THE OUTLOOK FOR DISARMAMENT AND PEACE

Summary of Remarks by

HAROLD E. STASSEN

Special Assistant to the President for
Disarmament, at the 60th annual Congress
of American Industry, Hotel Waldorf-Astoria,
New York, New York, Wednesday, December 7, 1955

Chairman Ruffin, President Riter, Reverend Mark, Man of the Year Charlie Hook, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary Folsom, My Friends of the National Association of Manufacturers:

In beginning my address to this great luncheon of the 60th session of the National Association of Manufacturers, may I bring you a word of report from these recent meetings of the National Security Council, of the Cabinet at Camp David. The President is back at the helm. He is asking those penetrating, probing questions again, interpolating with his sharp and at some times humerous remarks, coming through with those clear decisions. And I continue to hope and to pray that his health will be restored to such full vigor that he will continue to serve in his incomparable manner in the years ahead.

In speaking to you on the subject of your request, may I begin by stating this clear fact: The year 1955, which is now drawing to a close, is the first full year for a generation during which the entire world has been at peace. It has been a year that included many tense situations, serious continuing dangers, and new potentials for violent outbreak, but nevertheless a year in which no wars were waged anywhere around the globe.

At the same time, it has been a year of most significant economic advance in this country and in the world. I believe that when the final statistics are in, the gross product of the entire globe in 1955 will approximate 1,000 billion dollars equivalent, for an all-time high record world level.

More people are employed today in peaceful pursuits than ever before in the history of man. And this amazing record, I submit, has been due in large measure to the policies and program of the President of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower.

You know, his devotion to the objective of a durable and prosperous peace with freedom and justice has been and is

of historic significance. And during his recent illness, an unprecedented result occurred. The active role of a President of the United States is so unusual that in every previous instance of the illness of an incumbent of the White House, the Administration of the country began to split and weaken. Confusion and dissension became notorious. This time the Cabinet moved even closer together, and a tightly knit organization of your government, of this great country, carried forward successfully and effectively the policies and program of the President.

As you men are well aware, this, the functioning in absence, is one of the highest tests of an executive. And I would like to talk to you a bit this noon, because of its close relevance to the prospects of peace and the situation we are in, about the top quartet of the President's cabinet who deserve a large measure of thanks from this nation for the record of the three years and the exceptional results in the recent crisis.

These four men, senior in the cabinet, are John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State; Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense; George M. Humphrey, Secretary of the Treasury; and Herbert Brownell, Attorney-General.

Many of you know one or more or all of them. John Foster Dulles, son of a Presbyterian minister, validictorian of his class at Princeton, at the age of 19 in the Secretariat of the Hague Peace Conference, and then a lifetime of service in foreign policy, in international law.

George M. Humphrey, born in Cheboygan, Michigan, an outstanding graduate of the University of Michigan, and a distinguished career, as you know, in business and in finance.

Charles E. Wilson, born in Minerva, Ohio, and an honor graduate of the Carnegie Institute of Technology, and then that career so well known to you all.

And Herbert Brownell, born in Peru, Nebraska, a graduate with honors of the University of Nebraska, graduate of Yale Law School, as editor-in-chief of its Law Review and Order of the Coif, the Honorary Law Fraternity.

They have been crucial in the establishment of a successful foreign policy, a stable currency, an effective defense, and sound and just counsel.

The interrelationship of this effort to the President's objective of a just, durable and prosperous peace is obvious. They are all men who were outstandingly successful before they entered the Cabinet, and they have all been subjected to the pounding of public attack. I predict, gentlemen, that they will stand in history as one of the most significant top four of a cabinet of the United States since the days of the founders of this Republic.

Now, one of the attacks recently made will serve to highlight the results of the work of these men under the policies of the President in relationship to peace for America, peace for the world. The charge has recently been made that the defense of the United States had been weakened in these three years. Presumably the basis of the claim is the fact that defense spending has been reduced by several billion dollars a year, and the number of men in the Armed Forces has been cut from 3 million 600 thousand in 1952 to 2 million 900 thousand men currently.

But what are the facts of the defense strength of America? What should we draw from these statistics of reduced expenditure and reduced men in the Armed Forces? In 1952, hundreds of thousands of men in our Armed Forces were in Korea. They were in an exposed outpost, and many other thousands of them were in military hospitals as casualties. Did that add to the strength of America in its defense in the world in that posture? Compare it now with the ending of the Korean War, with the building up of the Army of the Republic of Korea to 20 divisions of its own Republic of Korea forces, to improving production, modernizing the armed forces, economizing day after day, checking the inflationary spiral, and together achieving spectacular results.

And may I interject this: Charlie Wilson may sometimes get tangled up with a dog story, but he certainly knows how to untangle production. The production for defense has been moving through in a remarkable way very close to production schedules as the requirements are there. Thus today in real strength, the United States is more powerful by far than it was in 1952 or in any other peacetime year, and this strength is due in large measure to the leadership of the President and of the top four. And this strength is devoted and dedicated to a durable, prosperous peace, with freedom and with justice.

And the resolution of these problems in distant points in the world, the basis on which a year of peace, and a favorable prospect in spite of all the difficulties of a durable peace, is attained, involves the most complex interrelation of solutions, of steps, of measures. That message I would like to leave with this outstanding leadership of America today.

There are no simple magic formulae, no easy answers for the way in which a great leading nation conducts its affairs in relationship to the whole world, and in the interests of peace in the atomic age. The significant developments in foreign policy that directly relate to the stability of the world situation and to the prospects of peace are well worth running through in just a sort of catalog way. I think all of us are inclined to see the problem ahead in terms of the current headline of difficulty. The difficult picture flaring up in Cyprus, or in the Near East, or some place of that kind, has the headline, but it is the solid move upon the complex of the world picture that decides the result for America and for the world.

In these three years, in addition to the conclusion of peace in Korea, there are these other matters that affected the posture of defense, and the prospects for peace:

First, a worldwide movement for and appreciation of the peaceful uses of atomic energy was successfully initiated. Scientists of 72 nations conferred at Geneva, and the International Atomic Energy Agency was established without a dissenting vote in the United Nations General Assembly just a few weeks ago.

Second, the people of Guatamala in this hemisphere removed a Communist-dominated government, established new leadership opposed to Communism and friendly to the United States. Now no government in this hemisphere is dominated by Communism.

Third, a rapprochement was achieved between the Republic of France and the German Federal Republic through which a Western European unity was established and Germany was admitted to NATO, And this source of so much difficulty, and of weakness and of war for a century, has been greatly improved by the adjustment of relationships between France and Germany, bringing them in together in a Western European union, and in association with the United States and Canada in NATO.

Fourth, the Trieste issue was settled. That port, that small area between Italy and Yugoslavia had been a festering problem. And then, economic and cultural relationships were resumed between these Mediterranean neighbors.

Fifth, an agreement was reached with Spain for mutual cooperation which includes valuable base rights for the United States in a strategic position behind the Pyrenees, between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

Sixth, the complete sovereignty of Austria was restored. The Red Army and United States troops were withdrawn, and a solvent, democratic, happy, musical nation emerged in the center of Europe.

The eight-year Indo-China war was ended. The sovereign states of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam moved forward as independent states and were strengthened economically and militarily, checking the Communist's Southeast Asian drive at the border of North Vietnam, taken over by the Communists in the settlement of that long war.

Eighth, the ruling leaders of the Soviet Union were told directly and plainly at the Summit Conference that the objective of the United States was and would continue to be a just and lasting peace, and a dramatic and sound proposal for the exchange of military information and aerial reconnaissance was made by the President.

And I shall never forget that afternoon as they sat at that great quadrangle table; off to the left, Prime Minister Faure and Foreign Minister Pinay of France; directly across the table from the President, Prime Minister Eden, and Foreign Minister Macmillan of Great Britain; and off on the right - on that side of the quadrangle - Prime Minister Bulganin, Khrushchev, Zhukov, and their associates. They were talking about these modern weapons and the tremendous destructive powers that they have, talking about the alternative of what could happen in the advance through the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

The President, looking directly across at Prime Minister Bulganin and General Zhukov and the others, spoke of how he had been searching his heart and his mind for a way to impress upon them and upon the world the intentions of the United States, its firmness of position in strength, but its desire to move constructively. Then he proposed that we exchange blueprints of our military establishments and open up the skies over each country, so that peaceful, unarmed planes can observe and verify that neither side has any intention other than peaceful, and to provide against the possibility of great surprise attack by these nations that have these powerful weapons in quantity.

It was a dramatic moment, and from athat time on, study and consideration have been going forward on this as a beginning or a gateway by which we might move safely away from the competitive arms buildup, with all of the dangers that that has held in history, the dangers that are inherent in it in the present situation.

And as the governments study it through, the United Kingdom has come out in solid support in the United Nations Assembly, and Canada, our neighbor, and France, and an increasing number of nations of the world are seeing the soundness and the inspiration, trying to move in the way in which this man of peace, with his tremendous military background, has proposed.

Thus far, the Soviet Union is raising many objections. But - there are also indications that they are studying and reflecting. That moment, taken against the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy and the way in which that shows an incentive for peace, even as there is the penalty of the danger of war, I believe will prove to be one of the historic moments of the great future in the atomic age.

And you know that in other areas of the world, such as in Iran, ancient Persia, with all its oil and the gateway to the Near East oil, a new government has been established to take the place of the unstable former government, and the Communist infiltration which was very extreme in that country was cleared up. More than 60 nations were assisted in advancing their economic well-being to a record high point, and that economic well-being of the free world has reflected, in part, in the economic success of our country in its post-Korean War adjustment, and now moving to its record high of production in its advance in the standard of living.

It is the year 1955 that was the first full year in a generation in which no wars were being waged anywhere in the world. What of the years ahead? No one can guarantee. No one should make predictions. It will not be easy; but from the position of productive strength and the poised and alert strength of America today, if administered with restraint, I do believe there is ground for a sober, prayerful optimism on the part of the people of this great nation.

No one should underestimate the problems, but neither should anyone ever be defeatist or low in morale in approach to this challenge of a mission of America in keeping with the very greatest of its fundamental principles of the individual human worth and dignity of spiritual value, and of belief in the individual human being on which America has been founded under God.

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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Washington, D. C.
January 15, 1956

FOR RELEASE AT 4:00 P.M., EST, JANUARY 15, 1956

STATEMENT OF HAROLD E STASSEN IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS FROM THE PRESS REGARDING ADLAI STEVENSON'S ATTACK ON SECRETARY DULLES, AND SENATOR HUBERT HUMPHREY'S SPEECHES ON THE CURRENT ARTICLE IN LIFE MAGAZINE.

Adlai Stevenson's attack yesterday on Secretary Dulles is a deliberate distortion of United States foreign policy for partisan political ends.

As I know it, the Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policy is not reflected with complete accuracy and comprehensive scope in what Adlai Stevenson says it is, nor in the Life Magazine article, nor in Senator Humphrey's speeches, nor in individual magazine articles and separate press stories, nor in single speeches in either party, nor through isolated incidents.

The Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policy is correctly and clearly portrayed only in the official statements of President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles and in the composite series of actions taken by the United States Government under the President's direction in these three years.

The Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policy cannot fairly be labelled by any thoughtful and responsible American as recklessly playing Russian roulette, and to so label it is harmful to the United States.

I would describe the Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policy as devoted to patiently and persistently producing prolonged peace. It is a successful foreign policy. It has involved strength and restraint, firmness and conciliation, moral values and careful considerations, unavoidable risks faced and other risks avoided, bipartisan consultations and responsible decisions, collective defense and national courage, economic aid abroad and economic solvency at home, diplomatic initiative and studied reserve, and it is designed, among other principles, to avoid miscalculation of either our deterrent power, our national interest, or our benign goals. In short, it has involved the continuing complex conduct of the relations of the United States to the rest of the world with the objective of peace.

The people should judge it primarily from its results. No one can deny that the United States and the world are now at peace for the first time in a long while. No one can deny that the Korean War and the Indo-China War are both ended and no new war has started. President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles have made a brilliant and favorable record. Senator George and Chairman Richards and many others deserve a part of the credit. No one does deny that there are continuing grave dangers and serious situations in a number of areas of the world. These problems must be faced. I hope they can be handled with a maximum of bipartisanship, notwithstanding the election year, for the sake of the people of America and of the world.

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STATEMENT BY
HAROLD E. STASSEN
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR DISARMAMENT
BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
JANUARY 25, 1956, 10:00 A.M.

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the Committee, I respond to the invitation of this special Committee to appear before you this morning and extend to you the pledge of cooperation in the conduct of our work in the executive branch.

At the very opening of my testimony I might state and emphasize that everything we do on this subject in behalf of the United States is devoted toward the objective of a just and a durable and a secure peace for America and for the world, and that objective is before us in every phase of study and negotiations and consideration, as I know it would be on behalf of the Committee.

In opening the testimony before this Committee, I shall try, in my capacity as Special Assistant to the President for disarmament matters, to give first a broad view of U.S. policy with respect to the limitation and reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prospects for international agreement.

The spokesmen of other departments and agencies of the executive branch, I understand, will also be available later to assist the committee in further consideration of the problem, if you wish, particularly as it concerns their individual responsibilities.

Under President Eisenhower, no national objective is receiving more earnest attention than the quest for an international agreement which would end the competitive arms build-up and would increase the security of our country and all others. If the Government of the United States is to serve its people and the cause of peace effectively in this matter, it will be with the whole-hearted, continuous, enlightened, bipartisan cooperation of the executive and legislative branches, backed by a fully-informed public opinion.

II. President Eisenhower's Proposals at Geneva

At Geneva, on the afternoon of July 21, 1955, the President of the United States, meeting with the leaders of France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union looked across the conference table directly at the Soviet delegation and spoke the following words:

> "I have been searching my heart and mind", he declared, "for something that I could say here that could convince everyone of the great sincerity of the United States in approaching this problem of disarmament.
>
> "I should address myself for a moment principally to the delegates from the Soviet Union, because our two great countries

admittedly possess new and terrible weapons in quantities which do give rise in other parts of the world, or reciprocally, to the fears and dangers of surprise attack.

"I propose, therefore", the President continued, "that we take a practical step, that we begin an arrangement, very quickly, as between ourselves -- immediately. These steps would include:

"To give to each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments, from beginning to end, from one end of our countries to the other, lay out the establishments and provide the blueprints to each other.

"Next, to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photography to the other country -- we to provide you the facilities within our country, ample facilities for aerial reconnaissance, where you can make all the pictures you choose and take them to your own country to study, you to provide exactly the same facilities for us and we to make these examinations, and by this step to convince the world that we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and relaxing tension.

"Likewise, we will make more easily attainable a comprehensive and effective system of inspection and disarmament, because what I propose, I assure you, would be but a beginning."

The President's bold concept fired the imagination of all the world.

At one stroke it lifted the disarmament debate to a new plane. It offered the world new hope, not only for progress toward limiting arms, but also for shackling surprise attack and even war itself.

The other heads of state at Geneva put forward other proposals relating to disarmament. There was a very considerable discussion of the whole subject. Mr. Eden suggested what he termed a "pilot scheme" for trial-run mutual inspections in a selected limited area in Europe; Mr. Faure suggested a plan for budgetary inspection and allocation of savings from reduced military expenditures to increasing standards of living; and Marshal Bulganin stressed the Soviet proposals that they had made on May 10, 1955. These Soviet proposals stipulated a series of political settlements, conceived in the Soviet sense, as a pre-condition to disarmament, including the dismantling of foreign bases and withdrawal of all troops from Germany; the imposition, within two years of certain ceilings on the armed forces of the principal military powers, and upon Germany and Japan; and the progressive elimination of atomic weapons after 75 per cent of agreed cuts in conventional forces were completed, all upon the basis of an inspection system which practically every other country in the world finds completely inadequate.

These various national proposals were extensively discussed in the succeeding months, first in the United Nations Disarmament Commission's Subcommittee meetings in New York from August 29 to October 8, in which I represented the United States as Deputy to Ambassador Lodge; at the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Geneva in November, which I attended as Adviser to Secretary Dulles; in the United Nations Disarmament Commission in late November; and finally in the United Nations General Assembly and its Political Committee in December, 1955, the sessions in which a member of your committee, Senator Pastore, participated as a part of the United States delegation.

On December 16, 1955, the General Assembly voted overwhelmingly by a margin of 56-7 for a U.S.-U.K.-Canadian-French resolution which gave top priority to the President's plan. And as you would realize, the seven were all countries strictly within the Soviet group and inside the Curtain. All other countries which voted, voted favorably on the resolution.

The pertinent operative paragraphs of that Resolution read as follows:

(The General Assembly)

"1. Urges that the States concerned and particularly those on the Disarmament Subcommittee:

"(a) Should continue their endeavors to reach agreement on a comprehensive disarmament plan in accordance with the goals set out in resolution 808 (IX);

"(b) Should as initial steps give priority to early agreement on and implementation of

"(i) such confidence-building measures as President Eisenhower's plan for exchanging military blueprints and mutual aerial inspection, and Marshal Bulganin's plan for establishing control posts at strategic centers;

"(ii) all such measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament as are now feasible;"

The majority of the nations of the world have, therefore, given general approval to the United States view of the best way to make progress toward disarmament; they have called upon the principal military powers which comprise the Subcommittee to make a renewed major effort now to translate the President's inspiration into actuality, and to take every feasible step toward disarmament which seems presently possible.

The Soviet Union has not accepted the President's Plan, but it has been chary of rejecting it outright.

You will recall that when certain remarks by Mr. Bulganin to the Supreme Soviet seemed too negative, he corrected them the following day, and issued another statement.

In the international negotiations since last July and in Marshal Bulganin's letter to the President of September 19, the Soviet Union has put itself in the role of seeking clarification. More recently, at the Foreign Ministers' meeting and particularly during the tour of Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Bulganin in India and in Burma, the Soviet leaders have endeavored to deprecate the proposal. Together with six of their satellities in the United Nations, they opposed the great majority in the vote on the Resolution I have just cited. But I do not feel they have taken a position, judging on past experience, which could not subsequently find them moving toward agreement. You may remember in the peaceful uses of atomic energy proposal, they made a series of negative moves before they finally did join in advancing toward the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

What Can the President's Plan Accomplish?

In the meetings of the Subcommittee in New York, I introduced an outline plan which describes in a brief preliminary manner how the President's plan would operate.

The heart of the proposal is unrestricted but monitored, reciprocal aerial inspection, by visual, photographic and electronic means. Personnel of the country being inspected may be aboard the aircraft.

Aerial reconnaissance has come a vast way even from the days of World War II and Korea. Starting from opposite sides of the country, two standard U. S. Air Force jet planes can now photograph a band of terrain, given favorable weather, 490 miles wide and 2,700 miles long, the distance from New York to Los Angeles in only two hours. A country the size of either the United States or the Soviet Union can have its picture taken, mile by mile, field and factory, in less than six months, and that is allowing for weather.

But mere statistics cannot give one not versed in the science the best picture of the capacities of modern aerial photography. In presenting this plan to the United Nations we were particularly anxious that the members should see with their own eyes just what it could do. Accordingly, with the cooperation of the U. S. Air Force and the USIA, we prepared an exhibit which was set up across the street from the United Nations Headquarters in the offices of the Carnegie Endowment. The Delegates and their military advisors were conducted through it by Ambassador Lodge.

In the course of the UN debates a number of the foreign representatives explicitly credited this exhibit with adding to their

understanding of the real effectiveness of the American plan. This worthwhile exposition is still in existence and many people are going through it daily at this time, many of the leaders of various nations have been looking at it when they had the opportunity. I would respectfully invite the members of the Committee, if they find it convenient to be in New York, to take a look at the exhibit.

The President's plan, of course, not only includes aerial reconnaissance but also the exchange of military blueprint information. We have told the Soviet Union and the other countries just what that comprises: First, the identification, strength, command structure and disposition of personnel, units and equipment of all major land, sea and air forces; second, a complete list of military plants, facilities and installations with their locations. Comparable information would be furnished simultaneously by each participating country. Freedom of communications for inspecting personnel would be assured.

In his letter of October 11, President Eisenhower also offered to add to his plan the proposals of Marshal Bulganin for the stationing of ground observers at certain key areas such as large ports, railway and highway junctions, and airdromes.

At Geneva in November, 1955, Secretary Dulles made it clear that if the Eisenhower proposal is accepted by the Soviet Union, the United States would be prepared to proceed promptly so far as it is concerned, to negotiate, both with other sovereign states involved and with the Soviet Union, for the appropriate extension on a reciprocal, equitable basis of the Eisenhower proposal and the Bulganin control posts to overseas bases, and to the forces of other countries.

Full details for the application of the President's Plan are being constantly studied by my staff, by the Special Task Forces which advise me, by the Departments of State and Defense and other interested agencies. Such plans relate to its initial application, full operation, logistics, costing, timing and relation to continuous inspection in a comprehensive plan for arms reduction. In due course and in the appropriate manner, we should be glad to discuss these projections with the Subcommittee.

Obviously, if this country ever reaches agreement and moves on it, it very directly involves the United States Senate in the matter of treaties, so in a way you are now proceeding in a very early and preliminary manner prior to any agreements being formulated that would involve Senate consideration.

The President's Plan, we believe, will unlock the gateway to international agreement for the regulation of armed forces and armaments.

It is an undertaking of delicate implications for the countries which participate in it. But it would provide a most important safeguard against that great surprise attack which could herald the holocaust.

We believe it will eventually and surely commend itself to all peoples who cherish peace.

III. The Background of the U. S. Proposals

When President Eisenhower made his proposals, it was because he recognized that the world had arrived at a crossroads in the search for the control of arms.

The technical base upon which past proposals had been constructed was being transformed by new scientific and industrial developments. The time had come for a new look at this problem.

You will recall that as far back as 1946, the United States made a proposal to share its atomic monopoly with all nations of the world, to place all stocks of nuclear material under international ownership under rigid conditions of effective inspection, to eliminate atomic weapons, and to devote all future nuclear production to peaceful purposes only.

The Soviet Union, which had not then developed nuclear weapons, consistently rejected these proposals on the grounds that they would violate its national sovereignty.

From 1946 to 1954, the Soviet Union called for prohibition and elimination of atomic weapons, by mere declaration, before any reliable inspection could be established. In other words, their program was merely "ban the bomb and trust the Soviet."

The United States proposals were supported by practically all the United Nations and opposed by the Soviet bloc up to 1954. From 1947 to 1954 they were further developed and extended to conventional weapons. Working upon some tentative ideas of the United States put forward in 1952, the British and the French, in 1954 and 1955, proposed ceilings of 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 men for the armed forces of the U. S., the Soviet Union and China, with subsidiary levels for other states, together with a proposal, which the United States did not support, to begin the elimination of atomic weapons after 75 per cent of agreed cuts in conventional arms and armed forces had been achieved. This program would have been supervised by thorough international inspection and control.

Meanwhile, in 1954 and 1955, the Soviet Union was taking up a series of contradictory positions which seem to have had some relation to the changes in Kremlin leadership. Eventually, on May 10, 1955, the Soviet Union ostensibly accepted a number of previous Western proposals. But the Soviet proposals were still conditioned upon impossible political settlements; they did not offer a reliable inspection system; they would have effectively prevented the use of atomic weapons by the free world in defense against aggression by mass armies, and they promised to eliminate nuclear weapons without providing adequate means of verification.

By the time President Eisenhower came to Geneva, we had realized that the basic concepts underlying our older plans -- and reflected in some degree in Soviet proposals -- were outmoded, that is the arrival of the H-bomb age brought a very new and important factor to everything involved in armaments.

The production of nuclear weapons material no longer needed to be concentrated in huge, expensive plants. It could be produced in simpler installations in many areas. A relatively smaller amount of nuclear material could be made to produce vastly greater yields in terms of explosive power. Capping this development was the development of hydrogen weapons in this country and in the Soviet Union.

But the most revolutionary change in the picture was cumulative. For almost a decade, nuclear production has been proceeding under no international control whatsoever. During all of the time it has been possible for a country interested in evading prospective international control to hide atomic weapons. The tell-tale radioactivity of nuclear weapons can be shielded by containers, beyond the range of any presently known detection device.

In other words, Mr. Chairman, we could have the best known scientific detection instrument here with the most elaborate and sensitive detection facilities, and 100 yards away there could be stored a dozen of the most powerful H-bombs, and if they are properly shielded in a way that everyone knows how to shield them, this best instrument now known would give no indication that they were hidden a hundred yards away, and the amount of material that you have to divert to establish a dozen H-bombs is relatively a small physical quantity of material. So this new development brings in an entirely new dimension on any matter affecting control and elimination of nuclear weapons.

So as the stockpile grows, the danger mounts. Because of the margin of error in accounting, with each year that passes, the amount of material available for hidden weapons has increased. With the passage of time we were bound to reach a crucial point at which this margin of error represented a dangerous potential in nuclear weapons. That point has now been reached.

This is the technical background of President Eisenhower's proposal at Geneva.

It means that the older plans for inspection of nuclear material based on total accounting for production have now become outmoded and unrealistic.

It means that no one can be sure that nuclear weapons have been eliminated under any control system now proposed or in prospect.

The Soviet Union in its May 10 proposals recognized very clearly the danger of mounting stockpiles in the changed technological picture. It also indicated that it saw the increased necessity of guarding against surprise attack.

The Soviet May 10 proposals contain these words:

> " . . . There are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading control and for organizing the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons, even if there is a formal agreement on international control. In such a situation, the security of states signatories to the international convention cannot be guaranteed, since the possibility would be open to a potential aggressor to accumulate stocks of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a surprise atomic attack on peace-loving states."

But the Soviet Union prescribes thus far no new remedy to fit their own clear diagnosis. It continues in a way to call for the elimination of atomic weapons, although it has shown very clearly why this is impossible. It continues to call for measures of disarmament which could not be backed up by limited and nominal inspection which is the only kind it would permit within the Soviet Union thus far.

In spite of repeated inquiries we have made in the United Nations, the Soviet Union will give no assurance that inspectors would be in the field and ready to operate before disarmament began. It will not specify in any detail those things which the inspectors would be allowed to inspect. It would allow inspection from the air only at the very end of a disarmament program.

The United States moved to meet the new situation very differently. Two things were required: Some new and different conception which would offer the world security and confidence while it tackled its problem; and an intensive review of the possibilities and limitations of international inspection under the new conditions.

To meet the first vital requirement of international security, and as a demonstration of American sincerity, the President put forward his proposals at Geneva on July 21.

To meet the second requirement, certain studies under my direction were put under way.

IV. Our Organization for Disarmament Studies

Several departments of the Government had for some time been reviewing the U. S. position. It became apparent that some coordination at Cabinet level was desirable and that extensive studies requiring full-time specialized

attention had to be performed.

On March 19, 1955, the President appointed me as Special Assistant for Disarmament Matters. To assist me, I set up a small staff, consisting of very able men loaned by the Department of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Central Intelligence Agency, and of a Special Research Group.

On August 5, 1955, I was also appointed as United States Deputy Representative to the United Nations to follow through on the international negotiation aspect of my assignment.

In all dealings with foreign governments, I am, of course, under the direction of Secretary Dulles; and with respect to negotiations in the United Nations, under the direction of Ambassador Lodge. I represent the United States in the Disarmament Commission's Subcommittee, consisting of the United States, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union.

In connection with the President's appointment, a special inter-departmental committee on disarmament problems was established. This inter-departmental committee includes representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and Central Intelligence Agency, and then also the Department of Justice, because if we ever do move in this field, there will be many legal problems within the United States, and the United States Information Agency, because the overseas understanding of what the United States is doing is so important.

I report to the Committee that I think all of these liaison arrangements are working well. They have been of great assistance in preparing policy matters for review and decision.

One of the first moves at the direction of the President was to ask a number of the most competent authorities in American life to undertake a study of the requirements and methods of effective international inspection and control. These outstanding men now head up Task Forces in the appropriate fields of inquiry and they in turn have associated with other highly qualified men. These are the chairmen of the eight Task Forces and their assignments:

The Chairman of the Task Force inquiring into inspection and control of nuclear materials is Dr. Ernest O. Lawrence, Director of the University of California Radiation Laboratories at Livermore, California. Undoubtedly Senator Knowland knows him well.

Associated with Dr. Lawrence is a large panel of some of the most distinguished nuclear physicists in America. This group stands ready to consider any suggestion which any government or any scientist may make to develop more effective means of accounting for nuclear weapons material and the detection of nuclear weapons, if they are concealed.

The vital task of further designing methods for aerial inspection and reporting in the light of the President's proposals is the responsibility of a Task Force headed by General James H. Doolittle, (Retired), now Vice President and Director of Shell Oil Company.

Inspection and reporting methods for Army and ground units is the responsibility of General Walter B. Smith, (Retired), former Under Secretary of State and former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, presently Vice Chairman of the American Machine and Foundry Company. He is assisted by General Lucian K. Truscott, (Retired), and by a Task Force group.

Vice Admiral Oswald S. Colclough, (Retired), Dean of Faculties, George Washington University, heads the Task Force for Navies and Naval aircraft and missiles, and he is an Admiral who had considerable submarine experience and experience with the Soviet Union during his active duty.

Steel is the core of military industry. Mr. Benjamin Fairless, formerly Chairman of the United States Steel Corporation, and now head of the Iron and Steel Institute, is Chairman of the Task Force for the steel industry.

Inspection and reporting methods for power and for industry in general are assigned to Mr. Walker L. Cisler, President of The Detroit Edison Company, and a group which he has assembled.

The study of methods of inspection and reporting of national budgets and finances has been assigned to Dr. Harold Moulton, former Chairman of the Brookings Institution.

No system of inspection and reporting is better than its communications system, which has peculiar and difficult responsibilities in the nuclear age. Dr. James B. Fisk, of the Bell Telephone Laboratories, and a member of the General Advisory Committee of the AEC, and other members of a Communications Task Force, have been charged with designing a method of rapid, continuous, reliable communications, necessary to implement an international inspection and reporting system, if it is agreed and we move to implement it.

These Task Forces have already done a great amount of most valuable work and have had splendid cooperation from various agencies of the Government. As a result of their studies, and in connection with the President's Plan, I believe we shall have something we have never had before -- a detailed operating manual of what to inspect, how and where it would be inspected, and a knowledge of what can and cannot be profitably inspected if we seek to provide a safeguard against surprise attack and to supervise an international arms limitation agreement.

Central, of course, in this is not only what you can and cannot inspect being acceptable, but what would be reciprocally acceptable in the United States. The problem is the kind of inspection you would want on the other side, and that you would reciprocally accept within the United States, and that in itself is a complex problem.

The Task Force work is not finally completed, but what has been done so far will furnish a firmer foundation for U. S. policy and enhance our position in international negotiations.

V. Towards A New American Position

With the means at my command and through the efforts of the regular Government agencies, and in international negotiations and meetings, the United States has tried to inform world opinion of the transformation which has occurred in the problem of international control of armaments. These efforts have met with some success.

I believe that there is now gradually increasing understanding in this country and abroad that verifying the elimination of atomic weapons under the present state of scientific knowledge and under an international arms agreement is not now feasible. The implications of that tremendous fact are becoming known and understood.

There is also a disposition, especially evident in the United Nations, to consider pragmatic or partial approaches to disarmament in the hopes that each such step might be regarded as an installment on the general agreement we all desire, and as a contribution toward mutual confidence, the absence of which has so far nullified our efforts. This is reflected in the General Assembly resolution to which I have referred.

I think there is also, if we are to judge by the United Nations vote, an understanding of the fallacious nature of the May 10 Soviet proposals, of their inadequacy and their implications, and a universal yearning to set such a seal against war as the President's plan could provide.

One measure which the United States has used to underscore its determination to launch the new approach has been to place a reservation upon the positions previously considered in the United Nations. We have not, for example, negotiated on the numerical ceilings on conventional forces, in the absence of a determination as to what could be done about nuclear weapons. We have neither rejected our past positions nor can we reaffirm them in blanket fashion. This has seemed to us an honest and logical course, especially while we are conducting the studies I have mentioned. The time has come to move beyond that reservation, under the new resolution passed by the United Nations General Assembly.

The United States will make a renewed and persistent effort in the coming months of 1956, to reach a sound agreement for the future limitation of armament in the interest of a continuing peace. Within a few weeks the United Nations Disarmament Subcommittee will resume its labors. The time has come for the United States to consider concrete suggestions in the light of its studies and in the terms of the General Assembly directive. It would be premature at this time to outline in detail what our position will be. I should like, however, to assert some of the principles under the statements which have been made by the President and by the Secretary of State, which govern our policy, and to outline our attitude on some of the principal issues.

First and foremost we want to reach agreement in this field. I think it is well to indicate that disarmament has come to mean not the literal meaning in the dictionary, but any offer to reach any kind of agreement or limitation or control or inspection affecting armed forces and armaments. It has taken on a special meaning in international circles.

It is true that the strength of the United States and the free world can meet threats brought against us as long as we are vigilant. It is also true that the awful power of nuclear weapons constitutes a deterrent force to major wars and even to smaller aggressions, so long as their probable perpetrators fear they may grow into something bigger and more dangerous to them. At best, however, mutual deterrence is a precarious balance which may always be upset by miscalculations or by madmen in future years or by the unpredictable result of probing actions upon the periphery. The collapse of the condition could mean world catastrophe. Such a prospect lays a dead hand upon hopes for a better world which could otherwise be fulfilled, and will place an increasing burden upon our spirits and material resources. It should compel us to make a new and determined effort to reach a sound agreement for the limitation of arms, and I emphasize sound agreement, because basic in our approach is that only an agreement which would involve effective inspection would ever be sound from the United States' viewpoint.

Secondly, the United States will not disarm or reduce arms unilaterally under any condition except on the basis of complete reciprocity, assured by rigorous, unremitting, thorough, forehanded international inspection and control. That system of control must now take account of the problem of undisclosed stockpiles of nuclear weapons material.

Third, in the divided state of our world, we must beware of creating a false sense of security and excessive phychological disarmament. We must beware of playing communism's game unintentionally, which seeks to beguile the free world into letting down its guard, withdrawing its bases and relaxing its alliances.

Fourth, in its own interest and as a responsible leader of the free world, the United States must demonstrate that the acceptance of the President's Geneva proposals would definitely end the competitive build-up of armaments and would turn the trend downward. The United States has promised the world that the President's Plan is a gateway to arms control. The President gave it as the beginning in this problem. The USSR has claimed, on the contrary, that it would promote an acceleration and expansion of the arms race. In its own interest the United States should demonstrate its sincerity in this respect.

Fifth, the balance of mutual deterrence will become still more hazardous when it is diffused in so many combinations.

Sixth, the United States has consistently urged that when a sound and effective system of international control is placed in effect and it does demonstrate its effectiveness, then nuclear production could be devoted to peaceful uses. The President took the initiative in that respect, as you recall, in his December 8, 1953, address, which the Congress supported in the amendment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and which has then been moved in implementation, including some steps in the United Nations General Assembly in which Senatore Pastore participated.

Seventh, because of the imminent development of guided missiles of intercontinental range and the proliferation of the means of nuclear production which would transform the problem of international control, the need for a solution is increasingly urgent.

In accordance with these principles, the United States will carefully and slowly shape its position. In the meantime, some particulars can be given: First, as to the use of atomic weapons: The United States will never use atomic weapons nor any other weapons, be it a gun, tank, warship or rifle, in any other way except to defeat aggression and in conformity with its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations.

The Soviet Union has indicated that it is not satisfied with that pledge. It wishes each nuclear power to give the commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons in war, and then only if approved by the Security Council. The United States will not accept this proposal of the Soviet Union.

> As Ambassador Lodge told the United Nations, "If an international agreement should make it impossible for law-abiding powers to use their principal weapons, even in dire extremity of self-defense against a massive aggression, then that power which is strongest in the conventional means of warfare would be immediately established as the strongest military power on earth, and it would still have a reserve of its own nuclear weapons sufficient to strike devastating blows.

"The true democracies of the world, by their very way of life, have traditionally been forced to accept the first blows in war. Thus, they generally concede a great strategic initiative. Should they also agree not to use their most powerful weapons in their own defense after taking that first blow, or if they should subject their self-defense to Security Council veto, they would be committing suicide."

The issue of inspection is another great issue which divides the Soviet bloc and the free world. I have already made clear what the Western world would insist upon in the way of inspection. It must be in place and prepared to operate before disarmament begins, and it must have adequate rights and immunities. The Soviet Union still has not said what it would inspect other than the fixed points, named in the Bulganin proposal, nor when it would allow inspection to begin, nor whether the inspectors could see all that they must see. We will continue to seek to draw them out on these points.

We believe that President Eisenhower's Plan should be the basis of the inspection system.

There has been much discussion of the idea of suspending or halting tests of nuclear weapons. We can understand a certain amount of feeling in this respect. We should not confuse treating the symptoms with eliminating the evil which in this case is the arms competition rooted in international tensions and the problem of war itself.

In the absence of a disarmament agreement, the United States and the free world are determined to maintain their defensive strength and their defensive collective security alliances. Nuclear weapons constitute a major part of this defensive strength, and weapons tests are essential to keep abreast of new developments, especially in respect to defense against nuclear attacks.

Scientific information available to the United States indicates that properly safeguarded nuclear testing constitutes no hazard to human health and safety. On United States initiative, the General Assembly has established a fifteen-nation Scientific Committee to collate and disseminate scientific information relating to radiological effects. The United States will make information available so that all nations may be in a position to draw their own conclusions.

Secretary Dulles at the Geneva meeting of Foreign Ministers stated that if agreement could be reached to limit nuclear weapons within the framework of an effective system of disarmament and under proper safeguards, there should be corresponding restrictions on the testing of weapons. To date, our deliberations have not produced any dependable formula acceptable to both sides. The United States is continuing to

examine the problem. Execution of the Eisenhower Plan of mutual inspection for peace would, of course, open the way for all these steps, including the eventual control or interruption of nuclear weapons tests, under adequate safeguards.

The Soviet Union has apparently tried to make some believe that it would be ready to hold up tests immediately without inspection and without reference to any agreement on arms limitation. It has not yet made any official proposal to that effect and there is nothing to show that the remarks of Mr. Khrushchev and Kuznetsov are for anything other than special consideration in the general propaganda effect.

Indeed, when Mr. Khrushchev spoke so well of a moratorium, he had just in the same statement been talking about what a tremendous explosion they had set off in their own recent test.

I come now to the important question of the actual reduction of armed forces and armaments.

The United States remains pledged to work for, earnestly desires and energetically seeks a comprehensive, progressive, enforceable agreement for the reduction of military expenditures, arms, armaments, and armed forces under effective international inspection and control.

We are ready to consider any reasonable approach to that goal, including the method of limited approaches, each of which would foster an increase of confidence and narrow the disagreement so that the deadlock can be broken, and further reductions negotiated, provided always that the inspection system is proved and any arms cuts are reciprocal.

As you know, we have reserved our position with respect to the old force levels which were discussed from 1952 to 1955, some of which the Soviet Union now states that they favor in their May 10 proposal. It is true that the United States did in 1952 suggest such figures, but at the time they were considered illustrative.

Since then the technological, military and political bases upon which they were calculated have changed. Whatever is proposed with respect to conventional forces will have to be considered in relation to what it may be practicable to do with nuclear weapons.

And in suggesting any schedule of reductions we must bear in mind that totalitarian countries may have certain advantages not only in concealing their arms levels but also in deciding upon and carrying out rearmament, once the democracies have relaxed.

All of these questions are receiving close study and will be reflected in any proposals the United States may eventually make.

As to military bases abroad, about which the Soviet Union has frequently expressed concern, we recognize that such bases are the product of the times and tensions in which we have lived; on our side they have been developed as part of the efforts of the free world to protect itself and to advance the cause of peace.

If the circumstances that brought them into being are mitigated, then it is logical that as the need for defense decreases the need for bases would also decrease.

VI. The Prospects

If the sincerity and conviction of the United States and its Allies were decisive we would now be well on our way toward disarmament. But we must reckon with the Communist philosophy and the peculiar purposes of the Soviet Union.

I think it is well to recall, I know every member of this committee recalls, that after World War II the United States very quickly dropped its arms levels from almost twelve million men down to a million and a half men, and it was at that point that the Korean war began. And then we came back up again, and at that time we certainly had shown that the United States wants reduced arms if the circumstances are right for it.

We must be ever wary of an attempt to lull the defense of the free world with smiles and to undermine our solidarity by promoting a specious disarmament program unsupported by thorough inspection.

We can understand the Soviet desire to protect its security. But, if it is sincere in its concern about the possibility of attack from the West, why is it not willing to join in an immediate practical program to prevent surprise attack by either side? We are prepared to suggest such a program in the framework of the Eisenhower Plan.

In spite of these cautions, there are two main reasons why I cannot be pessimistic about the struggle for agreement in this field, however, slow and unrewarding it sometimes seems.

First, I believe that the Eisenhower Plan corresponds to the deep desire of all peoples including the overwhelming majority of the people of Russia itself.

Second, the nature of the alternatives which confront the free world does not permit failure: On the one hand there is the vista

of a more abundant life than man has known through the peaceful uses of these new discoveries of science in the atomic field; on the other hand, the constant threat of devastation more complete than man can conceive -- a field of war where, as Pope Pius said in his Christmas message:

> "There will be no song of victory, only the inconsolable weeping of humanity, which in desolation will gaze upon the catastrophe brought on by its own folly."

I believe, perhaps slowly and after much debate and much study and after many deliberations and variation in the process, ultimately mankind will know which path to choose between these extreme alternatives before it.

THE OUTLOOK FOR DISARMAMENT AND PEACE

Summary of Remarks by

HAROLD E. STASSEN

Special Assistant to the President for
Disarmament, at the 60th annual Congress
of American Industry, Hotel Waldorf-Astoria,
New York, New York, Wednesday, December 7, 1955

Chairman Ruffin, President Riter, Reverend Mark, Man of the Year Charlie Hook, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary Folsom, My Friends of the National Association of Manufacturers:

In beginning my address to this great luncheon of the 60th session of the National Association of Manufacturers, may I bring you a word of report from these recent meetings of the National Security Council, of the Cabinet at Camp David. The President is back at the helm. He is asking those penetrating, probing questions again, interpolating with his sharp and at some times humerous remarks, coming through with those clear decisions. And I continue to hope and to pray that his health will be restored to such full vigor that he will continue to serve in his incomparable manner in the years ahead.

In speaking to you on the subject of your request, may I begin by stating this clear fact: The year 1955, which is now drawing to a close, is the first full year for a generation during which the entire world has been at peace. It has been a year that included many tense situations, serious continuing dangers, and new potentials for violent outbreak, but nevertheless a year in which no wars were waged anywhere around the globe.

At the same time, it has been a year of most significant economic advance in this country and in the world. I believe that when the final statistics are in, the gross product of the entire globe in 1955 will approximate 1,000 billion dollars equivalent, for an all-time high record world level.

More people are employed today in peaceful pursuits than ever before in the history of man. And this amazing record, I submit, has been due in large measure to the policies and program of the President of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower.

You know, his devotion to the objective of a durable and prosperous peace with freedom and justice has been and is

of historic significance. And during his recent illness, an unprecedented result occurred. The active role of a President of the United States is so unusual that in every previous instance of the illness of an incumbent of the White House, the Administration of the country began to split and weaken. Confusion and dissension became notorious. This time the Cabinet moved even closer together, and a tightly knit organization of your government, of this great country, carried forward successfully and effectively the policies and program of the President.

As you men are well aware, this, the functioning in absence, is one of the highest tests of an executive. And I would like to talk to you a bit this noon, because of its close relevance to the prospects of peace and the situation we are in, about the top quartet of the President's cabinet who deserve a large measure of thanks from this nation for the record of the three years and the exceptional results in the recent crisis.

These four men, senior in the cabinet, are John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State; Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense; George M. Humphrey, Secretary of the Treasury; and Herbert Brownell, Attorney-General.

Many of you know one or more or all of them. John Foster Dulles, son of a Presbyterian minister, validictorian of his class at Princeton, at the age of 19 in the Secretariat of the Hague Peace Conference, and then a lifetime of service in foreign policy, in international law.

George M. Humphrey, born in Cheboygan, Michigan, an outstanding graduate of the University of Michigan, and a distinguished career, as you know, in business and in finance.

Charles E. Wilson, born in Minerva, Ohio, and an honor graduate of the Carnegie Institute of Technology, and then that career so well known to you all.

And Herbert Brownell, born in Peru, Nebraska, a graduate with honors of the University of Nebraska, graduate of Yale Law School, as editor-in-chief of its Law Review and Order of the Coif, the Honorary Law Fraternity.

They have been crucial in the establishment of a successful foreign policy, a stable currency, an effective defense, and sound and just counsel.

The interrelationship of this effort to the President's objective of a just, durable and prosperous peace is obvious. They are all men who were outstandingly successful before they entered the Cabinet, and they have all been subjected to the pounding of public attack. I predict, gentlemen, that they will stand in history as one of the most significant top four of a cabinet of the United States since the days of the founders of this Republic.

Now, one of the attacks recently made will serve to highlight the results of the work of these men under the policies of the President in relationship to peace for America, peace for the world. The charge has recently been made that the defense of the United States had been weakened in these three years. Presumably the basis of the claim is the fact that defense spending has been reduced by several billion dollars a year, and the number of men in the Armed Forces has been cut from 3 million 600 thousand in 1952 to 2 million 900 thousand men currently.

But what are the facts of the defense strength of America? What should we draw from these statistics of reduced expenditure and reduced men in the Armed Forces? In 1952, hundreds of thousands of men in our Armed Forces were in Korea. They were in an exposed outpost, and many other thousands of them were in military hospitals as casualties. Did that add to the strength of America in its defense in the world in that posture? Compare it now with the ending of the Korean War, with the building up of the Army of the Republic of Korea to 20 divisions of its own Republic of Korea forces, to improving production, modernizing the armed forces, economizing day after day, checking the inflationary spiral, and together achieving spectacular results.

And may I interject this: Charlie Wilson may sometimes get tangled up with a dog story, but he certainly knows how to untangle production. The production for defense has been moving through in a remarkable way very close to production schedules as the requirements are there. Thus today in real strength, the United States is more powerful by far than it was in 1952 or in any other peacetime year, and this strength is due in large measure to the leadership of the President and of the top four. And this strength is devoted and dedicated to a durable, prosperous peace, with freedom and with justice.

And the resolution of these problems in distant points in the world, the basis on which a year of peace, and a favorable prospect in spite of all the difficulties of a durable peace, is attained, involves the most complex interrelation of solutions, of steps, of measures. That message I would like to leave with this outstanding leadership of America today.

There are no simple magic formulae, no easy answers for the way in which a great leading nation conducts its affairs in relationship to the whole world, and in the interests of peace in the atomic age. The significant developments in foreign policy that directly relate to the stability of the world situation and to the prospects of peace are well worth running through in just a sort of catalog way. I think all of us are inclined to see the problem ahead in terms of the current headline of difficulty. The difficult picture flaring up in Cyprus, or in the Near East, or some place of that kind, has the headline, but it is the solid move upon the complex of the world picture that decides the result for America and for the world.

In these three years, in addition to the conclusion of peace in Korea, there are these other matters that affected the posture of defense, and the prospects for peace:

First, a worldwide movement for and appreciation of the peaceful uses of atomic energy was successfully initiated. Scientists of 72 nations conferred at Geneva, and the International Atomic Energy Agency was established without a dissenting vote in the United Nations General Assembly just a few weeks ago.

Second, the people of Guatamala in this hemisphere removed a Communist-dominated government, established new leadership opposed to Communism and friendly to the United States. Now no government in this hemisphere is dominated by Communism.

Third, a rapprochement was achieved between the Republic of France and the German Federal Republic through which a Western European unity was established and Germany was admitted to NATO, And this source of so much difficulty, and of weakness and of war for a century, has been greatly improved by the adjustment of relationships between France and Germany, bringing them in together in a Western European union, and in association with the United States and Canada in NATO.

Fourth, the Trieste issue was settled. That port, that small area between Italy and Yugoslavia had been a festering problem. And then, economic and cultural relationships were resumed between these Mediterranean neighbors.

Fifth, an agreement was reached with Spain for mutual cooperation which includes valuable base rights for the United States in a strategic position behind the Pyrenees, between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

Sixth, the complete sovereignty of Austria was restored. The Red Army and United States troops were withdrawn, and a solvent, democratic, happy, musical nation emerged in the center of Europe.

The eight-year Indo-China war was ended. The sovereign states of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam moved forward as independent states and were strengthened economically and militarily, checking the Communist's Southeast Asian drive at the border of North Vietnam, taken over by the Communists in the settlement of that long war.

Eighth, the ruling leaders of the Soviet Union were told directly and plainly at the Summit Conference that the objective of the United States was and would continue to be a just and lasting peace, and a dramatic and sound proposal for the exchange of military information and aerial reconnaissance was made by the President.

And I shall never forget that afternoon as they sat at that great quadrangle table; off to the left, Prime Minister Faure and Foreign Minister Pinay of France; directly across the table from the President, Prime Minister Eden, and Foreign Minister Macmillan of Great Britain; and off on the right - on that side of the quadrangle - Prime Minister Bulganin, Khrushchev, Zhukov, and their associates. They were talking about these modern weapons and the tremendous destructive powers that they have, talking about the alternative of what could happen in the advance through the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

The President, looking directly across at Prime Minister Bulganin and General Zhukov and the others, spoke of how he had been searching his heart and his mind for a way to impress upon them and upon the world the intentions of the United States, its firmness of position in strength, but its desire to move constructively. Then he proposed that we exchange blueprints of our military establishments and open up the skies over each country, so that peaceful, unarmed planes can observe and verify that neither side has any intention other than peaceful, and to provide against the possibility of great surprise attack by these nations that have these powerful weapons in quantity.

It was a dramatic moment, and from athat time on, study and consideration have been going forward on this as a beginning or a gateway by which we might move safely away from the competitive arms buildup, with all of the dangers that that has held in history, the dangers that are inherent in it in the present situation.

And as the governments study it through, the United Kingdom has come out in solid support in the United Nations Assembly, and Canada, our neighbor, and France, and an increasing number of nations of the world are seeing the soundness and the inspiration, trying to move in the way in which this man of peace, with his tremendous military background, has proposed.

Thus far, the Soviet Union is raising many objections. But - there are also indications that they are studying and reflecting. That moment, taken against the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy and the way in which that shows an incentive for peace, even as there is the penalty of the danger of war, I believe will prove to be one of the historic moments of the great future in the atomic age.

And you know that in other areas of the world, such as in Iran, ancient Persia, with all its oil and the gateway to the Near East oil, a new government has been established to take the place of the unstable former government, and the Communist infiltration which was very extreme in that country was cleared up. More than 60 nations were assisted in advancing their economic well-being to a record high point, and that economic well-being of the free world has reflected, in part, in the economic success of our country in its post-Korean War adjustment, and now moving to its record high of production in its advance in the standard of living.

It is the year 1955 that was the first full year in a generation in which no wars were being waged anywhere in the world. What of the years ahead? No one can guarantee. No one should make predictions. It will not be easy; but from the position of productive strength and the poised and alert strength of America today, if administered with restraint, I do believe there is ground for a sober, prayerful optimism on the part of the people of this great nation.

No one should underestimate the problems, but neither should anyone ever be defeatist or low in morale in approach to this challenge of a mission of America in keeping with the very greatest of its fundamental principles of the individual human worth and dignity of spiritual value, and of belief in the individual human being on which America has been founded under God.

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
DAILY LOG - 1-16-56

Washington, D. C.
January 15, 1956

FOR RELEASE AT 4:00 P.M., EST, JANUARY 15, 1956

STATEMENT OF HAROLD E STASSEN IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS FROM THE PRESS REGARDING ADLAI STEVENSON'S ATTACK ON SECRETARY DULLES, AND SENATOR HUBERT HUMPHREY'S SPEECHES ON THE CURRENT ARTICLE IN LIFE MAGAZINE.

Adlai Stevenson's attack yesterday on Secretary Dulles is a deliberate distortion of United States foreign policy for partisan political ends.

As I know it, the Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policy is not reflected with complete accuracy and comprehensive scope in what Adlai Stevenson says it is, nor in the Life Magazine article, nor in Senator Humphrey's speeches, nor in individual magazine articles and separate press stories, nor in single speeches in either party, nor through isolated incidents.

The Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policy is correctly and clearly portrayed only in the official statements of President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles and in the composite series of actions taken by the United States Government under the President's direction in these three years.

The Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policy cannot fairly be labelled by any thoughtful and responsible American as recklessly playing Russian roulette, and to so label it is harmful to the United States.

I would describe the Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policy as devoted to patiently and persistently producing prolonged peace. It is a successful foreign policy. It has involved strength and restraint, firmness and conciliation, moral values and careful considerations, unavoidable risks faced and other risks avoided, bipartisan consultations and responsible decisions, collective defense and national courage, economic aid abroad and economic solvency at home, diplomatic initiative and studied reserve, and it is designed, among other principles, to avoid miscalculation of either our deterrent power, our national interest, or our benign goals. In short, it has involved the continuing complex conduct of the relations of the United States to the rest of the world with the objective of peace.

The people should judge it primarily from its results. No one can deny that the United States and the world are now at peace for the first time in a long while. No one can deny that the Korean War and the Indo-China War are both ended and no new war has started. President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles have made a brilliant and favorable record. Senator George and Chairman Richards and many others deserve a part of the credit. No one does deny that there are continuing grave dangers and serious situations in a number of areas of the world. These problems must be faced. I hope they can be handled with a maximum of bipartisanship, notwithstanding the election year, for the sake of the people of America and of the world.

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The Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policy is correctly and clearly portrayed only in the official statements of President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles and in the composite series of actions taken by the United States Government under the President's direction in these three years.

The Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policy cannot fairly be labelled by any thoughtful and responsible American as recklessly playing Russian roulette, and to so label it is harmful to the United States.

I would describe the Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policy as devoted to patiently and persistently producing prolonged peace. It is a successful foreign policy. It has involved strength and restraint, firmness and conciliation, moral values and careful considerations, unavoidable risks faced and other risks avoided, bipartisan consultations and responsible decisions, collective defense and national courage, economic aid abroad and economic solvency at home, diplomatic initiative and studied reserve, and it is designed, among other principles, to avoid miscalculation of either our deterrent power, our national interest, or our benign goals. In short, it has involved the continuing complex conduct of the relations of the United States to the rest of the world with the objective of peace.

The people should judge it primarily from its results. No one can deny that the United States and the world are now at peace for the first time in a long while. No one can deny that the Korean War and the Indo-China War are both ended and no new war has started. President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles have made a brilliant and favorable record. Senator George and Chairman Richards and many others deserve a part of the credit. No one does deny that there are continuing grave dangers and serious situations in a number of areas of the world. These problems must be faced. I hope they can be handled with a maximum of bipartisanship, notwithstanding the election year, for the sake of the people of America and of the world.

STATEMENT BY
HAROLD E. STASSEN
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR DISARMAMENT
BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
JANUARY 25, 1956, 10:00 A.M.

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the Committee, I respond to the invitation of this special Committee to appear before you this morning and extend to you the pledge of cooperation in the conduct of our work in the executive branch.

At the very opening of my testimony I might state and emphasize that everything we do on this subject in behalf of the United States is devoted toward the objective of a just and a durable and a secure peace for America and for the world, and that objective is before us in every phase of study and negotiations and consideration, as I know it would be on behalf of the Committee.

In opening the testimony before this Committee, I shall try, in my capacity as Special Assistant to the President for disarmament matters, to give first a broad view of U.S. policy with respect to the limitation and reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prospects for international agreement.

The spokesmen of other departments and agencies of the executive branch, I understand, will also be available later to assist the committee in further consideration of the problem, if you wish, particularly as it concerns their individual responsibilities.

Under President Eisenhower, no national objective is receiving more earnest attention than the quest for an international agreement which would end the competitive arms build-up and would increase the security of our country and all others. If the Government of the United States is to serve its people and the cause of peace effectively in this matter, it will be with the whole-hearted, continuous, enlightened, bipartisan cooperation of the executive and legislative branches, backed by a fully-informed public opinion.

II. President Eisenhower's Proposals at Geneva

At Geneva, on the afternoon of July 21, 1955, the President of the United States, meeting with the leaders of France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union looked across the conference table directly at the Soviet delegation and spoke the following words:

> "I have been searching my heart and mind", he declared, "for something that I could say here that could convince everyone of the great sincerity of the United States in approaching this problem of disarmament.
>
> "I should address myself for a moment principally to the delegates from the Soviet Union, because our two great countries

admittedly possess new and terrible weapons in quantities which do give rise in other parts of the world, or reciprocally, to the fears and dangers of surprise attack.

"I propose, therefore", the President continued, "that we take a practical step, that we begin an arrangement, very quickly, as between ourselves -- immediately. These steps would include:

"To give to each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments, from beginning to end, from one end of our countries to the other, lay out the establishments and provide the blueprints to each other.

"Next, to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photography to the other country -- we to provide you the facilities within our country, ample facilities for aerial reconnaissance, where you can make all the pictures you choose and take them to your own country to study, you to provide exactly the same facilities for us and we to make these examinations, and by this step to convince the world that we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and relaxing tension.

"Likewise, we will make more easily attainable a comprehensive and effective system of inspection and disarmament, because what I propose, I assure you, would be but a beginning."

The President's bold concept fired the imagination of all the world.

At one stroke it lifted the disarmament debate to a new plane. It offered the world new hope, not only for progress toward limiting arms, but also for shackling surprise attack and even war itself.

The other heads of state at Geneva put forward other proposals relating to disarmament. There was a very considerable discussion of the whole subject. Mr. Eden suggested what he termed a "pilot scheme" for trial-run mutual inspections in a selected limited area in Europe; Mr. Faure suggested a plan for budgetary inspection and allocation of savings from reduced military expenditures to increasing standards of living; and Marshal Bulganin stressed the Soviet proposals that they had made on May 10, 1955. These Soviet proposals stipulated a series of political settlements, conceived in the Soviet sense, as a pre-condition to disarmament, including the dismantling of foreign bases and withdrawal of all troops from Germany; the imposition, within two years of certain ceilings on the armed forces of the principal military powers, and upon Germany and Japan; and the progressive elimination of atomic weapons after 75 per cent of agreed cuts in conventional forces were completed, all upon the basis of an inspection system which practically every other country in the world finds completely inadequate.

These various national proposals were extensively discussed in the succeeding months, first in the United Nations Disarmament Commission's Subcommittee meetings in New York from August 29 to October 8, in which I represented the United States as Deputy to Ambassador Lodge; at the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Geneva in November, which I attended as Adviser to Secretary Dulles; in the United Nations Disarmament Commission in late November; and finally in the United Nations General Assembly and its Political Committee in December, 1955, the sessions in which a member of your committee, Senator Pastore, participated as a part of the United States delegation.

On December 16, 1955, the General Assembly voted overwhelmingly by a margin of 56-7 for a U.S.-U.K.-Canadian-French resolution which gave top priority to the President's plan. And as you would realize, the seven were all countries strictly within the Soviet group and inside the Curtain. All other countries which voted, voted favorably on the resolution.

The pertinent operative paragraphs of that Resolution read as follows:

(The General Assembly)

"1. Urges that the States concerned and particularly those on the Disarmament Subcommittee:

"(a) Should continue their endeavors to reach agreement on a comprehensive disarmament plan in accordance with the goals set out in resolution 808 (IX);

"(b) Should as initial steps give priority to early agreement on and implementation of

"(i) such confidence-building measures as President Eisenhower's plan for exchanging military blueprints and mutual aerial inspection, and Marshal Bulganin's plan for establishing control posts at strategic centers;

"(ii) all such measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament as are now feasible;"

The majority of the nations of the world have, therefore, given general approval to the United States view of the best way to make progress toward disarmament; they have called upon the principal military powers which comprise the Subcommittee to make a renewed major effort now to translate the President's inspiration into actuality, and to take every feasible step toward disarmament which seems presently possible.

The Soviet Union has not accepted the President's Plan, but it has been chary of rejecting it outright.

You will recall that when certain remarks by Mr. Bulganin to the Supreme Soviet seemed too negative, he corrected them the following day, and issued another statement.

In the international negotiations since last July and in Marshal Bulganin's letter to the President of September 19, the Soviet Union has put itself in the role of seeking clarification. More recently, at the Foreign Ministers' meeting and particularly during the tour of Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Bulganin in India and in Burma, the Soviet leaders have endeavored to deprecate the proposal. Together with six of their satellities in the United Nations, they opposed the great majority in the vote on the Resolution I have just cited. But I do not feel they have taken a position, judging on past experience, which could not subsequently find them moving toward agreement. You may remember in the peaceful uses of atomic energy proposal, they made a series of negative moves before they finally did join in advancing toward the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

What Can the President's Plan Accomplish?

In the meetings of the Subcommittee in New York, I introduced an outline plan which describes in a brief preliminary manner how the President's plan would operate.

The heart of the proposal is unrestricted but monitored, reciprocal aerial inspection, by visual, photographic and electronic means. Personnel of the country being inspected may be aboard the aircraft.

Aerial reconnaissance has come a vast way even from the days of World War II and Korea. Starting from opposite sides of the country, two standard U. S. Air Force jet planes can now photograph a band of terrain, given favorable weather, 490 miles wide and 2,700 miles long, the distance from New York to Los Angeles in only two hours. A country the size of either the United States or the Soviet Union can have its picture taken, mile by mile, field and factory, in less than six months, and that is allowing for weather.

But mere statistics cannot give one not versed in the science the best picture of the capacities of modern aerial photography. In presenting this plan to the United Nations we were particularly anxious that the members should see with their own eyes just what it could do. Accordingly, with the cooperation of the U. S. Air Force and the USIA, we prepared an exhibit which was set up across the street from the United Nations Headquarters in the offices of the Carnegie Endowment. The Delegates and their military advisors were conducted through it by Ambassador Lodge.

In the course of the UN debates a number of the foreign representatives explicitly credited this exhibit with adding to their

understanding of the real effectiveness of the American plan. This worthwhile exposition is still in existence and many people are going through it daily at this time, many of the leaders of various nations have been looking at it when they had the opportunity. I would respectfully invite the members of the Committee, if they find it convenient to be in New York, to take a look at the exhibit.

The President's plan, of course, not only includes aerial reconnaissance but also the exchange of military blueprint information. We have told the Soviet Union and the other countries just what that comprises: First, the identification, strength, command structure and disposition of personnel, units and equipment of all major land, sea and air forces; second, a complete list of military plants, facilities and installations with their locations. Comparable information would be furnished simultaneously by each participating country. Freedom of communications for inspecting personnel would be assured.

In his letter of October 11, President Eisenhower also offered to add to his plan the proposals of Marshal Bulganin for the stationing of ground observers at certain key areas such as large ports, railway and highway junctions, and airdromes.

At Geneva in November, 1955, Secretary Dulles made it clear that if the Eisenhower proposal is accepted by the Soviet Union, the United States would be prepared to proceed promptly so far as it is concerned, to negotiate, both with other sovereign states involved and with the Soviet Union, for the appropriate extension on a reciprocal, equitable basis of the Eisenhower proposal and the Bulganin control posts to overseas bases, and to the forces of other countries.

Full details for the application of the President's Plan are being constantly studied by my staff, by the Special Task Forces which advise me, by the Departments of State and Defense and other interested agencies. Such plans relate to its initial application, full operation, logistics, costing, timing and relation to continuous inspection in a comprehensive plan for arms reduction. In due course and in the appropriate manner, we should be glad to discuss these projections with the Subcommittee.

Obviously, if this country ever reaches agreement and moves on it, it very directly involves the United States Senate in the matter of treaties, so in a way you are now proceeding in a very early and preliminary manner prior to any agreements being formulated that would involve Senate consideration.

The President's Plan, we believe, will unlock the gateway to international agreement for the regulation of armed forces and armaments.

It is an undertaking of delicate implications for the countries which participate in it. But it would provide a most important safeguard against that great surprise attack which could herald the holocaust.

We believe it will eventually and surely commend itself to all peoples who cherish peace.

III. The Background of the U. S. Proposals

When President Eisenhower made his proposals, it was because he recognized that the world had arrived at a crossroads in the search for the control of arms.

The technical base upon which past proposals had been constructed was being transformed by new scientific and industrial developments. The time had come for a new look at this problem.

You will recall that as far back as 1946, the United States made a proposal to share its atomic monopoly with all nations of the world, to place all stocks of nuclear material under international ownership under rigid conditions of effective inspection, to eliminate atomic weapons, and to devote all future nuclear production to peaceful purposes only.

The Soviet Union, which had not then developed nuclear weapons, consistently rejected these proposals on the grounds that they would violate its national sovereignty.

From 1946 to 1954, the Soviet Union called for prohibition and elimination of atomic weapons, by mere declaration, before any reliable inspection could be established. In other words, their program was merely "ban the bomb and trust the Soviet."

The United States proposals were supported by practically all the United Nations and opposed by the Soviet bloc up to 1954. From 1947 to 1954 they were further developed and extended to conventional weapons. Working upon some tentative ideas of the United States put forward in 1952, the British and the French, in 1954 and 1955, proposed ceilings of 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 men for the armed forces of the U. S., the Soviet Union and China, with subsidiary levels for other states, together with a proposal, which the United States did not support, to begin the elimination of atomic weapons after 75 per cent of agreed cuts in conventional arms and armed forces had been achieved. This program would have been supervised by thorough international inspection and control.

Meanwhile, in 1954 and 1955, the Soviet Union was taking up a series of contradictory positions which seem to have had some relation to the changes in Kremlin leadership. Eventually, on May 10, 1955, the Soviet Union ostensibly accepted a number of previous Western proposals. But the Soviet proposals were still conditioned upon impossible political settlements; they did not offer a reliable inspection system; they would have effectively prevented the use of atomic weapons by the free world in defense against aggression by mass armies, and they promised to eliminate nuclear weapons without providing adequate means of verification.

By the time President Eisenhower came to Geneva, we had realized that the basic concepts underlying our older plans -- and reflected in some degree in Soviet proposals -- were outmoded, that is the arrival of the H-bomb age brought a very new and important factor to everything involved in armaments.

The production of nuclear weapons material no longer needed to be concentrated in huge, expensive plants. It could be produced in simpler installations in many areas. A relatively smaller amount of nuclear material could be made to produce vastly greater yields in terms of explosive power. Capping this development was the development of hydrogen weapons in this country and in the Soviet Union.

But the most revolutionary change in the picture was cumulative. For almost a decade, nuclear production has been proceeding under no international control whatsoever. During all of the time it has been possible for a country interested in evading prospective international control to hide atomic weapons. The tell-tale radioactivity of nuclear weapons can be shielded by containers, beyond the range of any presently known detection device.

In other words, Mr. Chairman, we could have the best known scientific detection instrument here with the most elaborate and sensitive detection facilities, and 100 yards away there could be stored a dozen of the most powerful H-bombs, and if they are properly shielded in a way that everyone knows how to shield them, this best instrument now known would give no indication that they were hidden a hundred yards away, and the amount of material that you have to divert to establish a dozen H-bombs is relatively a small physical quantity of material. So this new development brings in an entirely new dimension on any matter affecting control and elimination of nuclear weapons.

So as the stockpile grows, the danger mounts. Because of the margin of error in accounting, with each year that passes, the amount of material available for hidden weapons has increased. With the passage of time we were bound to reach a crucial point at which this margin of error represented a dangerous potential in nuclear weapons. That point has now been reached.

This is the technical background of President Eisenhower's proposal at Geneva.

It means that the older plans for inspection of nuclear material based on total accounting for production have now become outmoded and unrealistic.

It means that no one can be sure that nuclear weapons have been eliminated under any control system now proposed or in prospect.

The Soviet Union in its May 10 proposals recognized very clearly the danger of mounting stockpiles in the changed technological picture. It also indicated that it saw the increased necessity of guarding against surprise attack.

The Soviet May 10 proposals contain these words:

> " . . . There are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading control and for organizing the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons, even if there is a formal agreement on international control. In such a situation, the security of states signatories to the international convention cannot be guaranteed, since the possibility would be open to a potential aggressor to accumulate stocks of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a surprise atomic attack on peace-loving states."

But the Soviet Union prescribes thus far no new remedy to fit their own clear diagnosis. It continues in a way to call for the elimination of atomic weapons, although it has shown very clearly why this is impossible. It continues to call for measures of disarmament which could not be backed up by limited and nominal inspection which is the only kind it would permit within the Soviet Union thus far.

In spite of repeated inquiries we have made in the United Nations, the Soviet Union will give no assurance that inspectors would be in the field and ready to operate before disarmament began. It will not specify in any detail those things which the inspectors would be allowed to inspect. It would allow inspection from the air only at the very end of a disarmament program.

The United States moved to meet the new situation very differently. Two things were required: Some new and different conception which would offer the world security and confidence while it tackled its problem; and an intensive review of the possibilities and limitations of international inspection under the new conditions.

To meet the first vital requirement of international security, and as a demonstration of American sincerity, the President put forward his proposals at Geneva on July 21.

To meet the second requirement, certain studies under my direction were put under way.

IV. Our Organization for Disarmament Studies

Several departments of the Government had for some time been reviewing the U. S. position. It became apparent that some coordination at Cabinet level was desirable and that extensive studies requiring full-time specialized

attention had to be performed.

On March 19, 1955, the President appointed me as Special Assistant for Disarmament Matters. To assist me, I set up a small staff, consisting of very able men loaned by the Department of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Central Intelligence Agency, and of a Special Research Group.

On August 5, 1955, I was also appointed as United States Deputy Representative to the United Nations to follow through on the international negotiation aspect of my assignment.

In all dealings with foreign governments, I am, of course, under the direction of Secretary Dulles; and with respect to negotiations in the United Nations, under the direction of Ambassador Lodge. I represent the United States in the Disarmament Commission's Subcommittee, consisting of the United States, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union.

In connection with the President's appointment, a special inter-departmental committee on disarmament problems was established. This inter-departmental committee includes representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and Central Intelligence Agency, and then also the Department of Justice, because if we ever do move in this field, there will be many legal problems within the United States, and the United States Information Agency, because the overseas understanding of what the United States is doing is so important.

I report to the Committee that I think all of these liaison arrangements are working well. They have been of great assistance in preparing policy matters for review and decision.

One of the first moves at the direction of the President was to ask a number of the most competent authorities in American life to undertake a study of the requirements and methods of effective international inspection and control. These outstanding men now head up Task Forces in the appropriate fields of inquiry and they in turn have associated with other highly qualified men. These are the chairmen of the eight Task Forces and their assignments:

The Chairman of the Task Force inquiring into inspection and control of nuclear materials is Dr. Ernest O. Lawrence, Director of the University of California Radiation Laboratories at Livermore, California. Undoubtedly Senator Knowland knows him well.

Associated with Dr. Lawrence is a large panel of some of the most distinguished nuclear physicists in America. This group stands ready to consider any suggestion which any government or any scientist may make to develop more effective means of accounting for nuclear weapons material and the detection of nuclear weapons, if they are concealed.

The vital task of further designing methods for aerial inspection and reporting in the light of the President's proposals is the responsibility of a Task Force headed by General James H. Doolittle, (Retired), now Vice President and Director of Shell Oil Company.

Inspection and reporting methods for Army and ground units is the responsibility of General Walter B. Smith, (Retired), former Under Secretary of State and former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, presently Vice Chairman of the American Machine and Foundry Company. He is assisted by General Lucian K. Truscott, (Retired), and by a Task Force group.

Vice Admiral Oswald S. Colclough, (Retired), Dean of Faculties, George Washington University, heads the Task Force for Navies and Naval aircraft and missiles, and he is an Admiral who had considerable submarine experience and experience with the Soviet Union during his active duty.

Steel is the core of military industry. Mr. Benjamin Fairless, formerly Chairman of the United States Steel Corporation, and now head of the Iron and Steel Institute, is Chairman of the Task Force for the steel industry.

Inspection and reporting methods for power and for industry in general are assigned to Mr. Walker L. Cisler, President of The Detroit Edison Company, and a group which he has assembled.

The study of methods of inspection and reporting of national budgets and finances has been assigned to Dr. Harold Moulton, former Chairman of the Brookings Institution.

No system of inspection and reporting is better than its communications system, which has peculiar and difficult responsibilities in the nuclear age. Dr. James B. Fisk, of the Bell Telephone Laboratories, and a member of the General Advisory Committee of the AEC, and other members of a Communications Task Force, have been charged with designing a method of rapid, continuous, reliable communications, necessary to implement an international inspection and reporting system, if it is agreed and we move to implement it.

These Task Forces have already done a great amount of most valuable work and have had splendid cooperation from various agencies of the Government. As a result of their studies, and in connection with the President's Plan, I believe we shall have something we have never had before -- a detailed operating manual of what to inspect, how and where it would be inspected, and a knowledge of what can and cannot be profitably inspected if we seek to provide a safeguard against surprise attack and to supervise an international arms limitation agreement.

Central, of course, in this is not only what you can and cannot inspect being acceptable, but what would be reciprocally acceptable in the United States. The problem is the kind of inspection you would want on the other side, and that you would reciprocally accept within the United States, and that in itself is a complex problem.

The Task Force work is not finally completed, but what has been done so far will furnish a firmer foundation for U. S. policy and enhance our position in international negotiations.

V. Towards A New American Position

With the means at my command and through the efforts of the regular Government agencies, and in international negotiations and meetings, the United States has tried to inform world opinion of the transformation which has occurred in the problem of international control of armaments. These efforts have met with some success.

I believe that there is now gradually increasing understanding in this country and abroad that verifying the elimination of atomic weapons under the present state of scientific knowledge and under an international arms agreement is not now feasible. The implications of that tremendous fact are becoming known and understood.

There is also a disposition, especially evident in the United Nations, to consider pragmatic or partial approaches to disarmament in the hopes that each such step might be regarded as an installment on the general agreement we all desire, and as a contribution toward mutual confidence, the absence of which has so far nullified our efforts. This is reflected in the General Assembly resolution to which I have referred.

I think there is also, if we are to judge by the United Nations vote, an understanding of the fallacious nature of the May 10 Soviet proposals, of their inadequacy and their implications, and a universal yearning to set such a seal against war as the President's plan could provide.

One measure which the United States has used to underscore its determination to launch the new approach has been to place a reservation upon the positions previously considered in the United Nations. We have not, for example, negotiated on the numerical ceilings on conventional forces, in the absence of a determination as to what could be done about nuclear weapons. We have neither rejected our past positions nor can we reaffirm them in blanket fashion. This has seemed to us an honest and logical course, especially while we are conducting the studies I have mentioned. The time has come to move beyond that reservation, under the new resolution passed by the United Nations General Assembly.

The United States will make a renewed and persistent effort in the coming months of 1956, to reach a sound agreement for the future limitation of armament in the interest of a continuing peace. Within a few weeks the United Nations Disarmament Subcommittee will resume its labors. The time has come for the United States to consider concrete suggestions in the light of its studies and in the terms of the General Assembly directive. It would be premature at this time to outline in detail what our position will be. I should like, however, to assert some of the principles under the statements which have been made by the President and by the Secretary of State, which govern our policy, and to outline our attitude on some of the principal issues.

First and foremost we want to reach agreement in this field. I think it is well to indicate that disarmament has come to mean not the literal meaning in the dictionary, but any offer to reach any kind of agreement or limitation or control or inspection affecting armed forces and armaments. It has taken on a special meaning in international circles.

It is true that the strength of the United States and the free world can meet threats brought against us as long as we are vigilant. It is also true that the awful power of nuclear weapons constitutes a deterrent force to major wars and even to smaller aggressions, so long as their probable perpetrators fear they may grow into something bigger and more dangerous to them. At best, however, mutual deterrence is a precarious balance which may always be upset by miscalculations or by madmen in future years or by the unpredictable result of probing actions upon the periphery. The collapse of the condition could mean world catastrophe. Such a prospect lays a dead hand upon hopes for a better world which could otherwise be fulfilled, and will place an increasing burden upon our spirits and material resources. It should compel us to make a new and determined effort to reach a sound agreement for the limitation of arms, and I emphasize sound agreement, because basic in our approach is that only an agreement which would involve effective inspection would ever be sound from the United States' viewpoint.

Secondly, the United States will not disarm or reduce arms unilaterally under any condition except on the basis of complete reciprocity, assured by rigorous, unremitting, thorough, forehanded international inspection and control. That system of control must now take account of the problem of undisclosed stockpiles of nuclear weapons material.

Third, in the divided state of our world, we must beware of creating a false sense of security and excessive phychological disarmament. We must beware of playing communism's game unintentionally, which seeks to beguile the free world into letting down its guard, withdrawing its bases and relaxing its alliances.

Fourth, in its own interest and as a responsible leader of the free world, the United States must demonstrate that the acceptance of the President's Geneva proposals would definitely end the competitive build-up of armaments and would turn the trend downward. The United States has promised the world that the President's Plan is a gateway to arms control. The President gave it as the beginning in this problem. The USSR has claimed, on the contrary, that it would promote an acceleration and expansion of the arms race. In its own interest the United States should demonstrate its sincerity in this respect.

Fifth, the balance of mutual deterrence will become still more hazardous when it is diffused in so many combinations.

Sixth, the United States has consistently urged that when a sound and effective system of international control is placed in effect and it does demonstrate its effectiveness, then nuclear production could be devoted to peaceful uses. The President took the initiative in that respect, as you recall, in his December 8, 1953, address, which the Congress supported in the amendment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and which has then been moved in implementation, including some steps in the United Nations General Assembly in which Senatore Pastore participated.

Seventh, because of the imminent development of guided missiles of intercontinental range and the proliferation of the means of nuclear production which would transform the problem of international control, the need for a solution is increasingly urgent.

In accordance with these principles, the United States will carefully and slowly shape its position. In the meantime, some particulars can be given: First, as to the use of atomic weapons: The United States will never use atomic weapons nor any other weapons, be it a gun, tank, warship or rifle, in any other way except to defeat aggression and in conformity with its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations.

The Soviet Union has indicated that it is not satisfied with that pledge. It wishes each nuclear power to give the commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons in war, and then only if approved by the Security Council. The United States will not accept this proposal of the Soviet Union.

> As Ambassador Lodge told the United Nations, "If an international agreement should make it impossible for law-abiding powers to use their principal weapons, even in dire extremity of self-defense against a massive aggression, then that power which is strongest in the conventional means of warfare would be immediately established as the strongest military power on earth, and it would still have a reserve of its own nuclear weapons sufficient to strike devastating blows.

"The true democracies of the world, by their very way of life, have traditionally been forced to accept the first blows in war. Thus, they generally concede a great strategic initiative. Should they also agree not to use their most powerful weapons in their own defense after taking that first blow, or if they should subject their self-defense to Security Council veto, they would be committing suicide."

The issue of inspection is another great issue which divides the Soviet bloc and the free world. I have already made clear what the Western world would insist upon in the way of inspection. It must be in place and prepared to operate before disarmament begins, and it must have adequate rights and immunities. The Soviet Union still has not said what it would inspect other than the fixed points, named in the Bulganin proposal, nor when it would allow inspection to begin, nor whether the inspectors could see all that they must see. We will continue to seek to draw them out on these points.

We believe that President Eisenhower's Plan should be the basis of the inspection system.

There has been much discussion of the idea of suspending or halting tests of nuclear weapons. We can understand a certain amount of feeling in this respect. We should not confuse treating the symptoms with eliminating the evil which in this case is the arms competition rooted in international tensions and the problem of war itself.

In the absence of a disarmament agreement, the United States and the free world are determined to maintain their defensive strength and their defensive collective security alliances. Nuclear weapons constitute a major part of this defensive strength, and weapons tests are essential to keep abreast of new developments, especially in respect to defense against nuclear attacks.

Scientific information available to the United States indicates that properly safeguarded nuclear testing constitutes no hazard to human health and safety. On United States initiative, the General Assembly has established a fifteen-nation Scientific Committee to collate and disseminate scientific information relating to radiological effects. The United States will make information available so that all nations may be in a position to draw their own conclusions.

Secretary Dulles at the Geneva meeting of Foreign Ministers stated that if agreement could be reached to limit nuclear weapons within the framework of an effective system of disarmament and under proper safeguards, there should be corresponding restrictions on the testing of weapons. To date, our deliberations have not produced any dependable formula acceptable to both sides. The United States is continuing to

of a more abundant life than man has known through the peaceful uses of these new discoveries of science in the atomic field; on the other hand, the constant threat of devastation more complete than man can conceive -- a field of war where, as Pope Pius said in his Christmas message:

> "There will be no song of victory, only the inconsolable weeping of humanity, which in desolation will gaze upon the catastrophe brought on by its own folly."

I believe, perhaps slowly and after much debate and much study and after many deliberations and variation in the process, ultimately mankind will know which path to choose between these extreme alternatives before it.

Minnesota Historical Society