowing a distinction formulated by the sixteenth century Safed Kabbalist R. Moshe Cordovero, by assigning the Shema verse to *mi-tziddo*, God's point of view, whereas the rabbinic verse is *mi-tziddenu*, from "our" point of view. Thus, while in the most fundamental sense reality can be ascribed only to God, it is *His will*, that we mortals, caught up inextricably in this web of what God considers non-existent, must close our eyes to the cosmos' ultimate unreality and act as if it were all real. Hence, we first proclaim our assent to the ab-

stract proposition that naught but God exists, that we are devoid of all ontological validity--something which we can do only by a special intellectual effort. Then we return to our "everyday" world of sensate experience and human needs and declare that--accepting this world as real because of the obvious psychological need to do so *and* because God willed that despite our knowledge of the ultimate truth that only He truly exists we not act upon that knowledge--we virtually ignore the primary truth of our own non-reality and proceed to act as if we are real, as if "God is in Heaven and we are on earth" and we are both real and worthy to serve Him. In the course of living our lives *mi-tzidde-nu*, we confront and engage God as if we were real creatures, participating in "true" existence.

In a similar fashion, we might say that we acknowledge that from the point of view of ultimate reality--one that can be fully understood only by God and which we can only assert philosophically but never fully comprehend existentially--no such imperfections as need and injury and vulnerability and loneliness, etc., may ever be applied to Him. Ontologically, He is beyond emotion, including that of sympathy and love. Nevertheless, in our daily functioning, feeling, and everyday thinking, we relate to Him existentially and psychologically as a sentient, feeling, reacting Being--for such is His will.

This formulation keeps inviolate the strictures of an Onkelos and a Maimonides against anthropopathism (and certainly anthropomorphisms) and yet allows us to go beyond the realm of

metaphor, and to nurture our relationship to God in an existentially and psychologically more meaningful way than the merely poetic or metaphoric.

The Corodveran dichotomy therefore allows us to resolve the conflict between the philosophers and ordinary religious folk--the severe ontological view which considers all anthropopathisms as mere metaphor, on the one hand and, on the other, the phenomenological data of the daily experience of religious people for whom prayer is more than poetry and love is more than metaphor. It allows us to keep our heads without sacrificing our hearts.

NOTES

- (1) The sources are too numerous to be listed here. See, for instance, Sifre to Deut., pesikta 32, and the parallel text in Yoma 86a.
- (2) The most comprehensive work on the love of God in Jewish philosophy is Georges Vajda's *L'amour De Dieu Dans La Theologie Juive Du Moyen Age* (Paris: 1957).
- (3) See, e.g., *Sefer Mitzvot Gadol*, Pos. Com. 3, who maintains that the commandment to love God includes all of the Torah.
- (4) See, on this, my *Faith and Doubt* (Ktav, New York: 1971), pp. 32-34.
- (5) Sanhedrin 6:5.
- (6) In Hullin 60b and in Shevuot 9a.
- (7) To Shevuot, ad loc.
- (8) See Yalkut to Isaiah 63, #507.
- (9) See my article on "Kiddush Hashem" in the *Encyclopedia Judaica*, volume 10, 977-981, for references.
- (10) *Mi-pinkas Zikhronotai* (Jerusalem: 1987) p. 23 f.
- (11) God as echad (one) is frequently referred to in the Jerusalem Talmud (Meg. 10a) and Midrashic literature (Gen.R. 1:12, 98:13, and elsewhere) as yachid (individual, singular) or yechido shel olam (He who is singular in the world). This quality of aloneness is akin to, and implies, loneliness; hence the verse in Psalms 25:16, "Turn Thee unto me and be gracious unto me; ki yachid ve-'ani ani, for I am solitary and afflicted." The connection between yachid and 'ani, afflicted, surely points to a painful loneliness of the Psalmist. By extension, the singularity and aloneness of God suggests loneliness.
- (12) The last words of Erwin Altman (1908-1985), dictated to his brother Manfred, as cited by Levi Meier in his *Jewish Values in Psychotherapy: Essays on Vital Issues on the Search for Meaning* (Lanham/New York/London, University Press of America: 1988), p. 161.
- (13) As an example, one of the greatest of contemporary Hebrew poets, the late Uri Greenberg, is the author of an intriguing poem entitled "The Great Sadness" (or: "The Great Sad One"), which at first appears intended solely as pious or even as

biting, mocking humor, but really conveys as well a sense of sympathy for God who, in His oneness, suffers loneliness. The divine sadness issues from His solitude, having no close, intimate friend. A human can at least exchange body warmth with another, can smoke a cigar and drink a cup of coffee or glass of wine, can sleep and dream until dawn; but that is unavailable to Him--for He is God... See Sherry H. Blumberg in Eugene Borowitz, ed., *Ehad: the Many Meanings of God is One* [Sh'ma: 1988], p. 9.

(14) See his *The Body of Faith: Judaism as Corporeal Election* (New York: 1983), pp. 13, 60-65, and 119-124. One need not accept Wyschogrod's entire thesis in order to appreciate his contribution to a broader and more existentially meaningful conception of Judaism's understanding of love between God and man.

(15) See my *Halakhot ve'Halikhot* (Mosad Harav Kook, Jerusalem:1990), pp. 32-35; and my *Torah Lishmah: Torah for Torah's Sake in the Works of Rabbi Hayyim of Volozhin and His Contemporaries* (Yeshiva University and Ktav Publ., New York City & Hoboken, N.J.: 1989) pp. 81-84.