Irene Gomez-Bethke Papers.

Version 3
August 20, 2018

FOR IMMEDIATE PRESS RELEASE
AUGUST 31, 1970

It was just about months ago that the National Chicano Moratorium Committee sponsored its 2nd. peaceful Anti-War rally in Los Angles, California. Attendance for that rally in late February was good despite a constant rain as they marched through Eas Los Angles in a peaceful manner. The moratorium committee called out for a national rally on August 29. The rally was to express our protest at this country's participation in the immoral and unjust Southeast Asian War and specifically the greater number of chicanos serving in action and their percentage of death in this unjust war.
AUGUST 29,1970

The march stated at Belvodere Park at 10:00 A.M. and continued to the rally point, Laguna Park. Entertaiment stated at the rally, it was then the spokesmen ror the Moratorium Committee, Rosalio Munoz of L.A. was to introduce main speakers such as Cesar Chavez, Corky Gonzales and other speakers of the nowly formed Raza Unida Party.

The crowd at Laguna Park grew to an estimated 30,000 to 35,000 people and the march procession was 4 miles long. In Denver about 5:00 August 29 phone calls began to come in from Denver representatives that were present at the Moratorium staing that "All hell broke loose." About 12:00 p.m. prior to the speeches a minor hassle broke out near the rally. Media states that youths looted and robbed a liquor store and fled into the crowd after a confrontation with police, eyewitness reports state, owner would not let people into store and called police and siad people were looting their store when they were'nt even in the store. It was at this instant that the L.A. police supported by L.A. sheriffs department moved in on the crowd with violent force. Once again a police riot blamed on the people. When in reality it was people defending people.

People fled in all directions as 4 helicopters started to drop gas canisters on the crowd and over 1,000 police and sheriffs converged on on the crowd swinging, beating, and threat ng people.

The crowd fled, the nver group, not familiar with the area, regrouped and marched out of the immediate area, Under the leadership of Rudolpho "Corky" Gonzalez. When they got out of the area he asked to see who was missing of the Colorado group. It was then that Gonzales gathered some of the men to go look for some of the missing people, one of them being his 11 year old son. As people were found, the group increased. They then decided to move by truck, help was offered by Moritorium people. About 5:00 p.m. police pulled up along

the truck in which Gonzales and the other Colorado 23 were in with 3 California people, total of 26. It was stated by L.A. police that Gonzales and others had weapons when they were pulled over. Police jumped out of cars, pulled shotguns and hand weapons to Gonzales and the others heads and told them not to move or they would be dead.

At police headquarters the Colorado 23 were among the first charged. L.A. police could not figure out charges. First it was conspiracy to rob and concealed weapons on all and bond was set at $15,000. Today, Monday August 31, the charges are robbery with the bond set at $3,500. Legal Aid has begun and the total amount of arrests has gone up to 189. Reports are sketchy on who has been released and what charges have been filed.

A meeting held Sunday at the Crusade for Justice has developed a legal defense fund for the Colorado 23. The address: Crusade for Justice, 1567 Downing Street. Denver Colorado 80218, c/o Teresa Romero.

SOME OF THE FACTS SURROUNDING L.A. POLICE RIOT.

-----Gonzales has refused to be freed until all of the Colorado 23 have been charged and released on bond.

------The L.A. police riot has turned into a peoples defense of their community. There has been rioting Saturday and Sunday nights with the latest total, 189 arrests.

-----1 death as of present. Times columnist Ruben Salazar, killed by bullet as police openly gas cafe to move people out.

-----Not yet confirmed, 7 month old baby ran over by police car. Many serious injuries, with no estimates on amount of people injured.

-----National Guard has moved in 2nd largest barrio in the world and have created a police state.

-----The rally parade was 4 miles long and very peaceful all the way.

-----This is the 3rd.Chicano Moratorium. The last two were peaceful. This could have been peaceful.

September 1, 1970

The Denver Crusade bus arrived from L.A. California this morning at 3:15 a.m. On the bus were 39 eyewitnesses to the police riot. Many of those on the bus had been arrested and charges dropped.

Rudolpho "Corky" Gonzales, Chairman of the Crusade for Justice, was released from jail this morning at 1:30 a.m. Trials are pending and the defense fund will be needed to defend these people.

COVER STORY

"It's Your Turn in the Sun"

Now 19 million, and growing fast, Hispanics are becoming a power

In Washington, D.C., leaders of 120 Spanish-speaking organizations call for a White House conference on Hispanic Americans. Among the demands they want aired: greater emphasis on bilingual education; bigger immigration quotas; more federal civil service jobs.

In Sacramento, California's Governor Jerry Brown drops in on a Mexican-American convention. "You're the leading minority in the Southwest," Brown tells the crowd. "It's your turn in the sun and I want to be part of it."

In Miami, Carlos Arboleya, president of the area's Barnett Banks (assets: $315 million), surveys the local Cuban-American community and confidently declares: "History will write Miami's future in Spanish and English."

That extraordinary vessel, the American melting pot, is bubbling once again. The source of ferment: American residents of Spanish origin, whose official numbers have increased by 14.3% in the past five years alone. Now the country's fastest growing minority, they are bidding to become an increasingly influential one.

Hispanic Americans are learning how to organize and how to win a hearing. Jimmy Carter has taken note of these stirrings; he proclaimed one week last month to be National Hispanic Heritage Week and sent tape-recorded greetings in his unpolished Spanish to Hispanic communities across the land. First Lady Rosalynn Carter underlined those *saludos* by appearing at a Washington fund raiser for Congress's five-member Hispanic Caucus.

The Hispanic presence has been a palpable one in U.S. life for centuries. But broad awareness of its scope and potential did not really dawn until the 1960s, with the unionizing struggles of Cesar Chavez's United Farm Workers and the spread of Hispanic populations. Today, migratory bands of Hispanics are picking apples in Washington and Oregon, helping with the harvest in the Midwest, tending vegetable and fruit crops in California's fertile valleys. Hispanics are also flooding virtually every important U.S. city in search of better jobs, creating latino enclaves from the crowded *barrios* of East Los Angeles and Spanish Harlem to the manicured suburbs of Dade County, Fla.

The Hispanics' very numbers guarantee that they will play an increasingly important role in shaping the nation's politics and policies. Just as black power was a reality of the 1960s, so the quest for latino power may well become a political watchword of the decade ahead. Predicts Raul Yzaguirre, director of the National Council of La Raza (The Race), an umbrella group of Hispanic-American organizations: "The 1980s will be the decade of the Hispanics."

Statistics back up Yzaguirre's contention. According to 1978 census estimates, there are 12 million Hispanic Americans in the U.S. Hispanic leaders, however,



claim that their constituency was seriously undercounted in the 1970 census and all subsequent projections. The spokesmen may have a point. Until 1960, census takers counted as Hispanic only people born in Spain, Mexico, Central and South America, the West Indies, Puerto Rico and Cuba, plus any U.S. residents with Spanish surnames. In the 1970 census, the definition was broadened to include the racial origin of respondents no matter the accident of birthplace, resulting in a dramatic increase in the numbers of Hispanics *(see chart)*. Census officials have promised to take special pains to get a more accurate count during the 1980 census, in effect acknowledging that their methods have been inadequate.

Even the most reliable census figures, however, fail to take into account the enormous numbers of Hispanics who are living and working in the U.S. illegally. At a conservative estimate, some 7.4 million "undocumented" Hispanic aliens raise the actual total to more than 19 million, and the Hispanic proportion of U.S. population to around 9%, *vs.* 12% for blacks. Because the rate of natural increase (births over deaths) among Hispanics is 1.8%, .6% higher than that for blacks, and because Hispanic immigration (legal and illegal) is running at the staggering rate of an estimated 1 million people a year, Hispanics may outnumber American blacks within the next decade. Already the two groups are competing fiercely for jobs and Government aid.

As blacks are united by race, Hispanic Americans are united by two powerful forces: their language and their strong adherence to Roman Catholicism. But many more factors divide them. They may be Castilian Spanish, or Caribbean island black, or Spanish-Indian mestizo. Among them are Cubans who fled to the U.S. with money and middle-class skills; impoverished Puerto Ricans or Mexican Americans looking for a job—any job; aristocratic Spaniards, whose families settled in the Southwest before the *Mayflower* hove into Plymouth Harbor.

Of the officially recognized Hispanics, the largest single group is the chicanos,* comprising some 7.2 million people of Mexican origin concentrated largely in the U.S. Southwest. An estimated 1.8 million Puerto Ricans live chiefly in the northern-central states, particularly the Northeast. Some 700,000 Cubans, mostly refugees from Fidel Castro's regime, are now in the U.S., mainly concentrated in Florida. But there are also Dominicans, Ecuadorians, Colombians and natives of other Latin American countries or of Spain itself scattered all over the U.S., totaling an additional 2.4 million Hispanics.

The groups may mix, but so far they have failed to blend. Upwardly mobile Floridian Cubans have felt little in common with lowly Mexican-American migrant citrus pickers. Even in impoverished New York ghettos, newly arrived Dominicans look down on native American Puerto Ricans who, some of the latecomers feel, have not exerted themselves to move up the economic ladder.

*The word is a colloquial, shortened form of *Mexicano*. It became fashionable among younger Mexican Americans during the '60s; some members of the older generation prefer not to use it.



Above: East Los Angeles children jumping rope near chicano mural; Puerto Rican festival in Manhattan's Central Park; Cubans playing dominoes in Key Biscayne. Below: Hispanic gallery. Top row, left to right: Fireman Anthony Romero, Los Angeles Dodger Manny Mota, Policeman Victor Solis, Doctor Helen Rodriguez, Construction Worker Raul Alboniga. Center: Utility Representative Vivian Cabrera, Correction Officer Hedda Gentile, New York Assistant Deputy Mayor Shirley Rodriguez Remeneski, N.Y. Supreme Court Justice John Carro. Bottom: Boxer José Fernandez, Social Worker Doris Feliciano, Banker Juan Villanueva, Secretary Isabel Alicea, Cameraman Juan Barrera. Foreground: Students Manuel Feliciano, Camila Arbelo.

Frank Soler, Cuban-born editor of Spanish-language edition of the Miami *Herald*

In Little Havana, a different flavor but also Grandes Macs.

goods to the Caribbean and Latin America, returning with clothing, fresh flowers and food. In Coral Gables alone, 80 international firms have opened offices. Exxon, Du Pont and General Electric have their Latin American headquarters there. International trade now accounts for $4 billion in state income and has created 167,000 jobs, some of which have been filled by other Latin American nationals who have been drawn to the booming area.

For the Cuban middle class, hatching deals over lunch at Little Havana's American Club or lounging on weekends at the Big Five Club, life in the U.S. is a dream that grew out of a nightmare. Says Frank Soler, 35, who fled to the U.S. at age 17 and is now editor of *El Miami Herald*, a Spanish-language edition of the Miami *Herald* with a daily circulation of 50,000: "Suddenly we lost everything and were confronted with potential poverty and hunger. Fear spurred us to work our tails off to regain what we once had." Result: 40% of the county's Hispanics earned more than $12,000 last year. Nearly two-thirds own their own homes.

Brief though their stay has been, the Cubans have already had considerable impact on the region's culture. They have a plethora of Spanish-language newspapers and a string of glossy magazines to choose among (including a Hispanic version of *Cosmopolitan*). The Cubans enjoy a Spanish-language television station and a multitude of nightclubs that have brought back Havana's brassy night life.

The youngsters of the Hispanic community make up one-third of Dade County's pupil population, and they score well above other Dade students on English and math achievement tests. They have ready access to bilingual education, and in 1976, 72% went on to college.

In 1973 Dade County declared itself to be a bilingual jurisdiction, and Spanish became the second official language for such things as election ballots, public signs and local directories. Despite this accommodating gesture, there is friction between Hispanics and non-Hispanics in Dade. Many English-speaking residents, particularly older ones, resent the pervasiveness of the new language. There are frequent complaints of Cuban clannishness (only 5% of Cubans intermarry) and of arrogance. Result: many anglos are gradually retreating from Miami.

Miami's black community, which makes up 16% of the local population, is particularly resentful. Garth Reeves, publisher of the black Miami *Times*, warns of black hostility because of competition with Hispanics for low-cost public housing and lower-level service jobs that formerly were a black preserve. Says Reeves: "Before the Cuban influx, blacks had most of the hotel jobs, now they have less than 2%." One reason for this decline is that many jobs now require both English and Spanish, and most blacks do not speak the latter.

The Cubans have their own complaints. They point out that only two Hispanics hold elective offices in Miami: Mayor Maurice Ferré, a Puerto Rican, and City Commissioner Manolo Reboso, a Cuban. Cubans have no representatives in the Florida legislature or in the U.S. Congress. Latins hold only 20% of the city government jobs in Miami and only 4.9% of the top bureaucratic posts. Much of the blame for that rests with the Cubans: only 47% of them are American citizens. Many still see themselves, apparently, as anti-Communist absentees from their island home.

But the old political emotions are fading. Says Alex Robles, a prosperous homebuilder who fled Cuba in 1960: "To move back would be just as big a dislocation as coming here. I wouldn't go through the pain." As Mario Vizcaino, director of the city's Cuban National Planning Council, puts it: "Ten years ago, to become an American citizen was almost an act of betrayal. Now there is a growing awareness of voting power, that the voting booth is the place to get things done." Coupled with that attitude is a developing feeling that perhaps the U.S. is, after all, the Promised Land—a feeling that 132 other Cubans were allowed to share recently, when the Castro regime, in a small bid to thaw chilly relations with the U.S., gave them permission to emigrate.

Whatever the reason, Cubans are now taking out U.S. citizenship at the rate of 1,000 a month. They are also registering to vote at the rate of 800 a month; at present about 100,000 of the 351,000 eligible latino voters are actually registered. As a result of this increasing political involvement, two latino city commissioners were elected in Hialeah last year, and a hefty slate of Hispanic candidates is being prepared for state elections. Says Florida state Democratic Chairman Alfredo Duran: "We've been viewed as outsiders with no interest in government. This is going to change."

LOS ANGELES

On weekends, downtown Los Angeles' Broadway is a teeming mass of Hispanic shoppers. Record-store loudspeakers blare Mexican hits: *Juro que Nunca Volveré* (I Swear I'll Never Return), *Mi Fracaso* (My Downfall). The Orpheum Theater, where Al Jolson once sang in blackface, screens Spanish-language dubbings of anglo hits. An archipelago of taco and burrito carts dots the street. Stores and merchandise stands tout their wares: *vestidos, tocadiscos, muebles* (clothing, phonographs, furniture). Farther east, on Whittier Boulevard, young Hispanics express themselves with a unique form of Saturday night fever known as "low riding"—cruising in ornately decorated autos equipped with hydraulic pumps that lower the chassis to within inches of the roadway so as to produce showers of sparks as the car bounces along the street.

The Spanish-speaking presence in sections of downtown Los Angeles is so pervasive that other Angelenos sometimes refer to the area, with an edge in their voices, as "Baja Hollywood." Yet a strong Hispanic flavor is hardly surprising in a city that was founded in 1781 as El Pueblo de Nuestra Señora la Reina de Los Angeles de Porciúncula. At a conservative estimate, some 1.6 million of the metropolitan area's 7 million residents are Hispanics, overwhelmingly of Mexican descent. That makes Los Angeles a magnet for the estimated 7 million legally resident Hispanics scattered across the southwestern U.S.

In 1970 Hispanics replaced blacks as the largest minority in Los Angeles. They are now overhauling whites, whose share of the city population has declined from 80.9% in 1950 to a projected 44.4% in 1980. Rapid demographic swings have brought racial edginess back to Los Angeles, where the Watts ghetto riots of 1965 are still remembered with fear. Says retired Los Angeles Police Captain Rudy

de Leon: "There is more outward prejudice now against Mexican people than there has ever been." Los Angeles *Times* Publisher Otis Chandler did not help when he noted in an interview that his paper did not court the city's black and Hispanic readership because "it's not their kind of newspaper. It's too big. It's too stuffy, if you will. It's too complicated."

Activists such as Vilma Martinez, president of the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF), argue that chicanos have "a long way to go before we can use our collective muscle as a middle class." But, even with some 19% of chicano families below the poverty line, Martinez concedes that a middle class is "clearly emerging."

In the militant chicano rhetoric of the '60s, middle-class Hispanics were often criticized as "Tio Tacos" or "Tio Tomases"—the equivalent of the blacks' "Uncle Toms." Today businessmen like Gilbert Vasquez, 39, head of the largest Hispanic certified public accounting firm in the U.S. (five offices, 65 employees), feel that individual successes will be "stepping-stones" to lasting change. Vasquez, who has moved out of the *barrio* to suburban Alhambra, remains involved in ghetto issues and tries to get other Hispanic professionals to take part in politics. At one chicano fund-raising cocktail party, guests anted up $20,000 for Jerry Brown's re-election campaign.

MICHAEL DRESSLER

Hispanic shoppers in downtown Los Angeles food market

In the wake of rapid demographic swings, racial edginess.

Brown has appointed 27 Mexican-American judges and named MALDEF's Martinez to the board of regents of the University of California (she replaced Mrs. William Randolph Hearst). A chicano, Mario Obledo, 46, is Brown's secretary of health and welfare, the highest ranking Mexican-American official in the state government. But while Hispanics make up 15.8% of California's population, they hold only 2% of the state's 20,000 elective posts, including only six seats of 120 in the California legislature. With less than 8% of the state's population, blacks boast eight seats. There are no chicanos on the Los Angeles city council or the Los Angeles County board of supervisors. The sole California Mexican-American representative in Congress is Los Angeles Democrat Roybal. (Roybal has admitted that he "probably" pocketed a $1,000 payment from South Korean Wheeler-Dealer Tongsun Park. The House ethics committee has officially censured Roybal for that involvement.)

Part of the problem has been chicano political passivity, which includes a hesitancy on the part of many longtime Mexican-American residents to become U.S. citizens, often because, no matter how permanent their ties to the U.S., those to Mexico are even stronger. State Assemblyman Art Torres' own mother could not vote for him in 1974 because she did not become naturalized until the next year. But now, says Ignacio Lozano, publisher of Los Angeles' Spanish-language daily *La Opinión*, there is "very clearly a political awakening." In 1976 members of Cesar Chavez's United Farm Workers registered an estimated 350,000 voters in the state, bringing total registration to 52% of eligible Hispanic voters. Los Angeles' United Neighborhood Organization (UNO) is mobilizing thousands of *barrio* citizens to improve their neighborhoods. Says Father Luis Olivares, an East Los Angeles priest and UNO organizer: "The people involved never did anything before because they thought that they couldn't change anything."

Like other Hispanic groups, chicanos strongly support the California law providing that students who speak little or no English should receive bilingual education if their parents want them to. Last year only half of the 120,000 students in Los Angeles schools who were eligible for that help were getting it. One reason: a mere 5.5% of the city's 30,000 public school teachers are Hispanic.

A 1978 nationwide survey showed that 23% of Mexican Americans had less than five years of schooling, compared with 3.6% for the rest of the population. The school dropout rate among chicanos is high (one informed estimate: 42%), and many of those who leave school enroll elsewhere—in youth gangs. An estimated 13,000 young Hispanics belong to such gangs in Los Angeles County alone. Last year there were 69 gang killings.

Hispanic leaders were upset by recent announcements of more stringent entrance requirements for the University of California. They also fear that the Supreme Court's decision in the Allan Bakke case will work against their admission to U.S. universities. Meanwhile, chicanos deeply resent the success of black colleges and universities in getting federal aid. Says Los Angeles School Board Member Julian Nava: "There are 120 black [U.S.] colleges and universities receiving multimillion-dollar subsidies from Congress, but there isn't a single, goddamned Mexican-American institution of higher education." Actually, there are five—all small, struggling colleges, and all receiving little or no federal aid. But the point is that Nava and other Mexican Americans resent the blacks' preponderance—and that resentment does not bode well for racial harmony on the West Coast.

NEW YORK

Most of the 1.3 million Puerto Ricans in the greater New York City area live in the grim, crumbling tenements of Manhattan's East Harlem and Lower East Side, or in Brooklyn's Williamsburg ghetto, or in the burned-out wasteland of the South Bronx. For them, life is mostly a grinding struggle for survival.

But then there are the festivals, especially Puerto Rican Day in June, when some 250,000 members of the community parade up Fifth Avenue and turn Central Park into a joyous 840-acre cookout. It is then that Puerto Rican exuberance blossoms. Hotels and nightclubs rock to the three-two rhythms of *salsa*. Hot dog vendors watch forlornly as their all-American offerings are spurned in favor of *bacalaitos* (codfish fritters), *alcapurrias* (plantain-meat rolls) and *tostones* (fried plantains). The community comes ablaze—forgetting for a while the gritty realities of its plight.

Puerto Ricans are the largest—and most beleaguered—national group among the estimated 2.6 million Hispanics in and near New York City.* They are, of course, not ordinary immigrants but U.S. citizens, as are all 3.3 million inhabitants of the Puerto Rican commonwealth. Despite that advantage, the Puerto Rican experience today is all too often one of blighted hopes. Says Carlos Garcia, 20, a school dropout and part-time carpenter on Manhattan's Lower East Side: "I expected a *West Side Story*, and never got it."

Puerto Ricans are even more hard pressed than New York's ghetto blacks; 48% earn less than $7,000 a year, compared with 42% among blacks. The proportion of Puerto Ricans on welfare is

*Among the others: 400,000 Dominicans, 220,000 Cubans, 200,000 Colombians, 170,000 Ecuadorians and 150,000 Peruvians. An estimated half of these are illegal residents.

34%, *vs.* 32% for blacks. Among Puerto Ricans over 16 years old, only 6% have completed any job training; the rate for blacks is twice as high. With 14% of New York City's population, Puerto Ricans hold only 3.1% of police department jobs and 1.3% of those in the fire department.

With Puerto Rican youngsters now making up 25% of the public school population, one of the community's highest priorities is education. But according to New York's deputy mayor for education, Herman Badillo, the city's efforts on behalf of Hispanic pupils are a "disaster in all areas." Says Badillo, a Puerto Rican: "We have plenty of jobs in the skyscrapers of midtown Manhattan; the problem is that kids can't spell."

We took it over and we burned it up."

That could be one result of the deep ambivalence that many Puerto Ricans feel about living in the U.S. Indeed, after two decades of steadily rising immigration, the trend in recent years has been in the opposite direction—back to Puerto Rico. On any night, airliners buzz over the Statue of Liberty filled with returning or visiting Puerto Ricans who can afford the $87 fare. At Christmas, there is a two-month waiting list for night-flight seats to San Juan. Successful Puerto Ricans often prefer to export their new affluence. Says John Torres, head of the Metropolitan Spanish Merchants Association in The Bronx: "We don't vote enough nor do we get involved in the political process. I know many, many people who have two dreams: to have a house in Puerto Rico and to educate their children."

JOHN BETANCOURT

Hispanic Sunday procession near St. Cecilia's Roman Catholic Church in New York City

After two decades of steadily rising immigration, a trend back to Puerto Rico.

After heavy prompting in the form of a judicial agreement signed in 1974, New York grudgingly began providing bilingual education for Spanish-speaking youngsters. By the New York City board of education's most recent estimate, there were only 2,333 Hispanics among the city's 48,813 teachers.

Meantime, Badillo estimates the Puerto Rican school-dropout rate at 85%. Discouraged youngsters are almost natural prospects for membership in the city's underclass, quickly contributing to the ghetto plagues of violent crime, drug use and arson. Says one Lower East Side youngster: "A lot of kids want an education to get out of here. But in order to survive, they're dealing [drugs]. Kids ten and eleven make more money than their old man in the factory." Says another: "I saw some pictures of this place 20 years ago, and it had benches and trees.

Ex-Congressman Badillo points out that only 13 years ago he was the sole Puerto Rican actively engaged in elective politics. Now the community can boast three New York City councilmen, four state representatives and two state senators. Badillo's fellow Hispanics lamented his decision to abandon Congress for his deputy mayor's job, but his successor in Washington, Robert Garcia, is applauded as a compassionate, hard-working advocate of Puerto Rican concerns. Still, activists like Dora Collazo-Levy, 42, a Democratic Party district leader, complain that political passivity is the Puerto Rican community's principal bane. Says she: "People ask us why they should vote. We give them long-range answers."

Where music and dancing and painting are concerned, though, New York City's Hispanics are anything but passive. *Salsa* Bandleader Eddie Palmieri, 41, has become a latino superstar who packs halls across the U.S. No fewer than 169 recognized bands regularly tour New York City's circuit of Latin clubs and dance halls. Cityarts, an artists' collective now funded by the New York State Council on the Arts, mobilizes painters to create ghetto murals. Last March *El Museo del Barrio*, a Puerto Rican cultural museum begun in 1969, opened new quarters on Manhattan's Fifth Avenue. Its first show, "Resurgiemento," included Artist Domingo Garcia, whose work is in the city's Museum of Modern Art collection. Miriam Colón, whose Puerto Rican Traveling Theater gives summertime performances in ghetto streets from the back of a flatbed truck, has opened the first Hispanic off-Broadway theater in a recycled West Side firehouse and will offer plays in both English and Spanish. On the Lower East Side, the New Rican Village cultural center lures actors and dancers and poets. So whatever else the New York experience has done to Puerto Ricans, it has not stifled the creative impulse.

THE "ILLEGALS"

The scene is played out in the San Jacinto Plaza of El Paso, Texas (pop. 381,500), in the dawn hours of most Mondays. Sedans cruise slowly around the square, their drivers eying clusters of young women. Every so often, one of the women is beckoned from the sidelines. Deals are struck and the cars pull away.

The object of this ritual is not prostitution and the women are not harlots. They are illegal immigrants (known euphemistically these days as "undocumented aliens") who have crossed the Rio Grande from neighboring Juárez, Mexico, looking for work as maids. Their usual rate: around $25 a week. Because of its proximity to Juárez, El Paso is the second largest crossing point for undocumented aliens in the U.S. The largest is Chula Vista, Calif., which shares part of its sewerage system with neighboring Tijuana. Aliens have been known to crawl through the common drainage pipes to reach the U.S.

Undocumented aliens are the most shadowy portion of the Hispanic community. By federal estimates, there are 8.2 million of them in the U.S. Other estimates range from as low as 3 million to as high as 12 million. As many as 90% of the total are Hispanics. A million more are suspected of joining them every year.

Whatever the exact numbers, there is little doubt that the tide of undocumented Hispanic aliens has reached flood stage. Many thousands have come from Central and South American countries like Guatemala, Colombia and Ecuador, but about 90% are Mexican. On foot, by air or in autos, they filter across the 2,000-mile-long southern U.S. border. Last year nearly 1 million illegal entrants were apprehended and deported by the Immigra-

Illegal Mexican immigrants being rounded up at U.S. border near Tijuana

INS's Leonel Castillo

tion and Naturalization Service. But, admits Los Angeles Police Officer Antonio Amador, "the only way we're going to stop them is to build a Berlin Wall."

Behind the mass influx are some stark economic figures: half of Mexico's 18 million-member labor force is unemployed; a devalued peso has sent prices there spiraling; the country's 3.5% population growth is one of the world's highest. Says Border Patrolman Michael S. Williams: "They're starving to death down there."

Typical of them is José B., 33, who as a tenant farmer in an isolated area of Mexico's Jalisco state could earn no more than $500 in a good year. Now he works in a metals factory near Los Angeles and brings home $160 a week, counting overtime pay. In six years he has saved $2,000. Says José: "I love Mexico. It is very beautiful, but you can't live there. Coming to the U.S. was a question of economics."

After crossing the border three times near Yuma, Ariz., and being apprehended each time, José paid a "coyote" (smuggler) $200 to ferry him across. After a year in Los Angeles, he paid another coyote $400 to smuggle in his wife and three of their six children. Eight months later he sent for the other three, at a cost of $250. Now the family—including two children born in the U.S.—occupies a sweltering one-bedroom *barrio* apartment, in which every available piece of furniture doubles as a bed. Even such cramped quarters are an improvement over what would be available in Mexico. Pointing at his twelve-year-old daughter, José says: "If we were in Mexico, she would be working in the fields by now."

Many of the undocumented aliens live in a shadowy netherworld, fearful that anyone could betray them to the INS. They are preyed upon by coyote racketeers who take their fee and then skip out on the smuggling assignment; by shyster notaries who have made fortunes providing them with worthless documents; and by employers who call the INS to round up the illegals just before payday.

On top of all that, they are deeply resented. Some labor unions have asked for tougher enforcement measures against them, arguing that they take jobs away from legal residents and undercut wage rates. In Texas, local school boards have refused to provide free public schooling to children who cannot prove permanent legal immigrant status for themselves or their parents. Even fellow Hispanics often turn undocumented workers over to the INS. Says José Ramiriz of the Chicano Training Center in Houston: "There are mixed feelings about the undocumented in the Mexican-American community. The feeling is that they're receiving services that should be going to [legal] Mexican Americans."

Some federal authorities argue differently. A 1975 Department of Labor study estimated that while 77% of illegal aliens had Social Security taxes withheld from their paychecks and 73% had federal income taxes deducted, less than 1% were on welfare and less than 8% had children in school. The study's conclusion: illegal aliens provide a net benefit to the U.S. economy.

They also fill many jobs that nobody else wants, even in a period of high unemployment. Farmers near Presidio, Texas, in the Rio Grande Valley, learned that lesson while cooperating with a local INS crackdown on undocumented laborers from the nearby Mexican town of Ojinaga. The growers took out newspaper advertisements requesting 4,000 domestic agricultural workers at the minimum farm wage of $2.20 an hour. They got 300 replies. Finally the growers were allowed by the INS to import the help they needed —from Ojinaga.

Concerned about the ever increasing numbers of illegals pouring into the U.S., Jimmy Carter has proposed an unorthodox solution: an amnesty for any undocumented alien who arrived in the U.S. before 1970 and could prove it. Those who arrived after that date would be granted five-year temporary residence status, and at the end of that time would be asked to leave. A number of Congressmen object to Carter's policy on the grounds that it is unworkable, or even undesirable, and have stalled it in the Senate Immigration Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee. The amnesty may never see daylight.

But the President has succeeded in making one notable change. In 1977 he appointed the first Hispanic commissioner in the history of the INS, Leonel Castillo, 39, a former Houston politician—and the grandson of an illegal immigrant. Castillo has unofficially endorsed the establishment of private counseling centers where illegal aliens can go for help without being turned over to immigration officers; recast the INS' four detention centers as "service processing centers"; and even, in El Paso, provided thousands of dollars worth of soccer equipment for detainees. All this has irked the hard-pressed, 4,000-member U.S. Border Patrol, which would rather see more money spent on helicopters, sensing equipment and manpower to stem the tide of illegals. In an El Paso Border Patrol office hangs a cartoon showing a group of bedraggled, serape-wrapped aliens who have crossed the Rio Grande. On it, someone has scrawled the caption: "Castillo's cousins."

■ ■ ■

Sooner rather than later, Congress is going to have to confront the problem of halting the flow of illegals. Meanwhile, there are millions of legal Hispanics in the U.S., and it no longer matters whether they or their ancestors arrived as wetbacks splashing across the ankle-deep Rio Grande or as political refugees in fishing boats from Cuba, or in the trunks of coyote cars or the staterooms of proud galleons. What does matter is that they—and their fellow Americans—now face another problem: writing a new chapter in the perpetually unfinished story of American pluralism. Both sides will undoubtedly have ample reason to recall that in U.S. politics, representation by ethnic population is not handed out gratis, but must be fought for and won. The same goes for many of the other advantages that Hispanics are likely to demand.

"No, we haven't arrived yet," says Graciela Olivarez, director of the federal Community Services Administration and the first woman graduate of the University of Notre Dame Law School. "But never before have we had so many Hispanic assistant secretaries [in the Federal Government], or people in every Government department. We don't have someone on the Supreme Court yet, or a Cabinet Secretary, but we'll have that to look forward to in the next go-round." Olivarez's confidence is just one more proof, if another were needed, that Hispanic Americans will be pressing for many more go-rounds in the years to come. ■

A profile of Hispanics in the U.S. work force

Considerable variation among the Hispanic ethnic groups—Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, and other—exists in virtually all employment-related characteristics; divergent age distributions have a strong effect on labor force participation

MORRIS J. NEWMAN

Hispanic Americans, whose impact on the culture and economy of the Nation continues to expand, are not a homogenous people. They are an amalgam of several, historically and culturally distinct ethnic groups linked together by the shared background of Spanish colonialism in the New World. It is therefore not surprising that those persons of Mexican, Cuban, Puerto Rican, or other Hispanic origin or descent who came to the United States for different reasons, at different times, and entered different parts of the country, also show different patterns of labor force behavior.

This article, based on data newly tabulated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, examines the labor force patterns of the 7.1 million working age persons of Hispanic origin or descent residing in the United States. It includes an analysis of recent Hispanic labor force developments with special focus on the labor force status of the major Hispanic ethnic groups—Mexican, Cuban, Puerto Rican, and others—in 1977, and provides information on migration developments as they have related to the labor force situation. [1] (See appendix.)

Morris J. Newman is an economist in the Office of Current Employment Analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Population characteristics

The more than 12 million persons of Hispanic origin or descent residing in the United States (excluding Puerto Rico) accounted for 5.6 percent of all persons in the United States in March 1978. With more than 7 million individuals, Mexican-Americans were by far the largest of the Hispanic ethnic groups. The balance of the Hispanic population comprised 1.3 million Puerto Ricans, 0.7 million Cubans, and about 2.4 million persons of other Hispanic origin or descent.[2]

The Hispanic population is growing very rapidly. In the 5-year period from March 1973 to March 1978, the Hispanic population grew by nearly 14 percent, while the non-Hispanic population increased by only 3.3 percent. This large population growth occurred within each Hispanic ethnic group except Cubans. In fact, the Cuban population declined by 6 percent over the period. The Mexican population, which increased by about 14 percent, was outpaced by Puerto Ricans and other Hispanics, who grew by 18 and 19 percent, respectively.[3]

Differential patterns of population growth are reflected in divergent age distributions. Hispanics (except Cubans) residing in the United States are quite a bit younger than non-Hispanic Americans. The median age—where 50 percent of the popula-

Reprinted from December 1978
Monthly Labor Review

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Bureau of Labor Statistics

tion is older and 50 percent younger—of Cubans was 37 years, of Puerto Ricans 20 years, of Mexicans 21 years, and of other Hispanics about 23 years, compared with a median age among non-Hispanics of 30 years.[4] These disparate age distributions and population growth patterns result primarily from migratory differences. Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, and other Hispanics have been migrating principally for economic reasons, and hence tend to be young. On the other hand, the Cuban migration of the 1960's was primarily political, with many older and well-established people who saw themselves as threatened by the new regime choosing to depart their homeland. Moreover, the Cuban government's refusal in the mid-1960's to allow men of military age (15–26) to leave the country and the end of the refugee airlift in 1973 further skewed the refugees' age structure upwards.[5] Subsequent sections of this article will show how these divergent age distributions have apparently had a large effect on the labor force situation of Hispanic Americans, both when compared intra-ethnically, and when viewed against the labor force situation that existed among the overall population.

Labor force participation

The labor force participation rate measures the work force attachment of a population. It is the percent of those persons age 16 and over who are either employed or actively seeking employment. Although the participation rate of Hispanics 16 years and over in 1977 was only slightly lower than the corresponding rate among the total population (table 1), the overall rate conceals important demographic differentials and thus is too broad to adequately portray Hispanic labor force participation. A disaggregation of labor force participation rates by age, sex, and subsequently ethnicity, provides more revealing participation rate comparisons. Through this process, it was found that the different age distributions have impacted strongly on Hispanic/non-Hispanic adult participation rates. It was also found, however, that even after controlling for age differences there are important ethnic differences in participation, primarily among women and teenagers.

Among adult Hispanic women (20 years and over), the labor force participation rate was 45.0 percent, compared with a rate of 48.1 percent for all adult women. However, the apparent similarity in this measure is somewhat misleading. For most specific age groups, Hispanic women have labor force participation rates about 10 percentage points lower than all adult women.

	Labor force participation rates		*Age groups as a percent of adult population*	
Age group	*All women*	*Hispanic women*	*All women*	*Hispanic women*
20 and over	48.1	45.0	100.0	100.0
20–24	66.5	53.6	13.3	17.4
25–34	59.5	50.1	22.3	29.2
35–44	59.6	51.5	16.2	20.6
45–54	55.8	45.3	16.2	15.8
55–64	41.0	31.0	14.4	9.1
65 and over	8.1	5.1	17.6	7.9

This statistical anomaly is caused by the differing age distributions of adult Hispanic and non-Hispanic women. Because Hispanic women are considerably younger than their non-Hispanic counterparts, and young adult women are more likely to be participants than older women, the disproportionate representation of young Hispanic women in their adult population (20 years and over) tends to push up the rate for the entire group.

Among adult men, a similar pattern is observed. Adult Hispanic men had a *higher* labor force participation rate in 1977 (84.8 percent) than did men overall (79.7 percent), but this too is illusory, caused by the disparate age distribution. Hispanic men are, on average, younger than non-Hispanic men, and because young adult men tend to have higher participation than older men, this has the effect of boosting the overall participation rate for adult Hispanic men to a higher level than the age-specific rates would imply. The participation rates for each age group show clearly that adult Hispanic men are slightly less likely to be labor force participants than are men overall:

	Labor force participation rates		*Age group as a percent of adult population*	
Age group	*All men*	*Hispanic men*	*All men*	*Hispanic men*
20 and over	79.7	84.8	100.0	100.0
20–24	85.7	86.3	14.0	18.5
25–34	95.4	93.9	23.7	28.9
35–44	95.7	94.7	16.9	20.4
45–54	91.2	89.6	17.0	15.8
55–64	74.0	72.7	14.5	9.3
65 and over	20.1	20.7	14.0	7.1

Ethnicity. There were differences in labor force participation in 1977 among the Hispanic ethnic groups, mainly reflected by the lower rates of working-age Puerto Ricans as compared with other Hispanics. Mexicans, Cubans, and other non-Puerto Rican Hispanics each had rates of about 64 percent in 1977, virtually the same as

among the overall working-age U.S. population. During the same year, however, less than half of the working-age Puerto Rican population were labor force participants. (See table 1.)

When work force participation is analyzed separately by age-sex group, we find that adult Puerto Rican men were almost as likely to participate in the labor force as men of Cuban and Mexican origin. However, adult Puerto Rican women and Puerto Rican teenagers were much less likely to be in the labor force than were their other Hispanic counterparts. On average, only 30 percent of the Puerto Rican teenagers or women were participating in the labor force at any given time, while 50 percent of other Hispanics were participating, about the same frequency as for teenage or adult women workers overall. (See table 1.)

Trend developments. Labor force participation rates are useful barometers for measuring the impact of changing socioeconomic factors on labor force behavior. Therefore, a comparison of trends in participation among Hispanics and the overall population may provide insight into how current rates of labor force attachment evolved. Analysis of the data suggests that the low levels of Puerto Rican participation prevailing in 1977 are a reflection of a long-term decline in their work force attachment.[6]

One of the major socioeconomic occurrences of the mid-20th century has been the growth in the proportion of women who work outside the home. This rise in labor force participation among American women is rooted in many factors. Among these are increases in educational attainment and declines in fertility—both giving many women the opportunity to compete in the labor market that is increasingly acceptant of working women.[7]

The number of adult Hispanic women in the labor force grew by nearly one-third from 1973 to 1977, far outpacing the increase for all women. This surge in the number of Hispanic women in the labor force resulted mainly from an increase in their working-age population (due primarily to the ongoing migration), rather than a rise in the propensity to be in the labor force. (See chart 1.) Still, the participation rate of Hispanic women did increase from 1973 to 1977, with the increase roughly as large as that for all women. The March data show that rates for Puerto Rican women declined in the mid-1970's, in contrast to the pattern among other Hispanics and among all women.[8] (See chart 2.) Decennial census data for 1960 and 1970 demonstrate further that these declines were not confined to the mid-1970's but were instead part of a longer term decline in participation among Puerto Rican women.

The low rate of participation among Puerto Rican women is not adequately explained by divergences in education or fertility. Puerto Rican women have levels of educational attainment similar to Mexicans, and Mexican women had more children in their families than Puerto Ricans or other Hispanic women in 1977.[9] Rather, the low participation rate may be a carry-over from experiences in Puerto Rico, where from 1960 to 1976 on an annual average basis, the participation rate of women age 14 and over never exceeded 27 percent.[10] Low rates of female labor force participation are characteristic of Latin nations, both in Europe and the Americas. However, this effect has not occurred among Mexican women, who despite tracing their origin to a country with low female labor force participation, had a rate of 47 percent in the United States.

Table 1. Employment status of Hispanic workers 16 years and over by sex and age, 1977 annual averages

(Numbers in thousands)

Employment status, sex, and age	Total all workers	Total Hispanic origin	Mexican origin	Puerto Rican origin	Cuban origin	Other Hispanic origin
Total						
Civilian noninstitutional population	158,426	7,122	4,060	1,034	557	1,471
Civilian labor force	97,401	4,379	2,597	503	257	922
Percent of civilian population	62.1	61.5	64.0	48.6	54.1	62.7
Employment	90,546	3,933	2,325	434	225	844
Employment-population ratio[1]	57.9	55.3	57.5	42.0	58.3	57.4
Percent employed part time	18.3	15.6	16.3	10.6	11.7	18.2
Unemployment	6,855	441	262	69	31	79
Unemployment rate	7.0	10.1	10.1	13.6	8.8	8.6
Median duration, in weeks	7.0	8.2	8.1	10.0	8.0	(2)
Men, 20 years and over						
Civilian noninstitutional population	65,796	2,578	1,591	378	228	583
Civilian labor force	52,464	2,439	1,461	308	189	481
Percent of civilian population	79.7	94.6	98.4	81.9	83.6	82.5
Employment	49,737	2,252	1,356	271	177	448
Employment-population ratio[1]	75.6	78.3	90.2	72.1	78.3	76.8
Percent employed part time	7.7	7.7	8.1	8.2	8.1	8.4
Unemployment	2,727	187	105	37	12	33
Unemployment rate	5.2	7.7	7.2	12.0	6.6	6.9
Median duration, in weeks	9.4	8.8	7.3	16.4	9.6	(2)
Women, 20 years and over						
Civilian noninstitutional population	74,150	3,248	1,772	502	281	693
Civilian labor force	35,585	1,460	928	148	143	343
Percent of civilian population	48.1	45.0	48.6	27.5	50.9	49.5
Employment	33,199	1,315	708	130	129	318
Employment-population ratio[1]	44.8	40.5	41.5	25.9	45.9	45.9
Percent employed part time	25.8	20.3	22.1	12.3	15.5	21.4
Unemployment	2,486	145	89	18	13	25
Unemployment rate	7.0	9.9	10.7	11.9	9.3	7.3
Median duration, in weeks	5.9	5.6	5.0	5.3	5.2	(2)
Both sexes, 16–19 years						
Civilian noninstitution population	16,470	998	597	156	50	196
Civilian labor force	9,252	481	309	47	25	100
Percent of civilian population	56.2	48.2	51.8	30.3	50.0	51.0
Employment	7,510	371	241	33	19	78
Employment-population ratio[1]	46.2	37.2	40.4	21.3	38.0	39.8
Percent employed part time	54.9	46.4	44.2	(2)	(2)	53.2
Unemployment	1,542	110	68	14	6	22
Unemployment rate	17.7	22.8	22.1	29.7	(2)	22.0
Median duration, in weeks	4.7	4.3	4.0	5.1	7.7	(2)

[1] Civilian employment as a percent of the civilian noninstitutional population.
[2] Not available.
Percent not shown where base is less than 35,000.

Chart 1. Population and labor force growth for all persons and persons of Hispanic origin, by sex, 1973-77 annual average



The declining participation rates of Puerto Rican women that have occurred in recent years probably are related to the deterioration in the New York City economy in the 1970's, where, in 1977, one-half of all working-age mainland Puerto Ricans resided. From 1969 to 1977, overall employment in New York City declined by 12.6 percent, while the working-age population declined by only 1.8 percent. Three-fourths of the employment decline occurred in clerical and operatives jobs. In 1977, nearly two-thirds of employed Puerto Rican women were in these two occupational groups. (See section on Occupations.) During the period when employment in New York City was declining (1969–77), employment in the entire United States increased by 16.2 percent.[11]

In contrast to the pattern of increasing female labor force participation, the rates for men in the overall U.S. population have been consistently declining. Most of these declines have occurred among older men, as early retirement becomes more attractive through the spread of social insurance programs. Increased female labor force participation is also allowing many men of all ages to reconsider the traditional obligation to work outside of the home.[12]

Although the participation rate of all adult Hispanic men declined from 1973 to 1977 on an annual average basis, Current Population Survey data for March of these years show that the largest decline occurred among Puerto Ricans.

It is not plausible that the participation rate of Puerto Rican, Mexican, and other Hispanic men, who are relatively young, decreased because of early retirement. Also, because Puerto Rican women have not increased their participation, Puerto Rican men cannot be assumed to be leaving the labor force because their wives are working. An important factor probably is their concentration in declining occupations in New York City. The pattern of only slight participation declines among Mexican men may be related to the likelihood that many of the older men worked at farm jobs or in other employment that would have been excluded from coverage under the various social insurance programs, such that they may be unable to afford early retirement. Among Cuban men, however, it is likely that the effects of early retirement and working wives resulted in the lowered participation rates. (See Chart 2.)

As with the overall population, teenage Hispanics generally have increased their participation in the labor force in the 1970's. Only Puerto Rican teenagers, however, have shown little change in this regard.

Unemployment differences

Hispanics account for a disproportionate share of the Nation's unemployment. Their jobless rate was 10.1 percent in 1977, continuing the long observed pattern of being substantially higher than that for all white workers (6.2 percent) but lower than the rate for black workers (13.1 percent). However, while each Hispanic ethnic group had a 1977 rate that exceeded the average rate for the Nation as a whole, the incidence of unemployment was not shared equally across the spectrum of Hispanic ethnicity. Puerto Rican workers had the highest rate of unemployment among the Hispanic ethnic groups in 1977, 13.6 percent, compared with 10.1 percent for workers of Mexican origin, 8.8 percent for those of Cuban origin, and 8.6 percent for persons of other Hispanic origin. The higher overall rate of unemployment for Puerto Rican workers, and lower rates for workers of Cuban and other origin, generally held true for most major age and sex categories as well.

As shown in table 2, two-thirds of the Cuban labor force in 1977 were 35 years and over, while less than half of the workers in each of the other ethnic groups were in that age group. Workers 35 and over generally have lower jobless rates than younger workers, because they are more likely to have marketable skills and work experience. The concentration of Cuban workers in the upper age groups has therefore tended to limit their overall jobless rate (at least among men) vis-a-vis the other Hispanic groups.

Variations in jobless rates also stem from differences in educational attainment. Generally, those with lower levels of formal education have more difficulty finding employment than do more highly educated individuals.[13]

Recent data show that Mexicans and Puerto Ricans have lower levels of educational attainment than do Cubans and other Hispanics. This finding is not surprising, considering the history of Hispanic migration to the United States. Many of the Mexican and Puerto Rican migrants had very little formal education. They came to the United States unable to speak English and willing to accept low-paying jobs which required little or no education. By contrast, many of the Cubans residing in the United States are middle and upper-middle class refugees who had been successful in an economy similar to that in the United States, where relatively high educational attainment is often a prerequisite for economic success.[14] (The variations in migration patterns among Hispanics are discussed in more detail in a later section.)

Chart 2. Percentage point change in the labor force participation rate for all persons and persons of Hispanic origin, by sex, March 1973-77



Table 2. Percent distribution of the civilian labor force and unemployment rates by sex, age, and Hispanic origin, 1977 annual averages

(Numbers in thousands)

Sex and age	Percent distribution of the civilian labor force				Unemployment rate			
	Mexican origin	Puerto Rican origin	Cuban origin	Other Hispanic origin	Mexican origin	Puerto Rican origin	Cuban origin	Other Hispanic origin
Total, 16 years and over	2,597	503	257	922	10.1	12.8	8.8	8.6
In percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	---	---	---	---
16 to 24 years	31.5	28.0	16.5	25.7	15.4	23.7	16.9	15.2
25 to 34 years	29.7	31.0	16.6	28.1	9.0	12.5	5.1	7.1
35 years and over	38.9	42.9	67.0	45.3	6.6	8.3	7.9	6.2
Men, 16 years and over	1,540	225	205	540	8.5	10.7	7.6	8.0
In percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	---	---	---	---
16 to 24 years	30.1	24.5	15.6	24.1	12.6	15.6	17.6	14.6
25 to 34 years	29.5	30.1	16.1	30.1	7.9	13.9	6.3	6.2
35 years and over	40.4	45.4	67.3	46.0	5.6	7.2	5.1	5.2
Women, 16 years and over	956	157	151	386	12.9	13.4	10.4	9.4
In percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	---	---	---	---
16 to 24 years	33.9	33.3	16.6	27.3	18.2	20.4	12.0	16.2
25 to 34 years	29.8	32.9	17.2	25.1	10.9	9.8	4.3	5.3
35 years and over	36.3	37.7	66.2	44.8	9.5	11.1	12.0	5.4

Duration of unemployment. The impact of unemployment on workers is very difficult to measure. This is because the degree of economic deprivation is dependent on the personal situation of each unemployed individual and his or her family, a difficult condition to quantify. However, some general indication of the severity of unemployment on individuals can be obtained through measurement of the duration of unemployment (the length of a current spell of unemployment).

The new data series point up dramatic differences in median duration of unemployment among the Hispanic ethnic groups. (The median week is that week at which 50 percent of the unemployed are jobless for fewer, and 50 percent for more weeks.) Unemployed Mexican workers had the shortest duration of unemployment, averaging 5.1 weeks in 1977, shorter even than for all unemployed workers. The relatively short duration for Mexican workers, combined with their high unemployment rate, points to the fact that Mexican-Americans are prone to frequent but relatively shorter spells of unemployment than other Hispanics. (See table 1.)

Adult male Puerto Ricans suffer extraordinarily long bouts of unemployment. At 16.4 weeks, the 1977 annual average median duration of unemployment of adult Puerto Rican men was substantially longer than for Cuban men (9.6) and more than twice the duration of unemployed Mexican men (7.3). Among men overall, the median duration was 9.4 weeks.

It is possible that the youthfulness of the Mexican population has resulted in the short duration of unemployment, because duration tends to lengthen with age. This does not, however, explain the relatively long median durations of unemployment of Puerto Ricans, who are no older than Mexicans. The Puerto Rican-Mexican unemployment duration differences may be related in part to the residential distribution of the populations. New York and New Jersey, where most Puerto Ricans live, have relatively liberal unemployment insurance laws and longer duration among all unemployed persons, while the Southwestern states, where Mexican-Americans are concentrated, do not. Such laws tend to lower the covered individuals cost of unemployment in the less restrictive States vis-a-vis States with lower benefits and tougher eligibility standards.

Reason for unemployment. Cuban workers were far less likely to have been unemployed due to entering the labor force than were other unemployed Hispanics in 1977, with the strongest divergence occurring among new entrants (never worked at a full-time job for 2 weeks or more). The low number of unemployed Cuban entrants derives from their age structure: unemployed entrants, and especially new entrants, tend to be young. The comparatively high unemployment among Puerto Rican workers shows up among both job losers and labor force entrants. Unemployment rates, by reason for unemployment, for persons of Hispanic origin, are shown in the following tabulation (1977 annual averages):

	Total Hispanic	*Mexican*	*Cuban*	*Puerto Rican*	*Other*
Total	10.1	10.1	8.8	13.7	8.6
Job losers	5.1	4.9	5.3	7.4	4.1
On layoff	1.0	.8	1.1	1.8	1.1
Other	4.0	4.1	4.2	5.6	3.0
Job leavers	1.2	1.2	1.4	1.2	1.2
Job entrants	3.8	4.0	2.0	5.2	3.5
Re-entrants	2.4	2.4	1.4	3.4	2.1
New entrants	1.5	1.5	.6	1.8	1.4

Employment patterns, 1977

There were 3.9 million employed Hispanic Americans in 1977, comprising 4.3 percent of all employed Americans. With 55 percent of their working-age population employed, Hispanics were about as likely to be employed as workers overall, although there were sizable intra-ethnic and age-sex differences in this regard.

Puerto Rican teenagers, due to their high rate of unemployment and extremely low rate of labor force participation, were only half as likely to be employed as were all other Hispanic youngsters. Thus, only 21 percent of the Puerto Rican teens were, on average, working at any given time in 1977, versus percentages of 38 and 40 among Cuban and Mexican teens, respectively. For all teenagers in the U.S. population, some 46 percent were, on average, working in 1977. The low proportion of employed Puerto Rican teenagers could again be a reflection of the New York City economy, where only 22 percent of *all* teenagers were working in 1977.

Adult Puerto Rican women also were far less likely to have been employed than their non-Puerto Rican Hispanic counterparts. On average, only 26 percent of adult Puerto Rican women were employed in 1977, compared to 42 and 46 percent among Mexican and Cuban women, respectively. Mexican and "other" women were considerably more likely to be employed part time than either Puerto Rican or Cuban women.

Among adult men, there was much less divergence between the ethnic groups in the percentage of the population that was employed. Even so, Puerto Rican men were still less likely to be employed than other Hispanic men. Mexican men, who had the highest rate of employment among Hispanics, and "other" Hispanic men were somewhat more likely to be working part time than Cuban or Puerto Rican men in 1977. (See table 1.)

Occupations. Regardless of ethnicity, employed Hispanics in 1977 were more concentrated in lower paid, lesser skilled occupations than the overall work force. More than half of the employed women in each ethnic group were either clerical workers or nontransport operatives in 1977, two of the lowest paid occupations.[15] Although the large percentage of Hispanic women employed in clerical positions is similar to the situation among women overall, their heavy concentration in operatives jobs—dressmakers, assemblers, machine operators, and similar employment—is striking. One-third of the employed Cuban and Puerto Rican women worked at these jobs in 1977, compared with about one-fifth of employed Mexican women and only about one-ninth of all employed women.

Among Hispanic men, Mexicans and Puerto Ricans were less than half as likely as either Cubans or other Hispanic men to be employed in professional, technical jobs, or as managers and administrators—the two highest paid fields. To some extent, the youthfulness and low educational attainment of the Mexican and Puerto Rican work force could explain their low representation in these occupations. The largest concentration of Puerto Rican men was in the operatives except transport group, with 23 percent of the employed in these jobs. Large numbers of Puerto Rican men were also employed as service workers and craftworkers. Among Mexican and Cuban men, craft jobs were most prevalent, with service and operatives jobs also employing large numbers of individuals. (See table 3.)

Occupational developments, 1973–77. Despite the fact that Hispanics are underrepresented in the more skilled, higher paying occupations, there was some slight upgrading in the overall Hispanic occupational mix between 1973 and 1977. However, the occupational changes were about in line with those for all employed persons, such that no substantial changes in relative status occurred. Employed Hispanic men were somewhat more likely to be working at professional or technical jobs or as craftworkers in 1977 than in 1973. In fact, by 1977, Hispanic origin men were about as likely to be employed in the craft occupations as were men overall, but they remained severely underrepresented in the Nation's professional and technical ranks. The largest occupational declines among Hispanic men occurred in the relatively low paid nontransport operatives job categories and among farmworkers.

Among Hispanic women, the largest occupational declines also occurred in nontransport operatives jobs. The greatest increase took place in clerical employment, with lesser gains in service work and professional and technical jobs.

These movements in the Hispanic occupational mix are a reflection of overall changes in the American labor market, as lower skilled blue-collar employment opportunities decline because of increasing use of automated techniques, and white-collar office jobs increase. Therefore, although there was some shifting in the Hispanic occupational mix in the 1973–77 period, Hispanics have improved their occupational distribution only marginally relative to the overall work force. (See table 4.)

Socioeconomic status and immigration patterns

Not only are there major differences in the employment situation of Hispanics as compared to the rest of the population, but also we find there is considerable variation among the Hispanic ethnic groups in virtually all employment-related characteristics. A better understanding of the Hispanic work force can be reached through a look at the background factors which have affected each group's labor force status. It is true that there are certain cross-ethnic cultural traits, most notably the use of Spanish as native tongue, that may have caused similar difficulties in labor force adjustment among each of the Hispanic ethnic groups. However, the unique histories of the people who have come here from Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Mexico have no doubt strongly contributed to the ethnic divergences in labor force behavior. A brief look at some social characteristics and historical immigration patterns is presented below.

Puerto Rican origin or descent. As shown earlier, Puerto Ricans had an employment situation in 1977 that was considerably worse than that of any of the other Hispanic ethnic groups. Puerto Rican workers suffered from higher rates of unemployment, and the adult men had much longer durations of unemployment than Cubans or Mexicans. Puerto Ricans also had lower labor force participation, regardless of age or sex, than other Hispanics. Further, of those who were employed, a larger proportion of Puerto Ricans worked in low-paying occupations. Some 62 percent of the working Puerto Ricans had jobs as service, farm, or clerical workers, or as operatives, except transport, in 1977, the four lowest paid occupational groups.[16]

Puerto Ricans joined the mainland economy in much the same way as previous immigrant groups, by entering major cities, especially New York, and taking primarily unskilled or semiskilled jobs. But today, many of those jobs are being performed by machines that are quicker and less costly than human labor, and many Puerto Ricans often lack the requirements that are necessary to obtain the more skilled jobs. The difficulties of this situation are further compounded by the movement of the remaining factory jobs to areas outside of the old industrial base in the Northeast where most Puerto Ricans live.

The result of the especially poor employment situation among mainland Puerto Ricans is extremely low income. The latest Census Bureau data available show that in 1977 the median annual income of Puerto Rican families was $7,972; of Mexican origin families, nearly $12,000; of Cubans, in excess of $14,000; and for all U.S. families, $16,009. It was $9,563 for all black families. Some 39 percent of all Puerto Rican families lived below the poverty threshold, compared with 28 percent for blacks, 19 percent of the Mexican families, and 9 percent of U.S. families overall.[17]

The migration of Puerto Ricans to the mainland is primarily a post-World War II phenomenon. The largest migration occurred during the 1950's, when nearly 20 percent of the island's population immigrated. By that time, air travel between San Juan and New York had become economical and fast, and many Puerto Ricans who had acquired a

Table 3. Percent distribution of employed persons of Hispanic origin by occupation and sex, 1977 annual averages

Origin and sex	Total employed		White-collar workers				Blue-collar workers				Service workers	Farm workers
	Number (in thousands)	Percent	Professional and technical	Managers and administrators, except farm	Salesworkers	Clerical workers	Craft and kindred workers	Operatives except transport	Transport equipment operatives	Nonfarm laborers		
Total, 16 years and over	90,546	100.0	15.1	10.7	6.3	17.8	13.1	11.4	3.8	5.0	13.7	3.0
Total Hispanic origin	2,938	100.0	7.4	5.6	3.7	15.0	12.7	20.9	4.1	7.9	17.1	4.4
Mexican origin	2,235	100.0	5.6	4.9	3.0	13.7	15.0	20.4	4.6	9.3	16.5	6.9
Puerto Rican origin	434	100.0	7.4	4.1	4.6	15.9	11.5	25.0	3.9	5.7	18.4	1.6
Cuban origin	225	100.0	11.7	7.7	6.2	16.9	11.7	21.5	3.4	5.2	15.1	.6
Other Hispanic origin	844	100.0	10.9	7.6	4.4	17.3	12.0	19.5	3.2	5.7	18.7	.5
Men, 16 years and over	53,861	100.0	14.6	13.9	6.0	6.3	20.9	11.6	6.0	7.5	8.8	4.2
Total Hispanic origin	2,475	100.0	7.3	7.1	3.2	5.1	22.6	18.7	6.3	11.9	10.3	5.5
Mexican origin	1,501	100.0	4.9	5.3	2.3	4.4	22.1	19.6	6.9	13.7	11.5	8.3
Puerto Rican origin	289	100.0	5.9	4.5	4.5	7.5	16.6	23.2	5.5	9.3	19.7	2.1
Cuban origin	189	100.0	12.7	12.7	5.3	7.9	18.5	13.8	5.3	7.9	14.3	1.1
Other Hispanic origin	496	100.0	12.5	10.5	4.0	6.3	19.4	15.5	5.4	3.0	14.5	.5
Women, 16 years and over	36,685	100.0	15.9	5.9	6.8	34.7	1.6	11.2	.6	1.2	20.1	1.3
Total Hispanic origin	1,463	100.0	7.7	3.1	4.7	30.0	1.9	24.7	.4	1.3	23.6	2.6
Mexican origin	934	100.0	6.7	3.4	4.3	29.7	2.2	21.9	.5	1.4	25.7	4.3
Puerto Rican origin	145	100.0	7.5	2.8	5.5	32.4	1.4	31.7	---	1.4	15.6	.7
Cuban origin	136	100.0	9.6	1.5	5.9	39.4	2.2	23.1	.7	.7	16.2	.7
Other Hispanic origin	348	100.0	9.5	3.4	4.9	29.9	1.4	25.0	.3	1.5	24.4	---

knowledge of life on the mainland during World War II and the Korean War came to fill the labor demands of booming mainland factories.

In the 1960's, Puerto Rico began to industrialize, absorbing many of the unemployed rural workers who otherwise might have migrated to the United States. Still, the average annual net island-to-mainland migration was about 20,000 persons per year, so that by 1970 some 34 percent of all Puerto Ricans (in the United States and the island) were residing on the mainland.[18] The 1970's, however, have witnessed a continual net return migration, no doubt strongly encouraged by the 1973–75 recession on the mainland. Despite the recession, unemployment in the island Commonwealth has consistently been much higher than on the continent: the unemployment rate was almost 20 percent in 1977, far higher than the prevailing rate among mainland Puerto Ricans.[19] (See table 5.)

The hypothesis that Puerto Ricans who migrate back to the island from the mainland have a superior occupational mix because of their mainland experience (enabling them to work with English-speaking tourists, for example) is refuted in a 1973 report prepared for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Planning Board by Steven Zeil.

Table 4. Percent distribution of employed persons of Hispanic origin, 16 years and over, by occupation and sex, 1973 and 1977 annual averages

Occupation	1973			1977		
	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
TOTAL						
Total employed (in thousands)	84,409	51,963	32,446	90,546	53,861	36,686
In percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
White-collar workers	47.8	39.9	60.6	49.9	40.8	63.1
Professional and technical	14.0	12.5	14.5	15.1	14.6	15.9
Managers and administrators, except farm	10.2	12.6	4.9	10.7	12.9	5.9
Salesworkers	6.4	6.1	6.9	6.3	6.0	6.8
Clerical workers	17.2	8.6	34.3	17.8	8.3	34.7
Blue-collar workers	32.2	50.0	39.3	30.0	50.1	26.8
Craft and kindred workers	13.4	20.8	1.4	13.1	20.9	1.5
Operatives, except transport	13.0	12.8	10.3	11.4	11.6	11.2
Transport equipment operatives	2.9	6.0	.5	2.8	6.0	.5
Nonfarm laborers	5.1	7.7	.9	5.0	7.6	1.2
Service workers	13.2	7.9	21.6	13.7	8.8	20.9
Farmworkers	2.8	4.8	1.6	3.0	4.2	1.3
HISPANIC ORIGIN						
Total employed (in thousands)	3,333	2,158	1,175	3,953	2,481	1,472
In percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
White-collar workers	35.9	22.9	39.8	31.7	23.7	45.5
Professional and technical	6.5	6.3	6.9	7.4	7.3	7.7
Managers and administrators, except farm	5.5	7.1	2.6	5.8	7.1	3.1
Salesworkers	3.7	3.2	4.4	3.7	3.2	4.7
Clerical workers	19.2	6.3	25.9	15.0	6.1	30.0
Blue-collar workers	71.1	77.2	60.4	68.1	76.3	54.5
Craft and kindred workers	13.0	19.0	1.9	13.7	20.6	1.9
Operatives, except transport	24.3	20.1	32.2	20.9	18.7	24.7
Transport equipment operatives	4.6	6.9	.2	4.1	6.3	.4
Nonfarm laborers	8.0	11.7	1.0	7.3	11.9	1.3
Service workers	15.8	12.2	22.4	17.1	13.3	23.6
Farmworkers	5.5	7.3	2.7	4.4	5.5	2.5

NOTE: Data for 1973 and 1977 for persons of Hispanic origin are not strictly comparable because the 1977 estimates incorporate the expanded sample and revised estimation procedures introduced in the national sample in January 1978. For further explanation, see "Revisions in the Current Population Survey in January 1978," *Employment and Earnings*, February 1978.

Table 5. Unemployment rate, selected years, 1960–77

Year	U. S. total, all workers[1]	Puerto Ricans in the United States[2]	Puerto Rico[3]
1960	5.5	[4]10.3	12.1
1965	4.5	(5)	11.5
1970	4.9	[4]6.9	7.3
1975	8.5	(5)	18.2
1977	7.0	[4]13.6	19.9

[1]Persons 16 years or over. Data are from the Current Population Survey.
[2]Persons 14 years or over. Data are from the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
[3]Persons 14 years or over. Data are from the Decennial Census, 1960.
[4]Not available.
[5]Persons 16 years or over. Data are from the Decennial Census, 1970.

This study found the occupational distribution of nonmigrants and return-migrants to be quite similar. Zeil also found that, "Taken overall, return-migrants show an unemployment rate double that of nonmigrants, yet no differences between return-migrants and nonmigrants in sex, age, education, or participation explain this discrepancy." Although it was also found that unemployment rates among return-migrants decreased dramatically with length of time since return, it appears that migration to the mainland and then back to Puerto Rico has had no positive impact on the return migrants' employment prospects.[20]

Mexican origin or descent. Accounting for nearly 60 percent of the Hispanic working age population, persons of Mexican ancestry comprise by far the largest Hispanic-ethnic group. While Mexican-Americans had a high unemployment rate in 1977, 10.1 percent, the impact was tempered somewhat by short durations of joblessness. Although it is not known whether those who left unemployment status found jobs or stopped looking for work and left the labor force, the high Mexican participation rates imply that they found jobs.

Farmwork is often thought of as one of the main occupations of Mexicans in this country, but only 7 percent of the employed Mexicans were farmworkers in 1977. This proportion with farm employment is high, however, compared with less than 1 percent for non-Mexican Hispanics and 3 percent for all U.S. workers. Moreover, the number of employed Mexican farmworkers could be significantly understated. It is not known to what extent undocumented workers, many of whom work in the fields, are not accounted for in population surveys. Not only might they refuse to be interviewed because of deportation fears, but the migratory nature of farmwork makes it more difficult to adequately survey farmworkers during periods when they are following harvesting schedules.

The available data series show that the largest concentration of employed Mexican men, 22 percent, had jobs in the well-paid craft occupations, which include jobs as construction workers and mechanics. Some 30 percent of the employed

Mexican women were clerical workers.

The migration northward from Mexico of people in search of better employment opportunities and higher wage rates had roots in earlier centuries. Mexican settlers inhabited what is now the Southwestern United States during the 17th and 18th centuries. However, it was not until the turn of this century—when the combined economic forces of railroad building, the gradual movement of cotton plantations into the Southwest, and the development of large irrigation projects that brought the era of the large scale, highly capitalized farm to the region—that a huge demand for cheap labor drew many landless Mexican peasants northward into what was by then the United States.[21]

In recent times, the immigration of Mexicans into the United States has continued to increase, from 300,000 in the 1950's, to 454,000 in the 1960's, and in the period, from 1971 to 1976, 394,000 have entered. These totals do not include undocumented persons who have entered the country illegally, so the real totals may be considerably greater.[22] Mexican workers are attracted to this country by employment opportunities and wage rates which, although often very low by U.S. standards, are much better than those that exist in Mexico.

Cuban and other Hispanics. Cubans and persons of "other" Hispanic heritage are apparently more successfully integrated into the American economic mainstream than Mexicans or Puerto Ricans. Cubans and other Hispanics generally have lower unemployment rates, and, especially among men, a superior occupational mix when compared with Mexicans and Puerto Ricans. Nearly half of the working Cuban and other Hispanic men were employed in the generally well-paid managerial and administrative, professional or technical, craft and kindred, or transportation equipment operatives jobs in 1977.

The Cuban immigration, unlike that of Mexicans or Puerto Ricans, was politically, rather than economically, motivated. Although a small Cuban community had long been established in southern Florida, by far the largest flow of immigrants came about as a result of the 1959 revolution. For the most part, the Cuban refugee was a middle-class white-collar worker or a skilled or semiskilled blue-collar worker—a person who most likely had been economically successful prior to immigration. The 1977 occupational mix among Cuban workers suggests that the Cuban immigrants have, for the most part, successfully integrated themselves into the American work force. However, the comparatively high rate of unemployment among Cubans age 35 and over suggests that employment adjustment problems still exist among older refugees.

Because of the diverse nationalities that comprise "other" Hispanics, it is difficult to generalize about their immigration or labor force experience. However, based on the limited data available, it is apparent that the employment situation of this group is much more favorable than that for Mexicans and Puerto Ricans.

The vast majority of the 1951–76 immigrants from other Hispanic countries came from the western hemisphere. The largest influx, about 185,000 came from the Dominican Republic. Other Western Hispanic Nations with large numbers of immigrants to the United States in this period were Columbia, Argentina, and Ecuador. Some 77,000 recent immigrants were from Spain.[23]

THE AMERICAN ECONOMY in the industrial age has always relied on continual influxes of unskilled immigrants to fill the jobs at the bottom of the labor market. These jobs, characterized by low wages and poor working conditions, are often spurned by native workers, including the sons and daughters of immigrants who saw these same jobs as an advancement in social and economic status. The children of immigrants became "Americanized"—that is, they expect to work in the higher status and better paying jobs in the economy.

Now that the internal migration from the rural South to the industrial centers has ended, foreign migration—especially from Mexico with its poverty and long, common border—can be expected to continue, if not increase, in the coming years.[24] It is likely that this migration, coupled with the youthfulness of their population, will result in a continuation of the tremendous growth in the number of Hispanic Americans, and in their impact on American culture. □

FOOTNOTES

[1] Data on persons of Hispanic origin are tabulated separately without regard to race, which means they are also included in the data for white and black workers. According to the 1970 Census, approximately 96 percent of the Hispanic population was classified as white.

The primary source of the Hispanic data presented in this article is the Current Population Survey (CPS), a sample survey of 56,000 households nationwide conducted monthly by the Census Bureau for the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Identification of persons of Hispanic origin is obtained from

responses to the survey question, "What is your origin or descent?" Respondents are shown a "flashcard," a facsimile of which appears at the end of this footnote, and if they indicate any of the categories 10–17, they are identified as being of Hispanic origin. Persons who report themselves as Mexican-American, Chicano, Mexican, or Mexicano are consolidated into the one category, Mexican origin. Persons reporting themselves as Central or South American or other Spanish are grouped into the category "other" Hispanic origin.

What is your origin or descent?

01 German	10 Mexican-American
02 Italian	11 Chicano
03 Irish	12 Mexican
04 French	13 Mexicano
05 Polish	14 Puerto Rican
06 Russian	15 Cuban
07 English	16 Central or South American
08 Scottish	17 Other Spanish
09 Welsh	20 Negro
	21 Black

OR

30 Another group not listed

FORM CPS-397 (1-2-74) — U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATISTICS ADMIN., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS

ORIGIN FLASHCARD
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY

[1] *Persons of Spanish Origin in the United States: March 1973, Current Population Reports*, Series P–20, No. 323 (Bureau of the Census, 1978). This report is the latest in a series of Census Bureau reports on persons of Hispanic origin based on an expanded March CPS sample that began in 1973. The additional households included in the March sample result in increased reliability of sample estimates and allow for the publication of more detailed social and economic characteristics.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] Telephone conversation of Sept. 12, 1978, U.S. Department of State Cuban Desk.

[6] As noted in the appendix to this article, these data are subject to a relatively high level of sampling error. Thus, trends in labor force participation for Hispanics over time, especially for Hispanic ethnic groups, should be interpreted with caution.

[7] Robert W. Bednarzik and Deborah P. Klein, "Labor force trends: a synthesis and analysis," *Monthly Labor Review*, October 1977, pp. 3–12.

[8] Unpublished data for March 1973 and March 1977, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

[9] *Current Population Reports*, Series P–20, No. 329 (Bureau of the Census, 1978).

[10] Puerto Rico, Department of Labor and Human Resources, Division of Labor Statistics.

[11] For a detailed analysis of participation rate declines among Puerto Rican women in New York City (where most Puerto Ricans lived during the 1960's), see *A Socio-Economic Profile of Puerto Rican New Yorkers*, BLS Regional Report 46 (New York, July 1975).

[12] Bednarzik and Klein, "Labor force trends," p. 9.

[13] See *Educational Attainment of Workers, March 1977*, Special Labor Force Report 209 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1978).

[14] See *Cuban Refugee Program: Fact Sheet* (Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1978) for further detail.

[15] See BLS press release, USDL 77–955, Nov. 2, 1977, for a discussion of differences in earnings by occupation class.

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] See *Persons of Spanish Origin*, Series P–20, No. 323, and *Money Income and Poverty Status of Families and Persons in the U.S., Current Population Reports*, Series P–60, No. 116 (Bureau of the Census, 1977).

[18] See *Puerto Ricans in the Continental United States: An Uncertain Future* (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, October 1976), pp. 25 and 28.

[19] *Puerto Rican New Yorkers*, BLS Regional Report 46, pp. 16 and 23.

[20] Steven Zeil, *A Comparative Study of the Labor Market Characteristics of Return Migrants and Non-Migrants in Puerto Rico* (Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Planning Board, 1973). Also see Rita Maldonado, "Why Puerto Ricans migrated to the United States in 1947–73," *Monthly Labor Review*, September 1976, pp. 7–18.

[21] Joan Moore, *Mexican Americans* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1970).

[22] U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1976* (97th edition) and *1977* (98th edition).

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] See Michael J. Piore, "The 'New Immigration' and the Presumptions of Social Policy," a paper presented at the Twenty-Seventh Annual Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association.

APPENDIX: Methodology and limitations

Under Public Law 94–311, enacted in 1976, various Federal statistical agencies have been developing new programs and expanding existing ones so as to augment the heretofore limited socioeconomic data used to profile persons of Hispanic origin or descent living in the United States. The Bureau of Labor Statistics has contributed to this effort through the recent development of several new data series that greatly increase the store of labor force information concerning working-age Hispanic-Americans.

Collection of labor force data for Hispanic workers comparable in definition to those presented in this article began in 1973 when the current question relating to the identification of ethnic origin or descent was included in the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) conducted by the Bureau of the Census. Since that time, limited labor force information for the total Hispanic working-age population has been published on a quarterly and annual basis. Beginning with estimates for the first quarter of 1978, many of the

newly expanded series, including separate information on persons of Puerto Rican, Mexican, and Cuban origin, were published in the April 1978 issue of *Employment and Earnings*. Quarterly averages for both the new and old series will continue to be published regularly in the April, July, October, and January issues of this publication. In addition, individual State data for Hispanic workers residing in New York, California, Texas, Illinois, or Florida, as well as data for Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico combined, will appear annually in the Bureau publication, *State Profiles of Employment and Unemployment*.

Two reports on socioeconomic characteristics of persons of Spanish origin in the United States utilizing CPS data were issued prior to March 1973. Data in Census Series P–20, No. 250 (based on the March 1971 and March 1972 CPS) and P–20, No. 213 (November 1969 CPS) are not strictly comparable to the post-1973 data used in this article because the identifiers used to denote the Hispanic population were somewhat different. For more detail on the methodologies employed in these earlier surveys, see the *Directory of Data Sources on Racial and Ethnic Minorities*, Bulletin 1879 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1975), pp. 35–37.

Hispanic labor force data from the Current Population Survey are not as precise as those for whites or blacks because vital statistics records are not available for persons of Hispanic origin, and therefore there are no independent population controls available. CPS population estimates are "controlled" (that is, the factors used to inflate the sample count to the total population), with benchmarks obtained from the latest decennial census. During the period between censuses, these benchmarks are updated through information obtained from vital statistics records; since there are no Hispanic vital statistics data, no Hispanic benchmarks can be computed. Moreover, there most likely were a significant number of Hispanics "undercounted" or missed, in the decennial census itself. Although the size of this undercount is unknown because of the lack of vital statistics data, it is believed to be significant enough to have affected the reliability of the Hispanic estimates. Although many States are now beginning to include Hispanic origin information on vital statistics records, it will be many years before such information will be useful for adjusting Census and CPS data. The accompanying tabulation from *Coverage of Population in the 1970 Census and Some Implications for Public Programs, Current Population Reports*, Series P–23, No. 56 (Bureau of the Census, 1975) provides the omission rate in the 1970 Census by race and sex. It is probable that the rate for Hispanics is at least as large as that for blacks.

	Omission rate (percent)		
Sex	All classes	White	Black
Both sexes	2.5	1.9	7.7
Male	3.3	2.4	9.9
Female	1.8	1.4	5.5

The second major factor limiting the reliability of Hispanic labor force data arises from sampling error. Because the CPS is based on a sample of the population, the results may differ from the figures that would be obtained if it were possible to take a complete census using the same questionnaires and procedures. The sampling error is the measure of sampling variability, that is, the variation that occurs by chance because a sample rather than the entire population is surveyed. The chances are about 68 out of 100 that an estimate from the survey differs by less than the standard error, from a figure that would be obtained through a complete census.

Because they comprise a smaller segment of the population, data pertaining to the labor force status of Hispanic workers are subject to a higher level of sampling error than comparable data for whites or blacks. For example, the error at a 90-percent confidence level (that is, 1.6 times the standard error) for the 1977 annual average unemployment rate for all white workers is 0.104 percentage point, for all blacks it is 0.344, while for Hispanics it is 0.451. Thus, for Hispanic workers, the chances are 9 out of 10 that the estimated 10.1 percent unemployment rate in 1977 was actually between 9.6 and 10.6 percent.



International Comparisons of Unemployment

Americans can make valid comparisons of U.S. unemployment rates with those of other industrial countries by using this 168-page bulletin. The study adjusts foreign unemployment rates to U.S. concepts for the period from 1959 through late 1977. It also includes data on labor force, employment, participation rates, employment-population ratios, and unemployment by age and sex for the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Sweden. A concluding chapter investigates many of the reasons why international unemployment rates differ so widely even after adjustment for definitional differences. The bulletin includes 15 charts.

Order form

Mail to Bureau of Labor Statistics Regional Office nearest you, see inside back cover, or U.S. Government Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. 20402. Please send "International Comparisons of Unemployment," Bulletin 1979, Stock No. 029-001-02215-3 at $3.50 to:

Name _____

Firm or Organization _____

Street Address _____

City and State _____ Zip Code _____

☐ $_____ Remittance enclosed. (Make checks payable to Superintendent of Documents).

☐ Charge $_____ to my Deposit Account No.

_____

For prompt shipment, please print or type address on label below, including your zip code.

U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents
Washington, D.C. 20402

Official Business
Penalty for private use, $300

Postage and Fees Paid
U.S. Government Printing Office
375
Special Fourth-Class Book Rate
Book

Name _____

Firm or Organization _____

Street Address _____

City and State _____ Zip Code _____

Bureau of Labor Statistics
Regional Offices



Region I
1603 JFK Federal Building
Government Center
Boston, Mass. 02203
Phone: (617) 223-6761

Region II
Suite 3400
1515 Broadway
New York, N.Y. 10036
Phone: (212) 399-5405

Region III
3535 Market Street
P.O. Box 13309
Philadelphia, Pa. 19101
Phone: (215) 596-1154

Region IV
1371 Peachtree Street, NE.
Atlanta, Ga. 30309
Phone: (404) 881-4418

Region V
9th Floor
Federal Office Building
230 S. Dearborn Street
Chicago, Ill. 60604
Phone: (312) 353-1880

Region VI
Second Floor
555 Griffin Square Building
Dallas, Tex. 75202
Phone: (214) 749-3516

Regions VII and VIII*
911 Walnut Street
Kansas City, Mo. 64106
Phone: (816) 374-2481

Regions IX and X**
450 Golden Gate Avenue
Box 36017
San Francisco, Calif. 94102
Phone: (415) 556-4678

* Regions VII and VIII are serviced by Kansas City

**Regions IX and X are serviced by San Francisco

* U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1979 281-403/36

SIETE DE ABELARDO

DÍA TERCERO

"rescue me from the clutches of my enemies..."
better yet let them capture me in peace.
lucy, len and lalo,
by now your tummy is good and hollow.
ken and ron
the hunger pains are done.
tep, jack and brian
are now better able to detact the lying
and frank and tom
can now sum
injustices without
an electric adding machine
and so for two hundred and forty hours
the self denial of nourishment
was paradoxically
nourishing ten spirits
to the tune of pounds lost.
fasting for the causa of farmworkers
while not a front
was not the real issue
for the fasters were being
polished
in their material hunger
for a long lasting spiritual appetite
of carnalismo...the real issue worlwide,
anglos and chicanos
fasting for a tomorrow
that belongs equally to both
with abuse being the one thing in common that they loath.



AURORA

just as man sat foot on the moon once again
here on mother earth a sweet birth pain
brought you twins...
your only lovely daughter
bounces preocupada
as to how to wish
a birthday to the dawn
for the dawn itself
is a symbol of birth.
don't take too long
but do stop and take a look
at how full your life has been.
it is only
because you decided
long ago to take the type of job
that would allow you to pour yourself on others.
wednesday is the middle of the week
and it is the middle
of your life
we celebrate today.

the zodiac says,
---sometimes you over help people.---
it lies.
no one ever overhelps people.
aurora..aurorita..rita,
hasn't the world changed in fifty years.
i bet many of those changes brought you many tears.

DE TODOS MODOS

me convenzo ca'día más
de que la raza ya no 'ta atraz.
voy con un recuerdo grato de regreso
al chuco de pasco, del estado de washington.
cuarenta mil chicanos más o menos
andan por alla y verda' de dios
que también por alla
se avientan chicanos del movimiento
y son tan machos como tods...
la division del norte, si seño'.
hembras valientes como lupe y agapita
que no se quedan atraz .
me pasé unos días echando lente
y periqueando con la raza,
comiendo menudo
y bebiendo téquila y bailando corridos.
carnales como daniel y yañez
y villanueva
junto con de leon y compeán,
soto y bezinais, oimos de unos que se llaman "la voz unida"
y vimos a gamboa defenderse
en una corte...quesque
por transpassing
in a migrant camp
y clínicas y programas
pa'l imigrante
sabemos bien que son tan solo parapeto
puesto que lo que se pelea es por derechos y respeto.



AZTLÁN

"creían unos que se originaron los aztecas
en el lejano norte, es decir más allá de arizona;
suponían otros que provenían
de la legendaria tierra de aztlán,
mas nadie sabe donde se hallaba tal lugar."
los aztecas por victor w. von hagen

---the legendary land of aztlán---
do you walk on it today, chicano?
what is your historical role
as a direct descendant of those
legend makers, los aztecas?
in 1168, the aztec year two,
the year of the sugar cane---la caña.---
eight hundred and eight years ago...
subtract your present age and fit right in
the octo centennial aztec calendar..
one second? one day? one year?
twenty four years? forty four years?
one hundred and two years?
the aztecs knew who they were
in 1168.
do you know who you are in 1976?
their journey was to anahuac.
is our journey back from anahuac to aztlán?
the undocumented worker
seems to think so.
we think so.
only about one thousand aztecs made the journey.
are there one thousand chicanos today
willing...able...daring..full of a sense of history,
fulfillers of ancient incomplete legends?
the aztecs were proud and ready for battle.
is our pride watered down today
and our willingness to fight confined
to writing a letter of protest?



27 INCHES OF SNOW

NO, SEGURO QUE NO.
27 INCHES OF SNOW
STOP NO SHOW,
STOP NOT THOSE
WHO WILL GIVE UP
OF THEIR TIME,
OF THEIR ENERGY,
OF THEIR FULL PLATE
AND THE CONFORT OF HOME
IN ORDER TO COME OUT
AND FACE THE WEATHER,
FACE WHATEVER
STANDS IN THE WAY
IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE
FOR CAMPESINOS.
TODAY IS THE DAY OF THE COCONO.
IT JUST HAPPENS TO BE
THE WORST SNOW STORM
IN MORE THAN TWENTY YEARS
IN THE STATE OF COLORADO.
BAH, QUE IMPORTA EL FRÍO,
EL SUFRIR ARTIFICIAL TUYO Y MÍO
SI LO DEL CAMPESINO
ES DOLOR HECHO PIEDRA,
SI SUS HIJOS Y SU ESPOSA
SUFREN JUNTOS
A FUTURE TWICE AS COLD,
AS MEAGER, AS DARK
AND IF WE SUFFER A DAY
IT IS BUT LITTLE PAY.

FROM US CHICANO KIDS

A GROUP OF CHICANITOS FROM THE BARRIO WERE BUSED
TO AN ALL ANGLO SCHOOL. IT CAUSED A LOT OF FUSS.
THE FEW OF THEM WOUND UP SORROUNDED
BY THEIR QUITE-AFFLUENT-LIGHTER-SKINNED FRIENDS.
THEY FELT QUITE UNEASY...NATURALLY.
ONE DAY THE TEACHER ANNOUNCED EXPECTACTLY
THAT HER BIRTHDAY WAS COMING UP.
THE GABACHITOS TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY
TO BUY HER A NICE PRESENT
AND SHOW OFF
BEFORE THE IMPOVERISHED MORENOS.
THEY ALSO BROUGHT HER A CAKE.
T.O.T. WERE THE INITIALS ON TOP.
---TO OUR TEACHER--- THEY EXPLAINED
THE NICE AND TASTY SUGARY INITIALS.
THE CHICANITOS FELT BUTY AGUITADOS
SINCE THEY HAD NOT HAD THE FIFTY CENTS
TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE OCCASION
AND THE GUEROS MADE SURE THE TEACHER KNEW IT.
THE CARNALITOS NOT WANTING TO BE OUTDONE
BY THE FRECKLED COUNTERPARTS
WORKED TWO WEEK ENDS IN A ROW
AND SAVED ENOUGH MONEY TO BUY THE TEACHER
A NICER PRESENT AND A BIGGER CAKE
WITH MORE AND BETTER LOOKING INITIALS ON TOP.
WHEN THE TEACHER SAW THE INITIALS
SHE RAN OUT OF THE ROOM WITHOUT OPENNING THE DOOR.
SHE CAME BACK WITH THE PRINCIPAL,
THE COUNSELOR AND EVEN THE JANITOR.
IN A VERY ANGLO STERN VOICE
SHE DEMANDED TO KNOW,
---WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THIS?---
THE PERPLEXED, RED FACED BROWN STUDENTS
ANSWERED MEEKLY:

---FROM US CHICANO KIDS--- NATURALLY.



WHEN I GROW UP

WHEN I GROW UP
I'M GONNA BE A SODA POP.
NO, NO, NO, NO, NO.
I'M GONNA BE A DOCTOR
AND MAKE THE WHOLE WORLD WELL.
WHEN I GROW UP
I'M GONNA BE A DIXIE CUP.
NO, NO, NO, NO, NO.
I'M GONNA BE A LAWYER
AND SEE THAT JUSTICE'S DONE.
WHEN I GROW UP
I'M GONNA BE A SHORT STOP.
NO, NO, NO, NO, NO.
I'M GONNA BE A BUSINESSMAN
AND PLACE THE PLEASURE
OF CUSTOMERS OVER MY PROFITS.
WHEN I GROW UP
I'M GONNA BE A KEYSTONE COP.
NO, NO, NO, NO, NO.
I'M GONNA BE A MOVIE STAR
AND MAKE THE PEOPLE
LAUGH AND CRY.
WHEN I GROW UP
I'M GONNA BE A CHIHUAHUA PUP.
NO, NO, NO, NO, NO.
I'M GONNA BE A SALESMAN
AND SELL HOPE TO THE PEOPLE
AND MAKE THEM PAY WITH LOVE.
WHEN I GROW UP
I'M GONNA BE A RAG MOP.
NO, NO, NO, NO, NO.
I'M GONNA BE A BUILDER
AND BUILD EACH FAMILY A HOME.
WHEN I GROW UP
I'M GONNA BE A BIG PORK CHOP.
NO, NO, NO, NO, NO.
I'M GONNA BE A SPACEMAN
AND TRAVEL ON TO MARS.
WHEN I GROW UP
I'M GONNA BE A CANDY SHOP.
NO, NO, NO, NO, NO.
I'M GONNA BE A MAN OF GOD
AND BRING HIM DOWN
TO PLAY WITH US.
WHEN I GROW UP
I'M GONNA BE A LOLLY POP.
NO, NO, NO, NO, NO.
I'M GONNA BE A POLICEMAN
AND NEVER USE A GUN.
WHEN I GROW UP
I'M GONNA BE
....GROWN UP.



FARMWORKER DATA NETWORK

A Colorado Migrant Council Component

LA ONDA CAMPESINA by lalo 9-4-79

NATIONAL: THE O'BRIEN AMENDMENT TO THE LEGAL SERVICE CORPORATION'S BUDGET (H.R. 4392) READS AS FOLLOWS: ---NONE OF THE FUNDS APPROPRIATED IN THIS TITLE MAY BE USED TO CARRY OUT ANY ACTIVITIES FOR OR ON BEHALF OF ANY INDIvidual KNOWN TO BE AN ALIEN IN THE U.S., IN VIOLATION OF THE IMMIGRATION & NATIONALIATY ACT OR ANY OTHER LAW, CONVENTION OR TREATY OF THE .U.S. RELATING TO THE IMMIGRATION, EXCLUSION, DEPORTATION OR EXPULSION OF ALIENS.--- EXPRESS YOUR VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT.

ILLINOIS: FROM MLAP MEMO 8-20-79, ---ON MAY 18th OF THIS YEAR., JUDGE PRANTICE MARSHALL OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT IN CHICAGO DETERMINED THAT THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT SHOULD HAVE ISSUED AN ADDITIONAL 9,565 IMMIGRANT VISAS TO MEXICAN VISA APPLICANTS IN FISCAL YEAR 1977. CALL KRISTINE POPLAWSKI FOR INFO AS TO WHAT THIS MEANS FOR SOME LUCKY APPLICANTS, 312 3419180.

NEW MEXICO: LOVING: ---ON SEPTEMBER 28,29 & 30th, A NATIONAL GATHERING OF PEOPLE WILL TAKE PLACE TO SPIRITUALLY AND PHYSICALLY DEMONSTRATE OPPOSITION TO THE FIRST PERMANENT NUCLEAR WASTE DUMP IN THE U.S. THE GATHERING WILL TAKE PLACE IN FLORENCIA (LOVING) N.M., 12 MILES FROM THE PROPOSED SITE KNOWN AS WIPP (WASTE ISOLATION PILOT PROJECT).

COLORADO: DENVER POST 9-1-79, Kit MINICLIER, PALISADE, ---WHEN THIS SUMMER'S BUMPER CROP FRUIT HARVEST IS IN, ALLEN JONES WILL THROW HIS TRADITIONAL "MEXICAN LUAU," SLAUGHTERING A COUPLE OF SHEEP AND A PIG AND LAYING IN PLENTY OF SODA POP AND BEER FOR HIS SEASONAL EMPLOYEES.--- WHEN DO THEY SLAUGHTER THE FARMWORKERS, AFTER THE SEASON?

PUERTO RICO: EL NUEVO DIA 9-2-79 LA NUEVA TESIS (THE NEW THESIS) TRANSLATION. ---THE ECONOMY(OF PUERTO RICO) IS SUPORTED BY THE PRECARIOUS VIRTUE OF FEDERAL ASSISTANCE.---

CALIFORNIA: FELICITACIONES TO THE U.F.W. ON THEIR RECENT VICTORY AGAINST SUN HARVEST. THE NEW CONTRACT PROVIDES A $5.00/hr. MINIMUM WAGE.

HISTORY: THE TAMPA TRIBUNE 5-25-77 RICK BERRY & ERIC LASSITER, ---A FOUR YEAR OLD RUSKIN GIRL WHO NARROWLY ESCAPED SUFFOCATION IN AN ABANDONED REFRIGERATOR LATE SATURDAY DIED AS SHE WAS BEING WHEELED TO A HOSPITAL SOME FIVE HOURS LATER....LAURIE SANCHEZ, THE DAUGHTER OF FARMWORKER LORETTA SANCHEZ COULD HAVE BEEN AT THE HOSPITAL BEFORE MIDNIGHT, AMBULANCE SERVICE OFFICIALS AFFIRM, INSTEAD AT 4: A.M. SUNDAY SHE WAS STILL WITHOUT A HOSPITAL BED.____ TO BURY HER THE MOTHER WENT DOOR TO DOOR AT THE LABOR CAMP AND COLLECTED 91 DOLLARS.

7905 West 44th Avenue • Wheatridge, Colorado 80033 • (303) 425-1532

The El Paso Times

Serving the Fabulous Southwest for 97 Years

98th Year, No. 358 EL PASO, TEXAS, SUNDAY, DECEMBER 24, 1978 ★★★

EP Lawyer Lee Chagra Slain

Lee Chagra, an El Paso lawyer who in recent years gained nationwide attention as counsel for persons accused in narcotics-related crimes, was shot to death Saturday afternoon at his office. He was 42.

Police would not immediately disclose how the crime first was reported, but it was firemen who first reached the scene, dispatched by police on a resuscitator call. Firemen got their call at 4:04 p.m.

The firemen could not at first get into Chagra's office. Police helped them gain entrance. Reportedly they found Chagra alive but hemorrhaging.

Shortly after, Detectives George Drennan and Jerry Lattimer took charge of the investigation and ordered tight secrecy from the dozen or so peace officers who had gathered.

"We have no statement and won't have any statement for a very long time," Drennan told members of the press. "We've got a lot of work to do."



—(Times file photo)

LEE CHAGRA

Numerous cars began to drive up and relatives and business and professional associates of Chagra spilled out among them: State Sen. Tati Santiesteban, bail bondsman Vic Apodaca, attorneys Joe Ramos and Sib Abraham, and bank executive Rick de la Torre, who Chagra recently had defended in a cocaine-marijuana case involving singer Joe Renteria.

When a medical examiner arrived, police brought in a squad car, he did his job flanked by policemen front and rear who warded off questions from press or bystanders.

At 7 p.m., the body still had not been removed and Chagra's offices remained tightly guarded. Unconfirmed reports circulated that, before the arrival of police and firemen, someone had been seen running from the Chagra offices toward the Wallington Plaza apartments nearby, but police would not comment.

Neither would police comment immediately whether federal authorities had come into the investigation. Numerous telephone calls began arriving at *The Times* after word of the murder began to circulate.

One caller, who claimed a personal friendship with U.S. Assistant District Attorney Jim Kerr who was wounded in an assassination attempt linked to El Paso underworld elements, voiced the opinion that official speculation was bound to see a connection between that bungled job and the murder of Chagra.

Into the late hours Saturday, no facts of substance were emerging.

It was just Thursday that Chagra had moved into his new offices, at 910 N. Mesa. Businessmen nearby recalled that his moving of furnishings and belongings that day had tied up much of the 900 block.

Saturday, on his death, it was police cars, ambulances and the automobiles of his friends, relatives and the curious who again tied up traffic in the late afternoon.

Chagra and his wife lived at 636 Frontera. He had five children.

He was a graduate of El Paso High School and the University of Texas at Austin, where he was president of the student body.

After graduation, Chagra remained in Austin to attend UT Law School and become editor of the Law Review. He was graduated with top honors and went into practice here with Sib Abraham.

Recent drug cases in which Chagra was principle counselor for the defendants drew testimony from Drug Enforcement Administration agents and

(Please Turn To Page 3A)



Send pictures (color) to Ann Welle - Central.

MEXICO: MUCHO MACHO

ANNA MAYO

The liberation of the women of Mexico is still a subterranean movement, a volcano yet to erupt. In a 1971 survey of Women's Liberation around the world, *Visión* magazine, the Latin American equivalent of *Time*, detected no activity in Mexico. A more recent sprinkling of articles in the local press has been vague on the actions and purposes of the Movement, and members are interviewed under fictitious names in unnamed places.

At my first meeting with *las hermanas*, "the sisters," some 35 strong—in boots and *pantalones* unheard of on my last visit here 10 years ago—some looked wistful, but the consensus was that I should withhold their actual names. For one thing, they have no leaders so far and want no creations of the media. The *macho* history of Mexico has taught them plenty about leaders. When *una hermana* piped up with the suggestion that one or two "personalities" might serve to meet the press and popularize *el Movimiento*, which would free the rest of them to do the real work, Sa. (equivalent to Ms.) Asunción Perez, a former nun, answered her. "No, we cannot afford leaders. We must never have them. Never! Because a leader can be corrupted, a leader can be bought, a leader can be murdered, and the Movement would be corrupted, would be bought, would be murdered with her."

At the core of the Mexican Movement there is fear; and there is also courage. Mexican women face a society in which prostitution is considered one of the natural conditions of the female, in which abortion is illegal, in which the government has encouraged rabbit-size families despite an engulfing population problem. In April, President Luis Echeverría did announce a new policy of birth control, but an anthropological Mexico-watcher of good standing told me that he believes the policy will be reversed, as it has been before. Only last spring the director of a private IUD clinic here was attacked widely in the national press as a Hitlerian scientist engaged in experiments on helpless women that would cause them to conceive monsters.

It is true that there are provisions for women's rights in the Mexican Constitution, and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the ruling monoparty, awards a handful of insignificant token posts to women, but, basically, the Republic is a patriarchy. And an oligarchy as well, intolerant of any group outside its control. Anyone who foresees a large-scale Women's Movement should consider the fate of the Student Movement. In 1968, at the Tlatelolco Massacre, the army killed an estimated one thousand unarmed people demonstrating for educational reforms; last year it carried out a similar act of terror. A feminist informant who is not associated with Women's Liberation pointed out that there was a substantial proportion of women and children among the victims of the Tlatelolco Massacre. "That was not an accident," she maintained. "The government chose that occasion partly in reprisal against the mothers who had staged a nonviolent march against the Chamber of Deputies only the day before. The mothers were protesting the imprisonment or killing of their sons accused of political activity. They were neither feminists nor revolutionaries, but they were the predecessors of liberated women and their *nudo* stays in the stomach like a stone."

Beyond the state, the first facts of feminine life for most *mexicanas* are the tactics of the quintessentially male chauvinist Catholic Church. At the 1971 Roman Synod of Bishops, over the protests of progressive priests (many of them Latin American), Pope Paul VI ruled that the worst sins are still the sexy ones; and that the correct confession will remain a recital of sexual rather than social transgressions, that is, a man who lusts after women is more sinful than one who underpays his workers, cheats his customers, or lends money at 200 percent interest, a rate not infrequently exacted of the illiterate Mexican Indian.

Women, who are in the eyes of the church, Eves (that is, Evil personified), are put through tougher confessions than men; they must, for instance, ask the priest which sexual acts are or are not permissible, the priest thus becoming the other man in the marriage bed.

From first communion at age five, they are forbidden to fornicate. At a consciousness-raising meeting, one woman recalled how she once asked her mother what that word "fornicate" meant.

"It means 'doing bad things' (*cosas feas*)," replied *la mama*, changing the subject fast.

Little Clementina knew that touching or even looking at her genitals was *una cosa fea*, but then, so was stealing, or soiling her white dress. So that when she was eight years old and stole five pesos to go to the carnival, she confessed to the priest that she had committed fornication. That particular representative had no comment on her age, and merely recommended a few Paternosters, but at 12, Clementina met up with a more serious padre, who, when she owned up to kissing Cousin Horacio on the stairs, banged *(turn to page 118)*

found on street

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 116

and splintered the confessional box with his cane until she wept, the blows seeming to fall directly upon her. To make matters worse, the Sisters at school had told her that a kiss would make her pregnant; she awaited Cousin Horacio's progeny for months and months.

Nowadays, a liberated Clementina uses a speculum imported from California to view her *pudenda* (in English, pudenda means "female genitalia," but in Spanish, the Latin root meaning "shameful parts" is abundantly clear) so that they are *pudenda* no longer; Clementina loves lovemaking and never goes to confession, having nothing to confess.

Asunción, the ex-nun, instructed me, lapsed Protestant that I am, concerning the reality of where women are in the Church today. She wanted to become a doctor, but her parents refused to send her to a university, proposing instead marriage to an elderly widower. Asunción chose the convent instead. "I had seen enough of men in my family," she said, her eyes filling with old anger; "I saw how my father and my uncles were as husbands. I only wanted to be with women. The nuns, I thought, would be free of men, not like married women. But they are not free. Not at all. They are nothing more than maids to the priests and monks. They have to cook their meals and do their laundry, and they must go wherever they are sent. They even have to wait on the seminary students. And they are never ordained like the priests and monks. They remain quasi-sacramental creatures with no place in the hierarchy, and no voice in the politics of the Church.

"Among nuns in my order, friendship is forbidden. If two girls talk too much with each other, they are shipped to distant convents. Nuns who commit lesbian acts are punished by being sent to bed without supper or kept in from the daily walks, while, on the other hand, the mother superiors secretly indulge themselves with their favorites. In the monasteries things are different; the monks often visit brothels, but we were kept in a condition of perpetual sexual hysteria."

Asunción began her way back to the world when she was assigned work in a slum area dispensary. She learned about birth control from volunteer lay doctors and started giving secret classes to women, many of whose husbands forbade them to use contraceptives. For this she was called before the Bishop and severely castigated.

"But one day," she recalled, "I realized that I was not a prisoner. I could walk out at any time, and I did."

She walked out into a society that is a crooked mirror for the Church. I interviewed a number of men, and they made American male chauvinists look almost lovable. A department-store manager told me that he wouldn't think of marrying anything but *una señorita*—a virgin. "I don't take used merchandise!" he snorted. A computer engineer said that Mexican men will never allow their wives to work. "We want to keep them Mexican!" he bellowed. "Otherwise, we might just as well have Swedes or Americans!

On the street I was regularly pursued by a monotonous array of working-class men, all suffering from the Gringa-in-Search-of-a-Latin-Lover complex and using the identical line. "Are you alone?" they would ask, in what they presumed to be a seductive tone. They may be excused for lack of education, but what is to be said for upper-class men, for the artists and literati? At an elegant dinner party the Most Famous Painter in Mexico (there are dozens of these) lurched up



CONTINUED FROM PAGE 118

to me, his drunken face the color of a peony, and drooled, guess what? "Are you alone?" Fulminating, he went on, "You . . . you . . . you . . . are an *abnormal!* A woman should be glued to a man," he fumbled about and finally pointed to his Adamic rib—"here!"

Then there was the *Sa.* who, becoming more enraged as she spoke, told me how she did time as a secretary, acquired a doctorate in economics, and applied for a better job. The answer was nothing doing, and anonymous notes ridiculing women and Women's Liberation were stuck into her typewriter. When she wangled the promotion by going over her boss's head (to a man, it must be said), every *macho* in the office stopped speaking to her.

Another *Sa.*, a television director, divorced with two children, recalled: "I can tell you the exact moment my marriage was over. My husband, who as a poet earned less than I, insisted that he and he alone was the great creative artist in our family. He said that he would give me an existential analysis of our case, which turned out to be that I was one of those mistaken people who believe in equality, whereas he was a devotee of hierarchy." "Hierarchy"—the very word is from the Church.

Three of the comments that I gathered struck me as being peculiarly Mexican in that Mexico is a surrealistic country, a place where myth and the unconscious join with surface reality and the conscious. The Mexican experience is a psychoanalysis, particularly designed, I think, for the women of North America.

The first surrealistic comment came from an intellectual woman, a big girl with a strong, willful face. We were driving home together late at night when she blurted out her question: "Are there many suicides in the New York consciousness-raising groups?"

"No, not that I'm aware of," I told her. "Why do you ask?"

"We've already had two. And my husband says that all the women in Women's Lib are sick and will wind up killing themselves."

I've thought about her question a lot; especially when I heard this rather chilling analysis from a Mexican man, who sees himself as an ally of the Movement:

"*Si, hay!*, yes, the liberation of women is coming," he said. "You can tell by the increasing number of *autoviudas*—self-made widows. Up until now Mexican men have traditionally murdered their wives, but now their wives are beginning to kill *them*. There is the case of the *Señora* from Toluca who stabbed her husband to death last month. She would have gotten away with it, too, if she hadn't economized by putting him in the stew that she sells at her stand in the market. Now the *Señora*—*ay, pobrecita!*—is in the penitentiary. She may be paroled, but only after many years. But then, the road to liberation is a long one, *no es verdad?*"

Another male Mexican friend of rare character explained that the *mexicana* can only be understood in terms of her history as the violated woman, not only as the violated Catholic virgin, but as the raped Indian woman—*la chingada* as she is known in the language of popular blasphemy—taken originally as spoils by the Spanish conquistador who, in a futile effort to possess her, went so far as to marry her. Their children were *los meztizos, los hijos de chingada*, "the children of the raped woman," and that, continued my friend, "is why the men here fuck as many women as possible, identifying with their fathers, but why at the same time they are extraordinarily protective of their mothers. It is not just the Oedipus complex that makes *hijo de chingada* such a vile insult. It is the history of Mexico. When the mothers were killed at the Tlatelolco Massacre, their sons were immediately revolutionized; they are sitting in their rooms now, mulling over what has happened, but one day they will come out and take revenge. They do not know who they are yet, but then, no Mexican knows that. He does not identify. Tlatelolco was a symptom of cultural indigestion."

The Tlatelolco Massacre seen as a bloody burp. Such thoughts swarm into my mind whenever I am in Mexico. It is a country that makes me scream and laugh all at once.

It is also a country that makes me want to create, to work, to adopt more children, to love. Mexican women are extremely creative. Their creativity springs very largely from the Indian component in their psyches. It is one of their saving graces, a grace which sets them apart from the women of Spain and other Roman Catholic countries, and in another sense from the women of the United States. (Our Indian component is a phantom whose culture was destroyed not only by our forefathers but our foremothers.)

Some Indian women are beasts of burden, but just as there are 150 separate Indian languages in Mexico today, there are at least that number of variations on the theme of Woman. In some regions Indian women are partners of men; they may work in the fields or they may be the principal support of the family as artisans or keepers of market stalls. Some are actual matriarchs. They have weathered the bad old days of the late 1500s, they have resisted the conquistadores, the *caciques* (political bosses), the generals—the men of Mexico. They, with the exception of those who have suffered extreme economic deprivation, have come through experienced in the ways of resistance—confident, strong, and remarkably whole.

It must be remembered that every middle- and upper-class *mexicana* was raised by Indian maids, that she encounters traditional Indian women throughout her life—in the markets, begging on the streets, in the countryside, and finally in her own adult household.

Most *latina* women deny any connection with their dark sisters, but I have frequently observed in the homes of women on the way to liberation an alliance between the mistress and Indian maid. The latter will defend the mistress physically against the attack of a jealous husband, may become the woman's friend, and may remain with her after a divorce, managing her house and children while the woman goes out to work.

This alliance is a manifestation of the creative strength available to the *mexicana* when she realizes her Indian roots. The Mexican woman's unique contribution to the Woman's Movement is her Indian element. It is one beginning in a long struggle.

Anna Mayo, who has lived and traveled widely in Mexico and Spain, is a freelance writer and regular contributor to the "Village Voice." Her work has appeared in translation in "Vistazo" magazine, distributed throughout Latin America.

Every Mexican American in the Southwest has been affected in one way or another thooughout the years by the Crusade for Justice and its strong function under the leadership of Rodolfo "Corky" Gonzales. The Raza community is well aware of the presence and views of the Crusade for Justice and there is much respect in the hearts of Raza for the Crusade and its leader. Everybody benefits from the hard work of the Crusade which is a non-profit organization and can only exist through the efforts and commitment of dedicated people.

The Crusade has educated the people as to the meaning of Civil Rights. There is now in the community a greater awareness of equality and civil rights.

EDUCATION: The Mexican American has long been fighting for education. We have been asking for our history and our language. We know that this has been guaranteed to us by the Treaty of Hidalgo. We know that this is important to us as the history of the United States started with its first colony in Santa Fe, years before Plymouth Rooc. It started in the Southwest.

In Denver, we have but to look at the West High blowout and realize that this was fully effective in that, after the demands by Raza, fifty new Raza teachers and six administrators were placed. As school opens this year, we see that there will also be a Chicano principal in the school system for the first time in the history of Denver. We can view these changes in Denver schooling and its system due to the efforts of the Crusade and the fact that they did support the young people in making their demands and had foresight in making demands for the eucation of our people.

During the summer, the Crusade for Justice had a summer school with a registration of 325 pupils. This school taught Spanish, Mexican history, guitars, dancing, sewing, art, sculptoring and swimming. During this school session, there were free hot lunches served to everyone, everyday. All of this was provided, free, through the efforts of the Crusade. The instructors were our own people and professors from Mexico were also here to teach.

EMPLOYMENT: All of the government Raza programs have been affected, if not instigated through the efforts of Corky and the Crusade. The Southwest Council of La Raza was created from the ideas of Corky who also served on the Executive committee at its inception. The American G.I. Forum was organized in Denver by Corky, not to mention on the national level of the Forum and its programs. He also served

on the board of La Raza. He was Chairman of the War on Poverty program and Director of the NYC program and many agencies received his services

Many of the Raza that now sit in key positions throughout the Southwestern programs as well as in Denver, have been placed there through the efforts of Corky. All of these programs have been affected by Corky and the Crusade for Justice through out the years. As these programs continue to function, they cannot spurn the people who created them; those who have dedicated themselves to serving their people for free.

IDENTITY AND CULTURE: The Crusade has developed in the people and pride for what they are and a search for identity. Whatever we call ourselves, Spanish American, Hispano, Mexican, Manito, Surumato, Raza, Chicano -- the people are aware of being something. We are aware of our heritage and of knowing that we are not Anglos and we have no part in the Plymouth Rock history. The Crusade has developed this awareness through the message of "The Revolutionist", a play written by Corky. We know that there are other organizations that have patterned and tried to create duplicate programs and if there is any interest, it is only because of the awareness created by the Crusade. The difference is only because of the awareness created by the Crusade. The difference is that the Crusade is a do-it-yourself program and the other centers are @let me do it for you; let me HELP you." This is good only if our people learn and grow proud within themselves without being obligated to someone.

The 16th of September is very important for we see throughout the Southwest that this will in time be a Southwestern national holiday for La Raza in recognition of what we are and who we are.

POLICE ISSUES: Everyone of us has tasted the wrath of the Police departments at one time or another. For years, we have known of our family and friends that have been beaten in the jails and killed in the streets. We, at one time, learned to just stay away from the police. However, now we have had exposed to us what has been happening, and we are standing up to it. We see the policeman in a different light and we question his job and his performance in addition to his psychological attitudes. This awareness is important to us, for we view ourselves as EQUALS, not as a DEFEATED people that one kicks around.

AND WITH ALL OF THIS, THE MEXICAN AMERICAN HAS COME TO REALIZE THAT WE HAVE TO FIGHT FOR EVERY INCH THAT WE GAIN. WE HAVE COME TO REALIZE THAT WE HAVE TO THINK AS A PEOPLE WHEREVER WE MAY BE AND WHATEVER WE MAY BE DOING. AS RAZA WE KNOW THAT SOME PEOPLE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAKE IT BECAUSE THERE IS A CRUSADE THAT HAS MADE IT POSSIBLE THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT OF AWARENESS BY THE CRUSADE AND THOSE WHO ARE DEDICATED AND WHOSE LIVES ARE FULLY COMMITTED TO THE BETTERMENT OF THE CHICANO.

AND NOW AS WE SEE WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO OUR PEOPLE, AS WE SEE THE ARREST OF TWENTY THREE OF THE COLORADO PEOPLE THAT ATTENDED THE CHICANO MORATORIUM, WE SEE THE FACT THAT THE CRUSADE NEEDS THE RESPONSE OF THE COMMUNITY IT HAS SERVED SO WELL.

ALL OF YOU CHICANOS, WHEN YOU HAVE HAD PROBLEMS, YOU HAVE COME TO THE CRUSADE AND NOW IT IS TIME FOR YOU TO HELP. YOU, THAT CAME HERE WITH YOUR WOUNDS TO BE HEALED, YOU THAT CAME HERE BECAUSE YOU WERE EVICTED, YOU THAT CAME HERE WITH POLICE PROBLEMS: YOU THAT CAME HERE WITH COURT PROBLEMS: YOU THAT CAME HERE FOR EDUCATION: YOU WHO HAVE BEEN SERVED WITHOUT CHARGE, WITHOUT QUESTION, WITHOUT QUESTION, WITHOUT HESITATION--IT IS TIME FOR YOU TO ANSWER THIS NEED.

The Crusade for Justice has established a legal defense fund which will be needed to defend our people who were arrested in Los Ageles, California. Give whatever you can. If all you can give is 50¢ we thank you for that is your ability to give. If you can give more, we thank you, and if you cannot give money and give your support and spirit instead, THANK YOU FOR BEING WITH US FOR UNITY OF SPIRIT.

Read this please, and pass it to a friend or neighbor. This issue must be kept alive.

AWARNESS

AUG. SEPT.

"IN THE BEGINING." BY BURNISHED LEAF.

WE, THE AMERREMN INDIANS, STOOD ON THE SANDS OF TIME, BY THE ATLANTIC OCEAN AND WATCHED THE BILLOWING SAILES OF YOUR SHIP COMING TOWARDS THIS FREE LAND OF OURS. OUR EYES WERE UPON YOU, AS YOU CAME CLOSER, EVER CLOSER. THE WONDERFULL WAVES LAPED AT THE SIDES OF YOUR SHIP, THE SOFT, FULL, WHITE, SAILS MOVED IN THE GENTLE BREEZE. THEY LOOKED LIKE THE WHITE, CLOUDS THAT WE LOVED TO WATCH GLIDE ACROSS THE AZURE SKY. LITTLE DID WE KNOW THAT YOU, AN OPRESSED PEOPLE, SEEKING FREEDOM, JUSTICE, LIBERTY, AND YOUR HUMAN RIGHTS, WOULD SOON BE TAKING FROM US, WHAT WAS TAKEN AWAY FROM YOU IN YOUR OWN LAND.

WE WERE NOT AFRAID OF YOU THEN, FOR WE WERE A PEACEFULL PEOPLE. THIS WAS THE FIRST GLIMPSE OF WHITMAN THAT WE HAD EVER SEEN. WE WERE AWED BUT NOT AFRAID.

OUR CHIEFS GREETED YOU AND WELCOMED YOUR PEOPLE TO OUR LAND. WE SHARED ALL WE HAD WITH YOU. OUR FIRES WARMED YOU DURING THE LONG, HARD WINTERS. WHEN YOU WERE HUNGRY, WE SHARED OUR FOOD WITH YOU. OUR BRAVES TAUGHT YOU TO HUNT IN OUR FORRESTS, TO FISH IN OUR LAKES. OUR WOMEN NURSED YOUR SICK, AND OUR PEOPLE DIED LIKE FLIES FROM YOUR SICKNESSES. WE HELPED YOU WITH YOUR CHILDREN. WE WERE YOUR FRIENDS, AND THOUGHT THAT YOU WERE OURS.

ONE DAY WHEN YOUR BELLIES WERE FULL OF THE FOOD THAT YOU RAISED ON OUR LAND, YOUR HEADS GREW BIG AND YOUR MINDS AND HEARTS BECAME FULL OF GREED AND LUST.

YOU STOLE OUR LANDS, SLAUGHTERED OUR PEOPLE, OUR ANNIMALS; RAPED OUR WOMEN, BURNED OUR HOMES AND LEFT US TO FREEZE AND TO STARVE IN DESPAIR.

AFTER YOU PUSHED US AS FAR AS YOU COULD POSSIBLY PUSH, WE FAUGHT BACK. WHEN WE TRIED TO SMOKE THE PEACEPIPE WITH YOU, YOU TRICKED US WITH YOUR FORKED TOUNGUES LIES. THEN YOU BROUGHT ABOUT A GENOCIDE WAR ON US.

THE GREED OF YOUR PEOPLE INCREASED UNTILL YOU WERE A MAD, INHUMAN, LOT. WHEN YOU BEGAN TO TIRE OF TORTUREING US, YOUR SHIPS BROUGHT THE BLACK MAN TO OUR LAND, TO BE YOUR SLAVES AND TARGETS OF YOUR GREED AND HATE.

THE GREAT MEN AMONG YOU TRIED TO STRAIGHTEN OUT THE MESSES AND THE CONSTITUTION, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, TRIED TO BRING ABOUT THIS HELP THAT YOU NEEDED BUT YOU DISTORTED AND TWISTED THEM OUT OF PROPORTION, AS YOU HAVE DONE EVERY WHERE YOU HAVE

Set Your Set. "2"

THE GREAT SPIRIT HAS TOLD YOU THAT THERE WOULD BE A DAY OF RECONING, BUT YOU HEEDED IT NOT.

YOUR FALSE PROMISSES RANG LOUDER THAN THE LIBERTY BELL. YOU WILL NOT RECTIFY YOUR MISSTAKES.

OUR CRIES OF HUNGER, RING IN YOUR EARS, YOU CARE NOT FOR THE HOMES AND THE FAMILIES THAT YOU HAVE DESTROYED, OUR CHILDREN CRY IN THE COLD BUT YOU STILL HAVE THE BLINDERS ON, FOR YOU CHOOSE NOT TO SEE WHAT YOU HAVE BROUGHT ABOUT.

THE POLUTION OF OUR FREEDOMS AND THE AIR THAT WE BREATH, IS MORE THAN WE COULD EVER STAND.

YOU HAVE HUNG JUSTICE ON THE SOUR APPLE TREE, AND YOUR SYSTEM IS TRYING TO SHOVE IT,S FRUIT DOWN OUR THROATS.

HOW HAVE YOU FORGOTTEN, YOU WHO WERE OPRESSED, AND ARE NOW THE OPRESSOR?




PSYCHIATRY
United States
Bureau of Indian
Affairs and Medicine
P.H.D. B.A. M.D.
"Nothing to worry about. Now you have protection and land. It's only coincidence you feel this way."
"I have a terrible fear in living an instant replay about the fate of my Indian ancestors."
W.F.G.

150 copies

BILINGUAL SCHOOLING IN THE UNITED STATES

ABSTRACT

Ideally, a child's educational achievement should not be limited by his race, color, national background, sex, or religion. However, with present curricular patterns, certain ethnic groups continue to achieve below national norms in education.

The United States presently has more than 100 bilingual programs in public elementary schools, 76 of which are supported by $7.5 million appropriated under the Bilingual Education Act of 1968. Although such federal support for a relatively new and exciting form of education is gratifying, it is hardly adequate. The Bilingual Education Act is essentially an anti-poverty measure. As such it does not deal with the real problems of cultivating our language and cultural resources, nor does it begin to meet the needs of any significant proportion of disadvantaged children whose language is other than English.

A Rationale for Bilingual Schooling

Present bilingual schooling is not only inadequate in extent but also in quality. The rate of school failure has been traditionally high among the disadvantaged Spanish-speaking Mexican Americans of the Southwest, the French speakers of Louisiana, American Indians, Eskimos, etc.

American children who speak a non-English tongue generally fall into two groups. Either they are markedly advantaged -- that is, their possession of another language correlates with high socioeconomic status and high educational achievement -- or they are markedly disadvantaged. The latter group constitutes by far the majority. Among them, possession of another language

correlates with low socioeconomic status, low educational achievement, and ethnicity.

Is bilingual schooling an oasis or a mirage? It looks as if it has everything in its favor except public understanding. Ultimate success may well depend on the quality of initial bilingual programs. If these do not exhibit a sufficient quality to recommend them beyond question to critical observers, the present period of popularity will quickly die, and bilingual schooling will be discredited.

Planning a Bilingual Program

Several hazards exist for the fledgling bilingual programs.

The first and most obvious hazard derives from the fact that nine Americans out of ten are monoglots. For a monoglot, it is very tempting to believe all other Americans should also be monoglots. Often the suspicion lurks that learning of a second language is a threat to the learning of English.

A second difficulty is caused by the fact that many laymen do not understand the difference between a first language or mother tongue and a second language. This lack of understanding is shared by many educators who expect all children, regardless of cultural background, to perform in English as though it were their mother tongue.

Still another hazard has to do with the order in which language skills are learned. Just as we learn in our mother tongue to understand and then to speak and later to read and write, so we must observe this same order in teaching languages to children in school.

Still another difficulty in establishing a bilingual program is the fact that too many educators and citizens fail to understand the relationship of language to culture. Social scientists know that to a large degree

one's outlook on the world is determined by the language into which one is born and the culture that his language reflects. This is perhaps the greatest promise of bilingual schooling for it provides an opportunity first to understand and then to teach intercultural harmony.

A good bilingual learning system seeks to encourage disadvantaged children by enhancing their self concept, broadening their educational experiences through the use and cultivation of their first language, and providing entrée into an English-speaking world. Another major area of concern is motivating the learner. By providing materials to arouse and maintain interest and to help develop self-confidence and by individually prescribing instruction, quick learners can be encouraged to advance rapidly, slow learners can be allowed to progress at their own rate without threat of failure, and all learners can be helped to discover their own intellectual curiosity.

The Program

There are currently three basic approaches to the education of non-English-speaking children.

The first approach -- the traditional approach -- is that which rests on the proposition that since English is the official language of the United States, every American needs to learn English. The non-English-speaking child is considered to be most likely to learn if he is just thrown in mid-stream to sink or swim. The medium of instruction is English and no concessions are made to the child whose native language is not English.

The second approach is called the English as a Second Language approach. Like the first, it recognizes that all children need to learn English and assumes that the school should devote its entire attention to teaching in and through English. However, it does recognize that for many children English is not the first language, and therefore certain concessions have to be made

in the form and in the pace of teaching. This approach makes little or no use of the home language for educational purposes beyond perhaps a few words to facilitate communication between teacher and pupil.

The third approach is the bilingual approach. It rests upon the realization that the home language may be the most developed language and therefore the best medium for learning in general and particularly for learning to read and write. Using this approach, 75 percent of the teaching is usually done in the child's native tongue, and 25 percent of the teaching is done in English with full recognition that English is a second language. Many feel the potential of this latter approach.

Needed Action and Research

In order for the design to be successful, it must meet many different needs. It must be bilingual to satisfy linguists and language teachers. It must be bicultural to satisfy sociologists and anthropologists. It must be suited to the particular age of the children involved to satisfy developmental psychologists and early childhood specialists. It must be integrated to satisfy politicians and individualized to satisfy pedagogues, simple to satisfy teachers, functional to satisfy administrators, testable to satisfy research designers, affective to satisfy psychologists, economical to satisfy taxpayers, interesting to satisfy children, and convincing to satisfy the general public. In short, if a bilingual program is to measure up to the requirements of so many specialists and satisfy so many special interests, it should be designed by a team of specialists from many different disciplines.

Previous research indicates the promise of bilingual education. Still such proof as there is cannot be said to be conclusive. In the final analysis, it is hoped that the bilingual experiment will educate children who have a literate command of their first language as well as make them proud to identify themselves with their ancestral culture.

2:00 pm - Sunday -
~~1127~~ Bannock
1117 - Briefing - ~~Butte~~ Ed Vigil

THE SHORT AND TURBULENT LIFE OF CHICANO STUDIES*

by

Refugio I. Rochin

University of California - Davis

Introduction

Many of us know about Chicanos, their protests and movements on college campuses which have taken place over the more recent years. Many of us are also familiar with the concept of Chicano Studies, or educational programs which have come into being largely in response to the campus Chicanos.

What we tend to know less about, however, are the Chicano faculty who work with Chicano Studies programs. It is my contention that this group of academicians is neglected, at best, and is one group that faces great difficulties in adjusting to the pressures placed upon them by Chicano Studies. I further contend that if these pressures are left unchecked, they will spell out a short and turbulent life for Chicano Studies programs on any of the campuses which have such components in progress.

Background

These assertions have not been made as isolated observations of one Chicano faculty member seeking a way to express personal grievances. In January 1972, I sent questionnaires to directors in charge of such programs on each of the eight main campuses of the University of California.** My quest was to learn more about numbers: such things as, how many Chicano faculty are employed,

---

* Paper presented at the Southwestern Sociological Association Annual Meeting, San Antonio, Texas, March 30 - April 1, 1972. The author is an Assistant Professor of Economics on the Davis Campus.

** University campuses are located in : Berkeley, Davis, Irvine, Los Angeles, Riverside, Santa Barbara and San Diego.

whether they are directly engaged in Chicano Studies curriculum development, how many students they deal with, their faculty positions -- whether tenured or not. Other questions were asked about research, students, and problems in general. What gave rise to my assertions, largely follow from a synthesis of the findings of the questionnaires.

Chicano Studies

Before reporting the findings, some clarifications should be made: (1) Not all campuses have a Chicano Studies Program per se. Berkeley has a Chicano Studies Division which is within a Department of Ethnic Studies. Davis functions with a Chicano Studies Program with faculty members teaching Chicano-courses out of the traditional academic Departments. Irvine has a Comparative Cultures Program with a Chicano sub-component. The Los Angeles Program relies on a Chicano Studies Center which serves principally as an academic research center. Riverside has an interdisciplinary Mexican-American Studies program with faculty members teaching out of their respective departments. Santa Barbara functions with a Department of Chicano Studies and a Chicano Research Center. Santa Cruz is just developing a Chicano program within a new Urban Studies College. And San Diego's Chicano Studies is a sub-component of its Third College. Of the eight campuses, Berkeley, Irvine, Riverside and San Diego offer majors in Ethnic, Cultural or Chicano Studies.

Though differences between campus programs exist (in terms of the formal structure and operation of each), all campuses have at least two things in common: For one, courses are now taught by Chicano faculty members in each of the separate programs or departments. For another, they have common objectives of providing courses "for" as well as "about"Chicanos. (3) In addition, most Chicano Studies programs were preceeded by Chicano Student movements which expressed concern that:

(a) The American universities had neglected the Chicanos' socio-economic and educational needs and had tried to impose the Anglo-American monoculture syndrome on all Chicanos in general.

(b) The higher institutions of education had contributed indirectly to the deprived conditions of the Chicano, rural and urban, by benign neglect. On the other hand, they found it appropriate to provide special services to foreign students and not to Chicanos.

(c) The Chicanos would be by-passed by programs addressing the needs of Blacks and not the specific needs of Chicanos. This concern was important because of the fact that Chicanos outnumbered Blacks as the largest minority in California.* Furthermore, it was an obvious fact that Chicanos were not entering Universities or colleges in any significant number** and, hence, were grossly underrepresented in student affairs and other campus activities.

(4) Concommitant to the above, all Chicano Studies programs have the unique characteristic of being new; the oldest program in the University is the UCLA one which began in the Fall of 1968. The youngest program to be initiated in September 1972 is that at Santa Cruz.

In what follows, I will simplify the following discussion by continuing to use the term Chicano Studies to refer to all of the above mentioned programs even though the term is used rather loosely. What should be realized, though,

---

* Incomplete returns from the 1970 Census have revealed that more than 3.1 million Californians -- one out of six -- are of Mexican or other Spanish heritage (Nationwide, the figure stands at 9.3 million Mexican-Americans). Blacks number about half of the Chicano population in California. Source: Time-Post News Article, March 1972.

** The most recent report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights noted that if the present school drop-out rates in California failed to improve, more than one of three Mexican-American pupils in grades one through six -- that is, 120,000 pupils out of 330,000 -- would fail to graduate from high school. For Blacks, according to the Commission's 100-page report, the corresponding figures would be 60,000 dropouts of an elementary enrollment of 190,000.

is that the most important similarities yet to be discussed are the common problems facing the Chicano faculty on each of the University campuses.

About the University

The University of California is regarded as one of the major learning institutions of higher education in the U.S. As of March, 1971, the eight University campuses had a total enrollment of 76,133 undergraduate students. (See Table 1). Of that enrollment, only 2,462 (3.2 percent) undergraduates were Chicano or Mexican-American, compared to an enrollment of 2,761 Blacks and 5,615 Asian American.* (It is important to note in Table 1 that 72 percent of the Chicano students are enrolled primarily because of the Educational Opportunity Program.) These are appalling figures when one realizes that the Mexican-American population in California is greater than that of Blacks and Asians combined.

To service the students with regular teaching, the University employed (as of April, 1971) 2,453 Full Professors; 1,267 Associate Professors; 2,010 Assistant Professors; 145 Instructors and Associates and 645 Lecturers.**

Findings

What are the problems facing Chicano Faculty members? The foremost difficulty is pure and simple; there is a great shortage of trained, experienced and tenured Chicano faculty on any of the University of California campuses.

The questionnaire revealed that the combined force of Chicano faculty in the University of California numbers no more than 55 (see Table 2). Of the 55, 45 work with a Chicano Studies program in one way or another. The other

---

* Data is from memorandum #304 to Members of the Committee on Educational Policy from the Office of the President, January 20, 1972, regarding: Report on University of California Undergraduate Opportunity Program, 1970-71.

** Source: University of California, Statistical Summary: Students and Staff, 1970-71, April 1971. Compiled by the Office of Analytical Studies, Vice President - Planning. Statistics are for Full-time employees.

Table 1 Participation Rates of Chicano Students at the Undergraduate Level, University of California, March 1971.

	Chicano Students				All Students	
	Total[1]		EOP[2]		Total Undergrads[1]	Total EOP[2]
Campus	No.	%[3]	No.	%[3]	No.	No.
Berkeley	439	2.3	403	2.1	18,822	1,550
Davis	171	1.7	147	1.5	9,972	464
Irvine	130	2.6	64	1.3	5,054	227
Los Angeles	861	4.8	487	2.7	18,009	1,444
Riverside	197	4.2	97	2.1	4,673	233
San Diego	194	4.5	194	4.5	4,310	434
Santa Barbara	377	3.2	283	2.4	11,798	642
Santa Cruz	113	3.2	100	2.9	3,495	202
Total University	2,462	3.2	1,775	2.3	76,133	5,196

1. From Fall 1970 Ethnic Survey: University of California, dated March 10, 1971
2. From Campus Educational Opportunity Program Reports for Academic Year 1970-71.
3. Percentage of Total Undergrads.

Table 2 Number of Chicano Faculty Members Associated with Chicano Studies Programs at the Various Campuses of the University of California, March 1972[1]:

Campus	FTE's[2]	Profs.	Assoc. Profs.	Asst. Profs.	Instructors or Acting Asst. Profs.	Assoc. or Lecturers	Total
Berkeley	5	0	0(1)	0	0	8	8(1)
Davis	3	0	1	3	0	1	5
Irvine	2	0	0	0	2	0	2
Los Angeles	0	0	3(1)	2	4	4	13(1)
Riverside	1-1/2	1	1	1	1	0(1)	4(1)
Santa Barbara	3	0	0	3(2)	0	2	5(2)
Santa Cruz	0	0	1(1)	2	0	0	3(1)
San Diego	10	2	0(1)	2(2)	0(1)	1(1)	5(4)
All Campuses	24-1/2	3	6(4)	13(4)	7(1)	16(2)	45(10)

1. The term "Associated" is used to distinguish Chicanos of the U.C. Faculty system who work with the Chicano Studies Programs from those Chicanos of the U.C. Faculty who do not. The latter numbers are shown in parenthesis.

2. Full Time Equivalent rating for each Ethnic Studies Department on the individual campuses.

Source: U.C. Chicano Faculty Survey -- January 1972 -- by R. I. Rochin.

10 Mexican-Americans reportedly stick to their own academic specialty unrelated to Chicano interests. Even more significant, only 9 Chicanos, of the 45, are tenured, with Associate Professor rank or better. (Recall that for the entire University, there are about 3,700 Full and Associate Professors with tenured status.) On the other hand, the overwhelming percentage of Chicano faculty employed by the University are untenured. That includes 13 Chicano Assistant Professors and seven others who are working as Instructors or Acting Assistant Professors (a title reserved for those who have not completed their Ph.D. dissertations). To round out the 45, seventeen are either Associates or Lecturers; eight of those Lecturers are found on the Berkeley campus.

Related to the problem of short supply, the most fundamental problems faced by the Chicano faculty stem from the acute needs of (1) the Chicano students and the Chicano community at large and (2) the educational institutions where the Chicano Studies programs exist.

Without a doubt, most of the Chicanos employed by the University owe some sort of gratitude to the Chicano students who protested against the educational structure which was dominated by the northern European cultural values and descendants. Accordingly, the students demanded Chicano Studies to rectify this cultural imbalance. Once committed to work within Chicano Studies, though, the Chicano faculty are compelled to respond to the forthright requests of Chicano students. Such requests, and demands, involve the development of curriculum designed to provide cultural awareness and insight into the different aspects of Mexican-American culture: historical, linguistic, educational, political, economic, sociological, and psychological. This in itself is a rather tall order since the base of Chicano literature which one can draw from for lectures is slightly more than nonexistent.

Students also request personalized assistance on many matters ranging from problems of sex to finances, matters which they do not care to discuss with non-Chicanos. It's an admirable feature to have a "family" of issues to deal with, but at the heart of these requests lie a limited budget of time, which also has to be shared with one's own family, one's department of employment, and the University at large.

Of utmost importance to the Chicano Faculty is the problem of entering a new profession as an equal competitor for salary and honors and not as a token for being brown with a Spanish accent to boot. Realize in turn, the harsh reality of being tested from within an academic department, that has set standards and particularly the rigid rule of "publish or perish." But, where does one find the time? Not only that, how does one cope with the problem of wearing two hats at the same time· one hat of the Chicano Movement which seeks political expediency on issues of a multi-disciplinary nature in order to serve students and the other hat of the hard core academic elite, the tenured, which seeks a single disciplined expert of specialized opinion in order to serve the profession.

Without questioning the particular talents of Chicano faculty members, one should ask, how strong can a Chicano Studies Program be if it depends on a small group of faculty members who have yet to complete the requirements for tenure or even doctoral degrees? No doubt, many are capable scholars, but it takes herculean talents to build new institutions of Chicano Studies while simultaneously hoping to develop into specialized proponents of the traditional disciplines.

The University hierarchy poses major problems: (1) it requires a specific teaching load and (2) it expects minority representation on the multifarious Committees that are created to address the problems of minorities. On the Davis campus alone, there are 36 Administrative

Advisory Committees ranging from Affirmative Action, through Educational Opportunity to Upward Bound. Chicano faculty are asked to sit on these Committees to provide advise for the Chancellor and Vice-Chancellors. In actual practice, they provide a way for the University's Administrative oligarchy* of Anglos to: (1) show-off the Chicano presence and (2) to buffer further acts of protest which commonly arise from students. As such, the Chicano faculty is used and exploited. But on the other hand, if he does not provide for representation, he gets shunted from two sides, one, from the students who sought his representation in the first place and, two, from the administration who will pass decisions pertaining to Chicanos anyway, without his consultation.

Obviously, one way to solve many of the aforementioned problems is to increase the number of Chicano faculty on each campus; the University's Affirmative Action Program has this as a main objective. Unfortunately, the situation is much more complicated. To begin with, few Chicanos are graduating at the Ph.D. level. And of the few, most appear to be concentrated in Education, Spanish Literature, History and Sociology. I know of only two Chicanos with Ph.D.'s in Economics and Carlos Muñoz of Irvine has counted only eight Chicanos with Ph.D.'s in Political Science in the United States. Moreover, out of his national survey of 943 schools, he has been able to identify only 55 Chicano graduate students in Political Science, most in M.A. degree programs as opposed to the Ph.D.

---

* On the Davis Campus, only one top-level administrator (Assistant Vice-Chancellor for Student Affairs) is not Anglo. Minority staff members are concentrated primarily in subordinate, menial jobs.

Moreover, the University hasn't set up an adequate program to recruit and hire Chicanos. To date, most U.C. Departments continue to hire through a parochial "country club" network that excludes Chicanos; namely, when certain departments want to fill a position they call two schools -- Harvard and Princeton. And they ask, 'whom do you have?' without looking at anybody else. On top of this, Anglo faculty members subvert Chicano recruitment by protesting against what is termed "compensatory racism." Any Chicano who joins a department under these circumstances has to spend all of his time in a treadmill trying to "prove" his worth.

Conclusion

It is, of course, encouraging to find ourselves forerunners of a significant movement. But this often is the sole compensation for many exasperating pressures which conflict with intense desires to succeed professionally within traditional academic disciplines.

With these pressures, the young, inexperienced and untenured Chicano faculty members face severe difficulties in adjusting to the University and the ideal of Chicano Studies. Under present circumstances, without remedial improvements, Chicano Studies will experience a turbulent existence. An indication of this turbulence encompasses the following trend: Incoming Chicano faculty will actively participate within Chicano Studies for a year or so. After that, they will begin to decide one way or the other on where and what to devote their full energies and time to, either to Chicano Studies or their specialized professions. Chicano faculty will focus on the latter, primarily because a feeling for security (in tenure) generally rides high on their preferences. Others may seek out and obtain, given present government

interests, research grants or fellowships drawing them away from the campus activities. With their absence fewer will be available to carry the brunt of the burden of Chicano Studies. In addition, some of the best younger faculty members will be lost to other campuses because of the nationwide demand for qualified minority teachers.

I doubt that these are exaggerated points since the signs of this trend are already with us. In concluding, let me note that this paper is not to overlook the efforts of many who have developed Chicano Studies. Both the students and the University have made it possible to advance the ideas of a new educational experience, Chicano Studies. But, my concern is to open up the discussion on a realistic course of events. Without recognizing the problems and pressures facing Chicano faculty, Chicano Studies is subject to a short life. From here on out, its survival will depend increasingly on measures taken by the individual campuses to alleviate the present trend.

PABLO PICASSO *(Spanish, b. 1881)*

BULL FIGHT (1934)

Canvas, $19\frac{3}{4} \times 25\frac{3}{4}$ inches

The Phillips Collection,
Washington

Printed in Switzerland

Puerto Rican players have sense of family

By ANN BAKER
Staff Writer

Folk Ways

Puerto Ricans, they say, are not very fond of things. They don't care much about privacy or possessions.

They do care about politics. Ask a Puerto Rican if he wants his island to become a state, an independent country or to remain linked in commonwealth status to the United States, and he will talk your ear off, vigorously determined that his view is the only one a sane person could hold.

But there is something Puerto Ricans treasure even more. Everyone tells you the same. It is family ... parents, grandparents, the encircling network of uncles and cousins and nieces ...

"Your aunts would take care of your kids, and they'd smack them one, too," says Sonia Nieves Burton. "You visit your relatives without telephoning them first. And that's the main thing about the group here. It is like family."

By "the group" Mrs. Burton means the Puerto Rican Civic Association, which was formed about a year ago. Its first public endeavor will be a play next week at Macalester College. "La Carreta," ("The Ox Cart,") will be staged at 7:30 p.m. April 27 and 28 in the college's Janet Wallace Fine Arts Theater. The production will be in English, or "Spanglish," as some call the occasional slip into a familiar Spanish word like "ninos."

The cast of "The Ox Cart," from left, back row: Sonia Nieves Burton, Luis Ortega, Jennifer Jones, Isabelle Torres and Rochelle Lopez. In front: Chuck Cardenas, Carmen Robles and Jason Garcia. "We are the play," says Ortega. "Some of us have made it and some of us haven't — the dream my parents had to find a job and pay their bills and

It is a saga of the industrialization, unemployment and migration which brought thousands of Puerto Rican families to New York in the 1950s, and then sent some back to their tropical Caribbean home, sometimes scarred, sometimes with enough savings to open a business.

"They were told this was the land of opportunity and the streets were paved with gold," said Carmen Robles, who was born in New York 30 years ago, a couple of years after her parents landed there. Her father ran two grocery stores on the Lower East Side and after 18 years of scrimping, saved enough money to buy a house and dry-cleaning business back in Puerto Rico.

At 14 Carmen moved to Neillesville, Wis., to live with an aunt. She knew no other Puerto Ricans until she discovered the association.

"Ahh!" she says. "Now I'm speaking my language, eating my food. We go to each other's houses, dance a little salsa. It takes me back. I feel like me. I feel like Carmen."

In the play Carmen plans the leading role of Dona Gabriela, a widow who struggles to hold her family and her values together in the face of one attack after another.

Sonia, who plays the part of a neighbor, was born in Puerto Rico. She remembers coming to New York at age 5 without a coat "and it was winter." Her mother earned $20 a week sewing shirts and collars. She took in boarders, eventually bought an apartment building and sent her three children to college.

Puerto Ricans in the Twin Cities say there are many things they like here. But one thing that upsets them is the emphasis on race, said Michael O'Reilly, who came to the States from Puerto Rico about 30 years ago and was a founder of the local association. "We have Italian, African, Spanish, French and Irish heritage," he said. "In a family

Puert
have

By ANN BAKER
Staff Writer

Puerto Ricans, they s
things. They don't care m
sessions.

They do care about po
if he wants his island to
pendent country or to
monwealth status to the
talk your ear off, vigoro
view is the only one a san

But there is something
even more. Everyone t
family ... parents, gra
network of uncles and cou

"Your aunts would tal
they'd smack them one,
Burton. "You visit your r
ing them first. And that's
group here. It is like fami

By "the group" Mrs.
Rican Civic Association,
year ago. Its first public
next week at Macaleste
("The Ox Cart,") will be
27 and 28 in the college's
Theater. The production
"Spanglish," as some call
familiar Spanish word lik

The cast of
from left, back r
Burton, Luis
Jones, Isabelle
chelle Lopez.
Cardenas, Carr
Jason Garcia. "
says Ortega. "
made it and so
— the dream m
find a job and p
have food on
struggle has bee
us." — Staff ph

Skirted suit says 'authority figur

LA RAZA UNIDA
CRUSADE FOR JUSTICE
1567 DOWNING STREET
DENVER, COLORADO AZTLAN
80218

Dear Sir:

LA RAZA UNIDA means - The Race United. To explain the reasons behind the formation of LA RAZA UNIDA Party, the organization is making all LA RAZA UNIDA candidates available for speaking engagements in Denver or throughout the state of Colorado.

All groups, church, service and social clubs are urged to avail themselves of this opportunity.

Don't misunderstand the meaning of La Raza, now you can hear the story firsthand and have your questions answered.

For LA RAZA UNIDA candidates speakers please call;

789-3593

534-2706

545-5128 (Pueblo, Colorado)

Sin mas,

LA RAZA UNIDA
Crusade For Justice
1567 Downing Street
Denver, Colorado 80218



HEAR: * Andy Garcia (UMAS)
* Roger Martinez (UMAS)
* Antonio Archuleta (UMAS)
* Brian Sanchez
(La Raza Unida Candidate)
* LyLe Fulks (SWP Candidate)

SPEAK ON: Eye-Witness reports of the attack in L.A. & the direction of the Chicano movement.

L.A. cops in action

Photo by Dave Warren

On August 29th in Los Angeles, the National Chicano Moratorium anti-war demonstration which mobilized unprecedented numbers of the Chicano community was savagely attacked by the police. The attack came with no warning to the peaceful gathering of 40,000 people. It led to the death of the well known Chicano journalist Ruben Salazar and left numerous people injured. Several leaders and candidates of the Colorado Crusade for Justice and La Raza Unida Party were arrested on trumped up charges and later released. The peaceful protest was the target of an apparently planned, bloody police riot. How and why could such a thing have happened?

Colorado Univ. (Denver Extension)
1100 14th Str., September 18, Friday
Room 57, 12 p.m. – 2 p.m.

JOIN US !

BOYCOTT LETTECE BOYCOTT LETTUCE BOYCOTT LETTUCE

170 Mexican-American farmworkers in Center, Colorado, which is located in the San Luis Valley, are now striking against the Fresh Pict and Lee Consaul lettuce companies. They are striking for better wages and the right to collective bargaining. The number of children in each family ranges from 3 to 8. Money and food are needed to maintain the farmworkers in their peaceful struggle for equality and justice.

The wages in the fields in Center are much too low for the backbreaking labor involved. The farmworkers are asking $2.00 an hour for field hands and $2.50 an hour for supervisors. Some say that they are asking for too much. They say that if they had asked for less they would have been given a raise. This is said, but yet the lettuce growers won't even raise the wages 10 cents. When the potato season comes to the San Luis Valley, the potato cellars will be paying $1.75 an hour and the lettuce farmworkers are only receiving $1.40 an hour. If the lettuce campanies can't sincerely pay the $2.00 and $2.50 an hour, then they should show their sincerity by at least raising the wages to the level of the potato cellars.

The fight of the farmworker is one without weapons or fists. It is a struggle for justice, a struggle that can and must win. The farmworkers are fighting with their hearts so that all can understand that they are really trying to make a better future for their families. For those who don't understand, they are patient. For those who are violent, they show them their hearts.

Together as farmworkers and with your love and help they can win. Those now in the struggle can win for all. The lettuce is just one of many problems facing the poor. Together with your help and love they can correct these problems. With your help they can advance and get a better future for their children. They feel that they must strike for the future betterment of their children who will follow them.

The DICHO Y HECHO FARMWORKERS ORGANIZATION is the organization formed by the lettuce strikers. They are asking that all those interested in helping them please donate food, money, and support to their just cause. Please leave contributions in Denver at the American Friends Service Committee Office at 1460 Pennsylvania between 9 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. M-F. In Boulder leave them at 1150 Albion Street. For information or for pick-up service, please call 442-4229 between 8 a.m. and 10:30 p.m. Checks should be made payable to DICHO Y HECHO FARMWORKERS ORGANIZATION and sent to 1150 Albion, Boulder, Colorado.

We are also asking for your support by boycotting lettuce. DON'T BUY LETTUCE, so that our strike will be successful.

VIVA LA HUELGA VIVA LA HUELGA VIVA LA HUELGA

From the MOVEMENTS



BROWN POWER: Rebirth of the Chicos

RICARDO ONTIVEROS

A young breed of free spirits appeared on the American scene around 1938, gained national attention during the war years of the 1940s and continued into the early 1950s. They came primarily from northern Mexico across the border into El Paso, Texas, where the police department dubbed them *Pachucos*. The Spanish translation of this term is difficult, but it is generally taken to mean *punk*.

The Pachuco problem was controlled rather easily at first. The Border Patrol was then in its heyday, with plenty of manpower to deport the *malcriados*—bad boys—back to Mexico. By 1941, however, the problem was becoming more and more difficult to cope with.

Pachucos had begun to appear in other American cities. They were easily identified by their distinctive clothing, the zoot suit, which they introduced to the American fashion scene. The zoot suit consisted of baggy trousers tightly pegged at the ankle, long coats ending at the knee, and a long chain draped from waist to knee. Pachucos wore their hair in an exaggerated duck-tail style and developed a distinctive walk, known as the *Chuco* walk.

The police, the press and sections of the public reacted to the zoot-suit uniform, and harassment of the Pachucos began in the cities all over the country. In one riot in East Los Angeles over 200 young Pachucos and their girls were killed. The aggressors were primarily young men in the military and the action was condoned by the police. After such actions the Pachuco movement faltered and finally faded out around 1953. For the next 14 years, young Mexicans and Mexican-Americans in the United States were passive and avoided an identification with *La Raza*, the race.

The farmworkers' struggle exemplified by the grape strike in Delano, California, which started in September 1965 under the leadership of Cesar Chavez, was the first time in many years that the Mexican-American stood up and said: "I am a man, and a man of dignity, and I will be treated as such." Based on a philosophy of total nonviolence, this movement won the support of the liberal and student groups all over the country and eventually all over the world. It was followed by a more militant stand by the Crusade for Justice group in Denver, led by Corky Gonzales. Finally in New Mexico, Reies Tijerina in 1966 took revolutionary action to win back lands he felt rightfully belonged to the descendants of the Mexicans. He believed that the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo guaranteed the rights of those descendants to the lands.

Each of these Mexican-American struggles has been successively more militant. At the White House Conference on Mexican-American Affairs held in El Paso in 1967, Chavez, Gonzales, Tijerina and other leaders of the three movements came together and shared their experiences.

New stirrings among Mexican-American youth followed. The term *Chicano*, like the earlier *Pachuco*, has traditionally had a negative connotation to Mexican-Americans, and many older Mexican-Americans still bristle at the word. However, Chicano had come to identify the new Mexican-American, and the youth took it as their own.

The Chicano today is on the move. He shares similarities with his Chuco forerunners. Both express an attitude of a "free spirit." They share the identification with their culture and a desire to expand on their culture. Pachucos and Chicanos both adopted a uniform; the Chicanos identify with revolutionaries, particularly Ché Guevara. There is a bond of unity among Chicanos, as there was among Pachucos, which excludes non-Chicano or non-Latino groups.

But the times are different, and

RICARDO ONTIVEROS is Executive Director of the New Careers Development Organization in Oakland, California. He is a member of the Editorial Board of SOCIAL POLICY.

the differences between the Pachuco movement and the Chicano movement reflect this. The Chuco had no support, not even from the Mexican-American community; he was isolated and left to struggle and die. The Chicano, probably because of a climate set by the civil rights movement in general, is receiving support from the Anglo New Left and liberals, the Black Panther Party, and other militant black groups. Today's Chicano still faces opposition from the conservatives of all groups and the middle-class, semi-bought-off Mexican-American community.

Pachucos were concerned with turf, control of territory and the protection of their women. Today the young Chicano is interested in regional, statewide and national unity; conferences have been held in San Antonio, El Paso, Denver, Oakland, San Jose, San Diego and elsewhere and more are being planned to solidify the growing identification with *La Causa*. Chuco leaders were restricted to the small turf they could control physically; the Chicano leaders tend to have statewide and sometimes regional or national recognition. Chucos were almost entirely school dropouts; their garb brought out hostility, which resulted in their ostracism at school. Chicanos, on the other hand, include all segments of barrio youth; they range from elementary school through college age, both in and out of school. Pachucos had little time to expound philosophy or develop strategies for the future; their energy was needed for survival. The Chicano is beginning to formulate a philosophy around which a mass movement can rally, and they have developed an action plan, *El Plan De Aztlan*.

The Chicano movement is forcing the Establishment to recognize that they represent a substantial segment of dissatisfied people who must be dealt with. The Chicanos have already begun to push the Mexican-Americans and other Latinos who claim to be leaders of the Latin communities to be more forceful in their demands for equality, civil rights, human rights and dignity. More significant, there is now a Chicano constituency to provide new leadership and to back any Chicano leader, old or new, who is working for his people.

Now is the time for coalition with others who support our purposes and goals. Coalition, not co-optation. In the past, when the Chicano lent his support to causes he found himself used. The only exception to this pattern has been the association of the Brown Berets, a militant Chicano organization, and the Black Panther Party; the Panthers have dealt with the Chicanos as equals within a coalition for a common goal. Traditionally, we have been used to swell the number of protestors, but when benefits resulted, we were excluded. The developing political awareness in the Chicano community rejects further exploitation and exclusion.

Chicanos, the new Chucos, are giving rebirth to a spirit that is the Latino's heritage, a spirit for freedom and equality. The *Vendidos* of our community who have sold themselves no longer feel that spirit. The new Chicano is determined—never again!

LIBERATION DAY

September 16, 1970

Agenda

Master of Ceremonies

Youth - Richard Falcon, John Haro

Speakers

1. Andy Gavaldon (President of U.M.A.S., University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado)
    a. Education and youth
2. Ernesto Vigil
3. Lalo Delgado
    a. Migrants
    b. Poems
    c. Immigrants (Mexico)
4. Elizabeth Garcia (Pueblo Farmworker)
    a. Seasonal farmworkers
5. Al Gurule (Pueblo La Raza Unida)
    a. Politics
6. Ricardo Sanchez
    a. Indict Amerika
7. Leo Valdez
    a. Government Programs (Exposure)
    b. Economics
8. Fred Arguello (Bilingual Education)
    a. Education as we see it for the Chicano child
9. Corky Gonzales