

PART II

THE POLITICAL PROBLEM

THE POLITICAL PROBLEM

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## INTRODUCTION TO PART II

The session on Friday afternoon, January 4, initiated the political part of the program of the Conference on Problems of War and Peace in the Atomic Age. The first session of the Conference, on Friday morning, had been devoted to a presentation and discussion of the technical aspects of the problem of Inspection and Control of the Materials of Atomic Energy. The digest of these proceedings has been given in Part I of this report. Now, and for the remainder of its two-day program, the Conference considered what the Chairman had referred to in his opening address (Page 1 of Part I) as "the political problem arising from the revolutionary change in the nature of warfare, due to modern science."

The Friday afternoon session, he had stated, would be devoted to a discussion of "the political possibilities as conditioned by the interests and outlook of the United States, Soviet Russia, and other countries. An analysis of the Charter would follow on the next morning, taking up in detail the provisions which were of interest to us in the three great areas of security, economics and law. Then, after this examination of the Charter, there would be a discussion of the possibilities of implementation or amendment which might be necessary to make it a more adequate instrument for international control." At the closing Saturday afternoon session, "after having looked over both the technical and the political aspects of international relations, the Conference would come to the problems of world government, finally taking up the plans of the Conference for future work."

The plan thus outlined was followed. (See also the Program in the unnumbered initial pages of Part I.) All sessions were conducted as informal round-table discussions. This section of the report (Part II) has attempted to record those discussions, often without too much effort at streamlined editing.

FRIDAY AFTERNOON SESSION  
January 4, 1946

The session convened at 3:00 p.m. at the American Institute of Physics.

DR. JAMES T. SHOTWELL: It is my very pleasant duty to introduce to you the Chairman of the afternoon, Mr. Clark M. Eichelberger, the Director of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, and also Director of the American Association for the United Nations.

Mr. Eichelberger!

CHAIRMAN EICHELBERGER: My introductory remarks will be very brief. Our three guests this afternoon will speak consecutively before we have the discussion period, at which your questions can be put to one or to all three, and they can ask each other questions or ask you questions.

As one who has dabbled in the field of political science, I could not help thinking, in listening to your program this morning, of the differences between those discussions and the ones we shall have this afternoon. As scientists, you move with scientific and mathematical certainty to achieve results. In producing a bomb or a chain reaction, you are not concerned with the health of statesmen, or the propaganda of newspapers, or the forces of public opinion.

Our problem this afternoon, which is a political one, cannot be stated with the same certainty with which you could discuss your subjects. You were able to say fairly clearly this morning that certain inspections were possible providing the people and the statesmen would permit their being made, and providing also that there was good faith on all sides.

We turn this afternoon to a discussion by the political scientists and the military experts as to what the people will stand for -- what is practical politically in this difficult world of ours to achieve scientifically

the inspection you outlined earlier today.

To do this, we shall consider three areas. First of all we shall take the United States, and secondly the U.S.S.R., because everyone, I think, feels that the United States and the U.S.S.R. do present the greatest problems of inspection -- the United States because it is stockpiling bombs and has built such tremendous plants for producing them, and the U.S.S.R. because the Russian attitude for various reasons is more of an unknown factor than is the attitude of the British, which is the best known of all. Our third speaker will discuss the relationship of our problem to all of the other countries of the world.

It is always a pleasure to introduce Major George Fielding Eliot. He has been known as a military commentator and analyst, and recently his comments on the United Nations and on world organization have stamped him as one of the leading political commentators of the United States as well. That is a very unusual combination indeed, and one which has often proved very valuable to us.

Major Eliot will take up the political problem of inspection in relation to the United States. It is a privilege, Major Eliot, to present you to the group.



THE POLITICAL PROBLEM - IN RELATION TO THE UNITED STATES

George Fielding Eliot

I believe the attitude of the United States on the atomic bomb is now fairly well crystallized.

As far as the projects in hand are concerned, as outlined some time ago by the President, they consist of three steps. First is the establishment of domestic control over atomic energy, which will require action by Congress. Second is a consultation with the British and Canadians, who were so to speak our partners in the original atomic project, to determine a common approach to policy. Third is a recommendation by those three powers to the United Nations Organization to set up within the framework of that organization a commission for the international control of atomic energy.

It was found essential after taking the second step that there should be a sort of 2(a), that is, a prior consultation with the Russians before proceeding to the United Nations stage, and that also has been accomplished in the recent discussion of the Foreign Ministers at Moscow.

The progress of domestic control legislation has not been too rapid. There was opposition in scientific circles to the May-Johnson Bill, which was drafted in the War Department and represents the views of Secretary Patterson and Major General Groves. For the time being this bill has been held up, and everything is waiting on the outcome of the hearings before the McMahon Committee of the Senate. Whether any committee of the House will wish to hold additional hearings remains to be seen. At the present time unfortunately the hearings before the McMahon Committee are not having the public attention which they merit. They are being overshadowed by the Pearl Harbor Committee, which is attracting more attention than other Congressional investigations, and of course by the struggle between Labor and Management and by housing, all of which are attracting a great deal more attention. This is unfortunate, because experience has shown that these committees function best

under the spotlight of constant publicity.

As to international control, the communique of the Moscow Conference has repeated practically word for word the objectives stated in the ABC Commission's report: First, the exchange of scientific information for peaceful purposes; Second, the establishment of suitable controls to prevent the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes; Third, the elimination of atomic weapons and other weapons capable of mass destruction (long range rockets, guided missiles and so on) from national armaments; Fourth, the setting up of adequate safeguards to make sure complying nations shall not be subject to hazard by reason of evasion of the control arrangements.

The listing of these objectives in the communique was immediately followed by a statement to the effect that these objectives should be attained by successive stages. This gave rise to some disquiet on the part of Senator Vandenberg and other senators because they feared that the stages were identical with the objectives and would be sought in the order named. The Acting Secretary of State reassured Senator Vandenberg on this point before the Senator left for London as an American delegate to the United Nations Organization, saying that it was not intended that the objectives should be sought in the order named. In fact, it was intended they should be sought in parallel, that safeguards should accompany each stage of progress. The four objectives are not intended to be identified with the stages of progress by which it is hoped the Commission will proceed - at least from the American point of view. Whether the Russians have a different interpretation of the communique will have to wait on events.

Those of us who were at San Francisco know that sometimes these differences of interpretation as to the meaning of words cause considerable difficulty!

Meanwhile the War Department is insisting upon the greatest secrecy with regard to the continued operation of our own atomic plants, as to the number and location of the bombs we have already made, the number which we are



going to make, and what the policy on publicity and security will be. With respect to the forthcoming experiments in the Pacific Ocean, which will be carried out with regard to the effect of atomic bombs on ships and other floating structure, the policy regarding secrecy remains to be seen. There are those -- I am one of them -- who feel that the widest publicity on these experiments will be very useful, that it would be indeed a good idea if other nations, certainly the members of the Security Council, were to be invited as observers and given full facilities to find out what happens.

Perhaps we might consider whether it would be a good idea for the United States to make a public statement in the Atomic Commission for the benefit of the other members thereof as to the number of bombs we now have and the number we intend to use for experimental purposes, and to fix a limit on the number we will retain. The possibility of the removal of some of the atmosphere of dread which seems to hang over a good part of the world by this means ought to be considered. Just how much the rest of the world is actually afraid of what the United States may do in the future with the atomic bomb I don't know. There has been a rather strong hint in some of the reports which have come from abroad that the rest of the world is not worrying as much as some of the Americans think they might be. It all winds up, however, with the question of the attitude of our own people toward this whole subject.

The forces of public opinion determine in the last analysis the policy of our Government. What will the American people wish to do when they have the facts? As a matter of fact, they don't at the present know enough about what their Government is doing, particularly what is being done in connection with the manufacture of additional bombs, and they don't know enough about what the attitude of foreign countries may be.

The American member of the Atomic Commission will therefore enter upon his duties with a rather unformed public opinion behind him. That I think is unfortunate. I think if he had a clear and crystallized public mandate, if the American public knew exactly what they wanted and were pressing

to get it, it would be very helpful. A contribution towards the creation of such a public opinion is one of the duties which groups like this may well take upon themselves.

Thank you very much!

CHAIRMAN EICHELBERGER: Our second speaker this afternoon was a member of the Reparations Commission at the time the atomic bombs were dropped on Japan and therefore had an opportunity of seeing the reaction of the Russians to the atomic bombs. And he is the only person that I know of who has been in Russia sufficiently recently to give us a picture of the Russian point of view -- what he thinks the Russians would stand for in the way of inspection and control.

Dr. Isador Lubin was Special Assistant to President Roosevelt in Moscow in 1945 in the Reparations Commission.

THE POLITICAL PROBLEM - IN RELATION TO THE U.S.S.R.

Isador Lubin

The meeting this morning was an eye opener to me because only a little over a year ago at a meeting in Washington, at which various government departments were represented, we were attempting to work out a plan of action which might be accepted as the policy of the United States Government in its relationship to the International Labor Organization, and one of the things which came up for discussion was inspection.

This International Labor Organization, which was created at the end of the last war, is made up of the various countries of the world and the delegates and members under its constitution are representatives of workers' groups, of employers' groups and of government. All three parties draft conventions for the various countries to pass laws regarding conditions of employment.

One of the big objections to or criticisms of the I.L.O. in the past has been that these workers, employers and government representatives get together, agree that they will undertake to put into effect in their respective countries certain laws relative to labor (whether it be the limitation of hours, or prohibiting children from working on certain jobs, the working of women underground, night work, etc.), pass these laws, and then nothing happens in many instances. In fact, one of the South American countries has been most liberal in accepting certain labor standards as part of its treaty relationships with the rest of the world, and less is done about seeing that those standards are put into effect than in any other country in the world. The question, therefore, arose as to whether we should have international inspection with the I.L.O. -- whether it would be permitted to send into the various countries inspectors who were trained, who would look around in factories and see whether these laws which these countries had passed in agreement with other countries were actually being enforced.



A member of the State Department rose and said, "Do you think that the Congress of the United States would permit a foreign agency to come into this country and inspect our factories and tell us whether we were doing the job which we were supposed to do?" I think the unanimous answer was that the United States Congress would not.

I spent the morning here listening to the problems of inspection and the extent to which you would have to go to be sure that something was being done effectively to prevent the production of atomic bombs. Major Eliot raised the question as far as the attitude of the American people is concerned. I would like to discuss what in my opinion would be the attitude of the Russian people.

In order to get any light upon how Russia might take to a suggestion such as was made here this morning, we have to understand something about the nature of the Russian government. We have to remember first that the U.S.S.R. is run by a group of men - a very small group, a committee - of less than 30 people, and they really run the country. They determine what the laws shall be and at the present time, having determined what the laws shall be, they call a meeting of the Presidium, which is the legislature, submit the law and the law is voted upon.

Probably the best way we can understand who those people are is to ask ourselves what their background is like.

They are made up of two groups. One group is composed of intellectuals who lived under the Czarist regime, who knew what oppression was under that regime and who in only rare instances have been outside of the U.S.S.R. The other group contains relatively younger men who came into maturity after the revolution, who also know very little about the rest of the world, but know of the oppression under the Czars, and themselves have exercised such oppression in order to avoid the recurrence of what they wanted to avoid under their own U.S.S.R. regime.

These governors of the U.S.S.R. are a suspicious people. But the man on the street isn't. That is the interesting phenomenon about the U.S.S.R. The man on the street is more like us than any other citizen of any other country that I have ever met. He is a good fellow. He wants to be a friend. He wants to do anything he can for you. He has faith in you, and above all, he remembers the good turns you have done for him.

One of the most striking features of my experience with the man on the street in the U.S.S.R. was the number of times people expressed to me their gratitude for what we had done for them in this war - and not only in this war but at the end of the last war through the American Relief Administration. That is especially significant because of the fact that for 25 years the U.S.S.R. government has been trying to make the people believe that we did very little for them at the end of the last war, and that most of the material which was shipped in was to prevent starvation and came really from the Soviet Government and not from the American people.

The suspicions of the U.S.S.R. governors are based on various reasons. They have never got over the fact that it was only recently that they emerged from the state of being outcasts. They know that it was only in 1934 that the United States Government recognized the U.S.S.R. They know that when war broke out there were a lot of countries which did not recognize the U.S.S.R. They have very little faith in Great Britain. They are convinced if Britain had had her way, Hitler would have gone eastward, and that Britain would have made a deal with Hitler if Hitler had gone toward Russia first rather than gone westward. They remember Munich and the fact that they were not consulted about Munich; and they have not yet gotten over the fact that they were looked down upon by the rest of the world until relatively recently. There is also the fact that the older ones, in order to live under the Czar, had to be secretive about everything in order to save their own hides, and the younger ones still are convinced that there may be enemies within their gates, which requires

secrecy. There has been more secrecy in the U.S.S.R. during the war and since the fall of Germany than there was before the war, and that is understandable. The same is true in the United States.

I think the difference is this, that once the peace has been declared officially by Congress, it is going to be a lot harder to maintain secrecy in this country than it is at the present moment, when we are still legally in a state of war. That secrecy will not disappear in the U.S.S.R., because there is the tradition within the government that they are not quite sure that they can trust the other fellow. We experienced that particularly at Potsdam. When I say "we", I mean the United States and Great Britain. We had a problem there of getting the Russians to join with us in the membership of three very important committees which we felt were essential to bring some measure of organization back to Europe. It was suggested that we have a European Advisory Commission, a European Economics Commission, which would in a sense check up what has to be done to get Europe back on its feet, give priorities to the importation of certain materials and certain equipment, so that we would be sure that there would be some order in the reconstruction of Europe.

The U.S.S.R. delegates first wanted to read the terms of reference. What would they be supposed to be doing? Secondly, what would we be doing? Their argument was, "We did not draw the constitution. We did not draw the terms of reference. We want to check every line, every dot, every 'T' which is crossed." The fact is they refused to join even after they did all that. We tried to get them to join the European Coal Commission so we could allocate coal in a manner which would be most conducive to speedy reconstruction. There was a tremendous amount of hesitation and suspicion. How was it going to affect them? We had the same thing in regard to the European Transport Commission. President Truman tried hard to get them to adopt it, but the Russians would not join with us in it. However, it was evident in our meetings,



by the questions they asked, that they were not quite sure that something was not going to be put over on them.

As long as that feeling remains, whether justified or not, it is a very important factor which we must take into consideration in any discussion of the control of the atomic bomb.

We had that experience during the war. We wanted to get certain information from them on their method of making rubber from alcohol. We sent a commission over there. Our representatives waited around and cooled their heels for weeks and came back with very little, I must say. On the other hand, we did give them some of our technical secrets; but even in Washington the War Production Board had a tremendous amount of opposition from business interests represented on the Board against revealing that information to the Russians.

So, you have first, as I say, the background of these people; secondly, their feeling of suspicion; and thirdly, their method of doing business. The Russian government does not delegate authority to its representatives. (Mr. Lubin here told some off-the-record stories to illustrate his points regarding business methods and authority.)

.....At Potsdam, we worked in an interesting way. We had subcommittees of the Council of Foreign Ministers. We would make our recommendations. We would be given a term of reference, make recommendations. They would be discussed in morning meetings by the three Foreign Ministers, Molotov, Bevin and Byrnes. If they agreed upon them they would recommend them to the Big Three and they would be agreed to at the afternoon meeting. If they disagreed they would present a disagreement to the Big Three; but we never could get a change of a commitment on the part of the Russians either in subcommittees or even with Molotov in many instances. Stalin would change. He would do that after he listened to the argument. In one instance I remember we did not present the thought of the argument. He said, "Stop! Khorosho! (O.K.!) Get on

to the next point."

Why they do not have this authority to change a point of view I don't know, but you run up against this fact constantly. And you will run up against it when an Inspection Committee on atomic matters gets to some place in Central Siberia and wants to do something and the fellow out there does not have the authority to do what the Commission thinks he ought to be doing.

Another factor which you have to take into consideration is that these people are proud people. Because they are proud there are certain things which they don't like the rest of the world to know about. They don't want their poverty spoken about. They don't want people to come into their country and pick out specific instances and write about them and misinterpret or magnify things which they have seen in the U.S.S.R. Because of that pride and that feeling of secrecy which comes with it and which in a sense magnifies their pride, there is definite restriction of movement in the U.S.S.R. There always has been, and it still exists.

That is the first thing we have to remember if we are going to try to get the Russians to come along on any system of widespread, careful inspection.

The second factor was mentioned by Major Eliot -- the place of public opinion in the life of Russia. Major Eliot pointed out that in this country the ultimate determinant of what is done is public opinion, and you and I have a right to go out and stir up public opinion and educate the American people to want something. If we became a party to an international agreement which permitted all the things which were discussed here this morning, for example, and the public knew about it, the chances are that nine times out of ten our Government would have to go along. You might change the party in power. You might put in Republicans, or put in Socialists or anybody you want; but public opinion would still be there to see to it that we kept our part of the bargain, if that public opinion approved of the bargain we originally made.

In the U.S.S.R. public opinion is not a factor. In fact, there is none in the sense in which we exercise it. Public opinion there is determined by the government, by the press which is controlled by the government, by the radio which is controlled by the government; so you do not have the forces at work there which will assure you of that contractual fulfillment as you would have in a democratic country.

That does not mean that public opinion does not play some part in the life of the Russian Government. The changes which have occurred over the last twenty-five years are phenomenal. They have developed public opinions of certain types. They have developed a chauvinism, these different republics. It is surprising to hear how the Ukrainians talk about the Georgians, and the Georgians talk about the White Russians, and the White Russians talk about the Tartars. They are running little shows more and more by themselves, and less and less Moscow can give orders, and less and less Moscow can send in representatives to run certain situations unless the people they send happen to be people of the republic in which this problem exists. I foresee in another generation the same fight we have had here, of state versus federal control. You see growing evidences of that in Russia.

Granted that the Moscow Government stimulated chauvinism during the war to get people pepped up, and gave out certain authorities in order to take certain actions, the fact still remains that what they have done cannot easily be undone. It is because of the absence of public opinion and the inability to make that opinion felt as in a democratic country that you do have a problem.

I have implicit faith in any commitment which Stalin will undertake, but what if Stalin should die? What if there should be a change of leadership? There would be no public opinion to force the continuation of such a policy. You can easily fall into the hands of a leader who would become isolationist and tell the rest of the world to go its own way, forbidding you to



come in to inspect.

These are the problems which you are going to have to overcome. You are dealing with a different psychology. You are dealing with a different type of government. You are dealing with different political forces than we know in the United States, and for that reason the job is going to be a difficult one in the early stages. After all, we are trying to sell an entirely new concept.

Major Eliot said we were not so sure we have sold it to the American people. Will the American people stand for any commission which is appointed, as they will say, by a bunch of foreigners to visit our mines and our plants?

When you take that into consideration and ask yourself what the attitude of the Russian Government will be under the conditions I described, you can get some idea of the nature of the problem you have to deal with. You want to remember too that you are dealing with a people who have an oriental psychology. In a large part they don't think the way we do.

Major Eliot also mentioned the difficulty of words at San Francisco. We ran across difficulties of words every day in Moscow. We would agree on something, write it out and then could not agree on what the thing meant. We said it meant one thing, and the Russians said it meant another, and we knew if a word was changed it would mean something else again.

If you are going to draw up regulations with regard to inspection as to what is going to be done by boards, etc., you are going to have that problem again. It arises out of suspicion. They are afraid of us, and until that suspicion disappears, your problems are going to become more and more difficult. They are not sure we want to live in the same world with them or that we will permit them to live the life which they want to live, so that if you take into consideration this new concept you are going to sell them, we will have to sell ourselves too their oriental point of view, this difficulty of interpretation of words, the fact that their attitude toward life is

different than ours; and this suspicion must be considered. To make any contract under such conditions is going to be a laborious process, and the actual implementation of such a contract is going to bring all sorts of difficulties. This does not mean, however, that I am pessimistic about the matter.

This morning Professor Kerr mentioned that one of the basic factors in determining whether you could have successful inspection of raw materials is a knowledge of the metal resources of the world. We don't know what the resources of the U.S.S.R. are. We have geologists who have made all sorts of estimates but we don't know whether actually they are anywhere near those estimates. At least they have never told us. We don't know how much gold the U.S.S.R. has. If we are going to loan them money, we would like to know how much money they have with which to make purchases. Maybe they don't need money. Maybe they can buy anything they need with the gold they have.

It is rather interesting that the first international agreement which was actually made, which they have not signed yet and which may be the colored gentleman in the woodshed -- the Bretton Woods agreement -- provides for the first time that every member of the Monetary Commission and of the International Bank must furnish to the Commission certain information about its production, its gold holdings and a whole series of economic facts which will enable the Bank and the Fund to determine how to act in a world economy.

We had a difficult time with the Russians at Bretton Woods. They did not want to come along on that deal. They finally agreed, but they have not signed the agreement. If they sign it, the optimism which I have for the first time relative to getting a start in knowing what is happening and getting the information which Professor Kerr says is necessary, may become a reality.

Secondly, I am optimistic because of the fact that the type of people who would be on any inspection commission is going to be entirely different, I hope, (and I am almost sure they will be) from the type of people who

have been doing business with the Russian Government. As representatives of Great Britain, the United States and other nations, they are going to be scientists. They are not going to deal in ideologies. They are going to deal in specific terms with facts, with materials. They are going to be speaking the same language. One may talk in Russian, another may speak in English, but the thing they are talking about is something they will all understand.

When you talk about democracy to a Russian it means one thing to him. He will say you don't have it in the United States, and he will prove it to you, in his opinion. "Look at the negroes in the State of South Carolina," he will say. "You don't have democracy in America."

When you are talking about radium or uranium, however, you are talking about something specific. It will mean the same thing to two different scientists no matter what their language happens to be, and by that process I think you will develop an understanding which it is <sup>difficult</sup> to do when you are dealing with political ideologies. I saw that in Russia.

In my opinion probably the best informed American on Russia is a scientist who represents the Department of Agriculture. He has not learned about Russia by going to the Society for Cultural Relations or to the Foreign Office. He has learned about Russia by going to the experimental laboratories, the experimental farms. He sits there with the people day after day and tells them what we are doing in the United States in developing new strains of wheat, and they tell him what they are doing - and they are proud of what they are doing. They have dinner together and tea, and maybe a little vodka. They sit around perhaps for two or three days. That is the way you find out what is happening. I think this coming together and living together of the scientists will have a very big and significant effect upon Russia's understanding us and having faith in us and losing some of that suspicion which they have. I know of no other way of really doing this, and I would recommend if we do have an inspection commission, that it be the same commission for all countries



- not one for Russia, and another for some other country. I feel the Russians, the Americans, the French and the British should be together. You should have one large commission, break it up in parts, but always have some of the same people coming together so they will live with each other, know each other, and have the same sort of interests - the same sort of problems to cope with.

I am convinced that once the leaders of the Russian Government are convinced that we, the western peoples, want peace, your problems of inspection will not be insuperable.

CHAIRMAN EICHELBERGER: Our third speaker, who will discuss the political problems of the rest of the world, is Mr. Malcolm W. Davis, Acting Director of the Division of Intercourse and Education of the Carnegie Endowment. Mr. Davis was loaned by the Carnegie Endowment to U.N.C.I.O. in San Francisco, where he was Executive Officer of the First Commission. He was in Geneva for five years. He knew the League of Nations very well through contact with it. I believe he has much to offer on the political aspect of our problem in relation to the rest of the world.

THE POLITICAL PROBLEM - IN RELATION TO OTHER COUNTRIES

Malcolm W. Davis

To romp through the rest of the world in a consideration of the political problem as it affects the question of inspection and control of atomic energy means skipping from country to country in a way which makes it impossible to pretend to do more than throw out two or three problems for your discussion. It will be impossible to cover this area in the time at my disposal.

One of the first things which has to be done is to bring the discussion down to the kinds of questions which you have in mind and not to a general political discussion of the rest of the world.

The other speakers have touched on one point which I would like to emphasize. It is this: that the physical scientists have been able to solve their problems, to deal with them, more effectively than the political scientists have. I submit to you that that is partly because the physical scientists do have the opportunity of dealing with reasonably controllable elements, once you can understand them. The political scientists have to deal with the unreasonably uncontrollable elements which we all are; and what happens about the forces that the physical scientists have turned loose is the joint problem we have to deal with.

In taking these other countries, apart from the two that have been discussed, for the moment I am going to ask you to imagine that I am speaking, trying to speak, as if I were a national of one of them and not as an American, because coming back from a recent visit to London and Paris gave me an opportunity for talking not only with English and French friends, but with others from the Continent - Belgian, Dutch, Danish, Norwegian, Czech, Swedish and Swiss.

To give you a little sense of how they regard us - and by "us" I

mean both the Russians and the Americans, the United States - the feeling seemed to be about like this: that the English and the British Commonwealth and European people are about equally worried in different ways over the Russian Soviet Union and the American United States because both are almost equally irresistible to the other nations, at least for the moment, unless they should pull a Western European bloc together. I am speaking particularly of that Western European part of the world, and not of Latin America and Asia, because Europe and the English part of the world are situated between the Soviet Union and the United States whatever may happen, and the people of those countries are a little concerned, particularly about the American United States. That is because it seems as if the balance of energies and forces and influences in this country may present or produce a kind of American economic and financial imperialism for an industrial and social system of the kind which Americans believe in. They don't mean that all Americans would want to do that. They are only talking about a kind of balance of forces which may produce pressures from America on them. In connection with that, they are doubly worried over the fact that Americans control the manufacture of atomic weapons. Americans have not only the technical knowledge but also indicate great desire to keep that knowledge to themselves. And Americans have the facilities.

When it comes to control and inspection, the first question which these others want resolved is: how can such control and inspection be imposed on Americans?

English and European people noted that in the Conference about armaments at Geneva - and let us not call it the Disarmament Conference because it was a conference about armaments - Americans were willing on the whole to accept less control and less inspection than anybody else, including the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union would go much farther in agreeing to inspection, and could go farther in imposing it on the component elements in the



Union, than would the United States. So the others wonder also how the possession of this atomic power may be going to influence the American political system in relation to the kinds of economic and financial and industrial purposes which Americans may pursue, and which may affect the way other countries develop.

Would American industrial inspection of atomic energy, heat, light, power and resources mean that Americans would want or would attempt to exercise influences on others to determine their economic development and determine the way they handled industrial products for use inside their own systems and inside their own countries? That is part of what they want resolved as we come to an agreement about atomic bombs and atomic energy, because it is more than just that one technical problem. It is the general political-social problem.

Among the other countries concerned about such matters, the ones chiefly involved would obviously be those which at least at present are known to be in some sense sources of uranium, its derivatives, or thorium oxide. Let us leave out of consideration the unknown ones not yet inspected for such materials. Besides the countries discussed we know there are considerable sources in the Belgian Congo, in Canada, some in Czechoslovakia and the Minerals Yearbook has indicated their existence in possibly others - in Bulgaria, in Portugal, in Sweden. Some of these are countries that do not belong to the United Nations; and the question begins to come up, "What are you going to do, if you get a United Nations' agreement to handle this problem, about countries which do not belong to the system?"

If you move on from uranium sources to sources of thorium or thorium oxide outside of the countries which have been discussed, you also get Brazil and British India. What are you going to do about control and inspection in that group of countries?

The problem involves partly other members of the United Nations, and particularly a few non-belligerents in this war who are not under any agreement as yet with regard to the system.

That leaves open the question of Spain. There is an English-European Committee of Inquiry on European Questions in London, which works in a quiet way but which has indicated that there is evidence of some experiments in Spain with a small group of German scientists also on matters related to the problems which we are discussing here today, and apparently they have at least some materials with which to work. So still another highly uncertain, unpredictable country which is not a member of the United Nations comes into question.

What I am attempting to do here is to throw out to you, both as political and physical scientists, the fact that this problem of atomic energy control and inspection involves the question as to how any system of the United Nations, or any other system that could possibly be devised, could be put through against the political and psychological resistances which we all set up when it becomes a matter of letting foreigners come into our territory. It involves the question as to how any system can operate with countries not belonging to it, and how it would operate with the countries now belonging to it.

It is true that Paragraph 6 in the Second Article of the first Chapter in the United Nations Charter does provide that the United Nations shall see to it that the purposes and principles of the system are observed, in order to maintain peace and security, by nations that are not members of the system; but when you think of applying that in action you have to begin to think in terms of a set of very specific steps to be taken in order to see to it, let us say, that the Government of Spain, or the Government of Portugal, or the Government of Sweden, or the Government of Brazil or any of the United Nations accept all the degrees of control and inspection which would be

necessary to make it safe.

I submit to you at the end that what we are talking about is not nearly so much a fear of atoms as a fear of peoples, as a fear of what we know is in ourselves and in other men. The technicians indicate to us that the practical technical problem can be reasonably solved if the less practical political problem can be resolved, so that you can begin to make an attempt to get the control and inspection under way. I submit that we have to start with the available system, that we have to see how that can be made to work, and how that can be amended and developed to something better, or we have no chance whatsoever of starting at all.

CHAIRMAN EICHELBERGER: You have had three areas of the world covered. From now until as long as you want to run we will have a round table discussion. Address your questions to the three speakers, to each other, or make your own speech, as you wish.

DR. BENEDICT: I should like to comment on the last point you made, Mr. Davis. As I understood the consensus of the opinion of the technical people speaking this morning, it was that inspection would stand a rather good chance of success if it could be instituted before certain of these facilities were actually built in parts of the world which were under control, but that the chances of success of inspection would be greatly lessened if the facilities had already been constructed and there was an intent on the part of the country possessing them to divert a portion of their production to improper uses.

The United States, of course, is already in that position. It seems to me that it is most imperative, if the hope of the world is to avoid atomic war, to see that an inspection system can be devised in less time than it takes for other countries to develop these facilities, and my impression is that there is at most a period of two to three years in which this can be done.





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