

The Meaning of Divine Goodness

by RABBI DR. NORMAN LAMM

EDITOR'S NOTE: The following is reprinted with permission from "Yavneh Studies in Parshat Hashavua" (Copyright 1968, Yavneh), a series of essays dealing with philosophical problems raised by the various parshiot. Dr. Norman Lamm, whose essay deals with Bereshit, is Jakob and Erna Michael Professor of Jewish Philosophy at YU and Rabbi of the Jewish Center in New York City. He served until recently as Chairman of Yavneh's National Advisory Board.

Why did God create the world?

I do not ask this question in an ultimate metaphysical sense. For despite the various aggadic, philosophic, and Kabbalistic answers proposed in our tradition—for the sake of man, or Israel, or Torah, or "to create a dwelling place for Him in the lower worlds"—the most convincing of all remains that of Maimonides in his *Guide*, namely, that the purpose of the creation and existence of the Universe is to fulfill the Will of the Creator. This, of course, is another way of saying that we have no access to an intelligible answer, that it is both vain and arrogant to attempt to capture the great Creator in the limited vessels of a teleology conceived by the creatures. My question, rather, relates to the character of God: which of His *middot* did He exercise in order to bring the cosmos into existence? The problem is not an innocuous and fruitless theological speculation for, as Maimonides taught (*Hil. Deot* 1:6, based on the Mekhilta), the purpose of describing God by attributes is to inform man how he must live. *Imitatio dei* (or, in the language of the Torah, *ve'halakhta biderakhav*) cannot be achieved unless we know something about Him. When we ask, therefore, what is the source of the divine creation, we are in effect inquiring as to the source and hence meaning of human creativity.



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In the Yiddish manner, let us answer this question with yet another question. Throughout the account of the creation, after each major step, such as the creation of light and water and grass, the Torah tells us that *va-yar Elo-him ki tov*, "and God saw that it was good." Now, taken literally, these passages strike one as grossly anthropomorphic: as if the Creator of the universe is a kind of cosmic artist who, after every significant addition to his composition, steps back to admire his painting or sculpture and cannot refrain from an expression of self-gratulation. But from the days of Onkeles and on, the Jewish tradition has assiduously attempted to reinterpret every possible anthropomorphism in the Bible. What, then, does it mean when the Torah tells us that "God saw that it was good?"

A striking answer is provided by R. Jacob Zevi Meklenburg (in his *Ha-kefay ve'ha-Kabbalah*), whether or not one is willing to accept the syntactical accuracy of his exegesis. The word *va-yar*, usually translated as "he saw," is, in Hebrew, in the causative (*hifil*), which can therefore be translated as "he made seen" or: he brought into existence. Thus, God said (i.e., He willed), let there be light, and *va-yar Elo-him*, He brought this light into being, He made it visible. So, upon willing the existence of the land and the waters, of the luminaries and the grass and the animals, He made them visible, He called them into existence. But why did He do so? The answer is: *Ki tov*, because He is good! Not "that it was good," but "because He—God—is good." Whether the world as such is good remains, at best, a debatable thesis. It is the goodness of God, not of the world, that the Torah has come to teach us. Divine creativity is a function of divine goodness, for goodness is givingness.

The Kabbalah taught this secret too. One of the Sephirot (the ten stages of divine self-revelation) is *Chesed*—love or goodness—and this is identified with *hit-pashtut*, the overflow of effluence, the emanation of existence from God. "He creates" means He gives of Himself, and this He does *ki tov*, because He is good, because He possesses *Chessed*. Plato too (in his *Timaieus*) maintains that God brought the world into being because

he was not envious, not begrudging existence to those other than Himself. (For the history of the development of this idea in Western philosophy, see Arthur O. Lovejoy's *The Great Chain of Being*.)

The most valuable expression of human creativity must likewise be that of goodness-givingness. To be good is to do good. Hence, to give of oneself is to be good, and to be good is to be creative, and to be creative is to be God-like. "In the beginning God created" ultimately means, "In the first place, man must do good by giving of himself."

R. Shneur Zalman of Ladi, the great founder of HaBaD Hasidism and author of the *Tanya*, taught that the ideal *mitzvah*, the perfect commandment, is *tzedakah* (the giving of charity), for it is the act in which man most closely imitates God. Just as God's most significant act, creation, is an act of goodness by virtue of His giving (existence), so the apex of man's Godlikeness is his goodness expressed in giving—whether charity or time or money or love or compassion. A good man, like the good God, is a giving being.

This insight into the meaning of *tov* (good) provides us with a new understanding of the Biblical view of marriage. Adam finds himself in Paradise, yet *lo tov heyot ha-adam levado*, "it is not good that man should be alone" (Gen. 2:18). The companionship of man and woman is good; loneliness and solitude are not. But this divine judgment on the undesirability of celibacy is not merely a question of the welfare of the male of the species: that it is better for him psychologically and existentially to be married. It is also an ethical judgment, in terms of our definition of *tov*: when man is alone he cannot be "good," he has no one upon whom to shower his innate love and affection, no one to whom to give and with whom to share his gifts. With no wife to love, and no family to provide for, and no home to protect, and no other human being to whom to extend his pity and his assistance, how shall man be good? Goodness, as the act of giving, requires another human being in order to actualize itself. Thus was Eve created, in

order that human beings should now have each other in whom to inspire the divine-human attribute of *tov*. Marriage, then, is the institutionalization of human goodness, the maximalization of the potential for the deepest and most intimate giving. As such, the act of marital goodness is truly creative, in *imitatio dei* of the creation of the universe. (See further on this theme in *Mikhtav Me'Eliyahu* by the contemporary Musarite, the late and sainted R. Eliyahu Desler).

The Halakhah too incorporates this insight. When acquiring a new object, we are required to pronounce a blessing. Which *berakhah* should be recited? The Halakhah (according to the Babylonian Talmud, see *Be'ur ha-Gera* and *Mishnah Berurah* to *Sh. A. Orach Chayyim*, 223:5) distinguishes between two types of acquisition: if the object is one from which I alone will derive benefit, such as an article of clothing, then I must recite the *she'hecheyanu*, wherein I thank God for permitting me to live and survive to this happy time. But if the object is one which affords benefit not only to me, but to others as well, such as a house or automobile, which is made to share with others, then the proper blessing is *ha-tov ve'ha-metiv*, blessing God who is good and who does good. Here again we find the outgoing, creative nature of goodness. *Ha-metiv* should be translated not as "who does good," for that alone would not account for the difference in the blessings. A preferable translation would be, "who makes (others) good," in the sense that He teaches us to imitate His goodness (*ha-tov*) by giving to others. If I take care only of myself, I am entitled to no more than *she'hecheyanu* ("who has let us live"); I merely live, and live for myself. Only when I share my gifts and actualize my indigenous desire to give may I recite *ha-tov ve'ha-metiv*; for then He has made me good, even as He is.

The highest form of creativity is neither intellectual nor artistic; it is ethical. Man is both acquisitive and beneficent; he possesses elements of both the demonic and the divine; he can become both satanic and saintly. It is the function of Torah to teach man to exercise the latter in imitation of his Creator. *Ein tov ela Torah*—"Only Torah is truly 'good'" (*Berakhot* 5a).

On The Need For Ethical Models

by HARRY BROWN

In a recent lecture, Dr. Irving Greenberg mentioned, *en passant*, that one of the major problems confronting our modern world is the fact that people cannot find adequate ethical models, whose example they may follow in determining their course of action when confronted by a given problem. Judaism, realizing that this can be a major problem in life, has given us a religious guideline to provide us with these models. This consists basically of:

1. Models in scripture—*Maase Avot Siman L'Banim*, the most obvious and celebrated example being Avraham Avinu and the things that he is known for: *Hachnasat Orchim*, *Zrizus*, etc.
2. The Biblical injunction to follow the example of the Rabbanan and to heed their words. This last recommendation was especially directed at later generations, who may feel out of touch with the Biblical examples, and who must find contemporary models.

Which brings us to the situation at Yeshiva today, one that is both appalling and very disturbing. By and large, the average Yeshiva student has no consistent ethical model. Whether he realizes it or not, the Yeshiva student practices a form of situation ethics, within a quasi-religious framework.

This is most disturbing because one of the reasons for attending school in a yeshiva environment is to prepare the student to face the problems of later life, when he will not have a rabbi conveniently close at hand to offer him an immediate *pesak*. There must be something fundamentally wrong either with the notion of a yeshiva-university situation, or with our own selves, if we cannot accept those leaders who have traditionally been the ethical models of the *yeshiva bocher*. I doubt that anyone will deny that a majority of the students do not accept their Rebbeim as their ethical models. Witness the re-

peated criticism of these men as not being contemporary enough, as being insensitive to new issues, as being vestiges of a system conceived in Europe and, to a great extent, one that expired in Europe. These people are patently unacceptable to many of our students, and our students realize this. This is why they call for greater involvement in the issues on the part of those men who are acceptable to them, men like the Rav, Rav Aharon Lichtenstein and Rabbi Greenberg. The Rav, I believe, realizes that this is a major problem at Yeshiva, and has offered a suggestion—that the study of the Aggadic literature, for the ethical principles inherent therein, be expanded and emphasized. But this would be little more than a Mussar course. And anyone who is in the Bet Hamedrash at 9:40 p.m. on any given night realizes how little appeal to and effect on the student body such a program has.

We at Yeshiva need living, active ethical models; people who will teach as much by example as by instruction. They must be active enough to be easily recognizable, and they must be close enough to be easily approachable. But who are these people to be, and how can we assure that they will be acceptable to the students as models, while being acceptable to the Yeshiva and Yiddishkeit as teachers and motivators? Unfortunately, I have no answer, nor do I see an easy solution. Perhaps Yeshiva must change and become more "European," thus reinstating the Rebbe as the arbiter of behavior and approach. If the situation remains static, Yeshiva will become less of a yeshiva and more of a secular institution, under "Jewish auspices," of course. Are we prepared to allow this to happen? Is there anything that can be done about it, while realistically remaining within the framework of "Torah U-mada" and "Synthesis"?