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Neither with one side nor the other: with the Republic

WEEKLY SUMMARY

NOVEMBER 7–14, 2026

This week's top news stories about Cuba and the world.

This weekly summary in PDF format is part of Prensa Libre Cuba's commitment to Cubans' right to be informed. In a country where official media outlets conceal, distort, or silence the truth, we offer this service so that citizens can access verified news and independent analysis. Since the PLC website cannot be viewed in Cuba due to censorship, we have chosen to distribute this PDF version so that the information reaches—unblocked—those who need it most.

More than six decades later, the name *Prensa Libre* is coming back to life. **Prensa Libre Cuba** is launching online with a mission that honors that republican tradition: to provide a space for information, analysis, and debate that supports citizens at a decisive moment in our history.

Our goal is not only to chronicle the daily reality of Cuba—its challenges, its tensions, its hopes—but also **to open a broad and pluralistic forum on the country's future**. We want to be a place where ideas are discussed, perspectives are compared, and proposals are developed for a **democratic transition** that is already part of the collective imagination of millions of Cubans both on and off the island.

CUBA:

Trump Wants to Demolish the Castro Regime Without Inheriting Its Collapse

BY PLC CENTRAL EDITORIAL STAFF ON NOVEMBER 14, 2026, 11:00 A.M. |
ANALYSIS, CUBA, UNITED STATES, AND LATEST NEWS



But the goal of ending the Castro regime faces a challenge that no U.S. administration has managed to resolve: how to prevent the demise of the West's most decrepit dictatorship from triggering a crisis that ultimately affects the United States directly? Photo: Donald Trump, via social media

CUBA-UNITED STATES-CRISIS

PLC

By Carlos Cabrera Pérez – Prensa Libre Cuba – Analysis

Madrid. PLC. Analysis | The threat of military intervention, an energy blockade, and secret negotiations paint a picture of a strategy of maximum pressure that coexists with Washington' 's fear of an

implosion of the failed Cuban state and a new wave of migration toward Florida.

The precedent of the 1962 Missile Crisis is once again taking center stage in a relationship that has never managed to break free from its strategic constraints.

Donald Trump wants to "resolve the Cuba issue" before leaving the White House and does not rule out using military force to achieve this, as he told American journalist Hugh Hewitt on Thursday, when Hewitt specifically asked if he would be willing to order a military operation against the island. "Of course I would consider it," he replied, describing Cuba as a failed state and singling out Marco Rubio as the man in charge of steering Washington's policy toward Havana.

A three-pronged strategy: If it goes well, the president takes the credit; if it goes wrong, Rubio takes the blame—which would derail his presidential aspirations for 2028—and it reinforces the cryptic Castroist argument that the Secretary of State is a worse adversary than Trump, due to his Cuban roots, invoking the old adage that there's no worse wedge than one cut from the same log.

Trump's statement is not an isolated threat because it comes after months of economic pressure, energy restrictions, sanctions, warnings to countries supplying oil to Cuba, and confidential talks with representatives of the Cuban government—including offers of negotiation and selective concessions.

This is not an accidental contradiction: Washington wants to force Cuba's democratization and opening up, but it has reason to fear the consequences of an uncontrolled collapse, and the Secretary of State's inner circle has not been tactful, prioritizing Rosa María Payá's team over other actors; without taking into account that she lacks local roots because she does not live in Cuba, and the historical " " experience in transitions from dictatorships to democracy—where the

voice that carries the most weight has always been that of those on the inside, never those on the outside.

Cuba is showing signs of a failed state due to its inability to guarantee essential services, including the collapse of the healthcare and energy systems and food insecurity; while the repressive apparatus retains a partial capacity to control society, suppress dissent, and maintain its political monopoly, due to its reliance on terror rather than prosperity and openness; as demonstrated by the recent abuses against opposition figures, activists, and independent journalists, and the continued detention of 757 political prisoners, according to figures from the Cuban Human Rights Observatory (OCDH).

And this distinction is fundamental to understanding the United States' calculations, given that—so far—the economic weakening of the dictatorship does not guarantee its demise, nor does an implosion guarantee an orderly transition; with the risk of a power vacuum, the outbreak of an undesirable civil war, and a humanitarian crisis, all of which could lead to another massive wave of migration toward Florida.

The specter of Mariel

Washington is well aware of the consequences of an uncontrolled Cuban crisis, such as the Mariel exodus, which, in 1980, brought some 125,000 Cubans to the United States. Fourteen years later, during the Rafters Crisis, around 35,000 people set out to sea in makeshift boats to reach Florida. The Clinton administration ultimately negotiated the September 1994 and May 1995 migration agreements with Havana, which established mechanisms to channel departures and guarantee a minimum of 20,000 legal admissions annually.

The migration crisis once again reached extraordinary proportions between 2021 and 2024, when hundreds of thousands of Cubans—frustrated by the failure of the popular "aldabonazo" of July 11—left the island by various means, forcing the Biden administration to

manage the consequences of yet another Cuban exodus that overwhelmed traditional immigration policies.

The fear of a new crisis is not exclusive to Trump, Rubio, or the Republican Party. Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense during the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, warned in May that the greatest danger Cuba could pose to the United States was its own collapse and the possibility of a new mass exodus comparable to Mariel.

The concern has both a political and a national security dimension. Florida is the natural destination for a significant portion of Cubans who leave the island and—until now—a reliable source of Democratic votes, but a new wave of migration would directly affect U.S. domestic politics, border security, and stability in the Florida Straits.

In fact, the first phase of the talks in Mexico between the CIA's deputy director, Michael Ellis, and General Alejandro Castro Espín addressed what the U.S. side technically termed "damage control": emigration, drug trafficking, human trafficking, arms trafficking, and the fight against money laundering.

The midterm election upset placed the Democrats—among whom Castroism has long held significant influence—in an advantageous position to thwart the alleged plans for invasion and occupation, because both Democrats and Republicans know that late-stage Castroism wouldn't last even half a round, but problems will arise within the next five minutes.

Trump's Carrots and Sticks

Trump's policy combines two tracks that advance simultaneously. On the one hand, it aims to deprive the Cuban government of the resources that allow it to sustain itself; on the other, it keeps channels of negotiation open and provides for exceptions to prevent the

pressure from leading to consequences that Washington cannot control.

The executive order of January 29, 2026, declared a national emergency related to Cuba and established a mechanism to impose tariffs on products from countries that supply oil to the island. The measure extended U.S. pressure beyond bilateral relations: any government that contributes to maintaining Cuba's energy supply may become the target of trade reprisals.

The capture of Nicolás Maduro on January 3 and the interruption of Venezuelan oil supplies exacerbated Cuba's energy crisis because Venezuela had for years been one of the main material pillars of the Castro regime, which has since seen its structural crisis worsen.

However, Washington has not closed all doors and has allowed exceptions for certain supplies destined for Cuba's private sector, as well as authorizing the delivery of fuel under specific circumstances. In April, Marco Rubio justified the flexibility of some measures by citing the risk that excessive pressure could trigger another wave of refugees toward Florida.

Behind-the-scenes talks with representatives from Havana constitute the other side of the strategy. Trump has acknowledged these contacts, led by Rubio, and even spoke of the possibility of a "friendly takeover" of Cuba. So far, the White House is seeking, at the very least, an economic agreement that could open the door to political transformation, but its plan has run up against the internal conflict between hardliners and moderates and the lack of generous, forward-thinking leaders within the persecuted and fragmented Cuban opposition.

In May, *Axios* revealed that the administration had conducted military planning exercises in anticipation of a possible collapse of the Cuban government and, according to U.S. sources cited by the outlet, U.S. Southern Command had participated in an interagency exercise to

study “scenarios of chaos on the island,” but the reporters clarified th t Trump had not authorized an invasion and that he preferred a peaceful transition.

The *Axios* report described a strategy of gradual pressure, referred to by a senior official as *“accelerationism”*: accelerating the system’s deterioration while carefully managing its stages. The administration also announced $100 million in humanitarian aid for Cuba, on the condition that the funds bypass the government and be channeled through the Catholic Church and aid organizations.

A highly revealing combination, consistent with U.S. geopolitical interests: sanctions and energy strangulation, political contacts, selective humanitarian aid, and military planning for an eventual collapse of power. In short, Trump aims to strip the Castro regime of its ability to sustain itself, but does not want the crisis to ultimately become a migration and security problem for the United States.

The Shadow of 1962

The Missile Crisis is another historical precedent that helps shed light on the relationship between Washington and Havana. In October 1962, Kennedy and Khrushchev resolved the standoff through an agreement that included the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba, a U.S. commitment not to invade the island, and the discreet removal of Jupiter missiles deployed in Turkey.

The guarantee of non-invasion, however, was never a perpetual and unconditional promise. The Kennedy Administration attached conditions related to Cuba’s international conduct and to the withdrawal and verification of Soviet weaponry. In a draft U.S. statement sent to the United Nations on November 21, 1962, Washington expressly conditioned its commitment on Cuba’s failure to invade or support invasions of other countries—a requirement that Havana has violated on multiple occasions.

On February 9, 1963, Secretary of State Dean Rusk informed Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that the United States could not make an absolutely unconditional commitment regarding the future, because it depended on the Cuban government's attitude. Rusk cited Havana's subversive activities in Venezuela and other Latin American countries.

The Castro regime subsequently continued a policy of revolutionary and military projection abroad, from Latin America to Africa. Washington, for its part, never considered that the 1962 understanding prevented it from maintaining political, economic, and covert pressure against the Cuban government.

And although there is no record of Trump having explicitly invoked that precedent to justify his current policy, the parallels allow us to identify a continuity: the United States has never separated the Cuban issue from its strategic interests in the Caribbean and from the consequences that a crisis on the island could have on its own security.

Regime Change and the Cost of Collapse

Trump now has at his disposal a broader array of tools than the diplomatic pressure employed by Kennedy: the absence of the USSR and its satellites, financial sanctions, control over energy flows, the ability to exert pressure on third countries, and regional military superiority.

But the goal of ending the Castro regime coexists with a difficulty that no U.S. administration has managed to resolve: how to prevent the collapse of the West's most decrepit dictatorship from triggering a crisis that ultimately affects the United States directly?

Fidel Castro, who knew how to play with the chain without pissing off the monkey, would often use a geographical argument in similar crises, and would repeat a deceptive wink: "We can't move; our

country is 90 millimeters from the United States"—alluding to the Guantanamo Naval Base—and he would conclude, "But of course, our patience has a limit, and we have no reason to be the United States' border guards…"

The experience of Mariel and the rafters, the magnitude of the recent exodus, and the deterioration of living conditions on the island explain why Washington combines threats with exceptions, sanctions with aid, and public pressure with private talks. The White House wants to retain the initiative and set the pace of events, rather than merely reacting to a collapse.

In a nutshell: Trump wants to put an end to the Castro regime, but he doesn't want that upheaval to undermine Florida's stability. He aims to bring about Cuba's transformation without paying the price of its implosion. That is the true equation of his policy toward the island: to bring the regime to its knees, negotiate with its representatives, and have a military contingency plan ready for the day the olive-green, guayabera-clad caste loses control of the country.



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First Cuban mayor in Spain.

Cuba Is Plunged into Blackouts with Three Major Thermal Power Plants Offline

BY PLC CENTRAL EDITORIAL STAFF ON NOVEMBER 14, 2026, 11:00 A.M. |
ENERGY CRISIS, CUBA, AND LATEST NEWS



With three major thermal power plants out of operation simultaneously, Cuba is once again facing days marked by a massive generation shortfall and prolonged power outages, while each new breakdown further narrows the margin of an electrical system pushed to its limits. File photo of the Antonio Guiteras thermal power plant.

CUBA—ENERGY CRISIS

PLA

Havana. PLC | Cuba's electricity crisis has entered a new critical phase with three of its main thermal power plants out of service, a situation that further reduces generation capacity and prolongs the power outages plaguing the country.

The situation worsened with the shutdown of Unit 2 at the Ernesto Guevara thermoelectric plant in Santa Cruz del Norte due to a malfunction. Its shutdown left all three units at that plant out of service: Unit 1 was already out of service, and Unit 3 was shut down for maintenance.

This latest incident occurred while the National Electric System was already dealing with the absence of two other key facilities. The Antonio Guiteras thermal power plant in Matanzas remains offline following a malfunction in its boiler economizer. In Felton, Holguín, Unit 1 is undergoing scheduled maintenance for 21 days, while Unit 2 remains out of service.

This situation lays bare the depth of the crisis. Even before the latest breakdown in Santa Cruz del Norte, the Electric Union had forecast an availability of just 900 megawatts during peak demand hours, compared to an estimated demand of 2,800 MW, with an expected shortfall of 1,930 MW.

The combination of breakdowns and idled units is taking a toll on an electrical system that has been deteriorating for a long time and has been unable to meet the country's consumption needs for months.

Power outages have thus become one of the most serious manifestations of the Cuban crisis. The repeated failures at key facilities highlight the extreme fragility of an electrical infrastructure incapable of regaining lasting stability despite successive repairs and maintenance efforts.

With three major thermal power plants simultaneously out of operation, Cuba is once again facing days marked by a massive generation shortfall and prolonged blackouts, while each new breakdown further narrows the margin of an electrical system pushed to its limits.

Turiguanó, the Cuban island that saw tourism pass it by

BY CARLOS CABRERA PÉREZ ON NOVEMBER 14, 2026, 11:00 A.M. |
CUBA AND FEATURE STORY



But Turiguanó has more to offer than just cows and pastures. Its town, known as the Dutch Village, suddenly breaks the monotony of the road. The houses, with red-tiled gabled roofs and European-inspired architecture, cluster around orderly streets and gardens. File photo

CUBA—REPORT

By Carlos Cabrera Pérez – Prensa Libre Cuba – Feature

Madrid. PLC | To discover Turiguanó, you have to slow down a bit, because those traveling from Morón to Cayo Coco pass through this area almost without realizing they're entering a place with its own history—a landscape of cattle and wetlands, and a small village of red-roofed houses that seems to have escaped from a postcard of Northern Europe to settle in the heart of Cuba.

The highway winds through pastures, trees, and open fields, where—at times—cattle appear, scattered or in groups, with that leisurely gait of ruminants that seem to understand the rhythm of the island better

than human —an island that once served as a benchmark for Cuban cattle breeding with its Santa Gertrudis breed.

But Turiguanó has more to offer than just cows and pastures. Its town, known as the Dutch Village, suddenly breaks the monotony of the road. The houses, with red-tiled gabled roofs and European-inspired architecture, cluster around orderly streets and gardens. It's not a common sight in Cuba. The community was built in the early 1960s as part of a livestock development project that transformed that remote area into a workers' settlement.

The island's history, however, dates back much further. In the late 19th century, it was a land of forests, marshes, and swamps—a place that was far from hospitable to anyone unfamiliar with its paths. Mosquitoes, sand flies, and the presence of alligators fueled the tales of those who ventured there. It was also used by colonial authorities as a place of confinement for people considered troublesome.

The Swedes



At the beginning of the 20th century, Swedish settlers arrived. They settled in La Loma, built wooden houses, a school, a store, and workshops, and tried to make a living through farming and agricultural operations. The project did not prosper as its promoters had hoped. Some emigrants left; others sought their fortune in Morón and the surrounding area.

The Swedes did not arrive in Turiguanó as a small group of isolated adventurers: behind their settlement was an American real estate company, an advertising campaign targeting Nordic immigrants, and a land-sales venture that ultimately ended in failure.

The most detailed account has been published by historian José Antonio Quintana García in OnCuba, based on press documents from the time and research by Yudit María Pérez Pérez and the "Fantasmas de una isla" project.

The starting point was the sale of Turiguanó on May 5, 1905, by Francisco Comesaña López to a U.S. company. The transaction was closed for $50,000 and sparked concern in the Cuban press over the acquisition of national territory by a foreign company. The company was registered as the Turiguanó Land Company. Its owners were John Thomas McCall and Per Vildner, a Swedish journalist who had emigrated to the United States.

Vildner conceived a plan to attract Swedish families living in the United States and Canada to establish an agricultural colony on the island. To this end, he launched an advertising campaign in newspapers, books, and brochures. Turiguanó was portrayed as a lush, fertile, and sunny land—an alternative to the long winters of the north.

The company offered ten-acre plots—about four hectares—for $2,000. Some were delivered already planted with plantains and fenced in for raising pigs. Payment was split: half up front and the rest once the farm began producing, and the first families began arriving in 1906.

The first Swedish settlement was established in La Loma, with wooden houses built on stilts, but it was not a development in the style of the later Pueblo Holandés; rather, it was a Nordic rural community situated in the midst of a tropical territory that was still almost untouched.

The historical reconstruction includes five houses, a school, a store, a carpenter's shop, a saddlery, a slaughterhouse, and a workshop for repairing windmills. There was also a small two-story wooden hotel with fourteen rooms, which served as lodging for the newcomers while they prepared their plots.

The school had been built, but it did not yet have a teacher. There was no telephone or post office. The community held Mass twice a week. Water was another problem: the water they found had a high mineral content and was unsuitable for washing or cooking. For this reason, they built cisterns and rainwater collection tanks.

New Orleans-based journalist John Westin visited the settlement and published his impressions on April 27, 1911, in the Swedish newspaper *Svensk-Amerikansk Occidental*.

He found about forty families, almost all of them Swedish. He estimated that, with the new plots and the homes under construction, the colony could eventually grow to include some 150 families and 700 residents. He described it as a still-young settlement, with many rudimentary houses and a pace of life considerably slower than what some of the women had known before emigrating.

The venture began to go awry when the settlers realized that the business conditions promised by real estate developer Vildner did not match reality. One of the selling points was that banana production could fetch prices of seven or eight pesos per thousand. However, according to Quintana García's account, the actual price barely reached 1.50 pesos, which did not cover production costs; yet those who left did not get their money back, and the company kept the land.

About twenty Swedish families were stranded in Turiguanó because they lacked the resources to pay for their return trip. They had to diversify their crops—growing melons, tomatoes, yams, beans, corn, onions, and oranges—which they sold in Morón.

One of the most revealing details is the irrigation system they used. The children would carry a thirty-gallon tank mounted on a wheelbarrow, with two perforated tubes that distributed the water like a sprinkler. They would drape a rope over their shoulders and move through the fields while their father pushed the contraption.

Some families left Turiguanó and moved to areas closer to Morón. The surnames Swamberg, Olsom, Palm, and Grand appear among those who settled inland and developed citrus farms. Other immigrants settled in r Ceballos, where an American colony already existed. Clark Norberg was the last Swede to live in Turiguanó, where he died in the early 1960s.

The company that had promoted the colonization did not survive either. After John Thomas McCall's death in 1912, the business passed into the hands of his relatives and administrators. In 1917, the Turiguanó Land Company was dissolved and sold its properties to another company, the Turiguanó Development Company S.A., linked to the American Ezra J. Barker. From then on, cattle ranching came to play a decisive role in the island's economy.

Santa Gertrudis



The cattle breed originated at the King Ranch in South Texas and was developed by crossing British Shorthorn cattle with Brahman cattle of Indian origin. The final ratio that defined the breed was 5/8 Shorthorn and 3/8 Brahman, according to data from American specialists and veterinarians who sought a cow capable of withstanding the heat, humidity, insects, and poor pastures of South Texas, without sacrificing good meat yield.

Cuban records place the breed's arrival in Turiguanó in late 1935. The breed was introduced by the American owner of the island, E. J. Baker, who first imported 35 young bulls and then another twelve young bulls that—over several years—were crossed with mixed-breed Zebu and Red Polled cattle; in 1947, the Santa Gertrudis was recognized as a purebred breed, even though it was an F-2.

At the triumph of the Revolution, Baker's livestock holdings comprised some 400 caballerías of pastureland and 6,000 head of Santa Gertrudis cattle. The ranch was nationalized and converted into a collective farm, administered by Manuel Fajardo, a commander in the Rebel Army, according to historian Alipio Alonso Rojas.

The Castro regime established the Isla de Turiguanó Genetic Enterprise, with the mission of producing breeding bulls for Cuba's cattle operations, on a 7,282-hectare ranch with 16 herds, natural and cultivated pastures—including the Guinea and Estrella varieties—rational Voisin grazing, and the application of artificial insemination techniques, according to a study by researchers Ángel Ceró Rizo and Roylan González, affiliated with the University of Camagüey and the Ministry of Agriculture.

In January 2025, the Cuban News Agency reported on the intervention in Turiguanó by REPROMAS, a small private company from Camagüey specializing in animal reproduction and breeding, which identified cows with long periods without estrus and without pregnancy. To address this, they established so-called "gestation farms": they concentrated the females suitable for reproduction there , administered antiparasitic treatments, supplements, and hormonal treatments, and returned them to their dairy farms once they were pregnant as a result of insemination.

The landscape of this unique island also bears witness to another transformation. Turiguanó ceased to be isolated when it was connected to the mainland by road in the early 1960s. Later, the causeway that connected the island to Cayo Coco and Cayo Guillermo began there. The project changed the region's everyday geography and paved the way for the development of Jardines del Rey as a tourist destination.

Since then, travelers heading to the hotels and beaches of the cays pass through Turiguanó as if crossing a threshold. On one side lies rural life; on the other, the tourist destination built to welcome

visitors. The island serves as a gateway to a world of large hotels, yet it retains a different scale: low-rise houses with a European flair, quiet streets, and a connection to the land that isn't dependent on tourist seasons.

Perhaps that is why Turiguanó makes such a unique impression. It needs no grand monuments or spectacular landscapes to be remembered. Its appeal lies in the contrast: an island that was once a refuge for settlers, a cattle-ranching region, and the starting point for one of Cuba's major tourism infrastructure projects. A place that, while the surrounding keys filled with hotels, retained some of its former tranquility.

Nicolás Guillén dedicated a poem to it, included in **El son entero**, published in 1947. Hemingway, too, became associated with the memory of these landscapes. Two very different names for a small territory, yet one that's hard to reduce to a mere stop along the way. Turiguanó is not Cayo Coco, nor does it claim to be, because it is the Cuba of rural roads, red rooftops, grasslands, and a history that remains there, in plain sight for anyone who takes the time to pause and recall Guillén: Island of Turiguanó/I want to buy you whole and bury you in my voice (…) Oh, Turiguanó dreaming/ fixed before Morón/broken sky/gentle wind/oh, Turiguanó weeping/oh,



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First Cuban mayor in Spain.

THE G7 PUTS DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS ON THE TABLE FOR CUBA: WILL THE REGIME RESPOND WITH CHANGE OR WITH MORE RESISTANCE?

BY ANTONIO SUAREZ FONTICIELLA ON NOVEMBER 14, 2026, 11:00 A.M. |
ANALYSIS, SOCIAL CRISIS, CUBA, INTERNATIONAL, OPINION, AND LATEST NEWS



This is a political statement of considerable importance. It is not a binding resolution nor does it announce new sanctions, but it represents a joint position of seven governments that, despite their differences, have decided to point out that the solution to the Cuban crisis cannot be limited to an economic recovery led by the same political structures that have governed the country for decades. AI-generated image | © ASF

CUBA-G7 DECLARATION

By Antonio Suárez Fonticiella – Prensa Libre Cuba

Havana. PLC | The joint statement by the foreign ministers of the Group of Seven (G7), adopted following the meeting held in Paris on November 9 and 10, 2026, once again places Cuba at the center of an international debate that goes far beyond its deteriorating economic

situation. This time, the leading democratic economies did not limit themselves to expressing concern over the humanitarian crisis facing the Cuban people. They also called for far-reaching political and economic reforms, respect for human rights, freedom of the press, freedom of expression and association, a multiparty democratic system of governance, and the release of all those arbitrarily detained.

This is a political statement of considerable importance. It is not a binding resolution nor does it announce new sanctions, but it represents a joint position of seven governments that, despite their differences, have decided to make clear that the solution to the Cuban crisis cannot be limited to an economic recovery led by the very same political structures that have governed the country for decades.

The fundamental question is another: What will the Cuban government do in response to these demands? Will it be willing to accept changes that could alter the foundations of its political system, or will it respond, once again, with rejection and diplomatic confrontation?

The first response: rejecting the message and pointing the finger at Washington

Havana's reaction was not long in coming. On November 12, Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla questioned the G7's statement and accused the group of ignoring the effects of the U.S. embargo, the economic war, and what he described as an energy blockade against Cuba.

The minister maintained that the document repeated arguments fabricated by Washington and argued that U.S. policy constitutes a violation of the Cuban people's human rights.

This response confirms a well-known strategy of Cuban diplomacy: shifting the focus of the discussion toward the conflict with the United States and presenting international pressure as part of a policy

of hostility toward national sovereignty.

There is one element that must not be overlooked. The U.S. embargo has real consequences for Cuba's economy and trade opportunities, and must be part of any serious analysis. However, acknowledging that impact does not mean that the Cuban government's internal responsibilities—the economic decisions made over the years, the lack of institutional transparency, and the restrictions on political freedoms—should be ignored.

The problem arises when an external explanation ends up being used to avoid any discussion of the responsibilities of those in power within the country.

Can the government accept political reforms?

This is the most sensitive point in the G7 statement.

Economic reforms can be presented by Cuban authorities as a necessity for surviving the crisis. In fact, the government could expand certain areas for private enterprise, relax some regulations, seek foreign investment, and adopt measures to alleviate the population's material hardships.

But the political reforms called for by the G7 have another dimension. Talking about a multiparty system, freedom of the press, freedom of association, and freedom of expression means opening up spaces that are currently subject to severe institutional and legal restrictions.

Accepting genuine political competition would mean allowing other organizations to advocate for different agendas, challenge the " " representation of citizens, and question government decisions without fear of reprisals.

This raises a fundamental contradiction: Can a power structure accept a transformation that limits its own control over institutions and

political life?

My interpretation is that, under current conditions, Havana is unlikely to voluntarily accept a transition to a multiparty system. It is more likely to maintain its rejection of the G7's political demands and to attempt to present any economic changes as evidence of a willingness to reform.

What might Cuba do in the coming months?

There are several scenarios worth considering.

The first, and possibly the most likely, is the continuation of diplomatic confrontation. The government could insist that the G7 statement is influenced by U.S. policy, denounce the failure to recognize the embargo, and seek support from its international allies. This response would allow it to maintain its political rhetoric without making far-reaching domestic commitments.

A second scenario would be the implementation of limited economic reforms. Given the gravity of the situation, the authorities could expand opportunities for self-employed workers, facilitate certain investments, make marketing mechanisms more flexible, and allow for greater private participation in some sectors. However, these changes would not necessarily be accompanied by political freedoms.

A third, far more significant scenario would be the opening of a national dialogue that includes diverse social sectors, independent organizations, representatives of civil society, and voices critical of the government. A process of this nature could open up avenues for addressing the release of political prisoners, civil rights, and institutional transformation.

However, this last scenario would require a political willingness that has not yet been demonstrated in the official response to the G7.

There is also the possibility that Havana might attempt to combine specific concessions with increased surveillance of independent sectors, preventing economic measures from becoming avenues for political autonomy. This would be a way to modify certain aspects of the economy without altering the fundamental structure of power.

The Dilemma Facing the International Community

The G7 statement also raises questions for the very governments that signed it.

Will they stop at a diplomatic statement, or will they follow through on the demands they have made? How will they support Cuban civil society actors? What mechanisms will they use to promote humanitarian aid without it being conditioned by political interests or ultimately limited by the country's administrative difficulties?

The statement calls for aid to reach the entire Cuban population and for distribution mechanisms to be strengthened. This point is especially important because the crisis does not affect only those involved in political life. It affects families who cannot find food, the sick who need medication, workers whose incomes are insufficient, and the elderly who depend on increasingly inadequate assistance.

The international community must keep two issues separate: humanitarian aid, which addresses the urgent needs of the population, and political demands related to rights and freedoms. Both are important, but aid should not become a tool to exert pressure on those suffering from the crisis.

Is the government willing to listen to Cuban society?

The fundamental question is not merely whether the government will respond to the G7. It is whether it is willing to listen to the Cuban people themselves.

For years, different sectors of society have demanded freedoms, civic participation, institutional independence, judicial safeguards, and real opportunities to decide the country's future. These demands did not originate in Paris, nor do they depend on a foreign declaration.

The legitimacy of any transformation must be built on the will of the citizens and their right to participate without exclusion. No government can indefinitely supplant the voice of a society that needs to decide its own destiny.

For this reason, the demand to release those arbitrarily detained is of particular importance. This is not a secondary issue nor a diplomatic concession. It is a matter directly related to fundamental rights and to the possibility of public debate without reprisals.

A decision the government cannot postpone indefinitely

The G7 has expressed its position. The Cuban government has already responded with criticism focused on the U.S. embargo. But between these two statements lies a reality that cannot be resolved through declarations alone: the profound crisis Cuba is facing and the need for changes that will restore economic opportunities, rights, and decision-making power to its citizens.

It would be irresponsible to claim that this statement will bring about an immediate political transformation. Nor is there sufficient evidence to assert that the government is preparing for a democratic opening. What can be observed, however, is that international demands have been explicitly articulated and that Havana has chosen, for now, to challenge the message rather than address its concerns.

Cuban political history shows that diplomatic statements, on their own, do not change power structures. For real transformation to occur, internal decisions, institutional safeguards, and citizen participation are needed.

The questions remain open: Will the Cuban government accept that the country needs more than just economic reforms? Will it allow political freedoms that might challenge its monopoly on power? Will it release those who remain arbitrarily detained? Will it be willing to engage in dialogue with a society that demands a say in decisions about its future?

And perhaps the most important question is this: How much longer can a government postpone the changes demanded by its own society without deepening the crisis of trust between the government and its citizens?

The G7 has laid its demands on the table. Havana's official response has already shown its first signs. Now it remains to be seen whether those words will translate into concrete decisions or whether, once again, they will end up as just another episode of diplomatic confrontation while Cubans continue to wait for change.

The issue is not merely what the Cuban government is willing to concede to the G7. The real question is what it is willing to acknowledge and guarantee to its own people.



Antonio Suarez Fonticiella

Havana. Independent journalist, member of the editorial team at *Prensa Libre Cuba*.

Cuba: The Tumor the World Continues to Ignore

BY JUAN MORENO ON NOVEMBER 14, 2026, 11:00 A.M. |
ANALYSIS, SOCIAL CRISIS, CUBA, AND LATEST NEWS



Cuba has become a kind of living warning: this is what happens when a power without checks and balances, without political competition, and without accountability ends up merging with the state and taking control of the fate of an entire people. AI-generated image /JN

CUBA-SOCIAL CRISIS

By Juan Moreno – Prensa Libre Cuba - Analysis

Havana. PLC | While an entire country is in the throes of misery, blackouts, hunger, and despair, while thousands of families are falling apart in an exodus that is taking away much of their future, the world seems to have learned to live with the Cuban tragedy. Some look the other way; others prefer not to upset their political allies; and many simply consider what is happening on the island to be an internal matter.

But they are wrong. And perhaps the price of that indifference is yet

to be paid .

The Cuban regime long ago ceased to be exclusively a national problem. For decades, it developed a structure of political and ideological influence and strategic cooperation that extended its tentacles throughout Latin America and other regions of the world. Its model found fertile ground in governments and movements that used revolutionary rhetoric to justify the concentration of power, weaken democratic institutions, and perpetuate themselves in government.

Latin American history is well acquainted with this phenomenon. Some countries managed to escape this influence; others still suffer its consequences. Venezuela is probably the most obvious example of just how far the replication of an authoritarian model can go when it finds internal complicity and external support.

However, the danger does not end there.

Cuba has maintained strategic relations with governments criticized for their authoritarian practices and has developed political, military, and security cooperation ties with international actors at odds with Western democracies. It has also used its diplomatic apparatus and networks of influence to project a narrative that portrays any democratic challenge as imperialist aggression.

This is not to claim that Havana controls governments or international conflicts at will. It is to recognize that its ability to forge alliances, share methods of political control, and support authoritarian projects is a factor that should not be ignored.

The greatest danger of this model is its ability to normalize the unacceptable: turning repression into state policy, censorship into national defense, poverty into revolutionary sacrifice, and the absence of freedoms into a supposed social achievement.

When these practices are exported, justified, or held up as a model for

other governments, the damage is no longer confined to Cuba alone.

There is also another dimension that the world seems to underestimate: Cuba's decline has international consequences. The mass exodus, economic instability, dependence on foreign allies, and institutional deterioration have migratory, humanitarian, and security repercussions that extend beyond the Caribbean.

And meanwhile, within the island, the social fabric is rotting away. The nation is losing its young people, its professionals, its entrepreneurs, and even the hope of rebuilding itself. The country is being drained of its people while those who govern it cling to power as if the survival of a political structure were more important than the very existence of a nation.

Cuba has become a kind of living warning: this is what happens when unchecked power—without political alternation or accountability—ends up merging with the state and appropriating the destiny of an entire people.

The world should understand that it is not enough to merely observe, occasionally condemn, or diplomatically manage the tragedy. Nor is it a matter of promoting military adventures or interventions that end up punishing the population even further. It is a matter of backing up with concrete actions the right of Cubans to regain their freedoms, rebuild their institutions, and democratically decide their future.

Because political tumors do not disappear simply by ignoring them. As long as they retain the ability to reproduce, they continue to spread their effects.

Cuba does not need the world to learn to live with its dictatorship. It needs the world to stop treating it as a tolerable anomaly and to understand that its liberation is also a matter of international democratic stability.

The question should no longer be how much longer the Cuban regime can survive. The real question is how much additional damage its continued existence can cause before the world decides to stop looking the other way.11



Juan Moreno

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Institutional Crisis in Cuba: Guantánamo Governor's Dismissal Approved

BY FRANK ABEL ON NOVEMBER 13, 2026, 2:59 P.M. |
SOCIAL CRISIS, CUBA, AND LATEST NEWS



Prime Minister Manuel Marrero Cruz with Las Tunas Governor Yelenys Torner Menéndez. Photo by Cubadebate

CUBA—INSTITUTIONAL CRISIS

By Frank Abel, Prensa Libre Cuba

Havana, November 13. PLC | Miguel Díaz-Canel approved the removal from office of the governor of Guantánamo Province, Alis Azahares Torreblanca. Although, according to reports, her departure is due to health issues, the fact remains striking: she is the third governor to leave office in less than a week, a succession of replacements that reflects the institutional crisis Cuba is currently facing.

Earlier this week, the resignation of Camagüey Governor Jorge Enrique Sutil Sarabia was approved after he, according to official press reports, acknowledged mistakes made in the performance of his duties. The following day, the removal from office of Las Tunas

Governor Yelenys Torner Menéndez was approved, citing “family or personal constraints.”

Beyond the official explanations offered for each case, the succession of resignations and removals from office in such a short period of time is yet another sign of the instability affecting government structures amid the deep economic and social crisis the island is facing.

High prices for basic goods, the lack of public transportation, shortages of cooking fuel, extensive power outages—which in many places last more than 24 hours—and streets where garbage and sewage are part of the daily landscape reflect the deterioration of living conditions and the functioning of public services in Cuba.

In this context, it would not be surprising to see further replacements or resignations, even at other levels of the government structure.



Frank Abel

Havana. Independent journalist, member of the editorial team at *Prensa Libre Cuba*.

THE CUBAN COUNTRYSIDE IS COLLAPSING: IDLE LAND, UNPAID FARMERS, AND A MODEL THAT CAN'T FEED THE COUNTRY

BY ANTONIO SUAREZ FONTICIELLA ON NOVEMBER 13, 2026, 2:43 P.M. |
ANALYSIS, SOCIAL CRISIS, CUBA, OPINION, AND LATEST NEWS



The national agricultural sector is undergoing a structural crisis that threatens to deepen food dependency and further deteriorate the living conditions of millions of Cubans. AI-generated image/ASF

CUBA-AGRICULTURE

By Antonio Suárez Fonticiella – Prensa Libre Cuba Analysis

Havana. PLC | The Cuban food crisis has roots much deeper than a poor harvest, a drought, or an occasional fuel shortage. What is happening in the Cuban countryside is the result of decades of economic decisions, administrative controls, inefficient agricultural policies, and a " " production model that has failed to guarantee one of the most basic rights of any society: access to food.

The recent report *Diagnosis of Cuba's Agricultural System*, presented by the Observatory on Labor and Union Rights (ODLS) and the Independent Trade Union Association of Cuba (ASIC), once again brings to light a reality that is difficult to ignore: the national agricultural sector is undergoing a structural crisis that threatens to deepen food dependence and further deteriorate the living conditions of millions of Cubans.

The figures for the 2020–2024 period are devastating. Citrus production fell by 82.7 percent, other fruits by 66.3 percent, rice by 62.3 percent, beans by 60.2 percent, vegetables by 54.5 percent, and grains by 51.1 percent. We are not talking about minor fluctuations in production, but rather declines that directly affect the population's daily food supply.

But the fundamental question is not merely how much Cuba has stopped producing. The real question is: How did a country with an agricultural tradition, arable land, and farming expertise end up in such a situation?

The causes of a crisis that has been building for decades

One of the main problems identified by the assessment is the concentration of large tracts of land in state-owned entities that are unable to use them productively. While there is unproductive or underutilized land, thousands of farmers need land, tools, seeds, fuel, and financing to produce.

This contradiction reveals a problem of economic organization: having land does not necessarily mean producing food. For a plot of land to be productive, it requires managerial autonomy, resources, incentives, and security regarding the results of the work.

Added to this is a pricing system that, according to the report, often fails to cover the actual costs of production. When a farmer must purchase fuel, fertilizers, seeds, and other inputs at high prices but is

forced to sell a portion of their harvest at administratively set prices, profitability disappears.

Who is going to invest, expand their cropland, or take on new risks if, at the end of the harvest, they cannot recoup their investment?

Another key factor is the system of mandatory contracting and marketing, accompanied by quotas and control mechanisms that limit producers' decision-making capacity. Farmers may understand their community's needs, identify which crops are in highest demand, and know where to find better marketing conditions, but they do not always have sufficient freedom to make those decisions.

Power outages, fuel shortages, a lack of fertilizers, and the deterioration of irrigation systems complete a scenario in which farming becomes an obstacle course.

Naturally, weather events, financial difficulties, and external constraints also play a role. However, they do not, on their own, explain why an agricultural system loses productive capacity over the course of years and fails to recover.

Private producers sustain a significant portion of the country, but they, too, are unable to move forward

One of the most revealing findings in the report is that non-state producers accounted for between 71.1% and 88.4% of the crops analyzed in 2024.

This means that private farmers, cooperatives, and other non-state producers are a fundamental part of the food supply, despite the limitations they face.

Here lies one of the model's greatest contradictions: those who play a decisive role in production do not have all the necessary conditions to carry out their activities.

The case of Acopio is particularly illustrative. According to data released by ASIC, the state-owned company owes more than 60 million pesos to farmers in San Antonio de los Baños.

A farmer who delivers his harvest and does not receive the corresponding payment loses the ability to buy seeds, pay workers, purchase fuel, or prepare for the next growing season.

The problem goes beyond an accounting debt. It results in less land being planted, less food available, and greater hardships for those who depend on that production.

Furthermore, when the government demands compliance from farmers but its own commercial entities fall behind on payments, the trust necessary to maintain any economic relationship is eroded.

Who will suffer the consequences?

The first victims are Cuban families, especially those who depend on wages and pensions that do not keep pace with food prices.

The decline in domestic production increases dependence on imports, which require foreign currency, transportation, financing, and logistical capacity. In a country that struggles to secur r foreign currency, this dependence constitutes an additional vulnerability.

When supply decreases, prices put even more pressure on the family budget. Those with access to remittances or foreign-currency income are better able to make purchases; those who depend exclusively on their wages or pensions are left in a much more disadvantaged position.

Children, older adults, pregnant women, and people with chronic illnesses are among the groups most vulnerable to the consequences of inadequate nutrition.

The World Food Program reported that it supported 1.3 million people in Cuba during 2024. This figure demonstrates the social scale that food insecurity has reached.

Farmers, agricultural workers, and rural communities will also suffer. Lower production means fewer jobs, lower incomes, deteriorating living conditions, and greater incentives to leave the countryside or emigrate.

The result could become a vicious cycle: fewer producers, smaller harvests, more imports, and a population increasingly dependent on food that the country cannot produce in sufficient quantities.

What might happen if the current course is not changed?

If conditions remain the same, the most likely scenario is a continuation of low productivity, with difficulties in reviving traditional crops such as rice, beans, citrus fruits, and vegetables.

Dependence on imports could increase, while food availability would remain subject t r financial constraints, international prices, and distribution challenges.

Nor can we rule out further nutritional deterioration among vulnerable populations and a widening of food inequalities.

The problem is that agriculture does not recover overnight. A citrus orchard takes years to reach full productive capacity; restoring irrigation systems, machinery, and infrastructure requires sustained investment. Every lost growing season represents time and resources that cannot be recovered immediately.

Therefore, postponing these transformations means passing the cost on to future generations.

What needs to change for the Cuban countryside to recover?

Agricultural recovery requires moving away from the logic of managing scarcity and beginning to create the conditions for production.

First, it is essential to allocate idle land to producers capable of working it, through secure contracts, sufficient time frames, and legal guarantees that allow for long-term investment and planning.

Second, the pricing and contracting system must be revised. Farmers need to know the commercial terms in advance, cover their costs, and earn reasonable profits for their work.

Third, Acopio and other marketing entities must fulfill their payment commitments. Non-payment cannot become standard practice. Transparent contracting mechanisms, defined deadlines, and accountability for non-compliance are needed.

Fourth, producers must be allowed to freely market a larger portion of their harvests, access markets directly, and establish commercial relationships with other economic actors, without unnecessary bureaucratic obstacles.

Fifth, the country needs urgent investment in machinery, fuel, fertilizers, high-quality seeds, electricity, and irrigation systems. It must also strengthen agribusiness, refrigerated storage, and transportation to reduce post-harvest losses.

Finally, cooperatives must have genuine economic and administrative autonomy. Farmers need to participate in decisions that affect their production, rather than merely following guidelines devised in offices far removed from the reality of rural life.

These transformations require statistical transparency, independent oversight, and public policies that evaluate their results using verifiable indicators.

Cuba's problem is not merely producing food: it is allowing food to be produced

The assessment presented by ODLS and ASIC raises a question that the authorities should not avoid: if non-state producers account for the majority of the crops analyzed, why do they continue to face so many restrictions on their ability to work and market their products?

A country cannot build food security on unproductive land, indebted farmers, companies that do not pay, and administrative structures that hinder economic initiative.

Agriculture needs the freedom to produce, clear rules, investment, rights, and markets capable of connecting producers with consumers.

Hunger is not solved with speeches, meetings, or new plans that repeat unmet goals. It is solved by planting, harvesting, paying on time, transporting, and making food available to the population.

Cuban soil still has the capacity to feed its people. The question is how much longer economic and administrative obstacles will be allowed to continue preventing that capacity from turning into food on households' tables.



Antonio Suarez Fonticiella

Havana. Independent journalist, member of the editorial team at *Prensa Libre Cuba*.

Exclusive: MININT Investigates Looting at Hotels in Cayo Coco

BY CARLOS CABRERA PÉREZ ON NOVEMBER 13, 2026, 12:52 P.M. |
CORRUPTION, SOCIAL CRISIS, CUBA, AND LATEST NEWS



As of the time of this writing, the Cuban government and the state and provincial press have not reported on the alleged looting of tourist facilities in Cayo Coco, most of which are owned by the Gaviota financial-business-military complex. AI-generated image | ©PLC

CUBA-CORRUPTION

By Carlos Cabrera Pérez - Exclusive

Madrid. PLC | The Cuban government has launched an investigation into the looting of hotel equipment in Cayo Coco, according to sources close to the party leadership and the Ciego de Ávila provincial government, who declined to be identified and stated that initial evidence points to workers at the empty hotels on that islet, where Fidel Castro partied at a nightclub until dawn in 1993.

Investigations into alleged crimes against socialist state property are being led by officers from the General Directorate of Criminal Investigation and Operations (DGICO), because the “ ” agents from the MININT in the province did not detect the thefts until a purported

foreign investor—who intended to reopen hotels—arrived and found that the properties had been stripped of their fixtures.

Sources did not quantify the damage inflicted on the hotels, nor did they identify the facilities damaged by the looting attributed to workers in the tourism sector; they specified that "no arrests have yet been made of managers or workers who allegedly took advantage of their shifts 'to loot the facilities.'"

The alleged perpetrators stole motorized water pumps, glass from the shopping center's stores, locks and sets of keys for rooms and facilities, as well as electrical outlets and power cords, among other items, the sources specified.

As of the time of this writing, the Cuban government, as well as the state and provincial press, have not reported on the alleged looting at Cayo Coco, most of which is owned by the Gaviota financial-business-military complex, which owns 55% of the island's hotels; a circumstance that would identify the alleged looters as civilian workers of the FAR, who are subject to specific labor regulations and a recruitment process that is, in principle, more rigorous.

Gaviota's labor regulations are not public, but the new Labor Code, which replaced Law 116/2013 in September, contains a relevant provision:

TENTH: The Ministries of the Revolutionary Armed Forces and the Interior, taking into account the policies and guidelines established in the country and the specific characteristics of their institutions, shall approve the regulatory provisions regarding labor, discipline, conflict resolution, salaries, and other monetary compensation that apply to military personnel, combatants, and their civilian employees.

For its part, Law 147/2021 on Military Criminal Procedure establishes in Article 92 two main grounds for the jurisdiction of military courts:

a) When a member of the FAR or the MININT is accused in the proceedings, even if civilians are involved.

b) When the acts are committed in military zones previously established by the competent authorities, regardless of whether civilians are involved.

Therefore, working for Gaviota does not automatically mean that any crime committed by an employee must be tried by a military court. Jurisdiction depends on the circumstances established in that law, the legal framework that is established, and the interpretation of the matter by the olive-green and enguayaberada caste, which appears to have launched yet another offensive against illegalities, with the dismissals of the governor of Camagüey and the mayor of the Avila municipality of Venezuela, for errors—among other things—in the constitution and operation of the local Food Sovereignty Commission; yet another sugar-coated farce; much like that "Hydraulic Project" we never heard from again.

In February 2025, the newspaper Granma published the article "No Impunity for Crimes That Affect the People," signed by our colleague Ortelio González Martínez, referring to actions taken by the Ciego de Ávila provincial prosecutor's office against 32 citizens for the alleged crimes of fuel theft from generators located on the Cayo Coco and Cayo Guillermo islands, using government vehicles.

Furthermore, the article described thefts of dielectric oil from 139 transformers in Ciego de Ávila, with 18,337 liters stolen and economic losses estimated at 959,958 pesos. It also mentions the theft of screws, washers, and nuts intended for the construction of the Ciego Norte solar park.

Cayo Coco: Facts and History

Cayo Coco covers 370 km² and is Cuba's fourth-largest island, with beaches stretching 27 kilometers; It is located at 22° 30′ north latitude

and 78° 30′ west longitude and is connected to the mainland by a 17-kilometer causeway that crosses Los Perros Bay, starting from the island of Turiguanó—which is linked by road to Morón—and ending south of the islet at a place known as La Silla.

But before it became a tourist destination known for its sun and beaches, it was a virtually uninhabited territory, home to a few charcoal burners, fishermen, border guards, and wild cattle, as well as large swarms of mosquitoes. Its name does not come from the popular fruit, but rather from the white ibis, commonly known in Cuba as the "Pájaro coco"; a waterbird with white plumage, a curved beak, and long legs, characteristic of the mangroves and wetlands in the area.



Aerial view of Cayo Coco.

History attributes the name "Jardines del Rey" to Diego Velázquez, in honor of King Ferdinand the Catholic, during the Spanish exploration of Cuba's northern coast in the early 16th century, in an archipelago comprising numerous cays and islets off the coast of what are now the provinces of Ciego de Ávila and Camagüey, where nd Ernest Hemingway fished aboard his famous yacht, the Pilar, which gave its name to the beautiful beach at Cayo Guillermo.



Ernest Hemingway, with his famous yacht, the Pilar, used to fish in the Jardines del Rey keys and gave his name to the beautiful beach at Cayo Guillermo

The hotels on Cayo Coco represent an investment of hundreds of millions of dollars in buildings, technical facilities, equipment, and maintenance, and this state-owned asset was out of service between 2017 and February 6 of this year, when the Canadian tour operator Transat announced it was leaving the islet.

The longest-standing closure among the island's facilities is that of the former Emperador Hotel, which was previously known as the Senador, Cristal Laguna, NH Krystal Laguna, and Iberostar Cayo Coco; it ceased operations following the damage caused by Hurricane Irma in September 2017 and has not reopened.

Cayo Coco's tourism inventory includes eleven hotels with some 5,347 rooms, which would entail an annual cost per available room ( ) of $2,461, according to international standards for hotel maintenance and upkeep—equivalent to between $8 million and $13.16 million annually for the maintenance of the entire resort complex. These are

global cost benchmarks, not financial statements published by Cuban companies.

The 5,347 rooms are owned by the state-run companies Gran Caribe (1,086 rooms across three hotels), Cubanacán (1,318 rooms across three other hotels), and Gaviota (2,943 rooms across five tourist accommodations).

I have not found specific data on hotel occupancy in Cayo Coco, but the state-run National Office of Statistics and Information (ONEI) reported that—in five-star hotels—occupancy rates were 29% in 2024 and 34.1% the previous year; however, these are national figures, not for the now-plundered tourist resort.

For its part, Meliá Hotels International, in a report to Spain's National Securities Market Commission, stated that—in 2025—its revenue in Cuba fell by 11 million euros, which it attributed to an energy crisis, reduced air connectivity, and a drop in reservations. These figures cover its operations across the entire island, not just Cayo Coco.

Investment in equipment includes air conditioning, chillers, water pumps, hydropneumatic units, water heaters, piping, electrical systems, faucets, plumbing fixtures, furniture, kitchens, and laundry facilities.

A 2002 technical report documented that the steel hot-water pipes at the Tryp Cayo Coco hotel were replaced with plastic pipes from the German brand CPVC Friatherm, while the York and Anthony chillers were replaced with Frioclima units—manufactured in Cuba—and the Calpeda motor pumps were replaced with similar models from the U.S. brand Bell & Gossett. In addition, water heaters, electrical panels, and other components were replaced during the renovation.

The Cuban industry supplied faucets, valves, and plumbing fixtures from the Empresa Industrial Herrajes in Guanabacoa; pumps and electric pumps produced by the Empresa Industrial de Riego (EIR);

and part of the furniture was provided by Muebles Lídex, which furnished forty rooms and the lobby of what was then the Meliá Cayo Coco.

Fidel at the Dancing Light

Cayo Coco was the site of the first time Fidel Castro's visit to a nightclub became public knowledge—specifically, at the then-Guitart Hotel, which was inaugurated on November 12, 1993, by the commander-in-chief. He dined with business leaders, tour operators, diplomats, and the then-Spanish ambassador to Cuba, José Antonio San Gil, accompanied by wines from La Rioja and Catalan cava.

Castro stayed until 1:30 a.m. at the hotel's nightclub, where he listened to salsa, merengue, boleros, and '50s rock; without getting up to dance, but he followed the beat from a table next to the dance floor, according to the testimony of several of the Spanish hosts, who had welcomed him about ten hours before dinner, when he arrived aboard a helicopter from the Executive Squadron, technically subordinate to the DAAFAR and operationally to the MININT's Personal Security Directorate.



Carlos Cabrera Pérez

Carlos Cabrera Pérez, Havana, 1962. He has lived in Madrid since 1991. He has worked at Prensa Latina, Granma Internacional, EFE Havana, IPS Havana, Encuentro de la Cultura Cubana, and CiberCuba.

First Cuban mayor in Spain.

Trump Steps Up Pressure on Cuba and Opens the Door to the Use of Force

BY PLC CENTRAL EDITORIAL STAFF ON NOVEMBER 13, 2026, 11:00 A.M. |
CUBA, UNITED STATES, AND LATEST NEWS



The statement represents a hardening of Washington's rhetoric, but it is essential to distinguish between rhetoric and facts. File photo.

U.S.-CUBA CRISIS

PLC

Washington. PLC | U.S. President Donald Trump significantly raised the tone against Cuba by stating that he would be willing to consider a brief military campaign against the island. This is a statement of considerable political gravity, although so far there has been no announcement of a specific operation.

The remarks came during a telephone interview with journalist Hugh Hewitt of Salem News Channel. When asked if he would be willing to resort to a brief military campaign against Cuba, Trump replied that he would "certainly" consider it.

The president also stated that he wants to "resolve the Cuba issue" before leaving the White House and once again singled out Secretary of State Marco Rubio as a key figure in his policy toward the island.

The statement represents a hardening of Washington's rhetoric, but it is essential to distinguish between rhetoric and facts. Trump did not announce a military intervention, present an operational plan, or set a date. To portray his words as confirmation of an attack would, for now, be going beyond what is known.

What does exist is a growing policy of pressure against Havana. Throughout 2026, the U.S. administration has strengthened its sanctions framework against individuals, entities, and sectors linked to the Cuban government.

In this context, publicly raising the possibility of using military force dangerously increases tensions between the two countries. The profound economic, social, and political crisis Cuba is facing requires solutions, but making the island's future the target of a potential foreign intervention could add uncertainty and confrontation to a Cuban population that is already enduring enormous hardships.

Trump's words must be taken with the seriousness befitting the statements of a U.S. president, but also with precision: today there is a political threat on the table, not a declaration of war against Cuba.

How many loaves of bread are there in ECOTRA? 26 and one burnt one…

BY PLC CENTRAL EDITORIAL STAFF ON NOVEMBER 12, 2026, 11:45 A.M. |
ANALYSIS, CORRUPTION, SOCIAL CRISIS, CUBA, OPINION, AND LATEST NEWS



We still don't know if Comrade Sutil cooperated or if he'll have to be sent to Villa Marista—the only school converted into a barracks—to clear up his mess. Photo: Radio Cadena Agramonte.

CUBA—SOCIAL CRISIS

By Carlos Cabrera Pérez

Madrid. PLC | Comrade Jorge Enrique Sutil Sarabia, governor of Camagüey until the day before yesterday, is the latest of nearly 30 provincial leaders to have been sent to the Consolidated Enterprise for Other Revolutionary Tasks (ECOTRA) since 2021, and the official statement regarding his dismissal employs the usual Soviet-style language of crony communism.

Fuel diversion, illegal sale of state-owned products, and irregular use of public funds to benefit private businesses were the misdeeds that reportedly led Comrade Sutil to ECOTRA, according to leaks from Camagüey officials, as reported by independent journalist José Luis Tan Estrada.

We still do not know whether Comrade Sutil cooperated or will have to be sent to Villa Marista—the only school converted into a barracks—to clear up his mess; nor do we know the extent of the alleged criminal network; although the sanctions will be measured, since there aren't many "minipymeros" in Cuba—unless they dedicate a unit of Agramont's FARINT to replace the necessary collaborators of the alleged rogue governor.

Deputy Governor Yennis León Mayedo has been provisionally placed in charge of the province until a new governor is appointed—a task that will require some persuasion, since almost no one wants to be a leader anymore; instead, they'd rather be a "minipymero" or emigrate.

A Devastating Five-Year Period

Over the past five years, twenty first secretaries of the party and seven governors and/or their deputies have been reassigned; a circumstance that reveals the gradual flight from the heat and confirms that revolution means changing everything that needs to be changed—except for the top two at the central level, as they say in the provinces—but not all cases were dramatic.

Former Tunas Governor Yelenis Tornet Menéndez resigned two days after the Camagüey governor's ouster, citing personal problems and family constraints, according to the official statement.

Shuffles and Purge

Within the structure of the People's Power, the personnel changes have taken on different forms. Beatriz Johnson Urrutia left her post as governor of Santiago de Cuba to assume the position of first provincial secretary of the PCC. Mario Felipe Sabines Lorenzo underwent a similar change in Matanzas. Alberto López Díaz, governor of Villa Clara, was promoted to the Ministry of Food Industry.

Other cases had a different outcome. Alexandre Corona Quintero resigned as governor of Cienfuegos in April 2024; and Radio Bemba claims that his downfall was linked to an alleged corruption network in the "Pearl of the South," from which only Marydé Fernández was spared because she was Roberto Morales Ojeda's mistress; he protected her by making her deputy head of the Ideological Department of the Central Committee. She had been a counterintelligence officer before sacrificing herself for the party, and Morales Ojeda comes and goes as he pleases.

There is no official confirmation—nor any from the state-run press—of these skirmishes, which are not uncommon, since Morales's mentor was Machado Ventura, who did the same with his lover, Barbarita Castillo, removing her from MINCIN and sending her to head the civilian missions in Venezuela.

Although different in nature, the changes share a common denominator: a lack of transparency. This is hardly surprising in a country where the number one historical leader spent ten years under a "state secret" designation. Official communications regarding changes in first secretaries are typically limited to acknowledging the outgoing leader's work or pointing out their shortcomings and announcing their replacement and/or new assignment—a statement that is not always precise, as the Pan con na often uses the phrase "they will be assigned other responsibilities."

Nor are the results of any administrative or police investigations made public, despite the UPEC's repeated demands—congress after congress and plenary session after plenary session—for greater transparency, which never materializes. This is compounded by the fact that a journalistic subculture has emerged that appears to be in the know but fails to report on it.

The succession of changes makes it clear that the leadership in the territorial spheres of the Cuban political system shifts more frequently than prices do, causing instability within the party and

provincial governments, where leaders are as scarce as oil—because for years now, being a leader and a member of FARINT has ceased to be attractive, and when word leaks out that someone has been caught red-handed in a corruption scandal, the public reacts with indifference.

For those who doubt the necessity of these replacements and might even feel sorry for the "ecotrados," they should remember that men die—some faster than others—but the party remains immortal. And for those who think this is a more dynamic style of governance, here are a few gems from Comrade Fidel regarding the much-talked-about transfers of some party members to the ECOTRA:

I. April 22, 2008. Loss of energy and revolutionary consciousness. Replacement of the Minister of Education, Luis Ignacio Gómez Gutiérrez.

"He was truly exhausted. He had lost his energy and revolutionary consciousness. He should not have delivered his final speeches because he touted the fruits of many revolutionary cadres' labor as his own personal achievement."

When explaining the minister's trips to Venezuela, he remarked: over the last three years, he traveled there once a month. And he capped it off with an indisputable statement: "We no longer have confidence in him; to put it even more plainly: no confidence at all."

II. March 3, 2009. Those intoxicated by the sweetness of power. The replacement of Carlos Lage, Felipe Pérez Roque, and company.

"Healthy Changes in the Council of Ministers," he titled his reflection and wrote: "The sweetness of power, for which they made no sacrifice whatsoever, awakened ambitions in them that led them to play an unworthy role (…)

The external enemy harbored high hopes for them."

And getting carried away: “I will never resign myself to the idea that power is sought out of selfishness, self-sufficiency, vanity, and the supposed indispensability of any human being. Most of those who were replaced were never my nominees. Almost without exception, they reached their positions after being proposed by other comrades in the Party or State leadership. I never engaged in that practice.”

During that “harvest”—which marked the completion of Raúl Castro’s seizure of all power—the following comrades also fell: Carlos Valenciaga; Fernando Remírez de Estenoz; Otto Rivero; Conrado Hernández; and Raúl Castellanos Lage. Comrade Raúl proceeded to militarize the government, appointing heads of MINFAR directorates and displacing civilians.

III. October 14, 2004. Strong tendency toward self-sufficiency and underestimation of others’ judgment. Explanation of the reprimand of Marcos Portal León, whom Fidel accused of:

“Strong tendencies toward self-sufficiency and the underestimation of the judgment of other experienced comrades. Serious errors in various spheres of his activity. Erratic policies regarding nickel production. Decisions made entirely without consultation, which would have harmed the country’s economic interests. He was unable to warn the political leadership of the risks of an energy crisis that was perfectly preventable.”

Right now, the olive-green, enguayabera-clad elite continues to appoint and replace those who lead the provinces, but citizens still do not participate directly in the selection of their political leaders—whether near or far, geographically speaking.

The names in the offices change; but the G-2-PCC mechanism, which decides who occupies them, and the lack of transparency in information remain intact.

A diligent reporter from Radio Bemba claims that one of those who fell in defense of the revolution and socialism was arrested by the 440 because, despite being married with children, he fell in love with a transvestite nicknamed Blumer— —a “hot” figure for whom he had allegedly built “a house made of metal.” I have never been able to verify this account.



Carlos Cabrera Pérez

Carlos Cabrera Pérez, Havana, 1962. He has lived in Madrid since 1991. He has worked at Prensa Latina, Granma Internacional, EFE Havana, IPS Havana, Encuentro de la Cultura Cubana, and CiberCuba.
First Cuban mayor in Spain.

Cuba Seeks an Economic Lifeline in China, but Concrete Results Are Lacking

BY PLC CENTRAL EDITORIAL STAFF ON NOVEMBER 12, 2026, 11:00 A.M. |
CHINA, CUBA, AND LATEST NEWS



Bruno Rodríguez met with Liu Haixing, head of the CPC Central Committee's International Liaison Department.

CUBA-CHINA-RELATIONS

PLC

Havana. PLC | Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla's visit to China comes at one of the most critical moments for the island's economy. Havana is seeking investment, cooperation, and political support from Beijing, but so far, public announcements have shown more willingness to collaborate than concrete economic results.

Rodríguez, a special envoy of the Communist Party and the Cuban government, met in Beijing with Chen Xiaodong, president of the China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA). Both sides expressed their willingness to expand cooperation and economic, trade, and investment ties. However, no new loans,

investment amounts, specific contracts, or implementation timelines were announced.

The economic dimension of the visit was reinforced by the presence of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment Oscar Pérez-Oliva Fraga. At a forum held in Beijing, Cuba identified energy, food production, agribusiness, biotechnology, banking, tourism, and infrastructure as priority sectors, while promising to streamline procedures to attract foreign capital.

The trip also has a strong political component. During his meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Rodríguez described China as a model for Cuba's socialist development and reiterated Havana's support for the One-China principle. Beijing, for its part, reaffirmed its support for Cuba and its opposition to U.S. sanctions.

But a considerable gap remains between political rhetoric and the immediate needs of the Cuban economy. Havana needs capital, technology, energy, and new markets, while the statements released so far do not indicate any investment or financing package capable of alleviating the crisis in the short term.

China remains a key ally for the Cuban government and a potential source of technology, trade, and cooperation. However, the current visit demonstrates that a close political relationship does not automatically guarantee economic resources. For now, declarations of friendship and cooperation abound; what remains to be seen is how much of this will ultimately translate into investments and concrete results for Cuba.

The G7 Calls for Democracy and Freedom for Cuba in a Statement on Major Global Crises

BY PLC CENTRAL EDITORIAL STAFF ON NOVEMBER 11, 2026, 4:27 P.M. |
CUBA AND LATEST NEWS



The document calls on the Cuban government to implement "significant and concrete" reforms aimed at promoting prosperity, human rights, and the "legitimate aspirations of the Cuban people." It also specifies what some of those changes should be: multiparty democratic governance, freedom of the press, and freedoms of expression and association. Screenshot from the U.S. Embassy in Paris's website.

G7 FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING

Central Newsroom

Paris. PLC | G7 foreign ministers called on the Cuban government to implement "significant and concrete" political and economic reforms, take steps toward a multiparty democracy, ensure freedom of the press and expression, and release all those arbitrarily detained, in a comprehensive joint statement addressing some of the major international crises.

The document was released on Wednesday, November 11, following the meeting held on November 9 and 10 in Paris. In addition to Cuba, the ministers devoted specific sections to the war in Ukraine, the Middle East, the Indo-Pacific, Sudan, the Horn of Africa, Haiti, and Venezuela.

Regarding Ukraine, the G7 reaffirmed its support for the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity, backed U.S.-led efforts to achieve peace, and called for a complete and reciprocal ceasefire. It also addressed Ukraine's financial and energy needs and the economic pressure on Russia.

In the Middle East, the statement deals extensively with the situations in Iran, Yemen, Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria. In the Indo-Pacific, it expresses concern over tensions in the East and South China Seas, the situation in the Taiwan Strait, North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and the humanitarian and human rights situation in Myanmar.

In the Americas, in addition to Cuba, Haiti and Venezuela receive specific attention. Regarding Haiti, the ministers call for security, institutional strengthening, democratic elections, and humanitarian assistance in the face of the violence and crisis the country is experiencing.

Regarding Venezuela, the G7 supports reconciliation talks, calls for free and fair elections, guarantees for political parties and civil society organizations, and the release of political prisoners. It also links Venezuela's economic recovery to the process of political reconciliation.

Cuba: Between Economic Crisis and Political Reform

In the section dedicated to Cuba, the language used is particularly significant. The ministers express concern over the "deep economic crisis" and the humanitarian needs of the population, explicitly

mentioning shortages of food, fuel, and medicine. They also call for improved mechanisms to deliver and distribute humanitarian aid within the country.

But the G7's assessment does not stop at the economy. The document calls on the Cuban government to implement "significant and concrete" reforms aimed at promoting prosperity, human rights, and the "legitimate aspirations of the Cuban people." It also specifies what some of those changes should be: multiparty democratic governance, freedom of the press, and freedoms of expression and association.

The G7 also demands the release of all those arbitrarily detained and calls for a "constructive and inclusive" dialogue to find a way out of the crisis.

The political significance of the statement lies in the fact that it does not present the Cuban crisis exclusively as a problem of shortages, a lack of foreign currency, or economic difficulties. It explicitly links the country's recovery to political reforms and citizens' rights.

The comparison with Venezuela and Haiti also provides context. The document applies different formulations to each situation but maintains a common thread: democratic institutions, political participation, citizens' rights, and processes capable of restoring legitimacy to societies affected by profound crises.

The Paris Declaration does not announce new sanctions in the section on Cuba nor does it establish a mechanism to enforce the demanded reforms. Its impact is primarily diplomatic and political.

But the message is difficult to reduce to a discussion of the economy alone. Cuba needs food, medicine, fuel, investment, and humanitarian aid. According to the G7, it also needs political pluralism, freedom of the press, and rights that allow its citizens to participate freely in shaping the country's future.

The OCDH Reports More Than 80 Acts of Repression in Cuba During the First Week of November

BY PLC CENTRAL EDITORIAL STAFF ON NOVEMBER 11, 2026, 12:22 P.M. |
CUBA, HUMAN RIGHTS, REPRESSION, AND LATEST NEWS



In a post published on its official Facebook account, the OCDH states: "Over the course of these six days, the OCDH documented arbitrary detentions, threats, interrogations, police summonses, house searches, and restrictions on communications targeting independent journalists, opposition members, activists, religious leaders, content creators, and relatives of political prisoners." AI-generated image | ©JM

CUBA-REPRESSION

By Frank Abel – Prensa Libre Cuba

Havana (PLC) | The Cuban Human Rights Observatory (OCDH) reported that it documented more than 80 repressive actions in Cuba during the first days of November. The organization states that, between November 2 and 7, the island's authorities carried out searches, arbitrary detentions, threats, interrogations, and other

actions against opposition members, activists, and other members of civil society.

The OCDH also highlighted the cases of Berta Soler, Yoel Alejandro Pérez Serrano, and Rolando Pérez Lora.

In a post on its official Facebook page, the OCDH states: "Over the past six days, the OCDH has documented arbitrary detentions, threats, interrogations, police summonses, house arrests, and restrictions on communication targeting independent journalists, opposition figures, activists, religious leaders, content creators, and relatives of political prisoners."

The organization adds: "Among the most serious cases are the detention of Berta Soler, whose whereabouts have been unknown since November 7, and the operation against Yoel Alejandro Pérez Serrano in El Cobre, Santiago de Cuba, which sparked neighborhood protests during which detentions and assaults were also reported. Added to this are the threats of imprisonment and forced relocation against Pastor Rolando Pérez Lora."

Finally, the OCDH condemns the reported actions and demands an end to the repression: "We strongly condemn this escalation of repression and demand information on those whose whereabouts are unknown, the release of those who remain arbitrarily detained, and an immediate end to these human rights violations."



Frank Abel

Havana. Independent journalist, member of the editorial team at *Prensa Libre Cuba*.

Regression or Progress? The Ongoing Debate Over the Legacy of Communism

BY JUAN MORENO ON NOVEMBER 11, 2026, 12:06 P.M. |
SOCIAL CRISIS, CUBA, OPINION, AND LATEST NEWS



What happens to a society where obedience is more valuable than creativity? What happens when political loyalty outweighs merit? What happens when citizens no longer feel in control of their own destiny and begin to depend on decisions made from above? AI-generated image | ©JM

CUBA-SOCIETY

By Juan Moreno – Prensa Libre Cuba

Havana. (PLC) | There are ideas that survive more by the force of habit than by the merits of their results. Communism is one of them. More than a century after the Russian Revolution, there are still those who present it as an unfulfilled promise and those who point to it as one of the greatest political tragedies of the modern era. The debate remains open, but history offers some clues that deserve to be examined without slogans or romanticism.

Communism was born on the promise of building a more just society by eliminating exploitation and social inequalities. However,

wherever it was implemented as a system of absolute power, the results fell far short of that ideal.

The Soviet experience is perhaps the best-known example. The Soviet Union achieved significant scientific and military advances, but it also established a political apparatus in which dissent was persecuted, the economy was subordinated to state plans, and millions of citizens lived under strict controls over their lives. The individual ceased to be an end in itself and became a cog in a collective project.

Something similar occurred in Mao's China. Top-down economic campaigns ultimately led to profound social and human crises. Political will often took precedence over economic reality, with consequences that even today remain among the darkest chapters of contemporary history.

In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge took ideological obsession to the extreme. Intellectuals, professionals, and educated people were considered suspects simply because they possessed knowledge independent of the state. The result was a systematic destruction of the social fabric.

However, the greatest damage caused by these systems cannot always be measured in economic terms. People often find ways to survive scarcity. What is most difficult to recover is what is lost in the character of a society.

When individual initiative is punished, people learn not to stand out. When expressing an opinion can have consequences, people learn to remain silent. When the state controls opportunities, resources, and the future, dependence eventually replaces autonomy.

This gives rise to phenomena that have been evident in many communist societies: double standards, the fear of dissent, conformism, and the pretense as coping mechanisms. These are not inherent flaws in people, but rather learned responses to specific

systems of control.

The Cuban case warrants special consideration. For decades, the creation of a "new man"—committed to higher collective values—was promised. However, everyday reality gradually shaped another, less-discussed phenomenon: entire generations forced to develop survival strategies to cope with material shortages, economic restrictions, and limitations on individual freedoms.

The question, then, is no longer an economic one. It is not merely about production, wages, or growth. The deeper issue is a human one.

What happens to a society where obedience is more valuable than creativity? What happens when political loyalty outweighs merit? What happens when citizens cease to feel in control of their own destiny and begin to depend on decisions made from above?

Perhaps the true criticism of communism is not that it failed to make people wealthier. Other systems have also produced inequalities and crises. Its most serious failure seems to have been something else: limiting the conditions necessary for the full development of free, responsible individuals capable of building their own life plans.

For this reason, rather than an economic regression, many believe that communism brought about a civic and cultural regression—a regression reflected not only in statistics but also in habits, behaviors, and ways of relating to those in power.

Factories can be rebuilt. Roads can be repaired. The economy can recover. What is truly difficult is restoring— —trust, initiative, and inner freedom in a society after decades of dependence and control.

And perhaps therein lies the most uncomfortable question of all: if a system ends up weakening precisely those capacities that drive human progress, can it still be called progress?



Juan Moreno

Havana. Independent journalist and member of the editorial team at *Prensa Libre Cuba*.

Cuba Runs Out of Fuel for Air Travel and Deepens Its Isolation

BY PLC CENTRAL EDITORIAL STAFF ON NOVEMBER 11, 2026, 11:08 A.M. |
ENERGY CRISIS, CUBA, AND LATEST NEWS



The problem is becoming even more serious because it is affecting the country's main international gateways. Photo ©PLC

CUBA—ENERGY CRISIS

PLC

Havana. PLC | The Cuban energy crisis has entered a new phase. Ten of the country's main airports will be unable to supply Jet A-1 fuel to aircraft until 11:00 p.m. on November 30, local time, according to notices issued by the Cuban Air Navigation Company. The technical validity of the notices expires at 4:00 a.m. UTC on December 1, 2026.

The measure affects José Martí International Airport in Havana; Juan Gualberto Gómez Airport in Varadero; Jaime González Airport in Cienfuegos; Abel Santamaría Airport in Santa Clara; Ignacio

Agramonte Airport in Camagüey; Jardines del Rey Airport in Cayo Coco; Frank País Airport in Holguín; Antonio Maceo Airport in Santiago de Cuba; Sierra Maestra Airport in Manzanillo; and Vilo Acuña Airport in Cayo Largo del Sur.

The aeronautical notices, identified as NOTAM A3875/26 through A3884/26, were issued on October 30. All contain the same warning: "JET A1 FUEL NOT AVBL," meaning Jet A-1 fuel is not available for refueling aircraft.

The date of December 1 does not guarantee, however, that the supply will be restored by then. It merely indicates the expiration of the current notices, which may be replaced, modified, or extended if the shortage persists. That is precisely what has happened in recent months: one restriction replaces another without a stable solution emerging.

The airports are not closed, but operations are more difficult

It is important to clarify the scope of the measure. The ten airports are not formally closed, and the notices do not mean that all flights have been canceled. The facilities can continue to receive and dispatch aircraft, but airlines must operate without the usual option of refueling on Cuban territory.

To maintain their routes, airlines can load additional fuel at the departure airport—enough to cover both the outbound and return flights—provided that the distance, aircraft model, and operating conditions allow it. Another alternative is to schedule a technical stopover in a third country to refuel before completing the journey.

These solutions keep some connections open, but shift the cost of Cuba's inability to guarantee fuel supply onto the airlines. Carrying more fuel increases the aircraft's weight and may reduce the available capacity for passengers or cargo. Technical stopovers, meanwhile, lengthen the journey and add to operating costs.

The consequence is not necessarily an immediate and widespread suspension, but rather a gradual erosion of Cuba's competitiveness as a destination. Every route modification, additional stopover, or logistical uncertainty makes an operation less attractive—one that airlines constantly compare with other markets.

Air Europa, for example, has maintained its connection between Madrid and Havana but added a stop in Punta Cana to refuel on the return trip. Air China has used Nassau as a refueling point for its Cuba-related operations.

A Prolonged Crisis Through Extensions

The unavailability of aviation fuel began to be documented in February 2026, initially at nine airports. The restrictions were gradually expanded through successive notices, and the Cayo Largo del Sur terminal was subsequently added, bringing the number of affected facilities to ten.

The current series replaces another that expired on November 1. That notice had, in turn, replaced earlier notices with an expiration date of October 1. The succession of extensions demonstrates that this is not a brief interruption, but rather a problem that the government has been unable to resolve for months.

The problem is made even more serious by the fact that it affects the country's main international gateways. It is not limited to secondary airports or domestic operations: it encompasses the capital' , major tourist hubs, and cities essential for connecting the central and eastern provinces.

Varadero, Cayo Coco, Holguín, and Cayo Largo del Sur rely particularly on air travel to receive international visitors. The fuel shortage at these terminals creates an additional obstacle for a tourism sector that needs stable connectivity, business confidence, and operational predictability.

Tourism Loses Another Element of Credibility

For decades, the government has presented tourism as a strategic source of foreign exchange. Hotels were built and facilities for foreign visitors were expanded, even as other sectors of the economy suffered from shortages. However, no tourism infrastructure can function properly if the country fails to guarantee reliable flights, electricity, transportation, and basic supplies.

The shortage of Jet A-1 exposes this contradiction. Cuba has devoted significant resources to hotel development but is unable to secure the fuel needed to sustain the flights that are supposed to bring travelers to those hotels.

An airline does not plan its operations solely based on a destination's appeal. It evaluates costs, fuel availability, operational safety, demand, on-time performance, and the ability to respond to incidents. When an airport cannot provide fuel for months on end, the airline must assume risks and expenses that may ultimately lead to a decision to reduce flight frequencies, reorganize routes, or temporarily suspend service.

The loss does not affect only the state-run tourism industry. It also impacts private-sector workers, transport providers, landlords, small restaurants, and families that depend on the influx of visitors. Added to this are Cubans who need to travel for family reasons and those awaiting medicines, documents, or goods transported by air.

The Energy Crisis Hits a Strategic Sector

The shortage of aviation fuel is part of a much broader problem. In Cuba, the energy deficit no longer affects only domestic power outages. It impacts electricity generation, transportation, production, and international mobility.

PLC has documented the structural deterioration of the National Electric System, its outages, the aging of thermoelectric plants, and the dependence on a fuel supply that the country cannot guarantee on a stable basis. The crisis at the airports confirms that this same fragility now extends to infrastructure that is strategic for the economy and communication with the outside world.

The official response has so far been limited to issuing the necessary technical notices to inform pilots and airlines of the restrictions. But reporting the lack of fuel does not amount to explaining why it is missing, how long the situation will continue, or what the plan is to restore a regular supply.

The government must transparently communicate how much fuel civil aviation needs, what the actual shortfall is, which supply contracts have failed, and what measures it is taking. Every new extension without a comprehensive public explanation fuels uncertainty and erodes confidence in the country's ability to maintain essential services.

Flying to Cuba without knowing if there will be another extension

The severity of the problem lies not only in the fact that ten airports will lack Jet A-1 until the end of November. It lies in the fact that no one can guarantee that the fuel will be available again on December 1.

Airlines can improvise stopovers, carry additional reserves, and reorganize itineraries for a limited period. What they can hardly do is build a stable schedule on an endless chain of provisional notices.

Cuba can keep its terminals open administratively, but an airport unable to regularly refuel aircraft loses one of its essential functions. It can receive flights, but it does so under conditions that are more costly, complex, and vulnerable.

The aviation crisis thus becomes a metaphor for the country: facilities remain open, announcements attempt to convey a sense of continuity, and the government assures the public that services are functioning, but behind that facade, every operation depends on exceptional measures.

The fuel shortage at ten airports is not just a problem for pilots and airlines. It is a warning sign of how far the Cuban economy has deteriorated. When a country cannot guarantee jet fuel for its main airports, it does not just jeopardize a few flights. It jeopardizes tourism, cargo, family reunions, the inflow of foreign currency, and the country's connection to the world.

The energy crisis no longer merely leaves Cuba in the dark. It also threatens to leave it increasingly isolated.

Two Women Murdered in Two Days Heighten Concerns About Femicide in Cuba

BY PLC CENTRAL EDITORIAL STAFF ON NOVEMBER 11, 2026, 11:00 A.M. |
CUBA, FEMICIDE, LATEST NEWS, AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE



The Cuban government has enormous resources at its disposal to monitor opponents, control demonstrations, prevent independent gatherings, and persecute critical speech. However, when a woman needs to escape an abuser, there is a lack of shelters, secure communication channels, specialized assistance, and public accountability mechanisms. File photo.

CUBA-FEMINICIDES

By the Prensa Libre Cuba Editorial Team

Havana (PLC) | Juana María “Mayi” Guzmán Torres and Yasmina Ruano González were murdered just one day apart. The first was 54 years old, worked as an early childhood educator, and died on November 8 in the home she shared with her partner in the La Cañada neighborhood of Manzanillo. The second was 32 years old and was murdered on November 9 at her home in the 26 de Julio

neighborhood, known as Francoy, in Nueva Gerona. The men identified as the alleged perpetrators were arrested by the police.

These two crimes must not be reduced to mere statistics. Juana María "Mayi" Guzmán Torres leaves behind two adult children and the fond memories of those who knew her as an educator. Yasmina Ruano González leaves behind a young son and a daughter. The boy, between six and eight years old, witnessed his mother's murder and is now in a particularly vulnerable situation, as his father lives outside of Cuba. He needs specialized psychological care, long-term support, and a safe environment—all of which Cuban institutions are obligated to guarantee.

The scale of the problem is also reflected in the children who survive the victims. Between January and August 2026, 26 of the 49 women murdered during that period had children in their care. At least 40 children and adolescents depended on them; in 23 of those 26 cases, the perpetrators were partners or former partners.

National figures show discrepancies that must be rigorously explained. The updated record from the Alas Tensas Gender Observatory counts 63 femicides in Cuba during 2026, while the tally released by EFE and other media outlets puts the total at 59. The discrepancy stems from differing classification criteria: certain murders of women included by the observatory are not considered femicides in other tallies because they occurred during robberies or other circumstances in which a gender-based motive has not been established.

This discrepancy does not diminish the gravity of the phenomenon. It exacerbates it, because it demonstrates that Cuba continues to rely on the work of activists, independent journalists, family members, and community sources to uncover a reality that the state should be documenting transparently. The government does not publish an official, up-to-date, and systematic record that would make it possible to determine how many women have been murdered for gender-based

reasons, how previous complaints were handled, what the perpetrators' backgrounds were, and what failed in the protection mechanisms.

The available data reveal a pattern, not a series of isolated incidents. As of November 10, the independent observatory had verified 63 femicides, 38 attempted femicides, and two murders of men in contexts of femicidal violence. The 2026 figures already exceed the 56 cases documented for 2024 and the 50 included in the updated 2025 tally.

Between January and August, 32 of the 49 documented femicides occurred in homes, accounting for 65.3% of the total. The home, typically presented as a safe space for families, has become—for many Cuban women—the place where they are most at risk.

The economic crisis does not in and of itself cause gender-based violence nor does it absolve perpetrators of responsibility. However, power outages, lack of transportation, communication disruptions, and economic dependence can limit a woman's ability to seek help, leave her home, or maintain a separation. These barriers are even more severe in rural communities and areas far from support services.

In the face of this reality, the institutional response remains insufficient. Cuba lacks a national network of specialized shelters that would allow women under threat to leave their homes with their children. Nor has it passed a comprehensive law against gender-based violence or incorporated femicide as a separate crime in the Penal Code.

The government proclaims "zero tolerance" for gender-based violence, but a slogan is no substitute for public policy. Arresting the alleged perpetrator after the crime is necessary, but it does not bring the victim back to life nor does it prove that the state did everything possible to prevent the murder. The fundamental question is what happened beforehand: whether there were threats, complaints, or a

history of abuse; wheth r any institution assessed the risk; whether the woman had a place to seek refuge; and whether she was able to find an effective response while she was still alive.

Activists are calling for systematic public statistics, protection protocols, shelters, effective emergency hotlines, and the criminalization of femicide. These are not disproportionate demands. They constitute the minimum tools of a policy aimed at preventing, protecting, and saving lives.

The Cuban government has enormous resources at its disposal to monitor dissidents, control demonstrations, prevent independent gatherings, and persecute critical speech. However, when a woman needs to escape an abuser, there is a lack of shelters, secure communication channels, specialized assistance, and public accountability mechanisms. Therein lies one of the system's most serious contradictions: an extraordinarily effective capacity to control its citizens, yet an inability to guarantee sufficient protection to those in danger.

Juana María "Mayi" Guzmán Torres and Yasmina Ruano González had names, families, responsibilities, and plans. They are not numbers 62 and 63 in an inevitable statistic. Their deaths are part of a crisis that the authorities have chosen to manage with silence, incomplete data, and vague statements.

While independent organizations continue to count the victims, the government continues to avoid the essential question: how many more women will have to die before protecting them becomes a national priority rather than just an official slogan?

Betania, the publishing house that refused to leave half of Cuban literature out

BY CARLOS CABRERA PÉREZ ON NOVEMBER 10, 2026, 11:00 A.M. |
CUBA, CULTURE, INTERVIEWS, AND LITERARY SPACE



Felipe Lázaro (Güines, 1948). Cuban poet, novelist, and editor. Photo by León de la Hoz

INTERVIEW-CULTURE-LITERATURE

By Carlos Cabrera Pérez - Prensa Libre Cuba

Madrid. PLC | Felipe Lázaro (Güines, 1948) is a kind, warm, and discreet man whose publishing work forms part of Cuba's collective memory of the 20th and 21st centuries, starting with Editorial Betania, which—before the fall of the Berlin Wall—committed to eliminating the absurd and politicized dichotomy between authors inside and outside Cuba, a country he left in 1960 for Puerto Rico.

Once in Madrid (1967), he earned a degree in Political Science and Diplomacy, but his true calling lay in books, in the poetry that also

cultivates, and he had the good fortune to join forces with some of the island's finest: Gastón Baquero, Mario Parajón, Pío E. Serrano, José Mario, David Lago, and Manuel Fernández de Santelices, among others.

Prensa Libre Cuba interviewed him for three reasons: because he is an indispensable voice on the Cuban scene; for his political and aesthetic consistency; and because his life is a symbol of unwavering honesty and resistance in the face of totalitarianism and naysayers.

Betania was founded in 1987, when publishing outside of Cuba was a necessity for many writers and, at times, the only way to make their work known. Nearly four decades later, how do you assess that adventure? Has the publishing house fulfilled the goals it was founded with?

I founded Betania with a clear mission to publish exiled Cuban writers, since in those years being anti-Castro closed many doors—we were treated like pariahs—and it was a blessing to be able to print our books under the umbrella of a publishing house that brought us together. For that reason, in those early days, we didn't think about authors residing on the island, but rather about giving a voice to exiled Cuba.

I can tell you that one of Betania's greatest achievements has been publishing nearly the entire new generation of Cuban poets who emerged from the diaspora (in the late '80s and '90s), such as: Magali Alabau, Carlota Caulfield, Gustavo Pérez Firmat, Lourdes Gil, Pablo Medina, Alina Galliano, Rafael Bordao, Iraida Iturralde, Maya Islas, Laura Ymayo Tartakoff, Rafael Catalá, María Elena Blanco, Elías Miguel Muñoz, Luis Cartañá, Roberto Valero, and David Lago, among others.

After forty years of publishing, we have published more than two hundred Cuban authors, most of whom are in exile. Therefore, I

believe we have more than fulfilled our goal of preserving and compiling Cuban literature from the exile community.

You have published writers from different generations, aesthetic trends, and political stances. What criteria have guided your selection of a manuscript: its literary quality, its testimonial value, its importance to Cuban culture, or a combination of these factors?

We began as a pluralistic publishing house, and after so many years of work, it's only natural to have built up a diverse catalog. Regarding our publishing criteria, from the very beginning we've prioritized a combination of the factors you mentioned, always seeking out both established and emerging authors, but with the constant motivation of believing that we're discovering the very best.

Betania has published authors who for years were marginalized or silenced by Cuban cultural institutions. To what extent can a publishing house help dismantle the literary canon established by a political power?

As you rightly point out, we have published dissident Cuban writers who have been censored in their own country, such as José Mario and Delfín Prats, Nelson Rodríguez Leyva, and Raúl Rivero, among others, which has helped make their work known and available to readers in Cuba and in exile. In addition to the essay collections **La cárcel letrada: narrativa carcelaria cubana** (2012) by Professor Rafael E. Saumell and **Un puente contracorriente: Ediciones El Puente: Un esfuerzo literario dentro y fuera de Cuba** (2014) by Marlies Pahlenberg, and the novels by Daniel Iglesias Kennedy: **La hija del cazador** (1995), **Esta tarde se pone el sol** (2001), and **Espacio Vacío** (2003); Dolores Labarcena's *No *quiero llanto** (2020); and Jacobo Machover's **Memoria de siglos** (2026), among other works in our catalog—all of which denounce the excesses of totalitarianism in Cuba.

Do you believe that Cuban exile literature has received the recognition it deserves within the history of national literature? Which authors are still awaiting critical and editorial rediscovery?

There can be no recognition because the official history is still written by the oppressors, but it suffices to mention a few illustrious names from our exiled Cuba to highlight the voices that must never be absent or forgotten: Lydia Cabrera, Gastón Baquero, Leví Marrero, Jorge Mañach, Enrique Labrador Ruiz, Eugenio Florit, Lino Novás Calvo, Agustín Acosta, Carlos Montenegro…

In 1995, you published, together with Bladimir Zamora, **Poesía cubana: la isla entera (*Cuban Poetry: *The Entire Island**), an anthology that brought together writers from inside and outside Cuba. The 2024 reissue revisits that spirit of integration. What has changed in Cuban literature over those thirty years? Are we facing a literature that is increasingly deterritorialized?**

That was a pluralistic project that held out the hope of achieving a unified Cuba—at least in literary terms—and which, three decades later, has come to stand as a portrait of a divided family, separated geographically but united by poetry. Today I still believe in that homeland formed by everyone, without exception.

Is there today a Cuban literature in the strict sense, or should we speak of literatures, shaped by geography, generational experiences, and the distinct political and cultural realities of their authors?

Cuban literature is the sum of all works by national authors from the earliest times to the present day. Cuban writers and artists have always transcended time, regardless of the era in which they lived or the geographical space they inhabited. In the end, what remains are the most important voices from the cumulative body of work spanning several generations and their works.

For decades, the regime's cultural apparatus has attempted to draw a line between writers who remain in Cuba and those who leave. To what extent has this policy of exclusion distorted the country's literary history?

That division (island/exile) was very harmful in the early decades of the Castro regime, causing terrible damage on a national level. Today, that dichotomy has collapsed under its own weight and is practically nonexistent or ineffective. Consider that Cuba has grown, and geographically, it is no longer just the island—we must also include the entire exiled population. In reality, there is a common thread running from Heredia and Martí to Reinaldo Arenas and the youngest Cuban poet writing today from Madrid or New York.

You've published authors living on the island as well as writers in exile. What differences does an independent publisher face today in maintaining professional relationships with authors living in Cuba? Has anything changed in recent years?

From the very beginning of our publishing venture, our primary relationship was with Cuban writers in exile who wrote us letters and sent us their typewritten manuscripts (many of them professors or university students) interested in publishing their books with Betania. We received almost no correspondence from Cuba, except for a few projects that have stood out, such as the poetry collection **La novia de Lázaro** by Dulce María Loynaz, published in 1991—a year before she was awarded the Cervantes Prize in Spain. Or two important poetry anthologies, such as **Fatiga ser dos sombras** (2001) by Ángel Escobar, compiled by Efraín Rodríguez Santana, and **Herejías Elegidas** (2003) by Raúl Rivero, with a preface and prologue by José Prats Sariol. Not to mention the poetry collection **Lenguaje de mudos** (2013) by Delfín Prats and the short story collection **El regalo** (2015) by the Cuban writer Nelson Rodríguez Leyva, who was executed by firing squad in Havana in 1972.

These days, we receive messages from both Cuban authors in exile and those on the island, although they are no longer letters but rather a flood of emails and digital files.

Betania has committed to the free digital distribution of books, an initiative you launched in 2010. Has the internet managed to break the cultural isolation imposed on Cuban readers? What obstacles remain?

As you rightly point out, in 2010 we launched a new free digital collection that now consists of 45 PDFs (e-books) that can be downloaded and read on our EBETANIA blog: http://ebetania.wordpress.com However, the rest of our publishing catalog (more than 800 titles) is listed in the catalog and in distribution—books we try to sell in print editions, although some are already out of print.

The idea of giving away these digital versions of our books was an attempt to circumvent and overcome Castro's cultural censorship, and I believe we've succeeded. Although our print books cannot circulate legally in Cuba (except for copies brought in by friends traveling to Havana), today our digital books circulate freely throughout the island.

Betania's catalog includes poetry, fiction, essays, history, and personal accounts. How important do you consider the archival preservation of a literature that has largely had to develop outside its national institutions?

At Betania, we have ten collections: Poetry, Fiction, Essays, Theater, Art, Palabra Viva, Anthologies, Social Sciences, Children's Literature, and Documents. In any case, we have always carried out our publishing work with a sense of preservation—of leaving a record of works that will endure over time. For this reason, our founding book was **Conversación con Gastón Baquero** (1987); similarly, we published Dulce María Loynaz's finest collection of poems, **La novia de Lázaro**,

a year before she received the Cervantes Prize (1992), and we published nearly all of Reinaldo Arenas's poetry in two of his most iconic collections: **Voluntad de Vivir Manifestándose** (1989) and **Leprosorio** **(**1990). And, more recently, we have published Gastón Baquero's **Cartas a Lydia Cabrera** (2024), edited by Ernesto Hernández Busto, and José Mario's poetry collection **No hablemos de la desesperación** (2026), with texts by Isel Rivero and Pío E. Serrano.

As you've already mentioned, you've devoted a significant portion of your work to Gastón Baquero, Dulce María Loynaz, and Reinaldo Arenas. What debt does Cuban culture still owe to its great writers in exile and "in-exile"? What place should they occupy in educational curricula and in future histories of national literature?

The great writers of the exile community are already present in the history of Cuban literature—from the aforementioned Lydia, Gastón, and Reinaldo to Cabrera Infante, Heberto Padilla, Severo Sarduy, Calvert Casey, and Juan Arcocha… Their presence is undeniable, and they are already our finest voices of the 20th century. Dulce María is a symbol of Cuban identity and an indispensable lyrical voice.

The disappearance of independent publishing houses, magazines, and cultural projects has been a constant in the Cuban publishing world in exile. What has enabled Betania to survive for nearly forty years? Is it possible to sustain an independent cultural publishing house without significant financial resources?

From 1959 to the present day, many publishing houses founded in exile—which exemplify good publishing practices—have disappeared. I am thinking of Juan Manuel Salvat (Universal), José Mario (El Puente), César Leante (Pliegos), Carlos Alberto Montaner (Playor), Víctor Batista Falla (Colibrí), and Eugenio Suárez-Galbán (Orígenes). I must also mention Pío E. Serrano (Verbum), who founded one of the most prestigious publishing houses in exile and who continues to

expand his impressive catalog. All those mentioned are masters of publishing. At least in my case, I must acknowledge my debt to them.

As for Betania celebrating its 40th anniversary, it has perhaps been a combination of perseverance and hard work, but above all, the support received from Betania's authors—Cubans, Latin Americans, and Spanish- s—who chose to publish their works with our imprint; for without them, none of this would have been possible. A publishing house would not exist without its authors, who are the true architects of the publishing miracle.

I believe, after these four decades, that a publishing house's greatest asset is, precisely, its authors and its catalog. That is the true wealth of a company that, moreover, has always been more of a cultural project than a commercial one.

In recent years, there has been a new wave of Cuban emigration that has scattered writers, artists, and intellectuals across numerous countries. Are we witnessing the emergence of a new literary generation in exile? What differences do you see between this generation and previous ones?

Since 1959, there have been successive waves of Cubans fleeing into exile: the historic exodus of the 1960s and 1970s (with Camarioca and the "flights of freedom"), Mariel in the 1980s, the rafters' crisis in the 1990s, and the mass exodus following July 11, continuing to the present day. Thousands of Cuban intellectuals and artists have chosen to leave their homeland during these 67 years of the Castro dictatorship, and this massive exodus of exiles deserves to be studied and will be remembered as a national tragedy. But all of us—old and new exiles alike—are united by one word: Freedom! and the hope for a better homeland.

What amazes me today is the presence and proliferation of valuable young opponents of the Castro regime, who are actively fighting for the Cuba we need, both on the island and in exile. As never before in

our recent history, dissident voices have multiplied: digital magazines and newspapers, blogs and websites, as well as political and cultural organizations and institutions. This is more than just a symptom; it is the inevitable change that lies ahead.

You've announced your own literary projects, including a book of short stories about the expropriations of the 1960s and an essay on Cuba's participation in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. How important is it to recover episodes of national history that, in your opinion, have received little attention?

I have always been interested in Cuban themes, from my bachelor's thesis, "The Evolution of Agrarian Transformations in Cuba," at the School of Political Science and Sociology of the Complutense University of Madrid (1979), to various little-known anthologies of Cuban exile poetry, such as **9 Cuban Poets** and *Contemporary Cuban Poetry*, (Madrid: Catoblepas, 1986), **Cuban Poets in Spain** and **Cuban Poets in New York** (1988), **A Brief Anthology: Cuban Women Poets in New York** (1991), and the essay collection **Gastón Baquero: The Invention of the Everyday* (2001), with a foreword by José Olivio Jiménez.

If political restrictions and censorship were to disappear in Cuba tomorrow, what should be done with the country's publishing system and cultural institutions? How can we rebuild a national culture in which writers from the island and the diaspora can coexist, without exclusion?

Cuba needs to change, and then everything will change. With true change, all the institutions of the cultural establishment—which are part of the Castro regime and serve only to repress and censor—will be swept away by history, and in their place, a new democratic and pluralistic way of organizing the country must emerge, where all Cubans can live together in peace and prosperity.

Felipe Lázaro *(Güines, 1948). Cuban poet, novelist, and editor. He left Cuba in 1960. Between 1961 and 1967, he lived in Puerto Rico and has resided in Spain ever since. He holds a bachelor's degree in Political Science and Sociology from the Complutense University of Madrid. He is a graduate of the Spanish Diplomatic Academy and holds a master's degree in Business Administration from the Instituto de Empresa in Madrid.*

*He was one of the founders of the Madrid-based magazines *Testimonio* (1968), *La Burbuja* (1984), and *Encuentro de la cultura cubana* (1966), as well as the newspaper *La Prensa del Caribe* (1997). He served on the Editorial Board of Revista Hispano Cubana and the Bulletin of the Cuban Committee for Human Rights, both published in the Spanish capital. In 1987, he received the Cintas Fellowship and founded Editorial Betania.*

He is the author of six poetry collections, several books on Gastón Baquero, and various anthologies of Cuban exile poetry. Since 2019, he has been a member of the Academy of Cuban History in Exile, and in 2022, the Cuban Cultural Center of New York awarded him the EL TITÁN Prize for his editorial work and literary career.

His most recent published works are: **Conversations with Gastón Baquero (5th edition, 2019), **Time of Exile: A Poetic Anthology** (4th edition, 2021), **Cuban Poetry: The Entire Island** (2nd edition, 2024), and the short story collection **Invisible Triangles of Death**. **With Cuba in My Memory** (2nd edition, 2025), **At the Foot of Memory: An Anthology of Cuban Poets Who Died in Exile, 1959–2002** (2nd edition, 2026), and **Indomitable in the Sun: Five Cuban Women Poets from New York** (3rd edition, 2026). These six books are available on Amazon.**

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First Cuban mayor in Spain.

GAESA Shifts Assets While Golf Remains on Hold

BY CARLOS CABRERA PÉREZ ON NOVEMBER 9, 2026, 12:09 P.M. |
CORRUPTION, CRISIS, CUBA, ECONOMY, OPINION, AND LATEST NEWS



Cuba is modifying the legal and business structures through which it manages, operates, and shares its assets. Photo showing a rendering of the planned facilities at Punta Colorada, in the municipality of Sandino, Pinar del Río.

CUBA-GAESA

By Carlos Cabrera Pérez – Prensa Libre Cuba

Madrid. PLC. Opinion | The departure of the military-business conglomerate Gaesa from the Miramar Business Center and the transfer of the Mariel Container Terminal—in an effort to evade U.S. sanctions—are the first moves carried out under a last-minute legal reform that allows assets to be sold, contributed to new companies, or leased out; the penultimate death throes of a suffocating late-Castro era that never stops cheating.

In recent months, GAESA has simulated—on paper—the sale of its stake in the real estate company that operates the Miramar Business Center, has transferred the assets of the Mariel “ ” Container Terminal

to another state-owned company, and has begun offering CIMEX commercial facilities on a lease basis; maneuvers that coincide with the umpteenth reform of the business system that preserves state ownership, even though Havana and its bigwigs are selling it as if it were the latest craze from the Chicago School.

At the same time, propagandists in the service of the Pan con na party are running a glossy social media campaign touting Cuba's tourist attractions and announcing the imminent arrival of foreign investors for businesses that have been left stranded by the destruction of Cuban tourism caused by Manuel Marrero and compounded by COVID and the Trump administration's offensive.

Monte Barreto

On June 4, the British fund CEIBA Investments took full control of the real estate company behind the Miramar Business Center after acquiring the remaining 51% held by the Cuban partner, as the British group already owned the other 49%. The negotiations concluded on April 22, according to documentation released by the fund.

The transaction turned Monte Barreto into a company with 100% foreign capital, but this may be another ploy, as sources from the Ministries of Economy and Justice maintain that Cuba "requires the new *owners* to sign a private agreement in which they commit to returning the shares to the state" once the crisis subsides. In the Commercial Registry, only the sale is recorded, but the agreement for the return of what was supposedly sold is kept secret.

CEIBA stated that the purchase was financed with funds generated by the real estate company itself (reserves, undistributed dividends, and other funds) without any new cash contribution from the British fund, and that the transaction was conducted on market terms; however, it did not disclose the price it paid for 51% of the company. CEIBA's manager rejected claims that the Monte Barreto transaction was a front.

A few weeks later, the Mariel Container Terminal informed its customers that it had sold its assets to Coral Marítima, a company linked to the Maritime and Port Business Group, which is under the Ministry of Transportation. Coral established Terminales Portuarias CORAL to take over the business, the contracts, and customer relations.

Decree-Law 120, published in the Official Gazette on September 2, contains some curious provisions, such as the stipulation that the Ministries of the Armed Forces and the Interior retain their status as "representatives" of the owner within their respective business systems; in other words, the reorganization of the state apparatus does not remove these two major repressive institutions from control over their enterprises.

Punta Colorada: More Hype Than Substance



Photo showing a scale model of the planned facilities at Punta Colorada, in the municipality of Sandino, Pinar del Río.

In the Sandino municipality, Pinar del Río, another project illustrates how state and foreign participation is structured in large-scale

tourism investments, which remain on *hold* despite the government's renewed efforts to get them off the ground.

Punta Colorada was established in 2017 as a joint venture between Cubagolf S.A., owned by the Cuban government, and La Playa Golf & Resort International Panamá S.A. Ownership was divided 51% for the Cuban company and 49% for the Panamanian company, which is a subsidiary of a Spanish parent company.

The project, announced at that year's FITCUBA, called for two 18-hole golf courses, 1,500 hotel rooms, a marina with capacity for 300 boats, a convention center, and other sports and recreational facilities, which would span the municipalities of Sandino, Guane, and Mantua. Subsequent presentations described a complex of hotels, residential units, and water sports activities, to be built in several phases, but not a single inch of earth has been moved there.

At the same time, the corporate structure surrounding the project has been the subject of litigation in Spain, where a ruling by the Provincial Court of Barcelona on July 31, 2025, reconstructed the corporate chain: The Spanish company Playa Golf owns 100% of the Panamanian company, which in turn holds 49% of Punta Colorada Cuba. The remaining 51% belongs to the state-owned company Cubagolf. The ruling also confirmed that Golf Resorts Caribe Corporation (GOREC), a Spanish company owned by businessmen Jaume Roma Rodríguez and Roger Jordana Quer, had entered into a contract with Punta Colorada Cuba to manage the development. The court did not specify the date or the financial terms of that contract, but deemed it valid.

However, the stagnation at Punta Colorada is not an exception but rather the norm at Cubagolf, which—despite having been established in 2013—has not achieved a single "Albatros" (double eagle) and operates only the course attached to the Xanadú Mansion in Varadero, which dates back to 1932 and was renovated and expanded to 18 holes in 1998—before Cubagolf even existed.

The following projects are examples of the stagnation of the Cuban golf industry, and all predate Trump's involvement:

Punta Colorada Cuba Golf Marina (Pinar del Río): Originally planned with Spanish investors as the largest golf complex in Spanish-speaking America (3,700 hectares in Guanahacabibes). It promised several courses, including a hole over the sea, but no progress has been made. Castro's grandiloquence on barren ground.

Bellomonte (Havana): A partnership between Cubagolf and the Chinese firm Beijing Enterprises Holdings Limited. The plan calls for a luxury hotel and high-end condominiums on more than 300 hectares east of the capital, though not a single brick has been laid. "Let's all go sing, my friends..." But before the "narras," the firm Coral Capital Group—with Amado Fakhre in Havana and headquarters in the British Virgin Islands—reached a similar agreement with the state-owned company Palmares.

In 2011, Raúl Castro ordered Fakhre's assassination as part of a crusade against corruption that, two years later, led to the businessman's prosecution for ongoing bribery, illegal currency trafficking, and activities harmful to the national economy—specifically, for having charged a 20% commission on the sale of mining machinery.

In 2016, the Canadian magazine VICE published Fakhre's account of the Castro regime's allegations, in which he acknowledged that he had invited an executive from a state-owned company to spend a night at the Saratoga Hotel for her birthday, had given a car part to the father of a business partner, given $20 to a Cuban official for the repair of his official vehicle, lent money to other foreign companies based on the island, and received a 20% commission on the sale of mining machinery, which he did not specify.

The Coral Capital affair confirmed the Castro regime's underhanded tactics toward foreign investors, as the initial charge was espionage—

a crime punished with the utmost severity in Cuba, including the death penalty. State Security interrogators initially accused him of working for Israel and of being a Mossad agent, and forced him to sign a document linking his arrest to the disclosure of state secrets.

Months later, the G-2 abandoned that line of questioning and shifted to charging him with corruption—according to the businessman's testimony—who was sentenced to a total of eight and a half years in prison, a sentence he did not serve in exchange for leaving Cuba after twenty months in detention and losing 17.3 million U.S. dollars, which were transferred from his accounts to those of the mafia-like state.

La Carbonera (Matanzas): A project originally agreed upon with the British company Esencia Hotels and Resorts to build more than 1,000 residential units and an 18-hole golf course. It was one of the first projects approved under this "real estate residency for foreigners" model, but it remains on hold.

El Salado (Artemisa): Conceived in partnership with the Spanish group Globalia. It is located near the Mariel Special Development Zone and envisages oceanfront residential condominiums and associated golf courses that remain mere plans on paper. General Resóplez's great-grandchildren almost took the bait, but they pulled back just before reaching the precipice.

And these other projects that keep cropping up in the "Galicia-style" songs of the late Castro era as "business opportunities"—for whom?:

Rancho Luna – La Milpa (Cienfuegos): A mega-project worth up to 3.5 billion euros was announced with the Spanish construction firm Urbas Grupo Financiero. The financial situation of this international partner (which filed for bankruptcy protection in Spain) keeps the plans in administrative limbo.

La Tatagua (Cienfuegos): A 359-hectare area earmarked for the development of exclusive residential complexes combined with natural and coastal features. Another Pedro Navaja—no onlookers, no questions, no one cried.

Chorrera Ancón (Sancti Spíritus): One of the largest plots on offer (nearly 595 hectares) to capitalize on the "tourist appeal of the Trinidad area." That's all for now.

Loma Linda (Holguín) and La Altura (Artemisa): Protected virgin lands that the company continues to market with promises of tax exemptions and "perpetual property rights" for foreign buyers. Strange, very strange!

The sources consulted agree that the viability and profitability of these ventures are undermined by a combination of financial, logistical, environmental, and legal reputation barriers:

a) Financial setbacks and/or caution on the part of foreign partners.

b) Legal problems such as the Cuban government's own actions against Coral Capital, the Tokmakjian Group, and Tri-Star Caribe, among others.

c) A systemic and structural crisis involving shortages of water, electricity, and fuel.

d) Legal uncertainty and the U.S. embargo, exacerbated by the Trump administration's crackdown.

In a normal country, Cubagolf—a company within the Cubasol group—would have been shut down years ago, but revolutionary enthusiasm and communist bureaucracy are masters at replacing reality with patriotic self-delusion that doesn't stop even in the face of the immense "shank" (worst shot) of a company whose cost to

Cubans—past and present—remains unknown, with a 13-year track record of endless toasts to the quimbe and cuarta, yet zero business.

The fortunate bottle-carriers who have managed this golfing disaster over the past two five-year terms have been—in order of arrival—comrades Gabriel Álvarez-Guerra Plasencia, who signed the agreement with the Chinese for the Bellomonte project; Raudel García, who signed the La Carbonera deal; and Rubén Forés Rodríguez. The unprofitable company is located at 18006 Calle 13, between 5th Avenue and Calle 182, in the Flores neighborhood.

The Specifics

Cuba is modifying the legal and corporate structures through which it administers, operates, and shares its assets, and GAESA has already carried out transfers; the new legislation expands the available avenues; and projects such as Punta Colorada demonstrate just how far the separation can go between the party retaining majority ownership, the party providing capital, and the party managing the business.

The questions that remain are: How many assets will undergo a structural change, and who will ultimately retain effective control over them—the Castro regime through an agreed-upon transfer, or the foreign partner who supposedly paid for the corresponding shares?

The so-called businesses of the most stubborn and impoverishing dictatorship in the Western world are like the bored man who confided his misery to a friend, who recommended that, in moments of greatest tedium, he slowly and rhythmically rub his index fingers and thumbs together. Three months later, they met again, and the man was still the same. The friend asked him to make the motion and blurted out: “Oh, damn, but you’re missing the snot!” …



Carlos Cabrera Pérez

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First Cuban mayor in Spain.

When Panic Unleashes Repression

BY CARLOS CABRERA PÉREZ ON NOVEMBER 8, 2026, 12:17 P.M. |
ANALYSIS, CRISIS, CUBA, OPINION, AND LATEST NEWS



Late-era Castroism is terrified and has launched a wave of selective repression because the noose is tightening and it fears an uprising as much as a vampire fears the light. Image of Camila Acosta, Berta Soler, María Cristina Labrada, and Yoani Sánchez © Alas Tensas

CUBA-REPRESSION

By Carlos Cabrera Pérez - Prensa Libre Cuba – Opinion

Madrid. PLC Analysis | The post-Castro regime is living in fear and has launched a wave of selective repression because the noose is tightening around it, and it fears an uprising as much as a vampire fears the light—especially now that it is internationally isolated and frustrated by its inability to curb hyperinflation, which is hitting the poorest hardest, and at a time when there is no shortage of opportunistic initiatives by commanders and officers seeking promotions and recognition.

The "papití" with its Moncada 2026 military junk is not a deterrent against the United States, but a show of force by the olive-green, guayabera-clad caste against the starving and desperate masses; the unnecessarily showy arrests of Camila Acosta, Berta Soler, María Cristina Labrada, and Yoani Sánchez are warnings to discontented Cubans, who are legion.

The illegal ploy to remove Ángel Santiesteban from the leadership of Freemasonry is an attempt to make an example of a civilian group it no longer controls, and the raid by Special Troops on the home of activist Yoel Alejandro Pérez Serrano—who leads a community aid project in Guamuta, Santiago de Cuba, is an effort to uproot the consolidation of a supportive local leader, using a truckload of soldiers with long guns and intimidating the neighborhood.

The most decrepit dictatorship in the West is not innovative in its repressive acts—which are part of the communist totalitarian arsenal—but it is well aware of the contempt held by the majority of Cubans—including those who pretend otherwise—and has been traumatized ever since the lynching of Muammar Gaddafi, after he was swept away by the shockwave of the Arab Spring. Look up Raúl Castro's reactions to the impalement and murder of the Libyan dictator, and you will find clues to the fear that gnaws at yesterday's rebels.

Operation Timbiriche—supplies shipped from Miami—hasn't worked for them either. Unlike the hunger caused by the collapse of the USSR, there are now stores on many street corners selling food, but at prices out of reach for most, because successive economic schemes to save the revolution and socialism have turned the dollar and the euro into elusive objects of desire and the "timbiricheros" and "mete cabezas" into the new little kings of the mambo. *Under Fidel, none of this would have happened.*

Seen from the outside, this situation is tragicomic. After years of tenacious and absurd resistance to the privatization of services, they're accepting it because they've run out of options; the calculated opening—including the order to active-duty and retired FARINT officers and their relocated outposts to become shopkeepers on official assignment—is causing three adverse phenomena: skyrocketing prices, the emergence of " " a sub-outpost that's monitored but also looks down on them, and there is still no significant productive investment. The Galicians and the Chinese

used to supply their neighbors with almost everything—at better prices, higher quality, and without so many absurd regulations.

Why does the Pan con na tolerate self-employed workers? Because if it eliminates them, it could accelerate the popular rebellion it fears so much, but in its Bolshevik zeal there is not the slightest intention of reform, and all these maneuvers of playing at low-intensity capitalism have been imposed by its aversion to the freedom of Cubans and its totalitarian drive.

Was there any need to mount such a spectacle to arrest and threaten defenseless women? None whatsoever. Counterintelligence (CI) must know every detail of the lives of this brave quartet, but it needs to instill fear in their circles and ensure that the story of the abandoned cat belonging to the ABC correspondent in Havana spreads throughout Cuba, like dengue and chikungunya. Comrade Greta Thunberg and other environmental activists have not yet spoken out.

A volunteer with the Catholic Church who helped distribute *"Made in USA"* humanitarian aid said he stopped helping his Havana parish with the effort because "there are so many in need that I'm unable to tell who is poorer than whom."

A government built on terror and relentless poverty has its days numbered, and the best proof of this is President Díaz-Canel's disoriented and incoherent behavior. "That rooster is knocked out," commented a former high-ranking Castroist official who lives off support from his children and grandchildren in the U.S.

In an attempt to unseat Ángel Santiesteban from his position within Cuban Freemasonry, the regime has employed a legal ploy, which was laid bare during the trial itself, since the prosecutor—who is supposed to represent the state—sought the deprivation of civil rights for only one of the defendants— —forcing the court to extend it to all jurisdictions to prevent the former political prisoner from leading a reform movement within the fraternal organization most closely

linked to Cuban independence and the assault on the Moncada Barracks. It remains to be seen how the Freemasons will react to this umpteenth act of arbitrariness.

Since the G-2 was unable to impose its candidate on the Grand Lodge, it is now looking for a way to get rid of the troublemaker, even though Ángel Santiesteban has not mixed his political activity with his Masonic vocation. Back when the late Newton Briones Montoto headed the CI's Analysis Section, the order would have been to grant him a grace period and contact him to negotiate and agree on a way to coexist. But the dictatorship is in disarray because it has run out of time and options.

Too much noise, too many mistakes

The attacks against Santiesteban, Camila, María Cristina, Berta, Yoani, and Yoel stand in stark contrast to the measured crackdown on other opposition figures and independent journalists; a dirty trick that confirms the cheaters' fear of being exposed once again on the international stage, where they are lonelier than Robinson Crusoe, yet they do not relent in their efforts to stick their noses in—such as the much-touted election of Kid Tur de la Concepción to a United Nations body; that is, trying to reverse the U.S. expulsion with an unnecessary maneuver. But the parrots and squawkers at MINREX will no doubt be saying: "This is moral!" A strange moralistic passion in one of the strongholds of the ruling immorality.

The UN-U.S. agreement obligates Washington to grant visas to those elected to bodies of the world's largest multilateral organization, but Havana runs the risk of ending up like Arafat, who in 1988 had to settle for giving a speech in Geneva because the Reagan administration denied him a visa—and the MINREX "boxer" has been elected to a body based in the Big Apple, and we already know the deep appreciation and affection the "Lion of the Metro" feels for the United Nations.

But don’t rule out a swap with someone in Switzerland—provided the regulations allow it—where the boxer with a diplomatic passport could feast on delicious moitié-moitié (cheese fondue), although his bosses would be left high and dry and he’d be deprived of heading down to New Jersey to let loose at the Cuban Rumba in Jersey City, which is just two PATH train stops from the Cuban Mission, located in Manhattan.

Too much fanfare, too many mistakes; brutal and/or selective repression has never filled the warehouses with food, the pharmacies with medicine, the streets with buses, or the homes with electricity; it has only provoked popular uprisings with uncertain outcomes, and in the resulting catastrophes, the poor die, but so do the rich of Siboney and surrounding areas—who are the ones with the most to lose in Cuba.

Castroism was a succession of totalitarian crimes, voluntaristic mistakes, and a massive kowtowing to the USSR; the Raúl era was a reformist feint that fizzled out due to fear of Obama’s “Track Two”; and late Castroism is a panicked lemonade, spinning wildly—like Onelio’s Moñigüeso—because it fears falling on its own, but spinning around so much won’t keep it safe from a well-aimed stone—because they’ve filled Cuba with mischievous girls.



Carlos Cabrera Pérez

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First Cuban mayor in Spain.

When U.S. Sanctions End Up Punishing the Cuban People Twice Over

BY JUAN MORENO ON NOVEMBER 8, 2026, 11:38 A.M. |
ANALYSIS, CRISIS, CUBA, UNITED STATES, AND OPINION



U.S. sanctions and pressure have economic consequences, and it would be absurd to deny it. But it would also be unacceptable to allow the Cuban government to use them as an excuse to justify the deterioration of its own people's living conditions. AI-generated image | ©JM

CUBA-UNITED STATES – SANCTIONS

By Juan Moreno – Prensa Libre Cuba – Analysis

Havana. PLC Opinion | There is a reality that the Cuban regime tries to hide behind its endless "besieged fortress" rhetoric: every time U.S. pressure on the government increases, it is ordinary citizens who end up bearing the brunt of the consequences. What is most perverse is that the regime itself us —these very difficulties—to justify new sacrifices, more controls, and greater restrictions on a population that has been paying a price for decades that is not its own to bear.

U.S. sanctions and pressure have economic consequences, and it would be absurd to deny it. But it would also be unacceptable to allow the Cuban government to use them as a pretext to justify the deterioration of its own people's living conditions. No sanction obliges the authorities to repress, imprison opponents, persecute journalists, limit freedoms, or punish those who peacefully demand their rights.

The regime has an extraordinary ability to find culprits outside its own offices. If there is no electricity, it blames the embargo; if food is scarce, it blames the embargo; if hospitals are falling into disrepair, it blames the embargo. But when it comes to explaining corruption, waste, administrative inefficiency, the absence of freedoms, or the refusal to undertake profound reforms, explanations are replaced by patriotic rhetoric and slogans of resistance.

The problem is that the cost to the population does not end with shortages. It also affects those who dare to speak out. In Cuba, merely expressing peaceful disagreement with the system is enough to expose oneself to surveillance, arrests, legal proceedings, and imprisonment. The protests of July 11, 2021, demonstrated just how far the state's response can go in the face of a nationwide citizen mobilization.

When allegations of violence, abuses in custody, inhumane conditions of detention, or deaths requiring independent investigations are added to political persecution, we are faced with events of such gravity that they cannot be reduced to mere excesses of authority.

This raises an issue that the international community should not ignore. The concept of crimes against humanity has precise legal requirements, and determining whether they have occurred is the responsibility of the competent authorities. If certain acts were to become part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population and the remaining requirements established by international law were met, it would be necessary to investigate

whether they could constitute crimes against humanity. This is not about using a political label to make headlines, but rather about documenting the facts and establishing accountability through independent procedures.

The paradox is stark: while Washington increases pressure on Cuba's leaders, the government shifts part of the burden onto those who lack the power to change state policy. And while it demands international solidarity with Cuba, it restricts the fundamental rights of its own citizens.

The United States may review, tighten, or modify its policy toward Havana. These are decisions that fall to Washington. But no external pressure absolves the Cuban government of its domestic responsibilities. The embargo does not stop a citizen to interrogate them, does not hand down a politically motivated sentence, nor does it order the suppression of a peaceful demonstration. Those decisions are made within Cuba and have specific individuals responsible for them.

Enough of using the people as a political shield and bargaining chip. Cubans have no reason to continue paying the price for a confrontation that those in power also use as an excuse to justify their own failures.

Because when a government turns its people's hardships into a tool of control and uses repression to hold onto power, responsibility cannot be sought solely beyond its borders. It must also be sought where decisions are made: within the Cuban state itself.

Note: This article was written by Juan Moreno after he and his wife, Zelandia Pérez, were subjected to restrictions on their movement a few days ago.



Juan Moreno

Havana. Independent journalist, member of the editorial team at *Prensa Libre Cuba*.

Film Festivals in a City That Has Lost Its Movie Theaters

BY FRANK ABEL ON NOVEMBER 8, 2026, 11:00 A.M. |
SOCIAL CRISIS, CUBA, CULTURE, OPINION, REPORTING, AND LATEST NEWS



My memories also include the Récord and Rex movie theaters, which were also located on the Boulevard, likewise abandoned to their fate by a government that has always claimed to defend culture as one of the nation's bastions. Photos taken from social media and ©PLC

CUBA-MOVIE THEATERS

By Frank Abel – Prensa Libre Cuba – Opinion

Havana. PLC. Chronicle | With the French Film Festival and the European Film Festival currently taking place in Havana, I was reminded of a time when film festivals in the Cuban capital were a celebration. As a child, my parents would take me to El Cinecito on San Rafael Boulevard, a movie theater that today operates sporadically and poorly. As time went on, I set foot for the first time in the Payret—now the " "—which has been completely dismantled to

be converted into a hotel for a tourism industry that lies in ruins, just like the country itself.



Facade of what used to be the Rex and Duplex movie theaters. Photo: PLC



Entrance to the Rex movie theater after the so-called revolution



Rex-Duplex Cinemas before 1959

My memories also include the Duplex and Rex movie theaters, which were also on the Boulevard, likewise abandoned to their fate by a government that has always claimed to defend culture as one of the nation's bastions. Which is ironic because that same government has left neighborhood movie theaters to fall into oblivion—the Récord and Lido theaters in Marianao, the XI Festival theater in Alamar, the Guanabo theater, and many others—which today are, if not dilapidated buildings, certainly anything but movie theaters. This only demonstrates that the Cuban regime has become completely detached from reality in its eagerness to remain in power, because if there is one thing that has not disappeared from the world, it is the film industry, which generates millions in profits—one need only look at the box office figures for some movies in just a few days.



Photo of a Havana movie theater in the 1940s

In Cuba, long lines to see a movie at a theater are a thing of the past; first of all, there's almost never electricity, and second, there are hardly any movie theaters—only a few are still operating—and reversing that reality will be difficult. Although in the past, if you walked a few blocks, you might come across two or three movie theaters and a variety of film options—for example, on the central Reina Street in Havana, there were the Reina and the Cuba theaters, just to give one example. Just two blocks from the now-defunct Payret Theater—which had a rich history dating back to before the 1959 revolutionary triumph—stands the Actualidades, the first movie theater opened in Cuba, built in the early decades of the last century, and now also abandoned.



The Payret Theater-Cinema in days gone by.

Regarding this last case, I recall that about two years ago, while talking with one of the caretakers of that building, the man told me that the movie theater would be renovated for the International Festival of New Latin American Cinema, but time passed and life went on—the same or even worse—for the theater and for Cubans. In short, like so many other historic buildings in Havana, it was forgotten. Perhaps few Havana residents know that this tiny movie theater on Monserrate Street was the first one built in Cuba; perhaps not even those responsible for preserving heritage and overseeing culture are aware of it.

In short, the magic of cinema has also left Cuba; young people today can share a bottle of rum or a dose of "El químico," but they can't go to the movies. All because someone has forgotten that culture also educates and shapes, and inspires dreams—even though in Cuba there are dreams that are dangerous, like the dream of being free.



Frank Abel

Havana. Independent journalist, member of the editorial team at *Prensa Libre Cuba*.

El Cobre Defies Fear and Demands the Release of Activist Pérez Serrano

BY PLC CENTRAL EDITORIAL STAFF ON NOVEMBER 8, 2026, 11:00 A.M. |
SOCIAL CRISIS, CUBA, HUMAN RIGHTS, REPRESSION, AND LATEST NEWS



The protest took place on Saturday, November 7, just hours after State Security agents and special forces raided Pérez Serrano's home in Guamuta, a rural community in El Cobre. AI-generated image | PLC with photos by PLC and Yosmany Mayeta Labrada

El Cobre Defies Fear and Demands the Release of Activist Pérez Serrano

CUBA—EL COBRE PROTEST

PLC

Santiago de Cuba. PLC | The arrest of community activist Pérez Serrano sparked an unusual protest in El Cobre, Santiago de Cuba, where neighbors, women, and children took to the streets with signs and pots and pans to demand his release. The young man had become a well-known figure in the Guamuta community for distributing food, assisting vulnerable families, and promoting community projects.

The demonstration took place on Saturday, November 7, just hours after State Security agents and special forces raided Pérez Serrano's home in Guamuta, a rural community in El Cobre.

Videos shared by independent journalist Yosmany Mayeta Labrada show protesters marching with banners and banging on pots and pans as they demanded Pérez Serrano's release. The footage also shows mothers accompanied by children.

The protest is particularly significant within the Cuban context. It did not arise from a public call by a political organization, but rather from the reaction of neighbors to the arrest of a person known for his community activism.

According to reports released by opposition figure José Daniel Ferrer García, the raid began around 6:00 a.m. Armed officers entered the home, detained Pérez Serrano, and seized cell phones, food, pots, and other belongings. Ferrer García also stated that authorities blocked access to Guamuta to prevent other residents from coming to express solidarity with the detainee and his family.

Reports published by various media outlets also indicate that Yeny, Pérez Serrano's wife and a medical student, was reportedly detained. Mayeta Labrada also reported that other women were beaten and had their phones taken from them. These are allegations disseminated by independent sources for which no official statement from the authorities has been released.

As of the latest information available, the Cuban government had not publicly disclosed the charges against Pérez Serrano nor offered any explanation regarding the confiscation of food and kitchen utensils during the operation.

Pérez Serrano had gained recognition among the residents of Guamuta for spearheading "Salvar Cuba," a humanitarian initiative dedicated to distributing food and supporting vulnerable people. He

also promoted the construction of a medical clinic and a community soup kitchen using resources contributed by neighbors and supporters.

This active role in the community led some neighbors to call him “the mayor of Guamuta.” One of the reports consulted indicates that his initiative provided at least one meal a day, Monday through Friday, to the elderly, children with nutritional problems, the sick, and families in need.

A week before his arrest, Pérez Serrano had sent several videos to journalist Gallego. In those recordings, he was seen organizing community work, distributing food, and participating in religious activities. According to Gallego, the young man asked him to release the footage if anything happened to him. The journalist also stated that Pérez Serrano had received threats from State Security.

The arrest occurred one day after mothers in Guamuta reported threats of fines for not sending their children to school due to a lack of food. The reports described the difficult situation of families who claimed to be struggling to feed their children.

Pérez Serrano had already gained public notoriety after confronting Miguel Díaz-Canel during a visit to El Cobre in November 2025. On that occasion, he called for attention to be given to the residents of Guamuta and questioned the response to the community’s needs.

In July 2026, he also staged a solo protest in which he displayed messages related to freedom, democracy, justice, and dignity. He was subsequently summoned by the authorities.

But his public presence had not been limited to political activism. Distributing food and organizing community projects had made him a familiar figure to many families. This context helps explain the almost immediate reaction of those who took to the streets to demand his release.

It has not been possible to independently determine the exact number of participants in the protest or to establish the scope of the subsequent police actions. There are, however, publicly circulated videos showing women, minors, and other residents holding signs and banging on pots and pans to demand Pérez Serrano's release.

What happened in El Cobre thus goes beyond the arrest of a single activist. Pérez Serrano had earned support through concrete actions: feeding people in need and organizing community solutions wherever residents reported shortages. His arrest turned that accumulated solidarity into a public protest.

The image of residents leaving their homes with pots and pans and signs is likely the most politically significant aspect of the episode. Rather than remaining mere spectators in the face of the arrest, some residents decided to take their dissent to the streets and openly demand the activist's freedom.

El Cobre, known throughout Cuba for the Shrine of Our Lady of Charity, became this time the scene of yet another expression of hope: that of citizens who took to the streets to defend one of their neighbors and publicly demand his freedom.

PLC Demands Freedom of Movement for Juan Manuel Moreno and Zelandia Pérez Following a New Repressive Crackdown in Cuba

BY PLC CENTRAL EDITORIAL STAFF ON NOVEMBER 7, 2026, 9:47 P.M. |

CUBA, HUMAN RIGHTS, REPRESSION, AND LATEST NEWS



Prensa Libre Cuba strongly condemns the restrictions imposed on Moreno Borrego and Zelandia de la Caridad Pérez Abreu, and demands their immediate and full freedom, the cessation of the police operation around their home, and an end to any threats or reprisals against them. Photo captured from Cubahoy's Facebook page

CUBA-REPRESSION-HUMAN RIGHTS

PLC

State Security continues to restrict the movements of the journalist—a staff member of Prensa Libre Cuba on the island—and his wife, , after they received an invitation from the U.S. Embassy. PLC strongly condemns the harassment and demands an immediate end to the threats against both of them.

Stockholm. PLC / Repression against independent Cuban journalism has once again struck directly at Prensa Libre Cuba. Juan Manuel Moreno Borrego, an independent journalist, general director of CubaHoy, and a member of the PLC staff in Cuba, and his wife, Zelandia de la Caridad Pérez Abreu, a human rights activist involved

in the defense and monitoring of electoral rights, are facing restrictions and threats from State Security, according to a complaint made public on November 6.

The reported incidents occurred after the couple received an invitation from the Public Diplomacy Section of the U.S. Embassy in Havana to participate in the sixth edition of one of its programs. According to CubaHoy, after the invitation was received, police surveillance was deployed around the couple's home, and State Security agents restricted their freedom of movement.

The complaint also states that an officer identified as Rodrigo allegedly threatened Juan Manuel Moreno Borrego with arrest and "disappearance" if he left his home. This is an extremely serious accusation that, so far, comes from the complaint published by CubaHoy.



This is not, however, an isolated incident. In July 2024, the Cuban Institute for Freedom of Expression and the Press (ICLEP) publicly denounced a series of repressive acts against Juan Manuel Moreno

Borrego, including police summonses, house arrest without a court order, arbitrary detentions, the interruption of his communications, and threats related to his journalistic activities.

CubaNet reported on these allegations at the time and noted that the journalist had suffered harassment, house arrest without a court order, and arbitrary detentions. Martí Noticias also reported on Moreno Borrego's allegations, in which he described surveillance, visits by agents, and prohibitions on leaving his home.

Zelandia Pérez Abreu also has a history of public involvement in Cuba's independent civil society. She is the national coordinator of the Cuban Association of Electoral Observers (ACOE), an organization created at the initiative of the Cuban Electoral Ombudsman Commission (COCUDE). Alas Tensas later introduced her as an activist with the Cuban Alliance for Inclusion ( ) and recalled her work with COCUDE, in addition to describing her as a victim of political violence.

What happened is particularly serious because the reported trigger was not a demonstration or a clandestine action, but rather a diplomatic invitation. Turning contact with a foreign embassy into grounds for police surveillance, de facto confinement, or threats constitutes yet another sign of the pressure faced by independent journalists and civil society representatives within Cuba.

For **Prensa Libre Cuba**, this case also has a particularly personal dimension: Moreno Borrego is a member of PLC's staff in Cuba.

Prensa Libre Cuba strongly condemns the restrictions imposed on Moreno Borrego and Zelandia de la Caridad Pérez Abreu, and demands their immediate and full release, the cessation of the police operation around their home, and an end to any threats or reprisals against them.

We also demand that their physical integrity be respected, along with their right to move about freely and Moreno Borrego's right to practice independent journalism without intimidation from State Security agencies.

It cannot be considered normal for accepting a diplomatic invitation to place two citizens under police surveillance. Nor is it normal for a journalist to have to choose between remaining confined to his home or risking arrest for leaving it.

What is at stake goes beyond the case of Juan Manuel Moreno and Zelandia Pérez. It is the right of Cubans to report, assemble, and associate freely without the political police deciding where they can go, with whom they can speak, or what activities they can attend.

We at PRENSA LIBRE CUBA hold the Cuban authorities responsible for ensuring the safety and well-being of Moreno Borrego and Zelandia de la Caridad Pérez Abreu. We demand that both be immediately and unconditionally restored to their full freedom of movement.

INTERNATIONAL:

Russia Negotiates from a Parallel Reality as a Leak Reveals the Human Cost of War

BY PLC CENTRAL EDITORIAL STAFF ON NOVEMBER 11, 2026, 3:36 P.M. |
UNITED STATES, RUSSIA, UKRAINE, AND LATEST NEWS



The dispute over the map is not a minor disagreement. If Moscow negotiates convinced that a military victory is imminent, it will have little incentive to make concessions. Photos taken from social media.

RUSSIA-UKRAINE

Central Editorial Team

Stockholm. (PLC) | The first day of talks between Ukraine, Russia, and the United States in Abu Dhabi laid bare one of the biggest obstacles to any agreement: the delegations do not even share a basic assessment of the military reality on the ground.

According to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, the Russian military and intelligence re s claimed during the negotiations that their forces had already occupied half of the Donbas region that

remains under Kyiv's control. The Ukrainian delegation rejected that account and asserted that it has images, videos, and other evidence proving the contrary. Zelensky added that the U.S. representatives agreed with the Ukrainian assessment of the front lines.

"Putin lives in a different reality," the Ukrainian president stated. In his view, the distorted information the Kremlin receives may lead the Russian president to believe that his troops are one or two months away from completing the conquest of eastern Ukraine.

Despite the clash, Zelensky described the first day of talks on November 10 as constructive and substantive. The negotiations, spearheaded by the United States, also addressed security guarantees and a possible European security architecture.

The disagreement over the map is not a minor issue. If Moscow negotiates convinced that a military victory is imminent, it will have little incentive to make concessions. And if it presents the U.S. mediators with progress that does not correspond to actual territorial control, any peace proposal will be built on a false foundation.



The Kremlin's alleged disconnect takes on greater significance in light of a data leak from Rosstat, the Russian state statistics agency. A database containing more than 11 million death certificates includes 412,576 records explicitly linked to the war through official codes or

written references to combat and military operations. The files were obtained by the groups Cyber Partisans and Silent Crow. Rosstat acknowledged having suffered a cyberattack, though it denied that any sensitive information had been stolen.

This figure should be treated with caution. The Guardian noted that it was unable to independently verify the entire dataset. Furthermore, other analyses caution that some war-related codes may include civilians and that the various published figures correspond to different categories. Therefore, the 412,576 records should not be presented as an official and definitively verified tally of Russian soldiers killed.

Nevertheless, the documents generally align with other estimates. British intelligence estimated in September that approximately 500,000 Russian soldiers had been killed, while the independent media outlet Mediazona had identified nearly 286,000 fatalities by name and estimated that the actual total could be close to half a million.

The leak also reveals a deeply unequal social distribution. Poor and outlying regions appear to be far more affected than Moscow and St. Petersburg. This imbalance shows how the Kremlin has managed to keep the war away from the main political centers, shifting a disproportionate share of its human cost to territories with fewer resources and less visibility.

These two news items are part of the same reality. While the Russian delegation in Abu Dhabi presents an exaggerated picture of its conquests, records attributed to the state's own statistical apparatus reveal the extraordinary price paid to sustain those advances.

Peace negotiations require more than just seating adversaries around a table. They require agreement on the facts, the location of the front lines, and which objectives remain militarily attainable. If the Kremlin confuses propaganda with strategic intelligence, it may end up

negotiating over an imaginary map while thousands of Russians continue to die to turn it into reality.

See you next week!

The Editorial Staff of Prensa Libre Cuba

This weekly summary in PDF format is part of Prensa Libre Cuba's commitment to Cubans' right to be informed. In a country where official media conceal, distort, or silence reality, we offer this service so that citizens can access verified news and independent analysis. Since the PLC website cannot be viewed in Cuba due to censorship, we have chosen to distribute this PDF version so that the information reaches—unblocked—those who need it most.



Download our English version directly at http://prensalibrecuba.com

How to install the Prensa Libre Cuba app on your phone



You can now have **Prensa Libre Cuba** (http://prensalibrecuba.com) as an app on your phone, without going through app stores or dealing with large downloads. Our PWA version installs directly from your browser and works just like a regular app: it has its own icon, runs in full-screen mode, and loads quickly.

On iPhone (Safari):

1. Open *prensalibrecuba.com* in **Safari**.
2. Tap the **Share** button (square with an arrow).
3. Select **"Add to Home Screen**."
4. Confirm by tapping **"Add**."

The app will appear on your screen just like any other.

On Android (Chrome):

1. Open *prensalibrecuba.com* in **Chrome**.
2. Tap the **three dots** in the menu.
3. Select "**Add to Home Screen**."
4. Confirm by tapping "**Add**."

That's it: PLC will be installed as a standalone app.

With this version, you'll be able to access our news faster, even with slow connections. It's another step toward bringing free information to all Cubans, wherever they may be.

THE TRUE HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION



Prensa Libre Cuba-TV presents the most comprehensive documentary series ever produced on Cuba's contemporary history. Premiered in 1989 in the United States, Latin America, and Australia, it offers a rigorous examination of the facts that the Castro regime has distorted or concealed from younger generations. With three episodes, **La Cuba de Castro** remains the most comprehensive television series dedicated to the island's political, social, and military evolution.