

COPY

Chrysler Building,
135 East 42nd Street,
New York, New York.

April 27, 1945

Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Esq.
Adviser to U. S. A. Delegation,
Hotel Fairmont,
San Francisco, California.

Confidential

My dear Mr. Armstrong:

Unfortunately for me, I returned to New York after you had left for San Francisco. I was in Cuba as Chairman of the organization committee for the first meeting of a new International Air Transport Association. Perhaps we can thus solve some of the problems not solved at Chicago.

The matters which I wanted to discuss with you may indirectly arise at San Francisco and may affect long range relationship of civil aviation to world security. I am sorry that I must try to state my problems in a letter. My position might have been clearer had I been so fortunate as to see you. The views that I am expressing in this letter are my own. I have not discussed these matters with any other officers of Pan American Airways, nor is the Company in any manner concerned with the responsibility for my statements.

Two problems have given me great concern. They may be summarized as follows:

- 1) In any covenant that may be agreed upon having to do with disposition of the old League of Nation mandates, or setting out the terms of future international trusteeship over former enemy property, I hope that the language will be carefully considered so as not to hinder, unduly, the future development of United Nations civil air transport operations. As you will recall, the language contained in the so-called "Destroyer Deal Leases", pursuant to which the United States has built bases on various British Isles, is most unsatisfactory. Also, the language as to air navigation rights in the League of Nation mandates was drafted so long ago that it does not meet modern conditions. If, at San Francisco, actual covenants are to be drafted which hereafter

become operative and affect the right of United Nations' aircraft to use present enemy territory, this question may become very important. Certain of the Japanese Islands, for example, will be vitally needed in the future development of the best and shortest routes between the United States and Asia. Landing rights on the Japanese home islands may be of even greater importance. The shortest (and perhaps best) route from the United States to China is from Seattle to the Aleutian Islands to Japan and thence to the Chinese mainland. If matters of this kind are not clearly foreseen in the final draft of the San Francisco agreements, it may prove difficult to untangle the situation hereafter.

- 2) The second problem that concerns me is perhaps even more important from the long-range point of view of insuring future peaceful communication between nations. I personally (contrary to most American operators) foresee the time when the international civil aviation organization contemplated at Chicago, or some successor thereto, must be given some degree of economic control to curb the use of civil aviation as a means of direct or indirect aggressor action. I do not believe that this organization will ever be given, or should be given, complete economic control over international aviation such as was advocated at Chicago in the Canadian plan. It seems to me quite unnecessary that sovereign nations should, to that extent, surrender control of one of their principal means of world communication. On the other hand, as I have indicated above, civil aviation may be wrongfully or dangerously used so that in certain areas of the world it may become a threat to future world peace. If that happens, there should be some international machinery to control the situation if possible without military action, perhaps by giving to the international civil aviation organization limited economic control. On the other hand, I have the gravest doubts whether the aviation organization should be both judge and jury -- in other words, I doubt whether the aviation organization should both decide the conditions of aggression, or competition likely to affect world peace, have arisen and, thereafter, prescribe the remedy such as compulsory regulation or limitation of national operations over the routes or territories affected.

It seems to me that it would be much wiser if the world security organization, as part of its fundamental duties, could be assigned the responsibility for determining that in certain areas civil aviation was being used as a means of aggression and, with this finding, the matter could then be referred to the international aviation organization with authority to proceed to remedy the dangerous conditions thus found to exist.

My concern may arise through ignorance. It is not clear to me whether the powers proposed by the Dumbarton Oaks draft to be vested in the world security organization can be construed to vest in that organization the right to find the existence of conditions of aggression in a particular area, and delegate the curing of such conditions to a subordinate body. It is quite clear to me that it would be most unwise to raise, at San Francisco, the particularly difficult differences of opinion which were evident at Chicago. It might, therefore, be unfortunate if civil aviation, as such, were mentioned at all. On the other hand, it seems to me that considerable progress might be made if the San Francisco agreements could be drafted so as to include very general language giving the world security organization authority to determine the existence of acts of aggression other than actual armed aggression, and the right to provide directly or through subordinate organizations for economic sanctions aimed at stopping the aggression complained of. Something of this kind might possibly answer the problem.

As I have stated above, these suggestions, for whatever they may be worth, have not been discussed with any other officer of Pan American Airways. As it is, however, most difficult to separate anything that an executive officer of a company does from his company activities, I would ask that you keep this letter confidential. Perhaps you may wish to show it to Dr. Isaiah Bowman under the same conditions.

I am not at all sure that my thinking is of any importance in the situation as it exists at San Francisco. However, I do feel sufficiently troubled about these matters myself so that I would not be happy hereafter had I not at least divulged my views to someone on whose judgment I rely and who is (as you are) directly concerned in the work now going on at the all-important San Francisco Conference.

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If my views are of no practical value, please do not hesitate to forget the matter entirely. With kind regards and wishing you every success in your present difficult duties as an adviser to the Delegation, I am,

Sincerely yours,

(signed) John C. Cooper

JCC:ped

San Francisco
May 1, 1945

Dear Cooper:

Your letter of April 27 has just come and has been read carefully. I am interested by your statement in the first numbered paragraph that the language in the so-called "Destroyer Deal Leases" was unsatisfactory and the suggestion that some aspects of this arrangement are relevant to the discussion of trusteeships and should be taken into account in discussion of the latter subject here at San Francisco. If you could find time to tell me what specifically was unsatisfactory in the "Destroyer Deal Leases", I will be glad to pass your observations along to members of the Delegation who are particularly interested in the trusteeship part of the negotiation here. Meanwhile, I have shown your letter to Dr. Bowman and shall see that the substance of it is given to others here who would be particularly interested.

The question raised in your second paragraph can be answered fairly directly. The proposed Security Council and Assembly may raise a question regarding a threat to peace and security. They are not limited regarding the nature of that threat. Specifically, they are not prevented from raising the question that civil aviation is being misused. The language employed in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals was intentionally made general enough to cover any question involving a threat to peace and security.

I hope I have understood you clearly and that the foregoing is responsive to your questions.

With warm regards,

Sincerely yours,

Hamilton Fish Armstrong

Mr. John C. Cooper,
135 East Forty-second Street,
New York, New York.

HFA:DHM

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Fairmont Hotel
San Francisco


May 1, 1945

Dear Governor,

Thank you ever so much for reviewing
for me the draft of my proposed V-E Day
statement and for your suggestions which
have been most helpful.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,



Commander Harold E. Stassen, U.S.N.R.

United States Delegate

Fairmont Hotel

Stassen

May 1, 1945

Mr. McDermott
Mr. Byington ✓

There is much criticism about the fact that we did not open the Conference with a religious ceremony.

I suggest that you immediately prepare a short statement saying that this matter was examined thoroughly from every aspect and that the American Delegation by unanimous vote, adopted this suggestion as one method of satisfying everybody in view of the fact that it was impossible for the various religions represented to agree on any other procedure. This should be done promptly today.

cc to Mr. Stassen
Mr. MacLeish

S:ERS:RG:EDT

Mr. Stettinius would like to have any comment then made on this subject. Mr. Stassen may wish Mr. McDermott and Mr. Byington will prepare the statement.

Bond

THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

May 3, 1945

Commander Stassen:

We have the following requests for your services on the radio:

1. The Armed Forces Radio Service would like you to answer about three minutes of questions for their "Conference Reports" shortwave broadcast overseas. The record of your answers can be made at your convenience. The questions follow:

- 1) To the average person overseas, the fundamental idea behind the Conference is to figure out a way to prevent more wars. Just how do the delegates intend to do this?
- 2) What is the basic desire of the American delegation? In other words, "what do we seek"?
- 3) What provision will be made in the prevention of economic wars, where one country starts attacking the economic structure of another? A situation which usually leads to armed conflict?
- 4) It has been reported that the American delegation will act as a unit. Does that mean that the minority voice will not be heard on controversial issues?
- 5) Having recently returned from overseas, where you no doubt have obtained a picture of what the men desire of the Conference, have you at this time any report you could give to them?

Please feel free to revise the questions as you see fit. Studios are available either at the Veterans Memorial Building or at the Mark Hopkins Hotel.

2. The Junior Chamber of Commerce is preparing an "On to Japan" rally to be held in the Civic Auditorium and broadcast over one of the national networks. Tentative plans call for the following speakers: You, General Romulo and Mr. Ford of Australia. The rally will be heard probably in the afternoon or the evening over V-E plus 2. Will you please let me know your reaction to these requests at your convenience.

LDennis:DVC

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Fairmont Hotel
San Francisco

May 3, 1945

Dear Governor,

Abe Fortas has told me that Charles
Taussig is unhappy.

Is there any way we could pay more
attention to him regarding trusteeship
affairs?

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,



Commander Harold E. Stassen, U.S.N.R.

United States Delegate

Fairmont Hotel

THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

May 4, 1945

Requies

Commander Stassen;

This will confirm my telephone conversation with your secretary forwarding an invitation from the radio program "The Free World Forum", broadcast over the Blue network each Sunday afternoon 12 to 12:30 pm., PWT. Miles Standish, who is in charge of arrangements, would like your appearance on the broadcast of either May 13 or May 20. He understands that you will not be able to answer questions from the floor, but if you accepted, would make a brief statement at the beginning of the broadcast and then leave for another engagement. I would appreciate knowing of your pleasure in respect to this engagement at your convenience.

*Informed
5/7*

Lloyd Dennis
Radio Representative for
the State Department and
American Delegation

Thurman 110

MD

PL:LD:DVC

THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

May 4, 1945

TO: Commander Harold C. Stassen

FROM: Edward S. Mason
John S. Dickey
Edward G. Miller

SUBJECT: The Importance of a Renewal With Increased Authority of the
Trade Agreements Act

The Bill now before Congress has as its objectives the renewal of the Trade Agreements Act for a period of three years and the granting of increased authority to negotiate tariff reductions up to 50 per cent of the rates in force on January 1, 1945.

There are three points which should be emphasized in connection with this proposed legislation: (1) The determination of tariff rates by the method of trade agreements as compared with the older method of direct Congressional action to specify on tariff rates for each commodity; (2) the necessity at this time of increased authority in the negotiation of trade agreements; and (3) the significance of passage or failure of the Trade Agreements Act at this time for the broader program of international economic cooperation.

1. Two methods of tariff determination have been utilized by the United States. The first method, abandoned in 1934, was the method of determining tariff rates by Act of Congress; a century of experience indicated that this method was susceptible to the worst features of pressure group and log-rolling activity. The Trade Agreements legislation provides for a scientific and selective method of determining tariff rates after careful studies and negotiations as to each commodity. There is little disposition at the present time on either side of Congress to return to tariff making by Act of Congress. The main conflict comes over the questions of how long a period should be contemplated in the renewal of the present Act, whether any additional authority is needed, and whether trade agreements once negotiated should be subject to some sort of Congressional veto or approval. The present Bill proposes three years as the period of renewal and it would be difficult to undertake any comprehensive program of trade agreement negotiation if a shorter period is contemplated. Everyone who has had anything to do with

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the negotiation of trade agreements agrees that the submission to Congress of such agreements, once negotiated, would open up all the pressure group and log-rolling activities characteristic of the older tariff making procedure.

2. The reason for the increased authority lies in the fact that the existing authority has been pretty well exhausted with respect to some of the principal trading nations with which we shall want to undertake negotiations. What we want to accomplish ultimately is a reduction of foreign tariffs and other restrictions on American exports and for this purpose we need something with which to bargain. This is the reason for the inclusion of Section (2) of the Bill, which proposes to permit negotiations of tariff reductions up to 50 per cent of the January 1, 1945 level. This of course does not mean a horizontal reduction of 50 per cent of present American tariff rates. The trade agreement technique is a highly selective one in which no tariff reduction is proposed without extensive hearings as to the probable effect of the proposed reduction on American industry.

3. The passage or failure of the Trade Agreements Act will have an effect on our international economic relations which far transcends the immediate tariff question. While this subject could be elaborated at great length, the most important immediate effect of a failure to pass the Bill will undoubtedly be felt in the commercial policy of Great Britain. Great Britain now clearly stands at the crossroads with respect to its future commercial policy. It may go in the direction of strengthening its preferential system, its sterling bloc, and its bi-lateral discriminatory arrangements with other countries or, on the other hand, it may go in the direction of a liberal commercial policy. The British Government is itself divided on this question. It seems fairly obvious to us that a failure to pass the Trade Agreements Act would be sufficient indication to Great Britain that they may expect little assistance from the United States in working out a liberal commercial policy program. On the other hand, the passage of the Act might well give the liberal elements in Great Britain the assurance they need in opposing plans for a British economic bloc, and it would place our Government in a stronger bargaining position in having something to offer to the British in exchange for an elimination or reduction of their trade barriers. Although only Great Britain is here mentioned, the effects on other parts of the world of what the United States does in the tariff field are, in our opinion, profound.

For the reasons set forth above, it seems to us a matter of great significance that the present Trade Agreements Bill should be enacted

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by Congress. In fact, we are strongly of the opinion that the failure of Congress to pass the Trade Agreements Act (and the Bretton Woods legislation) would seriously jeopardize the success of the organization which we are here creating. It is also our view that a statement from you in support of the Bill would have a profoundly desirable effect.

Edward S. Mason

Edward S. Mason
Deputy to the Asst. Secretary of
State in charge of Economic Affairs

John S. Dickey
John S. Dickey
Director, Office of Public Affairs
Department of State

Edward G. Miller

Edward G. Miller
Legislative Assistant to
Asst. Secretary Acheson

ESMason:rs:rtg

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

San Francisco
May 5, 1945

Dear Governor,

You will find herewith attached a wire that I addressed to Mr. Hull the night before last and his answer that I have just received.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'E. Stassen', with a large, stylized 'E' and a cursive 'Stassen'.

Commander Harold E. Stassen
Fairmont Hotel
San Francisco
California

copy

TELEGRAM

May 4, 1945

Department of State,

Washington, D. C.

PERSONAL FOR MR. HULL

At this historic Conference of the United Nations, which your high idealism and untiring efforts have done so much to make possible, we join in sending to you this message as a token of our profound affection and respect. We need hardly say that the absence from San Francisco of the statesman who has come to be regarded all over the world as the father of the United Nations organization is most keenly and constantly felt, not only by ourselves but also by your many friends from the other nations represented here. We are all hopeful that before the Conference ends you will be able to join us and renew again the personal counsel and collaboration which had such fruitful results at Moscow and elsewhere.

With most cordial and affectionate personal regards,

Anthony Eden

V. M. Molotov

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.

copy

May 5, 1945

"I am deeply touched by your message and send you my heartfelt thanks. The progress of your deliberations has my constant and prayerful attention. It has been a bitter disappointment to me that I have not yet been able to join your Councils and to meet my dear friends.

"My faith has never waivered. I know you will succeed. I am confident that you and all the other leaders of peoples the world over will not lose sight of the great observations which give a meaning to our common victory. I know that united in the spirit of our great purpose you cannot fail to meet the challenge of this historic end. I salute your splendid leadership."

/s/ Cordell Hall

Copy for Mr. Stassen
429
May 7, 1945

SA - Mr. Pasvolsky:

A few thoughts have occurred to Mr. Sanders and myself about the regional problem.

A. There now is a fundamental inconsistency between the proposed amendment of Chapter VIII, C, and the provision already in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals in Chapter XII, paragraph 2. Under the new amendment, parties to mutual assistance pacts have responsibility for preventing future aggression by a present enemy state. Under paragraph 2 of Chapter XII, some other states have responsibility for the same action. If France and Russia struck at Germany five years from now, under VIII, C, as amended, the United States, China, and Great Britain could be involved in the same action under XII, 2.

Furthermore, under the Declaration of Moscow, it is already specified that all four major governments would take all measures they consider necessary to provide against any violation of surrender and disarmament terms imposed upon a common enemy. The mutual assistance pact amendment of VIII, C, simply cuts across the Moscow Declaration.

This confusing over-lapping may provide the entering wedge for reconsideration of the amendment in conversations with the Russians. It is dangerous mixing of authority from the standpoint of China and the United States, and consequently to Russia through crossing lines with them about Germany, et cetera.

B. Two constructive possibilities for handling any amendment of Chapter VIII, C, are:

1. To make any exception to the provision requiring authorization of the Security Council a transitional arrangement, by providing that the exceptional grant of authority would only last until the coming into force of the special agreement or agreements to provide armed forces. This course runs afoul of the above-stated inconsistency, but that would have to be eradicated in any case. It has the advantage of terminating independent action under mutual assistance pacts by a specific time limit. It would presuppose the necessity of a commitment by

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the major powers to proceed without delay to the making of the special agreements, since otherwise Russia could delay indefinitely to gain selfish advantages under this proposed course.

2. To make a distinction between initial, and continuing, action. Thereby regional arrangements, anywhere, previously recognized to be consistent with the purposes and principles of the general organization, would be free to take immediate action within the area to which their regional arrangement applies under their own terms and without specific authorization from the Security Council. In two kinds of cases action would have to be authorized by the Security Council voting by a majority of seven including all five permanent members:

- a. Continuing action within a region, and
- b. Measures of action to be applied between regions or outside any one region.

To these two courses, both necessary, there should be added a corollary that intervention in the internal affairs of states shall not be undertaken except for purposes of international peace and security and upon the authorization of the Security Council.

Except for reverting to the original language of the Oaks Proposals, which under existing circumstances would be very difficult to win, any solution on this problem is believed to lie along the lines above suggested.

Harley A. Notter

SPA:HNNotter
OA:ESanders:cw

May 8, 1945

Documents Officer:

In the future, would you kindly furnish me with four copies of any proposed amendments or changes to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals or any documents pertaining to such changes. All other documents of a routine nature, such as minutes of meetings, etc., should be supplied in duplicate.

Harold E. Stassen
Delegate


THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

May 9, 1945

To: Commander Stassen
From: Abe Fortas

I have found it necessary to return to Washington this evening. As I told the Secretary of State today, I shall do my best to return to San Francisco in the event that it appears that my presence here is needed.

I want to express to you my admiration of the work that you have done here and my hope and belief that you will continue to maintain the splendid position which you have taken on the various issues which have come to my attention.


Under Secretary of the Interior.

May 9, 1948

SECRET

MEMORANDUM for Delegates and Principal Advisers:

A few tentative ideas circulated only to stimulate thought and criticism.

Harold E. Stassen

Nothing in this Charter shall be construed to abrogate the inherent right of self-defense against a violator of this Charter.

Chapter 12, Paragraph 3: Transitional Arrangements

Pending the effective establishment of the organization and particularly of the security and enforcement facilities thereof, the Pan American Union should take measures in its region consistent with the provisions of this Charter to carry out the purposes thereof. The Security Council shall, by two-thirds vote, including a majority vote of the permanent members, notify the Pan American Union when it is prepared to assume these responsibilities under the Charter.

Chapter 8, Section D:

If the Security Council does not itself take measures and does not authorize action under the regional arrangement or agency, for maintaining or restoring international peace, nothing in this Charter should be deemed to abrogate the right of the parties to any regional arrangement which is consistent with this Charter to adopt such measures under it as they deem just and necessary for maintaining or restoring international peace and security. (Australia)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.8(b)

STATE DEPT. 61024405

BY _____ DATE _____

May 10, 1945

MEMORANDUM for Mr. John Bell:

Mr. and Mrs. W. C. Smith, personal friends of long standing, are in San Francisco for several days. While here they wish to renew acquaintance with friends of theirs who are connected with the Conference and located in the Veterans' Building. As they have appointments in that building nearly every day, considerable time could be saved if a pass could be given covering the time they will be here. If such passes are available, I should appreciate your issuing one to them.

Harold El Stassen

THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

May 10, 1945

SECRET

MEMORANDUM to U. S. Delegates and Advisors

On the basis of suggestions and discussions these past few days with a number of our delegates and advisors it appears to me that the following would be the best answer to our regional problem and it would at the same time meet other problems. This language arises from the suggestions of other delegates and advisors.


VI E. Self Defense

1. Nothing in this charter shall be construed as abrogating the inherent right of self defense against a violator of this charter.
2. In the application of this provision the principles of the Act of Chapultepec and of the Monroe Doctrine are specifically recognized.

It is of course also clear that all regions are fully entitled to use all peaceful means of settling disputes without the permission of the Security Council.

Harold E. Stassen

HES:bms



May 14, 1945

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM to U. S. Delegates and Advisers

SUBJECT: Suggestion on Voting for Consideration


Fifteen governments, including France, Australia and Brazil, have suggested some softening of the veto power of the individual permanent members of the Security Council. Under the present wording a single permanent member does not have the veto under Chapter 8, Section A if it is a party to a dispute, but does have a veto if it is not a party. It would not seem that this effect was intended by the language used.

Therefore, it seems that the intent of the voting section could be clarified and carried out by language somewhat as follows:

Chapter VI, Section C - New paragraph between 2 and 3:

Decisions of the Security Council under Chapter VIII, Section A, if none of the permanent members are parties to the dispute, should be made by an affirmative vote of eight members including the concurring votes of at least three of the permanent members.

Section A is the pacific settlements section and does not involve any enforcement action. The suggested amendment would do two things. It would meet the justified complaint of small nations that in a dispute involving two small nations it is now possible to have a decision on a peaceful settlement which has the five affirmative votes of great powers and only two affirmative votes of the six small powers. The amendment would mean that at least one-half, or three, of the small powers must join.



It would also meet the complaint that in a dispute between two small powers the veto of just one great power can prevent the Council from even hearing the dispute.

Under the suggestion you would need the affirmative votes of at least five lesser powers and three great powers--or four lesser powers and four great powers--or five great powers and three lesser powers--to investigate a dispute between two small nations and to recommend a settlement.

The requirement for unanimous action of the great powers in any enforcement action would be unchanged.

H.E.S.

HES:bms



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