

DR. RIDENOUR: That would depend on whether they could do it or not.

DR. ROSENBERG: A question was raised yesterday that was not answered, and I would like to raise it now. There is an urgent problem that this country possesses plants and is making fissionable material, and may or may not be making bombs, and certainly could make them. How long would it take to go through the political machinery necessary to come to some international agreement?

Apparently everybody in the panel has agreed that we need either amendments to the Charter or special international treaties to provide for international agreements on the production of atomic energy. Do we have time? If we don't, how can we hasten the international machinery so that we can get it done faster?

PROFESSOR KIRK: There is no way of saying how much time it takes because sometimes those things can be done very expeditiously and sometimes they drag on for a long time. I don't think any flat answer can be given. Perhaps Professor Eagleton knows what the average time has been to conclude international conventions.

PROFESSOR EAGLETON: I don't know.

PROFESSOR KIRK: What you are saying is that there is an urgent situation, in that the situation may get worse while negotiations are going on. That could be stopped by voluntary action on the part of this government concerning the production of new bombs. As an earnest of its intention to cooperate, the American representative on the new exploratory atomic commission could announce that we had agreed to suspend production, pending the completion of the work of the Commission. In this way the situation could be frozen and so it would not deteriorate while the other political arrangements were made.

CHAIRMAN JESSUP: Is it not fair to say on the time element that the business of forming the commission, getting the report from the commission,

and the report to the organs, does not require a great amount of time; that your amount of time is consumed in getting legislative bodies in the different states to meet and to take action on it? That has been the history of the delay in getting international agreements. Most countries have to refer them back to a house or a senate, and that does take a great deal of time.

DR. FELD: The question has been raised before as to the relationship between any domestic legislation which the United States might pass and possible international agreements.

I might say that there is a bill -- the McMahon Bill -- which has recently been introduced in Congress. Some of us have been discussing this at great length. There are some very attractive features about it from the international point of view which might be mentioned. First of all, there is the idea of placing complete power over all production of fissionable material -- a virtual monopoly on fissionable material and on power production -- in the hands of a single commission. That I think is good because it prevents the spreading out of these materials -- the spreading out of power plants, of knowledge and production of vested interests within a country -- which would make the job under control, once undertaken by the international commission, more difficult. It places the entire control in one governmental body. This would implement one international agreement which we would arrive at.

A second good thing about the bill is that it states explicitly that any work, any knowledge, any control that the United States may have on the military use of fissionable materials is subject to international control, and that international control will take precedence over any act of the United States with reference to the use of atomic weapons. This again is good because, first of all, it would assure other nations that such international control will be effective, and second, because it provides a means for making it effective insofar as military weapons are concerned.

We do think the bill can be strengthened in some respects, but what

I wanted to point out is that the McMahon Bill, as written now, and certainly with the suggested changes that some of us think should be made, first of all will help to provide a certain amount of confidence within the international body<sup>of</sup> nations so that they can make an agreement, know that the United States does have the power to abide by it, and second, does provide the necessary control so that such agreement can be implemented.

CHAIRMAN JESSUP: The only unpleasant part of chairing this meeting is bringing it to a close. I am always skeptical of analogies, but I would like to suggest one very simple point in the connection between the scientific work and the work in the natural and social sciences. Obviously no mathematician would have thought of tearing up Einstein's formula on the ground that it had not solved all of the existing problems. No physicist would have suggested destroying the cyclotron because on first operation it had not answered all of the questions. Similarly in the political field, the fact that the first experiment, or a second experiment, or a third experiment does not achieve all that is desired of it is not a ground for destroying that experiment or of ceasing to continue with the operation of that experiment.

I would like to suggest that in this field of political and social science, and in all work with human instruments, that the resistance of human nature with which human brains have to contend is even greater than the resistance of matter with which you have to contend.

Thank you very much!

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SATURDAY AFTERNOON SESSION  
January 5, 1946

An informal group luncheon at the Hotel Beekman followed the close of the morning session.

When the Conference reconvened at 2:30 p.m. at the headquarters building of the American Association for the United Nations, for the afternoon program which ended its two-day meeting, a change in the scheduled order of business transferred the discussion on Program and Plans for the Future to the first half of the afternoon's agenda. No record of that part of the discussion has been included in this report.

CHAIRMAN SHOTWELL: I think we are ready now to go into the final part of our program, with a consideration of World Government. We are to have two speakers on this subject -- Mr. Thomas K. Finletter and Professor Schuyler C. Wallace.

Mr. Finletter is a former Assistant to the Secretary of State. He has had long experience in public life, and is a distinguished lawyer, citizen and friend.

Mr. Finletter!

THE PROBLEM OF WORLD GOVERNMENT

Thomas K. Finletter

We have now reached the point where we are talking about world government. I am glad to have this opportunity for the first time of talking to men of science about this thing, for several reasons. I think what the scientists have done, and particularly what you gentlemen have done, has been about the one ray of light which I have been able to discern in this whole situation.

As I understand it, you invented this thing and then, having done it, were so appalled by what you had done that you decided it was your duty as citizens of the world to tell the people of your own country and all the other countries just what it was. You abandoned all your traditions and barged into this other field. That is the greatest contribution to world peace which I know of recently.

On the other hand, I think that some of your suggestions have been damaging. Just as you have broken all precedents in applied science, and have therefore had to show an audacity which I suppose is revolutionary, when you got out in the field of political science you became very timid and as reactionary in that field as you were forward looking in the other. Some of your suggestions in the political line I believe have been definitely harmful. That is understandable. After all, I am a lawyer and I can understand the business of mystifying people with terms of law. I would not have much income if I didn't. Maybe you gentlemen do it in your field sometimes, but I am absolutely certain that the political scientists do it in theirs.

I really mean this quite seriously. I hope that you will throw off this modesty and refuse to be satisfied with any political solution on the same standards that you refuse to be satisfied by the scientific solution. I beg of you, in the interest of the future of the world, get critical of political science.

One of the best things written on this whole matter, and it ought to be on your letterhead, is that letter which some of you wrote to the New York Times. You remember, somebody in the Times had said that you fellows should stick to your scientific knitting and keep your fingers out of international politics -- to leave that to the international politicians; and some gentlemen from Los Alamos wrote in reply the letter which I regard as a masterpiece. I remember what you said was that it would suit you to leave all these matters to the international experts, but that you wanted to know who they were, and where was the evidence of their handiwork?

What I am going to try to do briefly is to tell you why I believe that there is only one general type of solution to this problem politically, and that is some form of world government.

On the political side you have the choice between only one of two courses, and that is the main point I want to make. On the one hand, you have an arrangement which is based on a relationship of some kind between independent sovereign states in which the whole gist of the arrangement is mutual confidence and good faith. That is the first alternative.

The second alternative is some form of arrangement among the peoples of the world which in effect amounts to world government. I am going to come back to what I mean by world government. But the sharp distinction is this -- that in one case the reliance is on good faith, and in the second case the reliance is on law which is enforceable. Now please let me say dogmatically, despite the existence of some philosophic theories to the contrary, that for our purposes, gentlemen, there is no law which is not enforceable. I repeat again there are only two alternatives. One is an arrangement based on good faith, on contractual relations between sovereign states, and the other is world government, even though there are of course enormous variations within the two categories.

I want to emphasize this very dogmatic distinction because at the



moment there is an almost frantic search to find something which is in between. I don't like these analogies, but the way to look at it is this: It is like crossing the Rubicon. You either go the whole way over or you do not. What happens on the other side, of course, varies, but you either have to cross this boundary line or not. For that reason I deplore so many suggestions which have come from the scientists in which they try to work out some scheme which is something less than that -- to work out some magic formula. I don't think there is any magic formula. You have to do either one thing or the other.

What I want to do is to approach this thing not in broad conceptual terms, but to try to take it step by step. Will you bear with me as we try to see what is necessary as a political matter to control the weapons of mass destruction?

The first thing I think you will agree to is that there must be a rule that these weapons of mass destruction cannot be manufactured. I think you will agree that it is not safe to let them be manufactured, because if they are they will go off, or at least there is such a high danger that they may go off that you have to assume that they will. Obviously such a rule of itself is of no value whatsoever. It is merely like the Kellogg-Briand Pact whereby in 1928, 65 nations solemnly forever renounced war. And so you have to move into a second step. You have to see to it that this law is enforced.

How are you going to enforce that law? Quite clearly, you can do that only if you establish some world organization (and I think you should utilize UNO for that purpose) with preponderant military force. Quite obviously you are not going to be able to enforce the law if any one nation is able to say to you, "We don't like your law and we won't let you enforce it"; so there must be preponderant military power which comotes practically the total disarmament of nation states.

Having got those two things you still would need a third. UNO would have to know what is going on in the world because I believe it would be

possible that certain types of weapons of mass destruction could be manufactured secretly unless there was an adequate inspection system. If I am wrong, we don't need this, but let us assume that I am right. Obviously that inspection system will have to be adequate, which means that it will have to be enforceable, which means that the UNO inspectors will have to have the power to go into any factory or home, if necessary, in every country.

Next it seems to me (and please remember I am trying to talk in practical terms, my thesis being that when you talk in practical terms you end up in world government) that UNO must have the power to enforce its decrees directly against the individual citizen. If, for example, the UNO inspectors report back that Plant X in Country X is making atomic weapons, obviously UNO should say to that government, "You stop those fellows making those weapons." But if that government failed to act, quite clearly UNO would have to have the power to send its enforcement agents directly into the plant and stop it.

Next it seems to me that you would have to have a legislative assembly in UNO with the power to make laws. You would start off with your original rules that the manufacture of these things was illegal (and parenthetically I think you have to have the basic law that war itself is illegal) as a starter. You obviously would have to have a legislative body which would interpret those controls. How would you know what are weapons of mass destruction? You have to define that. I doubt if you gentlemen would agree on a definition at the moment. You certainly are not free to tell us your definition. Therefore, you have to have the right to change the rules under which the UNO operates. That means you have to have a legislature and that means that the legislature must be set up on some democratic basis. It cannot be set up on the basis of one representative for a state or nation.

Finally you have to have an executive who would execute. The present executive of UNO is, as you know, the Security Council, which has the right to determine each time as a political matter whether or not a certain decision



shall be taken. Any executive which is going to work must have the duty of executing the laws as does the American Executive. Therefore, you will have either to modify the veto in the Security Council or to establish some other kind of executive.

Lastly, I think you would probably have to have a limited taxing power. Governor Stassen's proposal might do. You remember what his tax was -- a tax on international travel. It seems to me that you have to give to UNO the ability to get the money it needs for its purposes. Otherwise the nation-states could prevent it from functioning.

I suppose that all of that shocks you in your capacity as political scientists just as much as it does everybody else. Obviously all of this is a tremendous order, because what I described here adds up of course to world government. It is a very shocking thing, not so much, I think, in its original implications as in the possibility of where it might go. After all, our own federal government was set up on certain limitations of power, one of which was of course that the institution of slavery should be preserved, and eventually those powers grew and grew and grew until the relative influence of the states has largely disappeared -- and I, being a conservative lawyer, don't like that any more than you do.

I think it is a very disagreeable thing which I have proposed. On the other hand, what is the alternative? I believe you know much more about the alternative than we do. I gather from the way you talk some of the time that some of the things you know scare you so that the alternative is much worse than we laymen think it is. Nevertheless we have to think what the alternative is, and I would like to mention the political aspects of what I guess it is.

For example, it seems to me that you are going to reach a critical point some time or other. You gentlemen say that in ten years or less other nations will have these atomic weapons. Let us call that the critical point,

because up to the time you have reached that point I don't think there is going to be much trouble. In the United States a lot of us are going to worry about it, but the United States is going to go on its way. However, as I see it, once you get to the critical point and these things you tell us can happen have really become a reality and not just something appearing in Collier's Magazine, then I think we are really going to get worried about this business. What are we going to do?

I don't know what you would advise us to do or what you would advise the President to do, but I gather from some of the things I have read from some of you that you would tell us that dispersion is the only answer. You will tell me, I hope, what the answer is. If the answer is what I have read, it sounds awfully unpleasant and involves an enormous degree of regulation by the War Department. If you gentlemen will assure us that we can get some rays to shoot up there and stop these things so they won't come, that is all right, but if, on the other hand, you are going to advise us that we have to really have our entire economy, our entire population, in the position where we can take one of these attacks and still be able to strike back, I would like to know what that is. The implications of it sound pretty terrible to me.

It would be extremely helpful, if instead of the statement issued by some of your gentlemen, you would really get pretty particular as to just what you would advise the War Department to recommend to the President as a method of taking an unforeseen atomic attack without having huge casualties and still being in a position to strike back. We don't know. We laymen don't know how we are going to make our political decisions because we don't know the scientific facts. But I want to throw this to you on the political side and that is, if you say that we are going to have to submit to a War Department State in this country as a matter of self-protection, I don't think the American people will stand for it. I think that if they have to take the choice between being regimented in that way or being helpless, they are going

to be helpless.

The point I want to make is that there will be a real change overnight when the critical point comes. Then the United States of America will pass from being a power which is unattackable by any power into a nation which is extremely vulnerable.

As between those two alternatives, and assuming that what I have said is anywhere near the truth of the alternative of doing nothing, I personally prefer the alternative of limited world government, which is the one I have tried to describe. There are some other people -- I think it is worth mentioning this -- who would say that the approach which I have suggested is all wrong; that you have to go at this thing in a much bigger way; that you cannot eliminate war unless you strike at the causes of war, some of which are, for example, the economic injustices of the world, the fact that certain peoples have ownership or control of the arable land or otherwise desirable parts of the world, and that as long as those injustices remain you will have to face war as inevitable, atomic or otherwise. That may be true. I don't know the answer.

But you see what the consequences of accepting that theory are. They are that you must set up a full world state with the powers of UNO at least equal to those in the Federal Government of the United States. It seems to me that those who advocate that may be right, but they are wrong in advocating it as a necessary first step. The first step should be merely to take the specific limited things which you have to have in order to get control of the weapons of mass destruction and set those up, and if they lead you into limited world government, all right, they do, and let these other problems go for the future.

Personally I have a great faith in the Economic and Social Council of UNO. That has been explained to you of course, and it is the organ which is to establish through nation-state cooperation the social and economic basis



of peace. I would leave that job to the Economic and Social Council, injecting the element of government and law only to the absolute minimum extent necessary in order to achieve the result which is attained.

I want to mention one point briefly. I think if you sit down and talk to any group of men quietly and long enough they will agree with you that world government is desirable. I have met very few people who after a reasonable discussion will not say, "Yes, I agree that is the inevitable future course." But the attack on it comes through the "When?" question. I mean anybody will agree that world government is possible and desirable a thousand years from now, and the point I want to make is that the gradualist approach to government is an impossible one.

I will make this very quickly. There is a theory, of which I have heard a great deal, that you can go into this thing gradually. Just take your inspection plans. First of all you start making an interchange of scholars; then as the scholars get used to each other you move up a bit and maybe you get a partial inspection system which does not amount to much; then after you get used to that you might really eventually end up with a real inspection system which would be complete and enforceable. That is a line of action sustained by very distinguished people.

The other line on the legal side is this: don't for goodness' sake shock public opinion by asking for a world legislative assembly. Edge into it. Get a lot of international streets criss-crossing, establishing international law. Establish a world common law by decisions and treaties. Rely on the Nuremberg trials because the Nuremberg trials are almost the first example of direct jurisdiction over the individual by an international tribunal. Do the same thing all along the line. Edge in gradually until you get the result, a little bit at a time. Until a week ago, that was about the official policy of the Government of the United States.

The Atomic Bomb Declaration -- and I want to make this in the form

of a flat assertion because it will be interesting to have a debate on it -- committed the United States Government, the United Kingdom and Canada to world government. I don't see how you can give any other interpretation to a paper of that solemnity, signed by the heads of the governments of these three countries, which calls for "effective and forcible safeguards for the maintenance of the rule of law," and for what in effect amounts to total disarmament -- that is, the elimination of weapons of mass destruction.

The implication of these words in my opinion is that they call for world government but only eventually; for then the Atomic Declaration goes on to say that all of this is to be done by gradual stages. You reach the point where the next stage is to be undertaken as the confidence for the previous stage has been gained.

The Atomic Declaration went on to list four immediate points to be put on the agenda of the UNO. A commission is to be set up for this purpose. The first one was the exchange of scientists. I forget what the second one is. The third and fourth are the important ones. The third was the point about total national disarmament and the fourth was the effective control so as to insure complying states against the hazards of violations of other states. But notice that No. 3 was total disarmament.

When Mr. Byrnes took that Atomic Declaration to Moscow, two things happened: No. 1, the phrase about enforceable safeguards came out. It became only "effective safeguards" against the use of atomic energy. And the rule of law came out. There is no reference to the rule of law in the Moscow Agreement. You ask my guess as to what happened. It is that the American and United Kingdom representatives proposed it and that the Russians struck it out. That is my guess. I cannot believe that the United Kingdom and the United States failed to present it, because the words are too important.

The four items on the agenda, the four steps to be taken -- roughly speaking the ones I have described -- were included in the Moscow Agreement.

Please note what happened to the principle of gradualism when Mr. Byrnes got back from Moscow. The first thing which happened, briefly stated, was that Mr. Austin and Mr. Vandenberg said, "We want an explanation of gradualism. Did you agree to tell the Russians what our engineering know-how is before you get effective safeguards against the outbreak of war and the violation of the atomic regulations, or did you not? And did you commit the United States to disarm itself at least of its weapons of mass destruction before you have these effective safeguards?"

The result was that Mr. Vandenberg came out of the White House after seeing the President and said in effect, "I have been assured by the President of the United States that no one of these steps will be taken except as a part of the scheme which first creates completely effective security measures."

I submit you are not going to get security measures except on the minimum basis outlined to you a short time ago -- except on the basis of world government; and so I submit the present state of the international scene is that we still stand committed to the proposition that we are not going to tell the Russians anything really important about these weapons, and certainly we are not going to disarm ourselves from them until we have something which amounts to a limited world government.

CHAIRMAN SHOTWELL: We will now hear from Professor Wallace, Professor of Government at Columbia University.

Professor Wallace:



THE PROBLEM OF WORLD GOVERNMENT

Schuyler C. Wallace

After all you have already heard any comment I may make is very likely to be a repetition of something already said, or platitudinous. Perhaps the best way I can present my reflections on the subject of world government is to read a memorandum which I dictated this morning and which will, I think, precipitate the discussion which is the purpose of our presence here.

As I look at the phenomenon of government generally, I am continually struck with the multiplicity of forces in society making both for integration and disintegration. We who live in the closely knit American republic often forget the power of the centrifugal disintegrative forces in society. Yet, if we have forgotten our own Civil War, the disintegration of France in the days preceding and immediately following the German invasion, and the Civil War which is seemingly nascent in China, should all the more remind us of their continued existence. The history of the world during the last four or five centuries is nevertheless a history of increasing centralization and integration.

This is not the place to review the rise of the great national states of Europe -- England, France, Prussia and Russia. Nor is it the place to analyze in detail the techniques by which this integration was achieved. Suffice it to say that more often than not it was the work of the man on horseback. In every case, however, this military integration was supplemented and reinforced by the development of a common culture over the geographic area affected.

The development of an English national culture was necessary to complete the process of unification which had been initiated by the sheer military power of the Normans. Even in the United States our initial unity was born in war and revolution, our intermediate unity was consummated on the battlefield of civil war.

In the generations which have passed since the Civil War, this military integration has unquestionably been supplemented and superseded by an emotional integration. American nationalism has completely supplanted the parochial patriotisms of a century and a half ago.

But what are the deductions which can be drawn from this exceedingly cursory review of the elementary facts of history? One deduction is self-evident. The same play of centripetal and centrifugal forces exists today on an international scale that at one time existed in the geographic areas which are now occupied by the great nation states. At the moment, however, the centrifugal rather than the centripetal forces are dominant.

Does this mean that the movement for international organization and world government is clearly futile? Certainly not! The movement for international organization and world government should neither cease nor abate. It should, however, go forward with those participating in it realizing that if three hundred or more years were necessary to integrate the nation states of England and France, and one hundred and twenty-five years were necessary to integrate the United States of America, it is highly improbable that in the twinkling of an eye the diverse nationalisms and parochialisms of the world, based as they are on a multiplicity of cultures, will vanish and a world state emerge -- a state to which men will give their undying, or perhaps I should say dying, devotion.

Any discussion of the problem of a world government must begin with the fact of nationalism, a psychological fact as real and brutal as any fact of the material world, one which cannot be exorcised away by the political wishful thinking or incantations of any group of individuals, no matter how distinguished.

Instead of decrying nationalism, as has become fashionable in some circles, I would suggest that the integration of the four major peoples of the earth, in the British Empire, China, Russia and the United States, is a govern-

ment achievement of no mean significance, an achievement which should lend encouragement to those who seek to extend the reign of law and order to even wider areas.

Indeed the great problem of the moment is the retention of such advantage as has been gained in the development of both the great empires of the modern world and of smaller states, and the integration of these empires and small states into some form of overall organization.

During this morning's discussion you have heard the Charter of the United Nations analyzed from the point of view of the provisions for security, the provisions for economic welfare and the provisions for justice, and you have had presented to you proposals for the implementation or amendment of the Charter to make it a more adequate instrument for international control.

The Charter is without question a milestone on the road to world government. Certainly it can and must be improved.

May I suggest, however, that much more necessary at the moment than any radical revolution in the United Nations Organization, and much more imperative than the perfection of a paper plan for world government, is the very practical problem of making what has been created permanently acceptable to the peoples of the earth -- of making the United Nations Organization work. Only thus, in my opinion, is there any chance that in the course of time there will evolve in a peaceful manner something which may justifiably be called world government.

As we stand at the threshold of another experiment in international organization, we may well ask what are its chances for success? In so doing we may inquire into the causes of the failure of the League, and more importantly into the causes of war generally. And having done this, we may ask to what extent has, and to what extent can, the United Nations Organization eliminate these causes? To what extent can it curtail or control them?



Without attempting to review all the causes of war, a number of the forces and factors which have made for war in times past can be mentioned. A first is the eternal power drive of ambitious men; a second, the justified or imaginary grievances of the so-called have-not nations; a third, the justified or imaginary grievances of assertedly overpopulated nations; a fourth, economic rivalries between national states, or between empires; a fifth, the clash of nationalistic or cultural aspirations; a sixth, shifting power potentials due to technological changes; a seventh, the justified aspirations of developing colonial peoples; an eighth, the existence of individual and national vested interests which make both ruling classes and whole nations complacent about the status quo and loath to change it; a ninth, the exceedingly great difficulty of developing a mechanism for peaceful change which will really work; a tenth, the ease with which nationalism can be transformed into chauvinism.

Without pursuing our analysis further, we are perhaps justified in asking, "Is there anything in the present or in the foreseeable future which in anyway eliminates any of the preceding forces and factors?"

Insofar as I can see at any rate, the forces and factors which have made for war in the past continue to operate in the present and probably will operate in the immediate future.

Such being the case, the question may well be asked: "Why bother with the United Nations Organization at all?"

The answer is, of course, that there is a possibility that through the instrumentality of such an organization, some of these forces will be curtailed, others controlled. The paradox is, however, that even as we build or strive to build a world organization, we must of necessity build it on empires and national states which are subject to the same internal drives and vicissitudes of the circumstances which have in the past produced war.

Thus the United Nations Organization must of necessity face the fact that it rests on a world of nations which have not extended, and on the basis

of past experience cannot justifiably be expected to extend, to each other full confidence and trust.

From this brutal fact flows a multiplicity of complications which makes the task of creating any kind of international organization which will operate exceedingly difficult.

Obsessed by a realization of these difficulties, there are some who would scrap the United Nations Organization and strive at once for a world state. But even if this were possible of immediate achievement, which from a psychological point of view it is not, there would still remain a further multiplicity of complications which I can perhaps suggest by a series of questions.

First, how will you recruit, and where will you locate the command of, your military forces so that no one geographic area can dominate the world? More specifically, where will the troops, the tanks and bombers be stationed? Where will the atomic bomb depots be located?

Second, if the command of troops is decentralized, how can one guarantee that civil wars will not occur very similar in character to and as bloody as the wars between sovereign national states that now scourge mankind?

Third, assuming that you do maintain a uniform reign of law and order under a central authority, how do you prevent that central authority from becoming the greatest tyranny that has ever occurred in history? In other words, would not the eternal problem of the reconciliation of authority and liberty become infinitely more complex, and the costs of failure to reach a solution infinitely higher, than it has been in a world of diverse states?

Fourth, how do you prevent the central government from becoming an instrument of class exploitation?

Neither time nor the capacity of the speaker make possible an enumeration of all the difficulties and complexities which will involve and confront the United Nations, and to a much greater degree a world government if one were

created. Sufficient perhaps has been said to drive home the one thesis I have: that the movement for international organization must go forward, but that it must go forward with the full realization of the innumerable difficult problems and difficulties which lie ahead.

A blind belief in the magic of the words "world government" might on the one hand undermine national policies essential for our own security. On the other, the reiterated charges that the United Nations Organization is totally inadequate may equally well develop the feeling on the part of the American public that the whole experiment with international organization is futile -- and the result may be that once again we will turn to isolation as our national policy.

CHAIRMAN SHOTWELL: We now have before us some of the problems which come to the non-scientific mind in very direct form. I wish you would get after these with the directness of the round table of yesterday, and let us see where we are.

DR. HARRISON BROWN: After sitting through the session today and yesterday, I frankly have become more pessimistic about the whole situation than I have ever been before.

What has brought that out more than anything is the session this morning, when, after a rather lengthy analysis of the United Nations Charter, there came a time to propose amendments to the Charter or to suggest changes in the Charter. If I remember correctly everything that was suggested in the way of strengthening it, such as the elimination of the veto, the making of laws applicable to individuals, etc., was pretty much discounted by our panel here as being not possible.

I am speaking now for the scientists at my own place in Oak Ridge. The members of our Executive Committee feel very, very strongly that a world



government of the type Mr. Finletter has been discussing is really the only ultimate solution. How you get there we don't know, but we feel that it is primarily a question of public opinion and we are not quite as pessimistic about the public opinion part of it as the various people who have been sitting on the panel apparently are.

It really is amazing to me individually when I talk with people and tell them that in our opinion other nations will have atomic bombs in another three years, say, and perhaps saturation quantities of bombs in seven years, and that the cost of atomic bomb attacks in terms of both money and industrial effort is absolutely insignificant in comparison to the normal costs of war, that almost without exception, as Mr. Finletter has noticed, they come around to that viewpoint.

I have been conducting my own Pullman car questionnaire within the last few months. I have occasion to travel quite a bit and at least among individuals who travel on Pullman cars it is really quite amazing to see the ease with which they come around once they are confronted with the facts; but the trouble is that there are very few people who have as yet been confronted with the facts. I strongly feel that once, through tremendous publicity drives of one sort or another, educational schemes, programs, etc., the people of this country realize the implications and realize what they are up against, the difficulties of changing the veto, of strengthening the General Assembly, etc., will not be nearly as great as many have stated during the course of the discussion today.

MR. BREWER: I too was very much impressed by Mr. Finletter's talk.

I think it is of interest to note the work of Clinton Laboratory, where a similar group, K-25 and Y-12 at Oak Ridge, held joint discussion group meetings for a period of a week or two weeks. When we got through we laid out a program which was very similar to the one laid out here, with steps A, B, and C, on down the line, working into world government, and we had in it even

Plant X to cover the whole situation.

I don't know whether I express the same pessimism exactly, but it has been more and more apparent in our discussions yesterday and this morning that such a program, while you can write it down on paper, and the logic is there 100 percent, just cannot work. Public opinion, not only in the United States but in Russia perhaps and in other countries, won't allow this thing to come into being at the present time.

A program has been suggested here how we can go through the gradual stages of strengthening the United Organizations, retaining the veto and all matters which are inherent with the hope that in the future we will go on from that point to world government. But I would like from Mr. Finletter a more complete statement as to the particular ways and means by which we would start to move now. We have some suggestions already for starting to move in the other direction.

Supposing we agree entirely with your theory of what we should get, what are the things to do to arrive at them?

MR. FINLETTER: I would not pretend to be able to answer your question. I cannot say how to do this thing. It is the most difficult thing that the world has faced for centuries. I can suggest one or two things: more meetings like this, getting clear what you want; conducting as Dr. Shotwell and Mr. Eichelberger and others are doing, big campaigns to tell the people what it is all about; continuing above all the work that you scientists are doing of explaining to the maximum extent possible what are the dangers; if possible getting yourselves, so you can really tell the truth, freed of these restrictions which are on you; getting down in black and white some specific amendments which would achieve the program that your group has proposed.

That, by the way, is being done. There are some specific amendments now proposed. I see a copy of them being waved at me from the rear, which have been prepared very largely by Mr. Clark. He has got down references to Article

36, 49, and so on, all along the line, which amendments if adopted would achieve the result that you want.

In general, as point one, this must come from the United States, in my humble opinion. I think that Britain has decided on this issue.

I am guessing now, but this is what I think happened in Britain. Bevin came out about August 11 or 12, and said the atomic bomb changes nothing. Between that date and the time that he appeared to debate in the House of Commons on the Atomic Declaration signed by his Prime Minister, something very radical had happened, because then he came out for a world assembly operating under a world law with a world judiciary to interpret it and with a world police force to enforce it, namely world government. In other words, the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain -- and he never acted without the approval of his Cabinet, you can be sure -- came out in the House of Commons in a most solemn way and said he wanted world government. Mr. Anthony Eden of the Opposition a few days before said that he wanted the kind of government relationship between nations such as existed between England, Scotland and Wales, namely, world government. Both the party in power and the Opposition in the United Kingdom have come out for world government.

My guess is that the scientists of Britain told the Cabinet of Britain just what was going on and what the facts were. They then calculated what might happen if twenty-five of these bombs dropped on the United Kingdom and then said, "We are for world government."

So you have one of the Big Three for it. That leaves Russia and the United States. Russia is an unknown quantity. Nobody knows what Russia is going to do, but I am sure of one thing and that is that she is not going to do anything until she knows what the democracies are going to do, and so it comes back to us.

Therefore, broadly speaking, the answer to your question is, if you want this thing and really want it effective, you must have effective control



of these weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, you must try to persuade the American people by every educational form possible and by every representation to the representatives in Congress and the Executive Branch that you want it.

PROFESSOR WALLACE: I wonder if I might comment on that. The thing which has interested me is the fact that Mr. Finletter and I both agree that world government, if it is to be achieved, can only be achieved through the United Nations Organization.

Mr. Finletter's concept of world government is very definitely that of a limited world government confined exclusively to military problems as presented here.

I wonder if the first step upon which we can all agree is that a very considerable analysis remains to be done about one problem alone: How can we get under control the atomic bomb? Until that analysis has been worked out, there is little basis for your propaganda. If, when this analysis is complete, it logically leads to the kind of world government that Mr. Finletter has been espousing, I am far from sure that it cannot be sold to the American public. Of one thing I am certain -- the first problem <sup>is the problem</sup> of analysis based upon the assumption of a working UNO.

DR. MORRIS LEIKIND: Mr. Finletter raised a point which has been made several times before and which I want to emphasize once again with regard to getting as much relaxation on the secrecy provisions as possible in order to have the full facts put before the public. I myself am a non-atomic scientist, so I am not privy to many of the secrets that the physical scientists have on this thing. I have tried to talk about the atomic bomb with many people and always found myself skirting the edges of information which they cannot give me. There is a lot that should be made public so that the people can have an intelligent understanding of what is going on; and unless as much information as possible can be released from the secrecy provisions, I don't

think we are going to get very far in forming an intelligent public opinion on this thing. We ought to keep hammering to get such a release of information to the public.

PROFESSOR KERR: I might suggest that one of the first steps in this problem of security regulations is to go directly to headquarters and ask just what you can say and what you cannot. I think you would be surprised to find out how much you can say.

PROFESSOR RABI: I want to make two remarks, one about Professor Wallace's statement and another about Mr. Finletter's.

In the first place, it seems to me that we must interpret the lessons of history differently when we consider a world government than we would in considering a limited state. A limited state is subject to forces from without. I doubt very much if the war between the states would have occurred if it had not been for forces from without, which certainly aggravated the situation.

If we look at the course of recent history in any event, there have been very few breakups of large organizations except due to forces from without, and so my feeling is that if we had a world government, it would be much more stable than any of the individual states which we have seen, corresponding to a law in physics that you cannot move the centroid of a system except by forces from without. Therefore, I have a great deal more confidence in global government than I would have in any more limited system.

With regard to Mr. Finletter's suggestion, it seems to me that that limited form which he suggests probably will not go far enough, that we must envisage something more comprehensive -- and now I am talking on the basis of technical knowledge. In this sense when we talk of atomic energy we think first of the bomb and the control of the bomb, and a limited form of world government of the sort he suggests could probably do a job with that and control the bomb in the form in which we now know it, and control the factories

which are devoted to the manufacture of the bomb. But we must realize that we are just on the threshold of this new field, not only in science but in technology, and that along with the bomb goes atomic power, the capacities of which we don't realize at all at present.

I believe we can take a long point of view such as Langmuir takes and say that atomic power is quite unimportant, since the atomic bomb's destructive potential is so great in comparison to the little we could gain from atomic power that he and I would be ready to forbid the use of atomic power until such time as the world state which we project got well under way and had its complete legislative machinery and precedents, and had won a certain amount of loyalty from the population of the world. However, there would be a large element in the population which is not as timid as Dr. Langmuir and myself. They see a certain good there in the atomic energy and something which they would want to exploit.

There are important areas of the globe where this would make a great difference, not compared with the difference that a universal system of peace would make. It would certainly make an actual difference, one which they could see. There would be natural resources to exploit, so it does not seem to me in the cards that we can stop the use of atomic power. Our own President for example, I think, is fascinated with the thought of atomic power.

Once you get into the realm of atomic power and the degree of exploitation which would compare with natural power sources and the natural expansion which you would get by the use of such a convenient source of power, then of course you can get to the point where the amounts of material necessary for bombs become a byproduct of them and you come into power regulations and the use of them.

This does not at all bring up the question of what happens as the result of continuing research in those fields. You need further and further regulation, so I think a limited world government, although a tremendous step



forward, is not the sort of thing which would put our fears completely at rest or which would permit our ordinary civilization and science to go forward in the atmosphere of freedom to which we have become accustomed. I think we would have to really consider the scientific possibilities, and even some of the things we see now that have not been worked out have immense possibilities.

Just as a simple statement of it, the energy of fission is to some extent related to the source from which the sun derives its energy; but we know there are much greater sources of energy in the stellate oval which are many areas greater than the radiant energy of the sun. We don't know what it is. We know that there are scientific discoveries which we do not know how to utilize, just as we did not know how to utilize atomic energy until the discovery of fission, which are almost certainly right in the offing.

To be able to live under those possibilities, now that we have seen the first example of the atomic bomb, I think we will have to go considerably further than a limited world government.

MR. FINLETTER: That is to me a very interesting statement.

I would like to explain what I think may be one misconception on your part, however, and that is this: that I was advocating what I described as this limited world state as a matter of strategy because it seems to me that we do now know, even from the limited facts that you have been able to give us, that the atomic weapons and the other weapons, (which I think make the case even without the atomic weapons) do imperatively require this minimum which I have stated if we are going to save civilization. That does not mean that, if to develop some other highly desirable objective, it is necessary to expand the powers of this limited world government, they cannot be expanded.

You would necessarily have to have an amending power in the United Nations Organization, and if at that time you could persuade Dr. Langmuir and the others who may not agree with you, and if it would become overwhelmingly clear to world opinion, that atomic energy or any other energy would be a great

boon to mankind but could not be released without some form of supra-national control, then you could make your case for your amendment of the UNO Charter so as to provide necessary and needed control which would enable you to utilize that energy for beneficent purposes.

Let me point out that we have a pretty good precedent for that. As I remember, in 1933, de Toqueville said that the society of America was directed entirely by the states, and the federal government had in effect power only in foreign affairs. Look where we developed to! I don't think that to start off with, the limited world government which I suggested necessarily precludes the course of having all of the powers necessary once there is world opinion, but I don't think that you need to go into the disputed powers at this time. That would block you from getting the necessary minimum which you would demonstrably need.

PROFESSOR RABI: I was speaking to the point that you did not need the limited power but found it necessary. I think that is something which we have to like, and we are talking more of the background from which we make our statements, which I think should be from the construction of more than a limited thing. Perhaps for reasons of policy that is all we would want to put out at the beginning -- that is, a limited thing -- and wait with the other.

MR. FINLETTER: I was merely stating my natural objection to government as such. If government is necessary to do something positive, I am in favor of it, so my objection is not as strong as all that.

MR. EICHELBERGER: I want to make several comments, probably not too well connected.

Just commenting for a moment on what Mr. Finletter said, I think it is true that our federal government has assumed more power from the states, but it is true that immediately after our Constitution was adopted we did have our Bill of Rights. From the very beginning the Federal Government did have some economic controls as well as the ability to conduct its affairs.



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