JOHN LIND:

It was in 1913 -­ the "hours of Mexico's agony" -- that President Woodrow Wilson selected as his personal representative in that troubled land John Lind, a Midwestern progressive and former Minnesota governor and representative in Congress.¹ Three years of turmoil and civil warfare had seen the end of the thirty-five-year dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz and the deposing of his more democratic successor, Francisco I. Madero. Mexico's government in 1913 was in the hands of the most recently successful revolutionary, General Victoriano Huerta, whose position as provisional president was even then being challenged by rebellious forces led by Venustiano Carranza.

Wilson refused to recognize the government of Huerta, a man who antithesized the president's democratic ideals and moralistic concept of the United States' interests in Mexico. Instead he formulated a mediation plan with the immediate objective of removing Huerta from power.

To implement his Mexican policy, Wilson chose Lind, a fair-haired, blue-eyed Scandinavian whose ideals were completely compatible with his own, Lind's Mexican sojourn began in August, 1913, and ended eight months later in April, 1914. Functioning in an alien culture and innocent of diplomatic experience, the Minnesotan was not able to achieve the goals set forth in the mediation plan. After Huerta rejected Wilson's scheme, Lind's role changed to that of an adviser and observer reporting to the United States State Department.

It has been held that Lind's Mexican mission failed because Wilson's approach to the elimination of Huerta -- that is, the policy framework within which Lind operated -- was impractical. It has also been proposed, inversely, that a contributory cause of failure was the president's selection of an inexperienced representative. Despite Lind's lack of success in negotiating the mediation plan, he was without doubt influential in shaping later policy and events. "The most significant aspect of the Lind mission," states Kenneth J. Grieb, "was not its abortive attempt to get Huerta to resign, but that Lind's reports brought the Washington government to a more realistic view of the steps needed to implement its policy."²

¹The quote is from George M. Stephenson, John Lind of Minnesota, 261 (Minneapolis, 1935).

²Grieb, "The Lind Mission to Mexico," in Caribbean Studies, 7:43 (January, 1968).

When Lind was named by President Wilson as his personal representative to Mexico in August, 1913, he was virtually unknown in national political circles. In his home state of Minnesota, however, he was a prominent lawyer and politician who, as congressman and governor, had established a widespread reputation as a man far more committed to progressive principles and issues than to party loyalty, a man who had once described himself as a "political orphan."

Lind's appointment, evidently made on the recommendation of Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, was as much a surprise to him as it was to the American public. For Wilson had chosen to send to Mexico on a mission of extreme delicacy a man with no diplomatic experience, no knowledge of either Mexican affairs or the Spanish language, and a strong anti-Catholic bias. His qualifications, aside from his personal and political loyalty to both Wilson and Bryan, were a reputedly circumspect attitude toward public statements and a strong independent spirit, which supposedly would enable him to resist partisan pressures in the execution of his mission.

This estimate of Lind's character proved to be only partially accurate. On the one hand, during his stay in Mexico (August 9, 1913-April 6, 1914) and for several years thereafter, the newspapers made him well known to the people of the United States as ''silent, John Lind," the tall, gaunt Swede who would not comment on Mexican affairs. On the other hand, on those rare occasions when Lind issued statements for publication, he somehow managed to stir up a great deal of controversy. More importantly, he became a strong supporter of the Constitutionalist cause shortly after his arrival in Mexico, and the conduct of his mission had neither the neutrality nor the objectivity that Wilson and Bryan had ostensibly desired.

Lind's preference for directness in speech and his impatience to achieve tangible results made him temperamentally unsuited for the role of diplomat. These qualities, together with the peculiar nature of his position, the manner in which the Wilson administration dealt with him and handled American-Mexican relations, and his lack of familiarity with his surroundings, often caused Lind to feel frustrated and isolated in Mexico. But while he was eager to return to Minnesota in June, 1914, and to resume the more comfortable roles of lawyer and political maverick, he maintained an avid interest in Mexico and in retrospect viewed his sojourn there as the most "intensely interesting" period of his life.

When Wilson assumed the office of president of the United States in 1913, Mexico was in the throes of revolution. For the Mexican nation it was a period of guerrilla warfare, coups d’état, and political assassinations, As rival factions struggled for military and political control, anarchy and economic collapse constantly threatened, The situation was complicated by the fact that powerful governments (most notably that of the United States), motivated by idealistic and economic interests, felt compelled to interfere in Mexican affairs. Between 1913 and 1915, President Wilson made the United States' relations with Mexico the chief international issue of his administration. He and Secretary of State Bryan, neither of whom had previous experience in the complex art of international diplomacy, embarked on a Mexican policy that sprang primarily from moralistic and idealistic impulses: the re-establishment of social, economic, and political order through the elimination of military dictator Victoriano Huerta and the creation of a democratically elected constitutional government. The policy was doomed to fail from the beginning, because it was based on unrealistic assumptions about and inaccurate appraisals of the Mexican situation.

Wilson and Bryan tried various methods of achieving their goals. First, they rejected the historic American practice of recognizing de facto governments and withheld recognition from the Huerta regime. When this action brought no results, they devised a mediation scheme designed to force Huerta's resignation and the holding of free elections. Lind was sent to Mexico to present the mediation offer and to exert diplomatic pressure for its acceptance. Because sending an ambassador would have been inconsistent with Wilson's policy of nonrecognition, Lind was given the ambiguous title of "personal representative"; clearly, however, he was to act in an ambassadorial capacity. When Huerta refused the terms of the plan (see page 9), Lind was instructed to remain in Mexico in the crucial role of observer and reporter, while Wilson and Bryan next embarked on a policy of "watchful waiting." Following another unsuccessful attempt to force Huerta's resignation, "watchful waiting" was abandoned in favor of encouraging the Constitutionalist forces opposed to Huerta and using direct military coercion in the occupation of Veracruz (both strongly advocated by Lind). Eventually, in 1914, the Constitutionalist military forces drove Huerta from power, and their "First Chief," Carranza, assumed control of the government without holding elections. Although Huerta had been eliminated, Mexico seemed no closer to stability through democracy than it had been before.

The Constitutionalist ranks soon split. Carranza was challenged both militarily and politically by such former allies as Francisco (Pancho) Villa and Emiliano Zapata, who were referred to as Conventionists after the Convention of Aquascalientes. Wilson and Bryan, having discovered that Carranza was as stubbornly unwilling to allow the United States to interfere in Mexico's internal affairs as Huerta had been, switched their allegiance for a time from the "First Chief" to the Conventionist forces opposing him. In 1915, however, as the Constitutionalists managed to continue in power, and as Wilson found his attention drawn more and more from Mexico to the crisis in Europe, he granted recognition to the Carranza government. Except for the Punitive Expedition sent into Mexico against Villa in 1916; the United States, with its ultimate policy objectives still not achieved, withdrew from its intense involvement in Mexican affairs and left one of the most important revolutions of the twentieth century to run its own course.

George M. Stephenson discusses the Mexican phase of Lind's career at some length in his biography, John Lind of Minnesota (Minneapolis, 1935).

The last four volumes of Arthur S. Link's five-volume biography of Woodrow Wilson each contain chapters detailing various phases of United States Mexican policy for the years 1913-1917: Wilson: The New Freedom; Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915; Wilson: Confusions and Crises, 1915-1916; and Wilson: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, 1916-1917 (Princeton, 1956, 1960, 1964, 1965).

Additional secondary sources in English dealing with the Mexican Revolution and relations between the United States and Mexico during this period include Ronald Atkin, Revolution! Mexico 1910-1920 (London, 1969); Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (Cambridge, Mass:, 1963); Kenneth J. Grieb, "The Lind Mission to Mexico" in Caribbean Studies 7:25-43 (January, 1968), and The United States and Huerta (Lincoln, Neb., 1969); Robert E. Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 1914-1915: The Convention Aquascalientes> (Bloomington, Ind., 1960); James W. Wilkie and Albert L. Michaels, eds., Revolution in Mexico: Years of Upheaval, 1910-1940 (New York, 1969).

Useful for information about more specific aspects of United States Mexican policy are Peter Calvert, The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1914: The Diplomacy of the Anglo-American Conflict (London, 1968) and Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of. Veracruz (Lexington Ky., 1962).

All of the books listed above contain extensive bibliographies of primary and secondary sources in both English and Spanish.

The following government publications also are helpful: United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1913-1917, 5 volumes (Washington, 1920, 1922, 192 1925, 1926); and United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Investigation of Mexican Affairs, 66 Congress, 2 session, 2 volumes (Washington, 1920).

The numerical files of the Department of State records in the National Archives which contain the greater part of the official papers pertaining to the United States' relations with Mexico for this period are in Record Group 59. The most important of these is the 812.00 file, "Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929. 11 The 711.12 file, entitled "Records Regarding Political Relations Between the United States and Mexico, 1910-1929," includes some additional materials. Microfilm copies of both files (accompanied by pamphlet inventories) may be purchased from the National Archives as Microcopies 274 and· 314, respectively. Roll 1 of each of these microfilm publications is available at the Minnesota Historical Society. These rolls contain "Lists of Documents," i.e., brief abstracts of the items reproduced in the microcopies which also serve as finding aids. Roll 1 of Microcopy 274 covers only the period February, 1910-March, 1914, while Roll 1 of Microcopy 314 lists documents for the entire period.

Additional manuscript and printed sources on Lind and on pertinent facets of Mexico's foreign relations, history, politics, and government in the manuscripts department and library of the Minnesota Historical Society are indicated in the catalog cards filmed on Roll 7 of the microfilm.

Following two undated items, the Mexican Mission Papers of John Lind begin in January, 1913, with a few manuscripts which predate Lind's diplomatic assignment and which deal with other facets of his career: correspondence regarding his law practice, his work as president of the board of regents of the University of Minnesota, political patronage, President Wilson's offer of the post of United States minister to Sweden, and Lind's decision to decline the position.

Manuscripts pertaining to the Mexican mission begin in late July, 1913, with telegrams from Secretary of State Bryan summoning Lind to Washington for consultation on an "important" and "confidential" matter. Materials from early August, 1913, include Lind's official letter of introduction; a copy of Wilson's instructions listing the terms of the United States' mediation proposal; newspaper clippings reporting Lind's appointment and arrival in Mexico; and letters of congratulation and introduction, many of them from Americans residing in Mexico. Also filed in August, 1913, are several groups of documents undoubtedly generated sometime during Lind's stay in Mexico: numerous alphabetically arranged calling cards; picture postcards portraying Lind on board the U.S.S. Michigan, Mexican architecture, and Mexican revolutionary leaders and activities; and Zapata's revolutionary manifesto, Plan de Ayala.

The records which date from Lind's arrival in Mexico in August, 1913, to his departure in April, 1914, consist primarily of diplomatic dispatches, letters from informants, printed materials, and copies of official documents. The heart of the Mexican Mission Papers are the diplomatic dispatches, in which government officials in Washington and diplomats in Veracruz and Mexico City kept one another informed of local developments. The bulk of the dispatches are from Lind to Bryan, usually in both coded and transcribed forms, sometimes with Lind's original draft attached. A lesser number from Bryan to Lind are present, as well as some which were exchanged between Lind and Nelson O'Shaughnessy, chargé d'affaires at the American embassy in Mexico City.

In his efforts to give the Wilson administration as complete a picture as possible of the social, economic, political, military, and religious conditions in Mexico, Lind packed his dispatches with diverse types of information. First, he reported what he considered and what appear to be actual, confirmed events, such as those he had witnessed or which had been reported in the press, verified by corroborating documents, or established as fact in some other way. Among such events are those relating to his negotiations with the Huerta government; incidents surrounding the October, 1913, elections; the request of presidential candidate Félix Díaz for asylum in the United States consulate in Veracruz; the arrival of arms and fuel shipments for Huerta from Europe; the conduct of Mexican governmental affairs, such as the convening of Congress and changes in Huerta's cabinet; the progress of important military campaigns and battles; and the financial crises continually plaguing the government.

Second, Lind relayed reports of unverified events (often transmitted to him by informants) which seemingly had the status of rumors, such as supposed arrests and executions carried out by the Mexican government; secret alliances and agreements entered into by Huerta with the business community and the Catholic church; and uprisings being planned by anti-Huerta partisans. Lind did not always clearly indicate, however, whether the information contained in his messages more closely resembled rumor or fact, and he sometimes tended to confuse the two and to exaggerate situations. For example, he repeatedly warned that the principal British oil investor in Mexico, Lord Cowdray (Weetman D. Pearson) of the firm of S. Pearson and Son, Ltd., had resolved to control and monopolize the Mexican oil industry; that in pursuit of this goal the Englishman had already consolidated his position to the extent that he dictated the Mexican policy of Great Britain and controlled the Huerta government; and that he was determined to embarrass the United States and thwart its policies. Lind further contended that the British minister to Mexico, Sir Lionel E. Carden, was acting as Cowdray’s agent and was, therefore, party to these Machiavellian intrigues, Lind's belief in the existence of this conspiracy became an obsession; his accusations concerning it, his determination to expose it, and his insistence that Carden be replaced are major themes in his dispatches.

Third, Lind reported what are clearly his personal opinions, impressions, and interpretations and recommended strategies and tactics he believed ought to be employed by the Wilson administration. He conveyed his negative views of the Irish, the Jews, the Catholic church, and the Mexicans, especially those in southern Mexico; his convictions that the fundamental causes of unrest in Mexico were not political but social and economic and that the establishment of political stability was ultimately dependent on reforms in the feudal agrarian system; his estimate of what course the principal revolutionary leaders would follow; his firm belief that, because the Mexicans understood only power and force, Wilson and Bryan had to develop a well-thought-out policy and plan of action, adhere to them without vacillation, and apply and maintain pressure at every point if they were to achieve their goals; and his deepening sense of frustration as he began to realize that such a policy and plan did not exist and that Huerta could repeatedly call the administration's bluff.

As his feelings of frustration and lack of accomplishment mounted, Lind began to fill his dispatches with recommendations designed to precipitate decisive action. Initially he argued that since the Constitutionalists would ultimately defeat Huerta, it would be wise for Wilson to recognize them, for, in the likely event that United States military intervention became necessary to pacify the country, the Americans would then have the good will of the faction in power. He subsequently decided, however, that it would be more expedient and far wiser for the United States to achieve its objectives indirectly. If the facade of neutrality were abandoned, public support granted to the Constitutionalists, and the arms embargo lifted, the Constitutionalists would have the means to achieve what seemingly could not be effected through direct diplomatic pressure -- the ousting of Huerta and the establishment of democracy and stability. This proposal, Lind argued, was the only alternative to military intervention, which would arouse intense hostility among the Mexicans toward the United States.

Shortly before his departure, Lind was recommending that the United States aid the rebels in seizing the gulf ports of Tampico and Veracruz in order to halt the flow of arms and fuel to the Huerta government and to establish a base of operations from which a semblance of law and order could radiate. But since Lind was no longer in Mexico during the Tampico incident and the United States' occupation of Veracruz, there is very little in the papers relating to these important events.

In his replies, Bryan generally acknowledged Lind's messages, reported that the information and recommendations they contained were receiving careful consideration, informed him of the administration's decisions and actions, assured him of the importance of his contributions, or occasionally requested documentation for his statements. Lind was irritated by the lack of specific information he received; he felt that Wilson and Bryan did not always keep him fully advised of the administration's policy and of its reaction to his dispatches. For the most part, Bryan1 s messages indicate neither the manner in which the decision-making process in Washington operated nor the nature or extent of Lind's influence on it.

The dispatches exchanged between Lind and O'Shaughnessy were primarily intended to inform one another of their plans, of developments in their respective cities, and of significant intelligence forwarded to or received from Washington.

Next to the dispatches, the richest manuscripts in the collection are the letters, memoranda, and reports sent to Lind by people in Mexico whose positions enabled them to inform and advise him about various aspects of the Mexican situation: Federico Adams represented Lord Cowdray's oil interests in Mexico; James N. Galbraith was connected with the Waters Pierce Oil Company of Tampico; George R. Hackley was an executive of the Southern Pacific Railroad of Mexico; Sloan W. Emery managed an experimental hacienda owned by the University of Minnesota; J. J. Slade, Jr., was a businessman; Loring Olmstead managed the British Club in Mexico City; Louis d'Antin was first clerk and legal counsel in the United States embassy in Mexico City; Robert H. Murray was the Mexican correspondent for the New York World; William A, Burnside was United States military attaché in Mexico City; Frank F. Fletcher and William A. Moffett were officers in the United States Navy. A comparison of the content of these manuscripts with that of the dispatches suggests that while Lind did receive communiques from and hold meetings with native-born Mexicans and other individuals, he usually relied more heavily on the diverse data received from foreign-born, English-speaking confidants in formulating both his reports to Washington and his own opinions, This circumstance necessarily put severe limitations on the perspective from which he and officials in Washington viewed Mexican affairs.

Printed materials in the papers include newspapers, magazines, and clippings as well as pamphlets, leaflets, flyers, and broadsides in both English and Spanish which Lind either collected himself or received from others during his Mexican sojourn. With copies of official government documents, they supplement the information in the dispatches and other correspondence and give an added dimension to the topics discussed.

Non-Mexican items of interest for this period include correspondence and newspaper clippings pertaining to the political implications of Lind's resignation from the board of regents of the University of Minnesota.

Lind returned to the United States in mid-April, 1914. He had hoped to proceed home to Minnesota but was detained in Washington until early June, 1914, by the A.B.C. Mediation Conference called during the crisis in American-Mexican relations following the occupation of Veracruz. That Lind played a pivotal role in the conference negotiations by serving as an adviser not only to the State Department but also to the Constitutionalists is amply revealed in the papers. Copies of letters, memoranda, and reports submitted by Lind to Wilson and Bryan give his assessment of the conference and outline his policy recommendations, which strongly favored the Constitutionalists, Comparison ·of his handwritten drafts and notations with copies of official Constitutionalist communications indicates that statements he composed were often released by the Carranzistas essentially as he wrote them.

The papers also disclose that Lind's delicate position was further complicated by his serving as a liaison between Zapata and the State Department. This involvement proceeded from a commitment made shortly before leaving Mexico to Zapata sympathizers Herbert L. Hall, an American who had resided in Mexico for over twenty years, and Arnold Shanklin, the United States consul general at Mexico City. Zapata was attempting to blackmail the United States government into sending him money, arms, and relief supplies by threatening to attack Mexico City, thereby jeopardizing the mediation negotiations. Copies of telegrams indicate that Zapata's demands and Bryan's replies were transmitted in “underground messages" through intermediaries Shanklin in Mexico City and Lind in care of the State Department. The key figures in the situation were referred to in these messages by code names -- Lind was known as Juarez, Zapata as Dix, Shanklin as Paz, Hall as Clark, and a General Martinez as Brady.

It is obvious from the correspondence, newspaper and magazine articles, pamphlets, flyers, news releases, information sheets, copies of official documents, and other materials in the collection for this period that Lind's concern with Mexican affairs did not wane when he returned to Minnesota after severing his official connection with the State Department. Through letters and memoranda he continued to submit to Secretaries of State Bryan and Robert Lansing and Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane his views of the Mexican situation. He passed on to them information received from informants and urgently pressed the necessity of recognizing the Carranza government as the only alternative to military intervention.

Lind kept abreast of and undoubtedly influenced developments in the vigorous campaign for recognition being waged by Carranza's representatives in the United States through contacts with such men as Charles A. Douglas, their chief counsel, and Eliseo Arredondo, the "First Chief's" confidential agent and head of the Constitutionalist mission in Washington. In correspondence and during periodic trips to the East at critical times to give advice in person, Lind suggested actions to be taken and drafted statements for public release. Both before and after the United States granted de facto recognition, Lind persistently recommended that the Constitutionalists mount a publicity effort to counteract the anti-Carranza campaign of the American Catholic church.

Lind also kept up a lively correspondence with friends and informants who continued to supply him with data on conditions in Mexico and developments in Mexican-American relations. Some of the subjects discussed in these letters are· the continuation of the alleged anti-American conspiracy of Carden and the English oil interests; the feud between Villa and Carranza and the anti-Carranza rebellion launched by Villa; and various public and private Mexican relief efforts.

Also in the papers are some letters and numerous newspaper clippings about the reported break between President Wilson and his adviser, Colonel Edward M. House; Lind's allegations that the former ambassador to Mexico, Henry Lane Wilson, had prior knowledge of Huerta's coup d’état and the plan to execute President Madero; Lind's trip to the Mexican town of Piedras Negras to meet the "First Chief" and the speculation that he would be named ambassador to Mexico; the anti-Constitutionalist attitude of the American Catholic church and press; the pressure for military intervention by the United States in Mexico; and the Punitive Expedition against Villa led by General Pershing. Lind's speech about Mexico to the Industrial Club of Chicago in November, 1914, prompted many comments by correspondents, particularly in reference to charges of plagiarism and anti-Catholicism that followed its publication in the Bellman and in pamphlet form under the title The Mexican People. There are also requests for copies of the pamphlet.

Non-Mexican topics of interest include World War I and Lind's hearty approval of Wilson's policy of neutrality; the election of 1916, in which Lind campaigned for Wilson's re-election; and the request by former President Taft that Lind serve as chairman of the Minnesota chapter of the League to Enforce Peace.

Materials for the period 1917-1931 consist only of those items from the Lind Papers that relate to Mexico. They fall into four major categories: (1) correspondence between Lind and persons he had met during the course of his Mexican endeavors whose occasional letters inform him about mutual friends, report on conditions in Mexico, or ask his assistance in securing jobs; (2) letters and newspaper clippings pertaining to Mexico's role in World War I, including correspondence discussing Lind's scheme to recruit an independent Mexican brigade for service in France, an action that he believed would foster closer relations between the peoples of the United States and Mexico in the face of Carranza1s continued insistence on Mexican neutrality; (3) correspondence relating to legal work Lind performed in 1917 on behalf of a client who owned a hacienda in the Mexican state of Oaxaca; (4) printed pamphlets on various social, economic, political, and religious aspects of the Mexican situation.

Other notable items are newspaper clippings regarding the activities of Villa and the withdrawal of the Punitive Expedition from Mexico; a copy of a speech made by Lind at a Loyalty Day rally sponsored by organized labor in September, 1917, in which he refers to Wilson's Mexican policy in the course of urging support for the president's revised war policy; materials regarding Lind's testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, which in 1919-1920 conducted an investigation of Mexican affairs; and letters exchanged between Lind and several magazine and newspaper editors seeking articles or interviews about Mexico, some of which contain interesting reminiscences.