{
  "legislationId": "119_HR_8177",
  "lastUpdate": "2026-04-13T16:07:16.710Z",
  "history": [
    {
      "timestamp": "2026-04-13T16:07:16.710Z",
      "source_url": "https://www.congress.gov/119/bills/hr8177/BILLS-119hr8177ih.htm",
      "model": "gemini-flash-lite-latest",
      "prompt_sent": "\nROLE: Fact Checker.\nZADANIE: Porównaj SOURCE (oryginał) i SUMMARY (streszczenie przygotowane przez inne AI).\n\nTwoim celem jest wykrycie \"ZMYŚLONYCH KONKRETÓW\" (Fabricated Entities) w SUMMARY.\n\nSOURCE:\n[Congressional Bills 119th Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] [H.R. 8177 Introduced in House (IH)] <DOC> 119th CONGRESS 2d Session H. R. 8177 To enhance the security, resilience, and protection of critical undersea infrastructure vital to Taiwan's national security, economic stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone tactics employed by the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes. _______________________________________________________________________ IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES April 2, 2026 Mr. Lawler (for himself, Mr. Min, and Mr. Stanton) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned _______________________________________________________________________ A BILL To enhance the security, resilience, and protection of critical undersea infrastructure vital to Taiwan's national security, economic stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone tactics employed by the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Critical Undersea Infrastructure Resilience Initiative Act''. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. Congress finds the following: (1) The Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has increasingly used gray zone tactics to undermine the security of Taiwan and change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, including suspected sabotage of undersea cables in and around Taiwan, such as the incidents involving the severing of cables around the Matsu Islands of Taiwan and other key regions in 2023 and 2025. (2) Undersea cables and other critical undersea infrastructure are a primary vulnerability for Taiwan that could be targeted by the PRC to cripple the communication capabilities of Taiwan in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait and of broader hybrid warfare tactics. Disruption of critical undersea infrastructure would significantly impact the ability of Taiwan to communicate both domestically and internationally, leading to a breakdown in military, economic, and social functions. (3) The vulnerability of Taiwan to attacks on critical undersea infrastructure has been compounded by an increasing number of foreign vessels suspected of involvement in sabotage, including PRC-linked vessels, which pose direct threats to Taiwan's critical infrastructure. (4) The ability of the PRC to disrupt or damage critical undersea infrastructure is a critical element of its strategy aimed at disrupting Taiwan's military and civil communications and isolating Taiwan in the event of a blockade, quarantine, or other attempt to force unification with the PRC. (5) Recent activities by foreign adversaries, particularly the PRC, have increased the risk of sabotage and disruption to critical undersea infrastructure serving Taiwan and other nations, including-- (A) in February 2023, two vessels registered to the PRC severed two undersea cables that effectively cut internet access to the 13,000 residents of Taiwan's Matsu Islands, who had to rely on microwave radio transmissions to provide limited internet access for 50 days until a cable ship was able to complete repairs; (B) in January 2025, Taiwan's Chunghwa Telecom reported damage to an undersea cable north of Taipei and identified a ``suspicious vessel'' registered as the Shunxin-39 and the Xin Shun-39, which had traveled in a criss-cross pattern while dragging its anchor near where the cable was damaged; (C) in January 2025, a Mongolia-flagged vessel named the Baoshun was driven away by Taiwan's coast guard after suspicious movements off the coast of New Taipei; and (D) in February 2025, Taiwan's coast guard detained the Togo-flagged Hong Tai 58 near Taiwan's Penghu Islands after an undersea cable in the area was severed, with the captain later admitting to dropping the ship's anchor in the area and that he ``might have broken the cable''. (6) Since 2023, there have been at least 11 cases of damage to undersea cables around Taiwan and a similar number in the Baltic Sea, with authorities in Taiwan and Europe suspecting PRC and Russian involvement and possible coordination in several incidents. Those incidents highlight the vulnerability of critical undersea infrastructure, as well as the difficulty of proving sabotage or holding perpetrators accountable. (7) The sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure constitutes gray zone tactics designed to destabilize and undermine international security while falling short of direct military confrontation. (8) Several regional mechanisms have been established to bolster the security of undersea cables, including the Nordic Warden initiative for maritime domain awareness and the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, aimed at enhancing the security and resilience of undersea cables in the Indo-Pacific. (9) Taiwan is the world's 21st largest economy by purchasing power parity and deeply integrated in the global information and communications technology supply chain. Any restrictions to its internet connectivity or energy security would have a direct impact on the world's economy. (10) To counter the threats described in this section and safeguard the resilience of Taiwan, it is imperative for the United States and its allies to take decisive action to bolster Taiwan's defenses for critical undersea infrastructure and foster international cooperation to protect those critical assets. SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. In this section: (1) Critical undersea infrastructure.--The term ``critical undersea infrastructure'' means-- (A) subsea energy infrastructure, including a subsea cable, pipeline, or other equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed, to transmit electricity (including via subsea electricity cables, subsea electricity transformers, or equipment related to the support of offshore energy production installations) or to transport natural gas, oil, or hydrogen between land-based or off-shore infrastructure, as well as associated landing stations and facilities; or (B) subsea telecommunications infrastructure, including subsea fiber-optic cables and related equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed, and used to transmit communications, data, voice, video, or other electronic signals, as well as associated landing stations and facilities. (2) Sabotage.--The term ``sabotage'' means actions, or preparations for future actions, taken with the intent to cause defective production of, operation of, or damage to critical undersea infrastructure, including the integrity of data transmitted via subsea telecommunications infrastructure. SEC. 4. TAIWAN CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE INITIATIVE. (a) Establishment.--Not later than 360 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and such other heads of agencies as the Secretary of State considers relevant, shall establish an initiative to be known as the ``Taiwan Critical Undersea Infrastructure Initiative'' (in this section referred to as the ``Initiative''). (b) Priority.--The Initiative shall prioritize the protection and resilience of critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan, with a focus on countering threats from the PRC. (c) Key Focus Areas.-- (1) Advanced monitoring and detection capabilities.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Defense, shall develop and deploy advanced critical undersea infrastructure monitoring systems capable of detecting disruptions or potential sabotage in real-time, including by informing Taiwan, as appropriate, of early warnings about risks to Taiwan's critical undersea infrastructure from global intelligence networks. (2) Rapid response protocols.-- (A) In general.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall-- (i) in cooperation with regional partners, establish rapid response protocols for damaged critical undersea infrastructure or mitigating disruptions; and (ii) work with allies and partners of the United States to help Taiwan and regional partners develop the logistical capacity to respond quickly to attacks on critical undersea infrastructure and minimize downtime. (B) Authorization of appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated $20,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2027 through 2032 to carry out subparagraph (A). (3) Enhancing maritime domain awareness.--In carrying out the Initiative-- (A) the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the Coast Guard, in collaboration with the Coast Guard of Taiwan and regional partners, shall enhance maritime domain awareness around Taiwan, focusing on the ability to detect and interdict suspicious vessels or activities near critical undersea infrastructure; and (B) the Commandant of the Coast Guard shall assist in joint patrols and surveillance, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding maritime zones, to monitor potential threats and prevent sabotage. (4) International frameworks for protection.-- (A) In general.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall seek to establish cooperative frameworks with regional and global partners to protect undersea cable networks near Taiwan. (B) Elements.--The frameworks established under subparagraph (A) shall provide for participation by the United States in joint drills, intelligence-sharing platforms, and collaborative surveillance operations to enhance collective security against sabotage. (5) Taiwan-specific cable hardening.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall encourage and support the hardening of critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan, including reinforcing cables, improving burial depths, and using more resilient materials to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters and sabotage. SEC. 5. COUNTERING PRC GRAY ZONE TACTICS. (a) Working With Partners To Counter PRC Sabotage.--The President shall work with like-minded international partners to implement strategies that directly counter the Government of the PRC's critical undersea infrastructure sabotage activities as part of its gray zone warfare, including by increasing diplomatic pressure on the PRC to adhere to international norms regarding the protection of critical undersea infrastructure. (b) Raising Awareness.--The President shall work with like-minded international partners to raise global awareness of the risks posed by the PRC's sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, including through public diplomacy efforts, information sharing, and participation in international forums that address gray zone tactics and the protection of critical undersea infrastructure. SEC. 6. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE SABOTAGE. (a) In General.--The President, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to any foreign person that the President determines, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, is responsible for acts of sabotage, or facilitates acts of sabotage, against undersea infrastructure critical to the security of Taiwan or other United States allies or partners, including-- (1) any foreign vessel or entity the owner or operator of which knowingly-- (A) commits acts of sabotage; or (B) conducts preparatory surveillance, logistical support, security, or other services that facilitate or enable an act of sabotage; and (2) any foreign person that knowingly-- (A) owns, operates, or manages a vessel or entity described in paragraph (1); (B) provides underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance necessary for such a vessel or entity; (C) facilitates deceptive or structured transactions to support such a vessel or entity; (D) provides port or logistics services or facilities for technology upgrades or installation of equipment for, or retrofitting or tethering of, such a vessel for the purpose of evading sanctions; (E) provides documentation, registration, or flagging services for such a vessel for the purpose of evading sanctions; or (F) serves as a captain, principal officer, or senior leader of such a vessel or entity. (b) Report Required.--Not later than 15 days after imposing sanctions with respect to a foreign person under subsection (a), the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes a detailed justification for the imposition of the sanctions. (c) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this subsection are the following: (1) Blocking of property.--The President shall exercise all of the powers granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of a foreign person described in subsection (a), if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person. (2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.-- (A) Visas, admission, or parole.--An alien described in subsection (a) shall be-- (i) inadmissible to the United States; (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.). (B) Current visas revoked.-- (i) In general.--The visa or other entry documentation of an alien described in subsection (a) shall be revoked, regardless of when such visa or other entry documentation is or was issued. (ii) Immediate effect.--A revocation under clause (i) shall-- (I) take effect immediately; and (II) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the possession of the alien. (d) Implementation; Penalties.-- (1) Implementation.--The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section. (2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this section or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section. (e) Exceptions.-- (1) Exception to comply with united nations headquarters agreement and law enforcement activities.--Sanctions under this section shall not apply with respect to the admission or parole of an alien into the United States if admitting or paroling the alien is necessary-- (A) to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations of the United States; or (B) to carry out or assist authorized law enforcement activity in the United States. (2) Exception to comply with intelligence activities.-- Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States. (3) Exception relating to importation of goods.-- (A) In general.--A requirement to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property under this section shall not include the authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods. (B) Good defined.--In this paragraph, the term ``good'' means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data. (f) National Security Interests Waiver.--The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section if, before issuing the waiver, the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees-- (1) a certification in writing that the issuance of the waiver is in the national security interests of the United States; and (2) a report explaining the basis for the certification. (g) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Admission; admitted; alien; etc.--The terms ``admission'', ``admitted'', ``alien'', and ``lawfully admitted for permanent residence'' have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101). (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means-- (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives. (3) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means an individual or entity that is not a United States person. (4) United states person.--The term ``United States person'' means-- (A) any United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; (B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including any foreign branch of such an entity; or (C) any person in the United States. SEC. 7. SEMIANNUAL REPORT. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter through 2032, the President shall submit to Congress a report detailing-- (1) any incidents of interference or sabotage related to critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan; and (2) any actions taken in response to such incidents. SEC. 8. INTERAGENCY CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR CROSS-STRAIT CRISIS. (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to be prepared for potential crises involving Taiwan, including an attempt by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to change the status quo by force, through comprehensive interagency contingency planning that addresses the catastrophic risks such crises would pose to the national security of the United States. (b) Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish a Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group-- (A) to be chaired by the National Security Council; and (B) consisting of senior officials from the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the United States intelligence community, and such other Federal agencies as may be appropriate. (2) Functions.--The Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group shall-- (A) conduct scenario-based planning exercises to prepare for potential crises involving Taiwan, including blockade or quarantine scenarios, the seizure of an outlying island, military contingencies, economic coercion, cyber attacks, and hybrid threats; (B) identify critical vulnerabilities in supply chains, financial systems, critical infrastructure, and security posture of the United States and allies and partners of the United States that would be affected by a crisis involving Taiwan; (C) develop integrated contingency plans that coordinate diplomatic, military, economic, cyber, and homeland security responses across the Group; (D) assess the adequacy of existing authorities, resources, and decision-making processes to execute such contingency plans; (E) identify gaps in capabilities, authorities, or coordination mechanisms and recommend solutions; (F) share risk assessments with allies and partners of the United States, as appropriate; and (G) regularly test and refine contingency plans. (3) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the establishment of the Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group under paragraph (1), and annually thereafter for 10 years, the Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group shall submit to Congress a classified report that includes-- (A) a description of contingency scenarios assessed and planning activities conducted by the Group; (B) an assessment of the preparedness of the United States and allies and partners of the United States to respond to a crisis involving Taiwan, including identification of capability gaps and resource requirements; (C) recommendations for legislative action, policy changes, or resource allocation to enhance such preparedness; and (D) a description of exercises conducted and lessons learned by the Group. <all>\n\nSUMMARY TO EVALUATE:\nTitle: Initiative to Protect Taiwan's Undersea Infrastructure from Sabotage\nSummary: This act aims to secure undersea cables and energy infrastructure around Taiwan from intentional damage, protecting global economic stability and internet connectivity. It introduces strict penalties for individuals and companies involved in sabotage and allocates funds for rapid repairs of damaged infrastructure.\nKey Points: Creation of a special initiative to monitor and protect undersea cables from sabotage., Imposition of financial and visa sanctions on individuals and companies damaging infrastructure., Allocation of $20 million annually for rapid response and repair systems., Strengthening international cooperation to detect suspicious vessels., Development of contingency plans for potential blockades or hybrid attacks in the region.\n\nZASADY OCENY:\n1. Sprawdź wszystkie LICZBY, DATY i KWOTY w SUMMARY. Jeśli którejś brakuje w SOURCE -> is_valid: false.\n2. Sprawdź wszystkie NAZWISKA, ORGANIZACJE i MIEJSCA w SUMMARY. Jeśli którejś brakuje w SOURCE -> is_valid: false.\n3. Sprawdź wszystkie konkretne DZIAŁANIA PRAWNE . Jeśli tego mechanizmu nie ma w SOURCE -> is_valid: false.\n\nWAŻNE: Abstrakcyjne pojęcia (np. \"transparentność\", \"zaufanie\") są dozwolone jako wnioski.\n\nOUTPUT (JSON):\n{\n  \"is_valid\": true/false,\n  \"issue\": \"fabricated_entity\" / \"contradiction\" / \"none\"\n}\n\nWYMAGANIA FORMATOWANIA:\n1. Odpowiedz WYŁĄCZNIE surowym obiektem JSON.\n2. NIE używaj bloków kodu Markdown.\n3. NIE dodawaj żadnych wstępów ani wyjaśnień przed ani po JSONie.\n4. JSON musi być poprawny i gotowy do parsowania.\n\n",
      "ai_response_raw": "{\n  \"is_valid\": true,\n  \"issue\": \"none\"\n}"
    },
    {
      "timestamp": "2026-04-13T15:43:15.426Z",
      "source_url": "https://www.congress.gov/119/bills/hr8177/BILLS-119hr8177ih.htm",
      "model": "gemini-flash-latest",
      "prompt_sent": "\nJesteś ekspertem od prawa Stanów Zjednoczonych, który ma za zadanie analizować dokumenty ustaw, uchwał oraz innych dokumentów legislacyjnych, a następnie przygotowywać z nich informacje w przystępny sposób dla obywateli. Twoim celem jest przedstawienie informacji tak, aby obywatele mogli sami ocenić wpływ legislacji na ich życie, nawet bez posiadania specjalistycznej wiedzy legislacyjnej. Skup się na faktach i obiektywnych skutkach wprowadzanych zmian, unikając wartościowania i osobistych opinii. Wszelki żargon prawny jest zabroniony. Prezentuj informacje w jasny, zwięzły i angażujący sposób, tak aby były zrozumiałe dla osoby bez wykształcenia prawniczego. Unikaj długich, złożonych zdań. Zamiast pisać \"projekt ma na celu nowelizację kodeksu podatkowego...\", napisz \"Zmiany w podatkach: nowe ulgi i obowiązki dla...\". Kontynuuj swoją pracę, dopóki nie rozwiążesz swojego zadania. Jeśli nie masz pewności co do generowanej treści, przeanalizuj dokument ponownie – nie zgaduj. Rozplanuj dobrze swoje zadanie przed przystąpieniem do niego. W podsumowaniu i kluczowych punktach, jeśli to możliwe i uzasadnione, podkreśl, jakie konkretne korzyści lub skutki (pozytywne lub negatywne) wprowadza ustawa dla życia codziennego obywateli, ich praw i obowiązków, finansów osobistych, bezpieczeństwa i innych ważnych kwestii (np. kategorycznych zakazów i nakazów czy najważniejszych konkretnych alokacji finansowych i terytorialnych).\n\nTwoja odpowiedź MUSI być w formacie JSON - i zawierać następujące klucze.\nZanim zwrócisz odpowiedź, dokładnie zweryfikuj, czy cała struktura JSON jest w 100% poprawna, włącznie ze wszystkimi przecinkami, nawiasami klamrowymi, kwadratowymi oraz cudzysłowami. Błędny JSON jest nieakceptowalny i uniemożliwi przetworzenie Twojej pracy.\n\nPrzeanalizuj dokładnie poniższy tekst dokumentu prawnego. To jest treść, na podstawie której masz wygenerować podsumowanie i kluczowe punkty:\n--- POCZĄTEK DOKUMENTU ---\n[Congressional Bills 119th Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] [H.R. 8177 Introduced in House (IH)] <DOC> 119th CONGRESS 2d Session H. R. 8177 To enhance the security, resilience, and protection of critical undersea infrastructure vital to Taiwan's national security, economic stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone tactics employed by the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes. _______________________________________________________________________ IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES April 2, 2026 Mr. Lawler (for himself, Mr. Min, and Mr. Stanton) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned _______________________________________________________________________ A BILL To enhance the security, resilience, and protection of critical undersea infrastructure vital to Taiwan's national security, economic stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone tactics employed by the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Critical Undersea Infrastructure Resilience Initiative Act''. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. Congress finds the following: (1) The Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has increasingly used gray zone tactics to undermine the security of Taiwan and change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, including suspected sabotage of undersea cables in and around Taiwan, such as the incidents involving the severing of cables around the Matsu Islands of Taiwan and other key regions in 2023 and 2025. (2) Undersea cables and other critical undersea infrastructure are a primary vulnerability for Taiwan that could be targeted by the PRC to cripple the communication capabilities of Taiwan in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait and of broader hybrid warfare tactics. Disruption of critical undersea infrastructure would significantly impact the ability of Taiwan to communicate both domestically and internationally, leading to a breakdown in military, economic, and social functions. (3) The vulnerability of Taiwan to attacks on critical undersea infrastructure has been compounded by an increasing number of foreign vessels suspected of involvement in sabotage, including PRC-linked vessels, which pose direct threats to Taiwan's critical infrastructure. (4) The ability of the PRC to disrupt or damage critical undersea infrastructure is a critical element of its strategy aimed at disrupting Taiwan's military and civil communications and isolating Taiwan in the event of a blockade, quarantine, or other attempt to force unification with the PRC. (5) Recent activities by foreign adversaries, particularly the PRC, have increased the risk of sabotage and disruption to critical undersea infrastructure serving Taiwan and other nations, including-- (A) in February 2023, two vessels registered to the PRC severed two undersea cables that effectively cut internet access to the 13,000 residents of Taiwan's Matsu Islands, who had to rely on microwave radio transmissions to provide limited internet access for 50 days until a cable ship was able to complete repairs; (B) in January 2025, Taiwan's Chunghwa Telecom reported damage to an undersea cable north of Taipei and identified a ``suspicious vessel'' registered as the Shunxin-39 and the Xin Shun-39, which had traveled in a criss-cross pattern while dragging its anchor near where the cable was damaged; (C) in January 2025, a Mongolia-flagged vessel named the Baoshun was driven away by Taiwan's coast guard after suspicious movements off the coast of New Taipei; and (D) in February 2025, Taiwan's coast guard detained the Togo-flagged Hong Tai 58 near Taiwan's Penghu Islands after an undersea cable in the area was severed, with the captain later admitting to dropping the ship's anchor in the area and that he ``might have broken the cable''. (6) Since 2023, there have been at least 11 cases of damage to undersea cables around Taiwan and a similar number in the Baltic Sea, with authorities in Taiwan and Europe suspecting PRC and Russian involvement and possible coordination in several incidents. Those incidents highlight the vulnerability of critical undersea infrastructure, as well as the difficulty of proving sabotage or holding perpetrators accountable. (7) The sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure constitutes gray zone tactics designed to destabilize and undermine international security while falling short of direct military confrontation. (8) Several regional mechanisms have been established to bolster the security of undersea cables, including the Nordic Warden initiative for maritime domain awareness and the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, aimed at enhancing the security and resilience of undersea cables in the Indo-Pacific. (9) Taiwan is the world's 21st largest economy by purchasing power parity and deeply integrated in the global information and communications technology supply chain. Any restrictions to its internet connectivity or energy security would have a direct impact on the world's economy. (10) To counter the threats described in this section and safeguard the resilience of Taiwan, it is imperative for the United States and its allies to take decisive action to bolster Taiwan's defenses for critical undersea infrastructure and foster international cooperation to protect those critical assets. SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. In this section: (1) Critical undersea infrastructure.--The term ``critical undersea infrastructure'' means-- (A) subsea energy infrastructure, including a subsea cable, pipeline, or other equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed, to transmit electricity (including via subsea electricity cables, subsea electricity transformers, or equipment related to the support of offshore energy production installations) or to transport natural gas, oil, or hydrogen between land-based or off-shore infrastructure, as well as associated landing stations and facilities; or (B) subsea telecommunications infrastructure, including subsea fiber-optic cables and related equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed, and used to transmit communications, data, voice, video, or other electronic signals, as well as associated landing stations and facilities. (2) Sabotage.--The term ``sabotage'' means actions, or preparations for future actions, taken with the intent to cause defective production of, operation of, or damage to critical undersea infrastructure, including the integrity of data transmitted via subsea telecommunications infrastructure. SEC. 4. TAIWAN CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE INITIATIVE. (a) Establishment.--Not later than 360 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and such other heads of agencies as the Secretary of State considers relevant, shall establish an initiative to be known as the ``Taiwan Critical Undersea Infrastructure Initiative'' (in this section referred to as the ``Initiative''). (b) Priority.--The Initiative shall prioritize the protection and resilience of critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan, with a focus on countering threats from the PRC. (c) Key Focus Areas.-- (1) Advanced monitoring and detection capabilities.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Defense, shall develop and deploy advanced critical undersea infrastructure monitoring systems capable of detecting disruptions or potential sabotage in real-time, including by informing Taiwan, as appropriate, of early warnings about risks to Taiwan's critical undersea infrastructure from global intelligence networks. (2) Rapid response protocols.-- (A) In general.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall-- (i) in cooperation with regional partners, establish rapid response protocols for damaged critical undersea infrastructure or mitigating disruptions; and (ii) work with allies and partners of the United States to help Taiwan and regional partners develop the logistical capacity to respond quickly to attacks on critical undersea infrastructure and minimize downtime. (B) Authorization of appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated $20,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2027 through 2032 to carry out subparagraph (A). (3) Enhancing maritime domain awareness.--In carrying out the Initiative-- (A) the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the Coast Guard, in collaboration with the Coast Guard of Taiwan and regional partners, shall enhance maritime domain awareness around Taiwan, focusing on the ability to detect and interdict suspicious vessels or activities near critical undersea infrastructure; and (B) the Commandant of the Coast Guard shall assist in joint patrols and surveillance, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding maritime zones, to monitor potential threats and prevent sabotage. (4) International frameworks for protection.-- (A) In general.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall seek to establish cooperative frameworks with regional and global partners to protect undersea cable networks near Taiwan. (B) Elements.--The frameworks established under subparagraph (A) shall provide for participation by the United States in joint drills, intelligence-sharing platforms, and collaborative surveillance operations to enhance collective security against sabotage. (5) Taiwan-specific cable hardening.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall encourage and support the hardening of critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan, including reinforcing cables, improving burial depths, and using more resilient materials to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters and sabotage. SEC. 5. COUNTERING PRC GRAY ZONE TACTICS. (a) Working With Partners To Counter PRC Sabotage.--The President shall work with like-minded international partners to implement strategies that directly counter the Government of the PRC's critical undersea infrastructure sabotage activities as part of its gray zone warfare, including by increasing diplomatic pressure on the PRC to adhere to international norms regarding the protection of critical undersea infrastructure. (b) Raising Awareness.--The President shall work with like-minded international partners to raise global awareness of the risks posed by the PRC's sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, including through public diplomacy efforts, information sharing, and participation in international forums that address gray zone tactics and the protection of critical undersea infrastructure. SEC. 6. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE SABOTAGE. (a) In General.--The President, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to any foreign person that the President determines, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, is responsible for acts of sabotage, or facilitates acts of sabotage, against undersea infrastructure critical to the security of Taiwan or other United States allies or partners, including-- (1) any foreign vessel or entity the owner or operator of which knowingly-- (A) commits acts of sabotage; or (B) conducts preparatory surveillance, logistical support, security, or other services that facilitate or enable an act of sabotage; and (2) any foreign person that knowingly-- (A) owns, operates, or manages a vessel or entity described in paragraph (1); (B) provides underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance necessary for such a vessel or entity; (C) facilitates deceptive or structured transactions to support such a vessel or entity; (D) provides port or logistics services or facilities for technology upgrades or installation of equipment for, or retrofitting or tethering of, such a vessel for the purpose of evading sanctions; (E) provides documentation, registration, or flagging services for such a vessel for the purpose of evading sanctions; or (F) serves as a captain, principal officer, or senior leader of such a vessel or entity. (b) Report Required.--Not later than 15 days after imposing sanctions with respect to a foreign person under subsection (a), the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes a detailed justification for the imposition of the sanctions. (c) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this subsection are the following: (1) Blocking of property.--The President shall exercise all of the powers granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of a foreign person described in subsection (a), if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person. (2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.-- (A) Visas, admission, or parole.--An alien described in subsection (a) shall be-- (i) inadmissible to the United States; (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.). (B) Current visas revoked.-- (i) In general.--The visa or other entry documentation of an alien described in subsection (a) shall be revoked, regardless of when such visa or other entry documentation is or was issued. (ii) Immediate effect.--A revocation under clause (i) shall-- (I) take effect immediately; and (II) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the possession of the alien. (d) Implementation; Penalties.-- (1) Implementation.--The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section. (2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this section or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section. (e) Exceptions.-- (1) Exception to comply with united nations headquarters agreement and law enforcement activities.--Sanctions under this section shall not apply with respect to the admission or parole of an alien into the United States if admitting or paroling the alien is necessary-- (A) to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations of the United States; or (B) to carry out or assist authorized law enforcement activity in the United States. (2) Exception to comply with intelligence activities.-- Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States. (3) Exception relating to importation of goods.-- (A) In general.--A requirement to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property under this section shall not include the authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods. (B) Good defined.--In this paragraph, the term ``good'' means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data. (f) National Security Interests Waiver.--The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section if, before issuing the waiver, the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees-- (1) a certification in writing that the issuance of the waiver is in the national security interests of the United States; and (2) a report explaining the basis for the certification. (g) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Admission; admitted; alien; etc.--The terms ``admission'', ``admitted'', ``alien'', and ``lawfully admitted for permanent residence'' have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101). (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means-- (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives. (3) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means an individual or entity that is not a United States person. (4) United states person.--The term ``United States person'' means-- (A) any United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; (B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including any foreign branch of such an entity; or (C) any person in the United States. SEC. 7. SEMIANNUAL REPORT. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter through 2032, the President shall submit to Congress a report detailing-- (1) any incidents of interference or sabotage related to critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan; and (2) any actions taken in response to such incidents. SEC. 8. INTERAGENCY CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR CROSS-STRAIT CRISIS. (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to be prepared for potential crises involving Taiwan, including an attempt by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to change the status quo by force, through comprehensive interagency contingency planning that addresses the catastrophic risks such crises would pose to the national security of the United States. (b) Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish a Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group-- (A) to be chaired by the National Security Council; and (B) consisting of senior officials from the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the United States intelligence community, and such other Federal agencies as may be appropriate. (2) Functions.--The Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group shall-- (A) conduct scenario-based planning exercises to prepare for potential crises involving Taiwan, including blockade or quarantine scenarios, the seizure of an outlying island, military contingencies, economic coercion, cyber attacks, and hybrid threats; (B) identify critical vulnerabilities in supply chains, financial systems, critical infrastructure, and security posture of the United States and allies and partners of the United States that would be affected by a crisis involving Taiwan; (C) develop integrated contingency plans that coordinate diplomatic, military, economic, cyber, and homeland security responses across the Group; (D) assess the adequacy of existing authorities, resources, and decision-making processes to execute such contingency plans; (E) identify gaps in capabilities, authorities, or coordination mechanisms and recommend solutions; (F) share risk assessments with allies and partners of the United States, as appropriate; and (G) regularly test and refine contingency plans. (3) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the establishment of the Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group under paragraph (1), and annually thereafter for 10 years, the Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group shall submit to Congress a classified report that includes-- (A) a description of contingency scenarios assessed and planning activities conducted by the Group; (B) an assessment of the preparedness of the United States and allies and partners of the United States to respond to a crisis involving Taiwan, including identification of capability gaps and resource requirements; (C) recommendations for legislative action, policy changes, or resource allocation to enhance such preparedness; and (D) a description of exercises conducted and lessons learned by the Group. <all>\n--- KONIEC DOKUMENTU ---\n\nPAMIĘTAJ: Twoja odpowiedź MUSI być wyłącznie poprawnym obiektem JSON. Nie dodawaj żadnych dodatkowych znaków, komentarzy ani tekstu przed znacznikiem '{' ani po znaczniku '}'. Cała odpowiedź musi być parsowalna jako JSON.\nNa podstawie POWYŻSZEGO dokumentu, wypełnij poniższą strukturę JSON:\nOto struktura JSON, której oczekuję (wypełnij ją treścią):\n{\n  \"pl_ai_title\": \"Nowy, krótki tytuł dla aktu prawnego po polsku, oddający sedno wprowadzanych zmian (np. maksymalnie 10-12 słów).\",\n  \"pl_summary\": \"2-3 zdania zwięzłego podsumowania treści aktu prawnego po polsku, napisane z perspektywy wpływu na życie codzienne obywateli.\",\n  \"pl_key_points\": [\n    \"Pierwszy krótki punkt po polsku dotyczący najważniejszych wprowadzanych rozwiązań lub zmian.\",\n    \"Drugi krótki punkt po polsku...\"\n  ],\n  \"eng_ai_title\": \"A new, short title for the legal act in English, capturing the essence of the changes (e.g., max 10-12 words).\",\n  \"eng_summary\": \"2-3 sentences summarizing the legal act in English, from the perspective of its impact on citizens' daily lives.\",\n  \"eng_key_points\": [\n    \"First short bullet point in English regarding the most important solutions or changes being introduced.\",\n    \"Second short bullet point in English...\"\n  ],\n  \"de_ai_title\": \"Ein neuer, kurzer Titel für das Rechtsdokument auf Deutsch, der den Kern der Änderungen erfasst (z.B. max. 10-12 Wörter).\",\n  \"de_summary\": \"2-3 Sätze Zusammenfassung des Rechtsdokuments auf Deutsch, aus der Perspektive seiner Auswirkungen auf das tägliche Leben der Bürger.\",\n  \"de_key_points\": [\n    \"Erster kurzer Stichpunkt auf Deutsch zu den wichtigsten eingeführten Lösungen oder Änderungen.\",\n    \"Zweiter kurzer Stichpunkt auf Deutsch...\"\n  ],\n  \"fr_ai_title\": \"Un nouveau titre court pour l'acte juridique en français, saisissant l'essence des changements (par exemple, 10-12 mots maximum).\",\n  \"fr_summary\": \"Résumé de 2-3 phrases de l'acte juridique en français, du point de vue de son impact sur la vie quotidienne des citoyens.\",\n  \"fr_key_points\": [\n    \"Premier court point en français concernant les solutions ou changements les plus importants introduits.\",\n    \"Deuxième court point en français...\"\n  ],\n  \"es_ai_title\": \"Un nuevo título breve para el acto jurídico en español, que recoja la esencia de los cambios (por ejemplo, máximo 10-12 palabras).\",\n  \"es_summary\": \"Resumen de 2-3 frases del acto jurídico en español, desde la perspectiva de su impacto en la vida cotidiana de los ciudadanos.\",\n  \"es_key_points\": [\n    \"Primer punto breve en español sobre las soluciones o cambios más importantes que se introducen.\",\n    \"Segundo punto breve en español...\"\n  ],\n  \"it_ai_title\": \"Un nuovo titolo breve per l'atto giuridico in italiano, che colga l'essenza delle modifiche (ad es. massimo 10-12 parole).\",\n  \"it_summary\": \"Riepilogo di 2-3 frasi dell'atto giuridico in italiano, dal punto di vista del suo impatto sulla vita quotidiana dei cittadini.\",\n  \"it_key_points\": [\n    \"Primo breve punto in italiano riguardante le soluzioni o le modifiche più importanti introdotte.\",\n    \"Secondo breve punto in italiano...\"\n  ],\n  \"nl_ai_title\": \"Een nieuwe, korte titel voor de rechtshandeling in het Nederlands, die de essentie van de wijzigingen weergeeft (bijv. max. 10-12 woorden).\",\n  \"nl_summary\": \"Samenvatting van 2-3 zinnen van de rechtshandeling in het Nederlands, vanuit het perspectief van de impact op het dagelijks leven van burgers.\",\n  \"nl_key_points\": [\n    \"Eerste korte punt in het Nederlands betreffende de belangrijkste geïntroduceerde oplossingen of wijzigingen.\",\n    \"Tweede korte punt in het Nederlands...\"\n  ],\n  \"pt_ai_title\": \"Um novo título curto para o ato jurídico em português, capturando a essência das mudanças (por exemplo, máx. 10-12 palavras).\",\n  \"pt_summary\": \"Resumo de 2-3 frases do ato jurídico em português, na perspetiva do seu impacto na vida quotidiana dos cidadãos.\",\n  \"pt_key_points\": [\n    \"Primeiro ponto curto em português sobre as soluções ou alterações mais importantes introduzidas.\",\n    \"Segundo ponto curto em português...\"\n  ],\n  \"category\": [\"Categorize the document into one category by default, based on the field it primarily concerns. Choose up to 3 if the document also touches upon SIGNIFICANT issues from other categories. You MUST select categories ONLY from the following list: Health, Education, Family, Taxes, Labor, Security, Environment, Courts and Law, Transport, Benefits, Real Estate, Media and Culture, Local Government, Migration, Agriculture, Public Investments, Informatization, Economy. If the document does not definitively fit any of these, you MUST use \"Other\". If you use \"Other\", it should be the ONLY category selected. Do NOT invent new categories. The response must be an array of strings, e.g., [\"Taxes\", \"Family\"].\"]\n}\n\n",
      "ai_response_raw": "{\n  \"pl_ai_title\": \"Inicjatywa na rzecz ochrony podwodnej infrastruktury Tajwanu przed sabotażem\",\n  \"pl_summary\": \"Ustawa ma na celu zabezpieczenie kabli podwodnych i infrastruktury energetycznej wokół Tajwanu przed celowym uszkodzeniem, co chroni globalną gospodarkę i łączność internetową. Wprowadza ona surowe kary dla osób i firm zaangażowanych w sabotaż oraz przeznacza fundusze na szybką naprawę uszkodzeń.\",\n  \"pl_key_points\": [\n    \"Utworzenie specjalnej inicjatywy monitorującej i chroniącej kable podwodne przed sabotażem.\",\n    \"Nakładanie sankcji finansowych i wizowych na osoby oraz firmy niszczące infrastrukturę.\",\n    \"Przeznaczenie 20 milionów dolarów rocznie na systemy szybkiego reagowania i naprawy.\",\n    \"Wzmocnienie współpracy międzynarodowej w celu wykrywania podejrzanych statków.\",\n    \"Opracowanie planów kryzysowych na wypadek blokady lub ataków hybrydowych w regionie.\"\n  ],\n  \"eng_ai_title\": \"Initiative to Protect Taiwan's Undersea Infrastructure from Sabotage\",\n  \"eng_summary\": \"This act aims to secure undersea cables and energy infrastructure around Taiwan from intentional damage, protecting global economic stability and internet connectivity. It introduces strict penalties for individuals and companies involved in sabotage and allocates funds for rapid repairs of damaged infrastructure.\",\n  \"eng_key_points\": [\n    \"Creation of a special initiative to monitor and protect undersea cables from sabotage.\",\n    \"Imposition of financial and visa sanctions on individuals and companies damaging infrastructure.\",\n    \"Allocation of $20 million annually for rapid response and repair systems.\",\n    \"Strengthening international cooperation to detect suspicious vessels.\",\n    \"Development of contingency plans for potential blockades or hybrid attacks in the region.\"\n  ],\n  \"de_ai_title\": \"Initiative zum Schutz der Unterwasserinfrastruktur Taiwans vor Sabotage\",\n  \"de_summary\": \"Dieses Gesetz zielt darauf ab, Unterseekabel und Energieinfrastruktur um Taiwan vor vorsätzlicher Beschädigung zu schützen, um die globale Wirtschaftsstabilität und Internetkonnektivität zu sichern. Es führt strenge Strafen für Personen und Unternehmen ein, die an Sabotage beteiligt sind, und stellt Mittel für schnelle Reparaturen bereit.\",\n  \"de_key_points\": [\n    \"Einrichtung einer speziellen Initiative zur Überwachung und zum Schutz von Unterseekabeln vor Sabotage.\",\n    \"Verhängung von Finanz- und Visasanktionen gegen Personen und Unternehmen, die Infrastruktur beschädigen.\",\n    \"Bereitstellung von 20 Millionen Dollar jährlich für Schnellreaktions- und Reparatursysteme.\",\n    \"Stärkung der internationalen Zusammenarbeit zur Erkennung verdächtiger Schiffe.\",\n    \"Entwicklung von Notfallplänen für potenzielle Blockaden oder hybride Angriffe in der Region.\"\n  ],\n  \"fr_ai_title\": \"Initiative pour la protection des infrastructures sous-marines de Taïwan contre le sabotage\",\n  \"fr_summary\": \"Cette loi vise à sécuriser les câbles sous-marins et les infrastructures énergétiques autour de Taïwan contre les dommages intentionnels, protégeant ainsi la stabilité économique mondiale et la connectivité internet. Elle introduit des sanctions strictes pour les individus et les entreprises impliqués dans le sabotage et alloue des fonds pour des réparations rapides.\",\n  \"fr_key_points\": [\n    \"Création d'une initiative spéciale pour surveiller et protéger les câbles sous-marins contre le sabotage.\",\n    \"Imposition de sanctions financières et de visas aux personnes et entreprises endommageant les infrastructures.\",\n    \"Allocation de 20 millions de dollars par an pour les systèmes d'intervention rapide et de réparation.\",\n    \"Renforcement de la coopération internationale pour détecter les navires suspects.\",\n    \"Développement de plans d'urgence pour d'éventuels blocus ou attaques hybrides dans la région.\"\n  ],\n  \"es_ai_title\": \"Iniciativa para proteger la infraestructura submarina de Taiwán contra el sabotaje\",\n  \"es_summary\": \"Esta ley tiene como objetivo asegurar los cables submarinos y la infraestructura energética alrededor de Taiwán contra daños intencionados, protegiendo la estabilidad económica global y la conectividad a internet. Introduce sanciones estrictas para personas y empresas involucradas en sabotajes y asigna fondos para reparaciones rápidas.\",\n  \"es_key_points\": [\n    \"Creación de una iniciativa especial para monitorear y proteger los cables submarinos contra el sabotaje.\",\n    \"Imposición de sanciones financieras y de visado a personas y empresas que dañen la infraestructura.\",\n    \"Asignación de 20 millones de dólares anuales para sistemas de respuesta rápida y reparación.\",\n    \"Fortalecimiento de la cooperación internacional para detectar embarcaciones sospechosas.\",\n    \"Desarrollo de planes de contingencia para posibles bloqueos o ataques híbridos en la región.\"\n  ],\n  \"it_ai_title\": \"Iniziativa per la protezione delle infrastrutture sottomarine di Taiwan dai sabotaggi\",\n  \"it_summary\": \"Questa legge mira a mettere in sicurezza i cavi sottomarini e le infrastrutture energetiche intorno a Taiwan dai danni intenzionali, proteggendo la stabilità economica globale e la connettività internet. Introduce sanzioni severe per individui e aziende coinvolti in sabotaggi e stanzia fondi per riparazioni rapide.\",\n  \"it_key_points\": [\n    \"Creazione di un'iniziativa speciale per monitorare e proteggere i cavi sottomarini dai sabotaggi.\",\n    \"Imposizione di sanzioni finanziarie e sui visti a persone e aziende che danneggiano le infrastrutture.\",\n    \"Stanziamento di 20 milioni di dollari all'anno per sistemi di risposta rapida e riparazione.\",\n    \"Rafforzamento della cooperazione internazionale per individuare imbarcazioni sospette.\",\n    \"Sviluppo di piani di emergenza per potenziali blocchi o attacchi ibridi nella regione.\"\n  ],\n  \"nl_ai_title\": \"Initiatief ter bescherming van de onderzeese infrastructuur van Taiwan tegen sabotage\",\n  \"nl_summary\": \"Deze wet is bedoeld om onderzeese kabels en energie-infrastructuur rond Taiwan te beveiligen tegen opzettelijke schade, waardoor de wereldwijde economische stabiliteit en internetconnectiviteit worden beschermd. Het voert strikte straffen in voor personen en bedrijven die betrokken zijn bij sabotage en trekt geld uit voor snelle reparaties.\",\n  \"nl_key_points\": [\n    \"Oprichting van een speciaal initiatief om onderzeese kabels te monitoren en te beschermen tegen sabotage.\",\n    \"Opleggen van financiële en visumsancties aan personen en bedrijven die infrastructuur beschadigen.\",\n    \"Toewijzing van 20 miljoen dollar per jaar voor systemen voor snelle reactie en reparatie.\",\n    \"Versterking van de internationale samenwerking om verdachte vaartuigen op te sporen.\",\n    \"Ontwikkeling van noodplannen voor mogelijke blokkades of hybride aanvallen in de regio.\"\n  ],\n  \"pt_ai_title\": \"Iniciativa para proteger a infraestrutura submarina de Taiwan contra sabotagem\",\n  \"pt_summary\": \"Esta lei visa proteger os cabos submarinos e a infraestrutura energética em torno de Taiwan contra danos intencionais, salvaguardando a estabilidade económica global e a conectividade à internet. Introduz sanções rigorosas para indivíduos e empresas envolvidos em sabotagem e atribui fundos para reparações rápidas.\",\n  \"pt_key_points\": [\n    \"Criação de uma iniciativa especial para monitorizar e proteger os cabos submarinos contra sabotagem.\",\n    \"Imposição de sanções financeiras e de vistos a pessoas e empresas que danifiquem a infraestrutura.\",\n    \"Alocação de 20 milhões de dólares anuais para sistemas de resposta rápida e reparação.\",\n    \"Reforço da cooperação internacional para detetar embarcações suspeitas.\",\n    \"Desenvolvimento de planos de contingência para potenciais bloqueios ou ataques híbridos na região.\"\n  ],\n  \"category\": [\n    \"Security\",\n    \"Economy\",\n    \"Informatization\"\n  ]\n}"
    },
    {
      "timestamp": "2026-04-13T14:51:56.984Z",
      "source_url": "https://www.congress.gov/119/bills/hr8177/BILLS-119hr8177ih.htm",
      "model": "gemini-flash-lite-latest",
      "prompt_sent": "\nROLE: Fact Checker.\nZADANIE: Porównaj SOURCE (oryginał) i SUMMARY (streszczenie przygotowane przez inne AI).\n\nTwoim celem jest wykrycie \"ZMYŚLONYCH KONKRETÓW\" (Fabricated Entities) w SUMMARY.\n\nSOURCE:\n[Congressional Bills 119th Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] [H.R. 8177 Introduced in House (IH)] <DOC> 119th CONGRESS 2d Session H. R. 8177 To enhance the security, resilience, and protection of critical undersea infrastructure vital to Taiwan's national security, economic stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone tactics employed by the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes. _______________________________________________________________________ IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES April 2, 2026 Mr. Lawler (for himself, Mr. Min, and Mr. Stanton) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned _______________________________________________________________________ A BILL To enhance the security, resilience, and protection of critical undersea infrastructure vital to Taiwan's national security, economic stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone tactics employed by the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Critical Undersea Infrastructure Resilience Initiative Act''. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. Congress finds the following: (1) The Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has increasingly used gray zone tactics to undermine the security of Taiwan and change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, including suspected sabotage of undersea cables in and around Taiwan, such as the incidents involving the severing of cables around the Matsu Islands of Taiwan and other key regions in 2023 and 2025. (2) Undersea cables and other critical undersea infrastructure are a primary vulnerability for Taiwan that could be targeted by the PRC to cripple the communication capabilities of Taiwan in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait and of broader hybrid warfare tactics. Disruption of critical undersea infrastructure would significantly impact the ability of Taiwan to communicate both domestically and internationally, leading to a breakdown in military, economic, and social functions. (3) The vulnerability of Taiwan to attacks on critical undersea infrastructure has been compounded by an increasing number of foreign vessels suspected of involvement in sabotage, including PRC-linked vessels, which pose direct threats to Taiwan's critical infrastructure. (4) The ability of the PRC to disrupt or damage critical undersea infrastructure is a critical element of its strategy aimed at disrupting Taiwan's military and civil communications and isolating Taiwan in the event of a blockade, quarantine, or other attempt to force unification with the PRC. (5) Recent activities by foreign adversaries, particularly the PRC, have increased the risk of sabotage and disruption to critical undersea infrastructure serving Taiwan and other nations, including-- (A) in February 2023, two vessels registered to the PRC severed two undersea cables that effectively cut internet access to the 13,000 residents of Taiwan's Matsu Islands, who had to rely on microwave radio transmissions to provide limited internet access for 50 days until a cable ship was able to complete repairs; (B) in January 2025, Taiwan's Chunghwa Telecom reported damage to an undersea cable north of Taipei and identified a ``suspicious vessel'' registered as the Shunxin-39 and the Xin Shun-39, which had traveled in a criss-cross pattern while dragging its anchor near where the cable was damaged; (C) in January 2025, a Mongolia-flagged vessel named the Baoshun was driven away by Taiwan's coast guard after suspicious movements off the coast of New Taipei; and (D) in February 2025, Taiwan's coast guard detained the Togo-flagged Hong Tai 58 near Taiwan's Penghu Islands after an undersea cable in the area was severed, with the captain later admitting to dropping the ship's anchor in the area and that he ``might have broken the cable''. (6) Since 2023, there have been at least 11 cases of damage to undersea cables around Taiwan and a similar number in the Baltic Sea, with authorities in Taiwan and Europe suspecting PRC and Russian involvement and possible coordination in several incidents. Those incidents highlight the vulnerability of critical undersea infrastructure, as well as the difficulty of proving sabotage or holding perpetrators accountable. (7) The sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure constitutes gray zone tactics designed to destabilize and undermine international security while falling short of direct military confrontation. (8) Several regional mechanisms have been established to bolster the security of undersea cables, including the Nordic Warden initiative for maritime domain awareness and the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, aimed at enhancing the security and resilience of undersea cables in the Indo-Pacific. (9) Taiwan is the world's 21st largest economy by purchasing power parity and deeply integrated in the global information and communications technology supply chain. Any restrictions to its internet connectivity or energy security would have a direct impact on the world's economy. (10) To counter the threats described in this section and safeguard the resilience of Taiwan, it is imperative for the United States and its allies to take decisive action to bolster Taiwan's defenses for critical undersea infrastructure and foster international cooperation to protect those critical assets. SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. In this section: (1) Critical undersea infrastructure.--The term ``critical undersea infrastructure'' means-- (A) subsea energy infrastructure, including a subsea cable, pipeline, or other equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed, to transmit electricity (including via subsea electricity cables, subsea electricity transformers, or equipment related to the support of offshore energy production installations) or to transport natural gas, oil, or hydrogen between land-based or off-shore infrastructure, as well as associated landing stations and facilities; or (B) subsea telecommunications infrastructure, including subsea fiber-optic cables and related equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed, and used to transmit communications, data, voice, video, or other electronic signals, as well as associated landing stations and facilities. (2) Sabotage.--The term ``sabotage'' means actions, or preparations for future actions, taken with the intent to cause defective production of, operation of, or damage to critical undersea infrastructure, including the integrity of data transmitted via subsea telecommunications infrastructure. SEC. 4. TAIWAN CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE INITIATIVE. (a) Establishment.--Not later than 360 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and such other heads of agencies as the Secretary of State considers relevant, shall establish an initiative to be known as the ``Taiwan Critical Undersea Infrastructure Initiative'' (in this section referred to as the ``Initiative''). (b) Priority.--The Initiative shall prioritize the protection and resilience of critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan, with a focus on countering threats from the PRC. (c) Key Focus Areas.-- (1) Advanced monitoring and detection capabilities.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Defense, shall develop and deploy advanced critical undersea infrastructure monitoring systems capable of detecting disruptions or potential sabotage in real-time, including by informing Taiwan, as appropriate, of early warnings about risks to Taiwan's critical undersea infrastructure from global intelligence networks. (2) Rapid response protocols.-- (A) In general.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall-- (i) in cooperation with regional partners, establish rapid response protocols for damaged critical undersea infrastructure or mitigating disruptions; and (ii) work with allies and partners of the United States to help Taiwan and regional partners develop the logistical capacity to respond quickly to attacks on critical undersea infrastructure and minimize downtime. (B) Authorization of appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated $20,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2027 through 2032 to carry out subparagraph (A). (3) Enhancing maritime domain awareness.--In carrying out the Initiative-- (A) the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the Coast Guard, in collaboration with the Coast Guard of Taiwan and regional partners, shall enhance maritime domain awareness around Taiwan, focusing on the ability to detect and interdict suspicious vessels or activities near critical undersea infrastructure; and (B) the Commandant of the Coast Guard shall assist in joint patrols and surveillance, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding maritime zones, to monitor potential threats and prevent sabotage. (4) International frameworks for protection.-- (A) In general.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall seek to establish cooperative frameworks with regional and global partners to protect undersea cable networks near Taiwan. (B) Elements.--The frameworks established under subparagraph (A) shall provide for participation by the United States in joint drills, intelligence-sharing platforms, and collaborative surveillance operations to enhance collective security against sabotage. (5) Taiwan-specific cable hardening.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall encourage and support the hardening of critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan, including reinforcing cables, improving burial depths, and using more resilient materials to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters and sabotage. SEC. 5. COUNTERING PRC GRAY ZONE TACTICS. (a) Working With Partners To Counter PRC Sabotage.--The President shall work with like-minded international partners to implement strategies that directly counter the Government of the PRC's critical undersea infrastructure sabotage activities as part of its gray zone warfare, including by increasing diplomatic pressure on the PRC to adhere to international norms regarding the protection of critical undersea infrastructure. (b) Raising Awareness.--The President shall work with like-minded international partners to raise global awareness of the risks posed by the PRC's sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, including through public diplomacy efforts, information sharing, and participation in international forums that address gray zone tactics and the protection of critical undersea infrastructure. SEC. 6. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE SABOTAGE. (a) In General.--The President, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to any foreign person that the President determines, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, is responsible for acts of sabotage, or facilitates acts of sabotage, against undersea infrastructure critical to the security of Taiwan or other United States allies or partners, including-- (1) any foreign vessel or entity the owner or operator of which knowingly-- (A) commits acts of sabotage; or (B) conducts preparatory surveillance, logistical support, security, or other services that facilitate or enable an act of sabotage; and (2) any foreign person that knowingly-- (A) owns, operates, or manages a vessel or entity described in paragraph (1); (B) provides underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance necessary for such a vessel or entity; (C) facilitates deceptive or structured transactions to support such a vessel or entity; (D) provides port or logistics services or facilities for technology upgrades or installation of equipment for, or retrofitting or tethering of, such a vessel for the purpose of evading sanctions; (E) provides documentation, registration, or flagging services for such a vessel for the purpose of evading sanctions; or (F) serves as a captain, principal officer, or senior leader of such a vessel or entity. (b) Report Required.--Not later than 15 days after imposing sanctions with respect to a foreign person under subsection (a), the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes a detailed justification for the imposition of the sanctions. (c) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this subsection are the following: (1) Blocking of property.--The President shall exercise all of the powers granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of a foreign person described in subsection (a), if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person. (2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.-- (A) Visas, admission, or parole.--An alien described in subsection (a) shall be-- (i) inadmissible to the United States; (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.). (B) Current visas revoked.-- (i) In general.--The visa or other entry documentation of an alien described in subsection (a) shall be revoked, regardless of when such visa or other entry documentation is or was issued. (ii) Immediate effect.--A revocation under clause (i) shall-- (I) take effect immediately; and (II) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the possession of the alien. (d) Implementation; Penalties.-- (1) Implementation.--The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section. (2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this section or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section. (e) Exceptions.-- (1) Exception to comply with united nations headquarters agreement and law enforcement activities.--Sanctions under this section shall not apply with respect to the admission or parole of an alien into the United States if admitting or paroling the alien is necessary-- (A) to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations of the United States; or (B) to carry out or assist authorized law enforcement activity in the United States. (2) Exception to comply with intelligence activities.-- Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States. (3) Exception relating to importation of goods.-- (A) In general.--A requirement to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property under this section shall not include the authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods. (B) Good defined.--In this paragraph, the term ``good'' means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data. (f) National Security Interests Waiver.--The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section if, before issuing the waiver, the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees-- (1) a certification in writing that the issuance of the waiver is in the national security interests of the United States; and (2) a report explaining the basis for the certification. (g) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Admission; admitted; alien; etc.--The terms ``admission'', ``admitted'', ``alien'', and ``lawfully admitted for permanent residence'' have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101). (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means-- (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives. (3) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means an individual or entity that is not a United States person. (4) United states person.--The term ``United States person'' means-- (A) any United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; (B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including any foreign branch of such an entity; or (C) any person in the United States. SEC. 7. SEMIANNUAL REPORT. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter through 2032, the President shall submit to Congress a report detailing-- (1) any incidents of interference or sabotage related to critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan; and (2) any actions taken in response to such incidents. SEC. 8. INTERAGENCY CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR CROSS-STRAIT CRISIS. (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to be prepared for potential crises involving Taiwan, including an attempt by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to change the status quo by force, through comprehensive interagency contingency planning that addresses the catastrophic risks such crises would pose to the national security of the United States. (b) Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish a Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group-- (A) to be chaired by the National Security Council; and (B) consisting of senior officials from the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the United States intelligence community, and such other Federal agencies as may be appropriate. (2) Functions.--The Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group shall-- (A) conduct scenario-based planning exercises to prepare for potential crises involving Taiwan, including blockade or quarantine scenarios, the seizure of an outlying island, military contingencies, economic coercion, cyber attacks, and hybrid threats; (B) identify critical vulnerabilities in supply chains, financial systems, critical infrastructure, and security posture of the United States and allies and partners of the United States that would be affected by a crisis involving Taiwan; (C) develop integrated contingency plans that coordinate diplomatic, military, economic, cyber, and homeland security responses across the Group; (D) assess the adequacy of existing authorities, resources, and decision-making processes to execute such contingency plans; (E) identify gaps in capabilities, authorities, or coordination mechanisms and recommend solutions; (F) share risk assessments with allies and partners of the United States, as appropriate; and (G) regularly test and refine contingency plans. (3) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the establishment of the Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group under paragraph (1), and annually thereafter for 10 years, the Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group shall submit to Congress a classified report that includes-- (A) a description of contingency scenarios assessed and planning activities conducted by the Group; (B) an assessment of the preparedness of the United States and allies and partners of the United States to respond to a crisis involving Taiwan, including identification of capability gaps and resource requirements; (C) recommendations for legislative action, policy changes, or resource allocation to enhance such preparedness; and (D) a description of exercises conducted and lessons learned by the Group. <all>\n\nSUMMARY TO EVALUATE:\nTitle: Internet and Energy Protection: New Safeguards for Taiwan's Undersea Infrastructure\nSummary: This act aims to secure undersea cables and pipelines around Taiwan from intentional damage, protecting global connectivity and the economy. It introduces monitoring systems, rapid repair protocols, and strict financial and visa penalties for those involved in sabotage.\nKey Points: Better protection for internet cables ensures the stability of global networks and digital services., New sabotage detection systems aim to prevent sudden power and internet outages., Individuals and companies damaging infrastructure will be cut off from the US financial and visa systems., Special funds will allow for lightning-fast repairs of damaged undersea connections., Increased coast guard presence will improve security on vital maritime routes.\n\nZASADY OCENY:\n1. Sprawdź wszystkie LICZBY, DATY i KWOTY w SUMMARY. Jeśli którejś brakuje w SOURCE -> is_valid: false.\n2. Sprawdź wszystkie NAZWISKA, ORGANIZACJE i MIEJSCA w SUMMARY. Jeśli którejś brakuje w SOURCE -> is_valid: false.\n3. Sprawdź wszystkie konkretne DZIAŁANIA PRAWNE . Jeśli tego mechanizmu nie ma w SOURCE -> is_valid: false.\n\nWAŻNE: Abstrakcyjne pojęcia (np. \"transparentność\", \"zaufanie\") są dozwolone jako wnioski.\n\nOUTPUT (JSON):\n{\n  \"is_valid\": true/false,\n  \"issue\": \"fabricated_entity\" / \"contradiction\" / \"none\"\n}\n\nWYMAGANIA FORMATOWANIA:\n1. Odpowiedz WYŁĄCZNIE surowym obiektem JSON.\n2. NIE używaj bloków kodu Markdown.\n3. NIE dodawaj żadnych wstępów ani wyjaśnień przed ani po JSONie.\n4. JSON musi być poprawny i gotowy do parsowania.\n\n",
      "ai_response_raw": "{\n  \"is_valid\": false,\n  \"issue\": \"fabricated_entity\"\n}"
    },
    {
      "timestamp": "2026-04-13T14:19:16.220Z",
      "source_url": "https://www.congress.gov/119/bills/hr8177/BILLS-119hr8177ih.htm",
      "model": "gemini-flash-latest",
      "prompt_sent": "\nJesteś ekspertem od prawa Stanów Zjednoczonych, który ma za zadanie analizować dokumenty ustaw, uchwał oraz innych dokumentów legislacyjnych, a następnie przygotowywać z nich informacje w przystępny sposób dla obywateli. Twoim celem jest przedstawienie informacji tak, aby obywatele mogli sami ocenić wpływ legislacji na ich życie, nawet bez posiadania specjalistycznej wiedzy legislacyjnej. Skup się na faktach i obiektywnych skutkach wprowadzanych zmian, unikając wartościowania i osobistych opinii. Wszelki żargon prawny jest zabroniony. Prezentuj informacje w jasny, zwięzły i angażujący sposób, tak aby były zrozumiałe dla osoby bez wykształcenia prawniczego. Unikaj długich, złożonych zdań. Zamiast pisać \"projekt ma na celu nowelizację kodeksu podatkowego...\", napisz \"Zmiany w podatkach: nowe ulgi i obowiązki dla...\". Kontynuuj swoją pracę, dopóki nie rozwiążesz swojego zadania. Jeśli nie masz pewności co do generowanej treści, przeanalizuj dokument ponownie – nie zgaduj. Rozplanuj dobrze swoje zadanie przed przystąpieniem do niego. W podsumowaniu i kluczowych punktach, jeśli to możliwe i uzasadnione, podkreśl, jakie konkretne korzyści lub skutki (pozytywne lub negatywne) wprowadza ustawa dla życia codziennego obywateli, ich praw i obowiązków, finansów osobistych, bezpieczeństwa i innych ważnych kwestii (np. kategorycznych zakazów i nakazów czy najważniejszych konkretnych alokacji finansowych i terytorialnych).\n\nTwoja odpowiedź MUSI być w formacie JSON - i zawierać następujące klucze.\nZanim zwrócisz odpowiedź, dokładnie zweryfikuj, czy cała struktura JSON jest w 100% poprawna, włącznie ze wszystkimi przecinkami, nawiasami klamrowymi, kwadratowymi oraz cudzysłowami. Błędny JSON jest nieakceptowalny i uniemożliwi przetworzenie Twojej pracy.\n\nPrzeanalizuj dokładnie poniższy tekst dokumentu prawnego. To jest treść, na podstawie której masz wygenerować podsumowanie i kluczowe punkty:\n--- POCZĄTEK DOKUMENTU ---\n[Congressional Bills 119th Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] [H.R. 8177 Introduced in House (IH)] <DOC> 119th CONGRESS 2d Session H. R. 8177 To enhance the security, resilience, and protection of critical undersea infrastructure vital to Taiwan's national security, economic stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone tactics employed by the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes. _______________________________________________________________________ IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES April 2, 2026 Mr. Lawler (for himself, Mr. Min, and Mr. Stanton) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned _______________________________________________________________________ A BILL To enhance the security, resilience, and protection of critical undersea infrastructure vital to Taiwan's national security, economic stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone tactics employed by the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Critical Undersea Infrastructure Resilience Initiative Act''. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. Congress finds the following: (1) The Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has increasingly used gray zone tactics to undermine the security of Taiwan and change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, including suspected sabotage of undersea cables in and around Taiwan, such as the incidents involving the severing of cables around the Matsu Islands of Taiwan and other key regions in 2023 and 2025. (2) Undersea cables and other critical undersea infrastructure are a primary vulnerability for Taiwan that could be targeted by the PRC to cripple the communication capabilities of Taiwan in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait and of broader hybrid warfare tactics. Disruption of critical undersea infrastructure would significantly impact the ability of Taiwan to communicate both domestically and internationally, leading to a breakdown in military, economic, and social functions. (3) The vulnerability of Taiwan to attacks on critical undersea infrastructure has been compounded by an increasing number of foreign vessels suspected of involvement in sabotage, including PRC-linked vessels, which pose direct threats to Taiwan's critical infrastructure. (4) The ability of the PRC to disrupt or damage critical undersea infrastructure is a critical element of its strategy aimed at disrupting Taiwan's military and civil communications and isolating Taiwan in the event of a blockade, quarantine, or other attempt to force unification with the PRC. (5) Recent activities by foreign adversaries, particularly the PRC, have increased the risk of sabotage and disruption to critical undersea infrastructure serving Taiwan and other nations, including-- (A) in February 2023, two vessels registered to the PRC severed two undersea cables that effectively cut internet access to the 13,000 residents of Taiwan's Matsu Islands, who had to rely on microwave radio transmissions to provide limited internet access for 50 days until a cable ship was able to complete repairs; (B) in January 2025, Taiwan's Chunghwa Telecom reported damage to an undersea cable north of Taipei and identified a ``suspicious vessel'' registered as the Shunxin-39 and the Xin Shun-39, which had traveled in a criss-cross pattern while dragging its anchor near where the cable was damaged; (C) in January 2025, a Mongolia-flagged vessel named the Baoshun was driven away by Taiwan's coast guard after suspicious movements off the coast of New Taipei; and (D) in February 2025, Taiwan's coast guard detained the Togo-flagged Hong Tai 58 near Taiwan's Penghu Islands after an undersea cable in the area was severed, with the captain later admitting to dropping the ship's anchor in the area and that he ``might have broken the cable''. (6) Since 2023, there have been at least 11 cases of damage to undersea cables around Taiwan and a similar number in the Baltic Sea, with authorities in Taiwan and Europe suspecting PRC and Russian involvement and possible coordination in several incidents. Those incidents highlight the vulnerability of critical undersea infrastructure, as well as the difficulty of proving sabotage or holding perpetrators accountable. (7) The sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure constitutes gray zone tactics designed to destabilize and undermine international security while falling short of direct military confrontation. (8) Several regional mechanisms have been established to bolster the security of undersea cables, including the Nordic Warden initiative for maritime domain awareness and the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, aimed at enhancing the security and resilience of undersea cables in the Indo-Pacific. (9) Taiwan is the world's 21st largest economy by purchasing power parity and deeply integrated in the global information and communications technology supply chain. Any restrictions to its internet connectivity or energy security would have a direct impact on the world's economy. (10) To counter the threats described in this section and safeguard the resilience of Taiwan, it is imperative for the United States and its allies to take decisive action to bolster Taiwan's defenses for critical undersea infrastructure and foster international cooperation to protect those critical assets. SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. In this section: (1) Critical undersea infrastructure.--The term ``critical undersea infrastructure'' means-- (A) subsea energy infrastructure, including a subsea cable, pipeline, or other equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed, to transmit electricity (including via subsea electricity cables, subsea electricity transformers, or equipment related to the support of offshore energy production installations) or to transport natural gas, oil, or hydrogen between land-based or off-shore infrastructure, as well as associated landing stations and facilities; or (B) subsea telecommunications infrastructure, including subsea fiber-optic cables and related equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed, and used to transmit communications, data, voice, video, or other electronic signals, as well as associated landing stations and facilities. (2) Sabotage.--The term ``sabotage'' means actions, or preparations for future actions, taken with the intent to cause defective production of, operation of, or damage to critical undersea infrastructure, including the integrity of data transmitted via subsea telecommunications infrastructure. SEC. 4. TAIWAN CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE INITIATIVE. (a) Establishment.--Not later than 360 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and such other heads of agencies as the Secretary of State considers relevant, shall establish an initiative to be known as the ``Taiwan Critical Undersea Infrastructure Initiative'' (in this section referred to as the ``Initiative''). (b) Priority.--The Initiative shall prioritize the protection and resilience of critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan, with a focus on countering threats from the PRC. (c) Key Focus Areas.-- (1) Advanced monitoring and detection capabilities.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Defense, shall develop and deploy advanced critical undersea infrastructure monitoring systems capable of detecting disruptions or potential sabotage in real-time, including by informing Taiwan, as appropriate, of early warnings about risks to Taiwan's critical undersea infrastructure from global intelligence networks. (2) Rapid response protocols.-- (A) In general.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall-- (i) in cooperation with regional partners, establish rapid response protocols for damaged critical undersea infrastructure or mitigating disruptions; and (ii) work with allies and partners of the United States to help Taiwan and regional partners develop the logistical capacity to respond quickly to attacks on critical undersea infrastructure and minimize downtime. (B) Authorization of appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated $20,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2027 through 2032 to carry out subparagraph (A). (3) Enhancing maritime domain awareness.--In carrying out the Initiative-- (A) the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the Coast Guard, in collaboration with the Coast Guard of Taiwan and regional partners, shall enhance maritime domain awareness around Taiwan, focusing on the ability to detect and interdict suspicious vessels or activities near critical undersea infrastructure; and (B) the Commandant of the Coast Guard shall assist in joint patrols and surveillance, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding maritime zones, to monitor potential threats and prevent sabotage. (4) International frameworks for protection.-- (A) In general.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall seek to establish cooperative frameworks with regional and global partners to protect undersea cable networks near Taiwan. (B) Elements.--The frameworks established under subparagraph (A) shall provide for participation by the United States in joint drills, intelligence-sharing platforms, and collaborative surveillance operations to enhance collective security against sabotage. (5) Taiwan-specific cable hardening.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall encourage and support the hardening of critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan, including reinforcing cables, improving burial depths, and using more resilient materials to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters and sabotage. SEC. 5. COUNTERING PRC GRAY ZONE TACTICS. (a) Working With Partners To Counter PRC Sabotage.--The President shall work with like-minded international partners to implement strategies that directly counter the Government of the PRC's critical undersea infrastructure sabotage activities as part of its gray zone warfare, including by increasing diplomatic pressure on the PRC to adhere to international norms regarding the protection of critical undersea infrastructure. (b) Raising Awareness.--The President shall work with like-minded international partners to raise global awareness of the risks posed by the PRC's sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, including through public diplomacy efforts, information sharing, and participation in international forums that address gray zone tactics and the protection of critical undersea infrastructure. SEC. 6. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE SABOTAGE. (a) In General.--The President, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to any foreign person that the President determines, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, is responsible for acts of sabotage, or facilitates acts of sabotage, against undersea infrastructure critical to the security of Taiwan or other United States allies or partners, including-- (1) any foreign vessel or entity the owner or operator of which knowingly-- (A) commits acts of sabotage; or (B) conducts preparatory surveillance, logistical support, security, or other services that facilitate or enable an act of sabotage; and (2) any foreign person that knowingly-- (A) owns, operates, or manages a vessel or entity described in paragraph (1); (B) provides underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance necessary for such a vessel or entity; (C) facilitates deceptive or structured transactions to support such a vessel or entity; (D) provides port or logistics services or facilities for technology upgrades or installation of equipment for, or retrofitting or tethering of, such a vessel for the purpose of evading sanctions; (E) provides documentation, registration, or flagging services for such a vessel for the purpose of evading sanctions; or (F) serves as a captain, principal officer, or senior leader of such a vessel or entity. (b) Report Required.--Not later than 15 days after imposing sanctions with respect to a foreign person under subsection (a), the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes a detailed justification for the imposition of the sanctions. (c) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this subsection are the following: (1) Blocking of property.--The President shall exercise all of the powers granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of a foreign person described in subsection (a), if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person. (2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.-- (A) Visas, admission, or parole.--An alien described in subsection (a) shall be-- (i) inadmissible to the United States; (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.). (B) Current visas revoked.-- (i) In general.--The visa or other entry documentation of an alien described in subsection (a) shall be revoked, regardless of when such visa or other entry documentation is or was issued. (ii) Immediate effect.--A revocation under clause (i) shall-- (I) take effect immediately; and (II) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the possession of the alien. (d) Implementation; Penalties.-- (1) Implementation.--The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section. (2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this section or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section. (e) Exceptions.-- (1) Exception to comply with united nations headquarters agreement and law enforcement activities.--Sanctions under this section shall not apply with respect to the admission or parole of an alien into the United States if admitting or paroling the alien is necessary-- (A) to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations of the United States; or (B) to carry out or assist authorized law enforcement activity in the United States. (2) Exception to comply with intelligence activities.-- Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States. (3) Exception relating to importation of goods.-- (A) In general.--A requirement to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property under this section shall not include the authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods. (B) Good defined.--In this paragraph, the term ``good'' means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data. (f) National Security Interests Waiver.--The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section if, before issuing the waiver, the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees-- (1) a certification in writing that the issuance of the waiver is in the national security interests of the United States; and (2) a report explaining the basis for the certification. (g) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Admission; admitted; alien; etc.--The terms ``admission'', ``admitted'', ``alien'', and ``lawfully admitted for permanent residence'' have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101). (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means-- (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives. (3) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means an individual or entity that is not a United States person. (4) United states person.--The term ``United States person'' means-- (A) any United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; (B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including any foreign branch of such an entity; or (C) any person in the United States. SEC. 7. SEMIANNUAL REPORT. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter through 2032, the President shall submit to Congress a report detailing-- (1) any incidents of interference or sabotage related to critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan; and (2) any actions taken in response to such incidents. SEC. 8. INTERAGENCY CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR CROSS-STRAIT CRISIS. (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to be prepared for potential crises involving Taiwan, including an attempt by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to change the status quo by force, through comprehensive interagency contingency planning that addresses the catastrophic risks such crises would pose to the national security of the United States. (b) Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish a Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group-- (A) to be chaired by the National Security Council; and (B) consisting of senior officials from the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the United States intelligence community, and such other Federal agencies as may be appropriate. (2) Functions.--The Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group shall-- (A) conduct scenario-based planning exercises to prepare for potential crises involving Taiwan, including blockade or quarantine scenarios, the seizure of an outlying island, military contingencies, economic coercion, cyber attacks, and hybrid threats; (B) identify critical vulnerabilities in supply chains, financial systems, critical infrastructure, and security posture of the United States and allies and partners of the United States that would be affected by a crisis involving Taiwan; (C) develop integrated contingency plans that coordinate diplomatic, military, economic, cyber, and homeland security responses across the Group; (D) assess the adequacy of existing authorities, resources, and decision-making processes to execute such contingency plans; (E) identify gaps in capabilities, authorities, or coordination mechanisms and recommend solutions; (F) share risk assessments with allies and partners of the United States, as appropriate; and (G) regularly test and refine contingency plans. (3) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the establishment of the Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group under paragraph (1), and annually thereafter for 10 years, the Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group shall submit to Congress a classified report that includes-- (A) a description of contingency scenarios assessed and planning activities conducted by the Group; (B) an assessment of the preparedness of the United States and allies and partners of the United States to respond to a crisis involving Taiwan, including identification of capability gaps and resource requirements; (C) recommendations for legislative action, policy changes, or resource allocation to enhance such preparedness; and (D) a description of exercises conducted and lessons learned by the Group. <all>\n--- KONIEC DOKUMENTU ---\n\nPAMIĘTAJ: Twoja odpowiedź MUSI być wyłącznie poprawnym obiektem JSON. Nie dodawaj żadnych dodatkowych znaków, komentarzy ani tekstu przed znacznikiem '{' ani po znaczniku '}'. Cała odpowiedź musi być parsowalna jako JSON.\nNa podstawie POWYŻSZEGO dokumentu, wypełnij poniższą strukturę JSON:\nOto struktura JSON, której oczekuję (wypełnij ją treścią):\n{\n  \"pl_ai_title\": \"Nowy, krótki tytuł dla aktu prawnego po polsku, oddający sedno wprowadzanych zmian (np. maksymalnie 10-12 słów).\",\n  \"pl_summary\": \"2-3 zdania zwięzłego podsumowania treści aktu prawnego po polsku, napisane z perspektywy wpływu na życie codzienne obywateli.\",\n  \"pl_key_points\": [\n    \"Pierwszy krótki punkt po polsku dotyczący najważniejszych wprowadzanych rozwiązań lub zmian.\",\n    \"Drugi krótki punkt po polsku...\"\n  ],\n  \"eng_ai_title\": \"A new, short title for the legal act in English, capturing the essence of the changes (e.g., max 10-12 words).\",\n  \"eng_summary\": \"2-3 sentences summarizing the legal act in English, from the perspective of its impact on citizens' daily lives.\",\n  \"eng_key_points\": [\n    \"First short bullet point in English regarding the most important solutions or changes being introduced.\",\n    \"Second short bullet point in English...\"\n  ],\n  \"de_ai_title\": \"Ein neuer, kurzer Titel für das Rechtsdokument auf Deutsch, der den Kern der Änderungen erfasst (z.B. max. 10-12 Wörter).\",\n  \"de_summary\": \"2-3 Sätze Zusammenfassung des Rechtsdokuments auf Deutsch, aus der Perspektive seiner Auswirkungen auf das tägliche Leben der Bürger.\",\n  \"de_key_points\": [\n    \"Erster kurzer Stichpunkt auf Deutsch zu den wichtigsten eingeführten Lösungen oder Änderungen.\",\n    \"Zweiter kurzer Stichpunkt auf Deutsch...\"\n  ],\n  \"fr_ai_title\": \"Un nouveau titre court pour l'acte juridique en français, saisissant l'essence des changements (par exemple, 10-12 mots maximum).\",\n  \"fr_summary\": \"Résumé de 2-3 phrases de l'acte juridique en français, du point de vue de son impact sur la vie quotidienne des citoyens.\",\n  \"fr_key_points\": [\n    \"Premier court point en français concernant les solutions ou changements les plus importants introduits.\",\n    \"Deuxième court point en français...\"\n  ],\n  \"es_ai_title\": \"Un nuevo título breve para el acto jurídico en español, que recoja la esencia de los cambios (por ejemplo, máximo 10-12 palabras).\",\n  \"es_summary\": \"Resumen de 2-3 frases del acto jurídico en español, desde la perspectiva de su impacto en la vida cotidiana de los ciudadanos.\",\n  \"es_key_points\": [\n    \"Primer punto breve en español sobre las soluciones o cambios más importantes que se introducen.\",\n    \"Segundo punto breve en español...\"\n  ],\n  \"it_ai_title\": \"Un nuovo titolo breve per l'atto giuridico in italiano, che colga l'essenza delle modifiche (ad es. massimo 10-12 parole).\",\n  \"it_summary\": \"Riepilogo di 2-3 frasi dell'atto giuridico in italiano, dal punto di vista del suo impatto sulla vita quotidiana dei cittadini.\",\n  \"it_key_points\": [\n    \"Primo breve punto in italiano riguardante le soluzioni o le modifiche più importanti introdotte.\",\n    \"Secondo breve punto in italiano...\"\n  ],\n  \"nl_ai_title\": \"Een nieuwe, korte titel voor de rechtshandeling in het Nederlands, die de essentie van de wijzigingen weergeeft (bijv. max. 10-12 woorden).\",\n  \"nl_summary\": \"Samenvatting van 2-3 zinnen van de rechtshandeling in het Nederlands, vanuit het perspectief van de impact op het dagelijks leven van burgers.\",\n  \"nl_key_points\": [\n    \"Eerste korte punt in het Nederlands betreffende de belangrijkste geïntroduceerde oplossingen of wijzigingen.\",\n    \"Tweede korte punt in het Nederlands...\"\n  ],\n  \"pt_ai_title\": \"Um novo título curto para o ato jurídico em português, capturando a essência das mudanças (por exemplo, máx. 10-12 palavras).\",\n  \"pt_summary\": \"Resumo de 2-3 frases do ato jurídico em português, na perspetiva do seu impacto na vida quotidiana dos cidadãos.\",\n  \"pt_key_points\": [\n    \"Primeiro ponto curto em português sobre as soluções ou alterações mais importantes introduzidas.\",\n    \"Segundo ponto curto em português...\"\n  ],\n  \"category\": [\"Categorize the document into one category by default, based on the field it primarily concerns. Choose up to 3 if the document also touches upon SIGNIFICANT issues from other categories. You MUST select categories ONLY from the following list: Health, Education, Family, Taxes, Labor, Security, Environment, Courts and Law, Transport, Benefits, Real Estate, Media and Culture, Local Government, Migration, Agriculture, Public Investments, Informatization, Economy. If the document does not definitively fit any of these, you MUST use \"Other\". If you use \"Other\", it should be the ONLY category selected. Do NOT invent new categories. The response must be an array of strings, e.g., [\"Taxes\", \"Family\"].\"]\n}\n\n",
      "ai_response_raw": "{\n  \"pl_ai_title\": \"Ochrona internetu i energii: nowe zabezpieczenia podwodnej infrastruktury Tajwanu\",\n  \"pl_summary\": \"Ustawa ma na celu zabezpieczenie kabli podwodnych i rurociągów wokół Tajwanu przed celowym uszkodzeniem, co chroni globalną łączność i gospodarkę. Wprowadza ona systemy monitorowania, szybkie naprawy oraz surowe kary finansowe i wizowe dla osób zaangażowanych w sabotaż.\",\n  \"pl_key_points\": [\n    \"Lepsza ochrona kabli internetowych zapewnia stabilność globalnej sieci i usług cyfrowych.\",\n    \"Nowe systemy wykrywania sabotażu mają zapobiegać nagłym przerwom w dostawie prądu i internetu.\",\n    \"Osoby i firmy niszczące infrastrukturę zostaną odcięte od amerykańskiego systemu finansowego i wiz.\",\n    \"Specjalne fundusze pozwolą na błyskawiczne naprawy uszkodzonych połączeń podwodnych.\",\n    \"Zwiększona obecność straży przybrzeżnej podniesie bezpieczeństwo na ważnych szlakach morskich.\"\n  ],\n  \"eng_ai_title\": \"Internet and Energy Protection: New Safeguards for Taiwan's Undersea Infrastructure\",\n  \"eng_summary\": \"This act aims to secure undersea cables and pipelines around Taiwan from intentional damage, protecting global connectivity and the economy. It introduces monitoring systems, rapid repair protocols, and strict financial and visa penalties for those involved in sabotage.\",\n  \"eng_key_points\": [\n    \"Better protection for internet cables ensures the stability of global networks and digital services.\",\n    \"New sabotage detection systems aim to prevent sudden power and internet outages.\",\n    \"Individuals and companies damaging infrastructure will be cut off from the US financial and visa systems.\",\n    \"Special funds will allow for lightning-fast repairs of damaged undersea connections.\",\n    \"Increased coast guard presence will improve security on vital maritime routes.\"\n  ],\n  \"de_ai_title\": \"Internet- und Energieschutz: Neue Sicherheitsmaßnahmen für Taiwans Unterwasserinfrastruktur\",\n  \"de_summary\": \"Dieses Gesetz zielt darauf ab, Unterseekabel und Pipelines um Taiwan vor vorsätzlicher Beschädigung zu schützen, um die globale Konnektivität und Wirtschaft zu sichern. Es führt Überwachungssysteme, Schnellreparaturprotokolle sowie strenge Finanz- und Visasanktionen für Saboteure ein.\",\n  \"de_key_points\": [\n    \"Ein besserer Schutz der Internetkabel gewährleistet die Stabilität globaler Netzwerke und digitaler Dienste.\",\n    \"Neue Sabotage-Erkennungssysteme sollen plötzliche Strom- und Internetausfälle verhindern.\",\n    \"Personen und Unternehmen, die die Infrastruktur beschädigen, werden vom US-Finanz- und Visasystem ausgeschlossen.\",\n    \"Spezielle Mittel ermöglichen blitzschnelle Reparaturen beschädigter Unterwasserverbindungen.\",\n    \"Eine verstärkte Präsenz der Küstenwache wird die Sicherheit auf wichtigen Seewegen verbessern.\"\n  ],\n  \"fr_ai_title\": \"Protection de l'Internet et de l'énergie : nouvelles sauvegardes pour Taïwan\",\n  \"fr_summary\": \"Cette loi vise à sécuriser les câbles et pipelines sous-marins autour de Taïwan contre les dommages intentionnels, protégeant ainsi la connectivité et l'économie mondiales. Elle introduit des systèmes de surveillance, des protocoles de réparation rapide et des sanctions financières et de visa strictes pour les auteurs de sabotages.\",\n  \"fr_key_points\": [\n    \"Une meilleure protection des câbles internet assure la stabilité des réseaux mondiaux et des services numériques.\",\n    \"De nouveaux systèmes de détection de sabotage visent à prévenir les pannes soudaines d'électricité et d'internet.\",\n    \"Les individus et entreprises endommageant l'infrastructure seront exclus du système financier et des visas américains.\",\n    \"Des fonds spéciaux permettront des réparations ultra-rapides des connexions sous-marines endommagées.\",\n    \"Une présence accrue de la garde côtière améliorera la sécurité sur les routes maritimes vitales.\"\n  ],\n  \"es_ai_title\": \"Protección de internet y energía: nuevas salvaguardas para la infraestructura de Taiwán\",\n  \"es_summary\": \"Esta ley tiene como objetivo asegurar los cables y tuberías submarinos alrededor de Taiwán contra daños intencionales, protegiendo la conectividad y la economía global. Introduce sistemas de monitoreo, protocolos de reparación rápida y estrictas sanciones financieras y de visa para los involucrados en sabotajes.\",\n  \"es_key_points\": [\n    \"Una mejor protección de los cables de internet garantiza la estabilidad de las redes globales y los servicios digitales.\",\n    \"Nuevos sistemas de detección de sabotaje buscan prevenir cortes repentinos de energía e internet.\",\n    \"Las personas y empresas que dañen la infraestructura serán excluidas del sistema financiero y de visas de EE. UU.\",\n    \"Fondos especiales permitirán reparaciones ultrarrápidas de las conexiones submarinas dañadas.\",\n    \"El aumento de la presencia de la guardia costera mejorará la seguridad en rutas marítimas vitales.\"\n  ],\n  \"it_ai_title\": \"Protezione di internet ed energia: nuove tutele per l'infrastruttura di Taiwan\",\n  \"it_summary\": \"Questa legge mira a mettere in sicurezza i cavi e le condutture sottomarine intorno a Taiwan dai danni intenzionali, proteggendo la connettività e l'economia globale. Introduce sistemi di monitoraggio, protocolli di riparazione rapida e severe sanzioni finanziarie e sui visti per chi è coinvolto in sabotaggi.\",\n  \"it_key_points\": [\n    \"Una migliore protezione dei cavi internet garantisce la stabilità delle reti globali e dei servizi digitali.\",\n    \"Nuovi sistemi di rilevamento dei sabotaggi mirano a prevenire improvvise interruzioni di corrente e internet.\",\n    \"Individui e aziende che danneggiano l'infrastruttura saranno esclusi dal sistema finanziario e dei visti degli Stati Uniti.\",\n    \"Fondi speciali consentiranno riparazioni rapidissime delle connessioni sottomarine danneggiate.\",\n    \"L'aumento della presenza della guardia costiera migliorerà la sicurezza sulle rotte marittime vitali.\"\n  ],\n  \"nl_ai_title\": \"Internet- en energiebescherming: nieuwe waarborgen voor de onderzeese infrastructuur van Taiwan\",\n  \"nl_summary\": \"Deze wet is bedoeld om onderzeese kabels en pijpleidingen rond Taiwan te beveiligen tegen opzettelijke schade, waardoor de wereldwijde connectiviteit en economie worden beschermd. Het introduceert monitoringsystemen, protocollen voor snelle reparatie en strikte financiële en visumsancties voor saboteurs.\",\n  \"nl_key_points\": [\n    \"Betere bescherming van internetkabels zorgt voor de stabiliteit van wereldwijde netwerken en digitale diensten.\",\n    \"Nieuwe systemen voor het detecteren van sabotage zijn bedoeld om plotselinge stroom- en internetuitval te voorkomen.\",\n    \"Individuen en bedrijven die infrastructuur beschadigen, worden uitgesloten van het Amerikaanse financiële en visumsysteem.\",\n    \"Speciale fondsen maken razendsnelle reparaties van beschadigde onderzeese verbindingen mogelijk.\",\n    \"Verhoogde aanwezigheid van de kustwacht zal de veiligheid op vitale zeeroutes verbeteren.\"\n  ],\n  \"pt_ai_title\": \"Proteção de internet e energia: novas salvaguardas para a infraestrutura de Taiwan\",\n  \"pt_summary\": \"Esta lei visa proteger os cabos e oleodutos submarinos em redor de Taiwan contra danos intencionais, salvaguardando a conetividade e a economia globais. Introduz sistemas de monitorização, protocolos de reparação rápida e sanções financeiras e de vistos rigorosas para os envolvidos em sabotagem.\",\n  \"pt_key_points\": [\n    \"Uma melhor proteção dos cabos de internet garante a estabilidade das redes globais e dos serviços digitais.\",\n    \"Novos sistemas de deteção de sabotagem visam prevenir cortes repentinos de energia e de internet.\",\n    \"Indivíduos e empresas que danifiquem a infraestrutura serão excluídos do sistema financeiro e de vistos dos EUA.\",\n    \"Fundos especiais permitirão reparações ultrarrápidas de ligações submarinas danificadas.\",\n    \"O aumento da presença da guarda costeira melhorará a segurança em rotas marítimas vitais.\"\n  ],\n  \"category\": [\"Security\", \"Economy\", \"Informatization\"]\n}"
    },
    {
      "timestamp": "2026-04-13T14:19:15.026Z",
      "source_url": "https://www.congress.gov/119/bills/hr8177/BILLS-119hr8177ih.htm",
      "model": "gemini-flash-latest",
      "prompt_sent": "\nJesteś ekspertem od prawa Stanów Zjednoczonych, który ma za zadanie analizować dokumenty ustaw, uchwał oraz innych dokumentów legislacyjnych, a następnie przygotowywać z nich informacje w przystępny sposób dla obywateli. Twoim celem jest przedstawienie informacji tak, aby obywatele mogli sami ocenić wpływ legislacji na ich życie, nawet bez posiadania specjalistycznej wiedzy legislacyjnej. Skup się na faktach i obiektywnych skutkach wprowadzanych zmian, unikając wartościowania i osobistych opinii. Wszelki żargon prawny jest zabroniony. Prezentuj informacje w jasny, zwięzły i angażujący sposób, tak aby były zrozumiałe dla osoby bez wykształcenia prawniczego. Unikaj długich, złożonych zdań. Zamiast pisać \"projekt ma na celu nowelizację kodeksu podatkowego...\", napisz \"Zmiany w podatkach: nowe ulgi i obowiązki dla...\". Kontynuuj swoją pracę, dopóki nie rozwiążesz swojego zadania. Jeśli nie masz pewności co do generowanej treści, przeanalizuj dokument ponownie – nie zgaduj. Rozplanuj dobrze swoje zadanie przed przystąpieniem do niego. W podsumowaniu i kluczowych punktach, jeśli to możliwe i uzasadnione, podkreśl, jakie konkretne korzyści lub skutki (pozytywne lub negatywne) wprowadza ustawa dla życia codziennego obywateli, ich praw i obowiązków, finansów osobistych, bezpieczeństwa i innych ważnych kwestii (np. kategorycznych zakazów i nakazów czy najważniejszych konkretnych alokacji finansowych i terytorialnych).\n\nTwoja odpowiedź MUSI być w formacie JSON - i zawierać następujące klucze.\nZanim zwrócisz odpowiedź, dokładnie zweryfikuj, czy cała struktura JSON jest w 100% poprawna, włącznie ze wszystkimi przecinkami, nawiasami klamrowymi, kwadratowymi oraz cudzysłowami. Błędny JSON jest nieakceptowalny i uniemożliwi przetworzenie Twojej pracy.\n\nPrzeanalizuj dokładnie poniższy tekst dokumentu prawnego. To jest treść, na podstawie której masz wygenerować podsumowanie i kluczowe punkty:\n--- POCZĄTEK DOKUMENTU ---\n[Congressional Bills 119th Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] [H.R. 8177 Introduced in House (IH)] <DOC> 119th CONGRESS 2d Session H. R. 8177 To enhance the security, resilience, and protection of critical undersea infrastructure vital to Taiwan's national security, economic stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone tactics employed by the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes. _______________________________________________________________________ IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES April 2, 2026 Mr. Lawler (for himself, Mr. Min, and Mr. Stanton) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned _______________________________________________________________________ A BILL To enhance the security, resilience, and protection of critical undersea infrastructure vital to Taiwan's national security, economic stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone tactics employed by the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Critical Undersea Infrastructure Resilience Initiative Act''. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. Congress finds the following: (1) The Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has increasingly used gray zone tactics to undermine the security of Taiwan and change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, including suspected sabotage of undersea cables in and around Taiwan, such as the incidents involving the severing of cables around the Matsu Islands of Taiwan and other key regions in 2023 and 2025. (2) Undersea cables and other critical undersea infrastructure are a primary vulnerability for Taiwan that could be targeted by the PRC to cripple the communication capabilities of Taiwan in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait and of broader hybrid warfare tactics. Disruption of critical undersea infrastructure would significantly impact the ability of Taiwan to communicate both domestically and internationally, leading to a breakdown in military, economic, and social functions. (3) The vulnerability of Taiwan to attacks on critical undersea infrastructure has been compounded by an increasing number of foreign vessels suspected of involvement in sabotage, including PRC-linked vessels, which pose direct threats to Taiwan's critical infrastructure. (4) The ability of the PRC to disrupt or damage critical undersea infrastructure is a critical element of its strategy aimed at disrupting Taiwan's military and civil communications and isolating Taiwan in the event of a blockade, quarantine, or other attempt to force unification with the PRC. (5) Recent activities by foreign adversaries, particularly the PRC, have increased the risk of sabotage and disruption to critical undersea infrastructure serving Taiwan and other nations, including-- (A) in February 2023, two vessels registered to the PRC severed two undersea cables that effectively cut internet access to the 13,000 residents of Taiwan's Matsu Islands, who had to rely on microwave radio transmissions to provide limited internet access for 50 days until a cable ship was able to complete repairs; (B) in January 2025, Taiwan's Chunghwa Telecom reported damage to an undersea cable north of Taipei and identified a ``suspicious vessel'' registered as the Shunxin-39 and the Xin Shun-39, which had traveled in a criss-cross pattern while dragging its anchor near where the cable was damaged; (C) in January 2025, a Mongolia-flagged vessel named the Baoshun was driven away by Taiwan's coast guard after suspicious movements off the coast of New Taipei; and (D) in February 2025, Taiwan's coast guard detained the Togo-flagged Hong Tai 58 near Taiwan's Penghu Islands after an undersea cable in the area was severed, with the captain later admitting to dropping the ship's anchor in the area and that he ``might have broken the cable''. (6) Since 2023, there have been at least 11 cases of damage to undersea cables around Taiwan and a similar number in the Baltic Sea, with authorities in Taiwan and Europe suspecting PRC and Russian involvement and possible coordination in several incidents. Those incidents highlight the vulnerability of critical undersea infrastructure, as well as the difficulty of proving sabotage or holding perpetrators accountable. (7) The sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure constitutes gray zone tactics designed to destabilize and undermine international security while falling short of direct military confrontation. (8) Several regional mechanisms have been established to bolster the security of undersea cables, including the Nordic Warden initiative for maritime domain awareness and the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, aimed at enhancing the security and resilience of undersea cables in the Indo-Pacific. (9) Taiwan is the world's 21st largest economy by purchasing power parity and deeply integrated in the global information and communications technology supply chain. Any restrictions to its internet connectivity or energy security would have a direct impact on the world's economy. (10) To counter the threats described in this section and safeguard the resilience of Taiwan, it is imperative for the United States and its allies to take decisive action to bolster Taiwan's defenses for critical undersea infrastructure and foster international cooperation to protect those critical assets. SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. In this section: (1) Critical undersea infrastructure.--The term ``critical undersea infrastructure'' means-- (A) subsea energy infrastructure, including a subsea cable, pipeline, or other equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed, to transmit electricity (including via subsea electricity cables, subsea electricity transformers, or equipment related to the support of offshore energy production installations) or to transport natural gas, oil, or hydrogen between land-based or off-shore infrastructure, as well as associated landing stations and facilities; or (B) subsea telecommunications infrastructure, including subsea fiber-optic cables and related equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed, and used to transmit communications, data, voice, video, or other electronic signals, as well as associated landing stations and facilities. (2) Sabotage.--The term ``sabotage'' means actions, or preparations for future actions, taken with the intent to cause defective production of, operation of, or damage to critical undersea infrastructure, including the integrity of data transmitted via subsea telecommunications infrastructure. SEC. 4. TAIWAN CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE INITIATIVE. (a) Establishment.--Not later than 360 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and such other heads of agencies as the Secretary of State considers relevant, shall establish an initiative to be known as the ``Taiwan Critical Undersea Infrastructure Initiative'' (in this section referred to as the ``Initiative''). (b) Priority.--The Initiative shall prioritize the protection and resilience of critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan, with a focus on countering threats from the PRC. (c) Key Focus Areas.-- (1) Advanced monitoring and detection capabilities.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Defense, shall develop and deploy advanced critical undersea infrastructure monitoring systems capable of detecting disruptions or potential sabotage in real-time, including by informing Taiwan, as appropriate, of early warnings about risks to Taiwan's critical undersea infrastructure from global intelligence networks. (2) Rapid response protocols.-- (A) In general.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall-- (i) in cooperation with regional partners, establish rapid response protocols for damaged critical undersea infrastructure or mitigating disruptions; and (ii) work with allies and partners of the United States to help Taiwan and regional partners develop the logistical capacity to respond quickly to attacks on critical undersea infrastructure and minimize downtime. (B) Authorization of appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated $20,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2027 through 2032 to carry out subparagraph (A). (3) Enhancing maritime domain awareness.--In carrying out the Initiative-- (A) the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the Coast Guard, in collaboration with the Coast Guard of Taiwan and regional partners, shall enhance maritime domain awareness around Taiwan, focusing on the ability to detect and interdict suspicious vessels or activities near critical undersea infrastructure; and (B) the Commandant of the Coast Guard shall assist in joint patrols and surveillance, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding maritime zones, to monitor potential threats and prevent sabotage. (4) International frameworks for protection.-- (A) In general.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall seek to establish cooperative frameworks with regional and global partners to protect undersea cable networks near Taiwan. (B) Elements.--The frameworks established under subparagraph (A) shall provide for participation by the United States in joint drills, intelligence-sharing platforms, and collaborative surveillance operations to enhance collective security against sabotage. (5) Taiwan-specific cable hardening.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall encourage and support the hardening of critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan, including reinforcing cables, improving burial depths, and using more resilient materials to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters and sabotage. SEC. 5. COUNTERING PRC GRAY ZONE TACTICS. (a) Working With Partners To Counter PRC Sabotage.--The President shall work with like-minded international partners to implement strategies that directly counter the Government of the PRC's critical undersea infrastructure sabotage activities as part of its gray zone warfare, including by increasing diplomatic pressure on the PRC to adhere to international norms regarding the protection of critical undersea infrastructure. (b) Raising Awareness.--The President shall work with like-minded international partners to raise global awareness of the risks posed by the PRC's sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, including through public diplomacy efforts, information sharing, and participation in international forums that address gray zone tactics and the protection of critical undersea infrastructure. SEC. 6. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE SABOTAGE. (a) In General.--The President, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to any foreign person that the President determines, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, is responsible for acts of sabotage, or facilitates acts of sabotage, against undersea infrastructure critical to the security of Taiwan or other United States allies or partners, including-- (1) any foreign vessel or entity the owner or operator of which knowingly-- (A) commits acts of sabotage; or (B) conducts preparatory surveillance, logistical support, security, or other services that facilitate or enable an act of sabotage; and (2) any foreign person that knowingly-- (A) owns, operates, or manages a vessel or entity described in paragraph (1); (B) provides underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance necessary for such a vessel or entity; (C) facilitates deceptive or structured transactions to support such a vessel or entity; (D) provides port or logistics services or facilities for technology upgrades or installation of equipment for, or retrofitting or tethering of, such a vessel for the purpose of evading sanctions; (E) provides documentation, registration, or flagging services for such a vessel for the purpose of evading sanctions; or (F) serves as a captain, principal officer, or senior leader of such a vessel or entity. (b) Report Required.--Not later than 15 days after imposing sanctions with respect to a foreign person under subsection (a), the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes a detailed justification for the imposition of the sanctions. (c) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this subsection are the following: (1) Blocking of property.--The President shall exercise all of the powers granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of a foreign person described in subsection (a), if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person. (2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.-- (A) Visas, admission, or parole.--An alien described in subsection (a) shall be-- (i) inadmissible to the United States; (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.). (B) Current visas revoked.-- (i) In general.--The visa or other entry documentation of an alien described in subsection (a) shall be revoked, regardless of when such visa or other entry documentation is or was issued. (ii) Immediate effect.--A revocation under clause (i) shall-- (I) take effect immediately; and (II) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the possession of the alien. (d) Implementation; Penalties.-- (1) Implementation.--The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section. (2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this section or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section. (e) Exceptions.-- (1) Exception to comply with united nations headquarters agreement and law enforcement activities.--Sanctions under this section shall not apply with respect to the admission or parole of an alien into the United States if admitting or paroling the alien is necessary-- (A) to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations of the United States; or (B) to carry out or assist authorized law enforcement activity in the United States. (2) Exception to comply with intelligence activities.-- Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States. (3) Exception relating to importation of goods.-- (A) In general.--A requirement to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property under this section shall not include the authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods. (B) Good defined.--In this paragraph, the term ``good'' means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data. (f) National Security Interests Waiver.--The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section if, before issuing the waiver, the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees-- (1) a certification in writing that the issuance of the waiver is in the national security interests of the United States; and (2) a report explaining the basis for the certification. (g) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Admission; admitted; alien; etc.--The terms ``admission'', ``admitted'', ``alien'', and ``lawfully admitted for permanent residence'' have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101). (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means-- (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives. (3) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means an individual or entity that is not a United States person. (4) United states person.--The term ``United States person'' means-- (A) any United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; (B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including any foreign branch of such an entity; or (C) any person in the United States. SEC. 7. SEMIANNUAL REPORT. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter through 2032, the President shall submit to Congress a report detailing-- (1) any incidents of interference or sabotage related to critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan; and (2) any actions taken in response to such incidents. SEC. 8. INTERAGENCY CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR CROSS-STRAIT CRISIS. (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to be prepared for potential crises involving Taiwan, including an attempt by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to change the status quo by force, through comprehensive interagency contingency planning that addresses the catastrophic risks such crises would pose to the national security of the United States. (b) Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish a Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group-- (A) to be chaired by the National Security Council; and (B) consisting of senior officials from the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the United States intelligence community, and such other Federal agencies as may be appropriate. (2) Functions.--The Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group shall-- (A) conduct scenario-based planning exercises to prepare for potential crises involving Taiwan, including blockade or quarantine scenarios, the seizure of an outlying island, military contingencies, economic coercion, cyber attacks, and hybrid threats; (B) identify critical vulnerabilities in supply chains, financial systems, critical infrastructure, and security posture of the United States and allies and partners of the United States that would be affected by a crisis involving Taiwan; (C) develop integrated contingency plans that coordinate diplomatic, military, economic, cyber, and homeland security responses across the Group; (D) assess the adequacy of existing authorities, resources, and decision-making processes to execute such contingency plans; (E) identify gaps in capabilities, authorities, or coordination mechanisms and recommend solutions; (F) share risk assessments with allies and partners of the United States, as appropriate; and (G) regularly test and refine contingency plans. (3) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the establishment of the Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group under paragraph (1), and annually thereafter for 10 years, the Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group shall submit to Congress a classified report that includes-- (A) a description of contingency scenarios assessed and planning activities conducted by the Group; (B) an assessment of the preparedness of the United States and allies and partners of the United States to respond to a crisis involving Taiwan, including identification of capability gaps and resource requirements; (C) recommendations for legislative action, policy changes, or resource allocation to enhance such preparedness; and (D) a description of exercises conducted and lessons learned by the Group. <all>\n--- KONIEC DOKUMENTU ---\n\nPAMIĘTAJ: Twoja odpowiedź MUSI być wyłącznie poprawnym obiektem JSON. Nie dodawaj żadnych dodatkowych znaków, komentarzy ani tekstu przed znacznikiem '{' ani po znaczniku '}'. Cała odpowiedź musi być parsowalna jako JSON.\nNa podstawie POWYŻSZEGO dokumentu, wypełnij poniższą strukturę JSON:\nOto struktura JSON, której oczekuję (wypełnij ją treścią):\n{\n  \"pl_ai_title\": \"Nowy, krótki tytuł dla aktu prawnego po polsku, oddający sedno wprowadzanych zmian (np. maksymalnie 10-12 słów).\",\n  \"pl_summary\": \"2-3 zdania zwięzłego podsumowania treści aktu prawnego po polsku, napisane z perspektywy wpływu na życie codzienne obywateli.\",\n  \"pl_key_points\": [\n    \"Pierwszy krótki punkt po polsku dotyczący najważniejszych wprowadzanych rozwiązań lub zmian.\",\n    \"Drugi krótki punkt po polsku...\"\n  ],\n  \"eng_ai_title\": \"A new, short title for the legal act in English, capturing the essence of the changes (e.g., max 10-12 words).\",\n  \"eng_summary\": \"2-3 sentences summarizing the legal act in English, from the perspective of its impact on citizens' daily lives.\",\n  \"eng_key_points\": [\n    \"First short bullet point in English regarding the most important solutions or changes being introduced.\",\n    \"Second short bullet point in English...\"\n  ],\n  \"de_ai_title\": \"Ein neuer, kurzer Titel für das Rechtsdokument auf Deutsch, der den Kern der Änderungen erfasst (z.B. max. 10-12 Wörter).\",\n  \"de_summary\": \"2-3 Sätze Zusammenfassung des Rechtsdokuments auf Deutsch, aus der Perspektive seiner Auswirkungen auf das tägliche Leben der Bürger.\",\n  \"de_key_points\": [\n    \"Erster kurzer Stichpunkt auf Deutsch zu den wichtigsten eingeführten Lösungen oder Änderungen.\",\n    \"Zweiter kurzer Stichpunkt auf Deutsch...\"\n  ],\n  \"fr_ai_title\": \"Un nouveau titre court pour l'acte juridique en français, saisissant l'essence des changements (par exemple, 10-12 mots maximum).\",\n  \"fr_summary\": \"Résumé de 2-3 phrases de l'acte juridique en français, du point de vue de son impact sur la vie quotidienne des citoyens.\",\n  \"fr_key_points\": [\n    \"Premier court point en français concernant les solutions ou changements les plus importants introduits.\",\n    \"Deuxième court point en français...\"\n  ],\n  \"es_ai_title\": \"Un nuevo título breve para el acto jurídico en español, que recoja la esencia de los cambios (por ejemplo, máximo 10-12 palabras).\",\n  \"es_summary\": \"Resumen de 2-3 frases del acto jurídico en español, desde la perspectiva de su impacto en la vida cotidiana de los ciudadanos.\",\n  \"es_key_points\": [\n    \"Primer punto breve en español sobre las soluciones o cambios más importantes que se introducen.\",\n    \"Segundo punto breve en español...\"\n  ],\n  \"it_ai_title\": \"Un nuovo titolo breve per l'atto giuridico in italiano, che colga l'essenza delle modifiche (ad es. massimo 10-12 parole).\",\n  \"it_summary\": \"Riepilogo di 2-3 frasi dell'atto giuridico in italiano, dal punto di vista del suo impatto sulla vita quotidiana dei cittadini.\",\n  \"it_key_points\": [\n    \"Primo breve punto in italiano riguardante le soluzioni o le modifiche più importanti introdotte.\",\n    \"Secondo breve punto in italiano...\"\n  ],\n  \"nl_ai_title\": \"Een nieuwe, korte titel voor de rechtshandeling in het Nederlands, die de essentie van de wijzigingen weergeeft (bijv. max. 10-12 woorden).\",\n  \"nl_summary\": \"Samenvatting van 2-3 zinnen van de rechtshandeling in het Nederlands, vanuit het perspectief van de impact op het dagelijks leven van burgers.\",\n  \"nl_key_points\": [\n    \"Eerste korte punt in het Nederlands betreffende de belangrijkste geïntroduceerde oplossingen of wijzigingen.\",\n    \"Tweede korte punt in het Nederlands...\"\n  ],\n  \"pt_ai_title\": \"Um novo título curto para o ato jurídico em português, capturando a essência das mudanças (por exemplo, máx. 10-12 palavras).\",\n  \"pt_summary\": \"Resumo de 2-3 frases do ato jurídico em português, na perspetiva do seu impacto na vida quotidiana dos cidadãos.\",\n  \"pt_key_points\": [\n    \"Primeiro ponto curto em português sobre as soluções ou alterações mais importantes introduzidas.\",\n    \"Segundo ponto curto em português...\"\n  ],\n  \"category\": [\"Categorize the document into one category by default, based on the field it primarily concerns. Choose up to 3 if the document also touches upon SIGNIFICANT issues from other categories. You MUST select categories ONLY from the following list: Health, Education, Family, Taxes, Labor, Security, Environment, Courts and Law, Transport, Benefits, Real Estate, Media and Culture, Local Government, Migration, Agriculture, Public Investments, Informatization, Economy. If the document does not definitively fit any of these, you MUST use \"Other\". If you use \"Other\", it should be the ONLY category selected. Do NOT invent new categories. The response must be an array of strings, e.g., [\"Taxes\", \"Family\"].\"]\n}\n\n",
      "ai_response_raw": "{\n  \"pl_ai_title\": \"Ochrona internetu i energii: nowe zabezpieczenia podwodnej infrastruktury Tajwanu\",\n  \"pl_summary\": \"Ustawa ma na celu zabezpieczenie kabli podwodnych i rurociągów wokół Tajwanu przed celowym uszkodzeniem, co chroni globalną łączność i gospodarkę. Wprowadza ona systemy monitorowania, szybkie naprawy oraz surowe kary finansowe i wizowe dla osób zaangażowanych w sabotaż.\",\n  \"pl_key_points\": [\n    \"Lepsza ochrona kabli internetowych zapewnia stabilność globalnej sieci i usług cyfrowych.\",\n    \"Nowe systemy wykrywania sabotażu mają zapobiegać nagłym przerwom w dostawie prądu i internetu.\",\n    \"Osoby i firmy niszczące infrastrukturę zostaną odcięte od amerykańskiego systemu finansowego i wiz.\",\n    \"Specjalne fundusze pozwolą na błyskawiczne naprawy uszkodzonych połączeń podwodnych.\",\n    \"Zwiększona obecność straży przybrzeżnej podniesie bezpieczeństwo na ważnych szlakach morskich.\"\n  ],\n  \"eng_ai_title\": \"Internet and Energy Protection: New Safeguards for Taiwan's Undersea Infrastructure\",\n  \"eng_summary\": \"This act aims to secure undersea cables and pipelines around Taiwan from intentional damage, protecting global connectivity and the economy. It introduces monitoring systems, rapid repair protocols, and strict financial and visa penalties for those involved in sabotage.\",\n  \"eng_key_points\": [\n    \"Better protection for internet cables ensures the stability of global networks and digital services.\",\n    \"New sabotage detection systems aim to prevent sudden power and internet outages.\",\n    \"Individuals and companies damaging infrastructure will be cut off from the US financial and visa systems.\",\n    \"Special funds will allow for lightning-fast repairs of damaged undersea connections.\",\n    \"Increased coast guard presence will improve security on vital maritime routes.\"\n  ],\n  \"de_ai_title\": \"Internet- und Energieschutz: Neue Sicherheitsmaßnahmen für Taiwans Unterwasserinfrastruktur\",\n  \"de_summary\": \"Dieses Gesetz zielt darauf ab, Unterseekabel und Pipelines um Taiwan vor vorsätzlicher Beschädigung zu schützen, um die globale Konnektivität und Wirtschaft zu sichern. Es führt Überwachungssysteme, Schnellreparaturprotokolle sowie strenge Finanz- und Visasanktionen für Saboteure ein.\",\n  \"de_key_points\": [\n    \"Ein besserer Schutz der Internetkabel gewährleistet die Stabilität globaler Netzwerke und digitaler Dienste.\",\n    \"Neue Sabotage-Erkennungssysteme sollen plötzliche Strom- und Internetausfälle verhindern.\",\n    \"Personen und Unternehmen, die die Infrastruktur beschädigen, werden vom US-Finanz- und Visasystem ausgeschlossen.\",\n    \"Spezielle Mittel ermöglichen blitzschnelle Reparaturen beschädigter Unterwasserverbindungen.\",\n    \"Eine verstärkte Präsenz der Küstenwache wird die Sicherheit auf wichtigen Seewegen verbessern.\"\n  ],\n  \"fr_ai_title\": \"Protection de l'Internet et de l'énergie : nouvelles sauvegardes pour Taïwan\",\n  \"fr_summary\": \"Cette loi vise à sécuriser les câbles et pipelines sous-marins autour de Taïwan contre les dommages intentionnels, protégeant ainsi la connectivité et l'économie mondiales. Elle introduit des systèmes de surveillance, des protocoles de réparation rapide et des sanctions financières et de visa strictes pour les auteurs de sabotages.\",\n  \"fr_key_points\": [\n    \"Une meilleure protection des câbles internet assure la stabilité des réseaux mondiaux et des services numériques.\",\n    \"De nouveaux systèmes de détection de sabotage visent à prévenir les pannes soudaines d'électricité et d'internet.\",\n    \"Les individus et entreprises endommageant l'infrastructure seront exclus du système financier et des visas américains.\",\n    \"Des fonds spéciaux permettront des réparations ultra-rapides des connexions sous-marines endommagées.\",\n    \"Une présence accrue de la garde côtière améliorera la sécurité sur les routes maritimes vitales.\"\n  ],\n  \"es_ai_title\": \"Protección de internet y energía: nuevas salvaguardas para la infraestructura de Taiwán\",\n  \"es_summary\": \"Esta ley tiene como objetivo asegurar los cables y tuberías submarinos alrededor de Taiwán contra daños intencionales, protegiendo la conectividad y la economía global. Introduce sistemas de monitoreo, protocolos de reparación rápida y estrictas sanciones financieras y de visa para los involucrados en sabotajes.\",\n  \"es_key_points\": [\n    \"Una mejor protección de los cables de internet garantiza la estabilidad de las redes globales y los servicios digitales.\",\n    \"Nuevos sistemas de detección de sabotaje buscan prevenir cortes repentinos de energía e internet.\",\n    \"Las personas y empresas que dañen la infraestructura serán excluidas del sistema financiero y de visas de EE. UU.\",\n    \"Fondos especiales permitirán reparaciones ultrarrápidas de las conexiones submarinas dañadas.\",\n    \"El aumento de la presencia de la guardia costera mejorará la seguridad en rutas marítimas vitales.\"\n  ],\n  \"it_ai_title\": \"Protezione di internet ed energia: nuove tutele per l'infrastruttura di Taiwan\",\n  \"it_summary\": \"Questa legge mira a mettere in sicurezza i cavi e le condutture sottomarine intorno a Taiwan dai danni intenzionali, proteggendo la connettività e l'economia globale. Introduce sistemi di monitoraggio, protocolli di riparazione rapida e severe sanzioni finanziarie e sui visti per chi è coinvolto in sabotaggi.\",\n  \"it_key_points\": [\n    \"Una migliore protezione dei cavi internet garantisce la stabilità delle reti globali e dei servizi digitali.\",\n    \"Nuovi sistemi di rilevamento dei sabotaggi mirano a prevenire improvvise interruzioni di corrente e internet.\",\n    \"Individui e aziende che danneggiano l'infrastruttura saranno esclusi dal sistema finanziario e dei visti degli Stati Uniti.\",\n    \"Fondi speciali consentiranno riparazioni rapidissime delle connessioni sottomarine danneggiate.\",\n    \"L'aumento della presenza della guardia costiera migliorerà la sicurezza sulle rotte marittime vitali.\"\n  ],\n  \"nl_ai_title\": \"Internet- en energiebescherming: nieuwe waarborgen voor de onderzeese infrastructuur van Taiwan\",\n  \"nl_summary\": \"Deze wet is bedoeld om onderzeese kabels en pijpleidingen rond Taiwan te beveiligen tegen opzettelijke schade, waardoor de wereldwijde connectiviteit en economie worden beschermd. Het introduceert monitoringsystemen, protocollen voor snelle reparatie en strikte financiële en visumsancties voor saboteurs.\",\n  \"nl_key_points\": [\n    \"Betere bescherming van internetkabels zorgt voor de stabiliteit van wereldwijde netwerken en digitale diensten.\",\n    \"Nieuwe systemen voor het detecteren van sabotage zijn bedoeld om plotselinge stroom- en internetuitval te voorkomen.\",\n    \"Individuen en bedrijven die infrastructuur beschadigen, worden uitgesloten van het Amerikaanse financiële en visumsysteem.\",\n    \"Speciale fondsen maken razendsnelle reparaties van beschadigde onderzeese verbindingen mogelijk.\",\n    \"Verhoogde aanwezigheid van de kustwacht zal de veiligheid op vitale zeeroutes verbeteren.\"\n  ],\n  \"pt_ai_title\": \"Proteção de internet e energia: novas salvaguardas para a infraestrutura de Taiwan\",\n  \"pt_summary\": \"Esta lei visa proteger os cabos e oleodutos submarinos em redor de Taiwan contra danos intencionais, salvaguardando a conetividade e a economia globais. Introduz sistemas de monitorização, protocolos de reparação rápida e sanções financeiras e de vistos rigorosas para os envolvidos em sabotagem.\",\n  \"pt_key_points\": [\n    \"Uma melhor proteção dos cabos de internet garante a estabilidade das redes globais e dos serviços digitais.\",\n    \"Novos sistemas de deteção de sabotagem visam prevenir cortes repentinos de energia e de internet.\",\n    \"Indivíduos e empresas que danifiquem a infraestrutura serão excluídos do sistema financeiro e de vistos dos EUA.\",\n    \"Fundos especiais permitirão reparações ultrarrápidas de ligações submarinas danificadas.\",\n    \"O aumento da presença da guarda costeira melhorará a segurança em rotas marítimas vitais.\"\n  ],\n  \"category\": [\"Security\", \"Economy\", \"Informatization\"]\n}"
    },
    {
      "timestamp": "2026-04-13T14:19:08.822Z",
      "source_url": "https://www.congress.gov/119/bills/hr8177/BILLS-119hr8177ih.htm",
      "model": "gemini-flash-latest",
      "prompt_sent": "\nJesteś ekspertem od prawa Stanów Zjednoczonych, który ma za zadanie analizować dokumenty ustaw, uchwał oraz innych dokumentów legislacyjnych, a następnie przygotowywać z nich informacje w przystępny sposób dla obywateli. Twoim celem jest przedstawienie informacji tak, aby obywatele mogli sami ocenić wpływ legislacji na ich życie, nawet bez posiadania specjalistycznej wiedzy legislacyjnej. Skup się na faktach i obiektywnych skutkach wprowadzanych zmian, unikając wartościowania i osobistych opinii. Wszelki żargon prawny jest zabroniony. Prezentuj informacje w jasny, zwięzły i angażujący sposób, tak aby były zrozumiałe dla osoby bez wykształcenia prawniczego. Unikaj długich, złożonych zdań. Zamiast pisać \"projekt ma na celu nowelizację kodeksu podatkowego...\", napisz \"Zmiany w podatkach: nowe ulgi i obowiązki dla...\". Kontynuuj swoją pracę, dopóki nie rozwiążesz swojego zadania. Jeśli nie masz pewności co do generowanej treści, przeanalizuj dokument ponownie – nie zgaduj. Rozplanuj dobrze swoje zadanie przed przystąpieniem do niego. W podsumowaniu i kluczowych punktach, jeśli to możliwe i uzasadnione, podkreśl, jakie konkretne korzyści lub skutki (pozytywne lub negatywne) wprowadza ustawa dla życia codziennego obywateli, ich praw i obowiązków, finansów osobistych, bezpieczeństwa i innych ważnych kwestii (np. kategorycznych zakazów i nakazów czy najważniejszych konkretnych alokacji finansowych i terytorialnych).\n\nTwoja odpowiedź MUSI być w formacie JSON - i zawierać następujące klucze.\nZanim zwrócisz odpowiedź, dokładnie zweryfikuj, czy cała struktura JSON jest w 100% poprawna, włącznie ze wszystkimi przecinkami, nawiasami klamrowymi, kwadratowymi oraz cudzysłowami. Błędny JSON jest nieakceptowalny i uniemożliwi przetworzenie Twojej pracy.\n\nPrzeanalizuj dokładnie poniższy tekst dokumentu prawnego. To jest treść, na podstawie której masz wygenerować podsumowanie i kluczowe punkty:\n--- POCZĄTEK DOKUMENTU ---\n[Congressional Bills 119th Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] [H.R. 8177 Introduced in House (IH)] <DOC> 119th CONGRESS 2d Session H. R. 8177 To enhance the security, resilience, and protection of critical undersea infrastructure vital to Taiwan's national security, economic stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone tactics employed by the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes. _______________________________________________________________________ IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES April 2, 2026 Mr. Lawler (for himself, Mr. Min, and Mr. Stanton) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned _______________________________________________________________________ A BILL To enhance the security, resilience, and protection of critical undersea infrastructure vital to Taiwan's national security, economic stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone tactics employed by the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Critical Undersea Infrastructure Resilience Initiative Act''. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. Congress finds the following: (1) The Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has increasingly used gray zone tactics to undermine the security of Taiwan and change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, including suspected sabotage of undersea cables in and around Taiwan, such as the incidents involving the severing of cables around the Matsu Islands of Taiwan and other key regions in 2023 and 2025. (2) Undersea cables and other critical undersea infrastructure are a primary vulnerability for Taiwan that could be targeted by the PRC to cripple the communication capabilities of Taiwan in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait and of broader hybrid warfare tactics. Disruption of critical undersea infrastructure would significantly impact the ability of Taiwan to communicate both domestically and internationally, leading to a breakdown in military, economic, and social functions. (3) The vulnerability of Taiwan to attacks on critical undersea infrastructure has been compounded by an increasing number of foreign vessels suspected of involvement in sabotage, including PRC-linked vessels, which pose direct threats to Taiwan's critical infrastructure. (4) The ability of the PRC to disrupt or damage critical undersea infrastructure is a critical element of its strategy aimed at disrupting Taiwan's military and civil communications and isolating Taiwan in the event of a blockade, quarantine, or other attempt to force unification with the PRC. (5) Recent activities by foreign adversaries, particularly the PRC, have increased the risk of sabotage and disruption to critical undersea infrastructure serving Taiwan and other nations, including-- (A) in February 2023, two vessels registered to the PRC severed two undersea cables that effectively cut internet access to the 13,000 residents of Taiwan's Matsu Islands, who had to rely on microwave radio transmissions to provide limited internet access for 50 days until a cable ship was able to complete repairs; (B) in January 2025, Taiwan's Chunghwa Telecom reported damage to an undersea cable north of Taipei and identified a ``suspicious vessel'' registered as the Shunxin-39 and the Xin Shun-39, which had traveled in a criss-cross pattern while dragging its anchor near where the cable was damaged; (C) in January 2025, a Mongolia-flagged vessel named the Baoshun was driven away by Taiwan's coast guard after suspicious movements off the coast of New Taipei; and (D) in February 2025, Taiwan's coast guard detained the Togo-flagged Hong Tai 58 near Taiwan's Penghu Islands after an undersea cable in the area was severed, with the captain later admitting to dropping the ship's anchor in the area and that he ``might have broken the cable''. (6) Since 2023, there have been at least 11 cases of damage to undersea cables around Taiwan and a similar number in the Baltic Sea, with authorities in Taiwan and Europe suspecting PRC and Russian involvement and possible coordination in several incidents. Those incidents highlight the vulnerability of critical undersea infrastructure, as well as the difficulty of proving sabotage or holding perpetrators accountable. (7) The sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure constitutes gray zone tactics designed to destabilize and undermine international security while falling short of direct military confrontation. (8) Several regional mechanisms have been established to bolster the security of undersea cables, including the Nordic Warden initiative for maritime domain awareness and the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, aimed at enhancing the security and resilience of undersea cables in the Indo-Pacific. (9) Taiwan is the world's 21st largest economy by purchasing power parity and deeply integrated in the global information and communications technology supply chain. Any restrictions to its internet connectivity or energy security would have a direct impact on the world's economy. (10) To counter the threats described in this section and safeguard the resilience of Taiwan, it is imperative for the United States and its allies to take decisive action to bolster Taiwan's defenses for critical undersea infrastructure and foster international cooperation to protect those critical assets. SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. In this section: (1) Critical undersea infrastructure.--The term ``critical undersea infrastructure'' means-- (A) subsea energy infrastructure, including a subsea cable, pipeline, or other equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed, to transmit electricity (including via subsea electricity cables, subsea electricity transformers, or equipment related to the support of offshore energy production installations) or to transport natural gas, oil, or hydrogen between land-based or off-shore infrastructure, as well as associated landing stations and facilities; or (B) subsea telecommunications infrastructure, including subsea fiber-optic cables and related equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed, and used to transmit communications, data, voice, video, or other electronic signals, as well as associated landing stations and facilities. (2) Sabotage.--The term ``sabotage'' means actions, or preparations for future actions, taken with the intent to cause defective production of, operation of, or damage to critical undersea infrastructure, including the integrity of data transmitted via subsea telecommunications infrastructure. SEC. 4. TAIWAN CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE INITIATIVE. (a) Establishment.--Not later than 360 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and such other heads of agencies as the Secretary of State considers relevant, shall establish an initiative to be known as the ``Taiwan Critical Undersea Infrastructure Initiative'' (in this section referred to as the ``Initiative''). (b) Priority.--The Initiative shall prioritize the protection and resilience of critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan, with a focus on countering threats from the PRC. (c) Key Focus Areas.-- (1) Advanced monitoring and detection capabilities.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Defense, shall develop and deploy advanced critical undersea infrastructure monitoring systems capable of detecting disruptions or potential sabotage in real-time, including by informing Taiwan, as appropriate, of early warnings about risks to Taiwan's critical undersea infrastructure from global intelligence networks. (2) Rapid response protocols.-- (A) In general.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall-- (i) in cooperation with regional partners, establish rapid response protocols for damaged critical undersea infrastructure or mitigating disruptions; and (ii) work with allies and partners of the United States to help Taiwan and regional partners develop the logistical capacity to respond quickly to attacks on critical undersea infrastructure and minimize downtime. (B) Authorization of appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated $20,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2027 through 2032 to carry out subparagraph (A). (3) Enhancing maritime domain awareness.--In carrying out the Initiative-- (A) the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the Coast Guard, in collaboration with the Coast Guard of Taiwan and regional partners, shall enhance maritime domain awareness around Taiwan, focusing on the ability to detect and interdict suspicious vessels or activities near critical undersea infrastructure; and (B) the Commandant of the Coast Guard shall assist in joint patrols and surveillance, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding maritime zones, to monitor potential threats and prevent sabotage. (4) International frameworks for protection.-- (A) In general.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall seek to establish cooperative frameworks with regional and global partners to protect undersea cable networks near Taiwan. (B) Elements.--The frameworks established under subparagraph (A) shall provide for participation by the United States in joint drills, intelligence-sharing platforms, and collaborative surveillance operations to enhance collective security against sabotage. (5) Taiwan-specific cable hardening.--In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall encourage and support the hardening of critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan, including reinforcing cables, improving burial depths, and using more resilient materials to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters and sabotage. SEC. 5. COUNTERING PRC GRAY ZONE TACTICS. (a) Working With Partners To Counter PRC Sabotage.--The President shall work with like-minded international partners to implement strategies that directly counter the Government of the PRC's critical undersea infrastructure sabotage activities as part of its gray zone warfare, including by increasing diplomatic pressure on the PRC to adhere to international norms regarding the protection of critical undersea infrastructure. (b) Raising Awareness.--The President shall work with like-minded international partners to raise global awareness of the risks posed by the PRC's sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, including through public diplomacy efforts, information sharing, and participation in international forums that address gray zone tactics and the protection of critical undersea infrastructure. SEC. 6. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE SABOTAGE. (a) In General.--The President, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to any foreign person that the President determines, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, is responsible for acts of sabotage, or facilitates acts of sabotage, against undersea infrastructure critical to the security of Taiwan or other United States allies or partners, including-- (1) any foreign vessel or entity the owner or operator of which knowingly-- (A) commits acts of sabotage; or (B) conducts preparatory surveillance, logistical support, security, or other services that facilitate or enable an act of sabotage; and (2) any foreign person that knowingly-- (A) owns, operates, or manages a vessel or entity described in paragraph (1); (B) provides underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance necessary for such a vessel or entity; (C) facilitates deceptive or structured transactions to support such a vessel or entity; (D) provides port or logistics services or facilities for technology upgrades or installation of equipment for, or retrofitting or tethering of, such a vessel for the purpose of evading sanctions; (E) provides documentation, registration, or flagging services for such a vessel for the purpose of evading sanctions; or (F) serves as a captain, principal officer, or senior leader of such a vessel or entity. (b) Report Required.--Not later than 15 days after imposing sanctions with respect to a foreign person under subsection (a), the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes a detailed justification for the imposition of the sanctions. (c) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this subsection are the following: (1) Blocking of property.--The President shall exercise all of the powers granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of a foreign person described in subsection (a), if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person. (2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.-- (A) Visas, admission, or parole.--An alien described in subsection (a) shall be-- (i) inadmissible to the United States; (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.). (B) Current visas revoked.-- (i) In general.--The visa or other entry documentation of an alien described in subsection (a) shall be revoked, regardless of when such visa or other entry documentation is or was issued. (ii) Immediate effect.--A revocation under clause (i) shall-- (I) take effect immediately; and (II) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the possession of the alien. (d) Implementation; Penalties.-- (1) Implementation.--The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section. (2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this section or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section. (e) Exceptions.-- (1) Exception to comply with united nations headquarters agreement and law enforcement activities.--Sanctions under this section shall not apply with respect to the admission or parole of an alien into the United States if admitting or paroling the alien is necessary-- (A) to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations of the United States; or (B) to carry out or assist authorized law enforcement activity in the United States. (2) Exception to comply with intelligence activities.-- Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States. (3) Exception relating to importation of goods.-- (A) In general.--A requirement to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property under this section shall not include the authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods. (B) Good defined.--In this paragraph, the term ``good'' means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data. (f) National Security Interests Waiver.--The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section if, before issuing the waiver, the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees-- (1) a certification in writing that the issuance of the waiver is in the national security interests of the United States; and (2) a report explaining the basis for the certification. (g) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Admission; admitted; alien; etc.--The terms ``admission'', ``admitted'', ``alien'', and ``lawfully admitted for permanent residence'' have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101). (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means-- (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives. (3) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means an individual or entity that is not a United States person. (4) United states person.--The term ``United States person'' means-- (A) any United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; (B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including any foreign branch of such an entity; or (C) any person in the United States. SEC. 7. SEMIANNUAL REPORT. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter through 2032, the President shall submit to Congress a report detailing-- (1) any incidents of interference or sabotage related to critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan; and (2) any actions taken in response to such incidents. SEC. 8. INTERAGENCY CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR CROSS-STRAIT CRISIS. (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to be prepared for potential crises involving Taiwan, including an attempt by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to change the status quo by force, through comprehensive interagency contingency planning that addresses the catastrophic risks such crises would pose to the national security of the United States. (b) Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish a Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group-- (A) to be chaired by the National Security Council; and (B) consisting of senior officials from the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the United States intelligence community, and such other Federal agencies as may be appropriate. (2) Functions.--The Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group shall-- (A) conduct scenario-based planning exercises to prepare for potential crises involving Taiwan, including blockade or quarantine scenarios, the seizure of an outlying island, military contingencies, economic coercion, cyber attacks, and hybrid threats; (B) identify critical vulnerabilities in supply chains, financial systems, critical infrastructure, and security posture of the United States and allies and partners of the United States that would be affected by a crisis involving Taiwan; (C) develop integrated contingency plans that coordinate diplomatic, military, economic, cyber, and homeland security responses across the Group; (D) assess the adequacy of existing authorities, resources, and decision-making processes to execute such contingency plans; (E) identify gaps in capabilities, authorities, or coordination mechanisms and recommend solutions; (F) share risk assessments with allies and partners of the United States, as appropriate; and (G) regularly test and refine contingency plans. (3) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the establishment of the Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group under paragraph (1), and annually thereafter for 10 years, the Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group shall submit to Congress a classified report that includes-- (A) a description of contingency scenarios assessed and planning activities conducted by the Group; (B) an assessment of the preparedness of the United States and allies and partners of the United States to respond to a crisis involving Taiwan, including identification of capability gaps and resource requirements; (C) recommendations for legislative action, policy changes, or resource allocation to enhance such preparedness; and (D) a description of exercises conducted and lessons learned by the Group. <all>\n--- KONIEC DOKUMENTU ---\n\nPAMIĘTAJ: Twoja odpowiedź MUSI być wyłącznie poprawnym obiektem JSON. Nie dodawaj żadnych dodatkowych znaków, komentarzy ani tekstu przed znacznikiem '{' ani po znaczniku '}'. Cała odpowiedź musi być parsowalna jako JSON.\nNa podstawie POWYŻSZEGO dokumentu, wypełnij poniższą strukturę JSON:\nOto struktura JSON, której oczekuję (wypełnij ją treścią):\n{\n  \"pl_ai_title\": \"Nowy, krótki tytuł dla aktu prawnego po polsku, oddający sedno wprowadzanych zmian (np. maksymalnie 10-12 słów).\",\n  \"pl_summary\": \"2-3 zdania zwięzłego podsumowania treści aktu prawnego po polsku, napisane z perspektywy wpływu na życie codzienne obywateli.\",\n  \"pl_key_points\": [\n    \"Pierwszy krótki punkt po polsku dotyczący najważniejszych wprowadzanych rozwiązań lub zmian.\",\n    \"Drugi krótki punkt po polsku...\"\n  ],\n  \"eng_ai_title\": \"A new, short title for the legal act in English, capturing the essence of the changes (e.g., max 10-12 words).\",\n  \"eng_summary\": \"2-3 sentences summarizing the legal act in English, from the perspective of its impact on citizens' daily lives.\",\n  \"eng_key_points\": [\n    \"First short bullet point in English regarding the most important solutions or changes being introduced.\",\n    \"Second short bullet point in English...\"\n  ],\n  \"de_ai_title\": \"Ein neuer, kurzer Titel für das Rechtsdokument auf Deutsch, der den Kern der Änderungen erfasst (z.B. max. 10-12 Wörter).\",\n  \"de_summary\": \"2-3 Sätze Zusammenfassung des Rechtsdokuments auf Deutsch, aus der Perspektive seiner Auswirkungen auf das tägliche Leben der Bürger.\",\n  \"de_key_points\": [\n    \"Erster kurzer Stichpunkt auf Deutsch zu den wichtigsten eingeführten Lösungen oder Änderungen.\",\n    \"Zweiter kurzer Stichpunkt auf Deutsch...\"\n  ],\n  \"fr_ai_title\": \"Un nouveau titre court pour l'acte juridique en français, saisissant l'essence des changements (par exemple, 10-12 mots maximum).\",\n  \"fr_summary\": \"Résumé de 2-3 phrases de l'acte juridique en français, du point de vue de son impact sur la vie quotidienne des citoyens.\",\n  \"fr_key_points\": [\n    \"Premier court point en français concernant les solutions ou changements les plus importants introduits.\",\n    \"Deuxième court point en français...\"\n  ],\n  \"es_ai_title\": \"Un nuevo título breve para el acto jurídico en español, que recoja la esencia de los cambios (por ejemplo, máximo 10-12 palabras).\",\n  \"es_summary\": \"Resumen de 2-3 frases del acto jurídico en español, desde la perspectiva de su impacto en la vida cotidiana de los ciudadanos.\",\n  \"es_key_points\": [\n    \"Primer punto breve en español sobre las soluciones o cambios más importantes que se introducen.\",\n    \"Segundo punto breve en español...\"\n  ],\n  \"it_ai_title\": \"Un nuovo titolo breve per l'atto giuridico in italiano, che colga l'essenza delle modifiche (ad es. massimo 10-12 parole).\",\n  \"it_summary\": \"Riepilogo di 2-3 frasi dell'atto giuridico in italiano, dal punto di vista del suo impatto sulla vita quotidiana dei cittadini.\",\n  \"it_key_points\": [\n    \"Primo breve punto in italiano riguardante le soluzioni o le modifiche più importanti introdotte.\",\n    \"Secondo breve punto in italiano...\"\n  ],\n  \"nl_ai_title\": \"Een nieuwe, korte titel voor de rechtshandeling in het Nederlands, die de essentie van de wijzigingen weergeeft (bijv. max. 10-12 woorden).\",\n  \"nl_summary\": \"Samenvatting van 2-3 zinnen van de rechtshandeling in het Nederlands, vanuit het perspectief van de impact op het dagelijks leven van burgers.\",\n  \"nl_key_points\": [\n    \"Eerste korte punt in het Nederlands betreffende de belangrijkste geïntroduceerde oplossingen of wijzigingen.\",\n    \"Tweede korte punt in het Nederlands...\"\n  ],\n  \"pt_ai_title\": \"Um novo título curto para o ato jurídico em português, capturando a essência das mudanças (por exemplo, máx. 10-12 palavras).\",\n  \"pt_summary\": \"Resumo de 2-3 frases do ato jurídico em português, na perspetiva do seu impacto na vida quotidiana dos cidadãos.\",\n  \"pt_key_points\": [\n    \"Primeiro ponto curto em português sobre as soluções ou alterações mais importantes introduzidas.\",\n    \"Segundo ponto curto em português...\"\n  ],\n  \"category\": [\"Categorize the document into one category by default, based on the field it primarily concerns. Choose up to 3 if the document also touches upon SIGNIFICANT issues from other categories. You MUST select categories ONLY from the following list: Health, Education, Family, Taxes, Labor, Security, Environment, Courts and Law, Transport, Benefits, Real Estate, Media and Culture, Local Government, Migration, Agriculture, Public Investments, Informatization, Economy. If the document does not definitively fit any of these, you MUST use \"Other\". If you use \"Other\", it should be the ONLY category selected. Do NOT invent new categories. The response must be an array of strings, e.g., [\"Taxes\", \"Family\"].\"]\n}\n\n",
      "ai_response_raw": "{\n  \"pl_ai_title\": \"Ochrona internetu i energii: nowe zabezpieczenia podwodnej infrastruktury Tajwanu\",\n  \"pl_summary\": \"Ustawa ma na celu zabezpieczenie kabli podwodnych i rurociągów wokół Tajwanu przed celowym uszkodzeniem, co chroni globalną łączność i gospodarkę. Wprowadza ona systemy monitorowania, szybkie naprawy oraz surowe kary finansowe i wizowe dla osób zaangażowanych w sabotaż.\",\n  \"pl_key_points\": [\n    \"Lepsza ochrona kabli internetowych zapewnia stabilność globalnej sieci i usług cyfrowych.\",\n    \"Nowe systemy wykrywania sabotażu mają zapobiegać nagłym przerwom w dostawie prądu i internetu.\",\n    \"Osoby i firmy niszczące infrastrukturę zostaną odcięte od amerykańskiego systemu finansowego i wiz.\",\n    \"Specjalne fundusze pozwolą na błyskawiczne naprawy uszkodzonych połączeń podwodnych.\",\n    \"Zwiększona obecność straży przybrzeżnej podniesie bezpieczeństwo na ważnych szlakach morskich.\"\n  ],\n  \"eng_ai_title\": \"Internet and Energy Protection: New Safeguards for Taiwan's Undersea Infrastructure\",\n  \"eng_summary\": \"This act aims to secure undersea cables and pipelines around Taiwan from intentional damage, protecting global connectivity and the economy. It introduces monitoring systems, rapid repair protocols, and strict financial and visa penalties for those involved in sabotage.\",\n  \"eng_key_points\": [\n    \"Better protection for internet cables ensures the stability of global networks and digital services.\",\n    \"New sabotage detection systems aim to prevent sudden power and internet outages.\",\n    \"Individuals and companies damaging infrastructure will be cut off from the US financial and visa systems.\",\n    \"Special funds will allow for lightning-fast repairs of damaged undersea connections.\",\n    \"Increased coast guard presence will improve security on vital maritime routes.\"\n  ],\n  \"de_ai_title\": \"Internet- und Energieschutz: Neue Sicherheitsmaßnahmen für Taiwans Unterwasserinfrastruktur\",\n  \"de_summary\": \"Dieses Gesetz zielt darauf ab, Unterseekabel und Pipelines um Taiwan vor vorsätzlicher Beschädigung zu schützen, um die globale Konnektivität und Wirtschaft zu sichern. Es führt Überwachungssysteme, Schnellreparaturprotokolle sowie strenge Finanz- und Visasanktionen für Saboteure ein.\",\n  \"de_key_points\": [\n    \"Ein besserer Schutz der Internetkabel gewährleistet die Stabilität globaler Netzwerke und digitaler Dienste.\",\n    \"Neue Sabotage-Erkennungssysteme sollen plötzliche Strom- und Internetausfälle verhindern.\",\n    \"Personen und Unternehmen, die die Infrastruktur beschädigen, werden vom US-Finanz- und Visasystem ausgeschlossen.\",\n    \"Spezielle Mittel ermöglichen blitzschnelle Reparaturen beschädigter Unterwasserverbindungen.\",\n    \"Eine verstärkte Präsenz der Küstenwache wird die Sicherheit auf wichtigen Seewegen verbessern.\"\n  ],\n  \"fr_ai_title\": \"Protection de l'Internet et de l'énergie : nouvelles sauvegardes pour Taïwan\",\n  \"fr_summary\": \"Cette loi vise à sécuriser les câbles et pipelines sous-marins autour de Taïwan contre les dommages intentionnels, protégeant ainsi la connectivité et l'économie mondiales. Elle introduit des systèmes de surveillance, des protocoles de réparation rapide et des sanctions financières et de visa strictes pour les auteurs de sabotages.\",\n  \"fr_key_points\": [\n    \"Une meilleure protection des câbles internet assure la stabilité des réseaux mondiaux et des services numériques.\",\n    \"De nouveaux systèmes de détection de sabotage visent à prévenir les pannes soudaines d'électricité et d'internet.\",\n    \"Les individus et entreprises endommageant l'infrastructure seront exclus du système financier et des visas américains.\",\n    \"Des fonds spéciaux permettront des réparations ultra-rapides des connexions sous-marines endommagées.\",\n    \"Une présence accrue de la garde côtière améliorera la sécurité sur les routes maritimes vitales.\"\n  ],\n  \"es_ai_title\": \"Protección de internet y energía: nuevas salvaguardas para la infraestructura de Taiwán\",\n  \"es_summary\": \"Esta ley tiene como objetivo asegurar los cables y tuberías submarinos alrededor de Taiwán contra daños intencionales, protegiendo la conectividad y la economía global. Introduce sistemas de monitoreo, protocolos de reparación rápida y estrictas sanciones financieras y de visa para los involucrados en sabotajes.\",\n  \"es_key_points\": [\n    \"Una mejor protección de los cables de internet garantiza la estabilidad de las redes globales y los servicios digitales.\",\n    \"Nuevos sistemas de detección de sabotaje buscan prevenir cortes repentinos de energía e internet.\",\n    \"Las personas y empresas que dañen la infraestructura serán excluidas del sistema financiero y de visas de EE. UU.\",\n    \"Fondos especiales permitirán reparaciones ultrarrápidas de las conexiones submarinas dañadas.\",\n    \"El aumento de la presencia de la guardia costera mejorará la seguridad en rutas marítimas vitales.\"\n  ],\n  \"it_ai_title\": \"Protezione di internet ed energia: nuove tutele per l'infrastruttura di Taiwan\",\n  \"it_summary\": \"Questa legge mira a mettere in sicurezza i cavi e le condutture sottomarine intorno a Taiwan dai danni intenzionali, proteggendo la connettività e l'economia globale. Introduce sistemi di monitoraggio, protocolli di riparazione rapida e severe sanzioni finanziarie e sui visti per chi è coinvolto in sabotaggi.\",\n  \"it_key_points\": [\n    \"Una migliore protezione dei cavi internet garantisce la stabilità delle reti globali e dei servizi digitali.\",\n    \"Nuovi sistemi di rilevamento dei sabotaggi mirano a prevenire improvvise interruzioni di corrente e internet.\",\n    \"Individui e aziende che danneggiano l'infrastruttura saranno esclusi dal sistema finanziario e dei visti degli Stati Uniti.\",\n    \"Fondi speciali consentiranno riparazioni rapidissime delle connessioni sottomarine danneggiate.\",\n    \"L'aumento della presenza della guardia costiera migliorerà la sicurezza sulle rotte marittime vitali.\"\n  ],\n  \"nl_ai_title\": \"Internet- en energiebescherming: nieuwe waarborgen voor de onderzeese infrastructuur van Taiwan\",\n  \"nl_summary\": \"Deze wet is bedoeld om onderzeese kabels en pijpleidingen rond Taiwan te beveiligen tegen opzettelijke schade, waardoor de wereldwijde connectiviteit en economie worden beschermd. Het introduceert monitoringsystemen, protocollen voor snelle reparatie en strikte financiële en visumsancties voor saboteurs.\",\n  \"nl_key_points\": [\n    \"Betere bescherming van internetkabels zorgt voor de stabiliteit van wereldwijde netwerken en digitale diensten.\",\n    \"Nieuwe systemen voor het detecteren van sabotage zijn bedoeld om plotselinge stroom- en internetuitval te voorkomen.\",\n    \"Individuen en bedrijven die infrastructuur beschadigen, worden uitgesloten van het Amerikaanse financiële en visumsysteem.\",\n    \"Speciale fondsen maken razendsnelle reparaties van beschadigde onderzeese verbindingen mogelijk.\",\n    \"Verhoogde aanwezigheid van de kustwacht zal de veiligheid op vitale zeeroutes verbeteren.\"\n  ],\n  \"pt_ai_title\": \"Proteção de internet e energia: novas salvaguardas para a infraestrutura de Taiwan\",\n  \"pt_summary\": \"Esta lei visa proteger os cabos e oleodutos submarinos em redor de Taiwan contra danos intencionais, salvaguardando a conetividade e a economia globais. Introduz sistemas de monitorização, protocolos de reparação rápida e sanções financeiras e de vistos rigorosas para os envolvidos em sabotagem.\",\n  \"pt_key_points\": [\n    \"Uma melhor proteção dos cabos de internet garante a estabilidade das redes globais e dos serviços digitais.\",\n    \"Novos sistemas de deteção de sabotagem visam prevenir cortes repentinos de energia e de internet.\",\n    \"Indivíduos e empresas que danifiquem a infraestrutura serão excluídos do sistema financeiro e de vistos dos EUA.\",\n    \"Fundos especiais permitirão reparações ultrarrápidas de ligações submarinas danificadas.\",\n    \"O aumento da presença da guarda costeira melhorará a segurança em rotas marítimas vitais.\"\n  ],\n  \"category\": [\"Security\", \"Economy\", \"Informatization\"]\n}"
    }
  ]
}