

June 9, 1967

Honorable Mark Hatfield
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator:

It was a great pleasure to see you personally
on Wednesday, June 7th.

Your affirmative approach to further and continued
leadership of the Senate in the crucial matter of sound peace-
building is excellent and encouraging.

In accordance with your request, I enclose a draft
for a possible Senate Resolution pertinent to the current
situation.

I also enclose a memorandum on the Resolution
of Senators Ball, Burton, Hatch and Hill in 1943 which played
such a large part in the preparatory development for the
United Nations.

Confirming our discussion, if you can obtain one
or two Senators from the other side of the aisle, and if the
number is two, match it with another Senator of our Republican
Party, you would play a very significant role in this crucial time.

I know you realize that a Senate Resolution immediately
provides the potential for the focus of the extensive latent public
opinion, for the further education and analysis through hearings
and committee reports, and for meeting objections and refining
proposals in a manner that no other action can accomplish.

It will be a privilege to follow through with you in
quiet research and consultation.

With personal best wishes as ever,

Sincerely yours,

HES/cbh
E Enclosures

June 9, 1967

DRAFT

Resolved, That the Senate advises that the United States take the initiative in calling upon the members of the United Nations to proceed to modernize and strengthen the United Nations organization so that it may be more effective in building for peace and in maintaining peace in the Mid East and in Vietnam and throughout the world, and that this should include:

1. An amending conference of the United Nations, assembled in accordance with Article 109 of the Charter, which amending conference can be called without a veto, and when convened can set the terms for the ratification of the new Charter, if necessary without the inclusion of all of the present five vetoes.

2. The eligibility for membership in the modernized and strengthened United Nations of all peoples, whatsoever may be their contemporary form of government, so long as they take the commitments of the revised Charter; including thereby the potential of two Vietnams; two Chinas, neither one with a veto; two Germanies, neither one with a veto; and two Koreas.

3. Provide for a new, reliable, equitable method of financing the United Nations.

4. Improve the peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and police force methods of the United Nations.

That pursuant to the Constitution of the United States, any Treaty made to effect the purposes of this Resolution on behalf of the Government of the United States with any other nation or any association of nations, shall be made only by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.

MEMORANDUM

The original Senate Resolution presented by Senators Ball, Burton, Hatch and Hill (two Republicans and two Democrats) was presented to the Senate on March 16, 1943 (S. Res. 114) and is reported at page 2030 Congressional Record -- Senate.

It was amended on March 17, 1943 at page 2108 Congressional Record -- Senate.

After extensive hearings and consultations it was recommended by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in amended form and was then presented to the Senate by the then Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Connally, and came to vote on November 5, 1943 and was adopted with Yeas - 85; Nays - 5; Not voting - 6, Congressional Record - Senate 9221-9222.

Memorandum on Proposed Resolution Senator Hatfield, et al.

There is an urgent need to modernize and strengthen the United Nations.

It must be made truly worldwide in the space age if it is to have an improved chance of resolving the Vietnam War, of resolving the Middle East crisis, and of preventing a World War.

This must then include within it the potential eligibility of all peoples, whatsoever may be their contemporary form of government.

To do this requires the potential of amending the present Charter without a veto, since otherwise, for example, the Nationalist Chinese Government could use the veto to prevent the two-China eligibility.

Senator Vandenberg, Senator Connally and others foresaw the need of future modernization and strengthening of the Charter, and they joined in introducing into the Charter the provision for amending conventions or conferences, as stated in Article 109.

It is a thoroughly recognized principle of Constitutional and of International Law that when such a conference

is convened, it then becomes complete in its own powers to set the terms of the ratification of the amended or new Charter. Thus it can provide for the potential eligibility of two Chinas, neither one with a veto; two Germanys, neither one with a veto; two Vietnams and two Koreas.

It can also establish other methods of financing and other methods of improved peacemaking and peacekeeping.

Each of the members of the conference have, in effect, the sanction power of their own realistic position in the world, but they do not have any arbitrary absolute veto power.

Under this sanction situation, strenuous and important negotiations can take place to work out the precise form of the amended Charter.

Obviously, much work will need to be done over a period of years to study through and negotiate through the specific terms of the new United Nations Charter. But an initiative of the United States Senate in this direction would immediately begin to have a wholesome effect. The initiative of the United States Government toward this sound move would immediately take an important diplomatic initiative and improve the prospects for fitting together a sound and honorable conclusion to the complex and tragic Vietnam and Middle East situations.

S. Res. 114 Original Resolution

"Resolved, That the Senate advises that the United States take the initiative in calling meetings of representatives of the United Nations for the purpose of forming an organization of the United Nations with specific and limited authority:

(1) To assist in coordinating and fully utilizing the military and economic resources of all member nations in the prosecution of the war against the Axis.

(2) To establish temporary administrations for Axis-controlled areas of the world as these are occupied by United Nations forces, until such time as permanent governments can be established.

(3) To administer relief and assistance in economic rehabilitation in territories of member nations needing such aid and in Axis territory occupied by United Nations forces.

(4) To establish procedures and machinery for peaceful settlement of disputes and disagreements between nations.

(5) To provide for the assembly and maintenance of a United Nations military force and to suppress by immediate use of such force any future attempt at military aggression by any nation.

That the Senate further advises that any establishment of such United Nations organization provide machinery for its modification, for the delegation of additional specific and limited functions to such organization, and for admission of other nations to membership, and that member nations should commit themselves to seek no territorial aggrandizement."

S. Res. 192 Passed Resolution

"Resolved, That the war against all our enemies be waged until complete victory is achieved.

That the United States cooperate with its comrades-in-arms in securing a just and honorable peace.

That the United States, acting through its constitutional processes, join with free and sovereign nations in establishment and maintenance of international authority with power to prevent aggression and to preserve the peace of the world.

That the Senate recognizes the necessity of there being established at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

That, pursuant to the Constitution of the United States, any treaty made to effect the purposes of this resolution, on behalf of the Government of the United States with any other nation or any association of nations, shall be made only by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur."

Congressional Record - Senate
November 5, 1943 Page 9222

June 12, 1967

Ms. Betty Groebli
WRC Radio
4001 Nebraska Avenue
Washington, D. C.

Dear Ms. Groebli:

It was a great pleasure to meet you and to join you in your significant discussion program on WRC.

I have had quite a number of comments and reactions to the program so that it is apparent that you do have a considerable listening audience.

Apparently your follow-up with the Chinese Ambassador and Peter Harkness had added some interest and depth to the total presentation.

May I add that events since that date in both the Mid East and Vietnam reemphasize the need to modernize and strengthen the United Nations on the one hand, and the essentiality of having a United Nations to function on world problems.

With personal best wishes as ever,

Sincerely yours,

Harold E. Stassen

HES/cbh

June 12, 1967

Mr. Godfrey Sperling, Jr.
Staff Correspondent
The Christian Science Monitor
National Press Building
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Sperling:

Our luncheon discussion was enjoyable to me, and I appreciated very much your constructive follow up article in "The Christian Science Monitor".

I have had quite a number of reactions to the article and it is apparent that you have a wide readership.

May I add that the events since that date in my view further emphasize both the need for modernizing and strengthening the United Nations, and the essentiality of having a United Nations to function in critical world situations.

With personal best wishes as ever,

Sincerely yours,

HES/cbh

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C.

June 20, 1967

Dear Harold:

I was very glad to see you in Washington and enjoyed our talk very much. I hope you will keep in touch with me and will let me know when you are coming down again.

I am sending you the Congressional Record in which your speech to the United Nations Association is recorded. I know that it will be of great interest to the Members of the Congress and to many throughout our country.

With best personal regards, I am

Sincerely yours,



John Sherman Cooper

Honorable Harold E. Stassen
1020 Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Building
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

JSC:sl
Enclosure

at the level of decision-making than Germany's bundesbank [federal reserve] governor Otnar Emminger, chairman of the "Group of Ten" now actively working on the problem. An interview with him follows:

"JANEWAY. What is the current state of the German economy?"

"EMMINGER. The German economy has been in a recession since the autumn of 1966—a recession which, in absolute terms, is really quite mild. It is the first post-war recession, however, in which expansion has actually come to a stand-still. Although the statistical time lag makes evaluation difficult, it is my opinion that we probably passed through the trough in April. So far, at any rate, the unemployment peak, seasonally adjusted, has been only 1.9 per cent.

"Recently some people, including trade union spokesmen, criticized the bundesbank for doing too little to deal with the situation. But the bundesbank does not believe that the situation warrants the alarm that was expressed in some quarters.

"JANEWAY. What has been the major consideration in the formulation of German monetary policy over the last six months?"

"EMMINGER. The monetary policy of the bundesbank has been geared to the domestic economic situation—the recession—but was helpful also to the outside world, especially to the United Kingdom. Since December, 1966, we have moved to make money easier every few weeks, lowering the discount rate four times to its present level of 3 per cent and increasing the liquidity base of the economy.

"JANEWAY. What is your view of Germany's economic prospects?"

"EMMINGER. The downturn should not continue much further; but I don't look for a very vigorous upturn in the immediate future. First, as a result of the long investment boom, we have overcapacity in a number of industries. Second, in some key sectors—notably coal and steel—there are structural difficulties which have existed for some years and cannot be expected to vanish overnight.

"Third, we have reached a temporary saturation point in some areas of construction, especially residential housing; the German population is now stagnant.

"Fourth, Germany no longer has a net inflow of labor. At most, therefore, the real rate of growth of the German economy will be 3½ to 4½ per cent.

"JANEWAY. What is the role of the French in the current discussions on monetary reform?"

"EMMINGER. It is in all countries' interest to keep the French involved. This is, of course, of special importance for the other member countries of the Common Market. And, while some commentators have speculated that the Germans went over to the French side during the recent Munich meeting of finance ministers of the Six, we have yielded only on the form of a future new reserve instrument while the French have made important concessions; these give us hope that the principles for a new international reserve system can be submitted to the September meeting of the IMF governors.

"JANEWAY. What do you think of recent statements by two leading American banks on United States gold policy?"

"EMMINGER. I consider the idea that the United States should stop selling gold to be harmful to the international monetary system and hence also to themselves. These statements have caused some astonishment in Europe. We are confident, however, that neither the federal reserve nor the treasury would go along with them.

E. Stassen spoke in Washington to the United Nations Association of the United States of America.

In his notable speech, he called attention to the many problems which affects our country. One of the most interesting and timely was his comment on the divided countries of the world and their influence against the establishment of peace. He speaks of the strengthening of the U.N. decisions to quiet down the areas which threaten war, and the priority of humanitarian actions.

It is a very stimulating and inspiring speech, and I know that the Members of the Congress and the people of our country will read it with great interest.

I ask unanimous consent that it be inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

I also ask for inclusion of an article which appeared in the Christian Science Monitor on Thursday, June 1, entitled "Stassen Proposes U.N. Pathway to Peace in Vietnam."

There being no objection, the speech and article were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ADDRESS OF HAROLD E. STASSEN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AT THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION HEADQUARTERS, WASHINGTON, D.C., MAY 26, 1967

In responding to your invitation to speak to you today, may I begin with a word of appreciation and commendation for the constructive and persistent work which you and your associates in other cities have performed in supporting the United Nations. Your organized volunteer efforts have been of significant service to the cause of peace. Your devotion and contribution have been in the best tradition of a free citizenry engaged in vital issues.

But let me turn to speaking forthrightly of my deepest concerns at this hour.

There is an urgent need to modernize and strengthen the United Nations, if it is to serve its prime objective "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."

And there is an urgent need to end the Vietnam War in an honorable and just manner.

I am convinced that these two urgent needs can be met together through an intelligent and desirable course of action. Furthermore, these two urgent needs cannot be fulfilled separately. They are intertwined.

We must together break out of the stubborn deep ruts of current thinking and lift to a new clear analysis of the path of peace in Vietnam and in the world.

This is not an easy process. As an example, for many years our country was in the dark groove of isolationism. Lifting out of isolationism and establishing the beginning of the United Nations and the opening of expanding worldwide trade was a difficult move. But almost everyone can now see how essential was this change.

Now we are caught in a notion of world segregationism, would segregationism toward the divided countries of North Vietnam, Mainland China, East Germany, and North Korea. We are harboring the costly illusion that American military might should maintain this unsound world segregationism. As a consequence, we are engaged in a bitter bloody unending War in Vietnam. As a consequence, we see the beginning of neo-Fascism in Germany. As a consequence, we delay and handicap the evolution of these peoples toward their own freedom. As a consequence, we continually intensify the danger of a future world war of indescribable horror for ourselves and for all humanity.

We must think anew of the world as it is in this modern space-nuclear age. We must recognize that this is verily one world with

one humanity. We must realize that if the United Nations is to have a real chance to build for peace it must become truly worldwide, with eligibility for all peoples, whatever may be their contemporary form of government, so long as the governments take the obligations of a revised and strengthened Charter. This means specifically that two Vietnams, two Chinas, two Germanys, and two Koreas would be eligible for membership in the United Nations. This means the differences of systems and governments would be moved to competition and controversy within the United Nations for the current period of history, rather than to war.

There is neither historic nor logical bar to such a step. Even as there are currently two Irelands; three Scandinavian countries named Sweden, Denmark and Norway; two North American former British colonies, Canada and the United States; and numerous separate African states which were former colonies; so there are now in fact and can continue to be formally, for the contemporary period, two Vietnams, two Chinas, two Germanys and two Koreas.

A United States initiative, open, creative and sustained, toward such a truly worldwide United Nations is one of the crucial elements for peace in Vietnam. The method of fulfillment will be through a convention to rewrite the United Nations Charter, but the beneficial effects can be immediate upon taking the initiative.

Each passing month will make it more and more evident that the American War drive in Vietnam will not lead to a solution. Such escalation of war will only add to the tragedy and sharpen the peril.

May I make it clear that I do not speak as a dove or as a hawk. In fact, I believe we need less of doves and less of hawks and more of peacebuilders and more of peacemakers!

I do not speak in a partisan sense. I am well aware that there are very divergent views within both of our political parties.

I speak with respect for those with different views and with recognition of their sincerity.

But I do speak earnestly and emphatically. I do speak out of extensive experience and long and continuing study.

I am confident that I know the path of peace in Vietnam.

It is not the road on which our country is now travelling and has travelled in the past 27 months in Vietnam.

It is not the way of withdrawal or of weakness or of surrender or of appeasement.

The path of peace in Vietnam will be made up of four essential inseparable parallel courses of action.

1. An open major United States initiative to modernize and strengthen the United Nations through rewriting the Charter so that all peoples are eligible for membership whose governments will take the obligations of the New Charter, and thus including two Vietnams, two Chinas, two Germanys, and two Koreas within the United Nations, and also to improve the United Nations in a comprehensive manner as the peacebuilder and peacemaker.

2. Deescalate and quiet down the Vietnam War; end the hunter-killer drives through the jungles; stop the bombing except in defense against attack; deliberately aim at the minimum of casualties for ourselves and for the Vietnamese; maintain a powerful military presence in Vietnam; and do each of these through unconditional decisions of the United States.

3. Give top priority to an extensive program in the educational, economic, and social fields for the future wellbeing of the Vietnamese people, and especially of the youth and the children of Vietnam, using the major resources which will be saved through quieting down the War.

4. Keep the United States very powerful and very alert, ready for any threat of War, and hold that military strength under firm moral restraint.

ADDRESS BY HON. HAROLD E. STASSEN TO UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, on Friday, May 26, the Honorable Harold

It may be constructive to try to place very short labels on each of the four. I would suggest:

1. A call for a truly worldwide United Nations.
2. A decision to unconditionally quiet down the War.
3. A priority for humanitarian action.
4. A maintenance of a very powerful alert United States of America acting with moral restraint.

It is my view that these four really involve the direct extension of the policies of restraint with strength for peace followed by both President Kennedy and President Eisenhower.

It seems quite clear that in the initial decision by President Johnson in February 1965 to begin American bombing throughout Vietnam, and to order the American ground combat in extensive hunter-killer drives through the jungles and over the mountains, the justification was that this process would bring about negotiations with the North Vietnamese for the ending of the Vietnamese problem.

Now that it has become very clear that this course of action was mistaken; that this Americanizing of the Vietnamese struggle and this escalation of the War brought a response of escalation and did not bring about negotiations; the Administration has advanced a new explanation for their failure to obtain the results which they had predicted.

The new claim now is that the dissent in the United States has been misinterpreted by the Government at Hanoi and has caused them to hold back from negotiations which otherwise they might have been brought about to conduct.

This again is an erroneous analysis of the situation. It is my view, based on long experience and thorough study, that there are three basic reasons why the North Vietnamese Government has not engaged in negotiations with the Johnson Administration.

First and foremost is the fact that they know that no country, not even the United States, can conquer and hold the vast dense jungles of Vietnam, and these jungles are their home and their haven.

Second, the Government at Hanoi has never been made a proposal which could be acceptable to them, since they have never been made a proposal which would include within it the recognition of their own sovereign entity with full rights for participation within the United Nations.

Third, no proposal has ever been made which takes realistic and intelligent account of the position of the Communist Government of Mainland China.

Thus, I emphasize the key approach that the United Nations must be modernized and strengthened so that it becomes truly worldwide in universal eligibility for representation of all peoples, whatsoever may be their current form of government. This is one of the four indispensable elements of the path of peace.

I am engaged in an extensive endeavor to move the President and his Administration in this direction; to also move my political party toward these policies; to focus the interreligious and interfaith leadership upon these measures; and to convince and mobilize public opinion.

I am encouraged that we are beginning to make progress.

I invite your assistance, individually and as an organization, in setting our nation on this path of peace in Vietnam and in the world.

I am hopeful that we can make a significant contribution to peace with justice in the years ahead for all humanity on this earth under God!

[From the Christian Science Monitor,
June 1, 1967]

STASSEN PROPOSES U.N. PATHWAY TO PEACE (By Godfrey Sperling, Jr.)

WASHINGTON.—A former presidential candidate and close associate of President Eisenhower, Harold E. Stassen, says he is convinced that if Mr. Eisenhower were president today "the country would not be involved in the war in Vietnam."

Mr. Stassen says that "from working closely with Eisenhower" he is certain the former President possessed a rare decision-making quality particularly evident in making foreign policy.

"Historians are already upgrading Eisenhower," said Mr. Stassen, "in light of the great problems in foreign policy that have come up since he was President."

"There was a tendency to depreciate those eight years of the Eisenhower presidency," the former three-time Governor of Minnesota said in an interview here. "But now this attitude is changing."

"John Foster Dulles also looks better all the time," he continued. "But I feel that historians will see that this was Eisenhower's policy—not Dulles's. The crucial decisions were made by Eisenhower, usually after an important discussion with the Security Council."

"As I was able to observe it his judgment factor was awfully good."

U.N. STRESSED

Mr. Stassen helped lay the groundwork for the nuclear-test-ban treaty; (he was President Eisenhower's disarmament adviser and negotiator from 1955-58). Earlier, he had played a role in setting up the United Nations (he is the last living member of the seven-member group that signed the original UN Charter for the United States).

He had this to say about the Vietnam conflict:

The only way to "reverse the tragic course" is to use the UN as a means of bringing Hanoi to the conference table.

"The path to peace in Vietnam, as I see it," he said, "lies in four essential, inseparable, parallel courses of action."

"First, there should be an open, major United States initiative to modernize and strengthen the United Nations through rewriting the Charter so that all peoples are eligible for membership whose governments will take the obligations of the new charter, and thus including two Vietnams, two Chinas, two Germanys, and two Koreas within the United Nations, and also to improve the UN in a comprehensive manner as the peace-builder and peacemaker."

INITIATIVE URGED

Here Mr. Stassen added that he didn't anticipate acceptance of this proposal from the nations involved. "Not at first," he said. "But you have to work on these things. Remember Trieste. And there are lots of other examples. But there must be a beginning, and the United States would gain a diplomatic initiative by making this proposal."

Continuing:

"Second, deescalate and quiet down the Vietnam war; end the hunter-killer drives through the jungles; stop the bombing except in defense against attack; deliberately aim at the minimum of casualties for ourselves and for the Vietnamese; maintain a powerful military presence in Vietnam; and do each of these through unconditional decisions of the United States."

"Third," he said, "give top priority to an extensive program in the educational, economic, and social fields for the future well-being of the Vietnamese people, and especially of the youth and the children of Vietnam, using the major resources which will be saved through quieting down the war."

"And finally," he said, "keep the United States very powerful and very alert, ready for any threat of war, and hold that military strength under firm moral restraint."

STRATEGY CRITICIZED

"It is my view," he said, "that these four proposals really involved the direct extension of the policies of restraint with strength for peace followed by both President Kennedy and President Eisenhower."

Mr. Stassen said, "it seems quite clear" that in the initial decision by President Johnson in February, 1965, to begin American bombing throughout Vietnam and to order the American ground combat in extensive hunter-killer drives through the jungles and over the mountains, "the justification was that this process would bring about negotiations with the North Vietnamese for the ending of the Vietnamese problem."

"Now," said Mr. Stassen, "that it has become very clear that this course of action was mistaken—that this Americanizing of the Vietnamese struggle and this escalation of the war brought a response of escalation and did not bring about negotiations—the administration has advanced a new explanation for their failure to obtain the results which they had predicted."

"The new claim now is that the dissent in the United States has been misinterpreted by the government at Hanoi and has caused them to hold back from negotiations which otherwise they might have been brought to conduct. This again is an erroneous analysis of the situation."

HANOI STAND PROBED

Mr. Stassen said he thinks there are three basic reasons the North Vietnamese have not engaged in negotiations:

"First and foremost is the fact that they know that no country, not even the United States, can conquer and hold the vast dense jungles of Vietnam, and these jungles are their home and their haven."

"Second, the government at Hanoi has never been made a proposal which could be acceptable to them, since they have never been made a proposal which would include within it the recognition of their own sovereign entity with full rights for participation within the United Nations."

"Third, no proposal has ever been made which takes realistic and intelligent account of this situation."

A BILL TO SETTLE THE CLAIMS OF ALASKA NATIVES

Mr. GRUENING, Mr. President, last Friday I introduced in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD a bill entitled "To settle the land claims of Alaska natives, and for other purposes," and made some comments on the bill which has been submitted by the Department of the Interior. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill (S. 1964) be printed at this point of my remarks.

There being no objection, the text was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 1964

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 3 of the Act of May 25, 1926 (44 Stat. 629; 48 U.S.C. 355(c)), is amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 3. (a) The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to grant in trust, subject to valid existing rights, to each tribe, band, clan, village, community, or group of natives in Alaska, hereinafter referred to as a group of natives, upon his own initiative and with-

June 27, 1967

Honorable John Sherman Cooper
United States Senate
Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C.

Dear John:

Thank you very much for your thoughtful letter of June 20th and for your very helpful move in placing the United Nations Association speech and the clipping in the Congressional Record.

I am leaving today for a business trip to Europe which will then include the World Law Conference of Judges and Lawyers in Geneva, where I will speak briefly on July 10th.

I will look forward to seeing you again when I return.

With personal best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

HES/cbh

August 4, 1967

Honorable F. Bradford Morse
House Office Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Brad:

It was a stimulating pleasure and a constructive occasion to see you.

May I reemphasize my commendation to you and your seven associates and to your staffs for your intelligent and sound initiative.

Responding to your request I enclose copies of a draft of the type of Resolution which we discussed. Upon further reflection I do believe that if your eight are joined by eight well regarded Democrats in introducing such a resolution it will have a major impact. It could be followed by a Hearing in the House Foreign Affairs Committee which would be fruitful at least in education, and perhaps in moving the Administration.

I believe the reasoning behind each of the phrases in the draft will be evident. Do not hesitate to ask for clarification or further information.

With personal best wishes as ever,

Sincerely yours,

HES/cbh
Enclosures

RESOLVED that the House of Representatives advises:

Whereas more than thirty months have elapsed since the first escalation of the Vietnamese War in February 1965; a series of further escalations have occurred since that date; casualties and loss of tragic dimensions have occurred to the United States and to Vietnam; and no end to that War is now in sight along this escalation course;

Now Therefore, a new and thorough bi-partisan consideration should be given promptly to methods and means and proposals for de-escalation of the Vietnamese War, having ever in mind the following inter-related objectives:

1. To serve the true future wellbeing of all of the people of Vietnam.
2. To enhance the prospects for a negotiated peace on a just and honorable basis.
3. To reduce American and Vietnamese casualties and costs, and to safeguard the security of United States and Allied forces in Vietnam.
4. To decrease the dangers of world war.

FROM THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSMAN F. BRADFORD MORSE (R.-MASS.)

FOR RELEASE, 10:00 A.M., MONDAY, JULY 10, 1967

MORSE PROPOSES NEW DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE IN VIETNAM

Washington.....Massachusetts Congressman F. Bradford Morse today led a group of his Republican colleagues in the House of Representatives in proposing a diplomatic initiative by the United States for the staged de-escalation of the war in Vietnam.

At a press conference in his Washington office this morning, Morse called the new proposal a "dramatic new initiative for peace involving minimum military risk to U.S. forces in the field."

The Congressman urged that careful diplomacy should precede his proposal which would involve a U.S. halt in bombing in North Vietnam north of the 21st parallel for 60 days (this area includes the city of Hanoi but not Haiphong). If the North Vietnamese responded with a similar de-escalatory step within the 60-day period, the U.S. would then end bombing north of the 20th parallel for a 60-day period, etc.

"Assuming that both sides would respond in turn to this de-escalatory process, both the U.S. bombing of the North and the North Vietnamese infiltration into the South could come to an end."

Morse, who is a Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said that his plan "calls for a series of small steps each of which builds confidence in the genuine sincerity of each of the combatants. If it is successful, a spirit of confidence might emerge that could provide a real opportunity for fruitful and honorable negotiations or for a similar staged de-escalation in South Vietnam, or both." h

The Congressman emphasized that the tying of each U.S. de-escalatory step to a comparable reduction in North Vietnamese support for the South involved minimum military risk to U.S. forces now in Vietnam.

In making his proposal, Morse took issue both with critics of the war and with the Administration for an "unyielding and inflexible" diplomatic position.

FOR RELEASE
10:00 a.m.
Monday, July 10, 1967

Statement of Congressmen: F. Bradford Morse (R-Mass.), John R. Dellenback (R-Ore.), Marvin L. Esch (R-Mich.), Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (R-Md.), Charles A. Mosher (R-Ohio), Richard S. Schweiker (R-Pa.), Robert T. Stafford (R-Vt.), Frank J. Horton (R-N.Y.)

It is disturbing to us that the recent public discussion of the war in Vietnam has polarized into rigidly opposing sides, the one urging military escalation in the hope of a quick settlement of the war, the other urging total withdrawal as the only key to peace. Both of these points of view, in our judgment, reflect ~~their~~ advocates' lack of understanding of the nature of limited war. In addition, they are essentially negative and do not offer any positive approach to the tragic problems of Southeast Asia.

What both sets of critics have forgotten is that the conflict in Vietnam is a limited war. This fact imposes special requirements not only on our military planning but on our diplomatic efforts as well.

We do not for a moment believe that the proposal we will make later in these remarks is the only hope for settlement, but we do think that discussion of the kind of diplomatic initiative we will suggest would contribute to a more balanced appraisal of our problems and perils in Vietnam.

The Nature of Limited War

The war in Vietnam is a limited war. It is limited in the combatants involved. It is limited in the objectives of the combatants. It is limited in the weapons they use. It is limited in the targets against which those weapons are employed.

Without a clear perspective of the nature of limited war, it may not be possible to devise practical diplomatic and military steps to bring the war to an end.

Many of the comments of the Administration and of both groups of its political critics on the Vietnamese war -- both those who would bomb more and those who would bomb less -- reflect a failure to comprehend the differences between limited and total war. Those differences are essential to an understanding of which steps may maximize the opportunities for peace.

What are the essential truths about limited war?

First, a limited war with limited objectives cannot be ended and cannot remain limited if one side insists on the unconditional surrender of the other.

In one sense this is obvious; the weapons and level of force necessary to obtain an unconditional surrender would turn the war from limited to total. In another sense this fact is not so obvious; when objectives and weapons are limited both sides must be willing to compromise if the war is to be ended.

Second, the end of a limited war requires that the combatants that meet at the peace table appear to be equals. If one side were to appear to "lose face" by negotiating; negotiations in a limited war context would not occur. A peace conference between victor and vanquished is possible only when one side wins and the other loses - loses not just face but the war, too. But that means surrender, which in turn means that at least one side has removed most of the limits on its use of military force. In other words, negotiations to end a limited war must appear to be at the initiative of both sides, must appear to some degree to be the result of a military stalemate in which both sides can claim success, and must result in an agreement which each side can convincingly claim as a major achievement in pursuit of its objectives. It is not necessary for the two sides to be actual equals; nor is it necessary for the agreement to be equally valuable to each side; but it is of paramount importance that both

governments can make a believable case to their people that will justify both the negotiations and their results.

Third, negotiations to end a limited war are unlikely without an advanced degree of mutual confidence in the word of the combatants. Unlike total war, limited war requires communications between the opposing sides --effective communications of both a tacit and direct form. It is through these communications that each side can understand the objectives of the other side and understand that both those objectives and the weapons used in support of them are genuinely limited. The purpose of the communications is not merely to avoid catastrophe from misunderstanding but also to build the kind of confidence in the sincerity of the other side that will allow negotiations to take place. It is thus in the interest of each side to define its limited objectives precisely, to avoid extravagant public diplomacy which might easily be misinterpreted as mere posturing for public relations purposes, and to be credible by keeping its promises and being willing to listen to the thoughts of others. It would be unwise for anyone to expect that a limited war will end suddenly - by one dramatic gesture which will lead to an immediate peace conference. On the contrary, if such a conference is to happen, it must be preceded by a series of small steps by which each side can test the other's genuine desires and by which each side can clearly demonstrate its own. Without that atmosphere of mutual confidence, negotiations for the end of a limited war are not likely to happen and are even less likely to be successful.

Fourth, it is not possible for one side to fight a limited war and the other a total war. The escalation of one side will inevitably be matched by the other. It is unreasonable to think that if one side has an advantage in available air power and the other in available numbers of land forces, that either would allow the other to use its advantage without employing its own. It is equally

unwise to become pre-occupied with the limits you have imposed on your own military forces and neglect the obvious but unused power available to the other side. A decision by either side to remove the limits to the power it employs is a decision to risk the likelihood of total war.

From the perspective of these truths of limited war, the Vietnam positions of the Administration and both sets of its critics are found wanting.

Those who advocate a rapid or steady escalation in the power applied against North Vietnam are convinced that such a course would force North Vietnam to the negotiating table on its knees. Far more likely would be the rapid escalation of the conflict from a limited to a total war.

Among the options still available for Communist escalation in the Vietnamese conflict are: the use of terrorist bombings against Saigon and the civilian populations of other South Vietnamese cities; the infiltration in massive numbers of the very large North Vietnamese standing Army; the use of Communist volunteers in massive numbers from other Communist countries; the opening of a second diversionary military action in Korea to sap Western strength; etc.

Despite its increasing qualifications as a truism, it is nonetheless vital to appreciate that it is not in the United States' interest to become engaged in an unlimited land war on the Asian continent. Escalation which would change the psychological atmosphere of the Vietnam war from emphasis on restraint to emphasis on power would be likely to result in such an unlimited land war. Therefore, it would be wrong.

Those who advocate a sudden and complete halt to the bombing are similarly convinced that this step would have the best chance of bringing North Vietnam to the negotiating table. Unfortunately, this step would also be unlikely to achieve the desired results. Given the history of U. S. policy and the nature of U.S.

domestic politics the government in Hanoi is likely to think that the sudden and complete cessation of or even pause in the bombing is either a ruse or a sign of desperation - and in either case the cause of negotiations would not be meaningfully advanced. Making the cessation a pause minimizes its risk and its effectiveness, too. The only positive value a sudden and complete cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam would have would come if the bombing were stopped for such a long time that North Vietnam became convinced of the genuine nature of U.S. motives and had the opportunity to make a diplomatic initiative of its own which would appear to be unrelated to the bombing cessation and would thereby not cause any loss of face to the Hanoi government. But in all likelihood the period of time required would be so long as to involve serious military risks in allowing the re-establishment of free-flowing supply and support channels to the South.

In other words, a complete bombing pause would not prove the genuine sincerity of the United States while a complete bombing cessation long enough to prove the genuine sincerity of the United States would involve a great military risk to the United States.

In still other words, a complete bombing pause would not prove the genuine sincerity of the United States but a complete bombing cessation long enough to prove the genuine sincerity of the United States would not in any way assure the genuine sincerity of North Vietnam. It might, therefore, prove to be a greater impetus to instability than to stability.

While the Administration rejects both of these suggestions from its two sets of critics, its position is also a dubious one. It appears to be unyielding and inflexible - rigidly insisting that the first concrete step toward de-escalation be taken by North Vietnam - dogmatically demanding that North Vietnam demonstrate its genuine sincerity for negotiations before the United States does. It is an

attitude which may reflect a misunderstanding of the nature of limited war, for it asks the enemy to risk losing face. The Administration insists on publicly putting the government of North Vietnam on the spot by insisting that she back down first. It is a position which comes dangerously close to changing the atmosphere of restraint to an atmosphere of power - and a limited war cannot stay limited or be ended in an atmosphere of power.

Significant military escalation, sudden and complete cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam, and a rigid devotion to the status quo all fail to meet the limited war criteria of a promising policy to bring about honorable negotiations to end the war in Vietnam.

But does a viable policy option exist? To qualify such a policy must meet the following criteria:

It must not risk expansion of the limited war to total war.

It must not risk significant erosion of the current military advantage of the United States in Vietnam.

It must induce a growing atmosphere of mutual confidence.

It must permit each side the opportunity to claim initiative.

It must not require either side to "lose face."

It must be susceptible to presentation, verification, and implementation through the private channels of diplomacy.

Staged De-escalation

Such a potential policy does exist. The experts would probably call it "staged de-escalation." One variation of it would be as follows:

The United States would agree to halt all bombing in North Vietnam north of the 21st parallel for 60 days.

If during that time the North Vietnamese Government undertook a similarly limited, similarly visible and similarly measurable step toward de-escalation

the United States would immediately halt all bombing in North Vietnam north of the 20th parallel for 60 days.

If within the first 60-day period the North Vietnamese had taken no such step, the bombing would be resumed.

In five such successive steps the United States would gradually cease all bombing of North Vietnam. Each step after the first would be dependent upon a similar de-escalation by Hanoi. If no such step were taken in the first 60 days, the plan would end.

If either side violated its word at any time, the plan would end. (The system should have the flexibility, however, to cause a minor violation merely to set back the timetable rather than necessarily ending the entire experiment.)

The United States should propose the plan to the Hanoi government through private diplomatic channels only. Any public notice or acknowledgment of its acceptance or implementation should be made only by mutual agreement.

Those equivalent de-escalatory steps to be taken by the North Vietnamese government could be proposed in the plan by the United States, or could be defined in advance by the North Vietnamese government, or could be accepted one by one as they are implemented. It is vital, however, that clear and precise information about them be communicated so that they can be verified. Obviously, agreement in advance would be preferable in order to assure that what Hanoi thinks is equivalent Washington does also.

Examples of measurable and equivalent de-escalatory steps by the North Vietnamese government might include: the cessation of shipments to and from specific military supply depots in the southern portion of North Vietnam;

the erection of barriers on and the non-use of specific supply routes in North Vietnam and Laos along the Ho Chi Minh trail; the withdrawal of all MIG fighters to distant bases in Northern North Vietnam; the cessation of all terrorist bombings in specific areas of South Vietnam; the release of U.S. prisoners of war; etc.

It would be vital not to expect the North Vietnamese to undertake steps which might put themselves at a distinct military disadvantage.

The staged cessation of U.S. bombing, if the plan does not work, can be reversed on a few hours notice. The steps to be taken by North Vietnam should be expected to be of the same nature. It would be unwise, for example, at an early stage in the de-escalatory process to demand or expect, from the North Vietnamese, steps such as the dismantling of their SAM sites, total evacuation of supply depots, or withdrawal of Army units from the South.

This policy of staged de-escalation meets each of the criteria cited previously to maximize the chances for negotiations in a limited war and minimize the military risks involved.

It obviously does not risk expansion of the limited war to total war.

It does not risk significant erosion of the current military advantage of the United States in Vietnam. The greatest military advantage which results from the bombing of North Vietnam comes from destroying targets in southern North Vietnam - supply depots and routes along the Ho Chi Minh and other trails into South Vietnam. By halting the bombing stages, by starting the cessation in Northern North Vietnam and gradually working southward, the by tying each successive stage to equivalent North Vietnamese reductions in its support operations to the South, the plan minimizes the military risks to the United States. If a cessation of U.S. bombing north of the 21st parallel were matched by a

dismantling of and evacuation from major North Vietnamese supply depots along the Ho Chi Minh trail, and if successive U.S. steps were matched by similar North Vietnamese steps, by the time U.S. bombings were halted in all of North Vietnam, most significant North Vietnamese infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam would also be halted. The first U.S. step envisaged in the plan may not be matched by the North Vietnamese - in which case after 60 days all the bombing the United States is now doing could be resumed. Furthermore, the sixty day cessation of bombing above the 21st parallel would effect raids over Hanoi, but would not effect raids over Haiphong or Nam Dinh areas, each of which would be immune from bombing only after the second U.S. step which must be preceded by some significant North Vietnamese de-escalatory step.

The staged de-escalation plan would induce a growing atmosphere of mutual confidence. In fact, the most important attribute of the plan is that each step by each side involves little military risk in itself, is clearly visible to and measurable by the other side, and is dependent upon a previous step by the other side. It is a series of small steps, each of which builds confidence in the genuine sincerity of each of the combatants. If it is successful, at the end of the process not only will U.S. bombing in the North and North Vietnamese infiltration into the South be ended, but a spirit of confidence might have emerged. That spirit of confidence could provide a real opportunity for fruitful and honorable negotiations or for a similar staged de-escalation in South Vietnam itself - or both.

The plan would permit each side the opportunity to claim initiative. The plan calls for nine or ten separate steps, taken alternately by the United States and North Vietnam. Patriots, political scientists, and propagandists in each country will be able to claim that it was the steps taken by their government which

led to the other side taking similar steps. Each side can claim - and do so justifiably - that its initiatives paved the way toward peace. It is a flexible system through which both sides can equally contribute toward peace and through which both can appear to pursue their national objectives.

The plan would not require either side to "lose face." It would not require that one side yield either to the force or the threat of force of the other. It would be a mutual de-escalation from which both sides could benefit. This would be especially true if the plan were initiated through private diplomacy - and implemented and announced through mutual diplomacy, which leads to the final criterion --

The plan obviously can be susceptible to presentation, verification, and implementation through the private channels of diplomacy. It can be, and if it is to succeed, it should be.

Even if the plan meets all the criteria of limited diplomacy, will it work? No one can answer that. All that can be said for it is that it seems to offer more promise than the stand-pat policy of the Administration or the alternatives suggested by either set of its major critics. For too long the Administration implicitly, and its Vietnam critics explicitly, have held out the hope to the American people that there is some simple formula, some magic key which, if found, could end the Vietnamese war suddenly and dramatically. This is extremely unlikely. It is not in the nature of limited war for peace to come overnight - for surrender is improbable and a cease-fire comes only after arduous diplomacy.

There is no panacea for Vietnam. The proposal offered here is not put forth as one. Without doubt it can be improved upon. But the best chance for peace lies not in giant power or in giant concessions. It lies in small steps, taken quietly - steps that make the position of each side credible to the other. This is now the task of responsible diplomacy in Vietnam.



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