

13 Massapoag Lane
Sharon, Mass. 02067 U.S.A.
August 21, 1970

Dear Rabbi Lamm,


I am enclosing a copy of my Broadside, and also an article I was asked to do for the North American Newspaper Alliance in connection with it. You must be in Israel by now. I envy you. I hope this package follows you there; I will try to affix postage enough to allow for overseas forwarding.

Thank you for the three articles you sent me recently. I hope you will continue to include me in your mailings whenever you have reprints of your talks or articles. Invariably they contain ideas which I find enlarging, which I am compelled to make my own, and which I would not want to have done without.

Forgive me if I say also that your piece on Ecology, in particular, displays an excellence of literary style that I don't remember noticing a few years ago. It may be that in the past I have been so immersed in considering the import of the content that I did not notice the style. But this article particularly joins a cutting edge and a light touch with serious indignation and concern in a most effective way. The secret, I think, is to write as you would speak.

A point you make in your address on Education reminds me of a conversation I had recently in Sharon. Someone suggested that we propose in the Town Meeting that motorboats be banned from the lake, since its bathing beaches are one of the town's most important attractions, and the accumulation of motor oil on the water's surface is beginning to be a nuisance. It was pointed out that realistically such a proposal could not be voted through, since many residents have invested in pleasure craft and outboards which they moor in the lake. When I suggested that if the proposal failed, we propose as a compromise that the motorboats at least be banned on the Sabbath, my Jewish neighbors were unable to take me seriously.

Sincerely,



Myron S. Kaufmann

Russian muscle and the loss of Israel's present boundaries could mean the final round in the Mideast struggle

Is stage being set for Israel's doom?

Mr. Kaufman is the author of the just-published book, "The Coming Destruction of Israel."

By Myron S. Kaufmann

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NEW YORK—The current American peace plan for the Middle East, put forth by Secretary of State William Rogers, has all the earmarks of a desperate effort to postpone ultimate disaster in that area, at least until after the presidential election of 1972.

Whether it succeeds or fails in its immediate goal of buying time, its ultimate effort will be to weaken the military and strategic position of Israel with a corresponding increase in Russo-Egyptian strength.

Israel was forced by American pressure to accept the Rogers plan, already accepted by Egypt and Jordan. Fearing a total shut-off of supplies, she dared not refuse if America insisted—and insist America did.

At a superficial glance, the plan sounds innocent enough—a 90-day cease-fire and negotiations through UN Representative Gunnar Jarring for a permanent settlement based on the UN resolution of November 22, 1967.

Israel has expressed strong misgivings over the possibility that Russia and Egypt

may use the temporary cease-fire to reinforce their war machine on the west bank of the Suez Canal; Israel prefers a permanent cease-fire.


President Nixon, in a televised news conference July 30, said he had "attempted to assure Israel that there would be no Russian build-up. It was obvious, however that without a show of American strength the United States could not guarantee Russian compliance.

But the worst of the Rogers plan, from the viewpoint of Israel's security, lies in the forthcoming negotiations themselves—for two reasons.

First, to judge by his public statements over the past 18 months, Mr. Rogers is virtually certain to pressure Israel to accede to something close to the Russo-Egyptian interpretation of the UN resolution which in effect would force Israel back to her indefensible pre-1967 borders, leaving her vulnerable to renewed invasion and possible extinction.


Secondly the Russo-Egyptian side will be negotiating with muscle. Units of the Soviet Air Force itself are based in Egypt, and Soviet equipment and Russian-directed manpower capable of overwhelming Israel's thin defense line are already deployed ready to settle the matter by force if the Kremlin gives the word.

The United States, eager to avoid any confrontation now with Russia, has thus



IN 1957 John Foster Dulles tried to solve the Mideast crisis by forcing Israel to withdraw from the Sinai in hopes for Egyptian gratitude. Instead, his policy led to renewed Egyptian mobilization. Myron Kaufman sees Secretary of State

William Rogers, right, also seeking a withdrawal by Israel to pre-1967 war boundaries that, he says, will bring about a short and unstable peace that will lead to the final round between Egypt and Israel.



THE SIX-DAY WAR of 1967 left Israel with defensible lines and with water barriers between her and the enemy. The forthcoming negotiations will see Israel, according to

Kaufmann, under American pressure to withdraw from the occupied area, leaving her as wide open and undefensible as before.

far countered Soviet strength with words only. The danger is that she will soon pressure Israel to accept peace at virtually any price.

ISRAEL NOW DEFENDABLE

Before the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel was any defensive strategist's nightmare. Tiny Galilee and the Negev Desert were joined only by a narrow coastal strip. A thrust of only eight miles would have been sufficient to cut Israel in two. Israeli Jerusalem and the road to it were like an exposed finger. Sixty percent of Israel's population were in range of enemy artillery.

This is why the Arabs, with their great preponderance of planes, tanks and manpower, expected to overrun Israel easily in 1967; and it is also why Israel was able to escape extinction only by relying on a quick pre-emptive first strike, that luckily caught the enemy's air forces on the ground.

The 1967 war left Israel with straightened, shortened and more defensible lines, and with water barriers (Suez Canal and Jordan River) between her and the enemy. The present lines are the most stable and defensible borders possible, from the point of view of either side.

The forthcoming negotiations will see Israel under American pressure to withdraw, leaving her as wide open as before, in return for worthless promises with no muscle to enforce them.

This is precisely what John Foster Dulles accomplished when he forced Israel to withdraw from the Sinai in 1957. Dulles hoped then for Egyptian gratitude, but did not get it. His policy led only to a renewed Egyptian mobilization, aimed at Israel's extinction, and the war of 1967. The United States, though it has said it would not repeat Dulles' error, is now doing exactly that. The result will again be a short and unstable peace, to be renounced as soon as the Arabs are ready for the final round. This time it will not take ten years, because the Russian air force is involved.

Russia wants Israel out of the way because, geographically, Israel is a buffer that keeps Egypt out of Saudi Arabia and the oil-rich lands of the Persian Gulf. With Israel destroyed, the oil lands of the Arabian peninsula will be defenseless before a Soviet-directed onslaught.

RUSSIA BRIEFS NASSER

Pro-Soviet rebellions will be fomented throughout these states, aided by direct Egyptian intervention through the Sinai route, and the Soviet Union will warn the United States not to interfere. Syria will overrun Lebanon (again with a Russian warning to America not to interfere), and Lebanon's ancient Christian minority will become an impoverished minority. An Israeli warning to Syria last year prevented a threatened invasion of Lebanon at that time.

Just over a month ago, on June 29, the Russians brought Nasser to Moscow to

brief him finally on the impending seizure of the canal and the Sinai. He was briefed that afternoon and the same evening the first step was taken—a complex of SAM-2 and SAM-3 missiles was moved forward overnight into position to threaten Israeli air cover over Egyptian canal-front artillery. The Israelis discovered this the next morning, June 30, losing three Phantoms as a result. Those presidential advisers who had been arguing for firmness were able to point out that the Russian moves could hardly be called "defensive" any longer, and the next day, July 1, Mr. Nixon for the first time issued a clear warning, long overdue, pointing out the Russo-Egyptian threat to Israel and the Arabian peninsula beyond it.

The warning, coming after 18 months of American condoning of Russian moves, caught the Kremlin by surprise and Nasser had to cool his heels in Moscow until July 16 while the Russians worked out a revised strategy. The new strategy was to pause, accept Mr. Rogers' warmed-over plan of June 19 and wait meanwhile to see (1) whether Mr. Rogers would hand over the Sinai without the trouble of a battle for it; and (2) whether Mr. Nixon meant to back up his July 1 warning with a show of American naval strength.

The commandant of the Soviet navy warned him harshly not to, in a July 26 article in Pravda. And by the beginning of August, there was no sign that the President had made any firm decision to do so.