

Memorandum;

Subject; Joint Army Navy, Surface and Air, liberation and evacuation of POWS in Japan, under command of the Commanding General of the 8th Army and utilizing units of the Third Fleet under the command of Commander Task Group 30.6, and assisted by representatives of the International Red Cross and of the Swedish and Swiss Legations.

1. Hitachi Area 639 prisoners

A liaison officer of the Com Gen 8th Army (G1 Section) to board the Flagship of Commander Task Unit 30.6.2

Two 8th Army Medical teams to board the Hospital ship or evacuation ship of this unit. A representative of the International agencies also to board the Flagship. CTU 30.6.2 then proceed to Hitachi Harbor with appropriate ships and evacuate the pows in this area in accordance with the policies of the ComGen8thArmy.

Japanese motor and rail transport to be commandeered for the short movement to the harbor. Limited motor transport to be loaded in an amphibious ship of 30.6.2 to assist in the operation.

Air cap and advance air reconnaissance to be provided during the operation

2. Sendai Area. 2000 pows

A liaison officer of the ComGen8th Army to board the Flagship of CTU 30.6.3 and 2 Eighth army Medical Units to board the Hospital ship or Evacuation Ship of this Unit. A representative of the International Agencies also to board the Flagship.

CTU 30.6.3 then proceed to Kamaiishi harbor and liberate and extend medical care and evacuate the pows in the Sendai area in accordance with the policies of the ComGen 8th Army.

Japanese rail and motor transport to be commandeered for the short movement to the harbor from adjoining camps.

Air cap and advance air reconnaissance to be provided during the operation.

3. Niigata Area. 2300 POWS

Same procedure as A and B proceeding to Niigata Harbor.

4. Nagoya Area 1500 POWS

Same procedure as A and B
entering Hamamatsu harbor.

5. Aihio Harbor

An 8th Army team with an 8th Army Medical Unit and
a Naval Liaison Officer from CEG 30.6 and unit to
obtain limited motor transport and commandeer additional
transport and proceed by road to Yokohama docks and
deliver released POWS to the Marigold US Army Hospital Ship

6. Ambulatory released POWS after medical screening to be
offloaded at Yokosuka docks for air transport to
appropriate destinations.

Tokyo # 5

Tokyo no 15

Tokyo no 13

Aomi

Nagoya

*7
8
9*

11

4. Nagoya Area 1500 POWS

Same procedure as A and B
entering Hamamatsu harbor.

5. Aihio Harbor

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a Naval Liaison Officer from CEG 30.6 and unit to
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6. Ambulatory released POWS after medical screening to be
offloaded at Yokosuka docks for air transport to
appropriate destinations.

* Aomori - northern part

| | |
|-------|----|
| Sakai | 6 |
| | 7 |
| | 8 |
| | 11 |

Hokkaido - of course - all island
part

Iwase - part on west side

Miyagi - full of mines

INSTRUCTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS COMMITTEE
DELEGATES FOR ASSISTANCE IN EVACUATING PRISONERS
OF WAR AND CIVIL INTERNEES.

I - TASK.

To watch over satisfactory execution of evacuation, it being understood that ultimate responsibility rests with the Japanese Military Authorities

To this effect the Delegate shall:

a) Obtain from the Camp Authorities:

1. Up-to-date and complete name lists, segregated by camps and nationality.
2. Up-to-date lists of sick, wounded and invalids, segregated by camps, stating diagnosis, whether capable of transportation and, if so, whether in a lying, sitting or standing position.
3. Name lists, segregated by nationality, in respect of those incapable of transportation and thus to be left behind, indicating diagnosis and present whereabouts.
4. Name lists of Civil Internees, segregated by nationality, remaining in Japan.
5. Name lists, segregated by nationality, of all POW and C.I. evacuated.

Indications of strengths in possession of the Delegate are based on Huryojohokyoku's figures per June 30, 1945. It is, therefore, possible that divergencies will be found to exist when comparing these figures with those to be submitted by the Camp Authorities.

Lists mentioned under 1/5 hereinabove are to be brought back by the Delegate to Tokyo for immediate submission to the Chief Delegate.

- b) Obtain the general evacuation plan from the Camp Authorities.
- c) Ensure complete evacuation, paying particular attention to the fact that no prisoner is left behind at outside prisons, hospitals or other places of detainment.
- d) Avoid all bottlenecks; proceeding first with evacuation of Camps located nearest to point of embarkation and only subsequently with that of Camps in more remote locations.
- e) See to it that no prisoner is moved until arrival of the evacuation vessel at point of embarkation, unless proper accommodation facilities are available.
- f) Leave the decision as to fitness or otherwise for transportation to POW medical officers, or, in the absence of such, to the Japanese medical personnel.
- g) See to it that each sick, wounded or invalid POW is provided with a label to be affixed on his uniform, stating in English diagnosis and whether transportation is to be effected in a lying, sitting or standing position. Such labels to be established by POW medical officers.
- h) Ascertain prior to each POW transport the exact number of sick, wounded and invalids, and arrange for an adequate number of stretchers and ambulances.
- i) Be present at the time of embarkation of evacuating POW.
- j) Render a final report concerning his mission and endeavour to advise the Chief Delegate in Tokyo by telegram or telephone of execution of his mandate, immediately following embarkation of the last prisoner.

II.- CONTACTS.

The Delegate shall:

- a) Contact and endeavour to remain in touch with the officer in command of the POW Camp Group assigned to him, as well as the Commanding Officer of the Japanese Army for the area concerned.
- b) Establish contact at the earliest opportunity with POW representatives, who shall assist the Delegate in the execution of his task on the one hand and with the Allied forces on the other.
- c) Approach the local representative of the Japan Red Cross Society with a view to obtaining assistance for the sick, wounded and invalids. The Japan Red Cross Society shall endeavour to have in readiness at each stage of the evacuation journey the following facilities:

Requisite material for camphor and morphine injections

First-aid material, including stretchers, pillows, etc.

Cold tea.

- d) Remain in contact with the Protecting Power representatives, all decisions to be taken jointly.
- e) Endeavour to communicate by telegram or telephone with the Chief Delegate in Tokyo, to whom any difficulty shall be referred.

III.- MISCELLANEOUS:

- a) 20% of the evacuation trains will be made up of second - class carriages which are reserved first for the sick, wounded and invalids, and secondly for the officers.
- b) Prisoners may take along their personal effects.
- c) American Red Cross relief, such as foodstuffs and medical supplies, is the property of the prisoners, and as such to be handed over

to and taken along by them, if they so desire.

- d) Questions relating to POW saving accounts and ashes of deceased POW are within the sphere of competence of the Protecting Power. POW shall, however, be permitted to carry an adequate amount of pocket-money in Japanese currency.

IV.- PRESS.

The Delegate is prohibited from disclosing any information or making any statement whatsoever to members of the press.

V.- BOARD AND LODGING.

Board and lodging during the mission shall be provided by the Japanese authorities or by the local chapter of the Japanese Red Cross Society.

VI.- RECOMMENDATIONS.

The Delegate shall manifest throughout his mission a spirit of objectivity, impartiality and conciliation, and shall moreover comport himself in a manner befitting a member of the Red Cross.

Dr. Marcel Junod
Chief of the Japan Delegation of
The International Red Cross Committee

Tokyo, August 23, 1945.

ROSTER OF OFFICERS
NavPers 353 (12-43)

To: The Chief of Naval Personnel.

| Ship, Station or Activity | | Commander Task Flotilla SIX | | | | | Date of Roster | |
|------------------------------|-------|-----------------------------|---------|-----|---------|------|-------------------|----------|
| | | Authorized Complement | | | | | Total | |
| Como. | Capt. | Cdr. | Lt.Cdr. | Lt. | Lt.(jg) | Ens. | Total | on board |
| 1 | 1 | | 1 | 2 | | | 5 | 5 |

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 |
|----------|--------------------|---------------------------|--------|-------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|----------------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------|
| File No. | See In- str. | Name (Last) (Initials) | Rank | Date of Present Rank | NA Cl. or NR Cl. | Mos. on Bd. | Mos. Pr. Dty. | Mos. at Sea this Cr. | Primary Duty | Collateral Duty | Duties in Training for. | Fros. Date Qualif. | Courses Quali- fications |
| 30986 | | SIMPSON, Rodger W. | Como. | 4/6/45 | 1921 | 3 | 3 | 3 | ComTaskFlotSIX | None | CTF | | None |
| 63380 | | FOSTER, Walter M. | Cdr. | 10/15/42 | 1930 | 3 | 3 | 54 | Chief Staff Off. | Operations | DesDivCom | Now | M3 |
| 95786 | | WALSH, Alexander R. | Lieut. | 12/1/42 | USNR(D) | 2 | 2 | 2 | Gunnery | Asst.Operations | Operations | Now | SS |
| 97377 | | GILMAN, Charles R. | Lieut. | 12/1/42 | USNR(D) | 2 | 2 | 51 | Flag Secretary | Intelligence | Operations | Now | PT(any) |
| 200356 | | WILLIAMS, Joseph N. | Lieut. | 10/1/43 | USNR(C) | 3 | 3 | 3 | Flag Lieut. | Communications | Chief CL Comm. Off. | Now | 76 |
| 160753 | R | POWERS, Milton W. | Lieut. | | USNR(D) | | | | | | | | |

W. M. Foster
W. M. FOSTER
Chief Staff Officer.

TO:- Allied Forces H.Q., on Japan.

FROM:- Squadron Leader QUINN Royal Australian Air Force.

DATE:- 20th, August 1945.

SUBJECT:- Treatment of Prisoners of War.

Whilst stating that treatment of P.O.W.s, was universally very bad, it is not my purpose here to cover treatment other than that which I have seen myself.

I was shot down at Rabaul Harbour, New Britain, on the 4th., December 1943 and captured almost immediately by the Japanese Navy. Was refused any medical aid for self or crew. Kept blind-folded and closely tied, not allowed to speak (except to answer questions) given nothing to eat or drink for four days. "Third degree" questioning under threat of death was continuous for ten days, except for short periods about noon each day when we were left tied out in the sun where the mob amused themselves by kicking us on the wounds, beating, pulling out our hair, burning us with cigarettes, etc. Each night we were handed over to Navy guards who kept up a similar intimidation programme. Refusing to answer questions or giving false or misleading information brought on severe beatings with a knotted rope and the flat of a sword. Requests to be treated according to the Geneva Convention resulted in more beatings and a statement by the Japanese commander at Rabaul that he had no regard for the Geneva Convention and that prisoners in his eyes were lower than dogs.

After sixteen days I was flown to Japan and taken to a "questioning camp", or intimidation camp as the Japanese called it, at OFUNA; just outside Yokohama. This Camp was run by the Japanese Navy; it was hidden in a pocket in the hills behind Ofuna railway station and is approached by a tunnel through the hill. In this camp, the guards and the prison camp administration did to the prisoners exactly what they liked.

As indicated above this camp was maintained by the Navy for the purpose of extracting information from prisoners by force. Beatings, clubbings, torture exercises, starvation and all sorts of other intimidation methods too numerous to mention were used continuously. No restraint was put on the guards, in fact they were encouraged by the authorities to harras prisoners as much as possible. Any guard could beat or club any prisoner as much as he liked; a Jap medical orderly was one of the worst. Prisoners were not allowed to speak or communicate with one another.

Only prisoners fresh from combat were brought to this camp. Many were injured, most were at least half naked. Medical attention was a bitter farce. Almost no clothing was issued to prisoners, yet during winter they were kept outside all day to increase their misery. Frost bitten extremities coupled with the common mal-nutritional diseases were the common lot. Food was kept at starvation level by order and worsened below that by wholesale pilfering by cooks and guards. Prisoners averaged forty to sixty pounds below their normal weight; my own weight went down to ninety five pounds from a normal of a hundred and fifty.

Everything was done to debase and demoralize the prisoners as much as possible because the more intimidated they were, the more likely they were to reveal information whilst being questioned.

Prisoners were not considered P.O.W.s, but "captives" who had no status, no rights, no redress of any sort. Protest to the camp authorities or to the visiting interpreters always resulted in an increase in the severity of the treatment to

continuation 1.

the complainer.

There were usually between forty and eighty prisoners held at Ofuna, the period varying from a few weeks up till two years but averaging about six months, at the end of which they were handed over to the Japanese Army.

I arrived at Ofuna December 24th., 1943 and was released from there September 30th., 1944.

Treatment by the Army was better but still far from satisfactory. During the time I was in the Tokyo Headquarters Camp the place was terrorized by a Jap N.C.O. (Sgt. WATANABE) who went berserk at least once a day singling out officers as a rule for the worst beatings. The Japanese officers made no attempt to restrain this man. He beat Padres, Doctors and many other officers very severely during my time there for little and often no offense. Pilfering of food and Red Cross supplies by the Japanese (in particular by Sgt. Watanabe) was heavy in this camp. I was forced together with about forty other officers to work in a leather shop sewing back packs for Japanese soldiers. I was at OMORI that is Tokyo Headquarters Camp from September 30th., 1944 till February 28th., 1945 when I went to a brick factory camp at Yokohama, (Yokohama Taika Renga). This was camp No. 18-D. This camp was comparatively peaceful, beatings of prisoners occurring at less frequent intervals, pilfering and withholding of food and Red Cross materials by the Japanese was severe.

After June 5th., 1945 I moved to camp 5-B at NIIGATA. This Niigata camp though latterly improved was during 1943-44 extremely bad, ninety seven men died from mal-nutrition, exposure and rough treatment in the first six months. The best witness to question regarding treatment in this area is Sergeant A.W. Rance, HKVDC.,

Treatment at many other places was similar to Rabaul. Marcus, Penang, Truk and Rabaul were all Hell holes for prisoners.

I am prepared to repeat this statement, and more, on Oath and am more than willing to give evidence that will assist in bringing the persons responsible for such treatment to justice.

/s/ N. Quinn

.....
Squadron Leader N. Quinn.

R. A. A. F.

We the undersigned agree that the statements made by S/Ld., Quinn concerning the treatment of prisoners in P.O.W. Camps in Japan are correct. We are willing to give similar statements or evidence as may be necessary.

Co-pilot of a Catalina PBY (VP-11; 11-P-10), I was imprisoned at the Ohuna Camp from 8 October, 1942 until 8 May 1943. AMM Ralph Ames and AMM Willie Scarborough, members of my crew, entered Ohuna Camp in good health, but died later as a result of treatment authorized by Japanese authorities.

/s/ J. L. COULTER

J.L. COULTER, Ensign, USNR.

At Ohuna, Jan. 6, 1944 - Oct. 1, 1944 William McFerren, 1st Lt. USAAC.
Capt. Farken M/U ALLIDES at Ofuna 19th Aug - 3rd Dec. 1943. Maj. D.W. Boyle USMCR, at Ohuna March 7, 1944 - January 15th, 1945. L.L. Farran Civilian Asst. Supt. Wake Island - Oct 11, 1942 to May 8, 1943.

Naoetsue, Japan
August 26, 1945

From: The P.O.W's. at Naoetsu Japan.
To: The Commanding Officer, Attached Air Groups, Officers and
Crew of the U.S.S. Lexington.
Enclosure: (A) "Appreciation", a poem.

We, members of the fighting services of the United States, England, Australia, New Zealand and Holland, desire to convey to you, our deep and heartfelt appreciation of your endeavours on our behalf, which have assisted us tremendously during the concluding stage of our imprisonment. It is difficult to find words suitable to express our feelings when your planes zoomed over our barracks on the morning of August 25, 1945. Let it suffice to state that we realized that we were free, that success, complete and absolute had attended our arms, and that freedom and peace reigned once more. A cause worth fighting for, and a condition that will be maintained while ever Uncle Sam produces men of your standard. Then again in the afternoon, when the planes dropped various comforts to us, it is difficult to express in words our deep appreciation. One man was heard to say, "Christmas may be four months from today, but today is Christmas for me". There's not one of the 698 Officers and men here who did not have a similar feeling of reaction.

Good luck to you all, a pleasant voyage and safe return.

J. A. Fitzgerald
Luit. Comdr. U.S.N.
Senior P.O.W. Officer Naoetsu

A. W. Campbell
Lieut. A.I.F.

M. J. Abbott
Lt. B.A.

J. E. Manuel
Sgt. 1/c Dutch Army

J. R. Denge
Sub. Lieut. R.N.Z.N.

APPRECIATION

J. Nichols

Our moment has come after these weary years,
We watch speeding planes, our eyes wet with tears,
Just a mad cheering croud as you go winging by,
A real message of hope from out of the sky.

We know it's the end to this living hell,
You've brought us a message we realize well,
Home again with our loved ones, to the Country we love,
A dream realized by your message above.

So God speed you boy as you wing on your way,
We thank you again, and we'd all like to say,
We'll never forget you as the years roll away,
May you have all the joy you brought us this day.

J. Nichols
135 Croydon Av.
Croydon Park
N.S.W. Aust.

HAROLD STASSEN PAPERS: Removals

Subgroup: Naval Service

Series: POW Repatriation

Folder title/dates: POW Repatriation: Correspondence - Misc. Related Material
1945-1946

Box #: 116 Shelf location: 142.A.18.1B

Document i.d.: Radio Communication

From Com 3rd Fleet To SCAP; USASTAF; CINCPAC

Date 29 August 1945 Classification Secret

Pages 2

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02

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
THIRD FLEET


4 September 1945.

MEMORANDUM TO: Chiefs of Sections.

Subject: POW Evacuation.

1. The emergency phase POW evacuation as far as this command is concerned is completed.
2. Henceforth the THIRD Fleet participation in POW evacuation will be considered as a normal operation, under an assigned commander, and placed into effect by a normal op-plan or op-order issued by Commander THIRD Fleet.
3. Further arrangements with the Army in connection with POW evacuation are now considered to be operational in character and Commander THIRD Fleet will be represented at joint Army-Navy conferences by an officer from 11 Section who may call on appropriate members of the Staff for technical advice when required.
4. Various aspects of POW liberation and evacuation will hereafter be handled normally by the appropriate Staff Section.

ROBT. B. CARNEY,
Chief of Staff.


H.C. CARROLL,
Ass't Flag Secretary.

→ 00 H
Info

→ 02

Include substance
in the official report



11

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
THIRD FLEET

8 September 1945.

MEMORANDUM TO: 01

Subject: Evacuation of POW's from Western Honshu.

1. On 2 September Major Fellows, Senior Camp POW of Niigata Camp 5 B, came to Omori No. 8 with Japanese Sergeant Major guard from his camp. He there contacted CTG 30.6 Sentry party and was sent out to the SAN JUAN. He was interviewed by Commodore Simpson and 02.

2. He confirmed our previous carrier intelligence information that there were a number of camps on west coast of Honshu. He stated his own 5 B Camp was one of largest, and had 688 POW's. He stated that the tension in his camp had become acute, that he had maintained discipline with difficulty, that the uncertainty, and the continuance under Jap guards who had beaten and oppressed them, and the illness of a number of the men caused a serious situation, that he had received approval of the Jap Camp Commander to accompany a guard to Omori Camp in Tokyo Bay, had called all his men together, told them to sit tight, and that he would be back the afternoon of 3 September. He stated he had indications that other camps were in the same or worse situation and that Camp 16 B at Kanose was hidden in mountains and had had no food drops and were in bad shape. Other camps would run out of food that day. He brought a letter from Capt. Hewitt, Senior Officer POW of 16 B, which had been sent to him via a Jap and which verified facts. He stated he needed someone to go back with him with a definite program and authoritative directions to the Japs and to the POW's, and that he considered evacuation by special train to be feasible.

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8 September 1945.

Subject: Evacuation of POW's from Western Honshu.

3. A dispatch was immediately sent to Com3rdFlt requesting more food drops and specifying camps (Com THIRD passed to CTF 38 and USASTAF and drops came in on the 4th).

4. His information confirmed CTG 30.6 previous estimate of situation. Com THIRD Fleet had previously recommended by dispatch to SCAP and 8th Army that contact parties be sent in to these and other camps. No reply had been received and informal remarks by officers of 8th Army HQ had indicated that they did not consider it feasible to go that far beyond phase lines without Army occupation forces.

5. CTG 30.6 told Major Fellows he would endeavor to arrange for his return flight and would send O2 with him and would request 8th Army to send officer, and to send up stretchers, medical party, etc. Major Fellows was nearly exhausted and was put to bed on SAN JUAN overnight. Major Fellows was also invited to remain at Yokosuka and that other officers would go back in. He firmly replied that he had told the men he would be back and he wished to and would return.

6. CTG 30.6 sent a request to Com THIRD Fleet for 2 TEM's and 4 VF for flight to take 4 passengers to Niigata indicating identity of passengers, and purpose of trip. Com THIRD Fleet passed the dispatch to CTG 31.6 for action.

7. Early on the 3rd, Major Fellows was taken to ComGen 8th Army HQ where he was interviewed, reviewed his report to CTG 30.6 and 8th Army HQ agreed to send Major Sutter on flight and to send stretchers, food, medical party, etc., and to prepare to receive POW's by truck at rail station if rail

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evacuation proved feasible.

8. O2 and party reported to Yokosuka air strip at 1145. The operations officer stated the trip would be ready at 1300 and that TBM 84 would be flight Leader. O2 and Major Fellows embarked in TBM 84 and Major Sutter and Jap Sergeant in TBM 88.

9. As to the flight, the operations officer gave the pilots a course of 330° to fly. Approximately one hour out O2 noted a change of course and adverse weather ahead, and inquired of pilot on intercom as to course and plans. Pilot reported he was flying north seeking a way through, as his course was blocked by weather and conditions did not appear favorable. Pilot was advised that if he could not find clear way through in another 10 minutes, he should return to base. Approximately 25 minutes later noting that courses had changed, but course did not appear to be toward base, O2 inquired of pilot on intercom as to course and plan. Pilot stated that the pilot in TBM 88 had taken over the lead, that they were flying 030 to avoid weather, that they were lost, did not know course back to base, and that they now had bad weather to south of them. O2 then gave his first direct order on the VHF. He verified with TBM 88 that he was lost and did not know course to base. Then he directed TBM 88 to fly 270° over the overcast until he could verify that he was over the Japan Sea; that he should then let down under the overcast and return to the coast line for position, that he should not fly through any overcast at less than 9,000 feet, as some peaks were that high in Honshu. Pilot obeyed orders, flew west over Japan Sea, let down through hole in overcast and returned to coast. From

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Subject: Evacuation of POW's from Western Honshu.

POW map 02 identified coast as being approximately 100 miles north of target and directed pilot to fly south along coast line watching for target. Rain squalls were encountered in the vicinity of target and target was overshoot. Another Jap air field was sighted and pilots were ordered to land for positive location. Location was verified, planes took off and flew direct to target and landed at Niigata field. It was then 1640, weather was adverse, and margin of gasoline safety in the TBM's was narrow for return flight. 02 verified this estimate of uncertainty of reliable return flight with all pilots and then directed that they remain overnight for safety. A double guard of POW's from nearby camp and a Japanese guard was established with at least one pilot always at the planes and then 02 proceeded to POW camps.

10. The situation was found to be as reported. The POW's in each camp were ^{formed} ~~found~~ in the compound and given the detailed plan and told to stand steady for an orderly evacuation. The Japanese were ordered to furnish truck and bus transportation and drivers at once to the Camp Senior Officers of all 7 camps and also to 02 for trips from camp to camp. They were directed to arrange a shipment of food from 5 B to 16 B, with a party of one officer and 3 men from the POW's at 5 B in charge, on a railroad train up the branch line at 7 AM next morning and to return the escort party that afternoon. Efforts were made with assistance of radiomen, POW's, and Jap equipment to get a message through that planes were remaining overnight. The Japanese were also directed to transmit this message via their circuits for relay.

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Subject: Evacuation of POW's from Western Honshu.

11. A complete schedule for the prompt evacuation of all seven camps of 2,843 POW's via seven special trains direct to Yokohama was arranged. (Evacuation has since proceeded successfully).

12. The weather was adverse on the morning of the 4th. O2 conferred with the pilots on their estimate of situation and then directed that they remain at Niigata until situation clarified for safe return flight, directed that one pilot and 4 POW's maintain constant guard at planes and directed Japs to maintain double guard. O2 advised pilots he would promptly report details of situation to Yokosuka air base on his arrival in Yokohama and would request Tokyo weather information be sent in to them with a navigation plane if necessary for certain flight. This message was sent to Yokosuka base on arrival O2 Tokyo Bay. All six pilots and planes returned without incident to Yokosuka airfield at 1130, 6 September after receiving favorable weather report from plane from base. The conduct and attitude of the pilots throughout was of the highest order.

13. A flash report followed by a seamailgram in detail was made immediately upon O2's return to Yokohama late at night on the 4th by rail.

14. ComGen 8th Army and SCAP on the basis of report of this trip, and because of additional reports of disorders and serious conditions in Kyushu and Southwestern Honshu camps, determined the necessity and feasibility of prompt contacts by air and rail to all camp centers in Japan and dispatched officers and medical parties for this purpose on the 5th and 6th of September.

H.E.S.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
THIRD FLEET

6 September 1945.

MEMORANDUM TO: 00
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Subject: POW Evacuation.

1. At conference on 5 September at GHQ, Grand Hotel, attended by General Fitch, Adj. Gen. of SCAP, General Rice, 8th Army Surgeon and other officers of SCAP and ComGen 8th Army, a complete plan of evacuation of all POW's in Japan was presented by G-1 and approved.
2. It is directly based on Commander THIRD Fleet's dispatch recommendations and on the procedure used by ComGen 8th Army, and Commander THIRD Fleet, and it was so stated.
3. General Fitch stated that the concept of waiting for occupation by troops of ports and areas was out and that General MacArthur had stated "Let's go as hard and as fast as you can. Admiral Halsey has shown the way".
4. Specifically, the following steps are being taken throughout Japan.
 - (a) The Japanese Government is being required to install radios in all remaining camps and reassuring and steady-ing broadcasts including newscasts are to be made.
 - (b) FEAF is to fly in reasonably Senior Officers to all camps as feasible to reassure men and maintain discipline. ~~A~~ report of gun fire between POW's and guards west of Toyama is being investigated. One Osaki camp has rioted.
 - (c) Jap rail is to be used to selected ports of embarkation with medical supervision and liaison officer and with camp organization maintained for journey, filled out under Senior Officer in Charge.
 - (d) An AH is to be used as screening ship at each embarkation point and the familiar THIRD Fleet screening method is to be followed with Army record teams and forms. APD's, LSV's and APA's are to be used as temporary billets pending flyaway or as surface transportation of ambulatory non-hospital cases.

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Subject: POW Evacuation.

5. The ports of evacuation are to be:

- Nagasaki - 18 camps, 10,000 POW's.
- Wacanaura - 32 camps, 10,259 POW's. Assistance of Commander FIFTH Fleet will be requested on these.
- Sendai - 11 camps, 11,806 POW's. Assistance of Commander THIRD Fleet will be requested on these.
- Hokadate - 5 camps, 1,605 POW's. Assistance of Commander North Pacific will be requested on these.
- Yokohama - 21 camps, 6,350 POW's. (Over 60% completed). Continued assistance of Commander THIRD Fleet will be requested.
- Hamamatsu - 11 camps, 3,340 POW's. (Over 40% completed). Continued assistance of Commander THIRD Fleet will be requested.

6. The Sendai operation is the only remaining responsibility of consequence as all other camps in Commander THIRD Fleet's area will be evacuated as a matter of course by operations now underway.

H.E.S.

United States Pacific Fleet

Flagship of the Commander Third Fleet



In the name of the President of the United States,
the Commander THIRD Fleet, United States Pacific Fleet,
takes pleasure in presenting the BRONZE STAR MEDAL to

COMMANDER HAROLD EDWARD STASSEN
UNITED STATES NAVAL RESERVE

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For meritorious service in connection with operations against the enemy while serving on the Staff of Commander THIRD Fleet in July, August, and September 1945. He was designated to formulate evacuation plans for Allied prisoners of war interned in Japan, and while on temporary additional duty with Commander Task Group THIRTY POINT SIX he contributed materially in liberating hundreds of United States military personnel prior to the formal surrender of Japan. He personally led rescue parties into inland camps in the Tokyo area and in Northern Honshu and freed the prisoners from their Jap captors and from conditions of death, disease and starvation. His fearlessness in the presence of the enemy, superb leadership, and consummate skill in the handling of dangerous situations undoubtedly saved the lives of many of these prisoners who were seriously ill, undernourished and suffering from Japanese brutality. Without regard to threats or obstacles which were placed in his path, he carried out his part of this successful evacuation operation days ahead of schedule and at a time when Japan was still armed. On 29 August the first sizeable group of prisoners were rescued and the operations continued until every known officer and man was safely aboard one of the Allied ships. His cool and determined accomplishment of this momentous and unique task, and his courage, sound judgment and expert counsel were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

W. F. HALSEY,
Admiral, U. S. Navy.

Temporary citation.

Refer to No.

• Pers-10 1T-mfh
134875

NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

10 December 1946

•To: Captain Harold E. Stassen, USNR,
744 Stewart Lane,
South St. Paul, Minnesota.

Subject: Permanent Citation -- Legion of Merit.

1. The Chief of Naval Personnel takes pleasure in forwarding herewith the permanent citation for the subject decoration which was previously awarded to you on a temporary citation.
2. The records of the Bureau indicate that you have received the decoration for this award.

By direction of Chief of Naval Personnel:

Assistant to Director,
Medals and Awards.

Encl:

- ### 1. Permanent Citation.

December 26, 1946

Honorable James Forrestal
Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I deeply appreciate receipt of the
Permanent Citation - Legion of Merit,
as forwarded to me on December 10th.

Sincerely,

HES vc



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