League of Women Voters of Minnesota Records

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PLANNING A COMMUNITY PROGRAM ON NATIONAL SECURITY

1. Before you plan your program, you should assess the level of public understanding and awareness of national security issues in your area. For example, what are the issues that concern the public most? Are some people more interested in these topics than others? What kinds of assumptions do people make that may bias their understanding of the issues? What is their main source of information on these topics? Are some people afraid to express an opinion on these issues for some reason? The accompanying Public Opinion Poll might assist you in your assessment.

2. Given your assessment of the level of public awareness of the issues, what information do you think people should have in order to improve their understanding of the issues? Consider what has been most helpful to you in learning about these topics.

3. As your group begins to design a program, you might want to consider:

--What audience should be targeted? Should you aim for a general audience or a more selected group. Why? How will you attract that audience?

--What resources are available? (Expertise, facilities, funding, network of local Leagues, regionally based networks, etc.)

--Would it be more effective to work with other groups? If so, in what way?

--Do you have people to help? Will the program attract new volunteers? Retain existing volunteer pool? Develop new leadership?

When getting down to the format, consider:

--Should the media be involved? As a vehicle for the program itself, as a publicity tool, or as a reporting mechanism?

--Is it desirable to personalize or localize the issue? How could this be done?

--How can you assure that balanced perspectives will be presented or in some way represented in the program?

--Is it desirable to involve public officials to give the program more visibility and impact?

--What kinds of funds are available and how can more be obtained? Should you have one big program or break it into more specific parts that can be "purchased" by interested funders? Are there small foundations, family trusts, state education programs, corportations or businesses that might be interested in giving funds of in-kind services for all or part of the program?

AN EXAMPLE OF A COOPERATIVE COMMUNITY FORUM ON NATIONAL SECURITY

ACHIEVING NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

Denfeld High School, Duluth, Minnesota

October 17, 26 and November 1, 9, 21

A community series of the Duluth Community Services, Duluth Public Schools, in cooperation with the Duluth League of Women Voters and the American Association of University Women.

I. THE CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR WAR: Can it happen? What would happen if it did? October 17th, 7:00 p.m.

A. Film: "War Without Winners II"
B. Judith Arvold, M.D., Physicians for Social Responsibility.
C. Michael Andregg, Ground Zero.
D. A representative of FEMA.

II. THE HISTORY OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS BUILDUP AND NEGOTIATIONS. October 26th, 7:00 p.m.

III. SOVIET GOALS AND POLICIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICA. How the insecurities of the Soviet system affect the quest for a secure global environment, and the challenge which this poses to U.S. leadership.
November 1, 7:00 p.m.

A. Dr. John Kress, UMD.

IV. WHAT IS NATIONAL SECURITY AND HOW CAN IT BE ACHIEVED?
November 9th, 7:00 p.m.

A. Dr. John Harris, Political Science Department, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.
B. Dr. Barbara Stuhler, Associate Dean of Continuing Education, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.
C. A representative of the Department of State, Washington, D.C.

V. THE CANDIDATES' VIEWS, THE CITIZENS' RESPONSIBILITIES AND OPTIONS.
November 21st, 7:00 p.m.

A. Invitations will be extended to our Congressmen and Senators and to new Congressional candidates to attend this forum. Position papers of Presidential candidates will be sought as well.

FACT SHEET ON LWVUS ARMS CONTROL STATEMENT OF POSITION - issued 12/9/83

Local League participation in the League arms control study was very high; 909 LLs = 76%.

Consensus is very strong in support of arms control measures to reduce the risk of war.

The arms control objectives, ranked as very important, and to which LWVUS will urge the U.S. government to give the highest level of importance, are:

-limiting and reducing quantities of weapons;
-limiting the spread and prohibiting the first use of nuclear weapons;
-prohibiting first use and possession of chemical, biological and radiological weapons;
-reducing tensions.

There is also agreement that:

-the U.S. government should negotiate measures that inhibit development and improvement of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, that increase incentives to attack first in a crisis;
-as a long-term goal the League supports the world wide elimination of nuclear weapons.

8929

There is strong support for multilateral negotiations as the most appropriate means to achieve arms control. But it also is recognized that bilateral efforts are appropriate. Unilateral initiatives are not considered the most appropriate means to achieve arms control.

There is strong agreement that progress on arms control should not be linked to other foreign and military policy goals and that arms control measures should ensure fairness (areequitable and verifiable), bring progress (provide continuity and have widespread agreement), build confidence and protect the environment.

LWVUS approves the following arms control action:

-support for a bilateral, mutually verifiable freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons, to be followed by reductions;
-support for the merger and resumption of the START and INF negotiations;
-support for a comprehensive test ban treaty;
-opposition to development of new space weapons that would violate the anti-ballistic missile treaty;
-support for negotiation to prohibit deployment of anti-satellite weapons.

A full statement will be mailed from LWVUS within ten days.
For further information call the Public Affairs Dept. at LWVUS.
Contact was Jean Marbourg, LWVUS lobby corps, to Sally Sawyer, LWVMN.

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THE POLITICS OF ARMS CONTROL

an address by Robert E. Matteson

LWVMN State Convention

UMD - June 3, 1983

at the National Security Workshop

There is no more important issue facing America - or the world - than the subject of arms control in which I include disarmament and crisis stability. It is, therefore, highly important and very fitting that the League of Women Voters address this subject, "The Politics of Arms Control," at this current meeting here in Duluth.

There are many important issues facing the electorate in the upcoming election of 1984 - the economy, the environment, race relations, population growth, civil rights - but each of these pales by comparison with the issue of arms control and nuclear war which, of course includes, relations between the two dominant powers on this tiny space-ship earth - the US and the USSR.

The overriding political issue in the politics of 1984 and, for that matter, the remainder of this century, is the issue of "no existence or co-existence," of "to be or not to be". Every day of our lives, now, we are living on the brink of a nuclear holocaust and if such a holocaust were to occur, the US would cease to exist as a viable nation. Millions of us would be dead or incapacitated and life for those who survive would hardly be worth living. As Churchill once said, "The living would envy the dead".

This being the case, it is all the more amazing when people you and I know continue to say that the state of the economy should and will determine the 1984 election result. The fact is that the American people tend to be ignorant about the issue of arms control and because it is complicated they tend to put it out of their mind and leave it to Washington.

Last fall, my wife and I traveled alone across Russia with the purpose of sounding out the Russian people about arms control and US-Soviet relations. We took the Trans-Siberian railroad from Moscow to Irkutsk in Central Siberia and also visited Outer Mongolia and Tashkent and Samarkand. This past March and April, my grandson and I (with my wife coming along by car) went 2,000 miles down the Mississippi by canoe, by tug boat and by car from St. Paul to New Orleans sounding out the American people on the pluses and minuses of Ronald Reagan and on arms control.

We found the same paradox in both cases. We found that while the Russian people and the American people earnestly desire peace, their governments find it necessary to prepare for a nuclear war. The result is growing nuclear arsenals on both sides, greater government deficits and the spread of nuclear capabilities to other countries.

And each month there are false alarms at the North American Defense Command and each week there are political incidents around the world that could ignite a chain reaction that would end us all.

The fact is that, given this present, increasingly precarious situation, we shall look back with amazement if general nuclear war is avoided in the remaining few years of the 20th Century. So given this situation, the overriding question today is what can and should be done about it.

In the time that I have, I shall try to do two things - first, lay out the situation today as I see it and, second, give you my prescription for what needs to be done.

I do this from the following background in war and peace:

I served in the infantry and counter intelligence with Patton's 3rd Army in Europe in World War II.

I sat in, in April, 1947, on a long, ground-breaking midnight interview in the Kremlin between Joseph Stalin and Governor Stassen and also one with Nikita Khrushchev then, and again in 1956 in London.

I was Director of the White House Disarmament Staff under President Eisenhower and Stassen when we almost achieved the first significant arms control agreement in the post-war period and I was Director of the Arms Control Policy Staff under President Kennedy and John McCloy when we came up with the so-called McCloy-Zorin Statement of Agreed Principles in 1961.

I was on the Board of National Intelligence Estimates in CIA under Allen Dulles and on the Planning Board of the National Security Council addressing the US-Soviet problem.

This, then, is the background from which I approach the subject of arms control and security.

The Danger Spots Today

US-Soviet relations today are at the lowest ebb since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and we live in a world spotted with flash points.

There is a potential flash point in the Syrian-Lebanon area made more dangerous now by the introduction of Soviet advanced Surface-to-Air Ballistic Missile Systems and Soviet troops. There is another particularly dangerous flash point in Central America in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras with the call now for an increase in the number of US military and the escalation in aid from the Soviet-Cuban axis. There are potential flashpoints in Poland - with the June visit of the Pope; in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam; in Iran, Iraq and the Gulf area; in Afghanistan, in the South Africa-Angola area; and with an extremely critical situation coming up in December in Germany with the deployment of US Pershing II and Cruise missiles unless an arms control agreement is reached before that. Our children and grandchildren will look back with astonishment if we and the Soviet can pick our way through these mine fields without setting off a nuclear holocaust.

The Leaders: Andropov and Reagan

As leaders of the two most powerful nations on earth during this critical period, we have Andropov and Reagan. Andropov has recently been characterized by the French foreign Minister as "a computer,""lacking in human warmth". He is considered to be a conservative and has a health problem. He has so far been unwilling or unable to adopt bold new initiatives while he consolidates his power. The old Brezhnev faction, headed by Chernenko, is his principal opposition to making any far-reaching change. While knowing more about the outside world than his predecessors - because he headed the KGB for 15 years, he himself, like Stalin, has never been outside the Communist world.

Ronald Reagan, by contrast, is a warm, likable conservative idealogue who, of late, shows some signs of being more pragmatic. When he entered office, he knew little about either foreign or national security policy. He has been learning on the job and has departed some from his earlier confrontational, hard line, nuclear war-fighting positions. But like most people whose world is only their own country, he has had an exaggerated idea of the monolithic quality and overall strength of the Soviet Union. This, in turn, has caused him to adopt a military policy and position that tends to be extreme and exaggerated - and this, in turn, has caused the USSR to react with heightened rhetoric and with a more confrontational attitude in its policy.

Arms Control Negotiations

As we know, there are two principal arms control negotiations taking place - both in Geneva. One is the so-called INF negotiation - or Intermediate Nuclear Forces, which resumed negotiation May 17th. The other is the START talks which will resume negotiation in a few days on June 8th. The US negotiator in the INF talk is the veteran, hard-line Paul Nitze. His Soviet counterpart is Yuli Kvitsinsky. The US negotiator in the START talks is General Edward Rowney, formerly with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His Soviet counterpart is Victor Karpov - a man I knew well in the 1960's when we debated arms control at universities around the country.

In the INF talks, the US first put forward, on November 18, 1981, the famous Reagan "Zero Option". This meant that if the USSR would eliminate all of its SS-20s, 4's and 5's in Europe the US would not deploy its Cruise Missiles and Pershing II Missiles - which, unless there is agreement, will be deployed in December of this year in Europe.

The Soviet counteroffer was to agree to reduce its SS-20 INF weapons in Europe to 162 if the US did not deploy its Cruise and Pershing II Missiles. The 162 is exactly the number of the British and French INF. The US and British and French refuse to consider the British and French missiles to be part of the negotiation and the UK and French forces are independent of the US.

In the meantime - under heavy pressure from the nationwide Freeze Movement and our allies, the Reagan Administration has now countered with an offer to reduce to an un-

stated, lower, equal, interim level before proceeding to zero.

An interesting footnote is that in July, 1982 - in the famous "walk in the woods", Nitze and Kvitsinsky informally agreed to a level of 75 US Cruise Missiles and 75 SS-20s. This would have been a good beginning but Washington didn't agree and nothing came of it except that Eugene Rostow, head of ACDA was fired and the young, inexperienced, hard-line Kenneth Adelman took his place as head of ACDA.

In the START talks - which took the place of the SALT talks - the US advanced the position of reducing land and submarine strategic missiles to 850 with a total of 5000 nuclear warheads, with 2500 or fewer on land based missiles. At the same time, the US agreed to abide by the SALT II agreement which Reagan campaigned against and which, therefore, has never been submitted for ratification by the US Senate. More recently, the Reagan Administration - following the Scowcroft report - has indicated that it is shifting its position to an emphasis on controlling nuclear warheads rather than missile launchers and is moving to a Midgetman, single warhead missile and away from the MIRV missiles with its multi-warheads.

Most experts agree now that when the US went for MIRVs in 1974, it was a dangerous mistake, for it made possible a counterforce, first strike weapon which made less stable the strategic balance. The result was that the USSR then did the same thing. A great opportunity was lost. And even more recently, there have been indications that the US is adopting the "build-down" concept of Senator Cohen, Republican of Maine, and Senator Nunn, Democrat of Georgia, which means that for every nuclear warhead on a new missile the US and USSR build, they will reduce by two, their existing nuclear warheads. Added to this is a second concept from Democrats in Congress and adopted by the recent Scowcroft report - to raise the limit on launchers so as to be able to move to single nuclear warheads.

Two other developments of note on the US side that affect the upcoming resumption in Geneva of the START - or strategic arms talks, are the so-called "Star Wars" position of the Reagan Administration and the recent passage by Congress of a resolution giving the green light to the development of the MX missile. Both of these, I believe, are dangerous developments. The only relieving grace is that in exchange for the green light on the MX, President Reagan has promised to come forward with more negotiable proposals at the START talks. We should be hearing very soon what these are and this, in turn, should tell us whether the Reagan Administration - under pressure from the Freeze Movement and our Allies - is serious about arms control or whether it is only posturing for a public opinion advantage while accelerating dangerously the nuclear arms race.

The "Star Wars" position was referred to first on March 23rd by the President and then in testimony of two high ranking Administration officials in May before a Senate Subcommittee on a draft treaty to ban the testing and deployment of costly and dangerous

anti-satellite weapons - ASATs, as they are called. Instead of favoring such a treaty, the Reagan Administration seems bent on extending the arms race into outer space.

It is the US with its open society that needs more its peaceful reconnaissance satellites to tell us what the Soviet is up to and to verify existing arms control agreements. And it is both countries that can ill afford a costly, dangerous arms race in outer space. What is needed now is a comprehensive ban to pin down progress beyond the existing 1967 outer space treaty - one that would not only eliminate all weapons from use in space but from use on the ground against targets in space.

The other recent development referred to above is the green light on the costly, unnecessary MX missile. It has three principal disadvantages: no secure basing mode has been found for it; it costs 20 billion dollars at a time when the US is suffering from an unparalleled series of budget deficits; and it is a first strike, highly destabilizing weapon.

Finally, with reference to the START talks, the Soviet position has been to agree to a reduction of delivery systems to 1800 with freedom to mix between categories of weapons and a ban on long range Cruise Missiles. Accompanying this position was a warning that if the US deployed Cruise Missiles or Pershing II missiles in Europe, the START talks might be broken off.

The Reagan proposal to reduce ICBM and Submarine Launchers to 850 would mean that the Soviet would have to reduce its launchers by 1500 while the US would reduce its launchers only by 700 - hardly equitable in Soviet eyes. Also the Reagan proposal would reduce the Soviet ICBM warhead component by 3700 warheads and the US by zero if both were to come down to 2500 ICBM warheads. The reason is that the Soviets have opted to place greater reliance on ICBMs than the US and the Reagan proposal would be directed at that strength.

The League's "Politics of Arms Control"

Given this disturbing, existing situation, what then would be a prescription for the League of Women Voters "politics of arms control". By this I mean, what should the League's program of action be in this all-important area as the nation faces a 1984 Presidential election campaign.

Before citing a series of positions that I would prescribe, let me state a few conslusions drawn from the existing situation I have described above which are the basis for the suggested list of actions to be taken.

Conclusions

1. The US under President Reagan is engaged in a major gamble which is to so increase US military power as to hope to force an early accomodation by the Soviet Union or, failing this, to engage in an all-out arms race which he is confident the US would win and, if it led to an all-out nuclear war, he believes the US would survive and prevail. Such a policy is similar to the John Foster Dulles policy of "increased pressure" of the 1950s, as opposed to a policy of a "bolder exploration of relaxation of tension".

2. There is a basic difference between the US and Soviet views of arms control. The Reagan Administration believes that any arms control agreement should be accompanied by Soviet good behavior abroad. The USSR, on the other hand, believes that arms control by itself is so important that it should be agreed even if there is heightened tension in other areas of concern.

3. The danger in the current situation lies not in any calculated, overt move to war by either the US or USSR but in war by accident or miscalculation. In this regard, the USSR may have miscalculated that Watergate, the Vietnam debacle, the hostage rescue failure in Iran showed such US weakness that it allowed the Soviet Union to pursue adventures in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angola and other places.

4. A fourth conclusion is that Soviet behavior is not decisively affected by internal Soviet economic problems. In other words, US trade sanctions will not cause the USSR to change its behavior or cause the Soviet to collapse.

5. Most experts agree that the USSR is not growing in overall economic and political strength even though they are capable of mounting a military build-up to match any US military advances.

6. Most experts believe that US-Soviet relations are at the lowest ebb since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and that US deployment of missiles in Europe in December will make the situation even worse.

7. President Reagan and his top advisors - Schultz, Weinberger and Clark - do not have a background in foreign affairs and national security and are, therefore, at some disadvantage in dealing with their counterparts on these subjects.

8. Neither the Soviet Union nor the US is willing and ready now to agree to far-reaching steps toward general and complete disarmament. These can only come with fundamental changes in the political systems and outlook of each country.

9. Given the probable reality that the world will see neither general disarmament nor a nuclear holocaust in the 1980s, the best that probably can be hoped for in these years is detente without illusion that would increase US-Soviet communication and result in agreement on certain kinds of stabilizing arms control measures.

10. Finally, and very important, is the conclusion that an overall strategy must be developed. The Reagan Administration provides no apparent strategy thus far except to be anti-Soviet and build greater military strength.

Recommended Prescription for League action

Based on the above described present situation and resulting conclusions, I would recommend the following list of courses of action to be the League of Women Voters' agenda for action in "the politics of arms control" in the 1984 election.

First, it should support the nuclear freeze and reduction as set down in the recent Congressional resolution. The freeze is not so much an arms control measure as a political rallying force for more negotiable arms control measures.

Second, it should support efforts to stop the funding of the production of the MX missile.

Third, it should support those parts of the Scowcroft report that call for the development of the single warhead Midgetman missile; the development of small, ballistic missile submarines as an alternate to Trident submarines; and the elimination of the MIRVed missile.

Fourth, it should support efforts to ban all weapons in space. This means not only support for the 1967 space treaty banning all weapons of mass destruction in space but also banning weapons on the ground that can be used against targets in space.

Fifth, it should support a build-up in US conventional strength so that the US can move to a position of no first use of nuclear weapons.

Sixth, it should support measures to improve US command and control mechanisms and the US-Soviet hot line in order to reduce chances of war by accident and miscalculation. In line with this, it should also press for the frequent use of back-channel communications and private conversations between Secretary Schultz and Gromyko to develop breakthroughs on arms control.

Seventh, it should support the build-down proposal of Senators Cohen and Nunn of eliminating two warheads for every new one added.

Eighth, it should support measures to remove front line atomic weapons in Europe and to seek to revive the Nitze-Kvitsinsky "walk in the woods" agreement of last July - 75 US Cruise missiles and 75 Soviet SS-20s, or alternately, a lower level of an INF mix of US, UK, French and Soviet missiles.

Ninth, it should support the ratification of a modified SALT II treaty. It makes little sense to have a policy of adhearing to it but not ratifying it.

Tenth, and finally it should support the development of an overall long-term arms control and reduction strategy. The strategy should be one like that President Eisenhower laid down in his Second Inaugural Address in 1957 when I was Director of the White House Disarmament Staff under Governor Stassen.

That strategy consisted of three stages: First, the creation of a stable military environment through confidence-building separable arms control measures. With the series of 14 separable, agreed arms control measures since 1959, we are into that first stage but without, as yet, nearly enough progress in creating a stable military environment.

Second, the adoption of accepted rules of law, enforced by international organization and backed by a world court.

Third, the reduction of national armed forces under verified arrangements to the point where no nation or group of nations could effectively oppose the enforcement of international law by international machinery.

The accomplishment of these second and third stages sounds utopian at this moment in time but so did the creation of the United States in 1776. The baby must learn to crawl before it walks. And this first stage, we are now in, of trying to create a stable military environment, by agreed single measures of arms control, requires patience and perserverance and, above all, the education of the American public and Congress. This is where the League can perform a great public service.

As a starter in helping the Reagan Administration to develop a strategy to accomplish this - a strategy it now sorely lacks - we should return to the McCloy-Zorin 1961 agreement as a basis for this strategy. This agreement had bipartisan backing in the US. It was then agreed to by both the US and USSR on September 20, 1961 and by the UN General Assembly on December 13, 1961. It is known as the McCloy-Zorin Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations. It came during the Democratic Kennedy Administration. It was engineered by a Republican, John McCloy. At that time, I was Director of McCloy's Policy Staff which had on it Helmut Sonnenfeldt and Lawrence Weiler. This September 20, 1961 agreement was a logical sequel to the 1957 Eisenhower position referred to earlier.

Just three months ago, March 4, 1983, I had a letter from John McCloy asking me to refresh his memory on the genesis of that statement in 1961. He is now 87 and writing it up. I think I shocked him a little by what I told him - for at first, he had been opposed to the idea of a strategy for general and complete disarmament until I quoted to him his own words on this written in 1956 in the preface to a book by Henry Roberts on Russia and America.

That 1961 McCloy-Zorin agreement may now be in need of some modifications but it set down agreed principles as a basis for negotiation that had the following valid objectives: a UN peace force; the disbanding of armed forces and elimination of all armaments except those necessary to keep domestic peace; the implementation by timed stages of verified disarmament; equitable balance of armament at each stage; international inspection without a veto and with access to all places necessary for effective verification; and agreements on more limited measures which would facilitate and form part of the overall program for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

People will, of course, say this is utopian and looked on in light of the today's world, it certainly looks that way. But it provides a framework and a light at the end of the tunnel which both the Russian people and American people, I am convinced would like to have. On our Russian Trans-Siberian and American Mississippi trips this past six months, I found the people of both countries weary of heightened tension, massive military expenditures, gigantic budget deficits and the "nuclear sword of Damocles" perpetually hanging over their heads. In spite of their governments, I have found that people are pretty much the same all over the world. They want peace,

an end to inflamed rhetoric, an end to the arms race and an end to proxy wars. They want disarmament, peaceful coexistence and competition.

But, at the same time, I found the people of both countries believing that the problem was so complex it had to be left to Washington and Moscow. In conclusion, let me quote Jonathan Schell, in his recent book Fate of the Earth, on this point:

"At present, most of us do nothing. We look away. We are silent. We take refuge in the hope that the holocaust won't happen and turn back to our individual concerns. We deny the truth that is all around us. We drowse our way toward the end of the world. But if once we shook off our lethargy, the climate would change."

"Two paths lie before us. One leads to death, the other to life. One day - and it is hard to believe it will not be soon - we will make our choice. Either we will sink into the final coma and end it all or, as I trust and believe, we will awaken to the truth of our peril - we will break through the layers of our denials, put aside our faint-hearted excuses and rise up to cleanse the earth of nuclear weapons."

These are critical times and the 1984 elections, because of the growing importance of the arms control issue, could be one of the most important elections of this century.

The League of Women Voters can play a catalytic role. Thoughtful letters, well-organized workshops, balanced resolutions, articles and speeches can play an important educational and political role in setting this nation on the proper arms control course and making more probable the survival of this - our small space-ship "Earth".

Thank you for your attention.

League of Women Voters of Minnesota, 555 Wabasha, St. Paul, MN 55102 - November, 1983

National Security Opinion Poll

The purpose of the poll is to get a sampling of attitudes from a broad range of people, to help assess the level of awareness in the community about National Security issues. It could provide a feel for the assumptions and perceptions people have when discussing these issues.

1. What factors do you think contribute to U.S. National Security?
2. What do you think should be the role of the U.S. in the world?
3. What do you think should be the function of military power in fulfilling the world role of the U.S.?
4. Do you think the U.S. spends too much, too little, or just the right amount of money for national defense?
5. What is your main source of information about military affairs? About foreign affairs?
6. Is American military power too visible in the world today? Not visible enough? About right?
7. Do our European allies contribute too little, too much or about the right amount of resources to the Western Alliance?
8. Is the Soviet Union a force of political instability in the world today?
9. Does the CIA have a legitimate role to play in providing for American national security?
10. Was the United States justified in invading Grenada?
11. Have you been following the nuclear arms control negotiations? What is your reaction to the results so far?

(Use other side if needed to complete your answers)

Date: _____ Age: Over 30 ____ Under 30 ____

Male ____ Female ____

Developed by LWV-Duluth in cooperation with UMD Political Science Department.

League of Women Voters of Minnesota, 555 Wabasha, St. Paul, MN 55102 - October 1983

REPORT ON LWVUS CONFERENCE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

by Margo Smith, LWV-Michigan National Security Chair

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY: FACTS AND ASSUMPTIONS, was the topic of three days of intensive briefings at the Wingspread Conference Center in Racine, Wisconsin which I attended as the delegate from Michigan.

I joined League leaders from 49 states and the District of Columbia meeting at Wingspread June 9 - 11 to hear experts in the fields of military policy, arms control and defense spending, to analyze public priorities regarding U.S. commitments abroad, and to design strategies for citizen education programs in the states. Participants were asked to assist Leagues in their home states in conducting the League's ongoing national security study Leaders would also help to conduct public education programs about national security issues.

Each participant brought to the conference, from all the geographical areas they represent, a cross-section of American impressions on U.S. national security interests based on informal sampling of public opinions on the issues. In addition to a discussion of these attitudes, participants were briefed by a diverse field of experts, including the following:

- John Lewis Gaddis, professor of history, Ohio University, who gave the keynote address on premises underlying national security priorities;

- Frances Farley, former Utah State Senator, who spoke about the fight she let to prevent the basing of the MX missile in Utah and Nevada;

- Lt. Gen. Harry A. Griffith, Director of the Defense Nuclear Agency, who participated in a panel discussion on the role of military force in U.S. relations;

- William W. Kaufman, professor of political science at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who assessed U.S. defense capabilities;

- Alton Keel, Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs of the Office of Management and Budget, who gave an overview of the Reagan Administrations's defense budget;

- Judith Reppy, Director of the Peace Studies Program at Cornell University, who participated in a panel discussion on the basing of missiles in Europe.

The conference was sponsored by the League of Women Voters Education Fund and the Johnson Foundation, with the support of The Ford Foundation and The Rockefeller Foundation.

Here are two reports on presentations given at Wingspread. These presentations helped me to think about and to make sense of the issues. The first is a report on the keynote address by JOHN LEWIS GADDIS. *(John Lewis Gaddis is a Professor of History at Ohio University since 1969. He was a Visiting Professor at the Naval War College for two years and a Fulbright Bicentennial professor at the University of Helsinki from 1980-81. He is the author of a seminal study of U.S. national security policy: STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF POSTWAR AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY. Note: Read the article in the summer LWVUS VOTER for some of Gaddis' views on establishing priorities and maintaining consistency in national security policy.)*

"Premises Underlying National Security Priorities"...According to Gaddis, the prospect of imminent execution has the advantage of clearing the mind, forcing one to distinguish between what is significant and what is insignificant. Were Gaddis to be placed in that position and given the opportunity to forestall the awesome event only by accounting for all the inadequacies of our postwar national security policy, Gaddis might say something like this - our problems have grown out of a failure to distinguish interests from threats, to establish priorities and to take sufficient account of psychological phenomena. Problems have also occurred because of a failure to maintain consistency in policy and a failure to pay attention to evaluation of results.

"On the Relationship Between Interests and Threats"...Gaddis said that evaluation of both interests and threats is critical in forming national security policy. But it seems that there is a certain order that one must follow in dealing with these patterns if one's policies are to be successful. And that order involves forming a conception of interests in one's country before beginning to address the question of threats that exist, too.

To Gaddis, the world is full of potential threats if one is paranoid enough to seek them out. What keeps us from paranoia is the discipline of defining interest, of saying to ourselves, "This is worth fighting for and that isn't; therefore, this threat is dangerous and that one can be ignored or downgraded in importance."

To illustrate his point, Gaddis gave an example from our early history of the cold war. As articulated by George Kennan, who was then with the policy planning staff at the U.S. State Department, the original concept of containment proceeded first from a definition of vital interest. These interests were, according to Kennan, seeing to it that no more than one of the five great postwar centers of industrial power - the U.S. Great Britain, Soviet Union, Japan, the Ruhr area - came under the control of a hostile power. From that conception of interests, there arose a specific conception of threat,that is, the possibility that the Soviet Union might take advantage of the powtwar vacuum to extend its interests over either Germany or Japan. There followed specific policies to deal with that threat thereby making containment work.

This was not a policy of defense of all interest in the world. Some interests were vital- such as defense of Central Europe and Japan; others were not vital, like China, because they did not constitute centers of industrial power. The policy of containment was aimed at the Soviet Union and not at containing international communism in general.

This early policy envisaged working with Communists who were independent of Moscow's control. It took into account the limits of American power. According to Kennan, we lacked the resources to manifest our presence in every part of the world. Instead, we were to concentrate on defense of those interests most vital to us with means we could most feasibly bring to bear. This policy did not last long.

The shocks of 1949 and 1950 -- specifically, the victory of Communist China, the Soviet Atomic bomb, the alleged espionage in high places, the North Korean attack on South Korea- led to a reassessment of U.S. national security policy. The reassessment led to a blurring of the distinction between interests and threats. National interest was defined as not to protect Kennan's vital power centers or to preserve a balance of power but rather to frustrate the Soviet design for world domination wherever that was manifested. There were no distinctions between vital and political interests. All Communists everywhere, except for Yugoslavia, were seen as following Moscow's orders.

Due to the grave nature of this perceived threat, it was felt that the nation should commit itself to spend what was needed to contain the threat, regardless of budget deficits, taxes and inflation. This strategy of "panic" was brought about by a tendency to define interests in terms of threats. It allowed the other side to determine what was important and how and where the nation's resources were to be used.

According to Gaddis, had we proceeded along the line of the original strategy as outlined by Kennan, we would not have blundered into an unnecessary war with Communist China in the process of containing North Korean aggression. We might then have avoided continuing hostilities toward China and possibly another unnecessary war in Vietnam, which was in large part, premised upon containment of Communist China.

It was realized in the early '70's, that there never had been a vital interest to contain Communism in Asia, rather that our vital interest was to maintain a balance of power there. It was in our interest to see that no one power would dominate and that involved working with some Communist countries. We had lost some dominoes but this was counterbalanced by gaining the biggest dominoe of all - China. This strategy gives testimony to the advantage of thinking of interests in terms of interests rather than in terms of threats.

Gaddis asked, "Are we making the same mistakes today? What are the merits of the current Administration's Central American policy?" According to Gaddis, we have heard far more about threats that exist than about what our interests are. Should we be opposing Marxism? This implies hostility towards all leftwing governments in Central America. Or should our concern be working toward a balance of power which might imply working with governments of both left and right. How does one balance off the principle of self-determination, which we are supposed to be for, against the hostility which the application of the principle might produce? There are not precise answers to these questions, but to Gaddis, we must get out of the unfortunate habit of defining interests in terms of threats rather than the other way around.

CONDOLEEZZA RICE was a panelist in a discussion on the U.S. role in the world. *(She is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Assistant Director of the Center International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University. She is a specialist on Soviet and East European foreign and defense policy, international security and arms control.)*

"U.S. - Soviet Relations: How Serious is the Threat?"...According to Rice, competitive impulses exist between the two superpowers. These are based on certain assumptions each side has of the other. These assumptions have arisen from sharp differences between the U.S. and Soviets. The two have different social and economic systems, with the core disagreemen lying in the sphere of ideology - on how society ought to be organized.

As well, different historical experiences and geographic locations have let to different views of the world. Each has differing perceptions on how best to obtain security. Americans have difficulty understanding the psychology of a people who lost 20 million countrymen in World War II. It is equally difficult for the Soviets to understand what the nuclear age means to Americans. Our heretofore inviolate shores mean nothing in a nuclear age. This change in thinking wherein the Soviet Union stands as the only power capable of mass destruction of American power is a psychological tenet that the Soviets have difficulty understanding.

Americans also fear global Soviet design. They assume that Soviet behavior is aggressive and that any Soviet restraint is actually a tactic and not a real restraint. Any move towards socialism is viewed as positive by the Russians and negative by the Americans. Thus U.S. and Soviet views of "progress" are antithetical.

Although keen competion marks the realtionship, cooperative impulses do exist. For one thing, the U.S. and Soviets both feel the drain from escalating military budgets and secondly, each side fears ultimate annihilation. They both perceive limits to their power in the sense that this is a complex world and that events occur despite their influence. For example, Soviet arsenals did not stop the rise of Solidarity in Poland and reversals in Afghanistan, nor did U.S. power stop the Vietnamese victory or the uprising in Nicaragua... As well, both sides have allies who are interested in promoting cooperation.

Instead of focusing on the Soviet threat, Rice proposes a <u>management strategy</u> that deals with this competitive/cooperative relationship. Real differences should be separated from differences based on misunderstandings. Areas of cooperation should be sought, such as in arms competition, economic policy, international stability, culture, medicine, education and the environment. Lowering the rhetoric would also be more productive.

In such a management strategy, there is acceptance of cooperation and competition. Rice said that the U.S. should resist the temptation to swing back and forth between the two modes of behavior. Such swings confuse the Russians, our allies and fellow Americans.It is also important to make rules of the game both sides can agree upon so that confrontation does not spin out of control.

If the U.S. and Soviet relationship is looked at in these terms, then the key question becomes: "How great is the competition and not how serious is the threat?"

NATIONAL SECURITY AND OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES

by

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NATIONAL SECURITY AND OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES

The title for my talk today is "National Security and Our European Allies." It is not as paradoxical a title as it might first appear. In a very real sense, American national security policy is intricately linked to the activities and attitudes of our Western European allies. This clear linkage can be seen in two dimensions. The first of these is in the present-day reality that much of our national defense planning and capabilities are dependent upon the assistance, cooperation, and close working relationship of our NATO military and political partners. The notion of unilateralism as a defining feature of American foreign and defense policies has long since disappeared from policy-making circles in Washington. In its place has come the theme of interdependence among Atlantic partners. Policymakers have recognized, as have the vast majority of the American public, that a "Fortress America" approach to national security issues is no longer realistic or viable in the contemporary era. Today, the United States finds its national interests at stake in various sectors of the globe (most certainly in Western Europe) and is aware that its defense and security policies must be commensurate with such global challenges and opportunities. Most of all, Americans recognize that if such policies are to be successful they need to be coordinated with our friends in Europe and elsewhere.

The second "European" demension to American national security policy is found in the fact that most Western Europeans believe that they, themselves, have a considerable stake in the policy decisions that are rendered in this country concerning security issues and are determined to exert some influence over these "national" policy debates. Most Western European have looked to the United States in the post-World War II era as an important contributor to both European and global stability and security.

Many of their leaders have made mention of the "nuclear umbrella" that has been extended from Washington across the Atlantic to guarantee the security needs of the NATO participants. At the same time, however, the Western European politicians and people have insisted on some voice in collectively charting the security needs of the Atlantic Alliance. They point out quite correctly that not only have they shouldered a considerable proportion of the costs and responsibilities NATO defense shield, but that they have as much to lose (some would contend more) as the United States through a failure of adequate military preparedness and security policy development. As such, Western European leaders have sought regular opportunities to remind Washington decision-makers of the need for American security policy to be aware of and sensitive to European concerns and requirements.

In recent weeks we have all witnessed two political developments that point to this dual link of Western European participation in American national security policy. The first of these was the active courting by the Reagan leaders at the Williamsburg Summit to support Washington's proposal for the deployment of new American nuclear weapons in NATO. Such persistant pressuring--resulting in as formal, collective policy statement on the matter--is not only indicative of the United States government's continuing interest in maintaining alliance solidarity and loyalty, but also provides visible proof of Washington's belief that national security interests cannot adequately be advanced without Western European cooperation. The second event of some notice in this regard was the widespread anti-nuclear weapons protest which broke out in West Germany and Great Britain at about the same time as the Williamsburg Summit.

Led by new, popular political organzations like the Greens and the CND, these protest movements reflected not only increasing Western European disenchantment with present American nuclear defense planning, but a desire on the part of the broad European public for new input into Atlantic security policy development.

Despite such recent happenings, the real participatory link of the Western Europeans in United States national security policy remains largely unnoticed, obscured or misunderstood by most Americans--both at mass and elite levels. Occasional and sporadic awareness may be brought forth by media coverage of events like the summit or protest marches on the continent, but there tends to be no sustaining attention or interest directed towards problems of defense policy coordination within the alliance. As with most other NATO issues, the concerns raised by the Europeans are not deemed to be particlarly important or relevant to most Americans. Furthermore, many Americans fail to see why the Western European members of the alliance should be so upset with present security policy decisions.

Such an attitude points to the fact that many Americans have operated from a series of false assumptions in their dealings with their European alliance partners. They have assumed that "all is well" within the Atlantic Alliance and that Europeans and Americans see eye to eye on all defense and security policy issues. They also have made the further assumption that a tacit "senior-junior partnership" exists between themselves and their NATO allies. This "partnership" being one in which the United States provides the ideas for policy and the Europeans eagerly follow along. Americans have also rather naively assumed that what security policy decisions are rendered in Washington will have no significant detrimental ramifications for London, Bonn, Brussels or the other Western European capitals.

It is unfortunate that such existing perceptions are so badly out of step with the reality of contemporary United States-European relations. As opposed to this shore of the Atlantic, their exists in Europe an intense public interest in alliance defense issues and a deep awareness as to how American national security policy decisions have a continuing influence over the daily lives of Europeans. The problems associated with the proposed introduction of new American nuclear weapons into NATO have been covered extensively in the European press and media and have become the focus of heated domestic political debates in such countries as Great Britain, West Germany, and the Netherlands. As one German politician has noted the question of alliance security policy bridges the international and domestic polictical areas: The debate is "not just over national identities and sovereignty but also over where their citizens should fight and die."

In recent years increasing numbers of Europeans have questioned whether American-originated, alliance security policies are really in their own best interest. It is foolish for us here in the United States to fail to recognize that there are some very real policy differences between the Western Europeans and ourselves. Some of these are related to disparate views on the need for additional equipment and personnel support for NATO. Some emanate from dissimilar attitudes towards the role of nuclear weapons in alliance defense. Still others stem from differing visions of the impact of detente with the Soviet Union on alliance cohesiveness and solidarity. The Western Europeans, for the most part, speak openly of these disparaties in policy preferences and yearn to engage Washington in constructive discussion of all of their concerns. It is often a frustrating endeavor, however, when American officials refuse to acknowledge that there are any divisions of thought within the Atlantic Aliance.

Of perhaps greatest importance to the Western Europeans is a desire on their part to be free of the inhibiting "senior-junior partnership" relationship which has dominated alliance security policy formulation since the end World War II. The European membersof NATO, as a whole, want greater opportunities to help construct basic alliance defense policies and more of a voice in making equipment and personnel decisions. They seek the freedom as well to formulate European security arrangements with non-NATO nations and to negotiate directly with the Societ Union and Warsaw Post members for the stability and security of their own continent. In sum, the Western Europeans desire a "true partnership" based upon equality of footing and participation in policy setting. This was the clear message which each of the Western European leaders stated at the Williamburg Summit and at the last heads-of-goverment meeting of NATO.

Fortunately for the sake of continued cooperative United States-Western European relations, there are some signs of hope that Americans are beginning to open their eyes to the reality rather than their preferred image of the Atlantic Alliance. This is particularly true in the areas of defense and security issues. The Reagan Administration, far more that its predecessor, has engaged in consultation with its NATO partners and has listened to the concerns expressed by the European leaders over existing security policies. At the same time, there has been a marked upswing in trans-Atlantic discussion of nuclear defense issues between private individuals and groups. The extensive coordination and interplay between the pro-nuclear freeze groups on both sides of the ocean is perhaps the best example of this latter type of activity. Most heartening from my own academic vista, is the expanding contact and communication taking place between both policy-makers and advisors and their academic coterie. Defense and security issues of mutual concern are now being

addressed more extensively at conferences and in print than in the past. In place of the three books that were published in the United States during the 1970's on United States-European relations, there now have come over two dozen separate studies of particular concerns of the Alliance--several of which have been jointly authored by Americans and Europeans.

Rather than devoting any additional time in chronicling the changing attitudes and perception asociated with the evolving character of United States-European relations, I would disire to spend my remaining time with you this afternoon briefly outlining three basic questions which go to the heart of the continuing debate between the American and European members of the Atlantic Alliance. They are, first: How does Western Europe fit into the defense and security policies and planning of the United States? Secondly: What are the real policy and program disputes between the alliance partners, especially as they apply to nuclear weapons? Third and finally: What are the best methods and approaches that can be utilized to overcome such alliance differences? It is to these specific concerns that we now direct out attention.

Western Europe has become a cental feature of American defense and security policies primarily as a result of the continuing framework of the NATO Alliance. This sixteen member organization stretching from the United States and Canada in the west to Greece and Turkey in the east, encompasses most of the major non-communist industrial nations of the world. Organized in 1949 as a mutual defense pact between North America and Western Europe, all members states pledged to come to the aid of one another in event of external aggression especially in the case of attack from the Soviet Union. The alliance participants further agreed to work together in coordinating and harmonizing their defense strategies resources. In addition, they sought to improve cooperation among themselves in

the political and economic realms.

The NATO Alliance was to be the first of a series of such Cold War pacts that were to be concluded between the United States and friendly governments around the globe. Others were to follow including: CENTO, SEATO and the Baghadad Pact. Most of the latter have now passed from the scene. Today, besides the Atlantic Alliances, the sole remaining multilateral Western alliance of this earlier era in ANZUS which binds the United States to the mutual defnese of Australia and New Zealand.

From 1949 onward, the NATO alliance proved to have two primary benefits for the West. First of all, it gave the United States a organizational means to restrain Soviet expansionism and influence in Western Europe. (This was to be a regional application of the broader, American global policy of containment towards the U.S.S.R.) Secondly, the alliance provided to the Western Europeans not only a "shield of protection" against possible Soviet aggressive designs, but also a means to guarantee continued United States concern and participation in European security affairs. Clearly, an American-led Western political-military alliance would bring an end to the inter-war aloofness and unilateralism that has been characteristic of the United States' attitude towards Europe in the recent past.

Both of these clear benefits have continued to inspire ongoing American and European participation in the NATO alliance. The multilateral pact which has emerged has become a significant defense and security force in the world today. In terms of new, material, resources and destructive capabilities it surpasses all previously existing military alliance systems. It is rivaled only by the Warsaw Pact, a Soviet led multilateral pact of Eastern European states aligned to resist supposed Western aggressive plans.

Despite the significant benefits accrued to both the United States and the European alliance partners through the operation of NATO, the alliance has not been a marriage without problems. From the outset, there were a variety of disputes between the members which regularly threatened the pact's continuance. James Reston of the New York Times has quipped that: Three months after the signing of 1949 treaty, the first newspaper article, started to appear with the headline 'Trouble in the Alliance.' Likewise yearly seminars have been held among academics on the continuing theme of the impending collapse of the Atlanic Alliance. Somehow, however, NATO has continued to operate despite such disheartening diagnoses and has accomplished the remarkable feat of keeping peace in Europe for nearly thirty-five years.

Despite this enviable record, it should be reiterated that the alliance partners have differed in the past over policy and program. Similarly,there has not always been the complete solidarity which NATO spokesmen are apt to intone so regularly. There are a number of issues on which Americans and Europeans have had differing views. They include: What should be the overall objective of the all ance defense policy? How are these objectives best secured? Who should control the making of defense policy for the alliance? Who should pay for the operation and maintenance of the alliance? What types of weapons and forces are best suited for the defense needs of the alliance? Who should produce the weapons required by the alliance members? Who should control decision-making with regard to the deployment and use of weapons--especially nuclear weapons?

These various issues have been the focus of debate among the alliance members throughout the thirty-odd years of the NATO agreement. They have waxed and wained in their importance as perceived external threats have ebbed and flowed.

None, however, has been ever satisfactorily resolved nor fully debated and as a consequence they remain as unsettled issues on the alliance agenda that reappear as major concerns on a regular basis. They are also problems which tend to be as much political in character or they are military or security concerns. Furthermore, in attempting to reach some consensus among the various alliance perspective, decisions have been rendered on each of these issues which tend to please no member fully. The goal of policymaking in the past has clearly been one of attempting not to dissatisfy any member to the extent of forcing its withdrawal from the alliance as was the case of France in the mid-1960's.

In this regard, perhaps the most significant NATO ministerial meeting to be held in recent years occurred in December of 1979. At that meeting all of the above issues were addressed in one form or another. The meeting had been called at the request of the United States and of the European members (most especially West Germany) to consider overall NATO policy for the 1980's and to respond to new, perceived threats from the Soviet Union. There was a definite feeling on the part of Washington and Bonn that the alliance was experiencing a period of drift, lack of unified commitment and a shirking of responsibilities and burdens on the part of some of its members. Likewise, there was deep concern that new deployment of SS-20 missiles by the Soviet Union was endangering the stability and future peace of Europe. As a consequence, three basis questions were posed to the assembled delegates: Shall the existing NATO defense policy and security stance be re-affirmed and supported? Shall specific monetary and resource commitments towards backing such a policy and stance be undertaken by the members? Shall the Alliance deploy its own new generation of INF weapons to counter the new Soviet SS-20's?

As it turned out--under considerable pressure from the United States and West Germany--each of these basic policy questions were answered in the affirmative. In the concluding communique a restatement was made of the determination of the NATO members to stand and work together in a more effective fashion to carry out the agreed upon defense objectives of the alliance. (This amounted to a solemn promise to "do better" in the area of alliance solidarity.) In addition, a specific commitment was made by all those repesented to increase their respective national resource contributions to NATO by some three percent, thus shifting some of the financial burden of alliance maintenance off the shoulders of the Americans and West Germans. Most controversial of all, it was affirmed that by the end of 1983, 572 Pershing II and cruise missiles would be deployed in Europe. These new nuclear delivery systems were deemed to be the appropriate military response to the Soviet Union's SS-20's and were to be accepted for basing in the United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

Tied to this decision to upgrade the military capabilities of NATO was a European-inspired proposal that the deployment of the new American nuclear weapons be linked to a proposed set of negotiations with the Soviets to eliminate or reduce the number of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe. This "du l-track" approach of negotiation prior to deployment was seen by most of the European members of NATO as the preferred means of re-establishing nuclear parity and stability in the region and in harmony with their overall goal of detente with the Soviet Union. The United States reluctantly accepted the negotiation proposal as the "price to be paid" for European acceptance of any new nuclear weapons on the continent.

The December 1979 NATO decisions inspired a variety of responses from the players involved. The Soviet Union was predictably unhappy about the conditional European acceptance of the American cruise and Pershing II missiles. The Soviet leadership suggested in official statements that the Western Europeans were simply assisting the United States in "uping the ante" in the nuclear arms race and reiterated that they would never allow NATO to retain nuclear superiority in Europe. The Soviet press also lectured the Western Europeans for being merely puppets of American global security interests and for ignoring their own regional security needs. President Brezhnev, in the process of initiating the Soviet Union's own highly publicized "peace initiative" towards Western Europe, hinted that should the new American weapons be deployed in Europe, the whole foundation of Soviet-Western European detente would be endangered.

American reaction to the 1979 NATO decisions was rather jubilant. Policymakers in Washington felt that they had emerged from the talks with their European partners "victorious on all fronts," First of all, they had been successful in persuading the Western Europeans of the primary importance of securing an improved military posture for NATO. Secondly, they were able to convince the Europeans to accept the American view that NATO was but one element (albeit a critical one) of a wider, global, anti-Soviet alliance system. Thirdly, they were able to get the Europeans to grudgingly accept the idea that the United States should provide the basic policy ideas for NATO defense planning through the 1980's. Fourthly, they were able to shift more of the financial burden associated with maintaining the alliance from the United States to the Europeans.

Fifthly, they were able to convince the Europeans to accept a new generation of American nuclear weapons in Europe and to reaffirm the status of nuclear weapons as a major element of NATO defense preparedness. Furthermore, the Americans were able to persuade the Western Europeans to underwrite part of the costs of installing these new weapon systems. Finally, American military commanders were to be l ft with final authority over the deployment and use of these nuclear weapons in Europe. As might be expected, the Europeans were for less sanguine about the results of the NATO meeting. Behind the immediate post-conference "consensus" there existed grave misgivings on the part of several of the States represented. The Netherlands and Denmark, for instance, voiced specific objection to the introduction of the cruise and Pershing II missiles within months of the December 1979 meeting. Additional nations were uneasy over what appeared to them to be a new "confrontational" approach in NATO defense policy. Other raised concern over the possible forsaking of detente with the Soviet Union under pressure from the United States. More general resentment was voiced that: "Washington has done it to us again." It was suggested that European interests had again been treated as subservient to America, and that the junior-senior partnership relationship was still very much alive in NATO defense and security policy formulation.

Beyond offical governmental levels in Europe, increasing numbers of the general public of the European states began to openly oppose the NATO decisions. Peace and nationalist groups like the Greens in West Germany and the CND in Great Britain began to organize and stage massive protests against the planned deployment of new American nuclear weapons. Likewise, such groups and sympathetic political figures attempted to lobby their national leaders and Washington to reconsider their policy decisions.

Such public protests in Europe--and to a lesser extent here at home-- have generated serious doubts on the part of political observers whether the decision of December 1979 will be implemented. Likewise, they have sparked equally serious debates as to whether in the long-term they should be implemented. At least in the short term, such public concern in Europe and the United States have prodded the two superpowers to begin negotiations and a careful reconsideration of the general problem of nuclear weapons in Europe. Within the context of the INF talks in Geneva both the United States and the Soviet Union have been able to outline initial positions for further discussion. On the one hand there in the famous Reagan "zero-option" proposal, and on the other, Andropov's suggestion of linking Soviet SS-20 missile numbers to the nuclear arsenals of France and Great Britain. Unfortunately, we have witnessed to this date very little movement in public from these beginning proposals. As such, the clock for the deployment of the cruise and Pershing II missiles rapidly ticks onward while the Soviet and American negotiators still seem to be in the process at Geneva of digging in and staring down.

I do not bring with me this afternoon amy magic solution to resolve this apparent inpasse. However, I do concur with some of the sentiments which Richard Ullam has recently expressed in an article in Foreign Policy entitled "Out of the Euromissile Mire." Ullam brings to our attention that the Euromissile question has become as much a political test of wills between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the United States and its European allies as a true military question. He suggests that national prestige may be more on the line than national security in this question.

Ullam notes, for instance, that the number of nuclear warheads involved in this policy dispute represents less than five percent of the overall nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States.

Beyond this initial word of caution and plea for perspective in decision-making, I would suggest that a temporary freeze on the plan to deploy the Pershing II and cruise missiles has some merit. This is particularly true if such a freeze can allow for additional time for negotiations with the Soviets without great additional security risks to NATO. Not only would it seem preferable in the course of creating greater stability in Europe to reduce through negotiation the number of nuclear weapons deployed on that continent, but such a decision on the part of the United States might assist the process of a refashioning a true consensus on the part of the NATO governments and peoples as to the role of nuclear weapons in their alliance defense policy. In the wake of repeated protest marches, it is hard to argue that the 1979 NATO meeting truly provided a lasting, solid consensus on the issue.

Finally, I will leave you today with a brief list of methods and approaches to inter-alliance security issues which appear to me as being useful in heading off future disputes of the kind which confront NATO today. This list includes the following suggestions: First, all members of NATO must recognize that security policy is a community concern and not either just an "American" or "Western European" issue. Secondly, it is time for the old junior-senior partnership approach to policy decision making to give way to a new style which recognizes an equal opportunity of all member states to fashion NATO's collective goals and programs. Third, there needs to be a recognition that all members do make useful contributions to the defense of the alliance and that

there contributions will vary in kind according to the particular characteristics of the States involved.

Fourth, it is important to stress the idea that negotiation is as an effective route towards guaranteeing military stability and parity between alliance systems as is a mutual build-up of forces. Fifth, we should not hesitate to send additional forces and equipment in a crisis situation to Europe or when a genuine, unrectified imbalance persists. Sixth, we need to improve both the quality and quantity of discussion of mutual problems between alliance partners to avoid future misperceptions and misunderstanding. Seventh, we need to increase the amount of public involvement in deciding important issues as national security policy to ensure that it truly reflects the opinions of our democratic societies.

In conclusion, I would argue that the League of Women Voters and other similar organizations here in the United States and in Western Europe are making significant strides towards publicizing the issue of national issue policy and ensuring its public accountability. I congratulate you on your efforts and urge your continued interest and work on the subject.

League of Women Voters of Minnesota, 555 Wabasha, St. Paul, MN 55102 - October 1983

OUR NATIONAL SECURITY: WHY WE SHOULD BECOME INVOLVED

Recently, there has been an upsurge in the belief that matters of our national security, particularly war and peace, are much too important to be left solely in the hands of our elected officials. We must take an active role in the formation of policies in international relations on these matters.

Barbara Tuchman, a Pulitzer Prize winning historian recently said, "Control of nuclear war is too serious a matter to be left any longer to governments. They are not going to get it for us; in fact, they are the obstacle." She also quotes President Dwight Eisenhower who said, "People want peace so much that one of these days governments had better get out of the way and let them have it." As Eisenhower also talked about, "...what is the true security problem of the day. That problem is not merely man against man or nation against nation. It is man against war." He continued to say, "...we are rapidly getting to the point that no war can be won. War implies a contest; when you get to the point that contest is no longer involved and outlook comes close to destruction of the enemy and suicide for ourselves--an outlook that neither side can ignore--then arguments as to the exact amount of available strength as compared to somebody else's are no longer the vital issues. At this point, "destruction will be both reciprocal and complete."

The public possesses a widespread fear of nuclear war and this must not be lost, according to Tuchman. She also says, "The ultimate objective must be kept in view: not to control weapons per se but to control war." In conclusion, she states:

> Through existing antiwar organizations, national and local, statewide and town-based, myriad in variety and membership, the public voice must continue to make itself heard. It has been growing in Europe and the United States in the last few years, and it must not now falter or fade. It is the only check we have on the imbecility of governments.
>
> One lesson has been learned since Vietnam: the executive cannot conduct a war without public support or against the national wish. The course we take rests with the people and their votes.

As citizens, we can exercise our right to vote. But that vote must be an informed vote. As the issues evolve, our votes for candidates who also are informed on the issues of war and peace may be some of the most important ballots ever cast. Our involvement is legitimate and necessary.

September 2, 1983

Dear Fellow Leaguers:

On Tuesday, September 27, 1983 our League will conduct Part One of the new National Security study. The meeting will start with coffee at 8:45 A.M. and at 9:00 A.M. promptly the program will begin. It will be held at the Community Services Building, Room 205 as usual. Because there is a consensus the meeting will continue to 12:00 o'clock. On Saturday, October 1, at 9:00 A.M. there will be a repeat meeting held at the Park Bench Eatery and Soda Fountain in Spring Park for those who cannot attend the Tuesday meeting.

The National Security study, Part Two, with another consensus will be held at our February meeting.

Needless to say, this is an exceptionally emotional and timely topic. It is also one of great magnitude. Therefore, it is imperative that there be home study so that consensus may be reached by an informed and knowledgeable membership.

The National Security study is under the International Relations portfolio. As a review, our International Relations position is:

> Promote peace in an interdependent world, through cooperation with other nations, the strengthening of international organizations and continuing efforts to reduce the risks of war including negotiations, disarmament, arms control and a bilaterally verifiable freeze on nuclear weapons.

The presentation at the meeting will focus on arms control (enclosed brown publication, THE QUEST FOR ARMS CONTROL: WHY AND HOW). As a forerunner to the study of arms control, it is necessary to understand military policy and weapons capabilities. A study guide with detailed information is attached so that every member may come to the meeting well prepared by having studied the enclosed green publication, PROVIDING FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE: A MILITARY POLICY READER. This will not be covered at the meeting.

Please bring this packet of information to the meeting with you.

We are very fortunate to have in hand excellent publications from LWVUS. We urge everyone to attend the meeting having done their homework. It promises to be an outstanding effort!

Sincerely,

Jo

Jo Longpre, Chair
Helene Borg
Martha deVos
Mimi Baker
Judy Anderson
Ann Thomas, Consensus Recorder

Doubting the experts is not so dumb

By Russell Baker
The New York Times

New York
My position on the nuclear freeze is that the government ought to stop telling me I'm too dumb to have an opinion on it.

Of course it's a complicated business, but it's nowhere near as hard to understand as economics, and during the elections this fall President Reagan urged everybody in the country to have an opinion about his economic policy. So did every other politician in the government, as well as all of those who hoped to get into the government.

There is something intimidating about a man who can talk about "mutual assured destruction" in a Middle European accent. It sounds so much more profound than it does when discussed in a Middle Western drawl.

I abandoned this theory after noting that many delicatessen countermen in New York also speak in Middle European accents, yet have trouble making change. And anyhow, what had Middle Europe ever produced except incessant warfare?

Gradually, I evolved another theory; namely, that nobody bothers to challenge them because nobody has yet had provocation to do so. When an economist's theory puts you out of

of shingles will give you a lot more insulation."

If he goes on to third, fourth and fifth layers, sooner or later I'm going to say, "Are you sure you know what you're doing?" and if he says, "Shut up, dummy, and worry about something like plumbing," I'm going to develop some strong roofing theories of my own, the first one being that I don't need a 30-story pile of shingles to keep me adequately insulated.

Now nuclear strategy is more complicated than roofing, and I don't want to suggest it isn't. On the other hand, economic policy is more complicated than nuclear strategy (if you think it isn't, just send me your

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Version 3
March 18, 2019

NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY

FOCUS: "To evaluate U.S. national security policies and their impact on our domestic programs and our relationships with other countries."

SCOPE: "Define the nature of national security and its relationship to military spending. Assess the impact of U.S. military spending on the nation's economy and on our ability to meet social and environmental needs. Determine the effects of U.S. military policy on our relationship with other countries."

GOALS:

1. to sharpen member awareness of the nature of national security as variously interpreted and to discuss U.S. military policy with emphasis on those areas that affect arms control efforts -- U.S. relationships with other nations and weapons capabilities of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

2. to review and discuss the evolution of arms control initiatives and the objectives they seek to achieve and to develop criteria for the LWV to use in applying the LWVUS position in support of "efforts to reduce the risk of war."

To fulfill the scope and focus of the adopted motion, the national board outlined for League study three areas of public policy:

1. MILITARY POLICY: the theories and strategies that underly military policy decisions: the role and capabilities of weapons; and the impact of U.S. foreign and military policy on other nations;

2. ARMS CONTROL: the evolution of arms control initiatives and measures

3. DEFENSE SPENDING: the cost of fulfilling military policy objectives.

In order to move from study to action, the national board approved four areas in which to seek member agreement/consensus:

1. Arms control objectives and criteria:	Reporting deadline: October 31, 1983
2. Military policy objectives	Reporting deadline: March 15, 1984
3. Defense spending	Reporting deadline: March 15, 1984
4. The national security decision-making process	Reporting deadline: March 15, 1984

The League's decision to undertake a study of National Security comes at a critical time in the nation's history, a time when American citizens are showing unprecedented concern over national security policies and the threat of nuclear war. At the core of the public debate are a number of questions centering on "how much is enough?"

Do we need to strengthen U.S. defenses to deter the Soviet Union?
Should the strategic nuclear weapons of both the U.S. and the Soviets be reduced: If so, by how much?
How much money should the United States spend on defense in an era of constrained budget resources and economic uncertainty?
How many promises of support can the United States extend to other countries?

The new National Security study will build on existing international relations, social policy, government and natural resources positions. If members agree on criteria and objectives for evaluating arms control proposals, negotiations and agreements, the LWV UN position will be given much needed definition that can be used to judge an arms control effort to "reduce the risk of war." By evaluating current military policy and seeking member agreement on what is needed to implement military objectives, the League may then enter fully into the debate on the federal budget, evaluating defense spending in relation to domestic and development aid spending. By examining the process by which decisions on military policy are made, the League may also find new applications for its Citizens Rights position.

******** S T U D Y G U I D E ********

The concept of National Security means different things to different people. With that in mind, we are going to take a deeper look into military policy. Why are we going to consider military policy before moving on to arms control? Because two aspects of military policy - U.S. relations with other nations and U.S. and Soviet military capabilities -- have important implications for arms control.

Background reading for:

--- the many perspectives on what constitutes national security (Attached PROVIDING FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE: A MILITARY POLICY READER - green publication - page 1.)

--- the blending/clash of foreign and military policy objectives in the post World War II era
(Attached PROVIDING FOR THE COMMON FENSE: A MILITARY POLICY READER - green publication - page 1. Lessons of the past through page 4. Soviet Strategic Policy; page 8, Alliances, and The Third World.

--- the purposes and capabilities of weapons in the U.S. and USSR arsenals (Attached PROVIDING FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE: A MILITARY POLICY READER - green publication - page 4. Comparing Launcher Capability through page 7.)

CONGRATULATIONS! You are now ready to study Arms Control!

Consensus

14

LWV of _____ State _____

Arms Control Objectives	1. What level of importance should the U.S. government give to each listed objective of arms control negotiations to reduce the risk of war? HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	SHOULD NOT BE AN OBJECTIVE	NO OPINION/ NO AGREEMENT	2. Which type(s) of negotiations or initiatives (multilateral, bilateral and/or unilateral) are *most* appropriate for achieving each objective? (You may check more than one box per objective). MULTI-LATERAL	BILATERAL	UNILATERAL
A. Limit quantity of weapons								
B. Reduce quantity of weapons.								
C. Prohibit possession of certain weapons: 1. nuclear								
2. nonnuclear, (biological, chemical, radiological)								
D. Prohibit first use of certain weapons: 1. nuclear								
2. nonnuclear (biological, chemical, radiological)								
E. Inhibit development and improvement of weapons								
F. Limit proliferation of nuclear weapons: 1. geographical (e.g., zones, seas & space)								
2. horizontal (i.e., to other nations)								
G. Reduce tensions, (e.g., *hotline)*								
H. Other: _____								
I. Other: _____								

SAM ONLY

Please weight* the criteria using the following scale:
1. **Essential**
2. **Desirable**
3. **Unimportant**
4. **Not Desirable**
5. **No Opinion/ No Agreement**

LWV of _____ **State** _____

3. What criteria should be used to evaluate arms control proposals, negotiations and agreements?

IF the objective of negotiations is to: / **THEN our LWV assigns the following weight* to these criteria:**	Limit quantity of weapons	Reduce quantity of weapons	Prohibit possession of certain weapons: nuclear	Prohibit possession of certain weapons: nonnuclear (biological chemical radiological)	Prohibit first use of certain weapons: nuclear	Prohibit first use of certain weapons: nonnuclear (biological chemical radiological)	Inhibit development and improvement of weapons	Limit proliferation of nuclear weapons: geographical (zones – sea space)	Limit proliferation of nuclear weapons: horizontal (to other nations)	Reduce tension	Other
Equity (The terms are mutually beneficial; i.e., no party is vulnerable)											
Verifiability (The process of determining that "the other side" is complying with provisions of an agreement)											
Linkage (Tying progress in arms control to progress in other foreign or military policy goals)											
Continuity (Continues progress or builds on previous agreements)											
Confidence Building (Crisis control mechanisms, advance notification, etc.)											
Environmental Protection											
Widespread Agreement (Ratification or approval by appropriate parties)											
Other:											

SAMPLE ONLY

LWV National Convention - Houston, 1982

Ellen Goodman 5/22/82

Women for Peace, From Way Back

HOUSTON—It was 61 years ago, at the very first meeting of an organization dubbed the League of Women Voters, when Carrie Chapman Catt, the president and founder, delivered a plea for peace to a group of brand-new voters.

No one was surprised to find peace so high on the agenda. The suffragists who founded the league in the flush of victory had an ideal, would make a difference—bring a special set of values with them into politics. They could do no less than transform the world.

Well, it didn't happen that way. Yet on Monday, at the league's national convention, they turned to that issue again. A sentiment had grown up from the grass roots of this sturdy, even dogged, "good government" organization: it was time to tackle the questions of bombs and butter, national security and national insecurity.

In careful League-ish prose, the delegates approved a resolution to "evaluate U.S. national security policies and their impact on our domestic programs and our relationships with other nations."

But what is different this time isn't the sentiment. It's the new power behind this "peace" concern. We are, just now, beginning to see what those suffragists envisioned, a distinctive and real vote among women along the lines of their own values.

In the days before suffrage, women held the standards of caretaking, nurturing and peace. But they held them in "their place," at home. It took more than an amendment to change that. It took decades of growing self-confidence and access to the wider world. It took the women's movement to foster women's political independence.

We can clock the times and places when women's views began to firmly diverge from men's. From 1975 on, in polls, women have been less willing than men to sacrifice quality of life to economic growth. By 1980, 54 percent of women disapproved of building a neutron bomb while 54 percent of men approved of building one. By late 1981, women were more likely than men—by nine points—to say that the proposed Reagan cuts in social programs were too high.

Today a pack of pollsters and analysts is trying to assess this thing, the women's vote. They agree on at least three possible reasons why women are more alienated than men from Reagan and the Republican Party: women's rights issues, cuts in social programs for the poor, fear of nuclear war.

Reagan pollster Richard Wirthlin described the "women's vote" to me as complicated, conflicted, still mysterious. But in one sense it is simple. All three of these concerns—equal rights, "fairness," peace — can be fairly placed under the umbrella labeled "values."

As pollster Pat Caddell reads it: "We're seeing a different perception in values, concerns, priorities. Women aren't willing to make the same trade-offs for economic growth, and they have a very real skepticism about machismo in foreign policy."

For perhaps the first time, women are bringing their values into politics, and sticking with them. For the first time, men are the followers. Over the past year, in one poll after another, women have staked out a clear position—against Reaganomics, against nuclear arms—and gradually men have drifted over to share those beliefs. If Reagan has modulated his tone on nuclear disarmament, it is largely because of this constituency.

I am not as comfortable as the suffragists in claiming higher virtue or morality for women. I can't talk about "women's values" as if all women share them and all men ignore them. It's not true.

Yet there is a real difference, a statistically significant difference. For whatever reasons—because of our culture, because of our history or because of motherhood—nonviolent convictions are more pervasive among women.

It was true that day in 1921 when Mrs. Catt spoke to the League. But 61 years later, women have finally gained enough assurance about themselves and skepticism about leaders to coalesce around this issue. Perhaps they needed distance. Perhaps they even needed the ultimate anxiety about the half-hour nuclear holocaust.

Now, in large meetings like this one across the country, and in small encounters, there is a real sense that women who have been working for their rights are also working for their values: values that put caretaking before missiles, love before glory, the urge to survive over the urge to fight.

They bring with them today the clout of their convictions.

BEGINNING NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY

by Mary VanEvera
State Chair, National Security Study

The militarization of the world is progressing, the changing military policy of the U.S. is clouded and confused, with the danger of nuclear war and USSR-U.S. relations still our focal concern. Citizens waiver between apathy and unprecedented assertiveness in asking for policies that reduce the risk of war.

If national security is the most important U.S. public policy issue of our generation, it is time that we understood it. The LWV is specially fitted to investigate, to ask what our national security policy is, what tools are used to deal with the issues of conflict and by whom in our pluralistic society this policy is being made.

The study will include military policy, arms control and defense spending. Consensus will be sought on arms control objectives and criteria, military policy objectives, defense spending, and the national-security decision making process.

By putting consensus on arms control criteria first, the LWVUS position will be given definition that can be used to judge an arms control effort to "reduce the risk of war" (as our position reads).

Start reading and discussions now. Look for answers to some of these questions before your spring unit meetings: What does national security mean to different people?

What assumptions underlie the statements people make when they state their views on foreign/military policy?

How have Soviet actions and policies affected U.S. foreign policy objectives, especially in Europe?

In what ways have U.S. political and economic interests abroad expanded since World War II?

In what cases have U.S. military policies been consistent with the foreign policy objectives they were designed to implement? Inconsistent?

To what extent do U.S. and Soviet foreign and military policies fuel or sustain the arms race?

When you begin your National Security Study you will be affirming your faith in the public's ability to understand and to affect governmental policy, casting off the temptation to deny the gravity of our situation, and recognizing that educating ourselves is our necessary first step.

Dear Fellow Leaguers:

On Tuesday, September 27, 1983 our League will conduct the new National Security study, which includes a concensus.

Needless to say, this is an exceptionally emotional and timely topic. It is also ONE of great magnitude.

The presentation at the meeting will focus on arms control. As a forerunner to the study of arms control, it is necessary to understand military policy and weapon capabilities. A study guide with detailed information is attached so that every member may come to the meeting well prepared.

It is imperative that there be home study so that concensus may be reached by an informed and knowledgeable membership.

We are very fortunate to have in hand excellent publications from LWVUS. We urge everyone to attend the meeting having done their homework. It promises to be an outstanding effort!

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International Relations Position: Promote peace in an interdependent world, through cooperation with other nations, the strengthening of international organizations and continuing efforts to reduce the risks of war including negotiations, disarmament, arms control and a bilaterally verifiable freeze on nuclear weapons.

NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY

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To fulfill the scope and focus of the adopted motion, the national board outlined for League study three areas of public policy:

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In order to move from study to action, the board approved four areas in which to seek member agreement/consensus:

1. Arms control objectives and criteria: Reporting deadline: Oct. 31'83.

2. Military policy objectives Reporting deadline: March 15,'84

3. Defense spending " " " "

4. The national security decision-making process " " " "

The League's decision to undertake a study of National Security comes at a critical time in the nation's history, a time when American citizens are showing unprecedented concern over national security policies and the threat of nuclear war. At the core of the public debate are a number of questions centering on "how much is enough?"

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(Attached PROVIDING FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE: A MILITARY POLICY READER, page 1. Lessons of the Past through page 4. Soviet Strategic Policy; age 8, Alliances, and The Third World.

---the purposes and capabilities of weapons in the U.S. and USSR arsenals (Attached PROVIDING FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE: A MILITARY POLICY READER, page 4. Comparing Launcher Capability through page 7.)

CONGRATULATIONS! - You are now ready to study Arms Control!

(1983)

UN—National Security study links

Leagues that traditionally do UN programming in the fall might want to consider tying the new National Security study to some aspect of the United Nations.

For example, you could look at the issue of "global security" and its relationship to development, the environment, food and hunger or energy. UN Day and World Food Day are good opportunities for programs (see National Security study).

While the NS study certainly will be the major focus of IR activities during this biennium, there will be ways for you to mesh international concerns with your other activities. We'll try to give you hints throughout the year on ways to build an international perspective into other activities you have under way in the areas of water, energy, human needs, etc.

National Security study

Although the National Security study adopted at Convention '82 is a new item on the League's agenda, we know that many Leagues have already done a great deal of spadework on the issues and are anxious to move forward. For others, however, it will take a little more time to appoint study chairs, set up committees and become acquainted with the range of issues that fall under the umbrella of national security. Study activities, combined with the September-October nationwide membership campaign, the fall-winter concurrence on Public Policy on Reproductive Choices, and your activities on state and local programs, promise to make for a busy fall season.

The national board took all these factors into consideration in designing the preliminary management framework for the study, as outlined in the June *Post Board Summary* (see box). The schedule offers some breathing time for those of you who need to catch your breath, yet opens up the opportunity to use the study as a major attraction to new members. The National Security Committee will meet in late August to work out a more detailed study plan. The more complete schedule will appear in the September *Post Board Summary*.

In this *Prospectus* we offer some guidance on current discussion topics that might serve as the basis for a fall meeting. The annotated resource list of articles and books is itself a "mini-guide" to possible meeting topics, as well as a roadmap to more information for resource committees. In addition, we've suggested some activities that Leagues may want to participate in with other organizations—another way to advance the League's involvement in the community and gain new members. And to cap that off, there are ideas on how to use the study to generate media attention (see Public Relations section).

Wrap up: UN Special Session on Disarmament

The background of disarmament

During the course of five weeks from June 7–July 10, seventeen heads of state, including President Reagan, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and forty-four Foreign Ministers, led by Andrei Gromyko of the Soviet Union, addressed the second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (SSOD II) at the United Nations in New York.

This second Special Session, a follow-up to the first Special Session on Disarmament held in 1978, was planned to review the world situation, evaluate previous disarmament efforts and look at new initiatives and the mobilization of worldwide public opinion. Its goal was not to negotiate an arms control agreement, but rather, to exert a general pressure on negotiations that are underway elsewhere.

Much has changed on the world scene since 1978. At that time, the United States and the USSR were working to gain acceptance of SALT as a major step toward disarmament. Four years later, the SALT process has been replaced by

From June 1982 Post Board Summary

National Security

Board discussion and decisions also created a management frame for this new study.

- Dorothy Powers will chair the committee for this study. it will include off-board appointees.
- Board discussion made clear that the League's evaluation of U.S. national security policies will include arms control and military spending as well as other related issues.
- International Relations staff will be increased, in accordance with budget adjustments made at the convention. They will work primarily on this study.
- A partial calendar was developed:

—**In July,** the next *Report from the Hill...* will delineate the kinds of actions that are possible under *present* IR positions.

—**In this PBS,** a summer reading list of five recommended resources....

—**In August,** a package of materials to presidents and DPM subscribers, for use by resource committees. It will include a report of the outcome of the Second Special Session on Disarmament; the status of SALT, START and other arms reduction efforts; and a more extended list of resources.

—**In the fall VOTER,** an article will lay out the overall issue of national security in a nuclear age.

—**By late fall or early winter,** Leagues will be sent resource committee guidance on the focus and staging of the National Security study.

—**Later in this League year,** the board also will establish a schedule for publishing every-member material and will determine a consensus deadline.

As this calendar moves forward, there will be a search for grant funding [see FINANCE section], though the conduct of this study is in no way dependent on such funding.

RECOMMENDATION: Leagues that are straining at the starting gate and want to have meetings this fall are urged to follow the prudent course of designing *very* open-ended meetings, using outside expert(s), in order not to precondition the course of the study. Such meetings might be an inspired way to attract new members.

Regardless of whether or not you hold a meeting this fall, be SURE to put in your calendar a spring 1983 membership meeting (unit or general) on the National Security study.

START. And during those intervening years, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan; U.S. embassy personnel were held hostage in Iran; and the Solidarity movement was born and suffocated in Poland—all incidents that have helped to fuel a new stage in the cold war.

Even as SSOD II opened, major conflicts in the Falkland Islands and the Middle East threatened peace. Participants were faced with the steady growth in worldwide arms sales—rising from $350 billion in 1978 to an estimated $600 billion today and involving many more Third World nations as recipients and sellers—and pressure from a burgeoning antinuclear movement to halt the arms race, as evidenced by the June 12 mass demonstration for disarmament in New York.

"All of these factors, according to Yugoslavia's Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Lazar Mojsov, who presided over the first Special Session, "have magnified the lack of confidence between the two superpowers." As a consequence, very little of the 129-paragraph Final Document adopted unanimously by the first Special Session has been implemented. Of the many proposals in its Programme of Action for nuclear and conventional disarmament, only a convention against the use of inhumane weapons has been signed. Some new disarmament machinery has been put in operation and the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament now includes all five nuclear weapon states.

Delegates came to SSOD II from all over the world to express their concern about the arms race and to put their national policies in the best possible light. Most nations used the rostrum to decry the lack of progress on disarmament, but there was little consensus on the means to improve the situation. Few major new initiatives emerged in the public speeches.

The sounds of disarmament

The following excerpts from delegate speeches provide a glimpse of the occasion's rhetoric.

"The fundamental fact about the present arms situation is that neither in quality nor in quantity can it be compared with any faced in the history of mankind before. National security, of course, has always been, and will continue to be, the foremost concern of Governments everywhere. The search for security through strength is as old and as deeply rooted in the life of nations as the desire to live in peace. But what puts the present arms race in an altogether different and still more dangerous category are two of its basic characteristics: first, it derives its momentum, not so much from well-considered security goals, as from the inexorable advance of military technology, and, second, it is a pursuit whose consequences do not accord with its assumed aims. This holds true, in one degree or another, in the fields of both nuclear and conventional weapons." **UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar**

"I feel very strongly [the responsibility] to reflect the deep preoccupation of all the millions of people in the world who are following these deliberations with hope, with concern, and with fear: hope, that we will take meaningful steps towards the solution of the most dangerous dilemma of our time; concern, over the consequences for humanity if the arms race is not checked; and fear that we may fail. Everything—the world, civilization—is at stake. This is not empty rhetoric; it is a fact." **Special Session President Ismat Kittani**

"In the nuclear era, the major powers bear a special responsibility to ease these sources of conflict and to refrain from aggression. That is why we are so deeply concerned by Soviet conduct. The decade of so-called detente witnessed the most massive Soviet buildup of military power in history. They increased their defense spending by 40 percent while American defense spending actually declined in the same real terms. Soviet aggression and support for violence around the world have eroded the confidence needed for arms negotiations.... The scourge of tyranny cannot be stopped with words alone. So we have embarked on an effort to renew our strength that had fallen dangerously low. We refuse to become weaker while our potential adversaries remain committed to their imperialist adventures....

"Over the past seven months, the United States has put forward a broad-based comprehensive series of proposals to reduce the risk of war. We have proposed four major points as an agenda for peace:

- elimination of land-based intermediate range missiles;
- a one-third reduction in strategic ballistic missile warheads;
- a substantial reduction in NATO and Warsaw Pact ground and air forces, and;
- new safeguards to reduce the risk of accidental war.

" We urge the Soviet Union today to join with us in this quest. We must act not for ourselves alone, but for all mankind." **U.S. President Ronald Reagan.**

"Current global spending on armaments has exceeded $600 billion a year and is still rising. By contrast, official development assistance is on the decline and today totals less than 5 per cent of the amount spent on armaments. A large segment of the globe continues to be deprived and underprivileged....

"This planetof ours...is now virtually divided into two.One is that of the rich, the other that of the poor; one is of the developed, the other of the under-developed; one is of growth, the other of decay. Hundreds of millions of human beings are spread out throughout the world—the deprived, the hungry, the destitute, the wretched of this earth—for whom, day in and day out, life is a ceaseless struggle for survival, a world where children die of starvation or are physically or mentally crippled because of malnutrition, where people are doomed to a subhuman existence haunted by poverty, disease and despair. The gap between the two worlds is ever-widening. It is not enough to prevent the gap from widening further; it is not even enough to build bridges across it. The gap must be closed. The two planets must be forged into one.

"Within the poor segment of the globe, there are again those who are poorer. There are those who live not just in misery but in squalor, those who are not just hungry but dying. Theirs is an agonizing march to extinction. The pace of the march grows rapid with every passing day. This march must be halted and reversed." **Lieutenant-General Hussain Muhammad Ershad, People's Republic of Bangladesh.**

"Guided by the desire to do all in its power to deliver the peoples from the threat of nuclear devastation and ultimately to exclude its very possibility from the life of mankind, the Soviet State solemnly declares: The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics assumes an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. That obligation shall become effective im-

mediately, from the mornent it is made public from the rostrum of the United Nations General Assembly....

"The peoples of the world have the right to expect that the decision of the Soviet Union will be followed by reciprocal steps on the part of the other nuclear States. If the other nuclear powers assume an equally precise and clear obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, that would be tantamount in practice to a ban on the use of nuclear weapons altogether.

"The military-political stereotypes inherited from the times of the one-time monopoly on the atom bomb have become out-dated. The realities of today require a fundamentally different approach to the questions of war and peace." **Message from Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev as read by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.**

"The [Palme] Commission started its work in September 1980.... We tried to show what practical steps could be taken to create a downward spiral in the arms race. General and complete disarmament is of course the final goal. But there is a need now to initiate a process that with time can gather momentum and lead us toward the goal. Results are badly needed if people shall keep any confidence in us. So we tried to identify measures that in the years ahead could reasonably be negotiated and implemented and contribute to disarmament.... Our conclusion was unambiguous: a nuclear war cannot be won. Victory is not possible. It would be such a catastrophe that the notion of victory would be meaningless....

"One thing that we all must understand, and that we must teach those who have not yet understood, is that nuclear weapons have transformed the very concept of war. In the nuclear age no nation can achieve absolute security through military superiority. No nation can defend itself effectively against a nuclear attack. No matter how many nuclear weapons a nation acquires, it will always remain vulnerable to a nuclear attack. And thus its people will ultimately remain insecure. This is a central fact that all nations must realize." **Mr. Olof Palme, Chairman of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues**

"Our generation faces a special responsibility, because the march of modern technology has made ever more deadly the weapons of war. We are most keenly aware of that in the case of nuclear weapons because of their terrifying destructive power which my generation has witnessed and which none of us will ever forget. However alarmed we are by those weapons, we cannot disinvent them. The world cannot cancel the knowledge of how to make them. It is an irreversible fact.

"Mr. President, nuclear weapons must be seen as deterrents. They contribute to what Winston Chuchill called 'a balance of terror.'.... Of course we must look for a better system of preventing war than nuclear deterrence. But to suggest that between East and West there is such a system within reach at the present time would be a perilous pretence....

"Nuclear war is indeed a terrible threat; but conventional war is a terrible reality. If we deplore the amount of military spending in a world where so many go hungry and so much else needs to be done, our criticism and our action should turn above all to conventional forces which absorb up to 90 per cent of military spending worldwide....

"Let us face the reality. The springs of war lie in the readiness to resort to force against other nations, and not in "arms races," whether real or imaginary. Aggressors do not start wars because an adversary has built up his own strength. They start wars because they believe they can gain more by going to war than by remaining at peace.... The causes which have produced war in the past have not disappeared today as we know to our cost. The lesson is that disarmament and good intentions on their own do not ensure peace." **British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.**

The signs of disarmament

Questions of substance—of what would emerge from SSOD II—were debated in three working groups:

I. to draft the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament;

II. to review implementation of the Final Document of the first Special Session;

III. to cover implementation of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade and measures to mobilize public opinion.

Progress in establishing these working groups came after much wrangling which concluded with an agreement to compromise on the question of enhancing UN disarmament machinery. Western nations wanted a separate working group on the machinery issue in the hope of getting agreement to remove the UN Centre for Disarmament from the jurisdiction of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, which is traditionally headed by a Soviet appointee. Developing countries had also been lobbying for a separate working group to consider the relationship between disarmament and development. Both efforts failed, though subgroups of the larger working groups did address some aspects of these issues.

Persistent controversies and fundamental differences among the non-aligned, western and eastern-bloc nations continued to plague efforts by the working groups. As the session proceeded it became clearer that no consensus could be reached on what many nations had considered to be the centerpiece of the conference agenda: formulation of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

Arms control activists, led by Mexican Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles, had hoped that this "Programme" would go a step beyond the theoretical goals of arms control adopted at the first disarmament session. They wanted it to address, among other prime arms issues, target dates for a comprehensive nuclear test ban, limits on nuclear arms production and deployment, the reduction of stockpiles and a treaty banning the production of chemical weapons. One of the major stumbling blocks was the question of whether or not to include timetables for completion of each of these steps. Western nations did not want a rigid schedule; the nonaligned nations offered a detailed four-stage plan; and the eastern bloc avoided timetables, calling for implementation "within the shortest possible time." Failing to reach substantive agreement on this and other issues, delegates agreed to refer the Comprehensive Programme back to the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, "which should continue the elaboration of the programme and submit it to the General Assembly at its 38th session" scheduled to meet in September 1983. The final report adopted by the SSOD II also calls for a Third Special Session on Disarmament, the date for which will be decided by the 38th General Assembly.

The only concrete achievement of the conference was the creation of a world disarmament campaign—a UN institutionalization of the drive to promote public awareness and concern about the arms race. Secretary General de Cuellar

opened the conference by pointing to the growing public awareness as "an encouraging phenomena." President Kittani declared the campaign officially open at the first meeting of the plenary but left many of the crucial questions, particularly financing, to be worked out during the session. Several proposals and counterproposals were exchanged throughout the debate over financing, methods of collecting signatures for a worldwide petition, review of the campaign's progress and, more generally, the role of public opinion. After initially abstaining, the United States agreed to support the campaign so long as it can be balanced and universal. As finally adopted, the purpose of the campaign will be "to inform, to educate and to generate public understanding and support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms limitation and disarmament." Funds will come from voluntary contributions, but the Secretary-General is also urged "to explore the possibilities of redeploying existing resources" within the UN budget.

The symbols of disarmament: A conclusion by LWVUS UN Observer Edith Segall

In the beginning the mood at the UN second Special Session was almost euphoric. In contrast to the first Special Session four years ago, the whole world seemed to know about SSOD II and attention was focused on the United Nations. Representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from all over the world (1789 plus 1500 from Japan were registered) lined up to receive their credentials, enabling them to get past the security guards and into the UN's meeting rooms, and even more people flocked to join the peripheral activities. On the steps of the UN a daily drama occurred: petitions to outlaw nuclear war were presented to the Secretary-General; tales of horror were retold by survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki ; demonstrations and vigils were held.

NGO observers were buoyed by the fact that this year 79 representatives of their organizations were to be allowed to address the Special Session—a contrast to the 25 NGO speakers four years ago and a tribute to the importance of their disarmament efforts. Most encouraging was the press, which had almost completely ignored SSOD I, but this time was giving thorough and serious coverage to the speeches by the many heads of state and foreign policy leaders, as well as the the issues involved.

The climax, of course, was the June 12th rally, where 700,000 people demonstrated that the risks of nuclear war were a prime concern of mainstream America. They departed, and gradually a more somber mood began to prevail. Speakers in the general debate sounded remarkably like those of previous years, urging other countries to disarm but making few new proposals or commitments. The session took almost two weeks to decide how to organize itself into working committees, let alone make substantive decisions. With only a few days left to go, most major questions remained unresolved.

Despite the superficial excitement, SSOD II convened against the reality of a vastly increased arms race and accelerating international tensions. During the session itself these tensions were exacerbated by two events very much related to the United Nations: the Falkland Islands crisis and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The Security Council met several times during SSOD II, and the General Assembly itself sandwiched a special emergency session on Palestine between its disarmament meetings. At such times SSOD II's goals seemed hopelessly unattainable.

From the start, knowledgeable NGO observers had realized that the prospects for any major disarmament breakthrough at SSOD II were dim and, indeed, had worried about how to combat the sense of letdown likely to be experienced by the thousands of demonstrators when no miracle occurred. Yet most participants in SSOD II—delegates and observers alike—take the UN's role in disarmament extremely seriously. They feel that specific steps to strengthen UN machinery, a Comprehensive Disarmament Program laying out timetables and stages leading toward general and complete disarmament, and an effective World Disarmament Campaign *can* nudge governments toward constructive negotiations. That little progress on these measures was made at SSOD II is certainly a disappointment for many. It may, however, be premature to judge the success or failure of the outcome right now. For the moment, it may be best to watch for potential effects of the Special Session and of increased public concern on negotiations underway through START, the Committee on Disarmament and elsewhere.

From Convention '82 Report of Day's Action, *Monday, May 17, 1982*

"4. A motion to change the wording of IR motion #4708 voted for consideration May 15 to read: "Promote peace in an interdependent world, through cooperation with other nations, the strengthening of international organizations and continuing efforts to reduce the risks of war including negotiations, disarmament, arms control and a bilaterally verifiable freeze on nuclear weapons" was CARRIED
(#4625, Howison, LWV Portland ME)

5. Motion #4625 as substitute wording for Motion #4708 was DEFEATED

Tabulated vote:
Number voting: 1,230: Yes 547, No 683"

Arms control: Where we stand and where we're going

The international community had agreed on some arms control measures during the past two decades and is proceeding with negotiations in numerous other areas. The following chronological outline and arms control glossary are adapted (by permission) from *The Glossary of Arms Control Terms* by the Arms Control Association, 11 Dupont Circle, NW, Washington, DC 20036. Single copies available without charge. You might also want to purchase the *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 1981*, from the Superintendent of Documents, US GPO, Washington, DC 20402, #008-004-00011-1, $9.50.

Arms control terms

arms control Any unilateral action or multilateral plan, arrangement, or process, resting upon explicit or implicit international agreement, which limits or regulates any aspect of the following: the production, numbers, type, configuration, and performance characteristics of weapon systems (including related command and control, logistics support, and intelligence arrangements or mechanisms); and the numerical strength, organization, equipment, deployment or employment of the armed forces retained by the parties.

deterrence Dissuasion of a potential adversary from initiating an attack or conflict, often by the threat of unacceptable retaliatory damage. Nuclear deterrence is usually contrasted with the concept of nuclear defense, the strategy and forces for limiting damage, if deterrence fails. Some hold that a strategy of nuclear defense may also have a deterrent effect, if it can reduce the destructive potential of a nuclear attack.

disarmament In UN usage, all measures related to the prevention, limitation, reduction or elimination of weapons and military forces. *See* general and complete disarmament.

first strike An initial attack with nuclear weapons. A *disarming* first strike is one in which the attacker attempts to destroy all or a large portion of its adversary's strategic nuclear forces before they can be launched. A *preemptive* first strike is one in which a nation launches its attack first on the presumption that the adversary is about to attack.

first use The introduction of nuclear weapons into a strategic or tactical conflict. *See* first strike. A no-first-use pledge by a nation obliges it not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in a conflict.

general and complete disarmament (GCD) The total abandonment of military forces and weapons (other than internal police forces) by all nations at the same time, usually foreseen as occurring through an agreed schedule of force reductions. In 1961, in the so-called McCloy-Zorin Principles, the United States and the USSR agreed that their negotiations would have GCD as their ultimate objective.

nuclear weapon-free zone An area in which the production and deployment of nuclear weapons is prohibited.

parity A level of forces in which opposing nations possess approximately equal capabilities.

proliferation The spread of weapons, usually nuclear weapons. Horizontal proliferation refers to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by states not previously possessing them. Vertical proliferation refers to increases in the nuclear arsenals of those states already possessing nuclear weapons.

strategic Relating to a nation's offensive or defensive military potential, including its geographical location and its resources and economic, political and military strength. The term strategic is used to denote those weapons or forces capable of directly affecting another nation's war-fighting ability, as distinguished from tactical or theater weapons or forces.

tactical Relating to battlefield operations as distinguished from theater or strategic operations. Tactical weapons or forces are those designed for combat with opposing military forces rather than for reaching the rear areas of the opponent or the opponent's homeland, which require theater or strategic weapons, respectively.

theater nuclear forces (TNF) Those nuclear forces deployed and intended for use in a particular geographic region, such as Europe or the Pacific.

theater nuclear weapon (TNW) A nuclear weapon, usually of longer range and larger yield than a tactical nuclear weapon, which can be used in theater operations. Many strategic nuclear weapons can be used in theater operations, but not all theater nuclear weapons are designed for strategic use. The Soviet SS-20 mobile missile is generally considered a theater nuclear weapon, as are the nuclear-capable U.S. fighter/bombers deployed in the Far East and Europe and the U.S. Lance missile.

Arms control agreements in force

The 1959 Antarctic Treaty demilitarizes the Antarctic and declares that it shall be used for peaceful purposes. 22 nations.

The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty bans nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. 108 nations.

The 1963 U.S.-Soviet Hot Line Agreement establishes a direct communications link between the governments of the United States and the USSR for use in time of emergency. A 1971 agreement further improved the communications link.

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits the placing of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction around the earth and also outlaws the establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons, and the conduct of military maneuvers in outer space. 76 nations.

The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco prohibits the testing, use, manufacture, production or aquisition by any means of nuclear weapons in Latin America. Under Protocol II the nuclear weapon states agree to respect the military denuclearization of Latin America. 22 nations, including all Latin American states except Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Cuba.

The 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon states and the acquisition of such weapons by non-nuclear weapons states. 117 nations.

The 1971 Sea-Bed Treaty prohibits the emplacement of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed beyond a twelve-mile zone. 66 nations.

The 1971 U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Accidents Agreement provides for immediate notification, one of the other, in the event of an accidental, unauthorized incident involving a possible detonation of a nuclear weapon.

The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, or acquisition of biological agents and any weapons designed to use such agents. 84 nations.

The 1972 ABM Treaty limited the deployment of antiballistic missile defenses by the United States and the USSR to two areas—one for the defense of the national capital, and the other for the defense of some ICBMs. A 1974 Protocol further limited both parties to a single area of deployment.

The 1972 Interim Offensive Weapons Agreement froze the aggregate number of U.S. and Soviet ballistic missile launchers for a five-year period. This agreement expired on October 3, 1977. This agreement and the ABM Treaty are known as SALT I.

The 1972 Incidents on the High Seas Agreement assures the navigational safety of ships assigned to the U.S. and Soviet armed forces. Measures providing for the safety of flight for military aircraft over the high seas are also included.

The 1972 Agreement on Basic Principles of Relations between the United States and the USSR provides the basis for relations between the United States and the USSR. Both parties agree to do the utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war.

The 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War provides that the United States and the USSR will take all actions necessary to preclude the outbreak of nuclear war.

The 1974 Declaration of Ayacucho Agreement envisions the limitation of armaments in Latin America. Not ratified.

The 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) limits the size of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons tests to 150 kilotons.

The 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) contains a provision on confidence-building measures which provides for notification of major military maneuvers in Europe. 35 nations.

The 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNE) complements the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty by prohibiting any individual underground nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes which has a yield of more than 150 kilotons, or any group explosion with an aggregate yield exceeding 1,500 kilotons.

The 1977 Environmental Modification Convention prohibits the hostile use of techniques which could produce substantial environmental modifications.

Arms control negotiations

Baruch Plan called for placing all atomic resources of the world under the control of an independent international authority. Soviet displeasure with certain provisions led to an eventual deadlock in the talks. Initiated in 1946.

Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), the central forum dealing with multilateral arms control, co-chaired by the United States and the USSR, created to discuss general and complete disarmament. Initiated in 1961.

Talks on Mutual and Balance Force Reductions (MBFR), multilateral negotiations seeking to limit NATO and Warsaw Pact forces within a limited geographic region. Initiated in 1973.

Indian Ocean Negotiations, bilateral talks between the United States and the USSR which seek to find mutually acceptable limits on weapons deployed in the Indian Ocean. Initiated in 1976.

Comprehensive Test Ban Negotiations (CTB), talks between the United States, the USSR, and Great Britain which seek to ban all nuclear testing. Initiated in 1977.

Negotiations to Limit Conventional Arms Transfers, bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR which seek to place constraints on arms transfers to certain areas. Initiated in 1978.

Committee on Disarmament (CD), created by the 1978 UN Special Session on Disarmament to replace the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. This new negotiating forum will operate under a rotating chairmanship. Initiated in 1979.

International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), a two-year, forty-nation study of the future of the international nuclear trade and nuclear technology concluded in 1979.

Theater Nuclear Force Negotiations (TNF), bilateral negotiations in Geneva on intermediate-range theater nuclear weapons in Europe. Initiated in 1981.

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), a continuing series of bilateral negotiations originally proposed by President Johnson and Premier Kosygin and formally launched during President Nixon's administration in 1969. The objective is to negotiate treaties that reduce the levels of strategic weapons while maintaining a verifiable balance between the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union.

The first step, SALT I, included the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms (listed under Agreements in Force). The ABM Treaty limited Anti-Ballistic Missile defense systems to two sites in each country. Subsequently, the 1974 ABM Protocol reduced the sites to one per country. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. signed the treaty in 1972, which was also ratified by the U.S. Congress. The treaty is of unlimited duration, subject to review every five years.

The Interim Agreement set the stage for the SALT II phase by freezing the number of intercontinental and submarine ballistic missile launchers to the number operational or under construction at that time. The agreement was to last for five years and then be replaced by SALT II agreements having permanent limitations and possible reductions. To allow more time to draft SALT II, both countries agreed to do nothing that would violate the terms of the agreement after the October 1977 expiration date.

The SALT II negotiations began in November 1972 with the goal of a comprehensive agreement limiting strategic offensive weapons. The final agreement concluded in 1979 set limits on the total numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles at 2250 launchers and also limited the number of launchers that could be fitted with multiple warheads. In addition, the treaty banned interference with national and technical means of verification. The U.S. has not ratified SALT II. U.S. critics charge that the treaty is "fatally flawed" in part because, they say, it would preserve an unstable Soviet strategic advantage in land-based missiles. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are tacitly abiding by the terms of the unratified SALT II accord.

After a three year hiatus, a new phase of negotiations has begun. President Reagan has renamed the talks START, for strategic arms reduction talks. The plan, which he outlined in a commencement address at his alma mater, Eureka College, calls for reducing ballistic missile warheads by one-third, down from reported totals of 7,500 to 5,000 for each superpower. No more than half of those 5,000 warheads would be on land-based missiles (thus obliging the Soviets to eliminate more than 50 percent of their arsenal). A limit of 850 missiles was also suggested. No restrictions on bombers and cruise missiles are indicated in the plan, which would also permit the U.S. to proceed with both MX and Trident II missiles. The first phase of START began in Geneva on June 29.

What you can do: A sampling of collaborative opportunities

First, a caveat.

Spurred on by the nuclear freeze initiative, many national and community-based organizations are rapidly becoming active in the antinuclear movement—by working to get the freeze on state and local ballots and lobbying members of Congress and other organizations. While supporting "efforts to reduce the risk of war, including negotiations on arms control and disarmament," the LWVUS does not support or oppose the nuclear freeze. Member discussions and consensus on the 1964 UN position was so much focused on the United Nations as an initiator of efforts toward peace that the national board is unable now to assume membership understanding and agreement on this issue as it presents itself in a much-altered world situation. Moreover, delegates at the 1982 national convention in Houston defeated an attempt to include a "bilateral and verifiable nuclear freeze" in the current UN position. (We know that many delegates were confused by the *Report of the Day's Action* summary of the votes on May 17. We've reprinted the

relevant action for you, p.19.)What delegates did go for was a study on National Security. (For more on the League's position and what you can do, see June/July *Report from the Hill*.)

During the next few months, many organizations will be seeking League support for their activities on nuclear arms issues. Collaboration can be an effective way to involve more people—and even gain new members. But you'll want to be careful to distinguish between education and advocacy, particularly around election time.

Ground Zero Ground Zero groups around the country are planning to organize congressional candidate debates on the issue of nuclear war and national security during the fall 1982 elections. Ground Zero is the nonpartisan educational organization that coordinated last spring's nationwide week of community-based discussion and activities focusing on the issue of nuclear war. Many Leagues cooperated in organizing those events last April and may also want to work with them on the fall debates.

Since most Leagues conduct candidate events as a regular voters service activity, you'll want to consider your own agendas before deciding to cosponsor an event or become involved in the Ground Zero events. Evaluate your resources, volunteer time, opportunity for media attention and the pros and cons of multi- versus single-issue events. Traditionally, League candidate nights have focused on a broad range of issues. One alternative is to sponsor a series of debates with other organizations, one of them oriented to foreign policy issues. If it's too late to organize such a series, you might want to invite Ground Zero organizers to work with you in planning a portion of the regularly schedules League-sponsored debate. Even in an advisory capacity, the skills and reputation that the League has gained in staging candidate events at every level are very valuable to any group interested in the political process and information education.

Important UN dates October is a busy time for sponsoring meetings around the United Nations. October 16 is World Food Day (anniversary of the founding of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization); October 24 is United Nations Day (the official anniversary of the UN's founding in 1945); October 31 is National UNICEF Day; and October 24–30 is UN Disarmament Week.

You might want to take advantage of the momentum generated by these commemorative days to sponsor special meetings around the issue of multilateral arms control, using the second Special Session on Disarmament as a discussion topic. You could also use the theme of global security to link development and the environment to the timely subject of disarmament. These celebrations are a good focus for joining with local UNA-USA chapters, churches, school groups or exchange organizations in developing community programs. Arms control and disarmament is to be one of the three specific issues covered in UNA-USA's kit of materials available for UN Day activities. In addition, UNA-USA has produced a special Arms Control and Disarmament Kit (UNA-USA, 300 East 42nd Street, NY, NY 10017. $5.00).

Planetary Initiative for the World We Choose The Planetary Initiative is a worldwide program of neighborhood-level Issues Exploration Groups coordinated by Planetary Citizens. Through local study and discussion, Planetary Citizens hopes to generate national meetings and ultimately a global conference to be held in Toronto, Canada, in June 1983. A central feature of the program is to explore values and expand individual awareness of the world commun. As a course of study and public dialogue, the initiative may be an activity you want to investigate. For more information, contact Donald Keys, c/o Planetary Citizens, 777 UN Plaza, New York, NY 10017.

Great Decisions 1983 Many local Leagues have participated in Great Decisions discussion groups sponsored nationally by the nonpartisan Foreign Policy Association. This year's program includes two topics related to the League's National Security Study: U.S.-Soviet relations and nuclear proliferation. The Great Decisions program might be an excellent way to supplement your own unit meetings on National Security. Briefing material will be available in January 1983 (FPA, 205 Lexington Avenue, New York, NY 10016. $6.00 plus 70¢ postage).

Resources on national and global security

Richard Barnet, *Real Security: Restoring American Power in a Dangerous Decade*. Touchstone/Simon & Shuster, New York. 1981. Analyzes changes in American's perceptions of what constitutes national security and presents the case for an alternative security system premised on arms limitation agreements.

Lester R. Brown, "Redefining National Security," *Worldwatch Paper #14*. Worldwatch Institute, 1776 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036. October 1977. $2.00. Adaptation from the author's book, *The Twenty-ninth Day: Accommodating Human Needs and Numbers to the Earth's Resources* (W.W. Norton, March 1978, $5.95). Identifies several major threats to national security, including food and energy supplies, deterioration of biological systems, and climate modification. Similar themes are expanded in another recent book by the same author, *Building A Sustainable Society* (W.W. Norton, 1981, $6.95).

Stephen R. Graubard, ed., "U.S. Defense Policy in the 1980s," *Daedalus*, Fall 1980 and Winter 1981. Two volumes of essays outlining various aspects of U.S. regional security interests (Persian Gulf, Middle East, Northeast Asia, the Caribbean, etc.), the prospects of arms control initiatives and technological advances. The preface to each volume provides very valuable historical and analytical background.

Roger D. Hansen and contributors for the Overseas Development Council, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Third World: Agenda 1982*. ODC, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036. $7.95. Presents the case for including the economic and political interests of the Third World in U.S. national security policies.

Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (Palme Commission), *Common Security—A Blueprint for Survival*. Simon and Shuster, New York. 1982. $5.95. The report of a high-level, 16-member commission established in 1980 under the chairmanship of former Prime Minister Olof Palme of Sweden. Offers a detailed plan to promote "a downward turn in the arms spiral" worldwide.

Norman Podhoretz, "The Future Danger," *Commentary*, April 1981. Points to a new consensus on the need to respond more firmly to the growth of Soviet power and to arrest and reverse the decline of American power.

Earl C. Ravenal, "Doing Nothing," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1980. Calls for a policy of nonintervention and a more narrow outlook on America's "security perimeter."

Jonathon Schell, "The Fate of the Earth," *New Yorker*, Feb. 1, 8 and 15. (Also available in book form, Knopf, 1982, $13.95.) A lengthy discussion of the impact of nuclear weapons on the survival of earth's life systems and mankind's need to form an emotional, intellectual and political response to the threat of devastation.

Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures*. World Priorities, Box 1003, Leesburg, VA 22075. 1981. $4.00. Graphical analysis of the competition between the military and social sectors of the world economy.

W. Scott Thompson, ed., *National Security in the 1980s: From Weakness to Strength*. Institute for Contemporary Studies, San Francisco. 1980. $8.95. A systematic study of the ways in which U.S. foreign and military policy should be reoriented toward a stronger defense. Includes essays by Richard Burt, Fred Ikle, Ilmo Zumwalt, Jr., and many Reagan administration advisors.

United Nations, *Disarmament Fact Sheets*. UN Center for Disarmament, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, United Nations, NY, NY 10017. Free. A series of brief reports dealing with selected questions of disarmament and arms limitation that are under active consideration as the subject of studies in UN bodies and other forums. For example, "The Relationship Between Disarmament and Development," and "The Relationship Between Disarmament and International Security."

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers*. ACDA Publication 112. ACDA, Washington, DC 20451. 1982. Annual report describing the size, trends and distribution of global military expenditures and the world arms trade.

Daniel Yergin and Martin Hillenbrand, eds., *Global Insecurity: A Strategy for Energy and Economic Renewal*. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston. 1982. $15.95. Tackles the question of what the impact of the energy crisis has been on society and what it is likely to be as we move through the 1980s. Includes essays on the United States, Europe, Japan and the developing countries.



from the desk of
a
Leaguer....

1-16-83

Dear Helene,

Our National Security duty is not too far away - March 22 - so I guess we better start thinking seriously about it.

I'll call you soon to set a definite date for our first organizational committee meeting.

Sincerely,

Jo.

Oct. 31 Concensus

League of Women Voters of the United States 1730 M Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 Tel. (202) 296-1770

memorandum

December 3, 1982

THIS IS GOING ON DPM

TO: Local and state League presidents
FROM: Dorothy K. Powers, National Security Study Chair

RE: The attached COMMITTEE GUIDE

We know that you share with us an eagerness to meet the hopes expressed at Convention 82 for a speeded-up study schedule that will equip us to start acting aggressively and effectively as fast as possible in the area of national security. The national board is also aware that the study calendar we approved in September requires all of us to do a great deal of work to get ready for spring-summer consensus. This Committee Guide is just part of our effort to help you do the best job possible to get prepared. We've also speeded up the publishing cycle to get an overview publication primarily for resource committees and a publication to help members with the consensus ready by February. Since both publications will run tight against the announced calendar, we are including outlines of each of the two publications along with a resource list in this Committee Guide.

You may remember that the national board advised Leagues shortly after convention "to put in your calendar a spring 1983 membership meeting (unit or general) on the National Security Study." After the announcement in the September Post-Board Summary that we would seek consensus by July 1, 1983, many Leagues rearranged their calendars to hold two meetings. We know that many of you felt that you didn't have that kind of flexibility in your calendar, but we also know that, as time goes on, League calendars do shift. We therefore urge you to take another look now, to see if a second meeting can be squeezed in. Though the discussion outline presented in this guide is based on a two-meeting format, we've indicated how it might be done in one meeting. (But if that one meeting is a short one--for example, in units that meet over breakfast or lunch--the compression just won't work.) We urge those of you who can't hold two meetings this spring to schedule two for the next phase in fall '83-winter '84.

The following is a summary of what is contained in the Committee Guide, a review of the material that you have already received, and a description of the publications and materials that you will receive over the next few months.

THIS COMMITTEE GUIDE:

--discusses the background, scope and goal of the League National Security study;
--offers tips and techniques for managing the study;
--includes discussion outlines with resource suggestions;
--provides a sample CONSENSUS FORM (the single copy per League, to use for reporting, will be mailed later, on colored paper);
--contains outlines of two upcoming LWVEF publications: on military policy and on arms control.

YOU HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED:

--Summer 1982 National VOTER: Convention '82 coverage.
--Fall 1982 National VOTER: "The Future of National Security," pp. 11-20.
--1982-84 PROSPECTUS #1: material on arms control, including an outline of agreements and negotiations, and a glossary of arms control terms, pp. 15-21.
--Impact on Issues 1982-84: IR section describing LWVUS position on "efforts to reduce the risk of war," pp. 31-33.
--June and September 1982 Post-Board Summary: outlines of study calendar and special activities.

YOU WILL BE RECEIVING:

--An overview publication with information on U.S. military policy, tentatively titled Providing for the Common Defense: A Military Policy Reader. (This pub will be essential to resource committees during both phases of the consensus and is recommended also for League members that have already been studying national security issues).
--A publication for every-member use, tentatively titled The Quest for Arms Control: Why and How, focusing on arms control objectives and criteria.
--A publication relating defense budget issues to military policy objectives, and an overview of the decision-making process involved in making U.S. national security policy for member use during the fall-winter consensus period.
--A new version of Congress and the Budget Process: From Chaos to Control.
--An article on U.S. relations with its allies, particularly the NATO countries, in the winter 1983 National VOTER.
--Future issues of the National VOTER and PROSPECTUS, with additional information.

COMMITTEE GUIDE

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League of Women Voters of the United States, 1730 M St. NW, Washington, DC 20036

Tooling Up for the National Security Study

FOCUS: *"To evaluate U.S. national security policies and their impact on our domestic programs and our relationships with other countries."*

SCOPE: *"Define the nature of national security and its relationship to military spending. Assess the impact of U.S. military spending on the nation's economy and on our ability to meet social and environmental needs. Determine the effects of U.S. military policy on our relationship with other countries."*

Motion adopted May 17, 1982 at LWVUS convention

The League's decision to undertake a study of National Security comes at a critical time in the nation's history, a time when American citizens are showing unprecedented concern over national security policies and the threat of nuclear war. At the core of the public debate are a number of questions centering on "how much is enough?"

Do we need to strengthen U.S. defenses to deter the Soviet Union?

Should the strategic nuclear weapons of both the U.S. and the Soviets be reduced? If so, by how much?

How much money should the United States spend on defense in an era of constrained budget resources and economic uncertainty?

How many promises of support can the United States extend to other countries?

AREAS OF STUDY: To fulfill the scope and focus of the adopted motion, the national board outlined for League study three areas of public policy:

military policy: the theories and strategies that underly military policy decisions; the role and capabilities of weapons; and the impact of U.S. foreign and military policy on other nations;
arms control: the evolution of arms control initiatives and measures; and
defense spending: the cost of fulfilling military policy objectives.

In order to move from study to action, the board approved four areas in which to seek member agreement/consensus:

- ☐ arms control objectives and criteria; — reporting deadline—July 1, 1983
- ☐ military policy objectives;
- ☐ defense spending; and
- ☐ the national security decision-making process. — reporting deadline—February 1, 1984

The new National Security study will build on existing international relations, social policy, government and natural resources positions. If members agree on criteria and objectives for evaluating arms control proposals, negotiations and agreements, the LWV UN position will be given much needed definition that can be used to judge an arms control effort to "reduce the risk of war." By evaluating current military policy and seeking member agreement on what is needed to implement military objectives, the League may then enter fully into the debate on the federal budget, evaluating defense spending in relation to domestic and development aid spending. By examining the process by which decisions on military policy are made, the League may also find new applications for its citizen rights position.

Obviously, these two rounds of League decision making on national security, major though they are, leave many important areas unstudied and unresolved. The 1983–84 program making process will be your opportunity to let us know which, if any, additional areas of study you want to pursue.

Getting your study under way

The study chair and resource committee are the nuts and bolts of your local study. The chair deals with all phases of managing the study: recruiting committee members (don't forget the new members that you added this fall); setting committee meeting dates and drawing up the agenda for those meetings; tailoring the discussion outline to local needs; maintaining close contact with the board on such matters as the schedule for general meetings, workshops and unit meetings, the recruiting and training of discussion leaders and recorders, and the scheduling of these people, as well as resource persons, at unit meetings, and informing and involving the rest of the community.

Two League publications supply basic information on how to manage a study item and reach member agreement/consensus. They are: *In League: Guidelines for League Board* (Pub. # 275, $2.00) and *Meaningful Meetings: The Role of the Resource Committee* (Pub. #319, 40¢). Both contain invaluable suggestions that will not be repeated here for carrying out a program item. They will make your job easier, the results more successful. *Meaningful Meetings,* in particular, is *must* reading for the committee.

With this COMMITTEE GUIDE in hand, study chairs will want to move fast in working out an overall plan for committee activities and assigning topics and appropriate bibliographies for the resource

committee. Divide the work up according to the talents of the committee members and the time they can give. Once again, don't forget to involve those new members. Be sure that each person knows when and what to report on as her/his assignment. Make the committee meetings learning opportunities. Invite a speaker or ask a member to review a book or magazine article for the group. You might consider opening up one of the committee meetings to interested members, making it a workshop. (This ploy might get around scheduling problems in the unit meeting calendar.) Use the committee meetings to learn, analyze and question the substance as well as to work on the final discussion outline for the membership meetings. Try to include background on current U.S. and Soviet military policy and proposals, as well as information that might be of special interest to your locality (an air force base, defense or aerospace industry). Remember, too, that it is the committee's job to work out what kinds of visual aids to recommend for illustrating key points, flip charts, for example.

With this as with every study, Leagues are at many different points on the spectrum of readiness, when it comes to the matter of consensus. A few have been briefing members on this subject for years, piquing member interest with bulletin inserts, workshops, speakers at annual meetings and conventions, perhaps even a full-fledged conference. Some have held a general meeting on some aspect of the consensus topic earlier in the year. Others have hitchhiked on a conference or meeting sponsored by another organization. And some have already scheduled the recommended two meetings for spring 1983. For the resource committee in a League that fits this picture, designing a plan will be a pleasure.

What if your League is one that has been able to give the National Security study little or no attention up to now? What if this year's schedule is tight and committee help scarce? What then? First of all, you're not alone. Many Leagues are in exactly this position. But we know, from past experience with national studies that presented challenges equally tough—both in complexity of materials and in time pressures—that Leagues all over the country will organize, starting right now, to do a first-class job with the resources available. A few recommendations:

☐ Budget your own energies.

☐ Make full use of printed information—that's a way of getting packaged expertise. Urge members to read the fall 1982 National VOTER article, "The Future of National Security," and excerpt quotes for the bulletin from the resources listed in the June *Post-Board Summary,* PROSPECTUS and this COMMITTEE GUIDE.

☐ Use people who already know the facts and the issues to present information on the issues and the policy choices. Look for resident experts in nearby Leagues, at the local high school, college or university, and in community businesses.

Some general advice. Without going back over ground well covered in *Meaningful Meetings,* we want to emphasize how important it is to hold a training session at which resource persons, discussion leaders and recorders can work out a team approach. Ideally, each would get a copy of this COMMITTEE GUIDE and of the Member Agreement/Consensus Report Form, a sample of which is attached. Make clear to the recorder that it is her/his job to deduce the thinking of the group and to complete the form.

Discussion outline: Meeting I

I. Introduction: General overview of the National Security study

☐ Review the FOCUS and SCOPE of the study as adopted by Convention 1982.

☐ Sketch the internal and external factors that signaled that the time was right for League study and action in this area: the importance and timeliness of the issue... the membership growth potential... the need to sharpen the League's position on "efforts to reduce the risk of war"... recent federal budget cuts and the League's inability to speak to major portions of the budget....

☐ Outline the AREAS OF STUDY for this biennium.

☐ Point out that study of these areas will prepare us to seek consensus in several areas. Positions will be formulated by the national board, based on reports of member agreement from local Leagues all over the country.

☐ State the goals of the two spring meetings (assuming you are holding two) in preparation for a July 1, 1983 reporting deadline.

Meeting I: to sharpen member awareness of the nature of national security as variously interpreted and to discuss U.S. military policy with emphasis on those areas that affect arms control efforts—U.S. relationships with other nations and weapons capabilities of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

Meeting II: to review and discuss the evolution of arms control initiatives and the objectives they seek to achieve and to develop criteria for the LWV to use in applying the LWVUS position in support of "efforts to reduce the risk of war."

Allow about 10 minutes for this introduction. If you are looking for places to compress, here's one. To speed up not only the introduction but also the discussion to follow, consider having the FOCUS, SCOPE, AREAS OF STUDY and GOALS of the meeting outlined on a blackboard or newsprint.

BASIC RESOURCES on how the study was adopted and developed:

- ☐ *National VOTER,* Summer 1982, convention coverage.
- ☐ *Post-Board Summary,* June 1982 and September 1982.
- ☐ *Impact on Issues.*

II. National Security

Explore the many perspectives on what constitutes national security: a strong military... economic stability... domestic tranquility... environmental quality... global cooperation... assured energy supplies... survival....

☐ Try a warm-up exercise to elicit the group's feelings: use a poster or other visual aid that raises questions and feelings.

☐ Ask questions. Here are some possible discussion starters:

—How do you think a European, African or Soviet citizen views national security? a member of Congress or President of the United States?

—What assumptions underlie the statements people make when they state their views on foreign policy/military policy; for example:

"The United States must be number one in the world." "The United States should be self-sufficient in every aspect of social, economic and political activity." "The world's problems are interdependent and need concerted attention by all nations."

After a short time (10–15 minutes), summarize the group's discussion and make the link to the next step: The League's study is framed by the fact that the concept of national security means different things to different people. With that in mind, we are going to take a deeper look into military policy. Why are we going to consider military policy before moving on to arms control? Because two aspects of military policy—U.S. relations with other nations and U.S. and Soviet military capabilities—have important implications for arms control.

III. Military policy

Identify and discuss military policy issues with particular emphasis on those areas that affect arms control efforts: U.S. relations with other countries and weapons roles and capabilities.

U.S. relations with other countries

Focus first on U.S. relations with other countries in the post-World War II period. Purpose: To examine the historical record to see how the United States has related military policy to foreign policy objectives in the past, in order to understand present policies better.

Key areas for discussion (See publication outline, Sections II and V)

1. How have U.S. foreign policy objectives changed or remained the same over the past 40 years?

Back-up questions:

—In what ways have U.S. political and economic interests abroad expanded since World War II?

—How have these interests affected U.S. foreign policy objectives?

—How have Soviet policies and actions affected U.S. foreign policy objectives, especially in Europe?

2. How have U.S. foreign policy objectives been implemented militarily?

Back-up questions:

—How have U.S. military policies responded to the expansion of U.S. foreign policy interests throughout the world?

—What has been the effect of Soviet military policies on U.S. policies?

—In what cases have U.S. military policies been consistent with the foreign policy objectives they were designed to implement? Inconsistent?

3. In what ways are current foreign and military policies an outgrowth of or departure from past experience?

Back-up questions:

—Is containment of the Soviet Union a continuing priority in U.S. policy?

—How has the policy of detente changed in the past decade?

—In what ways have U.S. policies responded to the changes in Soviet policies and vice versa?

4. What impact do U.S. and USSR military policies have on other nations?

Back-up questions:

—To what extent do U.S. and Soviet foreign and military policies fuel or sustain the arms race?

—What assurances do U.S. policies provide European allies in the event of an attack on them?

—How have U.S. and Soviet policies affected the Third World?

Allow approximately 30 minutes for discussion and then summarize the major points. You may choose to treat #1 as a presentation and preserve discussion time for the other three topics.

Weapons: Roles and capabilities

In order to implement its foreign policy objectives, the United States has developed and deployed nuclear and conventional weapons and personnel (collectively termed "forces"). Purpose: to examine the roles and capabilities of forces currently in the U.S. and Soviet arsenals.

Key areas for discussion (See publication outline, Section VI)

You will have to provide some factual background for this part of the discussion. Visual aids such as charts and diagrams, presented on flipsheets or slides or pass-out sheets, will really help to move the discussion along.

1. What purposes are served by the weapons in the U.S. and Soviet arsenals (e.g., to defend the homeland... to defend Europe—Eastern or Western—from attack... to respond to threats around the world... for deterrence purposes only... as a bargaining chip in negotiations... to sustain the domestic economy... as an end in themselves, rather than as a tool of policy)?

2. How do U.S. nuclear and conventional weapons compare to those of the Soviet Union?

Back-up questions:
—Should strength be measured in terms of numbers or quality, or some combination?
—How reliable are comparisons of relative capabilities?
—How important are comparisons?

Allow approximately 30 minutes for presentation and discussion. Summarize the group's discussion by trying to link conclusions from the previous discussion of policy issues with the development of weapons, e.g., how U.S. and Soviet foreign/military policies have led to the development of weapons systems capable of protecting U.S. and Soviet interests.

If your League plans only one discussion meeting on the National Security study this spring, the meeting must focus primarily on the goal stated for Meeting II. You will need, however, to provide background on the issues covered in Meeting I. Some tips on how to improve members' understanding *ahead of time:*

☐ Use all your communications channels to encourage members to read the fall 1982 *National VOTER* article, "The Future of National Security."

☐ Expand a meeting of the resource committee to include interested members; in effect, make it into a workshop.

☐ Excerpt articles, charts and diagrams from other sources in your bulletin.

☐ Buy enough copies of *Providing for the Common Defense: A Military Policy Reader,* for every-member distribution prior to the meeting.

☐ Alert members to lectures and discussions organized by other groups, special TV broadcasts or radio programs covering foreign and military policy.

Discussion outline: Meeting II

I. Introduction

☐ State the purpose and goal of the meeting:
—to review and discuss the evolution of arms control initiatives with emphasis on the objectives they seek to achieve;
—to develop criteria for the League to use in applying the LWVUS position in support of "efforts to reduce the risk of war."

☐ Review topics covered in Meeting I. Whether or not your League held an earlier meeting(s) to discuss the issues covered in the Meeting I outline, you will want to summarize these three points to establish a framework for the discussion of arms control initiatives:
—the many perspectives on what constitutes national security;
—the blending/clash of foreign and military policy objectives in the post World War II era;
—the purposes and capabilities of weapons in the U.S. and USSR arsenals.

II. Arms control

Examine the evolution of arms control initiatives with emphasis on the objectives and types of agreements achieved in the postwar era and criteria that have been used to evaluate progress of a negotiation, merits of a proposal or terms of an agreement.

☐ The discussion outline that follows is designed to parallel the three consensus questions. You may want the recorder to fill in the sample copy of the consensus form as you go along, rather than stopping the discussion at each phase. The recorder's written conclusions can then be read to the group for confirmation at the end of the meeting as a way to summarize the discussion.

☐ The four major discussion topics parallel the structure of the "every-member" publication, *The Quest for Arms Control: Why and How,* as you will realize in reviewing its outline, page 8.

☐ To speed your presentation and sharpen discussion, consider preparing ahead of time wall charts or other displays outlining previous arms control agreements and the status of current arms control negotiations. Use the lists provided in 1982–84 *PROSPECTUS #1*, pp. 20–21; *Security Through Arms Control?* (out of print); or Section V of *The Quest for Arms Control: Why and How* (see outline, p. 8 of this COMMITTEE GUIDE).

Historical perspective on arms control agreements

Purpose: to acquaint members with historical background on the evolution of arms control efforts to reduce the risk of war.

Key areas for discussion (see publication outline, Sections I, II and V)

1. How do arms control agreements of the past century reflect the changing nature of the arms race?

Back-up questions:

—What purposes were served by early agreements to codify rules of war, to establish procedures and institutions for settling international disputes and to ban certain weapons?

—In what ways have nuclear weapons changed the scope and purpose of arms control initiatives?

Allow 10 minutes for discussion.

Arms control objectives

Purpose: to identify the objectives of arms control negotiations to reduce the risk of war and the levels of importance that should be given each objective. (Consensus Question I)

Key areas for discussion (see publication outline, Section III)

1. What have been the primary objectives of arms control initiatives since World War II?

Back-up questions:

—Compare/contrast: the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START); the Biological Weapons Convention with the Geneva Protocol; the Seabed or the Antarctic Treaty with the Nonproliferation Treaty.

—In what way do agreements such as the 1963 U.S.–Soviet Hot Line Agreement seek to reduce the risk of war?

2. In deciding what level of importance to give specific arms control objectives, what factors need to be taken into consideration (e.g., how the arms race is affected... the type(s) of weapon involved... political or technical feasibility)?

Allow 15 minutes for discussion.

Types of arms control agreements

Purpose: to consider the appropriateness of multilateral or bilateral negotiations and unilateral initiatives for achieving specific arms control objectives. (Consensus Question II)

Key areas for discussion (see publication outline, Section IV)

1. Are there circumstances in which arms control objectives can be advanced best by involving many or most nations? A limited number of nations? One nation acting alone?

Back-up questions:

—In what way has the increase in the number of states in the international system affected arms control negotiations?

—How does nuclear weapons competition between the superpowers affect which type of negotiating forum is most productive?

—What are the possible gains or losses resulting from a unilateral initiative?

Allow 15 minutes for discussion.

Criteria

Purpose: to identify criteria that can be used to judge the quality of arms control negotiations, proposals and agreements (Consensus Question III)

Key areas for discussion (see publication outline, Section VI)

1. What criteria or factors have been important considerations in previous arms control agreements?

Back-up questions:

—How did the U.S. Senate apply the criteria of *verifiability*, *equity*, *linkage* and *continuity* in evaluating the SALT II Treaty?

—How has the SALT II Treaty been affected by the fact that one of the two *essential parties* has not formally ratified the agreement?

—Are so-called "adequate *verification* procedures" using national technical means sufficient for nuclear arms control agreements, or is on-site inspection necessary?

—How do the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Accords) and U.S.–Soviet Hot Line Agreement seek to *build confidence?*
—In what way was the Limited Test Ban Treaty affected by *environmental* considerations?

2. Does the importance of a criterion vary depending on the arms control objective?
Back-up questions:
—Is equity as important, for example, when the objective is to reduce tension as when the objective is to reduce the quantity of arms?
—Are verification procedures equally as necessary in agreements to reduce the quantity of arms, prohibit possession of certain weapons or limit proliferation of nuclear weapons?
—How has linkage been used by the U.S. and USSR in negotiations on various arms control measures?
—Is the effort to lay a framework for future negotiations, for example, more important in measures that limit the quantity of arms than in those that limit the proliferation of weapons?
—Are there some instances when environmental considerations should be given more attention?
—Could confidence-building measures be included in agreements dealing with limits, reductions or prohibition of weapons, as well as those agreements meant to reduce tensions?
—Are there some arms control objectives that can be advanced without widespread agreement?

3. Is it feasible to trade certain criteria for others, in the consideration of an agreement?
Back-up questions:
—Are there situations in which it would be advantageous to trade off all or some degree of verification, in exchange for mutually beneficial terms or improved confidence-building measures?
—Could widespread agreement be forfeited if an agreement made significant progress in limiting the quantity of arms or in prohibiting the first use of weapons?

Allow 25 minutes for discussion and proceed to the consensus questions, to summarize the group's conclusions.

Meetings at a glance

Meeting I (90 minutes)
I. General overview—10 minutes
II. National security—10 minutes
III. Military policy
  U.S. relations with other countries—30 minutes
  Weapons: roles and capabilities—30 minutes
IV. Summary—10 minutes

Meeting II (90 minutes)
I. Introduction—10 minutes
II. Arms control
  Historical perspective—10 minutes
  Objectives—15 minutes
  Types of agreements—15 minutes
  Criteria—25 minutes
III. Review the consensus form—15 minutes

Providing for the Common Defense: A Military Policy Reader

I. Introduction
- A. Current U.S. military policy based on nuclear deterrence and preparation for one major conventional conflict and one smaller conflict
- B. Basic questions:
  1. What are U.S. military security objectives? What questions have been raised about these objectives and what alternatives have been proposed?
  2. What kind of military policy will best enable the U.S. to achieve its current objectives? What policy would support the alternative objectives?
  3. What types and levels of military forces are necessary to implement each of these military policies?
  4. How does each of these military policies affect U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and other nations?

II. Lessons of the past
- A. Historical overview establishing pattern of relations with Soviet Union
- B. Foreign and military policies of Administrations from Truman to Reagan: shifts in policies, extension of U.S. interests overseas, growth in alliances and defense strategies

III. Theories underlying current U.S. military policy
- A. Deterrence theory
  1. Definition
  2. Mutual Assured Destruction
  3. First use policy and flexible response
  4. Implications for forces
- B. Contrasting concept of "counterforce"
  1. Warfighting capability
  2. First strike implications
  3. Implications for forces
- C. Influence of deterrence and counterforce theories on development of U.S. military policy

IV. Theories underlying current Soviet military policy
- A. Influence of counterforce theory
- B. Influence of deterrence theory

V. Effects of U.S. military policy on other nations
- A. U.S.–USSR relations
- B. U.S. relations with allies
- C. U.S.–Third World relations

VI. Comparison of current U.S. and Soviet military capabilities
- A. Functions of military forces
  1. United States
     a. Defend U.S.
     b. Defend Europe and other allies
     c. Respond to conflicts around the world
     d. Protect access to resources
  2. Soviet Union
     a. Defend Soviet Union against attack from Europe or Asia
     b. Defend Warsaw Pact allies
     c. Support client states
     d. Protect access to resources
- B. Defense systems
  1. U.S./NATO
     a. Members
     b. Roles of U.S. and European NATO members
  2. USSR/Warsaw Pact
     a. Members
     b. Roles of USSR and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members
- C. Comparisons of capabilities
  1. U.S./NATO
     a. Strategic forces
        1. Bombers and number of warheads
        2. ICBMs and number of warheads
        3. SLBMs and number of warheads
     b. General purpose forces
        1. Land forces

2. Tactical air forces
3. Naval forces
4. Mobility forces

2. USSR/Warsaw Pact
   a. Strategic forces
      1. Bombers and number of warheads
      2. ICBMs and number of warheads
      3. SLBMs and number of warheads
   b. General purpose forces
      1. Land forces
      2. Tactical air forces
      3. Naval forces
      4. Mobility forces
3. Other comparisons of military capabilities
   a. Pricing of Soviet defense capabilities in dollars
   b. Throw-weight
   c. Megatonnage
   d. Percentage of gross national product spent on defense

VII. Bibliography

VIII. Glossary of terms (BOX)

The Quest for Arms Control: Why and How

I. Introduction
- A. What is the arms race?
- B. What is arms control?

II. History of arms control
- A. Early agreements prompted by proliferation of arms production, imperialist rivalries, nationalism and competing alliance systems (early 1900s—World War II)
- B. Postwar agreements prompted by fear of nuclear annihilation, fear of nuclear proliferation and worry about effects of nuclear technology on environment
- C. After mid-1950s, agreements became step-by-step efforts due to arms race and growing development of nuclear power for energy

III. Objectives of arms control initiatives
- A. Possible objectives
  1. Limit or reduce the quantity of weapons by placing controls on their future growth ("vertical" proliferation)
  2. Prohibit the possession of weapons, either those already in existence or those that have not yet been developed
  3. Prohibit the first use of certain weapons
  4. Inhibit the development and improvement of weapons through means such as test bans and qualitative restrictions
  5. Limit the proliferation of weapons, both horizontally (from one nation to another) and geographically (to groups of nations in a region or to the sea, atmosphere and outer space)
  6. Reduce tension through means such as information exchange and notification of tests and maneuvers
- B. Importance of objective
  1. How the arms control initiative affects the arms race
  2. What types of weapons the initiative affects and the inherent danger associated with the weapons
  3. Political and technical feasibility of achieving agreement

IV. Types of arms control negotiations or initiatives
- A. Multilateral
- B. Bilateral
- C. Unilateral

V. Brief descriptions of major arms control proposals, negotiations and agreements (BOX)
- A. Agreements
  1. Geneva Protocol
  2. Antarctic Treaty

3. Limited Test Ban Treaty
4. "Hotline" Agreement
5. Outer Space Treaty
6. Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Tlatelolco)
7. Non-Proliferation Treaty
8. Seabed Arms Control Treaty
9. "Accidents Measures" Agreement
10. Biological Weapons Convention
11. SALT I (ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement)
12. Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement
13. Threshold Test Ban Treaty (U.S. has signed but not ratified)
14. Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (U.S. has signed but not ratified)
15. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Accords)
16. Environmental Modification Convention
17. SALT II (U.S. has signed but not ratified)

B. Proposals and Negotiations
1. Baruch Plan
2. Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and Committee on Disarmament
3. Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks
4. Comprehensive Test Ban Negotiations
5. Chemical Weapons Negotiations
6. Anti-Satellite Talks
7. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations
8. Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START)
9. Nuclear Freeze Proposals

VI. Possible criteria for judging arms control initiatives

A. Definition of criteria: standards by which an arms control initiative can be judged

B. Criteria
1. Equity
   a. Definition: terms are mutually beneficial and each party, on balance, gains security from the agreement
   b. Examples in which equity played a major role. such as Non-Proliferation Treaty, SALT I and SALT II
2. Verifiability
   a. Definition: process of determining, to the extent necessary to safeguard national security, that each party complies with the terms of an agreement
   b. Examples in which verification played a major role, such as Threshold Test Ban Treaty, SALT II
3. Linkage
   a. Definition: process of tying progress in arms contol with progress in another area of foreign or military policy
   b. Examples in which linkage played a major role, such as Limited Test Ban Treaty, SALT I and SALT II
4. Continuity
   a. Definition: builds on past efforts or provides a framework for future negotiations
   b. Examples in which continuity played a major role, such as Treaty of Tlatelolco, Non-Proliferation Treaty and SALT II
5. Environmental protection
   a. Definition: protects the earth's resources
   b. Examples in which environmental protection played a major role, such as Limited Test Ban Treaty and Environmental Modification Convention
6. Confidence building
   a. Definition: helps to reduce the general level of tension and reduce the risk of war
   b. Examples in which confidence building played a major role, such as the "Hotline" Agreement, "Accidents Measures" Agreement and Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement
7. Widespread agreement
   a. Definition: All appropriate parties adhere to the agreement
   b. Examples in which widespread agreement played a major role, such as Antarctic Treaty, Treaty of Tlatelolco, SALT I

VII. Glossary of terms (BOX)

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To: LWVUS
1730 M Street NW
Washington, DC 20036

POSTMARK DEADLINE July 1, 1983

From: LWV of _____

State _____

National Security
Consensus on Arms Control Objectives and Criteria

Please return this completed form by July 1, 1983 to the above address. Please mark the envelope "National Security Consensus." *The national board is under no obligation to consider replies postmarked after July 1, 1983.*

Use the grid form to indicate your League's member agreement on the following consensus questions:

1. What level of importance should the U.S. government give to each listed objective or arms control negotiations to reduce the risk of war?

2. Which type(s) of negotiations or initiatives (multilateral, bilateral, and/or unilateral) are *most* appropriate for achieving each objective?

3. What criteria should be used to evaluate arms control proposals, negotiations, and agreements?

QUESTION I: *Please indicate the level of importance that your League thinks the U.S. government should give each listed objective of arms control negotiations to reduce the risk of war. For each objective, place a check mark in one of the boxes indicated: "high," "medium," "low," "should not be an objective," or "no opinion/no agreement." In this question you are being asked to consider the level of importance of each objective on its own merits, rather than to prioritize the list of objectives, e.g., you are not being asked to indicate whether "reduce tensions" is more important than either "limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons" or "limiting the quantity of weapons."*

QUESTION II: *Please indicate the type(s) of negotiations or initiatives you want the League to favor in achieving each arms control objective by placing a check mark in the appropriate box or boxes indicated "multilateral," "bilateral," "unilateral." You may want to check more than one box on some lines. For example, your members may think that multilateral and bilateral negotiations are both important ways to address the "reduction of quantity of weapons."*

QUESTION III: *Please indicate the level of importance your League attaches to the criteria used to evaluate specific objectives of arms control negotiations, proposals or agreements by placing a number in the boxes depending on whether your League regards a specific criterion as essential (1), desirable (2), unimportant (3), or not desirable (4). The following example illustrates how the numbers should be used in responding to this question.*

OBJECTIVE: TO TAKE A PHOTOGRAPH

Equipment/ Condition	Rank importance in achieving the objective
camera	1
tripod	3
scratch on lens	4
film	1
color film	2
zoom lens	2

How did your board determine member thinking on this issue?

_____ Unit meetings

_____ General meeting(s)

_____ Bulletin tear-off

_____ Questionnaire or special mailing

_____ Telephone poll

_____ Other (specify on separate sheet)

Size of League (number of members):

_____ 1–50 _____ 101–149 _____ 201–249

_____ 51–100 _____ 150–200 _____ 250 or more

To facilitate tabulation, please use a SEPARATE SHEET for comments, identifying your LWV.

League of Women Voters of _____
(Local League name) (State)

SAMPLE ONLY

Signed _____
(Portfolio)

LWV of _____ State _____

Arms Control Objectives	1. What level of importance should the U.S. government give to each listed objective of arms control negotiations to reduce the risk of war?					2. Which type(s) of negotiations or initiatives (multilateral, bilateral and/or unilateral) are *most* appropriate for achieving each objective? (You may check more than one box per objective).		
	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	SHOULD NOT BE AN OBJECTIVE	NO OPINION/ NO AGREEMENT	MULTI-LATERAL	BILATERAL	UNILATERAL
A. Limit quantity of weapons								
B. Reduce quantity of weapons.								
C. Prohibit possession of certain weapons: 1. nuclear								
2. nonnuclear, (biological, chemical, radiological)								
D. Prohibit first use of certain weapons: 1. nuclear								
2. nonnuclear (biological, chemical, radiological)								
E. Inhibit development and improvement of weapons								
F. Limit proliferation of nuclear weapons: 1. geographical (e.g., zones, seas & space)								
2. horizontal (i.e., to other nations)								
G. Reduce tensions, (e.g., *hotline)*								
H. Other: _____								
I. Other: _____								

Please weight* the criteria using the following scale:

1. **Essential**
2. **Desirable**
3. **Unimportant**
4. **Not Desirable**
5. **No Opinion/ No Agreement**

LWV of _____ **State** _____

3. What criteria should be used to evaluate arms control proposals, negotiations and agreements?

IF the objective of negotiations is to: / **THEN our LWV assigns the following weight* to these criteria:**	Limit quantity of weapons	Reduce quantity of weapons	Prohibit possession of certain weapons: nuclear	Prohibit possession of certain weapons: nonnuclear (biological chemical radiological)	Prohibit first use of certain weapons: nuclear	Prohibit first use of certain weapons: nonnuclear (biological chemical radiological)	Inhibit development and improvement of weapons	Limit proliferation of nuclear weapons: geographical (zones sea space)	Limit proliferation of nuclear weapons: horizontal (to other nations)	Reduce tension	Other
Equity (The terms are mutually beneficial; i.e., no party is vulnerable)											
Verifiability (The process of determining that "the other side" is complying with provisions of an agreement)											
Linkage (Tying progress in arms control to progress in other foreign or military policy goals)											
Continuity (Continues progress or builds on previous agreements)											
Confidence Building (Crisis control mechanisms, advance notification, etc.)											
Environmental Protection											
Widespread Agreement (Ratification or approval by appropriate parties)											
Other:											

SAMPLE ONLY

[1983]

COMMITTEE GUIDE

Pub. No. 529 $1.00. December 1983.

League of Women Voters of the United States, 1730 M St. NW, Washington, DC 20036

Tooling Up for the National Security Study

FOCUS: *"To evaluate U.S. national security policies and their impact on our domestic programs and our relationships with other countries."*

SCOPE: *"Define the nature of national security and its relationship to military spending. Assess the impact of U.S. military spending on the nation's economy and on our ability to meet social and environmental needs. Determine the effects of U.S. military policy on our relationship with other countries."*

Motion adopted May 17, 1982 at LWVUS convention

The League's decision to undertake a study of National Security comes at a critical time in the nation's history, a time when American citizens are showing unprecedented concern over national security policies and the threat of nuclear war. At the core of the public debate are a number of questions centering on "how much is enough?"

Do we need to strengthen U.S. defenses to deter the Soviet Union?

Should the strategic nuclear weapons of both the U.S. and the Soviets be reduced? If so, by how much?

How much money should the United States spend on defense in an era of constrained budget resources and economic uncertainty?

How many promises of support can the United States extend to other countries?

AREAS OF STUDY: To fulfill the scope and focus of the adopted motion, the national board outlined for League study three areas of public policy:

military policy: the theories and strategies that underly military policy decisions; the role and capabilities of weapons; and the impact of U.S. foreign and military policy on other nations;
arms control: the evolution of arms control initiatives and measures; and
defense spending: the cost of fulfilling military policy objectives.

In order to move from study to action, the board approved four areas in which to seek member agreement/consensus:

- ☐ arms control objectives and criteria; — reporting deadline—July 1, 1983
- ☐ military policy objectives;
- ☐ defense spending; and
- ☐ the national security decision-making process. — reporting deadline—February 1, 1984

The new National Security study will build on existing international relations, social policy, government and natural resources positions. If members agree on criteria and objectives for evaluating arms control proposals, negotiations and agreements, the LWV UN position will be given much needed definition that can be used to judge an arms control effort to "reduce the risk of war." By evaluating current military policy and seeking member agreement on what is needed to implement military objectives, the League may then enter fully into the debate on the federal budget, evaluating defense spending in relation to domestic and development aid spending. By examining the process by which decisions on military policy are made, the League may also find new applications for its citizen rights position.

Obviously, these two rounds of League decision making on national security, major though they are, leave many important areas unstudied and unresolved. The 1983–84 program making process will be your opportunity to let us know which, if any, additional areas of study you want to pursue.

Getting your study under way

The study chair and resource committee are the nuts and bolts of your local study. The chair deals with all phases of managing the study: recruiting committee members (don't forget the new members that you added this fall); setting committee meeting dates and drawing up the agenda for those meetings; tailoring the discussion outline to local needs; maintaining close contact with the board on such matters as the schedule for general meetings, workshops and unit meetings, the recruiting and training of discussion leaders and recorders, and the scheduling of these people, as well as resource persons, at unit meetings, and informing and involving the rest of the community.

Two League publications supply basic information on how to manage a study item and reach member agreement/consensus. They are: *In League: Guidelines for League Board* (Pub. # 275, $2.00) and *Meaningful Meetings: The Role of the Resource Committee* (Pub. #319, 40¢). Both contain invaluable suggestions that will not be repeated here for carrying out a program item. They will make your job easier, the results more successful. *Meaningful Meetings,* in particular, is *must* reading for the committee.

With this COMMITTEE GUIDE in hand, study chairs will want to move fast in working out an overall plan for committee activities and assigning topics and appropriate bibliographies for the resource

committee. Divide the work up according to the talents of the committee members and the time they can give. Once again, don't forget to involve those new members. Be sure that each person knows when and what to report on as her/his assignment. Make the committee meetings learning opportunities. Invite a speaker or ask a member to review a book or magazine article for the group. You might consider opening up one of the committee meetings to interested members, making it a workshop. (This ploy might get around scheduling problems in the unit meeting calendar.) Use the committee meetings to learn, analyze and question the substance as well as to work on the final discussion outline for the membership meetings. Try to include background on current U.S. and Soviet military policy and proposals, as well as information that might be of special interest to your locality (an air force base, defense or aerospace industry). Remember, too, that it is the committee's job to work out what kinds of visual aids to recommend for illustrating key points, flip charts, for example.

With this as with every study, Leagues are at many different points on the spectrum of readiness, when it comes to the matter of consensus. A few have been briefing members on this subject for years, piquing member interest with bulletin inserts, workshops, speakers at annual meetings and conventions, perhaps even a full-fledged conference. Some have held a general meeting on some aspect of the consensus topic earlier in the year. Others have hitchhiked on a conference or meeting sponsored by another organization. And some have already scheduled the recommended two meetings for spring 1983. For the resource committee in a League that fits this picture, designing a plan will be a pleasure.

What if your League is one that has been able to give the National Security study little or no attention up to now? What if this year's schedule is tight and committee help scarce? What then? First of all, you're not alone. Many Leagues are in exactly this position. But we know, from past experience with national studies that presented challenges equally tough—both in complexity of materials and in time pressures—that Leagues all over the country will organize, starting right now, to do a first-class job with the resources available. A few recommendations:

☐ Budget your own energies.

☐ Make full use of printed information—that's a way of getting packaged expertise. Urge members to read the fall 1982 National VOTER article, "The Future of National Security," and excerpt quotes for the bulletin from the resources listed in the June *Post-Board Summary*, PROSPECTUS and this COMMITTEE GUIDE.

☐ Use people who already know the facts and the issues to present information on the issues and the policy choices. Look for resident experts in nearby Leagues, at the local high school, college or university, and in community businesses.

Some general advice. Without going back over ground well covered in *Meaningful Meetings*, we want to emphasize how important it is to hold a training session at which resource persons, discussion leaders and recorders can work out a team approach. Ideally, each would get a copy of this COMMITTEE GUIDE and of the Member Agreement/Consensus Report Form, a sample of which is attached. Make clear to the recorder that it is her/his job to deduce the thinking of the group and to complete the form.

Discussion outline: Meeting I

I. Introduction: General overview of the National Security study

☐ Review the FOCUS and SCOPE of the study as adopted by Convention 1982.

☐ Sketch the internal and external factors that signaled that the time was right for League study and action in this area: the importance and timeliness of the issue... the membership growth potential... the need to sharpen the League's position on "efforts to reduce the risk of war"... recent federal budget cuts and the League's inability to speak to major portions of the budget....

☐ Outline the AREAS OF STUDY for this biennium.

☐ Point out that study of these areas will prepare us to seek consensus in several areas. Positions will be formulated by the national board, based on reports of member agreement from local Leagues all over the country.

☐ State the goals of the two spring meetings (assuming you are holding two) in preparation for a July 1, 1983 reporting deadline.

Meeting I: to sharpen member awareness of the nature of national security as variously interpreted and to discuss U.S. military policy with emphasis on those areas that affect arms control efforts—U.S. relationships with other nations and weapons capabilities of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

Meeting II: to review and discuss the evolution of arms control initiatives and the objectives they seek to achieve and to develop criteria for the LWV to use in applying the LWVUS position in support of "efforts to reduce the risk of war."

Allow about 10 minutes for this introduction. If you are looking for places to compress, here's one. To speed up not only the introduction but also the discussion to follow, consider having the FOCUS, SCOPE, AREAS OF STUDY and GOALS of the meeting outlined on a blackboard or newsprint.

BASIC RESOURCES on how the study was adopted and developed:

- ☐ *National VOTER*, Summer 1982, convention coverage.
- ☐ *Post-Board Summary*, June 1982 and September 1982.
- ☐ *Impact on Issues.*

II. National Security

Explore the many perspectives on what constitutes national security: a strong military... economic stability... domestic tranquility... environmental quality... global cooperation... assured energy supplies... survival....

☐ Try a warm-up exercise to elicit the group's feelings: use a poster or other visual aid that raises questions and feelings.

☐ Ask questions. Here are some possible discussion starters:

—How do you think a European, African or Soviet citizen views national security? a member of Congress or President of the United States?

—What assumptions underlie the statements people make when they state their views on foreign policy/military policy; for example:

"The United States must be number one in the world." "The United States should be self-sufficient in every aspect of social, economic and political activity." "The world's problems are interdependent and need concerted attention by all nations."

After a short time (10–15 minutes), summarize the group's discussion and make the link to the next step: The League's study is framed by the fact that the concept of national security means different things to different people. With that in mind, we are going to take a deeper look into military policy. Why are we going to consider military policy before moving on to arms control? Because two aspects of military policy—U.S. relations with other nations and U.S. and Soviet military capabilities—have important implications for arms control.

III. Military policy

Identify and discuss military policy issues with particular emphasis on those areas that affect arms control efforts: U.S. relations with other countries and weapons roles and capabilities.

U.S. relations with other countries

Focus first on U.S. relations with other countries in the post-World War II period. Purpose: To examine the historical record to see how the United States has related military policy to foreign policy objectives in the past, in order to understand present policies better.

Key areas for discussion (See publication outline, Sections II and V)

1. How have U.S. foreign policy objectives changed or remained the same over the past 40 years?

Back-up questions:

—In what ways have U.S. political and economic interests abroad expanded since World War II?

—How have these interests affected U.S. foreign policy objectives?

—How have Soviet policies and actions affected U.S. foreign policy objectives, especially in Europe?

2. How have U.S. foreign policy objectives been implemented militarily?

Back-up questions:

—How have U.S. military policies responded to the expansion of U.S. foreign policy interests throughout the world?

—What has been the effect of Soviet military policies on U.S. policies?

—In what cases have U.S. military policies been consistent with the foreign policy objectives they were designed to implement? Inconsistent?

3. In what ways are current foreign and military policies an outgrowth of or departure from past experience?

Back-up questions:

—Is containment of the Soviet Union a continuing priority in U.S. policy?

—How has the policy of detente changed in the past decade?

—In what ways have U.S. policies responded to the changes in Soviet policies and vice versa?

4. What impact do U.S. and USSR military policies have on other nations?

Back-up questions:

—To what extent do U.S. and Soviet foreign and military policies fuel or sustain the arms race?

—What assurances do U.S. policies provide European allies in the event of an attack on them?

—How have U.S. and Soviet policies affected the Third World?

Allow approximately 30 minutes for discussion and then summarize the major points. You may choose to treat #1 as a presentation and preserve discussion time for the other three topics.

Weapons: Roles and capabilities

In order to implement its foreign policy objectives, the United States has developed and deployed nuclear and conventional weapons and personnel (collectively termed "forces"). Purpose: to examine the roles and capabilities of forces currently in the U.S. and Soviet arsenals.

Key areas for discussion (See publication outline, Section VI)

You will have to provide some factual background for this part of the discussion. Visual aids such as charts and diagrams, presented on flipsheets or slides or pass-out sheets, will really help to move the discussion along.

1. What purposes are served by the weapons in the U.S. and Soviet arsenals (e.g., to defend the homeland... to defend Europe—Eastern or Western—from attack... to respond to threats around the world... for deterrence purposes only... as a bargaining chip in negotiations... to sustain the domestic economy... as an end in themselves, rather than as a tool of policy)?

2. How do U.S. nuclear and conventional weapons compare to those of the Soviet Union?

Back-up questions:
—Should strength be measured in terms of numbers or quality, or some combination?
—How reliable are comparisons of relative capabilities?
—How important are comparisons?

Allow approximately 30 minutes for presentation and discussion. Summarize the group's discussion by trying to link conclusions from the previous discussion of policy issues with the development of weapons, e.g., how U.S. and Soviet foreign/military policies have led to the development of weapons systems capable of protecting U.S. and Soviet interests.

If your League plans only one discussion meeting on the National Security study this spring, the meeting must focus primarily on the goal stated for Meeting II. You will need, however, to provide background on the issues covered in Meeting I. Some tips on how to improve members' understanding *ahead of time:*

☐ Use all your communications channels to encourage members to read the fall 1982 *National VOTER* article, "The Future of National Security."

☐ Expand a meeting of the resource committee to include interested members; in effect, make it into a workshop.

☐ Excerpt articles, charts and diagrams from other sources in your bulletin.

☐ Buy enough copies of *Providing for the Common Defense: A Military Policy Reader,* for every-member distribution prior to the meeting.

☐ Alert members to lectures and discussions organized by other groups, special TV broadcasts or radio programs covering foreign and military policy.

Discussion outline: Meeting II

I. Introduction

☐ State the purpose and goal of the meeting:
—to review and discuss the evolution of arms control initiatives with emphasis on the objectives they seek to achieve;
—to develop criteria for the League to use in applying the LWVUS position in support of "efforts to reduce the risk of war."

☐ Review topics covered in Meeting I. Whether or not your League held an earlier meeting(s) to discuss the issues covered in the Meeting I outline, you will want to summarize these three points to establish a framework for the discussion of arms control initiatives:
—the many perspectives on what constitutes national security;
—the blending/clash of foreign and military policy objectives in the post World War II era;
—the purposes and capabilities of weapons in the U.S. and USSR arsenals.

II. Arms control

Examine the evolution of arms control initiatives with emphasis on the objectives and types of agreements achieved in the postwar era and criteria that have been used to evaluate progress of a negotiation, merits of a proposal or terms of an agreement.

☐ The discussion outline that follows is designed to parallel the three consensus questions. You may want the recorder to fill in the sample copy of the consensus form as you go along, rather than stopping the discussion at each phase. The recorder's written conclusions can then be read to the group for confirmation at the end of the meeting as a way to summarize the discussion.

☐ The four major discussion topics parallel the structure of the "every-member" publication, *The Quest for Arms Control: Why and How,* as you will realize in reviewing its outline, page 8.

☐ To speed your presentation and sharpen discussion, consider preparing ahead of time wall charts or other displays outlining previous arms control agreements and the status of current arms control negotiations. Use the lists provided in 1982–84 *PROSPECTUS #1*, pp. 20–21; *Security Through Arms Control?* (out of print); or Section V of *The Quest for Arms Control: Why and How* (see outline, p. 8 of this COMMITTEE GUIDE).

Historical perspective on arms control agreements

Purpose: to acquaint members with historical background on the evolution of arms control efforts to reduce the risk of war.

Key areas for discussion (see publication outline, Sections I, II and V)

1. How do arms control agreements of the past century reflect the changing nature of the arms race?

Back-up questions:

—What purposes were served by early agreements to codify rules of war, to establish procedures and institutions for settling international disputes and to ban certain weapons?

—In what ways have nuclear weapons changed the scope and purpose of arms control initiatives?

Allow 10 minutes for discussion.

Quest for Arms Control

1– Arms control objectives

Purpose: to identify the objectives of arms control negotiations to reduce the risk of war and the levels of importance that should be given each objective. (Consensus Question I)

Key areas for discussion (see publication outline, Section III)

1. What have been the primary objectives of arms control initiatives since World War II?

Back-up questions:

—Compare/contrast: the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START); the Biological Weapons Convention with the Geneva Protocol; the Seabed or the Antarctic Treaty with the Nonproliferation Treaty.

—In what way do agreements such as the 1963 U.S.–Soviet Hot Line Agreement seek to reduce the risk of war?

2. In deciding what level of importance to give specific arms control objectives, what factors need to be taken into consideration (e.g., how the arms race is affected... the type(s) of weapon involved... political or technical feasibility)?

Allow 15 minutes for discussion.

2– Types of arms control agreements

Purpose: to consider the appropriateness of multilateral or bilateral negotiations and unilateral initiatives for achieving specific arms control objectives. (Consensus Question II)

Key areas for discussion (see publication outline, Section IV)

1. Are there circumstances in which arms control objectives can be advanced best by involving many or most nations? A limited number of nations? One nation acting alone?

Back-up questions:

—In what way has the increase in the number of states in the international system affected arms control negotiations?

—How does nuclear weapons competition between the superpowers affect which type of negotiating forum is most productive?

—What are the possible gains or losses resulting from a unilateral initiative?

Allow 15 minutes for discussion.

3– Criteria

Purpose: to identify criteria that can be used to judge the quality of arms control negotiations, proposals and agreements (Consensus Question III)

Key areas for discussion (see publication outline, Section VI)

1. What criteria or factors have been important considerations in previous arms control agreements?

Back-up questions:

—How did the U.S. Senate apply the criteria of *verifiability*, *equity*, *linkage* and *continuity* in evaluating the SALT II Treaty?

—How has the SALT II Treaty been affected by the fact that one of the two *essential parties* has not formally ratified the agreement?

—Are so-called "adequate *verification* procedures" using national technical means sufficient for nuclear arms control agreements, or is on-site inspection necessary?

—How do the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Accords) and U.S.–Soviet Hot Line Agreement seek to *build confidence?*
—In what way was the Limited Test Ban Treaty affected by *environmental* considerations?

2. Does the importance of a criterion vary depending on the arms control objective?
Back-up questions:
—Is equity as important, for example, when the objective is to reduce tension as when the objective is to reduce the quantity of arms?
—Are verification procedures equally as necessary in agreements to reduce the quantity of arms, prohibit possession of certain weapons or limit proliferation of nuclear weapons?
—How has linkage been used by the U.S. and USSR in negotiations on various arms control measures?
—Is the effort to lay a framework for future negotiations, for example, more important in measures that limit the quantity of arms than in those that limit the proliferation of weapons?
—Are there some instances when environmental considerations should be given more attention?
—Could confidence-building measures be included in agreements dealing with limits, reductions or prohibition of weapons, as well as those agreements meant to reduce tensions?
—Are there some arms control objectives that can be advanced without widespread agreement?

3. Is it feasible to trade certain criteria for others, in the consideration of an agreement?
Back-up questions:
—Are there situations in which it would be advantageous to trade off all or some degree of verification, in exchange for mutually beneficial terms or improved confidence-building measures?
—Could widespread agreement be forfeited if an agreement made significant progress in limiting the quantity of arms or in prohibiting the first use of weapons?

Allow 25 minutes for discussion and proceed to the consensus questions, to summarize the group's conclusions.

Meetings at a glance

Meeting I (90 minutes)
I. General overview—10 minutes
II. National security—10 minutes
III. Military policy
U.S. relations with other countries—30 minutes
Weapons: roles and capabilities—30 minutes
IV. Summary—10 minutes

Meeting II (90 minutes)
I. Introduction—10 minutes
II. Arms control
Historical perspective—10 minutes Judy
1 Objectives—15 minutes Martha
2 Types of agreements—15 minutes Mimi
3 Criteria—25 minutes Helen
III. Review the consensus form—15 minutes

9-10 Presentation intro, hist., 1 objectives, 2 types of agreements
10–10:30 consensus on 1 and 2
10:30 – criteria
11 – consensus on 3

Providing for the Common Defense: A Military Policy Reader

I. Introduction
- A. Current U.S. military policy based on nuclear deterrence and preparation for one major conventional conflict and one smaller conflict
- B. Basic questions:
  1. What are U.S. military security objectives? What questions have been raised about these objectives and what alternatives have been proposed?
  2. What kind of military policy will best enable the U.S. to achieve its current objectives? What policy would support the alternative objectives?
  3. What types and levels of military forces are necessary to implement each of these military policies?
  4. How does each of these military policies affect U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and other nations?

II. Lessons of the past
- A. Historical overview establishing pattern of relations with Soviet Union
- B. Foreign and military policies of Administrations from Truman to Reagan: shifts in policies, extension of U.S. interests overseas, growth in alliances and defense strategies

III. Theories underlying current U.S. military policy
- A. Deterrence theory
  1. Definition
  2. Mutual Assured Destruction
  3. First use policy and flexible response
  4. Implications for forces
- B. Contrasting concept of "counterforce"
  1. Warfighting capability
  2. First strike implications
  3. Implications for forces
- C. Influence of deterrence and counterforce theories on development of U.S. military policy

IV. Theories underlying current Soviet military policy
- A. Influence of counterforce theory
- B. Influence of deterrence theory

V. Effects of U.S. military policy on other nations
- A. U.S.–USSR relations
- B. U.S. relations with allies
- C. U.S.–Third World relations

VI. Comparison of current U.S. and Soviet military capabilities
- A. Functions of military forces
  1. United States
     a. Defend U.S.
     b. Defend Europe and other allies
     c. Respond to conflicts around the world
     d. Protect access to resources
  2. Soviet Union
     a. Defend Soviet Union against attack from Europe or Asia
     b. Defend Warsaw Pact allies
     c. Support client states
     d. Protect access to resources
- B. Defense systems
  1. U.S./NATO
     a. Members
     b. Roles of U.S. and European NATO members
  2. USSR/Warsaw Pact
     a. Members
     b. Roles of USSR and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members
- C. Comparisons of capabilities
  1. U.S./NATO
     a. Strategic forces
        1. Bombers and number of warheads
        2. ICBMs and number of warheads
        3. SLBMs and number of warheads
     b. General purpose forces
        1. Land forces

2. Tactical air forces
3. Naval forces
4. Mobility forces

2. USSR/Warsaw Pact
   a. Strategic forces
      1. Bombers and number of warheads
      2. ICBMs and number of warheads
      3. SLBMs and number of warheads
   b. General purpose forces
      1. Land forces
      2. Tactical air forces
      3. Naval forces
      4. Mobility forces
3. Other comparisons of military capabilities
   a. Pricing of Soviet defense capabilities in dollars
   b. Throw-weight
   c. Megatonnage
   d. Percentage of gross national product spent on defense

VII. Bibliography

VIII. Glossary of terms (BOX)

The Quest for Arms Control: Why and How

I. Introduction
- A. What is the arms race?
- B. What is arms control?

II. History of arms control
- A. Early agreements prompted by proliferation of arms production, imperialist rivalries, nationalism and competing alliance systems (early 1900s—World War II)
- B. Postwar agreements prompted by fear of nuclear annihilation, fear of nuclear proliferation and worry about effects of nuclear technology on environment
- C. After mid-1950s, agreements became step-by-step efforts due to arms race and growing development of nuclear power for energy

III. Objectives of arms control initiatives
- A. Possible objectives
  1. Limit or reduce the quantity of weapons by placing controls on their future growth ("vertical" proliferation)
  2. Prohibit the possession of weapons, either those already in existence or those that have not yet been developed
  3. Prohibit the first use of certain weapons
  4. Inhibit the development and improvement of weapons through means such as test bans and qualitative restrictions
  5. Limit the proliferation of weapons, both horizontally (from one nation to another) and geographically (to groups of nations in a region or to the sea, atmosphere and outer space)
  6. Reduce tension through means such as information exchange and notification of tests and maneuvers
- B. Importance of objective
  1. How the arms control initiative affects the arms race
  2. What types of weapons the initiative affects and the inherent danger associated with the weapons
  3. Political and technical feasibility of achieving agreement

IV. Types of arms control negotiations or initiatives
- A. Multilateral
- B. Bilateral
- C. Unilateral

V. Brief descriptions of major arms control proposals, negotiations and agreements (BOX)
- A. Agreements
  1. Geneva Protocol
  2. Antarctic Treaty

3. Limited Test Ban Treaty
4. "Hotline" Agreement
5. Outer Space Treaty
6. Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Tlatelolco)
7. Non-Proliferation Treaty
8. Seabed Arms Control Treaty
9. "Accidents Measures" Agreement
10. Biological Weapons Convention
11. SALT I (ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement)
12. Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement
13. Threshold Test Ban Treaty (U.S. has signed but not ratified)
14. Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (U.S. has signed but not ratified)
15. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Accords)
16. Environmental Modification Convention
17. SALT II (U.S. has signed but not ratified)

B. Proposals and Negotiations
1. Baruch Plan
2. Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and Committee on Disarmament
3. Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks
4. Comprehensive Test Ban Negotiations
5. Chemical Weapons Negotiations
6. Anti-Satellite Talks
7. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations
8. Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START)
9. Nuclear Freeze Proposals

VI. Possible criteria for judging arms control initiatives

A. Definition of criteria: standards by which an arms control initiative can be judged

B. Criteria
1. Equity
   a. Definition: terms are mutually beneficial and each party, on balance, gains security from the agreement
   b. Examples in which equity played a major role. such as Non-Proliferation Treaty, SALT I and SALT II
2. Verifiability
   a. Definition: process of determining, to the extent necessary to safeguard national security, that each party complies with the terms of an agreement
   b. Examples in which verification played a major role, such as Threshold Test Ban Treaty, SALT II
3. Linkage
   a. Definition: process of tying progress in arms contol with progress in another area of foreign or military policy
   b. Examples in which linkage played a major role, such as Limited Test Ban Treaty, SALT I and SALT II
4. Continuity
   a. Definition: builds on past efforts or provides a framework for future negotiations
   b. Examples in which continuity played a major role, such as Treaty of Tlatelolco, Non-Proliferation Treaty and SALT II
5. Environmental protection
   a. Definition: protects the earth's resources
   b. Examples in which environmental protection played a major role, such as Limited Test Ban Treaty and Environmental Modification Convention
6. Confidence building
   a. Definition: helps to reduce the general level of tension and reduce the risk of war
   b. Examples in which confidence building played a major role, such as the "Hotline" Agreement, "Accidents Measures" Agreement and Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement
7. Widespread agreement
   a. Definition: All appropriate parties adhere to the agreement
   b. Examples in which widespread agreement played a major role, such as Antarctic Treaty, Treaty of Tlatelolco, SALT I

VII. Glossary of terms (BOX)

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SAMPLE ONLY SAMPLE ONLY SAMPLE ONLY SAMPLE ONLY

To: LWVUS
1730 M Street NW
Washington, DC 20036

POSTMARK DEADLINE July 1, 1983

From: LWV of _____

State _____

National Security
Consensus on Arms Control Objectives and Criteria

Please return this completed form by July 1, 1983 to the above address. Please mark the envelope "National Security Consensus." *The national board is under no obligation to consider replies postmarked after July 1, 1983.*

Use the grid form to indicate your League's member agreement on the following consensus questions:

1. What level of importance should the U.S. government give to each listed objective or arms control negotiations to reduce the risk of war?

2. Which type(s) of negotiations or initiatives (multilateral, bilateral, and/or unilateral) are *most* appropriate for achieving each objective?

3. What criteria should be used to evaluate arms control proposals, negotiations, and agreements?

QUESTION I: *Please indicate the level of importance that your League thinks the U.S. government should give each listed objective of arms control negotiations to reduce the risk of war. For each objective, place a check mark in one of the boxes indicated: "high," "medium," "low," "should not be an objective," or "no opinion/no agreement." In this question you are being asked to consider the level of importance of each objective on its own merits, rather than to prioritize the list of objectives, e.g., you are not being asked to indicate whether "reduce tensions" is more important than either "limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons" or "limiting the quantity of weapons."*

QUESTION II: *Please indicate the type(s) of negotiations or initiatives you want the League to favor in achieving each arms control objective by placing a check mark in the appropriate box or boxes indicated "multilateral," "bilateral," "unilateral." You may want to check more than one box on some lines. For example, your members may think that multilateral and bilateral negotiations are both important ways to address the "reduction of quantity of weapons."*

QUESTION III: *Please indicate the level of importance your League attaches to the criteria used to evaluate specific objectives of arms control negotiations, proposals or agreements by placing a number in the boxes depending on whether your League regards a specific criterion as essential (1), desirable (2), unimportant (3), or not desirable (4). The following example illustrates how the numbers should be used in responding to this question.*

OBJECTIVE: TO TAKE A PHOTOGRAPH

Equipment/ Condition	Rank importance in achieving the objective
camera	1
tripod	3
scratch on lens	4
film	1
color film	2
zoom lens	2

How did your board determine member thinking on this issue?

____ Unit meetings

____ General meeting(s)

____ Bulletin tear-off

____ Questionnaire or special mailing

____ Telephone poll

____ Other (specify on separate sheet)

Size of League (number of members):

____ 1–50 ____ 101–149 ____ 201–249

____ 51–100 ____ 150–200 ____ 250 or more

To facilitate tabulation, please use a SEPARATE SHEET for comments, identifying your LWV.

League of Women Voters of _____
(Local League name) (State)

SAMPLE ONLY

Signed _____
(Portfolio)