

File

HAROLD E. STASSEN, COMM. U.S.N.R.
STAFF COMMANDER, THIRD FLEET
FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA


Sent by HES

Bureau of Personnel
Navy Dept
Wash D C

Attention Admiral 75 Low U.S.N.

Reference your urgent wire
will be pleased to see
General Riley at Blackstone
Hotel Chicago ~~will~~

0900 Tuesday 26 February
I will be at Schweder Hotel Milwaukee on
Monday 25 February
Harold Stassen



APPROVED: 1 OCTOBER 1945
REVISED: 11 OCTOBER 1945

E. J. King

FLEET ADMIRAL
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

AND REFER TO

NAVY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



8 October 1945.

MEMORANDUM

From: Commander Harold E. Stassen.
To : The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Revised Syllabus for the Foundations of
National Power.
Reference: (a) SecNav Memo of 4 October, paragraph 7.

1. The syllabus and the entire concept of the course on Foundations of National Power is excellent.


2. I have these six suggestions for supplementing the syllabus.

(a) I consider there should be a greater emphasis on the importance of scientific research and invention as a major element of a nation's power position. This can be done by adding an additional point on page 4, part II, A, 2, f, "Its scientific research and inventive power and resourcefulness."

(b) A greater emphasis should be given on the relationship of the nation to the United Nations organization and other international organizations. Unquestionably, in the future the solidarity and support within a country and the number of allies or enemies will have a direct relationship to the record and success of the individual nation in the increasing development of international organization. This might be done by including under part II, A, 2, g, "The membership, participation, and success of the nation in world organization."

(c) Special emphasis could well be put on the importance to the power position of a nation of the consistency or inconsistency, integration or lack thereof, of the diplomatic policy and the military policy.

(d) The atomic energy question now deserves special discussion in a course of this nature. It could well be taken up in connection with the scientific phase of point (a) above.





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NAVY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

To: The Secretary of the Navy. 8 October 1945

(e) There might well be a greater emphasis on the question of the durable morale of the people in a crisis. This should include analysis of morale based upon rather complete information, as compared to morale based upon censorship and a propaganda program. It should also be recognized that there is a marked difference in the task of maintaining morale whether it be in the face of an invasion of a homeland, or in endeavoring to carry out a definite worldwide policy when a homeland is not invaded. Germany had the second situation early in the war, and shifted to the first later in the war. Russia had predominantly the first throughout the war. The United States had predominantly the second throughout the war.

(f) There could well be greater emphasis on the importance of a consistent long-range foreign policy of a nation as an element of its power.

3. These comments are supplementary in nature and should not be construed to detract from my hearty approval of the study outlined in the revised syllabus.

H.E.S.

AND REFERRED TO
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NAVY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.


9 October 1945.



MEMORANDUM

From: Commander Stassen.
To : The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Postwar Military and Security Organization.
Reference: SecNav Memorandum of 4 Oct, paragraph 3.

1. Mr. Eberstadt's report of September 1945 is excellent and I support most of his recommendations.
2. I would place greater emphasis on the position of the Chief of Staff to the President, and use it as the key to unified command in the field. Establish the position by Congressional action, make him the Vice-Chairman of the National Security Council, not give him the power of decision, but require that he make recommendations to the President for decision on matters on which the Council did not agree. Require that he keep the President advised, and give him the responsibility for seeing to it that a legislative mandate of unity of command in all theaters and areas is fulfilled. The President would himself act as Chairman of the Security Council whenever he saw fit to do so. The Chief of Staff would also serve as Chairman of the Joint Staff Committee.
3. I would suggest that a Secretary of Resources and Research should be created to take over all of the present duties of the Secretary of the Interior, plus those duties that have devolved upon various wartime resources and special research agencies.
4. As recommended by Eberstadt, a Department of Air should be established, not impinging, however, on the essential tactical air of the Army or Navy.
5. The National Security Council would then consist of the five Cabinet officers--State, War, Navy, Air, and Resources, chairmanned by the President's Chief of Staff, and with an effective Secretariat from the office of the President's Chief of Staff.



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NAVY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



To : The Secretary of the Navy. 9 October 1945.

6. A number of joint committees for Logistics, Purchasing, Munitions, and Intelligence should be established, in each instance chaired by an officer who would be a part of the National Security Council Secretariat and would be serving under the President's Chief of Staff. These chairmen likewise should not have the power of decision in event of disagreement, but would have the responsibility of bringing recommendations to the attention of the National Security Council and to the President's Chief of Staff for either decision on that level or by the President himself. The method of operation would be almost exclusively to assign the carrying out of a particular function to one or the other of the various departments involved.

7. A number of committees of special members from these five departments plus bipartisan representation from the Congress and occasional outside specialists should be established from time to time to develop long range national policy on specific world problems--such as the Pacific bases--the Dardanelles--the Balkans--the Arabs--Argentina, etc.

8.- All other functions should be brought under an appropriate member of the Cabinet, and all other major decisions should be made on a Cabinet basis.

9. It is considered that this type of organization would to a maximum degree result in unified command and the elimination of duplications, without losing the opportunity for the people, through their Congress, to decide between the major aspects of their national defense. Likewise this organization would have a better chance of maintaining coordination between our diplomatic policy, our military program, and our resources. In other words, decisions that would remain for the President to make under this form of organization would be those of such importance that they should not be made on any level lower than the President.

H. E. S.

NAVY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON 25, D.C. Revised 10 October 1945.



AND REFER TO
CONFIDENTIAL

REVISED MEMORANDUM

From: Commander Stassen.
To : The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Pearl Harbor Irregularities - SubBase Ship's Service - Civilian Housing Area Meat - Cdr. Blodgett.

1. The need of an account-examiner phase of the inspection activities is indicated. This could be developed by the Inspector General or the Inspector General could be retained on matters relating to military readiness and a financial examiner-audit service could be tied in with the development of a Comptroller-Budget office in the Department.
2. A survey of the administrative set-up at Pearl and the organization lines of command and supervision of all activities is indicated. There is a marked tendency to exclusively fix blame on subordinates without proper fixing of responsibility on senior command.
3. Court-martials to try senior officers should be convened by a command of sufficient seniority in the chain of command so that it will result in the selection of a court composed of senior officers not closely associated with the defendant in his duties.
4. All phases of the current investigation should be integrated and followed through thoroughly by senior officers with the assistance of an expert accountant. It should be commented, however, that while the irregularities are important they had no real relationship to the effective prosecution of the war. Furthermore, excessive investigation and auditing of the entire naval establishment during the war would have handicapped essential military operations.

H. E. S.

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By	00H NLE Date 4/4/09

NAVY DEPARTMENT

BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

12 OCT 1945

(ADVANCE COPY)

CIRCULAR LETTER NO. 303-45

To: All Ships and Stations

Subj: EDO Officers and Specialists - Transfer of Naval Reserve and Temporary USN officers to the regular Navy.

Refs: (a) Circular Letter 288-45.

(b) ALNavs 202, 206, 207, 214, 220, 233, 250, 271 and 283 of 1945.

1. The Navy Department desires requests from qualified Reserve and Temporary USN officers for appointment as Engineering Duty Only (EDO) officers in the regular Navy. At present, there is no classification other than EDO which can be used to designate various professions and specialties. Officers who have been performing duties related to the professions or specialties indicated in this letter or other officers whose education and experience is such that they feel they are qualified may apply.

2. The EDO designation offers many attractions for officers who wish to follow an engineering or other specialty for which they feel qualified by education and experience, rather than a career in unrestricted line duties. Officers commissioned as EDO will be eligible for any shore duty assignable to other Line officers of their rank and can succeed to command ashore. In pursuit of their specialty they may be assigned to sea duty, but they will not become eligible for command afloat. In promotions, they will not compete with unrestricted Line officers but will be assigned "extra numbers" and be considered separately by selection boards. All officers will receive the same equality of treatment outlined in reference (a). Transferred officers will be eligible to apply for postgraduate courses in their specialties or for flight training, as appropriate, on the same basis as officers already in

the regular service. Such transferred officers will be counted on to help keep the technical service of the regular Navy the finest in the world.

3. It is not the intent that officers selected for appointment will necessarily perform duties in the future under the cognizance of a particular Bureau. However, in order to better set forth the qualifications desired, the professions or specialties are listed under the various Bureaus and Offices which at present have cognizance of the work performed.

a. Bureau of Aeronautics.

(Aeronautical)

Aerodynamics
Aeronautical engineering
Industrial and Management
engineering
Mechanical Engineering
Metallurgy
Structural engineering

(Aircraft electronics)

Electrical engineering
Illuminating engineering
Mechanics
Physics
Electronic engineering

(Officers requesting appointment in the above categories are not required to be Naval aviators.)

b. Bureau of Ordnance.

Ordnance Engineering
Mechanical Engineering
Electronic Engineering
Electrical Engineering
Chemical Engineering (including explosives)
Metallurgical Engineering

c. Bureau of Ships.

Naval Architecture
Naval Engineering (Mechanical)
Naval Engineering (Diesel)
Electronic Engineering
Radio Engineering
Radar Engineering
Electrical Engineering
Petroleum Engineering
Metallurgical Engineering

Chemical Engineering
Industrial Engineering
Materials Engineering
Ventilation Engineering
Illuminating Engineering
Physics
Mathematics
Optics

d. Office of Research and Inventions.

Patent Attorneys	Radio Engineering
Mathematical Physicists	Mathematics
Nuclear Physicists	Metallurgy
Organic Chemistry	Aeronautical Engineering
Physical Chemistry	Aerodynamics
Bio Chemistry	Meteorology
Chemical Engineering	Psychology
Mechanical Engineering	Oceanography
Electronic Engineering	Physiology
Electrical Engineering	

e. Office of Naval Intelligence.

Language Officers.
Officers who are highly informed on foreign areas.
Officers experienced in intelligence technique.

f. Director of Naval Communications.

Officers who are specialists in Communication
Intelligence and Security.

4. Applicants submitting requests for appointment as EDO under paragraphs 3(a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) will be required to have a college degree or to demonstrate by means of a test that they have the equivalent general background and mental capacity, and, in addition, will be required to have had experience in their specialty. Applicants submitting requests for appointment as EDO under paragraph 3(f) will be required to have had only two years of college or to demonstrate by means of a test the equivalent general background and mental capacity, as well as to have had experience in their specialty.

5. The tests which applicants will take in lieu of a college degree or two years work toward a college degree, will be the same test described in reference (a) for applicants for unrestricted Line or Staff Corps appointments, and will be given by the Local Boards when applicants appear

for interview as prescribed in reference (a). These tests will be graded by the Navy Test Research Unit, Princeton, New Jersey, according to whether an applicant is demonstrating the equivalent general background and mental capacity of a college degree or two years of college. To facilitate grading, tests which demonstrate the equivalent of a college degree will be clearly marked on the cover page of each booklet as follows: "COLLEGE DEGREE". Further, such tests will be packaged and forwarded separately from other tests by the Local Boards.

6. All provisions of reference (a) will apply to officers requesting appointment as described herein, except that, under existing law, officers of the rank of ensign are not eligible for designation as EDO. The provisions of the AlNavs listed as reference (b) which do not conform to this letter or to reference (a) are cancelled. Applications will be submitted in the form and manner prescribed in reference (a) and applicants will be required to appear before a Local Board for interview. Service and physical requirements will be as stated therein. Age requirements are shown in the age column headed "EDO" of Enclosure (A) to reference (a). In addition, officers considering applying in accordance with the foregoing are reminded that they may apply after release to inactive duty or separation from the service and may accept or resign commissions as provided in reference (a).

(s) L. E. DENFELD.
Vice Admiral U.S.N., Chief of Naval Personnel.

Civil Center

DE 09774

Saltwater

Net 3120

Ext 847

88

Ordway 1738

Lo Follette

Day

Ext 626

Capt Shumaker

Comd

2439

mm with

748

Mrs Robert Dunn

Met 1801



AND REFER TO

NAVY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

16 October 1945.

MEMORANDUM

From: Captain Stassen.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Permanent Civilians in the Navy.

1. As directed, I conferred with Mr. McNeil and others in the Navy Department on the subject of permanent civilians in the Navy, and submit my reactions, which admittedly are based on limited information.

2. It appears that the Navy Department is weak in civilians in the middle executive civil service brackets, principally because the civil service ratings are low for Naval positions. This in turn is due to the fact that under the rotation policy the top two executive positions in practically all divisions and subdivisions are always held by officers, and therefore the civilian position is not given a high rating and is not considered by civil service to carry responsibility. The result is that good executives in these middle brackets are not attracted, and do not stay in the Navy Department even if they do start in that department in their early years.

3. It would appear desirable to make some increase in the role of permanent civilians in the Navy Department to strengthen the continuity of administrative policies. To do so will require a balancing between the obvious desirability of maintaining the Navy in command of the Navy Department, of having available shore billets for the officers of the Navy interspersed between their sea duties, and to afford administrative experience for the future command officers, and on the other hand to provide for administrative continuity and efficiency in the increasingly important tasks of the Department in an enlarged modern Navy.

4. I suggest a gradual change on an experimental basis by selecting the portions of a few of the Bureaus in which continuing technical and administrative ability of a civilian nature seems most desirable. In these instances make a special effort to secure higher civil service ratings and to attract able civilians, including possibly some of those who have served as Reserve officers during the war.

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Authority OAO DIRECTIVE	
By DTH	NLE Date 4/4/09

AND REFER TO

NAVY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

16 October 1945.

5. In order to maintain a degree of special military control, to avoid being loaded down from other departments on a strict seniority basis, and as an added safeguard to any question of subversive elements, I recommend a suggestion of Mr. McNeil that the specifications of civil service for middle bracket executive positions in the Navy Department have an added requirement that they must be Reserve officers. This assumes of course that a provision for WAVE Reserves will also be added to the law. The advantages in conversion from peace to war of this requirement are also obvious.

6. To carry through this experiment I suggest that the rotating officers to these particular sections or to a portion of them be brought in on an advisory and consulting basis rather than being placed in charge. This will fix the responsibility on the civilians who are actually administering the sections, will increase their ratings and hence improve the ability that could be obtained for the positions, will lessen the breach in continuity which the rotation policy sometimes results in, while at the same time bringing a Fleet viewpoint into the office in an advisory form. In the event of clash of policy the question could be referred on up to that senior point in the line of administrative supervision at which a Naval officer is in actual administrative control.

7. Unquestionably, some of the Navy's weakness in administrative activities, particularly at the beginning of the war program, was due to the rotation policy of officers in these technical and complicated administrative and professional activities in the Department. The senior officers of the line should adjust the admitted value of rotation to the realities of a modern specialized Navy program. It will involve some concessions each way, and should be on a gradually developing basis.

H.E.S.

AND REFER TO

NAVY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

16 October 1945.

MEMORANDUM

From: Captain Stassen.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Intelligence Organization.

1. As directed, I have considered the question of the postwar Intelligence organization, and have conferred with Commodore Inglis, General Bissell, J. Edgar Hoover, and Alfred McCormack.

2. I recommend the following organization on the basis of my admittedly limited information.

3. As a preliminary to presenting the organization views I emphasize the importance of keeping in mind what the information is that we seek, as there is a vast amount of interesting and even entertaining and important information which Intelligence organizations are prone to seek out but which is not worthy of the attention and effort of this country. It appears to me we should be interested in only the following major phases:


(a) The overall effective military and naval strength of each of the other major countries of the world.

(b) The overall economic strength of the major countries of the world and their economic policies toward us and toward the rest of the world.

(c) All treasonable moves within this country and subversive developments, including particularly their relationship to any other governments, with attention given to espionage and propaganda phases.

(d) Major political trends in other countries, particularly as to their relationship to us or to a change in their relationship to other nations.

4. The intertwining of the information on each of these is obvious. Likewise the necessity of a specialization in some phases of the information and of the very high policy that is involved are obvious.





AND REFER TO

NAVY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

16 October 1945.

5. It is recommended that a Joint Military Intelligence Office be established at once under one roof, with joint subordinate agencies for each divisible function staffed by personnel from each of the armed services as appropriate; with each subdivision under a single operating head, some of one service and some of the other; and with a single operating head of the Joint Military Intelligence Office selected from one of the services and rotated on a five-year basis between the services.

6. Senior to this operating head there should be a Military Intelligence Policy Committee, consisting of the Intelligence Officer of the Navy and of the Army and of the Air Corps. This same Policy Committee plus the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and the Director of the FBI should constitute the General Intelligence Policy Committee. These Committees should be chaired by an officer in the office of the Chief of Staff to the President, who would not have the power of decision on policy, but who would have the responsibility of seeing to it that decisions were reached either by agreement or by reference to higher levels. The Chairman would also supply the Secretary with responsibility for agenda, policy records, and keeping all agencies advised of policy. Policy questions would include delimitation and delegation agreements.

7. The activities of the FBI should be gradually extended to the rest of the world.

8. The Military, Naval, Air, and Legal Attaches should be continued and extended, with the local conference method of operation.

9. There should of course be exchange of information between the operating agencies.

10. The State Department should not develop as a separate Intelligence agency, and neither should there be developed a new super-Intelligence agency. The foregoing changes should take place quietly and in an evolutionary manner, without fanfare or publicity.

11. This set-up in my judgment will give flexibility, efficiency, and the decision of policy on proper levels.

AND REFER TO

NAVY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

16 October 1945.

12. Each of the military services will keep its hand definitely in the picture and with its own contribution of funds be reasonably assured of having its type of Intelligence developed and safeguarded. The State Department with its overall foreign relations policy responsibility will have its proper safeguards and control in that respect. The effective carrying out of the policy from a legal standpoint, particularly as to ramifications and prosecutions within this country will be properly developed under the Department of Justice.

13. The matters of any high-policy decision will come up in an orderly way through the President's Chief of Staff and the Cabinet officials to the President for decision.

14. It appears to me that this is a function in which there is every necessity of pulling the armed services together. The failure to do so would be used as a strong indication of the necessity of unification of the armed services administration as a whole, which I do not consider to be desirable.

H.E.S.

AND REFER TO

CONFIDENTIAL

NAVY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

16 October 1945.



MEMORANDUM

From: Captain Stassen.
To : The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Naval Education.


1. As directed, I have given consideration to the various educational proposals, including the Holloway Plan and the Jacobs-Barker Plan, and present to you herewith my reactions.

2. On the whole I wish to commend the studies and the plans, but wish to present these important modifications. I present them with admittedly limited background and information on which to form conclusions.

3. The selectees for Annapolis, West Point, and for the Air Corps College if established, should be given their first year of basic training after their selection at a new Joint Armed Services School. This will give them that vital association together as they live, study, and play together, early in life. It is my observation that the personal relationship is one of the most important factors for proper coordination of the branches of the service. This initial year of basic subjects could also be studied and taught more economically at a combined college of this kind. Prior to the establishment of such a college the combined selectees could be sent to two or three of the established universities to follow a required curriculum, and could be organized and drilled somewhat in the manner of the ROTC and NROTC units.

4. Annapolis should continue to be the source of the overwhelming percentage of Naval command. This is a point of important difference with the Holloway report. Emphasis should be on keeping it up to date and stimulating its teaching of new developments, rather than on weakening or watering down its traditions and its influence. Its capacity should be somewhat increased by arranging elsewhere for the first year of study as above.

5. Other sources for officers should be primarily for specialists, and the Navy should increase the specialization of its non-command officers in time of peace just as it was forced to do in time of war. Specifically, the communications, electronics, radar, intelligence, legal, logistic, and administrative



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NAVY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



To: The Secretary of the Navy.

16 October 1945.

phases of the enlarged Navy should be to a considerable degree staffed by officers who specialize, who acquire unusual education for their purposes at other colleges and from other sources, and who are assured a certain percentage of chances for future promotion within their fields. This promotion opportunity should of course be not of as high a relative percentage as that of the command group. The future command group of course should continue to be rotated in all types of duties for a broad understanding. But it is not sound to try to make specialists of them in these numerous fields that require real specialization. Likewise, the exceptional officer in a specialized field will occasionally qualify himself generally and rise in the command group.

6. The planning for postgraduate education of the Holloway report looks good, including the participation in joint schools and schools of other services. I would be inclined also to add for a selected group of officers actual duty with other services.

H.E.S.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AND REFER TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NAVY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

15 October 1945.



MEMORANDUM

From: Captain Stassen.
To : The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: The Ammunition Handlers' Mutiny -
Court-Martial Case of ALLEN, Julius J.
and 49 Others.

1. As directed, I have reviewed this case and give the following reactions:


(a) The conviction should be confirmed, and the sentences should be reduced to three years for those with previous records of minor misconduct, and two years for those with previous clear records, with credit for time already served.

(b) While there is voluminous testimony and discussion as to whether the men were clearly ordered to work, understood their orders, etc., etc., the fact that there were 328 originally involved and that in successive stages more and more went to work, and they were continually separated as to those who were willing to proceed to work and handle the ammunition and those who were not, in my judgment, makes it amply clear that they all knew the issue and their decisions were on a basis of adequate knowledge of the situation.

(c) While the evidence is not particularly strong of a concerted move, there is ample evidence to support the conclusion of the Court on this point, and mass fear alone does not appear to be the basis of the refusal. In fact, the mass fear angle is fairly well dissipated after 278 of the original 328 have returned to work.

(d) There was considerable justification for the very severe sentences while a state of active war existed, but there is every reason now in over-all justice to reduce the sentences. The sentences should not be reduced, however, to the extent that would return these men to civilian life earlier than the return of their associates who did proceed to load the ammunition.

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NAVY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



To: The Secretary of the Navy.

15 October 1945.

(e) The case has a lesson in it of the importance of the continuous emphasis of military discipline upon labor battalions if it is intended to have military rules apply.

(f) I do not observe any indication of discrimination. In fact, I believe that a non-colored battalion refusing orders under these circumstances during the war would probably have been dealt with even more severely.

H.E.S.

17 October 1945

Memorandum to: Admiral Benfeld
Admiral Gatch
Captain McFarlane
Captain Stassen ✓

You will note from the attached that the Secretary has approved the recommendation of Captain Stassen with respect to the court martial case of Julius J. ALLEN and 49 others. The Secretary requests that an appropriate endorsement for his signature embodying Captain Stassen's recommendation be prepared.

The Secretary further approves Captain Stassen's additional recommendation that the reduction of their sentences be first communicated to the defendants themselves before it is communicated to any other person outside of the Department.

Respectfully,

Mathias F. Correa

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

15 October 1945.

MEMORANDUM

From: Captain Stassen.
To : The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: The Ammunition Handlers' Mutiny -
Court Martial Case of ALLEN, Julius J.
and 49 Others.

1. As directed, I have reviewed this case and give the following reactions:

(a) The conviction should be confirmed, and the sentences should be reduced to three years for those with previous records of minor misconduct, and two years for those with previous clear records, with credit for time already served.

(b) While there is voluminous testimony and discussion as to whether the men were clearly ordered to work, understood their orders, etc., etc., the fact that there were 328 originally involved and that in successive stages more and more went to work, and they were continually separated as to those who were willing to proceed to work and handle the ammunition and those who were not, in my judgment, makes it amply clear that they all knew the issue and their decisions were on a basis of adequate knowledge of the situation.

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Authority	DOD DIRECTOR
By	DJH
NLE Date	4/4/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

15 October 1945

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(f) I do not observe any indication of discrimination. In fact, I believe that a non-colored battalion refusing orders under these circumstances during the war would probably have been dealt with even more severely.

/s/

H.E.S.

APPROVED:

J.F.

16 October 1945



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