

2.

THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE  
ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Hon. Harry S. Truman

Draft not sent  
? ?

In view of questions raised  
in some quarters permit me  
to convey to you my judgment  
that history will prove that the  
facing of issues in these preliminary  
stages of this conference, ~~at times~~  
than concession, at other times than  
adjustment, and at still others than  
direct decision by vote with full  
information to the people, has been  
right and wholesome. Furthermore  
the Chairman of our delegation ~~thoroughly~~ has  
carried out <sup>in an able, dignified, and firm manner</sup> the unanimous decision  
of the delegation, reached after careful and  
complete consideration ~~of the~~ those  
who are living in the past and are steeped

THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE  
ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

in the devious methods of ineffective  
diplomacy cannot understand or  
properly evaluate these procedures.

~~But I believe~~

~~and make~~

We are now moving forward ~~on~~ the  
main track. This could not be if the  
issues raised by the two Soviet Republics,  
the Argentine, and Poland had not been  
squarely and courageously met and decided.

HES

~~Source~~

Consultations  
on Issues between  
~~the~~ ~~on~~ Amendments  
for the Record

~~1~~

Fundamental  
Things

~~Paras.~~

~~Stellingsma~~

~~1~~

May 9, 1945

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM for Delegates and Principal Advisers:

A few tentative ideas circulated only to stimulate thought and criticism.

Harold E. Stassen


Nothing in this Charter shall be construed to abrogate the inherent right of self-defense against a violator of this Charter.

Chapter 12, Paragraph 3: Transitional Arrangements

Pending the effective establishment of the organization and particularly of the security and enforcement facilities thereof, the Pan American Union should take measures in its region consistent with the provisions of this Charter to carry out the purposes thereof. The Security Council shall, by two-thirds vote, including a majority vote of the permanent members, notify the Pan American Union when it is prepared to assume these responsibilities under the Charter.

Chapter 8, Section D:

If the Security Council does not itself take measures and does not authorize action under the regional arrangement or agency, for maintaining or restoring international peace, nothing in this Charter should be deemed to abrogate the right of the parties to any regional arrangement which is consistent with this Charter to adopt such measures under it as they deem just and necessary for maintaining or restoring international peace and security. (Australia)



May 10, 1945

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM to U. S. Delegates and Advisors

On the basis of suggestions and discussions these past few days with a number of our delegates and advisors it appears to me that the following would be the best answer to our regional problem and it would at the same time meet other problems. This language arises from the suggestions of other delegates and advisors.

VI E. Self Defense

1. Nothing in this charter shall be construed as abrogating the inherent right of self defense against a violator of this charter.
2. In the application of this provision the principles of the Act of Chapultepec and of the Monroe Doctrine are specifically recognized.

It is of course also clear that all regions are fully entitled to use all peaceful means of settling disputes without the permission of the Security Council.

Harold E. Stassen

HES:bms

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.3(D)  
STATE DEPT. 601000000  
BY DJH DATE 4/24/00



Mr Sydney Hillman  
~~The Organized World~~ <sup>Organization of World Labor</sup> which you represent has made  
Every attempt to secure a privileged position  
in the San Francisco Conference even though repeatedly turned  
down by the Steering Committee ~~which~~ <sup>which</sup> ~~represented~~ <sup>represented</sup> the  
delegation of the 49 states has represented, on the grounds that no more  
In their repeated attempts ~~the~~ <sup>you</sup> ~~Hillman~~

has delayed the progress of this San Francisco Conference  
a Conference which is possible because millions of men have fought and fought  
and have in a terribly regrettable manner attempted to  
use this conference to secure a special advantage. In so  
doing I am certain that you have not served the  
wishes of the rank and file of the CIO who are  
just as anxious for this conference to get on with  
their crucial work of drafting a charter that will  
represent the best hope of a lasting and just peace  
and for progress in the social and economic problems of the  
world.

<sup>Therefore</sup> I ~~plead with~~ <sup>directly request</sup> you, <sup>on behalf</sup> ~~in the name~~ of the  
people of America, including your own membership  
to cease these ~~attempts and delays~~ tactics.

So I am writing you to persuade that in dropping serious subject from  
up a week's period of requests for the possibility that this conference could not  
be held.

May 10, 1945

The following statement was issued by the British Delegation press office:

In view of questions following Mr. Eden's press conference, it seems necessary to clarify the position under the proposed amendment to Paragraph 4 of Chapter 8-A of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals.

The effect of this new draft is that the Security Council will now under this section possess the power actually to recommend the terms of settlement for any particular dispute. Further, since under the Yalta voting formula, the parties to a dispute cannot vote under this section, it follows that a great power party to a dispute will not be able to block any such recommendation being made.

It is of course true that this change does not alter the position that a great power which is not a party to a dispute may, if it so desires, prevent the Security Council from taking any action under this section, including the making of recommendations: but this point does not affect the advance which has recently been made in regard to the real increase in power which has now been given to the Security Council.

FILE

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
THIRD FLEET

~~SECRET~~

14 May 1945.

Dear Commander:

Enclosed are a few letters for you; the following are items of interest and changes that have taken place since my last note to you:

Admiral Halsey and his party will depart here at about 2100 on the 16th for Guam. His party will consist of Admiral Carney, Captains Wilson and Cheek, Commander Moulton, Lt. Comdr. Kitchell, Lieutenant Parkinson and Lieutenant Bailey. Lieutenant Bailey returned from leave yesterday.

Lieutenant Kennedy will be detached probably tomorrow or when directed by Admiral Carney -- I have his orders written. Lieutenant Parkinson will relieve him.

Commander Cleveland will be detached in a few days as directed by Admiral Carney -- I have his orders ready.

Commander Weeks is being detached. Admiral Halsey has agreed to detach him as the Doctor is desirous of getting back into a hospital. Admiral Carney dictated a letter regarding his detachment to Rear Admiral Agnew, BuMed. (Copy of this letter attached for your information.


Captain Dow, Commander Hoerner and Lieutenant Carroll are now aboard the MISSOURI making necessary arrangements for taking aboard the Flag. We received a letter yesterday from Lieutenant Carroll -- it was written to Commander Kitchell and Commander Kitchell passed to me for information. Mr. Carroll said that all things were shaping up pretty well and they expected to have necessary alterations completed before the Admiral arrived.

You're busy I know but I thought you would like to be informed of the above. My personal regards to you.

Respectfully,

*J. Conley*  
J. Conley.

Commander H.E. Stassen, USNR.  
c/o The Commandant 12th. N.D.





FILE

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
THIRD FLEET

11 May 1945.

My dear Bill:

Admiral Halsey has indicated that he is willing to release Commander C. Weeks, MC, USN., in order that he may return to some duty where he can again practice his specialty, surgery. I also understood that you have signified your willingness to talk the matter over with him.

In view of the foregoing I am leaving him with the Rear Echelon at Pearl (Commander THIRD Fleet Rear Echelon, c/o FPO, San Francisco, Calif.) pending receipt of orders detaching him. Just to keep the record straight I reiterate that Admiral Halsey approves his detachment and the Admiral would consider it a favor if his detachment orders were so worded that Weeks, upon detachment from THIRD Fleet Staff, would be directed to proceed to Washington so that he can personally talk with you.

I have not discussed the matter of this detachment with any of CinCPac's people, but do not consider it necessary in view of Weeks' Staff Status.

Joel Boone has been consulted and concurs in the procedure I have outlined above. In view of the fact that Piggy Weeks was actually a personal aide to Admiral Halsey, no replacement is required.

My Boss would esteem it a great favor if you can fix this matter up as I have suggested, and as for me, I know you will do everything you can to take care of the matter.

Sincerely,

ROBT. B. CARNEY.

Rear Admiral William J. Agnew, MC, USN.,  
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery,  
Navy Department, Washington, D.C.

THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE  
ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

May 14, 1945

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM to U. S. Delegates and Advisers

SUBJECT: Suggestion on Voting for Consideration

Fifteen governments, including France, Australia and Brazil, have suggested some softening of the veto power of the individual permanent members of the Security Council. Under the present wording a single permanent member does not have the veto under Chapter 8, Section A if it is a party to a dispute, but does have a veto if it is not a party. It would not seem that this effect was intended by the language used.

Therefore, it seems that the intent of the voting section could be clarified and carried out by language somewhat as follows:

Chapter VI, Section C - New paragraph between 2 and 3:

Decisions of the Security Council under Chapter VIII, Section A, if none of the permanent members are parties to the dispute, should be made by an affirmative vote of eight members including the concurring votes of at least three of the permanent members.

Section A is the pacific settlements section and does not involve any enforcement action. The suggested amendment would do two things. It would meet the justified complaint of small nations that in a dispute involving two small nations it is now possible to have a decision on a peaceful settlement which has the five affirmative votes of great powers and only two affirmative votes of the six small powers. The amendment would mean that at least one-half, or three, of the small powers must join.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5(b)  
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY JSH DATE 4/24/00

It would also meet the complaint that in a dispute between two small powers the veto of just one great power can prevent the Council from even hearing the dispute.

Under the suggestion you would need the affirmative votes of at least five lesser powers and three great powers--or four lesser powers and four great powers--or five great powers and three lesser powers--to investigate a dispute between two small nations and to recommend a settlement.

The requirement for unanimous action of the great powers in any enforcement action would be unchanged.

H.E.S.

HES:bms

May 14, 1945.

Permit me to extend my apology for having been unable to keep my appointment with you on Saturday morning. Late Friday an unexpected United States Delegation meeting was called for 9 o'clock Saturday. The Session began consideration of important issues requiring my presence and we did not adjourn until 12:30.

I hope that I may have the privilege of meeting and conferring with you before I leave San Francisco.

Sincerely yours,

Harold E. Stassen

The above letter was sent to the following:

Honorable Goodwin Knight  
Judge of the Superior Court  
of Los Angeles County, Los  
Angeles, California

Mr. J. L. Stuart, 37 Front Street  
San Francisco

Mr. Worthen Bradley  
Crocker Building, San Francisco

Mr. Wakefield Baker  
Messrs. Baker & Hamilton  
700 - 7th Street, San Francisco

Mr. W. Wesley Hicks  
Wesix Electric Heater Co.  
390 First Street, San Francisco

Mr. Tom Mellon (same as Mr. Hicks)

Mr. Daniel E. Koshland  
98 Battery Street, San Francisco

Mr. Walter Haas (same as Mr. Koshland)

Mr. A. P. Giannini  
Bank of America Building  
300 Montgomery Street, San Francisco

Mr. Earl Lee Kelly (same as Mr. Giannini)

Honorable Milton D. Sapiro  
Judge of the Municipal Court  
City Hall, Civic Center  
San Francisco

Mr. Harold Zellerbach  
534 Battery Street, San Francisco

Mr. J. D. Zellerbach  
3 Sansome Street, San Francisco

Philip S. Ehrlich, Esq.  
Russ Building, San Francisco

Oliver B. Wyman, Esq.  
625 Market Street, San Francisco

Mr. William J. Traner  
2320 Chestnut Street, San Francisco

Mr. Alvin Campbell  
Front and Jackson Streets, San Francisco

Fred S. Harrington, Esq.  
465 California Street, San Francisco

Mr. Joe Shoong  
National Dollar Stores, Ltd.  
929 Market Street, San Francisco

*Lacey*



BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH  
HARVARD UNIVERSITY AND RADCLIFFE COLLEGE

SIDNEY B. FAY, CHAIRMAN  
194 BRATTLE ST.,  
CAMBRIDGE 38, MASSACHUSETTS

772 WIDENER LIBRARY  
CAMBRIDGE 38, MASSACHUSETTS

May 22, 1945

My dear Governor Stassen,

I was one of those who was privileged through Professor Lambie to meet you at the Faculty Club earlier this year. As you said at the end of the very interesting meeting that you would be glad if any of us here at Harvard would send you any memoranda of our views, I am venturing to send you two articles in page proof which are about to appear in the HARVARD BULLETIN, one by Professor Seavey of the Law School and the other by myself. As the editor of the BULLETIN, for reasons of space, had to omit my final sentences I am enclosing them for you.

I am also enclosing a memorandum by Alexander Böker which I have just received, because I find that it largely expresses my own views (except in the matter of reparations by labor services). He is one of the finest instructors in economics whom we have had here in recent years. He is at present Washington correspondent for the Chicago Journal of Commerce. He is a native of Heidelberg, 33 years old, who studied law at Munich, Berlin, Königsberg, and was a German Rhodes scholar at Oxford. He is an expert on German agricultural economics. He took a Ph.D. at Harvard under Dr. Brüning and Professor W.Y. Elliott. As he is a very intelligent German, well acquainted with his country's economic conditions, I thought you would be interested to see what he has to say, and I send it to you with his approval.

With highest regards, Sincerely yours,

*Sidney B. Fay*

# TREATMENT OF POST-WAR GERMANY

*Professor Warren A. Seavey's Argument for stern measures*

WORLD SAFETY must be given first consideration in determining the post-war treatment of Germany. Economic welfare, except so far as it bears upon the question of world peace, is a poor second. Even less weight should be given to the punishment of war criminals and the matter of indemnities. With the advent of the bomb and the threat of the even more dreadful and far-spreading weapons which science may develop, it becomes imperative for the preservation of civilization that no nation should exist which has the power and the will to bring destruction upon its neighbors, now the entire world. Hopeful of international agreements as we now are, experience forbids them as the sole reliance. If post-war Germany will have the power and retains the will for conquest, it is of vital importance that it be deprived of one or the other, preferably both.

There are comparatively few non-Germans who are still so credulous as to believe that the German people would not have the will for conquest if they had the power. The myth of two Germanys is preserved chiefly as argumentative material by the England haters, the Russophobes, and the refugees who wish to return. The attitude of the great mass of Germans, as reported by our soldiers, the callousness with which the civil population both before and during the war witnessed the sufferings of the miserable victims of Nazism, the attitude of the prisoners of war in our midst, all point in one direction. While not all Germans are Nazis, especially in defeat, there are few who have not succumbed to the German philosophy and literature of the past hundred years; the "democratic" Pan-German is as dangerous to the world as the Nazi, perhaps more so, since he is less easily recognized. And although a few of the present leaders may now suffer for their sins, the dynamic leaders of the next generation will be the millions of young Nazis who have grown up knowing no god but Hitler. The will for conquest will remain.

As to Germany's strength, there is even less question. Losing on the field of battle, it has won its long-planned, horrifying biological war. Germany will be far stronger relatively than before. The ruin of its cities and the destruction of its industries are but a passing phase; these can be rebuilt. But the progress of a country is primarily based upon the intellect of its leaders and the strength of its people. Germany will have the leadership, the physical stamina, and the will to regain its lost ground. The more stupid of the Nazi leaders we may assume well be destroyed, but the bright young

men of Germany, the cold-eyed, skilful indefatigable, and fanatical younger officers will remain, many of them carefully preserved in our prison camps. The physical vigor of the great mass of the people will be unimpaired. It will emerge from the war substantially as populous as at the beginning, with its vital resources unimpaired, a nation of nearly seventy million strong, biologically

power is gone. Only then can the Germans live in peace with their neighbors. Only when its people realize that they cannot conquer can the reformation of the Pan-Germans begin.

We can accomplish these objects, I believe, without harm to our better natures or to the German people, by a far from drastic reordering of German economy. I can only outline the plan.

THE FIRST step is to forbid the rebuilding in Germany of all industry essential to waging a modern war. It has been through its wealth of coal that Germany, with few other critical materials, has obtained its industrial supremacy. By internationalizing the Ruhr (Upper Silesia with its 80 percent Polish population is already gone), Germany will have lost its great industrial war potential. To avert the consequences of a possible sudden reconquest, or a weakening of resolution of the allied nations, no heavy industry should be allowed to be rebuilt in the Ruhr or in the Saar. Such industry can be placed at convenient points in other countries in which are the iron and other materials or to which they can be brought. It is as easy to move the coal to the ore, or part way to the ore, as to have the industries at the mines. Lorraine can regain its old position; Swedish ore can be brought to Belgium or Holland as easily as to the Ruhr.

Secondly, any existing installations in Germany for the manufacture of certain critical materials should be removed or destroyed and their rebuilding forbidden. The guiding principle should be that German industry is to be limited to that which cannot be adapted for war purposes (to the manufacture of robombs, for instance), with every case of doubt resolved in favor of safety. Expert study should determine what these forbidden manufactures are, but a minimum list may be suggested. First would come synthetic gasoline and rubber, both uneconomically produced in the past. Aluminum and magnesium would be on any list; these are vital, and Germany has no particular advantages for their manufacture. So too the airplane industry, and probably the entire automotive industry, should not be revived. A check should be made by military and scientific experts to determine what parts of the chemical industry should be eliminated. On the other hand, there is no reason why the manufacture of textiles, glass and pottery, food and wood products, should not be continued. There would thus remain a large area of German industry which carries no threat to the world. The valuable additional safety measure recommended by Moulton and Marlio, that is, placing the control of electrical power into the hands of Germany's neighbors, will not interfere with its economy. Most of the policing against the forbidden industries can be done

## WORLD SAFETY COMES FIRST—SEAVEY

powerful people, united by their hates, with leaders prepared and acting secretly to make the third attempt for world conquest. Conscious of past errors and determined that in their next attempt the blow will be too sudden and too devastating to be resisted.

In contrast, the other nations of Western Europe are almost a shambles, with populations diminished and weakened by mass killings and semi-starvation, the birth rate seriously impaired by the malnutrition of its children and the long absence of the men, with much of their leadership destroyed, with the remaining leadership suspicious and divided. Even uninvaded England has a precarious economic outlook. They will be a group of small nations, torn with internal dissensions, each seeking to satisfy its own ends, each oppressed with the fear of another attempt to enslave them by Germany, a colossus politically and biologically and, if we permit, industrially. To still Europe's fears and to give it safety we must deprive Germany of the power again to strike. We must convince both it and Europe that the

*Photograph 2  
Prof Seavey  
SAS case*

THE EDITORS invited Professors Fay and Seavey to contribute their views on the general and vital question of What to do with Germany. Sidney B. Fay, '96, A.M. '97, Ph.D. '00, is Professor of History; Warren A. Seavey, '02, LL.B. '04, is Bussey Professor of Law.



from the air, since the required installations would be large and easily observable. This would be true, provided the large underground caverns, both natural and manufactured, were first filled up, an undertaking which I commend to those in charge of Nazi prisoners of war.

Thirdly, German agriculture should be revised. The extensive raising of hard grains, sugar beets and potatoes in large units, initiated after the last war to provide for German self-sufficiency, is not suited to local conditions. On the contrary, the country is far better adapted to small holdings, for market gardening, dairying, and the raising of fruit. With governmental encouragement for the other crops removed and with the breakup of the large holdings, agriculture will be an asset to Germany instead of an economic liability as previously. Here the Germans will find the employment denied them by the loss of their heavy industries; with the breakup of the large industrial establishments and mass labor, they may find that independence of spirit which is characteristic of small farmers. With the profit from their farms and from the remaining industries, they would be amply able to import what they could not grow, even if they would not be able to make or buy the machines of war.

**S**UCH A PLAN should satisfy our economists. They can have their industrial cake and eat it too. Their customers will be

somewhat different but there will be the same amount of trade and there should be the same amount of industry. Any loss by Germany will represent a gain to those whom it has despoiled. There will be no permanent dislocation; with so many German installations but a mass of twisted wreckage, it may be easier to replace them elsewhere. It should satisfy the humanitarians, since nothing disastrous to German life is involved. In fact, the Germans, as well as the rest of Europe, should be benefited by the change. It would aid the coming generation to throw off the shackles of militarism; a war machine, without the means of waging war, will be deprived of its appeal. The Teutonic mind will not be long in finding new avenues for demonstrating its superiority. There will be some chance that, whether or not the mass of the people become democratic, they will be come peaceful. And if they convince their neighbors that their dreams of conquest are dissipated, they may then be accepted into the group of cooperative nations.

To these economic arrangements should be added two other controls, one financial and one governmental.

No German should be allowed to hold ownership in any other country and the cartel arrangements which have worked so successfully for Germany's profit in previous years should be made illegal everywhere. Further, there should be no lending by individuals or even by individual governments to the Germans for any purpose. Any re-

building necessary to preserve the internal economy, as well as any necessary supply of materials or capital, should be advanced by an international organization having control over the purposes for which these are used.

The Allies should also see to it that whether or not a world organization gives protection to the individual against a member nation, a limited bill of rights should be imposed upon and enforced against the German State. Freedom of speech and thought, equality of opportunity, courts not controlled and elections not manipulated, may have a therapeutic effect upon the German mind.

Obviously the full success of these plans would be dependent upon the continuance of some form of international cooperation and the thoroughness with which the world has learned from its mistakes between 1920 and 1939. However, the proposed initial changes in German industry and agriculture would at least give Europe a period for recuperation, relatively free from fear. In the meantime Germany should be treated as a psychopathic case, other nations friendly but watchful for a recurrence of the delusions of grandeur and other symptoms of national paranoia. The shock treatment, followed by a few years of individual freedom and protection, may cause a decent Germany to emerge, cured of the militarism, Nazism, and Pan-Germanism which have made the nation the scourge of the modern world.

## WHAT IS TO BE DONE WITH GERMANY?

*Proposed Sidney B. Fay wants a Peace Rigorously Enforced*

**I**N ANSWER to this question from the Editors of the BULLETIN, one cannot say what will be done, for apparently the United Nations are not yet agreed on this very difficult problem. One can only say what, in the light of history, ought to be done—or ought not to be done.

People talk about a "hard" or a "soft" peace, but these are vague words, inspired by the quite natural emotions aroused by our knowledge of Buchenwald, Dachau, Maidanek, Rotterdam, the torture and slaying of innocent hostages, and all the other inhuman crimes and sadistic cruelties perpetrated by the Nazi regime. It is therefore better to talk about a "destructive" or a "constructive" peace, based not upon emotion but upon reason, regard for the future, and light from the past.

A destructive peace would be a vengeful one that aimed indiscriminately to destroy completely Germany's political and economic life. This would create a festering sore in the heart of Europe that would endanger the health of Germany's neighbors, invite chaos or communism, and sow the seeds of another war twenty or forty years hence. A constructive peace would be one that would make it impossible for Germany ever again, politically or economically, to plunge the

world into the horrors and destruction of war, but at the same time would aim to build up a democratic German state and give its people the hope of economic recovery and of reintegration into a society of nations organized on a basis of peace, goodwill, and security. It would be a peace dictated primarily by consideration for the future well-being of Europe as a whole, to which Germany could contribute her part, and which would still commend itself twenty years hence to United Nations public opinion as one to be rigorously enforced.

This last point is of the highest importance—that the peace terms imposed today will be regarded twenty years hence as wise and just and therefore deserving of rigid enforcement. Ten or twenty years hence, especially among Americans who are not inclined to vindictiveness, public opinion may change and soften. Present cooperation between Bolshevik Russia and the western capitalist powers may become more tenuous or cease altogether. History records that unfortunately allied powers too often fall apart once they have defeated the common foe. After 1918 the great mistake was not so much the terms of the Versailles treaty as the fact that it was not rigidly enforced when Hitler began to tear it up. Changes of public

opinion had taken place in Britain, France, and the United States which prevented them from standing together to uphold effectively the edifice of 1919. This time we need a settlement which will be rigorously upheld twenty years hence when present emotions may have cooled or changed.

In the light of these considerations, what, very briefly, ought to be done with Germany?

**A** FIRST and immediate task of the Allied armies of occupation should be to wipe out all vestiges of Nazism and militarism. The German General Staff should be completely smashed and its members be deprived of the exercise of any office or leadership. The war criminal should be apprehended and tried as soon as possible. Speedy trials are of the utmost importance, both as a kind of catharsis for the outraged emotions of millions of victims who have suffered directly and of civilized society in general, and as an object lesson in retributive justice to the German people themselves.

The criminals of lesser rank should be taken to the countries where their crimes were committed and tried by the local national courts. Trial upon the spot where their crime was perpetrated is preferable, because it will be easier to secure witnesses and evi-

dence, and will satisfy the local demand for justice. It will also make more certain that there will be no undue leniency and delay. To be sure, it may have the disadvantage that there may not be complete uniformity in the rules of procedure and the kind of law applied, but this is unavoidable.

The higher-ups—Goering, Himmler, Robert Ley and perhaps a hundred or so others—whose guilty deeds are not localized outside Germany but who ordered or approved the crimes of subordinates, should be tried by an Allied military commission and hanged or given other appropriate punishment.

Apparently the German people do not realize the enormity of the crimes of their rulers. Goebbels' strict censorship has kept them largely in the dark. Victims upon release from concentration camps have been compelled to sign statements promising that they would never reveal their experiences, and terror of the Gestapo has for years generally caused them to keep silence. American civilian experts—not newspaper reporters—who have followed the Allied armies and speak German fluently report that many Germans are stunned by the revelations now coming to light and by the grim non-fraternization policy ordered by General Eisenhower. Therefore every effort should be made to inform the German people by publications, films, and visits to the scenes of Nazi horrors. The German archives should be opened and the German people given a true history of the past two decades. Then only will they be brought to realize the justice of the punishment of the war criminals.

In addition to what has already been accomplished toward destroying Germany's military power by Allied bombing and by unconditional surrender, Germany should be compelled to deliver or destroy all her weapons of war guns, tanks, airplanes, naval craft, and all machine tools which are clearly primarily of use for making war materials. German industry should be left in German hands, but with certain long-time exceptions and restrictions which will prevent her from ever regaining military strength.

Accordingly, Germany should be stripped forever of all her synthetic gasoline plants. What gasoline and oil she needs can be imported but strictly rationed to peace needs. She should be stripped of heavy industries so far as they were primarily engaged in making war materials. This would include synthetic nitrogen plants making the basis for explosives, and all airplane factories; Germany should be allowed only a limited number of commercial airplanes to be purchased abroad. Importation of iron ore, tungsten, chromium, and other steel-alloy-making minerals should be restricted to normal peace needs. She should be deprived of a considerable number of her high-power hydroelectric plants which have been used for making aluminum for airplanes and special steel alloys used in shells and guns. A good part of the electric power needed for her legitimate peacetime needs should be supplied from outside the Reich and could be instantly cut off if used for other than peace needs. Allied technical control commissions should see that these restrictions are rigidly enforced. If a factory was found to be secretly

evading restrictions it should be warned; if the warning was unheeded, it should be immediately bombed out of existence by the United Nations air force.

SOME SUCH restrictive control of German industry, together with Anglo-American control of the seas and a United Nations Military Staff and air force, would give a sufficient guarantee against the danger of German military power in the future, but would not interfere with the economic re-

*Photograph N  
Prof. Fay  
Goebbels.*

#### PEACE . . . BASED UPON REASON—FAY

covery of Germany. It would also make possible the early withdrawal of most of Allied occupation forces. This is desirable because a prolonged military occupation is very costly for us, will soon be met by the urgent demand to "get the boys home," and is an unnecessary and humiliating handicap to the new democratic Germany that we want to see established.

German loot, so far as it can be identified, should be restored to its former owners. But it is not enough to restore machines, rolling stock and so forth, for they will have been largely worn out. They should be replaced by new and up-to-date machines, as soon as Germany has sufficiently recovered to manufacture them. Germany must therefore make reparations in kind, but these cannot be expected for two or three years, as Germany must first import the necessary raw materials and repair her devastated economy. The reparations obligations should not be in money payments nor extend over three generations, as after World War I, but should be for a relatively short period of ten or fifteen years, so that they will fall upon the war generation and so that Germany can have the hope of fulfilling and being rid of them within a reasonable period.

Part of the reparations should be in the form of labor services for repairing devastation in countries that desire it, such as Russia and France. German labor battalions will serve the double purpose of making good in part the destruction caused by the Nazis and keeping out of Germany for some years those Nazi prisoners who are not

yet convinced of the criminal folly of their government.

Germany's frontiers should be the same as before Hitler's aggressions, except that Upper Silesia should go to Poland, thus giving Poland a desirable increase of industrial resources with a corresponding decrease of Germany's industrial potential. The cession of East Prussia, demanded by Stalin and acquiesced in by Churchill, will be a mistake—like Bismarck's annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871, only worse. If the more than two million Germans are allowed to remain, they will form a very troublesome minority problem for the new Russian and Polish rulers. If the Germans are uprooted and replaced by uprooted Poles, untold misery will be caused, for peasants in Europe have a passionate attachment to their homesteads of which we have no idea in mobile America. Hitler's cruel mass-uprooting and transplanting of populations should be a warning of what not to do.

An effort should at once be made to reconstruct German political life. This should begin at the bottom in village, town, and city, where agriculture and industry should be restored to normal conditions as quickly as possible to avoid famine and unemployment. When local government has been established under the supervision and control of the Allied military authorities, it can be extended upwards to the formation of larger political units, and ultimately to some kind of democratic federal government for Germany as a whole. There are many reasons why it would be a mistake to try to break Germany up into several separate and independent states.

## LETTERS

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~  
recaptured. Yet I had lost between 20 and 25 pounds and had a mouthful of sores from vitamin deficiency. Picture the state of the other guys!

That place was pretty awful. It was not a prison camp, but a prison-hospital (*Gefangenzazareth*), and here we will have a short pause for ironic laughter. We had two American doctors, also prisoners, who cared for us as best they could, but they had little to work with, and about the major complaint, the fact that we were all starving, they could do nothing. They tried writing to the Red Cross in Switzerland for POW packages, but the Germans stopped the letters and we never got 'em. Our diet was as follows: In the morning we got one-tenth of a loaf of black *ersatz* bread—a lump about half the size of my fist. At noon we got a boiled potato and a few spoonfuls of sauce. At supper, potato-peeling soup. Sometimes we got soup for both meals. One of the docs told me he figured it at between 500 and 800 calories a day.

Hunger like that is a funny thing. It's not nearly so much physical sensation as it is a mental state. You can't think or talk about anything but food. Particularly talk. You try not to at first because it makes you so hungry. You try to talk about something



7  
One of the lessons of history seems to be that it is wise statesmanship for the victor to treat the vanquished with some generosity rather extreme severity. Only generosity can engender the cooperation and good will on which sound and peaceful relations can rest in the future. Thus, in spite of Napoleon's oppression of Europe for twenty years, the Allies ~~in 1815~~ treated his country with generosity in 1815. Generosity was also Bismarck's policy toward Austria after the war of 1866, and Britain's policy toward the vanquished Boers in 1902. In each of these cases generosity paid good dividends in ~~an~~ quick re-establishment of sound friendly relations and loyal cooperation. On the other hand, Bismarck's severity to France and annexation of Alsace-Lorraine caused a resentment and bitterness which led to alliances, armaments and suspicions which directly contributed to war in 1914.

World War II, to be sure, has been different in character from all the ~~se~~ wars since 1789. The Nazis have perpetrated inhuman crimes unequalled in sadistic cruelty since the Thirty Years' War, ~~and~~ the Spanish wars against the Moors, American indians and ~~the~~ the Low Countries, and the wars with the Turks of the 16th and 17th centuries. Quantitatively, the Nazi extermination of innocent victims has exceeded anything in all history. Yet in spite of this horrible difference between the ~~vanquished~~ vanquished Nazis and the defeated peoples in the wars of the last century and a half, the lesson of history is still true that in the long run, with a view to a constructive peace that will bring a basis of goodwill instead of lasting bitterness and a spirit of revenge, generosity of the victor toward the vanquished is the only wise policy. History is a good teacher, but unfortunately, especially in times of emotion and a natural desire for retribution, people are too little inclined to heed her lessons.



# ~~SECRET~~

Mr. Stassen

May 23, 1945

## MEMORANDUM TO THE AMERICAN DELEGATES

I am writing this memorandum to confirm information given to you at this morning's meeting by Mr. Dunn and by me and to add certain additional information with respect to the Secretary's conversation this morning with the President.

### 1. Trip to San Francisco

The President definitely decided to come to San Francisco to close the Conference and authorized Mr. Stettinius to announce this as he left the White House.

### 2. Voting in the Security Council

The President was sympathetic to the idea of modifying the Yalta formula with respect to voting in the Council on matters relating to pacific settlement of disputes, provided the Soviets concur in such modification. His position was that we must stand firmly on the Yalta formula unless the Soviets are willing to have it modified.

### 3. Withdrawal

The President felt it would be unfortunate for an amendment with respect to withdrawal to be introduced by us at the Conference. He felt the position as expressed by Dr. Eaton the other night that the instrument should be silent, but that we interpret silence as not precluding the right of withdrawal, to be the correct one.

### 4. Full Employment

The President felt it would be most unfortunate if we attempted to get these words out of the

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.6(b)

STATE DEPT. 6210ELIAD5

BY DJH DATE 4/24/00

~~SECRET~~

document.

5. Participation of Non-Members of the Security Council in Council Decisions for the Employment of Military Forces

The President approved the adoption of a provision on this matter as set forth in the following language:

"When a decision to use force has been taken by the Security Council, it shall, before calling upon any Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfillment of its obligations under the preceding paragraph, invite such Member, if it so request, to send a representative to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of its armed forces."

6. Compulsory Jurisdiction

The President said he would leave this matter in the hands of the Delegation but that he had a rather strong instinctive feeling that we should not oppose compulsory jurisdiction.

7. Trusteeship

The President studied carefully the last working paper on this subject and was quite satisfied with it and expressed the hope that agreement could be reached on it.

8. Preparatory Commission

The President approved our plans on this as outlined in the memorandum which the Delegation considered in a preliminary way yesterday. He also approved the thought that the Commission should sit in London.

Hayden Raynor

# TIME

INCORPORATED

TIME & LIFE BUILDING  
ROCKEFELLER CENTER  
NEW YORK 20

EXECUTIVE OFFICES


May 24, 1945

Commander Harold E. Stassen  
Fairmont Hotel  
San Francisco, California

Dear Harold:

Last week in Washington someone asked me to prepare a memorandum on what we need to do on foreign policy. I wrote the enclosed which please regard as completely confidential. Don't show it to anybody else.

Sincerely yours,



Raymond L. Buell

THE NEED FOR A NEW U.S. FOREIGN AND MILITARY POLICY

I. World War III. Unless the U.S. quickly gets a new foreign and military policy, the present war will result in (1) a Russian-dominated Europe, (2) a Russian-dominated Asia. This can only lead to World War III at the end of ten or fifteen years.

It is not too late for the U.S. to reduce the danger of World War III; but no time is to be lost. We should accept the San Francisco Charter and Bretton Woods; but within this framework, we must also adopt a stiff and just policy to restrain Russian imperialism, always acting jointly with Britain and all other countries that will adhere to an Anglo-American nucleus.

II. A Concrete U.S. Policy in Europe

A. Poland. The incident of the 16 Poles shows that Stalin does not intend to make any real modification in the Lublin government, despite the Yalta declaration. We should strengthen our bargaining position on the Polish question at once by accrediting Ambassador Lane, who has been sitting in Washington since last fall, to the Polish government in London.

11. We should protest publicly against the "annexation" of northern Germany by the Lublin government. If we can do this in the case of Trieste, we certainly should do it in the case of northern and eastern Germany.

B. Germany. There is grave danger that unless the U.S. gets a new German policy, Russia will gradually dominate the whole of Germany -- through a policy of playing up to the German under-dog, while summarily executing all industrialists and middle-class leaders as "war criminals". In contrast, the goal of the U.S. and Britain should be to strive to the utmost to bring Germany into the Western orbit. Toward this end we must quickly execute war criminals, instead of indulging in prolonged trials which may last for years under the present program, making

pacification impossible. We must also strive to evoke democratic forces within Germany; the non-fraternization order should be modified accordingly. Finally and most important, we should merge the American, British and French zones under General Eisenhower as a single Rehabilitation chief, subject to the advice of a combined economic and political staff. If Stalin prefers to remain in his separate zone, we should respect the Yalta agreement to that effect, but should proceed to create a consolidated zone of our own. The present four-zone plan is clearly unworkable; and will play into Russian hands.

C. Trieste and Vienna. U.S. naval and air units should be publicly dispatched to the Adriatic to support the Anglo-American position in respect to Trieste.

Likewise if it is true that Yalta agreed to the tripartite occupation of Austria, American and British troops should proceed into Vienna, now monopolized by the Russians, after demanding that Stalin live up to the Yalta agreement.

For the moment, it is better to exercise Anglo-American military pressure on Russia on the periphery of Russian interests, such as in Trieste and Vienna, rather than at the center, as in Poland. If we make a strong stand now, Russia may take us seriously and pull in its horns without a fight. This is why we cannot acquiesce in Tito's pretensions to Trieste -- a predominantly Italian city. If the U.S. and Britain continue to give way, as in the past, Russia will go ahead until the point where war becomes inevitable. (Such was the history of Munich.)

D. An Anglo-American nucleus. Concrete steps should be taken to make permanent the combined staffs, to pool British and American bases, and to find means of assisting Britain to solve its tremendous balance of payments problem after the war. If we do not do this, Britain will eventually be forced into the Russian orbit -- with disastrous results to U.S. security. Meanwhile we should also work out a concrete rehabilitation program for France and Italy who should be tied to the Anglo-American nucleus. Something more is necessary than Bretton Woods and The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act for this purpose.



E. General.

i. The U.S. and Britain should demand publicly the right of their correspondents to enter Poland and every other liberated country to ascertain the actual facts.

ii. The U.S. should stop all lend-lease to Russia, including the cancellation of existing machine tool priorities.

iii. The President should publicly announce that it will be impossible for the U.S. to extend any public credit to any country (i.e. Russia) with whom the U.S. has failed to solve political differences.

iv. The U.S. should correct the mistake of the War Department in announcing that only 400,000 troops would remain in Europe. We should announce a "change of plans" so as to maintain at least a million troops in Europe. We do not need to announce our purpose; but in fact, these troops should stay there until Russia has withdrawn its own troops in accordance with the Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943, which declared, "after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other States except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation."

III. A Concrete U.S. policy for Asia.

Unless U.S. strategy is revised the war in the Orient will end up with the Russian domination of Manchuria, Korea, and North China. Both from the standpoint of the U.S. and an independent China, it is folly to expend a million American lives simply to replace Japan with Russia on the Asiatic mainland. This result can be avoided as follows:

A. Fight a limited war against Japan. Complete the conquest of Okinawa, and the destruction of the Japanese fleet and merchant marine. If the U.S. wants to conquer and occupy the Japanese islands in the name of "security", I would acquiesce -- although the casualties will be excessive, as Okinawa already demonstrates. I would prefer a U.S. policy of bombing and naval blockade of Japan, while building up China.

B. Discourage Russia from entering the Pacific war. It is to the interest of Russia to enter the war with Japan if it can acquire Manchuria, and Korea, and dominate North China without having to fight materially. Consequently Russia is likely to apply to Japan the same policy it followed in the case of Bulgaria. We can avert this result by the following:

i. Refuse to ship any lend-lease to Vladivostok, a port exposed to air and submarine attack. Such a policy would hold the Russian armies back because it is doubtful whether they can operate in Siberia without U.S. lend-lease.

ii. Do not attempt to dislodge the Japanese armies from Manchuria with American troops. Strengthen the Chinese armies for this purpose as below, in the hope that these armies will eventually become strong enough to break a Russo-Japanese military deadlock in Manchuria.

iii. At the right time, land a U.S. force in Korea -- i.e., before the Russians can get there.

C. Strengthen Chungking China by:

i. Opening a port in South China, possibly at Foochow.

ii. Concentrating U.S. lend-lease on China so as to build up a strong Chinese army capable of breaking a Russo-Japanese deadlock in Manchuria and driving out Japanese troops to the south. If Manchuria is finally conquered by Chinese troops, with U.S. help, the chances of an independent China become much greater than if Japan is expelled from Manchuria either by Russia or the U.S. alone.

iii. Urge Chungking to make further reforms, but not at the expense of undermining Chiang Kai-shek or of strengthening the Chinese communist army.

D. Offer concrete peace terms to Japan, defining what we mean by unconditional surrender. (President Truman made a start in his statement of May 8.)

i. Stand by the Cairo Declaration; but in addition:

ii. Announce that the Japanese constitution, including the Emperor question, is for the Japanese people to decide, except for the destruction of the Japanese military class.

iii. Announce that the U.S. has no intention of annexing Okinawa as a naval base, but will merely insist on its demilitarization under international control. (The Japanese would resent a U.S. naval base at Okinawa as deeply as the U.S. would resent a German base at Cuba.)

iv. Guarantee Japan access to the markets of southeastern Asia and the Philippines in which it can sell textiles and other manufactures so that it can buy imported food. Otherwise the Cairo declaration will doom the Japanese people to starvation. Moreover, the restoration of the old economic system in the Philippines, based on free trade with the U.S., but high tariffs against Japan, is a blind policy if we want lasting peace in the Pacific.

###

Such a policy of gradually stiffening against Russia, of making a firm democratic nucleus within the framework of the San Francisco Charter, and of hastening the end of the war with Japan so as to prevent the Russian domination of Asia, will save thousands of American lives in this war, while reducing the dangers of World War III. Our recent policy of giving Russia everything it wants, while having a goal only of destroying Germany and Japan, must be changed if this country is to have a future.



# MINNESOTA HISTORICAL SOCIETY

Copyright in this digital version belongs to the Minnesota Historical Society and its content may not be copied without the copyright holder's express written permission. Users may print, download, link to, or email content, however, for individual use.

To request permission for commercial or educational use, please contact the Minnesota Historical Society.



[www.mnhs.org](http://www.mnhs.org)