



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

F. BRADFORD MORSE  
5TH MASSACHUSETTS

August 7, 1967

Honorable Harold E. Stassen  
1020 Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Bldg.  
Philadelphia 9, Pennsylvania

Dear Governor Stassen:

Thanks so very much for lunch the other day.  
I was mighty pleased that we had an opportunity to  
exchange our ideas.

The draft Resolution was on my desk this  
morning, and I will discuss it with my colleagues  
tomorrow. It may well serve as a useful focal point  
in our efforts.

I will be in touch with you just as soon as  
we have had a chance to develop our plans.

With high regard, I am

Sincerely,

F. Bradford Morse  
Member of Congress

FBM:mm

August 14, 1967

His Eminence  
John Cardinal Krol  
5700 City Avenue  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Your Eminence:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter of August 7th.

I am pleased that you have referred a copy of my letter to both the Permanent Observer of the Holy See and to the Bishop in charge of the Catholic Office for United Nations Affairs.

I trust that if either of them wishes to have any clarification of any portion of the recommended program and policies, they will not hesitate to request it.

The events of each passing week in Vietnam and in the world have deepened my convictions that the proposed course of action is the road to peace with freedom and justice.

With my personal warm regards and deep respect as ever,

Sincerely yours,

HES/cbh



*PL*

5700 City Avenue  
Philadelphia, Pa. 19131

August 7, 1967

The Honorable Harold E. Stassen  
1020 Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Building  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (19109)

Dear Mr. Stassen:

Your letter of June 12 arrived before I left for Rome, but it has become a part of the accumulation of mail that has flooded my desk in the past month.

I want to assure you that I have referred a copy of your letter to both the Permanent Observer of the Holy See and to the Bishop in charge of the Catholic Office for United Nation Affairs.

You would appreciate that while they are not in a position to initiate any type of activity in this matter, at least they will have the benefit of your knowledge and views on the possibility of amending and strengthening the United Nations.

With cordial and prayerful best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

*John Cardinal Dooley*  
Archbishop of Philadelphia

erb

August 30, 1967

Mrs. Shirley Temple Black  
Woodside, California

Dear Mrs. Black:

My enthusiastic congratulations and commendation to you for your decision to campaign for the seat in Congress for your California District.

This is wonderful and significant news which has very important national implications.

Mrs. Stassen joins me in wishing you every success and extending best wishes to you and to your husband and family.

Sincerely yours,

HES/cbh

August 30, 1967

Mrs. Robert W. White  
Box 336 Route 2  
Wilmington Island  
Savannah, Georgia

Dear Ann Douglas:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter.

I am intensifying my efforts to move our national  
policy in Vietnam.

There are some encouraging developments.

I will look forward to seeing you again personally.

Sincerely yours,

HES/cbh



xx

Harold E. Stassen

August 28, 1967

Honorable Margaret Chase Smith  
Senate Office Building  
Washington, D. C.

Have sent a telegram to Chairman Stennis respectfully requesting an appearance to testify in the closed sessions on bombing in Vietnam, based upon my experience as Assistant Chief of Staff to Admiral Halsey, Commander of the combined land, air and sea forces of the South Pacific during World War II and as Director of Foreign Operations and Member of the National Security Council and Operations Coordinating Board during the initial Indo China and Vietnam developments during President Eisenhower's Administration, as I wish to present important facts not included in the published reports of Secretary McNamara's testimony and different conclusions than he presented for the consideration of the Committee. Sincerely yours,

Harold E. Stassen

1020 The Fidelity Building  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19109

xx

Harold E. Stassen

August 27, 1967

Senator John Stennis  
Chairman Senate Committee  
Senate Office Building  
Washington, D.C.

May I respectfully request an appearance to testify in <sup>the</sup> ~~your~~ closed sessions on bombing in Vietnam, based upon my experience as Assistant Chief of Staff to Admiral Halsey, Commander of the combined land, air and sea forces of the South Pacific during World War II and as Director of Foreign Operations and Member of the National Security Council and Operations Coordinating Board during the initial Indo China and Vietnam developments during President Eisenhower's Administration, as I wish to present important facts not included in the published reports of Secretary McNamara's testimony and different conclusions than he presented for the consideration of ~~your~~ <sup>the</sup> Committee. Sincerely yours,

Harold E. Stassen

1020 the Fidelity Building  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19109

xx

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August 27, 1967

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Chairman Senate Committee  
Senate Office Building  
Washington, D. C.

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Harold E. Stassen

1020 the Fidelity Building  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19109



August 30, 1967

Honorable John Stennis  
Chairman  
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee  
Senate Office Building  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

May I acknowledge your letter of August 29th.

Since the matter is so urgent and immediate,

I submit the enclosed memorandum without delay.

Sincerely yours,

HES/cbh  
Enclosure

RICHARD B. RUSSELL, GA., CHAIRMAN

JOHN STENNIS, MISS.  
STUART SYMINGTON, MO.  
HENRY M. JACKSON, WASH.  
SAM J. ERVIN, JR., N.C.  
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DANIEL B. BREWSTER, MD.  
HARRY F. BYRD, JR., VA.

MARGARET CHASE SMITH, E  
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JAMES B. PEARSON, KANS.  
PETER H. DOMINICK, COLO.

## United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

WILLIAM H. DARDEN, CHIEF OF STAFF  
CHARLES B. KIRBOW, CHIEF CLERK

August 29, 1967

Mr. Harold E. Stassen  
1020 Fidelity Building  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 10109


Dear Mr. Stassen:

This is in reply to your telegram of August 28 requesting that you be permitted to appear and testify in the Subcommittee's inquiry into the air war against North Vietnam. I appreciate this offer and certainly recognize your qualifications.

For the time being, however, the Subcommittee has determined that its witnesses will be limited to those presently holding official positions and those who have recently held official positions in connection with the bombing campaign in the recent past. If the Subcommittee should change its mind about this matter, I will certainly be back in touch with you.

In the meantime, please be assured that we appreciate your offer to be of assistance to us in connection with this matter.

Sincerely,



John Stennis  
Chairman, Preparedness  
Investigating Subcommittee

Harold E. Stassen  
1020 The Fidelity Building  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19109

Senator John Stennis  
Chairman  
Senate Preparedness Investigating Sub-Committee  
Senate Office Building  
Washington, D. C.

With reference to your current investigation of the War in Vietnam, since I will present important facts which were not included in the published testimony of the Secretary of Defense, and since the conclusions which I will present are very different from his, may I first very briefly state the basis for my presentation.

The basis is service as Assistant Chief of Staff to Admiral William Halsey, Commander of the combined land, air and sea forces in the South Pacific in World War II, continuing to the end of the war; service as Director of Foreign Operations with jurisdiction over the United States programs in Vietnam and the other Indo China and Southeast Asia countries; membership on the National Security Council and the Operations Coordinating Board in the Administration of President Eisenhower during the years when Indo China emerged from French Colonialism; and the member of the United States Delegation at San Francisco under appointment of President Roosevelt and President Truman assigned to be in charge of the dependent peoples and trusteeship portions of the United Nations Charter. As one part of my duties as Assistant Chief of Staff to Admiral William Halsey, there was included responsibility for assembling all of the intelligence information from all the United States and Allied Forces and redistributing

it to those in his command who needed to know in the conduct of the War. As one part of the duties of Director of Foreign Operations, there was participation in the last phases of the French operations in Vietnam; the emergence of the two halves of Vietnam from French Colonialism in 1954; and the origins of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, known as SEATO.

May I then move directly to the factual matters which were not included in the public statements of the Secretary of Defense's testimony to your Committee last week. They may be centered on these points.

1. The effect upon the morale, solidarity and combat effectiveness of the North Vietnamese and Vietcong of the United States program of bombing and of direct American combat action, instituted in February 1965.
2. The effect upon the combat effectiveness of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces of the United States' major direct combat and bombing operations.
3. The effect upon the leadership of the South Vietnamese people of the United States' program of bombing and direct combat, instituted in February 1965 and escalated since that time.
4. The consequences to the United States of America of a War of Attrition conducted on the Mainland of Asia.

On each of the matters on which I speak, there are in the files of the United States Government from 1958 and earlier years, extensive and thorough classified reports which will substantiate each point which I make. I, of course,

will not refer to any classified information and will make the points only on the basis which is proper from a non-classified basis.

Let us take up Point 1.

1. The effect upon the morale, solidarity and combat effectiveness of the North Vietnamese and Vietcong of the United States ' program of bombing and of direct American combat action, instituted in February 1965.

The bombing of a territory of a people under Colonialism, or emerging from Colonialism, establishes greater solidarity of the people against the source of the bombing, increases their spirit of resistance, and enhances their willingness to work and to fight against the source of the bombing. This tendency is further multiplied if a color dimension is added to the situation. It is also further multiplied if the terrain in question provides shelter and keeps alive the hope of survival.

2. The effect upon the combat effectiveness of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces of the United States' major direct combat and bombing operations.

A sense of a pre-eminent and indispensable role in a battle for independence and nationhood is absolutely essential for a high combat effectiveness and fighting morale on the part of an armed force. Any sense of being relegated to a secondary or non-essential role causes a serious deterioration in the combat effectiveness of an armed force. This factual premise is also being proven again in these last 2 1/2 years in Vietnam.

As the United States moves to take over the War, the fighting



effectiveness of the South Vietnamese units declines. The sharp decrease in South Vietnamese casualties is a direct result of the plain fact that they are no longer doing much effective fighting on their part. It is also a reflection that the combat effectiveness of the North Vietnamese and of the Vietcong is greater against the United States' troops than it is against other Vietnamese.

If we pause to reflect, I believe we can all understand the logic of this factual premise, which has been thoroughly analyzed in extensive studies through the years.

Can there be any doubt, that if Lafayette had come to the United States during the Colonial struggles and said, in effect, that he and the French would take over the battles for the American Colonials, there would have been a very different story in our War of Independence! There would have been a different story of Valley Forge, and of the crossing of the Delaware, and of countless other deeds of great valor and heroism and combat effectiveness which were decisive for our own independence and freedom!

While the degree and the precise form may vary with peoples of different cultures, the elementary human psychology is as true in Vietnam as it is among any peoples.

3. The effect upon the leadership of the South Vietnamese people of the United States program of bombing and direct combat, instituted in February 1965 and escalated since that time.

Closely related to the second point is the other vital point of the development of effective native leadership, leadership which can with a

charismatic quality mobilize and develop a nation. It is impossible for this kind of leadership to emerge under a circumstance in which another large nation is carrying on the principal war operation within the borders of the nation concerned.

Here again, your reflection upon this point will make the logic of the factual premise quite obvious. A recent example will emphasize the point. In 1953, when the Huk Communist guerillas were threatening in a major way in the Philippines, there were those who felt then, sincerely, and urged earnestly, that the United States must send in the U. S. Marines and U. S. Armed Forces to save the Philippines. But the wise decision was made to keep the responsibility upon the Filipinos, to help them with equipment and advice and training, but to be very careful not to take over that struggle or even to appear to take it over. Out of that climate of responsibility and challenge, President Magsaysay arose to become a tremendously effective leader of the Philippines. By his very nature, he never could have emerged from an extensive United States military operation. By reason of the entire psychological climate, no leader could have thus emerged to attract the enthusiastic sacrificial determination and following of the Philippine people, if there had been an extensive United States military operation.

In Vietnam in these past two-and-one-half years the psychological result of the United States' extensive bombing and extensive direct combat is to establish a circumstance in which it is impossible for the kind of leadership to emerge for the South Vietnamese that must be a part of their development

as a free and independent nation.

4. The consequences to the United States of America of a War of Attrition conducted on the Mainland of Asia.

One of the oldest and most thoroughly analyzed principles of United States' military studies is that our country should not be involved in a War of Attrition on the Mainland of Asia. And yet that is precisely what General Westmoreland stated he was conducting, under the orders which he had been given, in Vietnam today. It is this War of Attrition on the land which gives rise to the requirements and demand for bombing in support. It is the tragic mistake of the War of Attrition which must be reanalyzed, and I respectfully submit that this distinguished committee should become the central point for such a reanalysis.

May I follow up these points with equal emphasis to say that the alternative to the War of Attrition is not the way of withdrawal. It has never been United States' policy not to be involved in Asia. Quite the contrary, it has been United States' policy that we must be involved in the entire world. But the manner of involvement must not include within it a War of Attrition on the Mainland of Asia. What then does this mean in exact terms in Vietnam?

It means that the orders to the United States military forces in Vietnam must be changed if we are to win in Vietnam. Those orders must be changed away from the War of Attrition. They must be changed to orders to maintain a powerful military presence in South Vietnam with a minimum of casualties of the United States and of the Vietnamese people. This would mean the

stopping of bombing, except in defense against attack or imminent threat of attack. It would mean making it very clear to the South Vietnamese that while we would backstop them to the point of maintaining a powerful military presence and of preventing the North Vietnamese or Vietcong from completely overrunning their country, the ultimate defeat of the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese will depend upon the South Vietnamese. This would be a very important military, psychological, political and economic change.

At the same time, a reanalysis is needed of the kind of political basis on which the Vietnamese situation can be solved. Elementary to this is the recognition that in this period of history there must be two Vietnams if the bitter, bloody unending War is to be resolved. So long as the French concept of 1954 that one or the other of the two governments would become the government of the whole of Vietnam is perpetuated, the continuing War is inevitable. Thus, I submit that a United States initiative should be taken for having two Vietnam Governments come into the United Nations and thus to compete in their respective social, economic and political systems. With the acceptance of this concept the United Nations should then police the border between North Vietnam and South Vietnam, and between Cambodia and Vietnam. With this initiative, there should be placed before the people of Vietnam, and especially before the young men of Vietnam, the potential opportunity for education and economic development. This is the way to win in Vietnam for the true objectives of the United States.

It is also important that the same principle of two Vietnams should also

be applied to a truly worldwide eligibility of membership in the United Nations through a modernized and strengthened Charter, including thereby two Chinas, neither one with a veto, two Germanys, neither one with a veto, and two Koreas. This would require an amending conference under Article 109 of the Charter. Senator Vandenberg, Senator Connally and I and others anticipated this need when we provided for Article 109 in the Charter at San Francisco in 1945.

As you realize, I am urging that the War in Vietnam be quieted down; that it be de-escalated; and that the initiatives toward a political solution should be escalated and be given top priority.

I feel certain that a thorough analysis from a military standpoint would conclude that there cannot be an American War solution in Vietnam. The reason is that in Vietnam there are more than fourteen thousand square miles of jungle. This is a virtually impenetrable jungle. It regrows very rapidly when it is cleared out. These jungles in turn connect up with more than two hundred miles of jungle border with the jungles of other Southeast Asia countries, including Cambodia, Laos and China. No country, not even the United States, can conquer and hold these jungles against the people who live in them. It is the clear knowledge of this fact, in my view, that causes distinguished military leaders like General Gavin and General Shoup and General Ridgway to reluctantly, but clearly, speak up against what the United States is doing in Vietnam.

Thus the bombing and the War of Attrition creates new guerillas



faster than they can possibly be killed. Thus, the highest rate of kill claimed at any time by the United States has been less than the rate at which young North Vietnamese reach military age. As a War of Attrition, it is self-defeating. A powerful military presence around the major cities and the principal rice bowls can be maintained with a very minimum of casualties and minimum of costs. This would be similar to the proven strategy of Admiral Halsey and General MacArthur in the Pacific and Asian Areas in World War II. Then the necessary area for an airfield and a port would be captured and held with a defense perimeter. But never would our forces try to conquer and hold the jungles or to engage in any War of Attrition against the Japanese within the jungles. Many of the Japanese were still there in the jungles when the war ended!

Furthermore, every thorough study I know of indicates that before long any attempts of the opposition to mobilize and attack such defensive positions would take heavy casualties and lose the morale of its own forces. Then the guerilla bands wither away, as the young men turn to the opportunities of peace. This happened in the Philippines. It happened in Malaya. It will happen in Vietnam.

This is particularly true if the alternative is presented of full recognition and status in the United Nations of a sovereign government of North Vietnam, and if the opportunity for peaceful economic developments and education of youth is extended in a comprehensive program.

This Committee is urged respectfully to be the catalyst which moves the United States away from the present tragic mistaken course in Vietnam to this new path of peace with strength.

September 6, 1967

The Honorable John Stennis  
Chairman, Preparedness  
Investigating Subcommittee  
The United States Senate  
Senate Building  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator Stennis:

May I acknowledge your letter of September 1st, enclosing a copy of your Subcommittee report of August 31, 1967.

As you state, the Subcommittee "has a different idea" about the war in Vietnam than I do.

It is for this very reason that I renew my respectful request to be heard. From my long and relevant experience, I feel certain that the Subcommittee's conclusions would only deepen the present tragic mistaken course of action in Vietnam.

In the national interest, will you reconsider extending an occasion for me to endeavor to convince the Committee?

Sincerely yours,

HES:cc

Harold E. Stassen

RICHARD B. RUSSELL, GA., CHAIRMAN

JOHN STENNIS, MISS.  
STUART SYMINGTON, MO.  
HENRY M. JACKSON, WASH.  
SAM J. ERVIN, JR., N.C.  
HOWARD W. CANNON, NEV.  
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## United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

WILLIAM H. DARDEN, CHIEF OF STAFF  
CHARLES B. KIRBOW, CHIEF CLERK


September 1, 1967

Mr. Harold E. Stassen  
1020 Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Building  
Philadelphia 9, Pennsylvania

Dear Mr. Stassen:

I thank you for your letter of August 30 and for your memorandum with respect to the war in Vietnam. I am glad to have the benefit of your views, but, as you will see from the enclosed report, the Subcommittee has a different idea about this matter.

Sincerely,



John Stennis  
Chairman, Preparedness  
Investigating Subcommittee



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