

Lecturers  
Season 1914-1915

(In reverse order)

Major General H. H. Henshaw  
Col. Henry

"Part of the Force in World  
War I"

Honorable John H. Henshaw, D.A.C.

Spanish War in Henshaw

"The Spanish War in Henshaw"

## CALVIN BULLOCK FORUM

ONE WALL STREET

Chairman, Henshaw's Forum in Henshaw

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# Lecturers

## Season 1944-1945

(In reverse order)

MAJOR GENERAL E. R. QUESADA  
U. S. Army

— "Part of Air Power in Winning  
German War"

HONOURABLE JOHN BALFOUR, C.M.G.,  
British Minister in Washington  
(British Minister in Moscow, 1943-45)

— "What About Russia?"

HONORABLE J. A. KRUG  
Chairman, War Production Board

— "Industry's Part in Reconversion"

FIELD MARSHAL SIR HENRY MAITLAND WILSON,  
G.B.E., K.C.B., D.S.O.  
Head of British Joint Staff Mission  
(Formerly Supreme Allied Commander  
in the Mediterranean Theatre)

— "The Internal Security of  
Europe After Victory"

HONOURABLE SIR GIRJA BAJPAI,  
K.B.E., C.I.E.  
Agent General for India

— "The Future of India"

MAJOR C. B. ORMEROD  
Special Relations Officer and  
Assistant to the Controller of the  
British Information Services

— "An Inside Account of the  
San Francisco Conference"

DR. EDWIN W. KEMMERER  
Professor Emeritus of International  
Finance, Princeton University

— "Stabilization Under the  
Bretton Woods Plan"

HONOURABLE HAROLD B. BUTLER, C.B.  
His Britannic Majesty's Minister in  
Washington

— "Britain's Foreign Policy"

BRIGADIER LORD LOVAT, D.S.O.  
Famous Commando Leader

— "Jerry Got Hell"

HIS EXCELLENCY HENRI BONNET  
Ambassador of France

— "France's Present Policy"

BRIGADIER FENIMORE IRWIN, C.B.E.  
Chief Staff Officer, British 14th Army

— "The Burma Campaign"

BRIGADIER GENERAL CARLOS P. ROMULO,  
U.S. Army  
Resident Commissioner of the  
Philippines to the  
United States

— "The Philippine Campaign"

HIS EXCELLENCY CIMON DIAMANTOPOULOS  
Ambassador of Greece

— "Current Situation in Greece"

OFFICIAL PICTURES OF BRITAIN'S GRIM  
BATTLE AGAINST GERMANY'S  
VENGEANCE WEAPON:

— "The Robot Bomb"

HIS EXCELLENCY ALEXANDER LOUDON  
Ambassador of the Netherlands

— "Holland's Extremity"

HONORABLE BASIL O'CONNOR  
Chairman  
American National Red Cross

— "The Red Cross in Action  
in Europe"

HIS EXCELLENCY JAN CIECHANOWSKI  
Ambassador of Poland

— "Poland's Part in the War  
and in the Peace"

MAJOR GEORGE FIELDING ELIOT

— "Fruits of Victory"

HIS EXCELLENCY THE NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR

HONORABLE BASIL O'CONNOR

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS CROWN PRINCE OLAV OF NORWAY

HIS IMPERIAL HIGHNESS THE ARCHDUKE OTTO OF AUSTRIA

HIS EXCELLENCY THE POLISH AMBASSADOR

HIS EXCELLENCY THE PORTUGUESE AMBASSADOR

BRIGADIER GENERAL CARLOS P. ROMULO, *U. S. Army*

BRIGADIER GENERAL THEODORE ROOSEVELT

HIS EXCELLENCY THE AMBASSADOR OF THE UNION OF  
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

HONORABLE LEVERETT SALTONSTALL

HIS EXCELLENCY THE SPANISH AMBASSADOR

ADMIRAL W. H. STANDLEY

GENERAL C. P. SUMMERALL

MAJOR GENERAL T. A. TERRY, *U. S. Army*

HONORABLE WENDELL L. WILLKIE

FIELD MARSHAL SIR HENRY MAITLAND WILSON,  
G.B.E., K.C.B., D.S.O.

REAR ADMIRAL HARRY E. YARNELL

HIS EXCELLENCY THE YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR

## CALVIN BULLOCK FORUM

ONE WALL STREET

This unique Wall Street institution was founded by Mr. Calvin Bullock in 1937. The eminence of its speakers and audiences has given it an international reputation.

A partial list of speakers appears within. Audiences have substantially exceeded 10,000.

Lectures are usually held in mid-week at four o'clock sharp, last thirty minutes, and are followed by a fifteen-minute question period.

Everything said is off the record. This permits unusually intimate addresses and discussions.

Subjects are confined to military or political or economic questions, in short those matters that would profoundly affect the business world.

Attendance is by invitation and by ticket only.

The sad death on June 21, 1944 of the Forum's beloved founder determined its continuance by his associates as a Memorial to him. But his perfect counsel as to choice of speaker, subject, and audience can never be replaced.

Sept. 1, 1945.

## Some Lecturers Since 1937

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HONOURABLE JOHN BALFOUR, C.M.G.

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DR. EDWIN W. KEMMERER

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AMERICAN COUNCIL ON PUBLIC RELATIONS

369 PINE STREET  
SAN FRANCISCO 4, CALIFORNIA

September 5,  
1945

Commander Harold Stassen, U.S.N.  
State Capitol  
St. Paul, Minnesota

Dear Commander Stassen:

Our Council has conducted a poll among our members to determine the individual in America who, they think, has contributed most educationally and scientifically to public relations during the past year. The results of this national poll, which has recently closed, are as follows: Dr. Raymond W. Miller, Washington, D.C., was first; Eric Johnston of the United States Chamber of Commerce was second; Edward Stettinius, United Nations representative, was third; you were fourth; and Paul Garrett of General Motors Corporation was fifth.

We are pleased to pass this information on to you, as we consider it a splendid tribute to the work you have done at the United Nations Conference.

Enclosed is an invitation to be present at the dinner here where Dr. Miller will receive the award from our Council. All of us officially connected with the Council would feel very pleased and proud if you could attend.

Sincerely yours,

*Rex F. Harlow*

President

Rex F. Harlow/dam

Enc.



The Officers and Trustees  
of the  
American Council on Public Relations  
cordially invite you to attend a banquet in the  
Italian Room of Hotel St. Francis,  
San Francisco,

Thursday evening, September 20th, at 6:30 P.M.,  
at which Dr. Raymond W. Miller of Washington, D. C.,  
selected by a national ballot of Council members, will  
receive the Council's 1945 Award for the person in America  
who has contributed the most educationally and  
scientifically to public relations during  
the past year.

R. S. V. P.

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S. A. C. land. Minn.  
Sept. 11th 45

Com. H. E. Stassen U. S. N. R.  
Staff Commander, 3rd Fleet.  
% Fleet P. O. San Francisco Cal  
Dear Mr Stassen,

On Oct 4th 1943 our son Major Donald A. Appert was reported missing in action on a bombing mission over Germany. You know him personally because he campaigned with you in your first successful run for Gov of Minn. About December 1st 1943 a short wave radio message was intercepted by Mr. Archie S. Narotsky 628 East Ridge street. Ishpeming Mich. "This is Capt Don Appert I have a wife living in Texas and a mother living at St Cloud Minn. please notify them that I am well and O.K."

We were unable to understand why such a message should come out of Tokyo Japan when Don's plane was reported to have been shot down in the north sea off the coast of Holland. It was considered propaganda and the War Dept at Washington claimed no reception of such a message. Recently I learn thru service men and personal that there were Jap subs operating in the North Sea in 1943 bringing to and taking supplies from Germany. I am under the impression that one of these subs could have picked Don and his companion off a life raft and taken them to Japan. The parents of T. Sergeant Geo W Rooney 53 School St. Glen Cove New York (Don's radio operator) received a similar short wave radio message from Tokyo.

I don't think these messages were propaganda. Don was promoted from Capt to Major during the last week of Sept as released by public relations. And all his newspaper publicity was referred to as Major Don A. Appert. He did not have his major insignia at the he was reported missing. He was wearing his Captain stripes - consequently



The Japs would <sup>not</sup> allow him to make a broadcasting recording as Major. Am informed by the Short Wave Radio expert Raymond Reed of Hopkins Minn that the Jap message were all recordings.

Maybe it would be good reasoning to demand these or this recording from the Jap Radio broadcasting system. And it could be that they are holding many more flyers from the European theatre than they would like to admit. No doubt there are some secret prison camps that the U.S. officials have been unable to contact. I was able to thru Cong. Harold Knutson to get ADs Case to the Int. Red Cross but I don't think they can give it the personal attention that you can by virtue of your position and the very good job you are doing.

I have a feeling AD is alive someplace. AD was a kid that would be quite able to get out of a "tough" spot - a professional swimmer - a good athlete and a pretty fair news paper man.

I sure would be pleased to have him you and him meet and very soon. I sincerely hope I'm not imposing on you too much with an assignment like this but I assure you we will always be heartfully grateful for your help and past accomplishments.

Thanking you so very kindly in advance for anything you may accomplish I remain.


Very Sincerely Yours.

Albert A. Appert.  
1010 - 8th Ave No  
St. Cloud Minn.

# Stoughton Vocational School

G. W. Schefelker, *Director*  
Phones 570-887

Stoughton - Wisconsin



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September 12, 1945

The Honorable H. E. Stassen  
State Capitol Building  
Minneapolis, Minnesota

Dear Sir:

During the past several years the public forum, which has been sponsored and developed in the city of Stoughton, has come to be regarded as one of the outstanding events of the year by the general public of our community. This year we are again making an effort to present to our community the best program that can be provided.

Our local forum committee, which is now endeavoring to complete arrangements for a series of programs, desires very much to include you in its list of guest speakers. Because of your recent travels abroad in countries in which the people of our community are especially interested, we can think of no other speaker in whom they would have a greater interest or a desire to hear.

The speakers that have been selected for this year's forum thus far are:

Hulda Frisk Gran  
Robert Kazmayer  
Henry M. Hodges  
Dr. Robert Hartman  
Dr. Diosdado M. Yap

January 20  
January 27  
February 3  
February 10  
February 24

Is it possible for you to accept our invitation to appear as guest speaker on our program on Sunday afternoon, March 3? If so, kindly advise us as to the subject upon which you would like to speak, and also the fee that would be expected.

Very respectfully,

G. W. Schefelker  
Director

GWS:vln

MINNEAPOLIS  
STAR JOURNAL AND TRIBUNE

JOHN COWLES  
PRESIDENT

September 15  
1945

Commander Harold E. Stassen  
USNR  
Staff Commander, 3rd Fleet  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California

Dear Harold:

As you may have heard, I was out in the Pacific for three weeks in August visiting the navy and army installations. I had hoped very much to see you, but of course you were with Halsey's task force at that time.

Literally dozens of different men in the navy from admirals down to gobs talked to me about you. Without a single exception, everyone said that you had done a superb job in the navy.

Although I am well aware of your previous decision not to run against Shipstead for the senate in 1946, I wonder whether, since the Japanese war was won possibly six or eight months sooner than most people anticipated, and it is a long time until 1948, it wouldn't conceivably be well for you to review that original decision. In no sense am I trying to urge you to run. I also fully realize that a freshman senator is in a difficult position. On the one hand he has to commit himself on all sorts of troublesome minor issues, and he cannot play too prominent a part in some of the senate's activities or he will alienate the older senators who think a newcomer should lie low. I also realize that you are much more interested in the administrative side of public office than you are in the legislative side. You did such an outstandingly superb job at San Francisco, however, that conceivably you might have developed a liking there for conciliating and mediating conflicting viewpoints and pushing for affirmative agreement on legislative acts which you favor.

I believe that you could beat Shipstead. I am far from sure that Walter Judd can, although I am a great admirer of Judd and think that aside from you and possibly Ed Thye, Judd would probably make the best run ~~run~~ against Shipstead in the Republican primary of any of the possibilities.

If you were elected to the senate, I believe that you could strengthen your hold on the Republican organization in the state and probably bring about more unity within the party. The Republicans are, as you know, badly split now. If Shipstead should beat Judd, you might find yourself with a badly divided party organization here at home when 1948 rolls around.

Again let me emphasize that I have no desire to try to persuade you to make the senatorial race if you don't want to do that or if in your judgment it is unwise. I simply wanted to suggest that possibly you should take another look at the whole picture in the light of the present situation before finally reaching any conclusion.

Attached is a pamphlet of reprints of some articles I wrote for the Star-Journal following my return from the Pacific. Even if you don't have time to glance at any of the others, I would appreciate your reading the last chapter in the pamphlet, the one urging consolidation of the war department and navy department into a single unified Department of National



September 15  
1945

Defense. I regard that as of top importance. I realize the opposition of most of the admirals and have discussed the thing with many of them. I don't believe it is possible for us to have a modern, effective system of national defense without combining the services. If you have the time, I would be interested in your personal slant on this subject.


With congratulations on the wonderful war record you have made, and with warm personal regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

  
John Cowles

# Report from the Pacific

—By JOHN COWLES



Reprinted From the  
MINNEAPOLIS STAR-JOURNAL  
and the  
DES MOINES REGISTER and TRIBUNE



JUST prior to the Japanese surrender, John Cowles visited American army and navy forces and installations in the Pacific theater, at the invitation of the Secretaries of Navy and War.

He visited Guam, Saipan, Tinian, Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, etc., and was on Okinawa when the first Japanese overtures that resulted in surrender were received.

## Report From the Pacific

By John Cowles

### I

It is almost impossible for anyone who has not actually crossed the Pacific ocean to comprehend the enormous area it covers, or to appreciate how widely separated are many of the islands which our American forces have had to capture on their way to Tokyo. But those distances must be got into one's mind before one can understand the problems American military, naval and air forces faced in the Pacific.

Guam, our island base where for some months Fleet Adm. Nimitz has had his headquarters, is 4,000 land miles west of Pearl Harbor. Pearl Harbor itself is 2,400 miles from San Francisco. For comparison, to realize what such distances mean, one should remember that it is only 2,600 miles from New York to San Francisco.

In recent months the actual ground fighting with the Jap forces has been in the Philippines, 1,500 miles southwest of Guam, and on Okinawa, which is almost that far northwest of Guam, and which is 1,000 miles from Manila.

Most of these Pacific islands, moreover, have not had harbors deep enough to handle ocean-going ships. Manila is an exception, but there 400 Jap craft of all kinds were sunk by our fleet and air force and they seriously obstructed our use of Manila's harbor and dock facilities.

Our whole war supply problem in the Pacific consequently was immeasurably more difficult and complicated than it was in Europe.

We have had to dredge and deepen harbors and build breakwaters and docks on many Pacific islands, to handle the landing of our vast stores of supplies and equipment.

This was imperative so that we could give our men that superiority in armaments and equipment which was essential in order to blast the Japs, with their artillery

and machine guns hidden in the hillside caves, from their prepared positions.

To clear the jungles and cut down the hills so that airstrips for our planes could be constructed, incredibly large amounts of road building and grading machinery were necessary. Far more bulldozers have probably been used on half a dozen relatively tiny Pacific islands than were employed in building the Alaskan highway.

Our victory in this war should mean ample glory for every branch of our services. When the laurel wreaths are awarded, the construction battalions—both navy Seabees and army engineers—should certainly not be neglected.

Scores of thousands of construction troops labored 12 or 16 hours a day, seven days a week, frequently under direct Jap air bombing or artillery fire. They improved the harbors, and constructed the air strips and the gasoline pipe lines necessary to fuel our planes, built the roads essential for hauling bombs to the airfields, and all the other installations necessary for pressing the assault against the Japs.

Even while the first waves of our combat troops were attacking

the hills and ridges in which the Japs were fortified with artillery and machine guns, our supply forces were also landing and beginning their jobs of clearance and construction.

The recognition and praise of a grateful nation should be given without stint to our Seabees and army engineers as well as to the infantry and marines, the airmen and the sailors, whose valor has naturally been more widely publicized.

**We have fought and won a war a third of the way around the**

**world away from us. We have had to carve airfields out of mountains and jungles. Without the extraordinary ingenuity, resourcefulness and courage of our engineer troops, it couldn't have been done.**

It will be a difficult job for anybody to try to persuade those boys who have seen the almost impossible achieved under fire in the Pacific that we can't find ways in peacetime to do such things as clear the slums, eliminate conditions of squalor, and provide decent housing here at home.

## II

The islands in the Pacific where the final battles against the Japs were fought, and from which our planes bombed Japan, are mostly of volcanic origin.

Some, such as those in the Marshall group, are atolls or coral reefs, surrounding a volcanic mountain which long ago sank below the ocean's surface.

Other islands, like Guam, are tops of volcanic peaks, with coral reefs off the shore, so landings by even small craft are difficult.

Most of these islands are located in the typhoon belt, where storms of such terrific intensity as to be able literally to blow warships apart are not uncommon.

Persons who have seen Somerset Maugham's play "Rain" on the stage or in the movies will have some appreciation of how wet these islands can be. While some have moderate temperatures, the heat on others is frequently so intense and the humidity so high that after a bath it is impossible to get dry.

**Sometimes one sleeps at night**

**in pools of sweat. Clothes mildew. Leather moulds.**

Mr. Maugham's play, moreover, omits a new development: dust. It is difficult to describe how dusty those islands can be in intervals between cloudbursts.

Due to our incessant, round-the-clock construction of air strips and roads on an island like Okinawa, the dust clouds are so dense five minutes after a heavy rainstorm that even though the sun is shining brightly frequently trucks and jeeps have to use their headlights.

**Then the sudden downpour brings wet dust, blobs of mud that coat windshields and make truck and jeep driving something like flying blind with no instruments.**

Add the factor of rough, hilly roads just being constructed, with hairpin curves around steep cliffs, roads being built to air strips being leveled on what a few days before were jungle hilltops, and one can appreciate why traffic accidents are not uncommon on such islands as Okinawa.

In capturing such islands, one must realize our troops had the great disadvantage of going up against not only tough Japanese soldiers who, according to experts, fight more desperately and savagely than any troops known in military history, but also against natural fortifications that greatly aided the defense.

Okinawa, for example, is a succession of jungle-covered ridges, a series of steep hills sometimes cliff-like in the sharpness of their rise. The strata of rock are broken every few rods by fissures and caves in which the Japs installed artillery and machine gun nests.

Even violent, sustained naval bombardment and concentrated air raids against such enemy positions could do no great damage except as direct hits were scored in the actual cave openings, sometimes only a foot or two or three wide at the surface.

A friend of mine who commanded a marine platoon on three invasions (he was the only officer in his battalion not killed or wounded in one day's fighting) showed me a Jap position that had held up his outfit for almost a day with heavy losses. He said that occasionally American artillery would make a direct hit in the mouth of the cave where a Jap machine gun was located and silence it. Thereupon the marines would immediately advance, only to have the Jap machine gun resume fire and mow down the attackers.

Eventually the cave was captured, and it was discovered that after a narrow passage some 40 feet in length there was a large room, impregnable because buttressed in every direction by 40 or more feet of rock.

**In it were the remains of 35 Jap soldiers and one Jap officer.**

Apparently two Japs manned the pillbox at the cave's mouth while the remaining ones waited

comfortably in the inner room. Whenever the Nips' machine gun ceased firing because of a direct American hit, the Jap officer would presumably send two more men and a fresh machine gun to the cave's mouth to resume shooting. It required some 18 direct hits before the pillbox and its 36 defenders were eliminated.

\* \* \*

In invading most of the central Pacific islands, our forces faced another serious military disadvantage. Frequently these islands had only one or two beaches where a landing was even potentially possible. Cliffs or almost impassable reefs prevented the possibility of landings elsewhere.

**Consequently the Japs could know with certainty at what point or points the American forces would land, and would install their artillery and machine gun nests to sweep those areas.**

On large land masses like the Philippine Islands or New Guinea, landings could be made at many different points. Consequently the Japs, not knowing where we would hit, could not concentrate their defenses.

As a result, initial landings could be made with far fewer or no casualties. Once our forces were ashore, the greater strategic and tactical mobility that the larger land masses provided enabled our men to destroy the enemy with relatively lighter casualties than was the case on some of the smaller islands.

Considerable discussion has taken place here at home as to the relative merits and abilities of the top army and navy commands in amphibious landings. The fact that some invasions of relatively small islands resulted in heavier casualties than did other invasions of much larger areas, is in itself meaningless as a standard for judging the relative military abilities of the commanders.



### III

Wholly apart from the various Jap-held islands which the American forces in the Pacific by-passed on the long road back to Tokyo, there were many Japanese troops hiding in jungles and caves on most of the islands that had been successfully invaded and occupied by the Americans and announced as "secure."

Saipan, for example, one of the Marianas group from which our B29s bombed Japan, was declared "secure" almost a year ago. It contains 71 square miles. At that time, it was believed that there were from 1,000 to 2,000 Jap troops still loose on the island. Since Saipan was declared "secure," more than 8,000 Jap soldiers have been killed there, more than 800 captured, and on the day Tokyo surrendered, it was estimated there were still from 1,000 to 2,000 Japs hiding in jungles or caves.

On various other relatively small islands invaded and occupied by our forces, the number of Jap troops killed or captured subsequent to the date that the island was declared "secure" has run from five to ten times the number estimated alive at the time organized resistance was declared at an end.

\* \* \*

Although the Japs hiding on such islands frequently sniped at American troops and occasionally shot at jeep passengers whom they judged to be high ranking officers, they made few if any organized offensive attacks.

Incredible as it may sound, I was told by commanders on several islands that no Japs had tried to cut our gasoline pipe lines although they were easily accessible, running usually on the surface of the ground from the harbor through the jungle to our various air strips.

It would have been impossible to place enough guards along the gasoline pipe lines completely to protect them. One island commander told me that instead of doing a half way job of guarding the pipe lines, he figured it was better psychology not to guard them at all, to avoid suggesting to the Japs the idea of sabotaging them.

Small painted signs warned truck drivers every few hundred yards of the existence of a gas pipe line so that they would not accidentally run over it and damage it, and cautioned troops not to throw lighted cigaret butts near the pipe line where leaking gasoline fumes might become ignited.

One night the Japs on Saipan moved all of these warning signs several hundred yards away from the place where the pipe line actually ran, presumably to confuse the Americans as to its location, but they made no effort to damage the pipe line itself.

\* \* \*

On Okinawa I visited a prison camp which contained some 6,700 Japanese troops, some 800 of them officers. Through a Nisei United States army interpreter, I talked with a number of them, both officers and enlisted men.

They looked husky and well fed, although uniformly small in stature. Some of the officers had lost neither their arrogance nor their belief in their empire's destiny, but the bulk of them seemed completely docile.

One well-educated Japanese officer who had been a cadet in the government military academy, admitted the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor without a declaration of war had violated international custom and had been "a mistake." When he was asked if he expected to go back to Japan

after the war, his eyes grew cold and his expression hard. He said, "It is my duty to return and help rebuild Japan into a powerful nation."

Although the Japs were wearing prisoner of war garb, many of them still had their original shoes, which are designed with the great toe separated from the four smaller toes. This was the "cleft hoof" which we saw on many still unburied Jap corpses both on Okinawa and Corregidor.

These Jap shoes somewhat re-

semble an Indian moccasin, except that the big toe is in a separate compartment. Presumably it was designed so that the Japanese troops could move more quietly when trying to infiltrate American lines or slip up on American soldiers.

On Guam, Saipan, Tinian, Okinawa and the Philippines additional Jap prisoners were being brought in almost daily while I was there, prior to the Mikado's surrender. I saw 78 Jap prisoners being admitted at one time on Okinawa.

### IV

To persuade the Jap soldiers who were still hiding out on Pacific islands occupied by American forces to surrender, various tactics were used.

Airplanes with loudspeakers were flown over the areas where Japs were believed to be hiding and small boats with loudspeakers cruised close to shore where Japs were believed to be in caves. Good treatment and good food was promised those who complied. Frequently Nisei or Jap prisoners of war were sent out into the jungle to try to locate Japs, talk with them and attempt to convince them to become captives.

Never was the Japanese equivalent for the word "surrender" employed. Instead the Japs were told "Japan has already lost the war. Join us, come over to our side. You will be given plenty to eat, and once peace comes you can do more good by helping your people than by starving to death here."

Always the prisoners of war sent out on these missions returned, except occasionally when they were apparently killed by still de-

fiant Jap officers who objected to their trying to persuade their countrymen to give themselves up.

On one occasion, a prisoner of war returned from his assignment with word that he had located a Jap major who did not believe the stories about how good the prison camp food was and how decently he would be treated if he surrendered. He reported that the Jap major was willing to come to the prison camp and see for himself what the conditions were, if the American commanding officer would give him his word that he could return to the jungle if he concluded he wished to do that.

This commitment was made, and the next morning the Jap major was brought into the prison camp. He lived there from day to day, without making his decision, because he said he suspected that the food and treatment were particularly favorable at first in order to impress him, and he wanted to be sure that the good fare would continue.

Finally on the fifth day he told the camp commandant that he

Manila. American troops wanting to send souvenirs from the Philippines to their wives, mothers and girl friends at home, frequently pay \$15 for a handkerchief that would normally sell for 25c, or pay \$50 for a locally woven straw hat that would have sold prewar for a dollar.

\* \* \*  
In the Marianas where a marine division was undergoing final training for the invasion of Japan, I saw my first "war dog platoon." Some thirty GI's spent their entire time training these war dogs to obey various commands and signals.

In addition to being taught to spring at an enemy, crush his right arm in their teeth and cling to it, particular training was given the dogs in locating mines hidden in the ground. The dogs have an uncanny ability at sniffing out spots where anything had been buried. Once they had found such a place they would indicate it to their trainers and could not be persuaded to walk over it. Each soldier had about three dogs to handle. Thirty minutes in the forenoon and thirty minutes in the afternoon was devoted to each one's training, separately.

## VI

The Philippine islands are scheduled by act of the United States congress to be given their complete independence by July 4, 1946, but the end of the Pacific war finds them ill-prepared for independence.

More than three years of Jap occupation, followed by terrific war damage in recent months as the islands were successively liberated, have left the Philippines in a desperate condition.

\* \* \*  
Prewar Manila, a modern metropolis of 750,000 population, was considered one of the world's most beautiful cities. Today most of Manila's downtown buildings are rubble, destroyed by air bombing and naval and artillery shelling which Gen. MacArthur's forces found it necessary to use in order to blast the tenacious Jap army out of one square block after another.

The extent of Manila's destruction is such that plans are currently being considered to rebuild the business district in a com-

pletely new location, miles distant from its prewar site.

Throughout the Philippine islands the story is the same. Either the retreating Japs deliberately demolished buildings and bridges, power plants and water works, or they were necessarily destroyed by attacking Americans.

The 18,000,000 Filipinos had a prewar standard of living probably higher than any other Asiatic people. Now most of their cities and towns are in ruins, their transportation and communications systems are wrecked, their utilities, factories, churches and schools are largely destroyed.

\* \* \*  
Three-fourths or more of the domesticated water buffalo, called carabao, which served as beasts of burden and which Filipino farmers used to cultivate their rice paddies, were killed and eaten by the Jap army of occupation.

Most of the small ships, which plied between the hundred different Philippine islands, have been sunk. Most local banks and in-

surance companies are insolvent. Sources of tax revenue have dried up.

**Billions of dollars will be needed to rebuild the economy of the Philippines. Universally it is assumed the United States will have to foot the bill.**

Desire for complete independence from the United States is stronger than ever among the Filipino masses. No candidate for public office would have a chance for election unless he voiced this universal demand.

Yet every well-informed, responsible Filipino will privately say the Philippines can not prosper as an independent nation without large scale, continuing assistance from the United States.

This applies not just to matters of national defense, but to the whole economy. Agreements already have been made to give the United States perpetual naval and air bases on the islands. That we will, of course, protect the Philippine islands from foreign aggression is taken for granted by Americans and Filipinos alike.

Continuing American economic aid in the future, in addition to restoration of war damage, appears to informed Filipinos to be vital if, under independence, their nation is to have the overall standard of living, the good schools, and the effective sanitary and medical controls which existed in prewar decades of American control.

During the period of Jap invasion and occupation, the Filipinos proved their loyalty to the United States. Almost alone among colonial or subject peoples in Asia, they demonstrated their faith in and affection for the nation that had governed them.

Their confidence that the United States not only will militarily

guarantee their future independence as a nation and provide billions of dollars necessary to repair their devastated island economy, but then will also remove tariff barriers so Philippine sugar, Philippine coconut and other vegetable oils, and Philippine cigars, can be permanently imported duty free into the United States while competing nations pay tariffs, appears somewhat naive. Like appealing children, the Filipinos assume they can both have their cake and eat it, enjoying the advantages of independence without assuming its burdens.

For one who does not believe in imperialism, for one who deeply sympathizes with the aspirations of the Filipinos and all other colonial peoples for their complete independence, the facts are unpleasant. The truth is however Filipinos are not now prepared, either economically or psychologically, for early and complete independence, much as they want it.

**If they continue to insist they desire their independence next year, of course we should live up to our 10-year-old pledge and give it to them.**

But, following the election late this autumn, possibly the successful Filipino presidential candidate may send a mission to Washington to suggest postponement or modification of complete independence until Philippine economy has been restored and the nation is better prepared to carry the burdens of full sovereignty.

Filipinos are a gallant, high-spirited, likeable people. We owe them much for the wartime loyalty they have shown us. But the problem of the Philippines will not be solved simply by our giving them their independence next summer and casting them adrift in the world.



## VII

While every American favors our holding permanently such Pacific naval and air bases as are necessary to provide security, some proposals which are being advanced are utterly fantastic in their extravagance and imperialism.

No one needs fear that the navy will not ask for enough, or more than enough, in the way of postwar bases in the Pacific. Probably the navy will request substantially more than it privately thinks it needs, in the expectation that congress will not appropriate all the funds that it initially solicits.

Yet the house naval affairs subcommittee issued a report to congress Aug. 18 advocating a program of bases in the Pacific that goes so far beyond anything which responsible navy spokesmen have asked as to constitute imperialism or militarism of the most unenlightened type.

This congressional subcommittee demanded the United States claim "full title" to every Pacific island where American bases are now temporarily located, even though many of them are owned by Australia, New Zealand and others of our Allies.

The congressmen listed many islands throughout the entire Pacific which they said we "must" control, whether or not our Allies who own them wish to transfer them to us, and on which we "must" develop and maintain bases.

During August I discussed the question of postwar bases with many admirals throughout the Pacific. Although several advocated programs that seemed excessively large to me, none even suggested that the United States needed a single base of its own below the equator in either the central or

western Pacific. Yet the congressional subcommittee insists we must acquire and develop half a dozen naval bases there. This would be utterly unjustified by any conceivable national defense need.

One of America's ablest and most intelligent sea warriors is Adm. Raymond A. Spruance, commander of the famed United States Fifth fleet, probably the individual upon whom Fleet Adm. Nimitz has most depended throughout the war. If Adm. Nimitz had been called to Washington to take Adm. King's job as chief of staff of the entire navy, a position Nimitz would have been thoroughly qualified to fill, presumably Spruance would have succeeded Nimitz as top commander in the Pacific.

Although Adm. Spruance so dislikes personal publicity that he had only one press conference during the entire war, a week after the issuance of the congressional report he held a press conference and told reporters he thought it neither necessary nor advisable for the United States to control any islands in the Pacific except the Jap-mandated Marshalls and Carolines and Marianas, plus those we already have.

Not only did Adm. Spruance indicate that he saw no need for American bases far below the equator, but he suggested Okinawa be held as a joint United Nations base. Okinawa was one of the islands that the congressional committee report insisted we hold.

As one who has recently covered some 20,000 miles of the Pacific, I am convinced the American people have no comprehension of the colossal sums of money being spent in the Pacific for permanent,

as contrasted with wartime, naval and air installations. Wholly apart from the manpower — navy seabees and army engineers—being employed in constructing these permanent bases, we are spending hundreds of millions of dollars for material and equipment for their postwar use.

Congress, instead of going even further than our navy and army leaders in asking greater expenditures in the Pacific, might better devote its energies to scrutinizing the current program to see whether substantial savings in it could not wisely be made. Even our present projects were undertaken long before the effects of the atomic bomb and other new weapons were known. Possibly hundreds of millions, even billions, of dollars that will otherwise prove utter waste could even now be saved if our construction program in the Pacific were carefully reviewed.

The atomic bomb and various new inventions which after V-E Day we discovered the Germans were developing, have wrought such a revolution in warfare that all military conceptions based on conditions existing even a few months ago are now obsolete.

Probably not one person in a thousand yet comprehends the im-

plications of the development of the atomic bomb and the rocket or appreciates the startling progress that has been secretly made in the whole field of electronics. There is a real danger we may be lulled into false security by the spending of billions in ways that would have helped speed the winning of this war, had we acted five years sooner, but which might prove worthless for a future war.

**If another war comes—which God forbid—it probably will be possible to send rocket missiles carrying atomic bombs half way around the world, and to direct them accurately by radar against a specific target.**

Gen. H. H. Arnold, head of the army air force, has gone so far as to suggest that this may be the last war in which any human will pilot an airplane.

Island bases in the Pacific might be valueless if a new war were to come a decade or a generation from now.

For a congressional committee at this time even to suggest that we seize additional bases from our Allies and spend billions of dollars more than even the most extravagant navy program calls for to fortify the Pacific, is not just imperialism or militarism — it is sheer insanity.

## VIII

Unification of the war and navy departments into a single department of national defense is probably the most important and desirable piece of legislation that the present congress could enact.

We cannot have maximum national military effectiveness and a modern, efficient system of defense with a separate war and a

separate navy department, as is the case today.

Several hundred thousand more American men were in uniform in this war because of the duplication resulting from the existence of the two distinct departments than would have been necessary had we had one unified set-up.

Billions of dollars of taxpayers'



money were unnecessarily spent because of the waste inevitably produced by this lack of unification.

Undoubtedly, although it is unprovable, more American boys gave their lives to win the war than would have been the case had the army and navy been unified ten years ago.

The men in every branch of the service showed equal valor in this war. In the victory that our forces won, there is ample glory for all. But the prevailing civilian impression that our American army, navy and air force operations were really unified is utterly false. Some — not all — of the various services were co-ordinated, in varying degrees, in different areas. Victory would have come sooner and our armed might would have been more effective had we had a completely unified military set-up.

Our victory would have been less costly in human terms, in dollars and in time if we had not had the duplication, waste and service rivalries that resulted inevitably from the existence of the two separate governmental departments.

The procurement services of the war department and navy department in effect competed against each other in the purchase, storage and transportation of weapons, supplies and equipment.

Service rivalries between the war and navy departments produced duplicating air fields, hospitals, supply depots, and even officers' clubs in many parts of the world.

Both the army (ATC) and the navy (NATS) operate an airline service across the Pacific. Even on a remote Pacific island only large enough for a single air strip, where planes land to refuel, the army and navy each maintains its own exclusive personnel to put

gasoline into its planes. The army takes it for granted that only soldiers should put gasoline into army planes and the navy takes it for granted that only sailors should put gasoline into navy planes, so we have the double set-up, the double personnel.

This relatively trivial example is simply symbolic. It could be multiplied a hundred fold by duplicate army and navy headquarters and staffs with all their supporting service troops, duplicate intelligence services, duplicate supply depots, duplicate facilities and installations throughout the globe.

Even when the command is unified at the top, with one general or one admiral in supreme command of both army and navy forces in a particular theater of war, the duplication and overlapping occur on each descending layer of army and navy command.

**Such duplication is inevitable, inescapable, under the chain of authority that necessarily exists with separate war and navy departments at Washington.**

Unification of the army and navy into one department of national defense does not mean making either of the two traditional services subordinate to the other. Scientific progress may inexorably reduce the relative importance of one arm or the other, or both the traditional services, as new discoveries are made.

Today we have "total war." It is an indivisible mixture not only of land and sea and air fighting, but of construction and logistics, of industrial production and scientific research.

The argument that the army's operations and the navy's operations are so dissimilar that the two services need completely separate governmental departments simply will not withstand logical analysis. Every type of military

service requires specialization. An excellent submarine officer might know nothing about handling fighter planes on an aircraft carrier, or clearing Manila harbor of the four hundred sunken ships that obstructed navigation there. An excellent army infantry officer, superb in leading combat troops in a Pacific jungle, might know nothing about the intricacies of radar operation in a B-29, or of ways of deciphering the enemy's code.

Should the atomic bomb and ocean spanning rockets be developed and controlled by the army or by the navy?

The answer is inescapable: they should be developed and controlled by one unified department of national defense. The hundreds of millions of dollars a year that would be saved by eliminating the duplications that are unavoidable in our present double headed set-up would provide funds for more research work on new weapons than we have trained scientists available to handle.

**Our traditional system of separate war and navy departments is not only extremely wasteful, but it also breeds harmful service rivalries and jealousies.**

Back in 1942, the army discovered after actual battle experience in the South Pacific that the marine corps' shoe was superior to the army infantry shoe. Consequently, the army instructed its shoe manufacturers to make future army shoes identical with the shoes being worn by the marines. When the marine corps

learned of this, its shoe manufacturers were told that they must quickly find some way to change the looks of the marine shoe, as the marines did not want their shoe to resemble that worn by army infantrymen. At that very time the marines and infantry were gallantly fighting side by side on Pacific atolls, yet service rivalries at the top were such that the idea of marines and infantry wearing identical shoes was considered deplorable.

Actually all uniforms, except clothing designed for some specific operational function, should be identical throughout all branches of our service. Military titles for commissioned officers should be identical. Pay should be the same in all services for men of the same rank performing tasks of comparable danger or difficulty. Morale or esprit de corps could be safeguarded through having insignia indicating the specialized type of service in which the individual was engaged worn on the collar.

Only by eliminating all the outworn distinctions and petty jealousies and rivalries between the different services can we have unification of our system of national defense. With the discovery of the atomic bomb and the rocket, and with amazing developments in electronics, war is being revolutionized.

Our national defense system needs to be revolutionized, too. The first step in achieving it is to consolidate the war and navy departments.

OC  
COPY

File  
Sept. 15, 1945

Dear Harold,

You got to Tokyo sooner than expected, for which all of us are thankful. I hope it also means you'll be back sooner also.

Betty and I got back home for three weeks this summer and did a little, not too much, snooping and checking on the GOP pix, particularly with reference to the senior senator.

No question but that the Dem-F-L party is considerably stronger, but is handicapped by the Benson anchor around its neck and a great dearth of good candidate material, which latter seems also to afflict the GOP.

Ed Thye is strong as ever and will have no trouble, but who will follow him is wide open. Ed himself likes JO Christianson, whom I don't know but about whom I have some misgivings as a candidate. However, as you know, Ed will run for governor in 1946, and that's one problem that can be postponed.

There are rumors Schmahl will not run, but my hunch is he Burnquist and Mike will all be there when filings close. Likewise, in spite of rumors and buildup, Staff King will file for re-election, and make his try if any for gov or senator in 1948. Personally, I'd like to see a slate of returned veterans in the GOP primary, against Holm, Schmahl, Burnquist and a few of the Congressmen. Unless something is done to show them the GOP offers them some chance, they'll drift into the opposition.

Which brings me to Shipstead. His vote against the charter has made him stick out like a sore thumb and in my opinion makes it imperative that you do something about defeating him. Shipstead's renomination, whether he were defeated in the final or not (I think

he would lose to a fair DFL candidate in the final) would be interpreted nationally as a serious blow to your support in your home state. It would hurt particularly among GOP internationalists, to whom we must look for your spearhead support in 1948.

As you know, I have always felt that if possible you yourself should take on Shipstead. Reasons: you are surest to beat him, you would be in a far better position for 48 in the Senate than in private life, the national spotlight on a Shipstead-Stassen contest would be good, the Senate being a disadvantage is wrong-- tremendously important issues will be decided in Congress in the next three years, which in turn will be the issues of the 48 campaign. Better to be in the thick of the fight than on the outside.

Hence, if you are likely to get out of the Navy by January, I think you should take on Shipstead, from all angles. If not, you should at least be in the campaign to defeat him, with Judd as the only candidate in sight that I can see. I also want to get into that scrap, hence all this unsolicited advice. If Judd is to run, he ~~is~~ and his friends should get going immediately. I don't want to until I'm sure there is no possibility of your running.

Incidentally, it is my definite impression that Shipstead is a political shell and won't be too tough, though I wouldn't tell Judd that. I've talked to too many who have always supported him and not are against him. His main support is some of the MNpls GOP.

As ever,





# SAINT PAUL

SATURDAY NIGHT  
RALLIES  
IN STEM HALL

# Youth for Christ

MAILING ADDRESS, 353 ROBERT STREET  
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September 19, 1945

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Commander Harold E. Stassen, U.S.N.R.  
3rd Fleet, C/O Fleet P.O.  
San Francisco, California

Dear Mr. Stassen:

Please permit me to introduce myself to you as the pastor of your sister church in St. Paul, the Dayton's Bluff Baptist Church. We did meet once before in the town of Racine, Wisconsin, at a Sunday afternoon mass meeting where you served as speaker.

Although you have been away from home for a long time, perhaps you have heard of the Youth for Christ movement. It has mushroomed into an international organization and is spreading like prairie fire. Our sole purpose is to evangelize and seek the consecration of youth. Over 500 rallies are in existence with approximately 75 in Minnesota and nearby states. The rallies are held in cooperation with evangelical Christian bodies, usually on Saturday evenings, with the finest of Christian talent and the largest auditoriums available. Chicago drew 70,000 in Soldier Field for its anniversary rally.

The regular St. Paul rally is held every other Saturday, beginning October 6th, in the Theatre section of the Auditorium. Our anniversary date comes early in the new year and we plan a special observance on February 2nd in the Arena with 13,000 seats.

With Christian people everywhere enthused about Youth for Christ, and likewise enthused about you and your career as a Christian man, it is our fondest hope that you might be home and might consent to appear on our anniversary program. Believe me, there is nothing fanatic about this movement, but it seems God-directed to provide a host of youth to evangelize the world in the post-war period. We believe, as I know you do, that the gospel of Christ is the most potent force for peace known to the world.

We plan a thorough advertising campaign to bring thousands from the Twin Cities and State for a momentous rally. Minneapolis regularly enjoys a 4000 to 6000 crowd and is giving us 100% cooperation. The North Central regional office and the International office will also promote this event. We plan to consider radio coverage also, if it can be procured. It will certainly bring great blessing to fill the Arena that night. Our city needs this witness to the glory of our Lord and we will pray that you will be enabled of Him to accept our invitation.

Enclosed is a stamped envelope for your reply.

(over)

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Were your pastor, John Wobig, here, I know he would join me in sending warm Christian greetings to you.

Finally, let me add that today's youth are our national leaders of tomorrow, and we need desperately to give them the gospel and every encouragement to live the Christian life. The attraction of outstanding Christian leaders in Youth for Christ meetings is one of the secrets of their success. The recognition of many outstanding leaders is being given to Youth for Christ and even the press is aware of its significance in today's youth problem in America. We therefore look earnestly to you for the testimony you can bring to the youth of Minnesota, the Nation and the world.

Awaiting your reply with prayerful interest, I am

Yours for youth,

John H. Halcup





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September 20, 1945

Harold E. Stassen, Commander USNR  
Staff Commander Third Fleet  
c/o F.P.O. San Francisco

Dear Harold:

It has been some time since I have had the pleasure of talking with you or discussing the State's aviation program. However, in your absence we have been successful in carrying out your original suggestions and I believe have developed a sound progressive aviation program for the State of Minnesota.

The National Aeronautic Association has been highly instrumental in the development of such a program. It was largely through their efforts in planning legislative strategy that the various measures were considered and approved. In addition NAA has developed a rather ambitious, if not elaborate, program in its own right. I am enclosing a copy of the same. One of our projects includes the publication of a monthly magazine to be known as "Wings", the first edition of which will be published on November 15th with an October 15th deadline.

We shall be highly honored to have an expression from you concerning our program and the accomplishments of NAA, which we hope to feature in the first edition. It has also been suggested that we publish an article under your signature concerning the war picture generally or some of your individual experiences. If you are free to undertake such a project, possibly the title "I Saw the Japs Surrender" would be most fitting.

I shall be very pleased to hear from you in any event but if it is possible for you to undertake the writing of either an article or letter to the Association, we shall be very grateful to you for it. The magazine, incidentally, will be of state wide distribution and will be designed to further the interests of aviation throughout the State. We are confident of its success and hopeful that we may include you in the initial issue.

With kindest regards and best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

VERNON S. WELCH, PRESIDENT  
Greater Twin Cities Chapter


VSW/ah

SPONSORS OF STATE COUNCIL OF N. A. A.

21 September 1945

Dear Harold:

Just arrived here too and am indeed very proud of the wonderful record you made in handling the prisoners. I am doing the same right now for the Army. Was with the Eighth Army until a little while ago and am now at General Richardson's Headquarters. Enclosed is some dope which the PRO got out about me and tells what I have been doing since I saw you last. Hope I can see you before you shove off. You can reach me at General Richardson's headquarters - Ft. Shafter phone no. - 12273 or Honolulu number - 87007.

  
KLEIN



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