

Problem of Divine Presence vs. Freedom of the Will

The Problem = G-d is נשוא מאין (otherwise, He might have had a beginning in time. But since He is above time, in fact He created time, then He is eternal, & these are irrelevant to this). He is also omniscient. Hence, also present. How, then, freedom?

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I. Saadia, Halvi, others -- following Kalam:

(3:3 2'1111) 1,1111 220 323 1111 11112 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111

i.e. Knowledge & action are not in a causal relationship.

They are independent categories. Halvi (Kuzari, end): just as 1,1111 220 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 - Knowledge of past is not reason for its being. (NL: i.e. since premise of problem assumes irrelevant of these to G-d, so resolution proves future from past). Thus: presence $\neq$ pre-determination.

II - Aristotle, others - restricts G-d's omniscience

to to guarantee freedom. G-d knows only that which, acc. natural law, will certainly occur; He does not know possibly, bec. these "knowledge" is irrelevant. Thus (פ' 1111, 1111, 1111, 1111)

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Acc. this, G-d's knowledge is restricted to פ' 1111

which are part of 1111, i.e. causal chains

III - Crispas ($\frac{2-1-2}{2-1-2}$) & some others: restricts freedom to
guarantee omniscience. Says:

Principle 1: when we see an event in vacuo -- then freedom is a reality,
whereas in its causal context it is seen as determined.
(N.B.: analogy: an ^{indiv.} act, as part of a statistical aggregate)
g-d thus knows its predetermined conclusion by
virtue of his knowledge of all causes & their effects.
However, man, treating each event per se,
retains the existential freedom.

IV - Mainwinder - read 12/15/11 11:10.

Use explanations with its 11:10. In addition:
for M., major problem of freedom is not exposed
but - 12/15. Thus 11:10 = background; 12/15 = 12/15.
Then 11:10 = 11:10 11:10, & only in 12/15 does he reach
exposed. Up to 11:10 - questioning omnipotence;
after: omniscience.

Raava's objection - cannot be sustained. M.
does not merely plead ignorance. What he does is to
remove the problem from the realm of philos. discussion
simply bec. by definition man lacks the possibility of
arriving at an answer. That definition is: $\forall x (11) (11)$
11:10/11:10/11 - - 11:10 g-d's knowledge is not superior
to his essence, but identical. Hence, divine knowledge,
like essence, is beyond human ken.