



# *NATIONAL DEFENSE EXECUTIVE RESERVE*

## *FIFTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE*

*Washington, D. C.  
October 23-24, 1967*



## *A REPORT*



FIFTH  
NATIONAL CONFERENCE

October 23 - 24, 1967





THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 6, 1967

The wars of this century are no longer confined to the battlefields. The national will, as expressed by the patriotism and willingness to serve, of millions of private citizens is a vital measure of a country's strength.

By your service in the National Defense Executive Reserve, you testify to America's readiness to commit all of her talents, energies, and skills to resist any threat to our freedom.

I am pleased to extend to each Executive Reservist my warmest greetings and your country's thanks.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, which appears to be "Lyndon B. Johnson", is written below the typed text.



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PREFACE

It is a privilege to issue this report on the fifth national conference of the National Defense Executive Reserve. The comments we have received about the meeting have been most complimentary. This should be a source of pride and satisfaction to all Executive Reservists, since it is your dedication to service and your willingness to leave busy schedules for periodic training that brings this praise and enhances the preparedness of our Nation.

*Price Daniel*  
Price Daniel  
Director, Office of  
Emergency Planning

January 31, 1968

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## SECTION 1

### INTRODUCTION

With a warm letter of greetings to Executive Reservists from President Johnson, the fifth national conference of the National Defense Executive Reserve was held in Washington, D. C., October 23-24, 1967. The national conference brings together members of all Executive Reserve units for an exchange of views among themselves and with top Government leaders responsible for the program. Briefings on current national and international developments round out the work of individual Reserve units. Here the Executive Reservist receives specialized training related to his emergency preparedness assignment. This broadens unit training given by Federal agencies locally, regionally, and nationally, in the periods between national conferences.

New members received unit orientation during the morning of the first day of the conference. At 2 p.m. the first plenary session was held at the Sheraton-Park Hotel. Vice President Humphrey gave a full account of the U. S. position in Viet Nam. His remarks were greeted with thunderous applause from the Reservists. The general session also included penetrating addresses by the Honorable Paul H. Nitze, Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Honorable William H. Shaw, then Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs; and the Honorable Robert R. Bowie, Counselor, Department of State. Governor Endicott Peabody, Assistant Director of the Office of Emergency Planning, chaired the plenary session.

All business sessions on the second day of the conference were devoted to unit training. The Office of Oil and Gas (Department of the Interior), the Federal transportation agencies, and OEP units conducted their training sessions in the Sheraton-Park's meeting rooms. Other Federal agencies held unit training at their headquarters. Summaries of these sessions are included in this document.

An entertainment subcommittee chaired by Mrs. India Edwards, an OEP Reservist and Consultant, staged an interesting and informative program for the ladies attending the conference as guests. A special late afternoon conducted tour of the White House was a feature of the program. Other tours included Arlington Cemetery, President Kennedy's grave, the Iwo Jima Memorial, Mt. Vernon, the State Department's diplomatic reception room, the Washington National Cathedral, the Shrine of the Immaculate Conception, and the Embassies of India, Peru, and Japan. The ladies also enjoyed luncheon with Mrs. Betty Furness, Special Assistant to the President for Consumer Affairs, and attended, with the Reservists,



a special concert performance of "West Side Story" presented by the American Light Opera Company.

The conference closed the evening of October 24 with a reception and banquet at the Sheraton-Park in honor of the Executive Reservists and their guests. Mr. Theodore F. Koop, Vice President of the Columbia Broadcasting System and President of the NDER Conference Association, was Master of Ceremonies. The Colors were presented by a Joint Color Guard of the Armed Forces, and Major General Edwin R. Chess, Chief of Air Force Chaplains, gave the invocation. Governor Peabody introduced General Maxwell D. Taylor, Special Consultant to the President, who gave a major address spelling out the strategic reasons for our commitment in Viet Nam and the compelling logic underlying our present course. A program of patriotic entertainment was presented by the United States Marine Corps Band and the United States Navy Band Sea Chanters.

Conference planning and execution were undertaken jointly by a Government arrangements committee and the NDER Conference Association. The arrangements committee, chaired by Mr. Robert Y. Phillips, Director of OEP's Emergency Operations Office, managed the conference and training. The NDER Conference Association, under Mr. Koop's leadership, supervised conference finances and the conference contractor, At Your Service, Inc.

The NDER Conference Association was incorporated August 25, 1961 under the Non-Profit Corporation Act of the District of Columbia. Association officers are Executive Reservists from the Washington area who met frequently, at no cost to the Government nor the Association, to plan the conference and assist in the post-conference period to settle financial accounts. A final audit of the Association records indicates that a very healthy surplus of \$6,632.46 will be carried forward to help finance the next national meeting.

## SECTION 2

### ADDRESSES

BY

### DISTINGUISHED CONFERENCE SPEAKERS



AN ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE HUBERT H. HUMPHREY  
VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE EXECUTIVE RESERVE

Governor Peabody, members of the National Defense Executive Reserve, ladies and gentlemen:

First may I, on behalf of a very grateful government, thank you for your willingness to serve as part of the national security system of this country.

National security is far more than military defense. National security involves the health and vitality of the American economy; it involves the will and determination of the American people.

I am privileged as an officer of this government to serve in the President's Cabinet, to be a member of the National Security Council, to be as well informed as this government can make one.

Today I want to talk to you as Americans whose uppermost concern is the security of this Nation. I want to talk to you as men and women who have important and responsible roles in your home communities. I need not tell you that how you fulfill those roles of leadership will determine the ultimate strength and vitality of this Nation.

Our World Responsibilities

I want to talk to you also about our responsibilities in the world, because there is no longer any place to hide. Our neighborhood is no longer just our community or even our State or our Nation. The neighborhood that affects our lives and the lives of our children is the entire world; and it might well be said that it is the solar system itself.

So I talk to you of responsibilities that are ours in the world-- and today most specifically in Southeast Asia -- and about some of the discussions taking place right here in America concerning those responsibilities.

Why are we in Southeast Asia and Viet Nam?

We are there, as I see it, for two clear and interrelated reasons:

We are there, first of all, in the interest of our own national security.

We are there also to increase the possibilities of a stable and peaceful world. We are there because of our commitment to the Charter of the United Nations, which calls on us to resist aggression, to promote self-determination and to fight social misery.

### Preventing World War III

We are facing today, in Viet Nam and Southeast Asia, the most recent challenge that we have had to meet since World War II in our effort to prevent World War III.

We are meeting aggression at a limited level so that it will not have to be met later at far wider and more dangerous levels.

We are resisting once again a militant, aggressive communism, but this time in Southeast Asia. Since World War II -- since the advent of terrible nuclear weapons -- we have been tested many times.

We have been tested in Iran, in Greece and Turkey, in Berlin, in Korea and in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Each test has been filled with danger, but each has contributed ultimately to a more peaceful and stable world.

We might well ask ourselves, what kind of world would it be had we failed to have the courage to meet these tests? What kind of world would it be had we not met the Communist challenge in Greece or Turkey? What kind of world would it be had President Truman not had the courage to meet the first test in Berlin ... had we not been willing to stand fast in Korea ... had Mr. Khrushchev been allowed to leave his missiles in Cuba?

These are questions that every thoughtful American might ask himself. Fortunately, we have always proved equal to the challenge -- even when the danger was greatest.

### The Most Difficult Test

Now we're being tested again. And this time the test is perhaps the most difficult of all. For today's aggression doesn't come in the form of conventional invasion -- massed tanks and planes -- across national frontiers. The struggle doesn't take place on a continent where we have relatives or cultural ties, and where the languages and last names are familiar.

And it is doubly painful because television, for the first time, has brought all of the agony and misery of this war into our living rooms, into the comfort of our homes, every day.

### Burdens of Leadership

What is even more difficult to accept is the fact that the burden of leadership and defense for free and independent nations seems to be ours in such a disproportionate measure.

But I think that in our more reflective moments we understand that leadership is a duty and a burden, not a comfort or a privilege. It's difficult because we don't have the luxury of turning away from these responsibilities. But if we, my fellow Americans, with our wealth and our power, turn away when the weak and the poor are the victims of force, subversion and aggression, who else will stand for freedom, for self-determination and for peace?

One disadvantage of being a peaceful country is that you can't unfortunately, pick the time and place where you will be confronted with aggression. You cannot select the battlefield. Like it or not, the time is now and the place is Viet Nam and Southeast Asia -- there is no escaping it.

I have talked, face-to-face, on many occasions with the leaders of Southeast Asia. I shall be talking with them again this coming weekend and next week. And they have said to me without exception that if we failed in Viet Nam, they would be under unbearable pressure from a powerful, nuclear-armed Communist China.

### Militant Asian Communism

The overwhelming fact of international life in Asia today is a militant Asian communism, backed and supported by a Communist China which still lives, regrettably, by irrational, revolutionary creed and preaches the doctrine of the "war of national liberation."

Leaders of free Asia have said to me that if we fail, they will face the peril of aggression -- overt, covert or both.

If they were to survive, they would be compelled, they have told me, to make "some sort of new arrangement" with the militant power which is at their doorstep.

Let me give you the words of a statesman respected in this country and Asia, Thanat Khoman, the Foreign Minister of Thailand. Speaking in Bangkok earlier this year, he said:



"Thanks to the wisdom and courage of the President of the United States ... we are now succeeding in putting out a small fire. It was a decision that will go down in history as the move that prevented the world from having to face another major conflagration."

#### Asian Security

President Park of Korea, who surely knows what it means to face Communist aggression, said in his State of the Nation address last year:

"For the first time in our history, last year we decided to dispatch combat troops overseas, because in our belief any aggression against the Republic of Viet Nam represented a direct and grave menace against the security and peace of Free Asia and therefore directly jeopardized the very security and freedom of our own people."

Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand: "We can thank God that America at least regards aggression in Asia with the same concern as it regards aggression in Europe -- and is prepared to back up its concern with action."

Only last week Prime Minister Holt of Australia spoke in even more direct terms in equating the defense and security of Australia with the outcome of the struggle in Viet Nam, as he dispatched more troops from Australia, our devoted ally in World War I, World War II, Korea and now.

#### Aid Against Aggression

Here's what Prime Minister Holt said to the Parliament and people of Australia on their recent increase in troop strength:

"We are there because we believe in the right of people to be free. We are there because we responded to an appeal for aid against aggression. We are there because we want peace, not war, independence, not slavery to be the lot of the peoples of Asia. We are there because we do not believe that our great Pacific partner, the United States, should stand alone for freedom. We will continue to be there while the aggression persists, because as a free and independent nation we cannot honorably do otherwise."

And President Marcos of the Philippines said:

"I find it honorable to say, in view of the resolution of the United States Government to help protect the freedom loving peoples of Asia, that the least that the peoples of Asia can do is to fulfill their own part, and that is, demonstrate their own love for freedom by fighting with their own men, with their own complement, and their own soldiers, for freedom."

That is why all these nations are standing with us -- along with others -- in Viet Nam.

#### Asian Contributions

That is why the combined military contribution of Asian and South Pacific nations in Viet Nam now far exceeds the contribution of our allies in the Korean war.

It may be that all those Asian nations and leaders are wrong in their commitments and in their views. But their strong beliefs -- taken together with the hard evidence of Asian Communist subversion and aggression over the past few years in Korea, in India, in Tibet, in Burma, in Thailand, in Indonesia, in Malaysia, in Laos, and in Viet Nam -- these beliefs and this evidence lead me to conclude that the United States of America would be foolish to act on any other assumption than that these free Asian leaders are right when they say that their security is at stake.

So there are hard-headed, tangible reasons for our involvement in Southeast Asia and Viet Nam, reasons clearly affecting the stability and the safety, the integrity and independence of a vast area of the world rich both in people and in resources -- an area that includes two-thirds of the world population.

In this area of the world, all of America's struggles since Pearl Harbor have begun. And most Americans who have died fighting for their country in this century have died here.

How can we ignore Asia as if it were not our concern? Surely, you haven't forgotten Pearl Harbor and Korea.

#### Our National Interest

It is not in our national interest to ignore the facts of international strife; nor is our security served by permitting vast areas of the world to fall victim to Communist pressure.

If our policy of mutual security and containment of Communist power in Europe has been right, then the same logic and compelling reasons require the application of such a policy in Asia.

Where are we headed, and what does the future hold? No one has the power of prophecy. But I think we may have some idea from the course of postwar history. We did go through a similar experience after World War II with active and aggressive communism in Europe.

By our firmness and perseverance, and that of our allies, with great risk and great cost, we are able to live today in "peaceful coexistence" with the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe.

#### Bridge Building

We are, in fact, able to engage in what we call "bridge-building" -- to join in a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and to sign a new Space Treaty banning weapons of mass destruction in outer space; to work toward a new agreement halting the further spread of nuclear weapons; to sign a consular agreement; and to do many other things so that we may find ways to live together in peace.

I believe that if we are willing to stand fast today with the independent nations of Asia, we can in time have a chance for the same experience there.

I believe that, with time and evolution, changes may take place in Communist China which will bring her back into the family of nations. That is why I have talked of a policy of "containment without isolation" -- why our President has talked of reconciliation -- why our Secretary of State has talked about peaceful coexistence with Mainland China.

We do not seek to make Mainland China our enemy. We do not seek to encircle and crush her; nor do we seek to crush anyone.

#### Coexistence in Asia

What we seek to do is to help the independent nations of Asia strengthen themselves against subversion and aggression so that a new generation of Mainland Chinese leaders may, in time, see the futility of subversion, wars of liberation and militancy; and peaceful coexistence in Asia, as in Europe may be possible. For our part, we would welcome that day.

But were we to reduce our assistance to the nations on the Asian rim, were we to withdraw from Viet Nam short of a just and peaceful settlement, I believe the ultimate goal of reconciliation and peaceful coexistence would not be served. I believe it would be threatened.

So I support our policy in Southeast Asia and Viet Nam -- I support it now as I have over the past 12 years.

#### Prudence and Restraint

I support our policy of prudence and restraint in the exercise of our power and our efforts carefully calculated to discourage further aggression but not to run the risks of triggering a nuclear and final World War III.

One is not a responsible official if he condones lawlessness, aggression, violence and destruction. That is irresponsibility at its worst. Nor is one a responsible public official if he takes the risk of triggering nuclear war -- World War III.

It is that fine dividing line between firmness and resolution on the one hand, and belligerency and emotionalism on the other, that determines whether a man is a leader -- a statesman.

It takes, and will take, prudence, restraint, real statesmanship to fulfill our commitments and our responsibilities for our own national security while avoiding the all-out catastrophic world war.

I support our policy because I believe it to be vital to our own national security. I support it because I believe it serves the long-term interest of a stable and peaceful world. Were we to abandon that policy today, it is my belief that our children might have to pay the final, terrible price tomorrow.

I have not forgotten the lesson of the thirties, when men who cried out "peace" and sought to adjust themselves to the dictators and the aggressors failed their time and their generation. I have not forgotten the lessons of history, when powerful nations let madmen run loose in Europe and Asia, when Hitler's Reich was on the march until it gained momentum and literally engulfed the world in a blood bath.

I, for one, would not want to be responsible for a policy which deferred today's manageable troubles until they became unmanageable -- a policy of Armageddon on the Installment Plan.



Now, for a moment, permit me to talk with you about the discussion taking place in America concerning our involvement in Southeast Asia and Viet Nam.

#### Academic Discussions

I have heard many plausible arguments, and read many well-reasoned papers and articles over the past few months as to how the present conflict in Viet Nam might have been avoided -- in fact, how Mainland China might have been saved from communism, how France might have had a different colonial policy in Indo-China, how Ho Chi Minh might have been handled differently 10 years ago, and how any other number of things might have been done to make unnecessary our involvement today.

All of this is very interesting, particularly as academic discussion. Some of it has been useful in understanding past mistakes so that they might be avoided in the future. Yet, I must say, it has not offered realistic alternative courses of action for today.

#### The Hour for Decision

Protest without an alternative course of action provides for debate and discussion; it also requires decision. When you are in a position of responsibility, public or private, after the discussion, the debate and the dissent, the hour of decision arrives. But those who do not have to make the decision seem to enjoy the discussion most.

Nor is it enough to say, as many do, that the nations of Asia ought to be able to fully take care of themselves. Maybe so. But the fact is that, although they are working together and making progress, more now than ever, they are not able to take care of themselves alone.

It is not enough to say: "But the 'war of liberation' concept makes no sense. Its success in Viet Nam would not necessarily mean it could succeed elsewhere." That has been repeated often. Maybe it is right, but the fact is that a powerful, neurotic, aggressive regime in Asia has given every indication of believing that a war of national liberation could succeed in Viet Nam and elsewhere.

A former President of the United States felt much the same way. I would like to quote to you what President Kennedy said to two television commentators, David Brinkley and Walter Cronkite, in September 1963.

Let his words speak for themselves. I'm not necessarily in complete agreement with all of them, but this was the view of a great President, following a policy that was established by his predecessor, President Eisenhower.

"Mr. Brinkley: 'Mr. President, have you any reason to doubt this so-called domino theory, that if South Viet Nam falls, the rest of Southeast Asia will go behind it?'

"President Kennedy: 'No, I believe it. I believe it. I think that the struggle is close enough. China is so large, looms so high just beyond the frontiers that if South Viet Nam went, it would not only give them an improved geographical position for guerrilla assaults on Malaya, but would also give the impression that the wave of the future in Southeast Asia was China and the Communists. So I believe it.

"I don't agree with those who say we should withdraw. That would be a great mistake," President Kennedy said. "We took all this -- made this effort to defend Europe; now Europe is quite secure. We have also to participate -- we may not like it -- in the defense of Asia.

"The fact of the matter is, that with the assistance of the United States, Southeast Asia and, indeed, all of Asia, has been maintained independent against a powerful force, the Chinese Communists.

"What I am concerned about is that Americans will get impatient and say, because they don't like events in Southeast Asia or don't like the government in Saigon, that we should withdraw. That only makes it easy for the Communists. I think we should stay."

It is not enough to say: "The Saigon government is not a model of parliamentary democracy." We know that. But few of the governments in the world are.

#### Progress in South Viet Nam

The fact is that the people of South Viet Nam have made more progress toward representative self-government in the past few months than they have in their entire previous history. Five elections have been held since September 1966, and all of them have taken place in the face of war and calculated terror and disruption.

One of our newspapers this morning made a critical comment on the fact that about 70 percent of the electors cast their votes



for the Viet Nam House of Representatives. It will be a great day when that happens in the United States. We're lucky if we get 50 percent of our eligible electorate to vote in a Congressional election.

As for our own Constitution, 100 men were invited -- not elected -- to come to Philadelphia; 55 came -- two weeks late. Thirty-nine stayed, 38 signed, and there never was an open, public meeting.

I might add that we gained our independence with a little help, too. At Yorktown, half the troops were French, and the fleet that bottled up the British fleet was French. Three-fifths of the casualties were French. And France made the loan that made it possible for the Americans to fight.

It is not enough to say: "We ought to seek peace." We have, without ceasing, over many months, sought discussions leading to peace. We have "stopped the bombing" on five occasions, with no response other than a stepping-up of North Vietnamese infiltration and supply. We have sought the help of third parties around the world in getting to the conference table.

Our Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg, has just presented our appeal again.

The President of the United States has written directly to Ho Chi Minh.

#### No Positive Response

Yet we are still to have our first positive response. The answer from Hanoi to the President, to the United Nations, to the Pope, to one and all has been, "No."

But despite North Viet Nam's out-of-hand rejections of discussions or negotiations or cease-fire -- all of which we have offered, all of which we are ready to accept -- we shall continue to seek peace.

We do so this day as I speak to you; we stand ready now, without any preconditions, to discuss the possibility of negotiations.

We have been and are ready to accept an immediate cease-fire by all combatants. We are ready to attend a reconvening of the Geneva Conference now, to cease all aerial and naval bombardment of the North when this will lead promptly to productive discussions.

The road block to peace, my fellow Americans, is not in Washington; it is in Hanoi.

#### Peace-Making

You see, peace-wishing is a good deal easier than peace-making. But the Scriptures say: "Blessed are the peace makers," not the "wishers" or the "talkers" or the "walkers."

Peace-making is most difficult when your adversary still believes that time is on his side, as all the official statements of the North Vietnamese Government indicates he does. There isn't a day that the embassies assigned to North Viet Nam do not inform the world that North Viet Nam feels we will give in.

It would be reassuring to believe that, under these circumstances, there is some magic formula which would bring peace tomorrow. If you know one, may I say that a beleaguered President of the United States would deeply appreciate your formula, because he seeks it continuously.

But I think it is time that all Americans realized that we are in the midst of a protracted, costly struggle -- a struggle in which we're making slow but steady progress, but which nevertheless will probably not end until Hanoi comes to believe that we have the will, the determination, the perseverance, the patience, strength and unity of purpose to see it through.

#### Can the United States Last the Course

I will be criticized by some for saying this, but I have no doubt that the expressions of American public support, or lack of support, have a good deal to do with convincing Hanoi and Peking, and the other nations of Asia, whether we can and will last out the course.

Our hearts cry out at the misery and loss of life in Viet Nam, and for the families that have had to bear so much. We desperately want an end to the struggle.

But we must know that the enemy's hope for victory is not in his military power, but in our division, our weariness, our uncertainty. He won his last struggle against a French government that was divided and weak. But America is not weak. And this is not France of the early 1950's.

#### Befuddling History

We are not in Viet Nam as colonial masters, we are not there to preserve an empire. We are not there to conquer North Viet Nam.

We are there to help a part of Southeast Asia remain a free and independent nation. We are there to promote the right of self-determination. We are there to resist aggression. Those who befuddle and confuse history do themselves and the Nation a disservice.

We also must know that the road to peace -- peace with honor -- lies in a large degree in our unity, in our steadfastness, and in our purpose.

Never have we put finer troops in the field. Never has there been better morale in our military forces. And yet, never have our troops had to suffer such indignities at home as now, even as they battle in Viet Nam.

I think my record in public life indicates that I have been a liberal and have spoken up for the right to dissent, and I have used it myself. I believe in each American's right to be different. I believe in a pluralistic society. I believe in the right to dissent and debate.

But in such a time as this, I would ask each American -- when he indulges in dissent -- to consider as well the policy options available to his government, to consider in his own mind whether he in fact has a constructive alternate course to offer, and to consider whether his dissent will add to, or subtract from, intelligent and well-reasoned discussion of the issue. This is all that I would ask.

#### Abusive Actions

I feel sorry for the honest dissident because of the ridiculous, abusive actions of some who say they do it in the name of dissent. This does not help good debate, which a free society must have.

Freedom carries with it responsibility.

Rights carry with them duties.

I believe that we as a nation must be aware of the questions being asked about us here and elsewhere, such as one asked of me only last week by the Chief of State of an independent Asian country. He asked: "If you cannot stand up in Viet Nam, who will place any reliance in your capacity to stand up anywhere else?"

#### President and Public Opinion

But there are those who say, what about public opinion and the decisions which the President has made? Well, it's interesting

note that in our War for Independence only half the population supported the Continental Army, a good percentage of which on occasion deserted.

I need not tell you of the terrible divisions which beset this Nation during the period of the Civil War. Nor need I tell you of the fierce dissension and debate that raged before and during World War I.

President Wilson's request for a draft law was opposed by the Speaker, Majority Leader, and the Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee in the House of Representatives. Five Senate committee chairmen, including the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, opposed President Wilson's declaration of war. More than 1500 people were arrested under two sedition laws. Riots and demonstrations took place all over the Nation.

Only a short time before Pearl Harbor, Selective Service was extended by a margin of one vote in the House of Representatives. Congress refused to fortify Guam. And in September of 1941, a prominent columnist called for a "clear decision to shrink the army." All these things were happening, I might remind you, while Hitler was overrunning Western Europe and while Japan was marching to conquest in Asia.

#### 11 on Korean War

In January of 1951, a Gallup Poll showed 66 percent of the American people favored withdrawal from Korea. When President Truman fired General MacArthur, only 29 percent of the people favored the President and 69 percent favored the General.

By 1952, President Truman's popularity had fallen to an all-time low of 26 percent.

If Presidents gauged national policy decisions on popularity polls, we would never have had independence, the Emancipation Proclamation, or the right of franchise for some of our people; nor would we have been able to protect the Union.

The point of all this is that the President, if he is to truly serve his country, must be prepared to go forward with the course he believes to be right, even in the face of strong opposition. And I believe there is not a single American who would want his President to act otherwise.



## Proved Right by History

Today President Johnson is following the course that he believes to be right in Viet Nam and Southeast Asia. He has consulted Americans from every walk of life; he confers with a former President of a different party; he seeks the counsel of Republicans, Democrats, business and labor, friend and foe. But when it's all done, the decision must be made by the Commander-in-Chief. As President Truman said, the buck stops here.

And I believe that, as other strong Presidents in the past, President Johnson will be proved right by history.

Who is there today who thinks that our stand in Korea was not right; that our stand in Europe in two world wars was not right; that our stand against Khrushchev in Cuba was not right?

I support the President, and I support the course he is following, because I too believe that it is right, and no amount of popularity that can be gained is worth the abandonment of conscience.

I mean it in no partisan way when I say that I believe the American people will express their support for a policy which they surely must ultimately recognize as one more hard but necessary step toward the security and the peace of this Nation and the world.

I know of no nation in our time that has given so much and has had such a consistent record in support of the goal of a just and enduring peace as this one. I see no reason to doubt it now.

## AN ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE ROBERT R. BOWIE COUNSELOR, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

### United States Foreign Policy

Governor Peabody, ladies and gentlemen, I'm going to talk to you about what seem to me to be the major issues of U. S. Foreign Policy, and I am going to try to talk about it in a little broader and longer perspective than perhaps customary because this seems to me appropriate to the kind of interest which I believe you have.

We are in a period, it seems to me, of reappraisal, not primarily or even mainly in this country, although that is obviously going on here, but, I think, throughout the world generally there is a sort of new look at the international situation. In part this is because of the Second World War, more than two decades behind us. Those of you who are as old as I am will recall that in the 30's you had a similar phenomenon after World War I, with a change of generations and the change in basic attitudes which results from that fact.

So I would like to talk a little bit about the changes in underlying conditions which have occurred in recent years and what they presage for the future; and second what the tasks are of foreign affairs, as I see them; and finally a little bit about what this means for the conduct of American Foreign Policy.

I would like to enumerate the ways, it seems to me, the current situation differs from what it was shortly after the war. Most of these things are familiar to you, but I think we ought to enumerate them so that we can think about them. The first is the change in the Communist threat. This doesn't mean that the threat has disappeared, but it has taken on a different character from what it was at the end of the war. The split between the Chinese and the Soviets, the ferment in Eastern Europe and social change in the Soviet Union itself have all changed the character of the threat. Then, too, the military aspect of the threat has certainly shifted as a result of the nuclear equation. The Soviets have learned the lesson that there is no money to be made in all-out nuclear war and therefore have adopted the policy of coexistence which they conceive as struggle without general major war. But coexistence clearly does not mean diminishing their efforts to achieve military strength, because they have been building up their military strength in many ways over the past four or five years. It doesn't mean foregoing the use of force in all forms. So-called wars of liberation, one of which is going on in Viet Nam, are very much part of coexistence policy. Nevertheless, I see the kind of threat

we now have to deal with as different from the way it was at the end of the war and up to, say '50 or '55.

The second big change in the world is in the relationship with Europe. The balance within the Atlantic Community is not the same as it was even ten years ago when Europe was weak and had lost all its confidence. Now Europe is prosperous. Europeans have very little fear of the Soviet Union today in terms of a direct threat to their security. They rely almost completely in what they conceive to be an effective nuclear stalemate, and are therefore largely dependent upon the United States.

In the economic field, they have moved forward to economic integration and into forming a larger community. Yet, this work is not completed and Europeans still remain divided in many important respects. As a result, they feel a very keen disparity between their own strength and influence as individual countries and that of the United States. As a result, there has arisen a certain element of resentment about U. S. "dominance" which didn't exist formerly when they felt relatively weaker.

The third big world change which has occurred is in the fact of the spreading of the area of action of foreign affairs. Not too long ago, this was focused entirely on Europe. But now, as the result of the ending of colonialism we have had the rise of new nations in Africa and Asia. Now there is a whole new array of contests and tensions between these countries, like the tension between Israel and Egypt, India and Pakistan and in other world areas. The Chinese ability to exploit these tensions and of course the growing Chinese nuclear threat, which is a special menace all of its own, have contributed to the change in focus. The significant thing here, as I see it, is that while great changes have been taking place over the last 20 years, the present clearly is not the end of these changes but only their mid-range. These changes are still going on wherever you look, whether we look in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union, where evolution is still in process, or whether we look at Western Europe, where the situation is far from stable as the result of the fact that there has been no achievement of any sort of immunity or structure in a political sense.

Europe itself is still divided by the Iron Curtain; Germany is still divided into two parts. If you look at the less developed countries, instability and the certainty of further change stares you in the face.

What we are confronting, I believe, is a situation in which the world is in the grip of two separate types of forces which pull in different directions. One is interdependence among nations, which is a product of science and technology pulling us all

together, breaking down the barriers of distance. These forces are pulling us together in economic terms. Nuclear weapons have made the national security of all interdependent. In other words, these forces are creating a necessity for some organized system of international order. But along with this, as people have regained confidence, as memory of war has receded, we see a desire for greater independence, a desire for self-determination, the opportunity to run one's own affairs and at least to give expression to the rather limited perspective and loyalties which exist in so many parts of the world. We find this force in undeveloped countries in particular, but not only there, because nationalism is still a potent force in many parts of the world as an assertion of the possibility of total independence, which is really no longer feasible. De Gaulle I suppose is the most dramatic example of this type of aspiration.

Now, the United States is caught right in the middle of all these cross-currents, so that how they evolve is vital to our own security and welfare. If there were nuclear war, we would obviously be in the midst of it. If Europe remains divided and fragmented and becomes frustrated and unstable, we would be drawn into it whether we like it or not. A less developed country in turmoil and trouble can not fail to involve us in some way.

In the Far East, if China should become dominant, the United States would have to recognize this as a direct threat. In other words, we simply can not prosper as if we were an island in a sea of turmoil and hostility. So whether we like it or not, we have to be interested in the efforts to create some kind of dependable world order, based on pluralism, so that each country and each people is able to choose its own way of life. But there nevertheless would be a degree of independence and cooperation which would recognize the facts of life as they now are.

Now, the effort to move toward some kind of order is not by any means an easy one. Events are not under U. S. control or never were. Even so, our role, because of our resources and power, is tremendously important. But our opportunity to exercise influence effectively depends on the way we use our resources, economic capability and military strength. If we can't find ways of using these coherently, according to some general strategy, we probably would have very little effect on the way the world goes.

Now, what are the elements of adequate strategy for this situation? Fundamentally, it seems to me, such a strategy must recognize the fact of change and try to apply American influence to shape it in constructive ways. Without being too detailed, may I just suggest what this means briefly in each of the main arenas of international affairs. First, with respect to the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe.



Here it seems to me the aid must be to promote a change and evolution in Soviet purposes so as to cause them to accept a genuine kind of coexistence, that is, coexistence in the sense of "Live and Let Live" as distinguished from coexistence as a struggle to achieve dominance by other means.

We're going to have to pursue a dual type of policy for quite a long time to come. On one hand, we have to continue to maintain an effective deterrent which depends on our military capability and which makes it unprofitable (for the indefinite future) for the Soviet Union to attempt to use force or the threat of force as a means of strengthening its influence. And that means we certainly can't stand still in the military field so long as the Soviet Union is devoting large amounts of national resources, as it is, to develop its own capabilities. On the other hand, we must at the same time carry out a parallel policy of seeking cooperation with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, whenever this is feasible, both by means of trade, contacts, measures to reduce the danger of war, arms control, and the like.

To my mind, the prospect of making any great progress in these constructive areas in the near future is very small indeed. But it's not negligible, and it seems to me that what we must work for is the long term effect. But in the short run there is very little prospect that the Soviet Union will be willing to make any radical change in Soviet policy. It seems to me their fundamental purpose is still hostile to our own. They seem to be seeking to divide Europe and to isolate the Republic of Germany, so as to cause our loss of influence in Western Europe, and perhaps ultimately our withdrawal from Europe.

If we look at China and that part of the Communist world, the situation is perhaps more menacing, but its problems are similar. China is much more assertive, much more ideologically aggressive and fanatical. But our long term aim here must be similar, to constrain them from expansion by force or threat of force and at the same time to try to do what we can to lead them to a gradual and more constructive kind of relationship with the outside world. I unhesitatingly say this will be a very long time coming.

It would be well to bear this in mind. It means, for example, that we have to try to be willing to conduct efforts like the war in Viet Nam, which in themselves are frustrating because they inevitably combine political and military tasks in circumstances where we can not unleash the full range of our power without incurring undue risk of a major war. In the effort to try to create a more viable situation in the Far East, Japan is

one of the major building blocks. Japan has made a remarkable recovery since the war, and is now showing a renewed interest in constructive activities in the region which it occupies. I hope we can help the Japanese to move towards a role of maintaining order in that part of the world.

If we turn to Europe, we find a similar complicated situation. The need for cooperation with Europe continues as great or greater than it was in the past. We need their cooperation to prevent Soviet expansion, or the expansion of Soviet influence. We need the cooperation of Europe--the European countries are the most advanced countries of the world--for the purpose of maintaining our own monetary and economic well being. We need a close relationship with them as a basis for the kind of dual policy that I described as existing between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and we furthermore need the cooperation of the European countries with their vast resources for the task of economic development.

But we have to recognize that there are some serious obstacles to the kind of cooperation which is required. As I see it, the main obstacle is disparity of size between the United States and any one of the European countries. As you know, any one of them, including Britain or France or the Federal Republic of Germany, has a gross national product perhaps only ten percent or twelve percent of ours. This means that when they join separately in enterprises with us, they feel outclassed because they don't have the kind of influence or role that is significant. This causes friction in a variety of ways on both sides. From our side, for example, we tend to look at Europe as if it were a single entity. As I have noted, Europe is emerging as an economic entity, but it isn't able to act as an entity in the field of foreign affairs and events. And yet we tend to think of it in certain respects in that way. The result on our side is frustration when they can't decide to help in doing the things we think are important or don't carry what we see to be their share of the load. On their side, frustration rises from the general feeling that they can't have as much influence as they feel they would like because of their relative weakness compared to us. This shows itself in a variety of ways, like the so-called technological gap. They feel we are well ahead of them in advanced industries, and in the nuclear field where our control of nuclear weapons seems one-sided. Our efforts to work out relations with the Soviet Union on things like nonproliferation treaties often appears to be going on over their heads. Whatever the particular form, however, the underlying factor, it seems to me, is this relative disparity of power. However, if we can get past the present situation, the condition may ultimately correct



itself. For the moment, there isn't too much that can be done because of the position of General De Gaulle against moving ahead in the field of integrating Europe. But there are still some very profound forces which are favorable to the emergence of Europe, both in the field of technology and as regards having more control of their own destiny. This may well be an attribute of time. I think there is still considerable life in the idea of trying to move toward some kind of European structure. If that can occur, then it seems to me many obstacles to cooperation will be lessened. I don't mean that it's going to be an easy thing at all, because the Europeans will have views of their own and they will assert them strongly. But it seems to me to provide the basis for a more healthy kind of relationship, where it now tends to be one of considerable friction and discontent.

If we look at the less developed countries, the situation is not as hopeful. In two-thirds of the world, people live in dire poverty; the rate of growth of population continues to rise--it's already at more than two and one-half percent a year. The food supply is now growing one percent or less a year. The need for food grains in the twenty years from 1960 to 1980 will grow by three hundred million tons. The process of change in this situation is an extremely complex one of social change--producing trained people, adequate capital, improving local leadership, self help and so on. These are all the things which the West has had centuries to achieve in a gradual way. But under the pressure of modern conditions, the developing countries are trying to compress into decades what was done in centuries in the Western World--under conditions where new methods of public health have made it much harder because of the rapid rate of population growth they make possible.

The World Bank estimates that less developed countries could readily use three to four billion dollars a year more than the present aid level. Yet for the last four or five years, the net rate of transfer of resources to the less developed countries has been declining, not rising. If you're going to get even a two percent rate of increase in standards of living in these countries over the next decade, aid from the advanced countries to the less developed countries will have to double in the aggregate by 1975, and even if you achieved that (which is probably very unlikely) you would still have per capita standards of living in those countries below \$170.00 a year, about one-twentieth of what we enjoy.

This very brief appraisal suggests that the tasks we face in the field of foreign affairs in the incoming decade or so are extremely complex and difficult.

In the field of Communist relations our policy approach requires that we try and cooperate with countries which are basically hostile. In the field of economic development we are going to have to provide, as I see it, a much larger volume of aid in an area where progress is extremely slow. We are going to have to resist limited aggression in forms of less than all-out warfare, which in itself is extremely frustrating. The nature of each of these tasks means that there is no solution to these problems, which require gradual structural change in many parts of the world. Our efforts are bound to be marked by set-backs and only partial successes and by frustration.

As I see it, what lies ahead is a real test of our national maturity. The problem is not basically one of resources. There is going to be a very great need for resources, but no country has ever been as well set as we to provide those resources we think we need for the job. We are in a class by ourselves in this respect. Our resources are undeterminable. Our GNP is three times that of the Soviet Union, more than double that of Europe and twenty times those of the less developed countries. Instead, the question is, how are we going to use our resources and our influence.

It seems to me to be a matter of prime concern for our citizens and our leadership whether we are going to feel discouraged by these difficult tasks; whether we are going to be too impatient for quick results instead of recognizing that the problems involved are long term; whether we are going to be frustrated because these are complicated problems; or whether we are going to try to disengage in futile ways from these responsibilities. If we do, I think we are in for a very bad time. But I don't despair that the United States and its people will be able to understand the complex world we live in, to accept the tasks which it imposes, and to persist over a long period, as we will have to, in trying to discharge our responsibilities.

The picture I have painted may seem to you rather grim. I don't mean it to be, but I am trying to be realistic. I will simply end with a little story which I think is useful.

It is about two hoboes who were sitting on a curb. They had been talking seriously together about life and philosophy, and after a long pause one turned and looked at the other and said, "This is one hell of a world." The other said, "Compared to what?"

If the world I have described is the world that we're living in, then it seems to me it behooves us to accept it and get on to the business. If we do that, we won't necessarily become frustrated and full of dissention anymore than our people would have if they

had this kind of analysis when they were sitting on the eastern side of the Appalachian Mountains before the move West. If they had received an analysis of what it would have been like to settle the West, some might have been discouraged but not the majority. Instead, they took it as a challenge. As we know, they had many hardships, but they seem to have found a very satisfactory way of life in their efforts to settle the West and open it up. I think we are living in another stage in trying to build a world in which we can find a place for our style of life. Many of our younger people can approach it in that light--to see it as a challenge, an opportunity and a means of testing their talents. I think it might be a very exciting world and not a depressing one. Thank you.

AN ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE PAUL H. NITZE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Military Developments

Governor Peabody, ladies and gentlemen, it is a pleasure to be with you. What I propose to do is to say a few things about the overall strategic situation in the world as we see it, and then go on to some of the things that we're about in the Defense Department. I don't propose to address myself particularly to Viet Nam; General Taylor will be your banquet speaker and will go into that subject in detail. As we look at the world situation, the question arises what is the most important part of that strategic situation? I take it to be the U.S.S.R.

For the last 20 years, all of us who have been working in this field have hoped and have worked for some measure of detente with the U.S.S.R. However, a precondition to making progress in that field is that we not let our guard down -- that we maintain our strength because it is only from a position of strength that one can hope for a detente.

Today many people, particularly in Europe, look upon the situation as being different than it was five years ago. They see some degree of detente today. From where I sit that's where that result is really evident. It stems from the fact that we stood up to the challenge during the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

Europeans do not now face the day-to-day threats that they experienced in '61 and '62. The reason for that has been the strength of the free world and its willingness and determination to stand up to those threats.

As one looks at the military situation in the U.S.S.R., he finds that the Russians have continued to make progress in their defense establishment year by year. This year, for instance, they have accelerated the pace with which they are emplacing their ICBM. It is possible that within another few years they may have as many launchers as we have today. It remains true, however, that our ICBMs are more sophisticated than are theirs. We have an outstanding lead in our submarine based missiles -- the Polaris systems. We have an outstanding position in bombers; we have six hundred bombers -- 40 percent of which are on alert. The Russians maintain ground forces numbering in excess of two million men. They are continually improving the equipment of those ground forces. They have a substantial air force. They are improving their aircraft in the various criteria of performance -- in range,



speed and particularly in all-weather capability. They are replacing their present planes with more modern ones on a one-for-one basis.

One can also see Russian progress in their naval forces. They have launched a very substantial submarine fleet -- the largest in the world. They are now improving the sea-keeping and other performance characteristics of their submarine fleet. Their surface fleet is deploying more frequently out into the open oceans and is maintaining a continuous presence in the Mediterranean to a degree which it did not do in former years.

All-in-all, they increased their defense budget this year by 15 percent. This they announced recently. Of course it's hard to tell exactly what their published budget figures mean. Their bookkeeping cannot be taken at face value and can be changed from time to time for various purposes. Obviously, they do not compute profits or taxes in their defense industries. Thus, even though their defense budget appears to be some 13 percent of their overall budget, on comparable accounting it would be much greater. We estimate that it would be on the order of 50 billion dollars measured in comparable U. S. terms, and that is approximately what our defense budget is apart from the special expenditures in Viet Nam.

Let's turn now for a minute to Communist China. I think the thing that all of us have been watching with interest has been their so-called "Cultural Revolution." This has been characterized by various phases of increasing disorganization in China, followed by efforts to pull back and become more unified again.

To Mao Tse Tung the Chinese version of communism is something which has a world-wide mission. He makes it clear that he wants the Chinese Communist movement not to have what he thinks are the faults of the Russian movement. He does not want the bureaucracy to rise to a new class; the Red Guards were his mechanism for attempting to prevent that.

It now appears that the movement is in a new phase; it's called the phase of "Great Unity"; and so overt discords are disappearing today. They are much less than before. One can't predict what the next phase might be. But I think it is interesting that even during the upheaval of the cultural revolution there has not seemed to be any decrease in the support that the Chinese Communists have been able to give to the North Vietnamese. Nor does there seem to have been any material slowing down in their development of new weapons systems. Obviously we have had to pay attention -- particular attention -- to their development of

nuclear weapons systems, and their development or potential development of ICBM systems. This resulted in the decision, outlined by Mr. McNamara in his San Francisco speech, that we propose to deploy a Chinese Communist-oriented ABM System. This decision, which was announced in September, was not inconsistent with the position which was taken this spring in Mr. McNamara's posture statement before Congress. At that time, he pointed out that the time had not -- the decision point had not -- yet been reached when it was necessary to decide whether to deploy a Chinese-oriented system.

He pointed out secondly that we considered it advisable to see whether it would be possible to have negotiations with the Russians, so that perhaps neither of us would deploy ABM Systems. During the summer it became evident that any prompt initiation of talks was unlikely. Another point was that time was going by and the Chinese were continuing with their ICBM development. Unless we made the decision now there was a possibility that we couldn't get an ABM in place in time. So September became the appropriate time to make the decision, and it was made. Of course the Chinese have other resources; they have maybe two-and-one-half million men under arms in a hundred divisions. They continue to modernize their air force, as well as other parts of their military establishment.

Let us turn now to some of the original questions which are of continuing interest and concern to us. One of them obviously is Europe. It would seem to me that Europe really is an outstanding success story. Twenty years ago what we were worried about was the possibility of economic or political collapse in Europe. What we were working toward was the political and economic recovery of Europe. Those things have come to pass. After that we became concerned about the security of Europe. Thus, NATO was created.

The military strength of NATO was the foundation on which we built and on which we stood up to the pressures of the Berlin Crisis in 1961 and 1962. The strength of NATO continues. In fact, it has improved since then.

Granted, we had our difficulties with France but the other 14 countries have continued to work together. Our collaboration with the other 14 has developed and improved in recent years. The Nuclear Planning Group meets regularly and we have now far greater common understanding than we had before of the nuclear issues which face NATO. We continue to work on other ways in which to deepen the relationship between the NATO countries. It is true that we propose, or at least are discussing with our NATO partners the possible redeployment of 35,000 men from NATO -- the 24th

Division and four air force squadrons. What we really would be doing, should the move be made, is capitalizing upon the improvement and mobility of our forces -- the range of our aircraft and the capabilities of the C-5 aircraft which very rapidly can move forces from one continent to the other. The program would be one under which one brigade of the 24th Division would be in Europe at all times. The other two would be deployed back to the United States but would go back to Europe to maneuver at least once a year. A full set of equipment would be left in Europe. Thus the reaction time would be a matter of hours, not a matter of days.

We really have done well in keeping up our strength in Europe, despite the fact that we have been so heavily engaged in the Pacific.

Let me turn for a minute to the situation in Southeast Asia, outside of Viet Nam. Clearly the development of the situation outside of Viet Nam is importantly affected by developments within that country. Thailand, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines are troubled with some degree of internal subversion -- attacks upon their institutions. They are having and have had a very difficult task in meeting their problems of social development -- at the same time bracing themselves to meet this threat of insurgency. I think they are using their time well. Taiwan, Japan and Korea are demonstrating what can be done when the security problem is licked -- or more or less licked. Granted that Korea is facing some threats today, but the attempts of North Korea to infiltrate into South Korea are not meeting a favorable climate. The job is being done well in Korea. You all know of the outstanding success in Japan and success in Taiwan.

The Middle East clearly is an area of divergent interests and divergent feelings. Last June we saw the outbreak of a confrontation there arising from those divergent interests. We saw the stinging defeat that the Israelites administered to Egypt, and Syria and Jordan. The situation is unsettled. There is much to be done. The issues of what happens to the occupied territories; what happens to the right of innocent passage; the termination of the state of belligerency -- these are the important problems which have to be worked out. I think one can say with certainty that the role of the U.S.S.R. has been less than helpful in the area. The Soviets delivered large quantities of arms to countries in the area. They have not been a restraining force. They have addressed themselves to the act of diminution of Western presence in the area. One can summarize the position in the Middle East by saying that it is a position of uncertainty and instability.

In Africa there are eight countries in which there has been a violent change of leadership in the last two years. One was in

ana which I think added to the stability of the area. Some of the others have not. This also is in an area in which arms are being supplied by the U.S.S.R. or the Eastern Bloc.

We have tried to restrain our giving military assistance to the very minimum possible. We have had to give some in order to help meet the minimum security needs; including needs for internal security. Similarly in Latin America we have attempted to diminish to the smallest possible amount the diversion of resources from the main objective -- the main objective being the program of the Alliance for Progress. But certain military strength is necessary for civic action programs, for internal security and for the minimum military establishment consistent with being a sovereign country. But we have tried to keep the diversion of resources down to the very minimum.

This has been a brief survey of the strategic situation as we see it. I think the first and most obvious additional point is that there has been a very substantial buildup in the size and capability of our own forces. Today we have some three million men under arms; we have 1600 long-range ballistic missiles (1000 of them Minuteman; and something over 600 in Polaris Submarines). We have some 600 long-range bombers. About 40 percent of these are kept continuously on alert. The Army has been increased to 17 divisions; the Marine Corps has been increased from one division to four. We have 23 Tactical Air Wings. We have approximately 1000 ships (of which 16 are aircraft carriers) plus all the things that go with this capability. But I think the most notable improvement has been in the performance of our weapons systems. This I think is true of all of our weapons systems; in our missiles and our planes; in the ordnance which those planes carry; in the electronic equipment; and in the communications of command and control. In order to do that, it has been necessary to have a very large and extensive research development program. That research and development program has produced outstanding results.

The reliability and effectiveness of our weapons are improving from day to day. There have been some areas in which there have been tremendous increases -- for instance, in the area of Air Mobility. In 1972, when the C-5s are delivered, we will then have a ten-fold increase in air transport capability over what it was in 1961. Our Special Forces in the counter-insurgency field, for another example, have gone up 20-fold.

Now, obviously, our primary job in the Defense Department is that of assuring the solidity and excellence of our defense. Our second job is that of seeing to it that we achieve that defense posture at the lowest possible cost. You are all familiar with the cost reduction program which was introduced some five years ago and



which we think has made an outstanding contribution to reducing avoidable cost.

You all are familiar with the program of eliminating bases and installations which weren't fully necessary for either present or foreseeable contingencies. We eliminated some 950 installations resulting in an annual saving of a billion and a half dollars. Despite these efforts, obviously our budget is large -- 70 billion a year. But one point that is not frequently recognized is that 70 billion is some nine percent of our Gross National Product. That is a smaller percentage than any of our defense budgets between the years 1952 through 1959. Obviously, the reason for that small percentage is the very great growth in our GNP, particularly in the last six years.

It is interesting to compare for a minute, the experience in the Korean War with that in the Vietnamese War. The actual increase in defense expenditures in the Korean War was three times that so far in the Vietnamese War. In the years from '50 to '53 about 50 percent of the increase in GNP went to increased defense expenditures. The increase in our defense expenditures from '65 to '67, during the Viet Nam buildup, has been approximately a fifth of the growth in GNP. Part of the reason is that prior to the Korean War we had what I think was too low a defense posture. We had a substantial job of rebuilding our defense posture during the Korean crisis. We went into the Vietnamese War with a much higher state of readiness than when we went into the Korean War.

In addition to the task of providing for security and doing this at the lowest reasonable cost, there are other things that we have to address ourselves to which bear upon the general community. We estimate that there will be some 800,000 men who will finish their tours of duty in the Armed Services this year and perhaps 900,000 next year. About half of those people are pretty clear on where they are going when they are released from the Armed Services -- back to their previous job or some job that they know of. The other half are not certain where they are going -- they can use either counseling or advice as to where jobs may be, or perhaps some additional degree of training. We now have a number of pilot projects underway to see how we can do this counseling job better so that every man who leaves the Armed Services has the best chance of getting the right job for him and he is in the best position to fill it in a useful way. Also we have a program called Project 100,000. Under this program we're selecting for special assistance 100,000 people from among the inductees who tested in the 10 to 15 percentile -- or the lower bracket of competence -- many of whom are unemployed or underemployed. Our experience with them has really been extremely favorable. It turns out that the thing that is most important is motivation. We find

that when many of these people get into the Army and are put through the usual basic training course, they have very high motivation to do the job. It turns out that some 90 percent of these men are fully acceptable and fully useful for military purposes.

In summary, we have a threatening world. We are trying to do what we can about it and we need your support. Thank you.



AN ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE DR. WILLIAM H. SHAW  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

The Economy of the United States

Ladies and gentlemen, it is a real pleasure to be a speaker at the National Defense Executive Reserve Conference. Until recently I was an active member of the Reserve and I have been in the audience many times. In fact, I will never forget the drama of the Cuban Crisis during the 1962 Conference-- and I think many of you here will also remember that. Several weeks ago, however, about the same time I received the invitation to address this meeting, I was notified that one of the computers at the Pentagon had transferred me to inactive status. Inactive is hardly the right word for an average 70 hour week in Washington but I intend to make the most of my opportunity this afternoon.

In a way, my inactive status is a fortunate circumstance. It permits me to compliment you without the constraints that modesty imposes. As one who knows a lot about the Executive Reserve, and on behalf of all the millions of Americans who know little about it, I want to thank you. You prepare for a job and then hope that you won't be called on to do it. You get little public acclaim. Your only reward is the satisfaction of performing a vital public service. I know I got-- and I hope you are getting, an inner glow from that service.

Most great men in history knew how to handle a variety of situations. For example, George Washington apparently knew the key to a successful speech. He once said, "Let your discourse with men of business be short and comprehensive." That admonition could be applied to everyone. I will try to follow it but I must warn you that most economists will not admit that there can be a discussion of economics that is both short and comprehensive.

I have the advantage of speaking at a time when the issues are clearly drawn and can be easily understood when fleshed out with a few facts of economic life. The issues are simple but they are also very important-- the stakes are very high.

In the next few moments I would like to show you how the economic policies we adopt in the next few months can affect the course of business and government for many years to come. I'd like to examine the present economic situation, the outlook for the next

year, and the policies needed to induce sound and balanced growth. Finally, I'd like to make a few observations on inflation and some of the methods that have been proposed to combat it.

First, let's look at the shape and character of the economy over the past few years. To describe the 1960's as a period of record prosperity is entirely accurate--but it also is an understatement. The word "record" has been used often in describing economic statistics over the past six and a half years and it is true that we have attained new levels of business volume, profits, employment and income. But we could also use the word "record" to describe the population every month since the number of people is always larger than the month before.

The truly remarkable thing about the 1960's is that these economic records have been stacked one on top of the other ever since February, 1961--the longest period in our history without a serious setback. In the absence of recessions, our average rate of growth in the 1960's has been remarkably rapid. This has been translated into a sizeable boost in our standard of living.

There are many statistics which tell this story of economic achievement but since statistics can be used to support anything, even economists, I will cite only one: In only three years, from 1963 to 1966, the increase in consumer purchasing power was greater than in the entire decade from 1950 to 1960. This comparison allows for price increases and growth in population since it is actual purchasing power calculated on a per capita basis.

Most of the slack was taken out of the economy in the early 1960's and most of our manpower and other resources were being fully utilized at the time the military buildup began in South Viet Nam in mid-1965. The balance and stability which had accompanied sustained growth was threatened in late 1965 and early 1966 by the combination of a plant and equipment investment boom and expenditures to support the military campaign in Viet Nam. A number of measures were taken to slow the economy to what was considered an adequate and sustainable growth rate--about 4 per cent in real terms. The measures worked. In fact, some would say they worked too well.

Economic policy was shifted once again as a stimulus early this year when it became apparent that an excessive inventory buildup was having a decided dampening effect on the economy. The shift seems to be getting results. The economy has been gathering steam since early summer. Following gains of \$4 billion in the

first quarter and \$9 billion in the second, the Gross National Product rose \$15 billion in the third. It should be noted that the summer quarter would have been about \$2 billion higher if there had not been a strike in the automobile industry. And were it not for that strike, the fourth quarter would clearly be running well beyond a \$15 billion gain.

Three months ago, at the time the President proposed a temporary tax surcharge, we could only assume that, unless corrective action were taken, the economy would be moving too fast and that stability would be threatened. That assumption is giving way to reality. Any further quickening in the pace of expansion will aggravate the inflationary tendencies that are already apparent.

A year ago, economists were sharply divided about the outlook for 1967; some predicted a tendency toward overheating throughout the year; others envisioned a wobbly pattern of demand; and a few could see a recession in their crystal balls. In contrast, the overwhelming majority now see a robust expansion in 1968 with much of the advance taking the form of inflation. Nearly all are urging a policy of restraint to keep the economy from overheating.

The need for restraint ties in with President Johnson's proposal for a temporary tax increase. But there are other important reasons behind the proposal.

First, the cost of Viet Nam is high and it is still rising. I think there is general agreement that a good part of these costs should be paid out of current revenue and that a surcharge on income taxes is a small sacrifice indeed for Americans on the home front whose incomes are at an unprecedented level.

Second, the Federal deficit is large and getting larger, and a large deficit, especially when considered on a national income accounts basis, provides an undesirable stimulant when the economy is already operating at close to full utilization of its men and machines.

Third, a large deficit under the present circumstances will generate further inflationary pressures at a time when we should be trying to reduce those pressures.

Fourth, if we depend on monetary policy alone to combat inflation, the impact will be uneven and unfair and could bring about a sequence of boom and bust. Too tight money invariably hits homebuilding and adds markedly to the costs of schools and hospitals. Too tight money dries up jobs and can set the stage for subsequent recession.



Fifth, cutting Federal expenditures is a supplement to, not a substitute for raising taxes. In the short run there are decided limits to such cuts. We should cut less essential spending to the bone and you can be sure that the President and the Congress will do so -- but we cannot realistically expect the cuts to be deep enough to reduce the deficit substantially in view of our critical international commitments and the relatively small amount of controllable nondefense spending.

And, finally, we must restrain the economy if we expect to continue to hold the deficit in our international balance of payments within reasonable bounds. Except for the costs of Viet Nam, we have made good progress in the balance of payments accounts, but rapidly rising demand and extensive inflation would increase our imports and make our own goods less competitive in world markets.

Regardless of the way you approach the problem, the tax increase makes good budgetary and good economic sense.

The main problem of 1968 will be the danger of too rapid expansion and inflation. Even with the dampening influence of a tax increase and all possible cuts in Federal spending, an analysis of the principal demand elements in the economy tells us that a gain in the order of \$50 billion to \$60 billion in gross national product next year is fairly well assured.

The third quarter turn around in inventories suggests that the largest inventory correction since World War II has been completed with the smallest economic disturbance. Employment and incomes continued to increase steadily even during the pause in the first half of the year, and consumers have a huge backlog of purchasing power. Savings have been accumulating at an extremely high rate in recent quarters, and if consumers return to normal spending patterns, demand will rise several billion dollars a year.

Retail sales in the past three months have firmed appreciably. Government demand is rising -- at the State and local level as well as at the national government level. Home building has recovered strongly and steadily over the past year despite high interest rates.

As sales go up, businessmen are likely to start spending more on new plants and equipment -- and any increase in this sector would give another push on the demand side. True, the present

level of capital goods seems more than adequate to meet the demand in some manufacturing industries, but it must be remembered that plants are also modernized for competitive reasons. Cost-saving factors are likely to play an increasing role in capital spending decisions.

We can never be absolutely sure about the economic future because we cannot foretell political, military, or other events which may greatly influence business. A forecast of a gain of \$50 billion to \$60 billion in GNP next year reflects an assumption that the Viet Nam War will continue on about the same scale. An end to the fighting would, of course, bring about a dramatic shift in the economic mix. But it need not mean a recession as it did in 1953-54. Prudent planning can ease transition problems and set the stage for continued economic growth. I may add that such planning is underway and is proceeding well.

Major strikes also can affect business, but the effects are usually temporary. Basic trends are not changed despite spreading secondary effects while the strikes are on and frantic catch-up pains after the strikes end.

The major problem of the year ahead, however, is not our inability to predict precisely what is going to happen in the future. Rather it is the one element common to all forecasts for the coming year -- inflation.

And, unhappily, there is no assurance that inflation will vanish even if we take strong measures to combat it. In fact, the nature of recent price increases indicates that the chain reaction of price and wage boosts will not subside for some months to come. We certainly can't afford to gamble by adding to these built-in pressures. A one percent increase in prices means a loss of \$8 billion in purchasing power -- a burden that falls most heavily on those least able to bear it -- the poor and the old.

In the first half of the 1960s, retail prices moved up only 1 or 2 percent per year -- an extremely fine record for a strong expansionary period. Because of rising productivity, there was no increase at all in unit labor costs.

Prices started moving up strongly in 1965 and this fairly strong upward push did not subside until early this year. The improved performance of price indexes last winter and spring was due in part to a decline in farm prices. The retail and wholesale indexes started moving up at a faster pace in the summer and there seems little doubt that inflation will continue to be one of our major concerns in 1968.

Inflation can set off reactions that eventually may choke off business expansion. Other than adopting policies which will keep demand from rising too rapidly, what can we do about inflation?

I'd like to mention a number of alternatives. These are merely suggestions which have been offered by Congressmen, economists, businessmen, and others -- including the average man in the street.

Some think we should simply ignore it. This school of thought preaches that action may do more harm than good, and that the ship will somehow right itself after the storm subsides. This view is not very helpful to those in the eye of the storm -- those who become unemployed or whose businesses fail.

Some contend we should control prices and wages by government fiat -- as was done in World War II and Korea. A recent opinion poll claimed that a large percentage of consumers feel this way.

Obviously, these represent two extreme views. We cannot ignore inflation and hope that it will go away. On the other hand, controls are repugnant to our system of economic freedom and should be used only in extreme situations. I can say categorically that no one who has ever had any experience in administering wage and price controls looks on them with favor.

Some believe that monetary policy is the key to stability -- you simply tighten the screws on the money supply until prices start giving ground. However, the record shows that this disrupts money markets, results in serious harm to some industries such as home building, and if applied too strenuously could even produce a boom-bust sequence.

Here are a number of other suggestions I will mention without comment:

The Administration remains pledged to the guidepost principle which worked reasonably well in the early 1960s; some believe that we should return to the practice of recommending a specific figure as guideposts for wages and prices.

Some urge the establishment of a prestigious public panel which could act in an authoritative advisory capacity, champion stability, and help educate the public on wages and prices and related subjects. Post-audits of key settlements and public verdicts could be one of the functions of such a panel.

Some believe the Government should put pressure on individual unions or companies which raise wages or prices in an obviously callous manner.

Some favor extension of the antitrust approach, on the one side reducing the stickiness of administered prices, on the other bringing unions under the antitrust umbrella.

Some believe there is a possibility of asking labor and business to work out standards for wages and prices that they believe they could follow.

Some favor a so-called prenotification system under which major wage and price changes would have to be reported in advance to a public board. The board would make a recommendation before the change could be made, but the recommendation would be just that -- it would have no legal force.

I wish I could say which of these, taken singly or together, would provide a good bulwark against spiraling wages and prices. I can only say that, in my judgment, the inflation problem will be much easier to deal with if we have a good balance of monetary and fiscal policy. In addition, the fiscal policy should be balanced between tax increases and prudent spending cuts.

A moment ago, I said that the next few months would be particularly crucial ones for economic policy. The wisdom of a flexible economic policy has been successfully demonstrated in the 1960s, and I believe the general public -- and businessmen in particular -- have pretty well accepted the idea that we should use tax cuts and other fiscal stimulants whenever we are threatened with recession. I hope the idea was not oversold. Economists who believe in making adjustments in Federal fiscal policies have always said that there are times when restraint rather than stimulus should be the order of the day. Those who haven't fully grasped this principle -- those who looked only at the success of the tax-cutting measures of the early 1960s -- may now fear that raising taxes will cause a recession.

They are somewhat like Mark Twain's cat. He said his cat once sat on a hot stove and it learned a lesson too well. That cat never sat on a hot stove again -- but it never sat on a cold one either.

Thank you.



AN ADDRESS BY GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
SPECIAL CONSULTANT TO THE PRESIDENT

United States Options in Viet Nam

Governor Peabody, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, I am very proud indeed to be invited to the rostrum this evening to address this gathering of the National Defense Executive Reserve. I have known and admired from a distance the devotion to national duty represented by the membership of this body and feel that this meeting is an especially happy event symbolizing, as it does, a recognition of responsibility to country which is in sharp contrast to recent events which have taken place in our capital.

I must say, however, that I accepted with considerable trepidation the suggestion of speaking tonight on Viet Nam and on some of the alternatives which we face in that part of the world. I often wonder whether it is a public service to add to the columns of print and the stridence of debate which have been generated in our country over recent months, with regard to our problems in Southeast Asia. As I travel about the country, talking to our fellow citizens, I am often impressed with the fact that confusion describes best the general feeling toward these problems; a confusion which I think has been the result of the very efficiency of our reporting media. The press, television, radio, our officials who cable piles of messages to our Government--all contribute to the news which then flashes across our television screens and across the headlines of our papers, today bringing us a message of good news, tomorrow bad news but rarely with any explanation of what it all really means. As the coming Presidential campaign proceeds, inevitably our political leaders on both sides will be reexamining their positions and reappraising the basic factors involved in South Viet Nam and their significance for the United States. I suspect there will be a growing search for alternatives in the feeling that, if we are not satisfied generally with the present situation, we should see if we can not do better. For these reasons, I have taken for my subject tonight some of the alternatives in Viet Nam.

I think that before we can proceed with a discussion of alternatives, we must ask ourselves, alternatives to what? Presumably we mean alternatives to the course of action we are now following--hence, we need to agree at the outset of any discussion of alternatives what our present objectives are and their supporting strategy.

Such agreement should not be hard to reach in spite of those who say that they don't know what our present policy is. I take serious issue with such statements because it seems to me our policy is clear and can be stated simply in one paragraph. Our policy consists of an objective and a coherent strategy designed to obtain that objective. And, furthermore, our objective has not varied since 1954. Three Presidents and three Administrations have stated it in essentially the same sense, although sometimes in slightly differing words.

I take tonight for the statement of our objective, President Johnson's words in Baltimore in April 1965, when he said, "Our objective is the independence of South Viet Nam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves, only that the people in South Viet Nam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way." I submit that that is clear--it is unambiguous. In simple English, it states that we seek two things in South Viet Nam, a cessation of the Communist-directed aggression from North Viet Nam against South Viet Nam, and the right of self determination for the people of South Viet Nam. These are not new principles of behavior; they have guided our foreign policy since World War I in many political conflicts throughout the world. The objective in Viet Nam is not only simple and clear but it is limited in the sense that it asks for no unconditional surrender, nothing which is vital to those who are promoting this aggression against the South.

Now, if we have identified the overall objective, what is our strategy, how are we trying to attain our objective? Again, I think a simple answer will explain our efforts. We are trying to do two things: first, we are trying to use graduated military force in order to protect the population of South Viet Nam against the depredations and terrorist attacks of the guerrillas who for thirteen years have been trying to impose a communist state on South Viet Nam against the wishes of the vast majority of South Vietnamese. At the same time that our forces are undertaking to give security to the people, they are trying to inflict maximum losses against the military and paramilitary forces of the enemy in order to convince the leaders of Hanoi that no military victory is possible for them.

That is the purpose of the military effort. The non-military aspect is even more important--it is to build a nation under extremely difficult conditions. It is nation-building on the battlefield; nation-building under constant attack; nation-building to include establishing a government comparable in

form and concept to our idea of stable constitutional government. It includes protecting an economy inherently fragile and always under the pressure of the inflationary forces of a war which has been going on for thirteen years. And then, as security becomes greater as the result of the military success of our forces, it includes the restoration of the war-torn provinces, and the revival of some kind of normalcy of rural life in a country which is essentially a nation of peasants and farmers.

The foregoing describes our overall objective and the strategy that we are following. Our hope is that, as this course of action succeeds, the leaders in Hanoi will be forced to conclude that their efforts against the South can not succeed, that the Viet Cong guerrilla apparatus will dissolve and that the guerrillas will be eventually absorbed into the society of South Viet Nam or will be returned to North Viet Nam. A new nation will then arise in South Viet Nam comparable to the new nation that arose in Korea after the termination of hostilities there. That, then, is the hope of our present course of action.

Yet our critics say: "That is fine but the trouble is, General, these things aren't happening, or they aren't happening fast enough or they will never happen." Some may even add, "And furthermore they shouldn't happen this way." In the face of such criticism, many of us quite properly will say if this is not the best way to do our business, if this is not the best course of action to protect the interests of the United States and of our allies, what are the alternatives which offer greater promise?

First, let me say what isn't an alternative. It is not an alternative to say that we should keep out of a remote, insignificant country like South Viet Nam. That might have been an alternative in 1954, but is not in 1967. It does us no good to wring our hands in regret over what we did in the past. Personally, I have no regret for most past decisions of Viet Nam policy but many people have and I can't dispute their right to feel that way. But the point is that we are up to our governmental neck in South Viet Nam and it does no good to say we wish we weren't there, that we shouldn't be there. We are there, and the decision-makers of our Government must live with that fact and you and I must help them carry on from that point.

What are the real alternatives beyond the course of action which we are following? I don't like to appear to sloganize but slogans seem essential to attract attention. I would say that the slogans describing the four courses of action which I consider the only real alternatives are: one, "Pull Out"; two, "Pull Back"; three, "All Out"; four, "Stick It Out", the course we are



now following. If you will permit me, let's take them in order and talk about the pros and cons of each.

Let's first talk about "Pull Out". How exactly we would go about pulling out of Viet Nam if we decided to do so in a short period of time, I frankly don't know. The French, however, found a way. They elected Mendes-France to the premiership in the summer of 1954 with a mandate to get out of South Viet Nam and he executed that mandate by announcing that within one month he must have an agreement with the Communists for French evacuation or he and his countrymen would go home anyway. This pell-mell dash to the conference table resulted in the series of agreements which were formalized in 1954 in Viet Nam and at Geneva which amounted to turning over South Viet Nam and North Viet Nam to the Communists while the French washed their hands and went home. I don't think we would do it that way-- I hope not-- but that was one way to get out and I don't exactly know how the American proponents of the "Pull Out" solution would propose to terminate our involvement in South Viet Nam.

But assuming it can be done, let's ask ourselves what is the good, and what is the bad, what are the pros and what are the cons of the "Pull Out"? On the pro side, those who argue for this case would say, I think, that a "Pull Out" would stop this waste of our resources in South Viet Nam which runs into billions of dollars a year. Furthermore, it would remove the danger to peace which all military conflicts entail in this confined nuclear world of today and it would end the international criticism which the United States is receiving from many quarters, generally from those distant countries which feel far enough removed to be unaffected by the issues represented in South Viet Nam. Finally, I think the argument of the pros would include the point that our Nation, woefully split today by the Viet Nam issue, would be reunited upon the elimination of the Viet Nam problem by our withdrawal. These, I think, are the usual arguments which one hears for a "Pull Out".

Now what are the cons against the "Pull Out"? The obvious one is that it would be a resounding defeat for the United States foreign policy, the lowering of a flag which has been nailed to the mast of our Asian policy, with nails driven in by both Democratic and Republican administrations. I call it a resounding defeat because it would resound throughout the world, not only through Asia but through Europe as well and through the United States, the Halls of Congress and every element of our society-- the tidings that, for the first time since becoming a world leader, the United States had suffered a humiliating defeat abroad.

Some would call this defeat serious; others would call it disastrous. It would certainly be serious and perhaps disastrous because it would register a victory for the so-called "War of National Liberation" technique which has been proclaimed in Hanoi, Moscow and Peking as the favorite tactic of the future for expansive communism. This new weapon consists of the use of subversive guerrilla warfare to tunnel under the defenses of weak non-Communist nations into the heart of the citadel, using the Fifth Column methods of subversion developed in the Civil War in Spain before World War II.

What would be the effect in South Viet Nam if we followed the "Pull Out" solution? I don't know for sure but certainly South Viet Nam would soon become absorbed into North Viet Nam, an unwilling captive of that Communist state. In this case, I would like to call your attention to what took place from 1954 to 1956 in North Viet Nam while Ho Chi Minh was consolidating his Communist state. Historians estimate that at least 50,000 North Vietnamese were executed by firing squads in the implementation of the agrarian program in North Viet Nam and that many thousands more were sent to concentration camps. If indeed we sacrificed our friends in South Viet Nam to this ruthless gang in Hanoi, we could expect to witness a far greater bloodbath than the one in Hungary which we watched in horror in 1956.

What would be the effect on Red China if, at this critical point in Chinese history when that nation is virtually impotent from internal strife, the United States should abandon the struggle in Viet Nam? I would suspect that such conduct would greatly encourage the leaders who will emerge from the present turbulence to an increasingly belligerent, aggressive attitude toward the Western World in subsequent relations.

What the effect would be at home in the United States if we accepted defeat in Viet Nam, I frankly don't know. I think perhaps we can learn something from what happened in France after the Mendes-France government had withdrawn from Viet Nam. The complete discreditation of the politicians responsible for this retreat opened the way to the authoritarian Gaullist regime which took over power a few years later and remains in power today. I doubt whether our own country could absorb such a defeat without similar damage to our governmental, political and social structure.

Fortunately, very few of our citizens have thus far publicly advocated the "Pull Out". Even in the anonymity of the polls, only about 10 to 11 percent of those polled indicate they are for a "Pull Out". But I notice that certain people try to give a certain respectability to propositions which in effect would amount to a "Pull Out" by adding qualifying phrases such as "Let's get out with honor" or "let's get out as quickly as possible."

So much then for the extreme case of the "Pull Out". What may be said about that second alternative I mentioned, the "Pull Back"? In this case, we do have many voices throughout the country which, in effect, are proposing a "Pull Back". A "Pull Back", as I understand it, means a de-escalation of some sort. Usually it means at least, "Stop the bombing of North Viet Nam." Sometimes it means also, "Stop the offensive ground action of our troops against the enemy"; sometimes it includes "Withhold sending reinforcements from the United States to South Viet Nam"; and sometimes extends to the so-called "enclave" strategy. This latter carries with it the connotation that not only do we stop fighting but we quit the battlefield, withdraw into defensive areas generally along the coast, dig in and hope that the other side will tire of our presence and will eventually propose some kind of solution that we can accept.

What are the pros and cons of this "Pull Back" alternative? I think the proponents would argue something like this: A reduction of our military efforts would tend to defuse the situation and would take out some of the tension created by the armed conflict which is going on at present. They would probably add that it would tend to encourage an atmosphere favorable to negotiations which would eventually lead to peace. Also, they might point out that it would reduce the cost in dollars and losses in men and would tend to assuage the criticism which is being directed at the United States from many quarters.

Now, let's look at the other side. What's wrong with a "Pull Back"? To me, at least, and I think to many of those who share my views, it is a self-imposed stagnation of a situation which is showing dynamic progress.

Oddly, those who favor a "Pull Back" often deny this progress and describe the present situation as stagnated. Yet, they then propose ground rules for our conduct which would assure complete stagnation-- one created by ourselves. Beyond this consideration, it would mean the abandonment, at least in part, of the Vietnamese civil population which we are trying to defend, and to which we are bringing security. It would tie down our forces in static, defensive positions to become targets for the enemy's rockets, artillery and sabotage raiders while our men sat on the defensive and waited for something to happen. Our Vietnamese allies and Free World allies, our comrades of the battlefield-- how would they feel? They would have a right to consider themselves abandoned and start looking for some way to seek accommodation with the Communist leaders in the Far East.

What I would worry most about would be the effect on Hanoi, the government with which we need to reach a settlement satisfactory to our policy objectives. If we voluntarily pull back from the battlefield, that withdrawal would seem to them a precursor of victory, and we would lose any chance of getting them to a negotiation table in a frame of mind conducive to a solution reconcilable with our objectives.

Now, we get to the third option which was the "All Out" alternative, sometimes phrased as: "Win quick or get out." This course of action places the emphasis on military victory, on the utilization of more of our military strength faster and with fewer restraints, on the elimination of the gradualism with which we are applying our military strength. Implicit in this alternative is an unlimited bombing policy in North Viet Nam and some expansion of the ground war against the so-called sanctuaries in the Demilitarized Zone, in Cambodia or in Laos. The expansion might extend to the extreme case of an invasion of North Viet Nam.

Also, the proponents of this alternative sometimes add: "Let's declare war; let's mobilize the country; let's give up the butter and go in only for guns."

What are the pros and cons of this alternative? Again, I shall quote the proponents as I understand their arguments. They, I think, would say that this alternative allows us for the first time to use our vast military potential without restraint; to strike fast and decisively and hopefully to reach an early decision and thereby to economize those losses which result from a war of attrition; to utilize to the fullest all the advantages which we have as a great industrial nation. On the psychological side, the argument is that, if indeed we mobilize the country as proposed, we would eliminate many of the doubts, uncertainties and uneasiness that we feel about the present course of action and the need for it. We would pull the country together and unite it as it has never been really united on the Viet Nam situation before and, thus, we could attain success before our resolution flags. Many of the proponents of this course of action are deeply concerned over the question of our long-term resolution to stay with our uncongenial task in Viet Nam and this concern inclines them to this drastic alternative.

Now let's look at the other side of the ledger, the cons. To use our military strength at higher levels of intensity implies that there are important targets remaining to be destroyed, tangible things that we can hit. The unhappy fact is that we don't have many targets of that kind. On the ground, we have an elusive guerrilla enemy. Regardless of our strength in numbers, we can not be sure at a given place and moment to find him waiting to do



battle. Nor are there identifiable pieces of terrain which, if taken, will produce decisive military results.

In the air war, we have the same problem-- no target system which by any application of the criteria of strategic bombing of World War II is worthy of strategic attack. Of the targets available in North Viet Nam, there are virtually none which we have not hit which have any real military significance. About all that remains are the urban centers, particularly the capital, Hanoi. But apart from humanitarian considerations, there are strong practical reasons for conserving the seat of a government with which we may wish to deal in negotiating a final settlement of a guerrilla war which, without control from Hanoi, might linger on for years.

A significant expansion of the ground action would create a requirement for more American troops. If we are considering anything like an invasion of North Viet Nam, we are talking about many more divisions which it will take time to make ready, transport and deploy for action. This means heavy increases in manpower requirements, dollar costs, and international risks. These considerations are sufficiently serious, I think, to cause us to pause before we opt for this alternative and abandon our present course of action. So, let's consider what we are presently doing and see whether such a change is necessary and justified.

Our present course of action, the "Stick It Out" alternative, has its pros and cons like the others. On the pro side, I would say that it has the advantage of clear evidence that it is succeeding, that significant progress is being made. On the tactical battlefield, the enemy has not scored a victory worthy of the name in nearly two years. On the political front, progress has been particularly notable and I would like to comment upon it at some length.

When I was in Viet Nam as Ambassador in 1964-65, I had the dubious privilege of dealing with five different governments in that one year. The turbulence in internal politics after the overthrow of Diem was the most discouraging factor of that difficult period. Since my departure -- not necessarily because of my departure, I hope -- there has been continuous political progress toward stability in response to the demand of the people for a legitimate constitutional government. On the road to constitutionality, during the past year the South Vietnamese have had five general elections resulting in the choice of a constitution, a constitutional president, a senate and a house of representatives.

I like to remind all of my American fellow citizens that it took us from 1776 to 1789, aided by the vast experience of the Founding

Fathers to accomplish such a transition to stable constitutional government. Yet, this little people with no background of political experience, under conditions incredibly difficult, has in three years of warfare reached the point where they have, at least, made a beginning of constitutional government.

Another indication of progress is the increased proportion of the population secure from the Viet Cong. When I left in 1965, about 50 percent of the population lived in comparative security; now that figure is about 67 percent. So we are clearly succeeding on many fronts, perhaps not as fast as we would like but nevertheless progress is being made.

Furthermore, this progress is taking place with minimum risk of expansion of the war outside of Viet Nam. A short time ago, there were many voices raised in warning that we were on a head-on collision course with Red China or with the Soviet Union or with both. The fact is that we have had no such collision and I think the indicators very much favor the view that the risk, if any, is diminishing.

Finally, the cost of this course of action has remained within tolerable bounds in terms of its impact on our society and our economy. In spite of the many individual sorrows and burdens which this conflict has caused among our people, as a nation we remain comparatively untouched by the effects of war. We are having our guns and butter too.

Well then, what are the cons which oppose our present course of action? We hear them on all sides. Many of you will voice them in replying, "General, you say we're making progress but we're not making progress fast enough. It's far too slow. You can't tell us when it is going to end. There is no light at the end of the tunnel. Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh appear unyielding."

"Furthermore, General, here at home it is hard to explain this war. We don't understand it. No one has ever told us what the real issues are. This gradualism you have talked about, this progressive use of military force we have never known in our past. It contradicts our military history; it contradicts our national temperament. As a result, this policy is losing domestic support and will eventually collapse in domestic bankruptcy."

I might add, in response to such criticism, that when we are discouraged at home and our voices rise in opposition to what our government is doing, Hanoi hears, Hanoi is encouraged and the success of our policy is jeopardized by our own doubts and misgivings.

So there we have them, ladies and gentlemen, the pros and cons of four different alternatives. I don't know how they impress you but, as I see them, none is attractive without reservations and all are subject to objections of varying shades of gravity. To pull out or to pull back amounts to the abandonment of the basic objective which we have set for ourselves, an independent Viet Nam free from attack. And in abandoning that objective we would have to accept the bitter consequences of defeat.

The "All Out" alternative, the military solution, retains the basic objective but puts main reliance upon the effectiveness of overwhelming military force. The course we are now on, the "Stick It Out" alternative, retains the objective and continues to adhere to a balanced strategy in spite of the evidence of growing public impatience and loss of popular support.

In the light of all these considerations, what do you think we should do? Would you change our policy and, if so, which way would you go? If any change is made, it should be done with a clear recognition that no change is "for free", that any change may entail consequences no less serious and perhaps much more serious than staying on our present course. Thank you very much.

### SECTION 3

#### UNIT TRAINING

##### INTRODUCTION

In Executive Order 11179, the President assigned to the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning the responsibility to provide for appropriate standards of training for the National Defense Executive Reserve program. OEP, therefore, provided leadership and coordination for the training activities of the Federal agencies during the fifth national conference.

Training preparations for the conference began formally on June 9, 1967, when a training subcommittee was established, chaired by Mr. Eugene J. Quindlen, the Director of Program Planning and Evaluation, OEP. The subcommittee, comprised of representatives from all Federal agencies having an NDER program, began its work immediately.

Each agency formalized its training objectives for the conference. Appraisals by the individual agencies and by OEP of the training activities of the 1965 conference and subsequent training sessions were used to ascertain the existing level of capability and to identify the areas of greatest need. It became apparent that a number of agencies had reached the point in their training where scenarios and problem play could be used more effectively. OEP, therefore, supplied three general training situations for use by the agencies, at their option, covering tension and potential outbreak of war, limited war, and general war involving nuclear attack on the United States. Each of the agencies could adapt any or all of these situations to meet their training objectives.

Each training program was discussed by the training subcommittee so that all parties would be knowledgeable of the various facets of the total effort. Some of the training programs involved a large number of Reservists and numerous agencies (e.g., Transportation, Labor, and Business and Defense Services) and, therefore, required close cooperation and active participation in separate planning sessions.

Most of the agencies also faced the challenge of devising a program which would hold the interest of all of the participating Executive Reservists when some were attending their first training session while some had been to two or more sessions.

All of these factors were brought to bear in the challenge to assemble 1432 Executive Reservists with various backgrounds, who



had divergent views about the NDER program, and to provide them the opportunity to have meaningful training experiences over a very brief period of time.

The most distinguishing feature of the training conducted by the participating agencies at the conference was the emphasis on problem play as a vehicle to introduce participants to the decision-making environment of emergency operations. Seven of the twelve training programs used the problem play approach. Five of the programs were primarily orientation and indoctrination in nature; this was necessary because in these cases most of the participating Reservists were new.

The training sessions were superior, collectively, to those of any previous conference. This is the opinion of a group of evaluators from OEP who observed the sessions and this view was confirmed again and again by Reservists who expressed their opinions privately and publicly. Individually, the training sessions were judged to range from "good" to "excellent" -- with the preponderance rated on the high side.

As plans begin for the next NDER national conference there is a larger problem -- that of providing a total training structure which will meet the preparedness objectives of the various Federal agencies, yet be fully acceptable to the Reservist, and his employer where appropriate, both in terms of content and demands on his time. Further emphasis will be given to these areas of the program:

- . Regional training programs for Reservists to include those conducted by individual agencies, and those which combine the Reservists of two or more agencies.
- . Exercise problem play to be used to the maximum extent possible by all agencies in their training activities. Where feasible, problems should provide for cross play among agencies and functions in order to emphasize interrelationships.
- . Specific assignments to organizational positions or areas of responsibilities to be given to each Reservist wherever practicable.
- . Plenary sessions, where they are a part of the program, should take a minimum of time in order that more time can be used for training.

#### HIGHLIGHTS OF UNIT TRAINING SESSIONS

##### Department of Agriculture

The USDA section of the National Defense Executive Reserve conference met in general session in the Secretary of Agriculture's

conference room on the morning of October 24, 1967. Nine Executive Reservists of the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS) unit and twenty-seven of the Consumer and Marketing Service (C&MS) unit met in a combined general session. Mr. George H. Walter, Acting Assistant to the Secretary for Mobilization Planning, presided. The Under Secretary of Agriculture, John A. Schnittker, in an opening statement welcomed the Executive Reservists to the Department of Agriculture, discussed some of the Department's major on-going programs and thanked the Reservists for their participation in the training program while expressing gratefulness of the Department for their willingness to serve in time of need.

Mr. Edwin A. Jaenke, Associate Administrator of ASCS, and Mr. Howard P. Davis, Deputy Administrator of C&MS, highlighted defense responsibilities of their agencies as they relate to the USDA NDER program.

Mr. Bruce M. Easton, Chief, Defense Activities Staff, ASCS, and Mr. George A. Dice, Director, Transportation and Warehouse Division, C&MS, the officials responsible for the agency NDER units, talked with the Executive Reservists about the training exercise planned for the afternoon sessions conducted separately by ASCS and C&MS. A briefing was given the Reservists of the salient aspects of the assumed attack in the exercise and its effect on the resources in which the Reservists would have executive capability responsibility in an actual emergency.

The afternoon ASCS session, chaired by Mr. Easton, was devoted to discussion and resolution of exercise problems covering eight major areas of ASCS concern. The Reservists participated enthusiastically. All had attended previous orientation sessions and consequently were able to concentrate on problem solving.

Most of the C&MS Reservists were attending their first exercise; consequently, Mr. George Dice, the chairman of that session, opened the proceedings with an orientation and then guided discussions on the kinds of problems likely to face food processors and distributors in a post-nuclear attack environment. These discussions in turn led to a spirited examination of the interdependence of resources and requisites and the interrelationships among the industries represented by the Reservists against the backdrop of a nuclear attack.

##### Department of Commerce

Bureau of the Census. Dr. A. Ross Eckler, Director of the Bureau of the Census, welcomed the Census Reservists to the Bureau's headquarters in Suitland, Maryland. He later joined the group for lunch and informally discussed with them a wide range of Bureau

activity, including specific legislation in the area of Census operations.

The unit training program presented by Bureau officials featured high-level briefings on its statistical programs, facilities, and procedures. The briefings were given by the Agency's senior economists and administrators, with particular attention to planned demographic and economic censuses and surveys. The Reservists were shown how much of the data emanating from current programs, coupled with the work of the Office of Business Economics and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, would serve a vital need in an emergency. Following each presentation there was a lively, intelligent, and forthright discussion period participated in fully by the eleven Reservists who attended. A number of documents were distributed to augment the briefings.

During the afternoon session, a special tour was made of the electronic machine data processing area.

Bureau of International Commerce. The Executive Reservists were welcomed by Mr. Lawrence A. Fox, Director of the Bureau. Thirty of the forty-five enrolled Reservists attended the unit training sessions to hear top Bureau officials follow Mr. Fox with the presentation of an interesting and informative program on the functions, background, and operating procedures of the Office of Export Control. Special presentations were made on organization of the Export Control Program, the relationships between U. S. control and international controls, policy formulation, office administration, and controls enforcement. The program closed with the presentation of a film on port preparedness and a conducted tour which gave the Reservists an opportunity to observe OEC's licensing process.

In addition to spirited discussion of the formal presentations, the Reservists participated in a review of emergency functions and the prospective roles they would play if called to duty. The Reservists were told that in an emergency they would constitute the core around which OEC staff would expand to meet an anticipated heavy increase in workload. The other emergency functions of BIC were also outlined. These would be import controls, and resource requirements and claimancy.

Future training for Reservists discussed during the meeting envisages two or three unit sessions a year sponsored solely by the Bureau with each held in a centrally located city outside Washington. In addition, the Bureau hopes to participate in Regional training exercises sponsored for all units of the Reserve by the Office of Emergency Planning.

Business and Defense Services Administration. Four hundred and seventy Reservists, candidates, and guests attended the BDSA unit training session held on the second day of the conference. Joined by Reservists assigned to the Office of the Secretary, they were welcomed by the Honorable Lawrence C. McQuade, Assistant Secretary of Commerce, and by Mr. Rodney L. Borum, the BDSA Administrator. Mr. Anthony A. Bertsch, Assistant Administrator for Industrial Mobilization, then opened the formal training activity with a situation presentation which established a framework for the problem solving exercise that featured the day's activity.

The BDSA industry divisions had prepared 105 problems for the Reservists to take under consideration during the exercise. The problems, dealing with hypothetical mobilization situations progressing from limited war to the brink of nuclear attack, were introduced into the exercise play in two phases: the first, a hypothetical emergency situation requiring the call to duty of a limited number of Reservists; and the second, a hypothetical emergency situation in which nuclear attack was anticipated.

At the conclusion of the general situation presentation, Reservists reported to their assigned industry divisions within BDSA where they in turn formed their problem-solving groups. With lunch at their desks the groups grappled with the phased problems, developing proposed solutions. Their solutions were compared to the BDSA Division school answers in critiques that started at about 3:00 p.m.

BDSA activated its War Room for the day's activity. High-level Government officials expert in the various resource areas assembled in the War Room with BDSA's top production team to consider problems flowing up from the Operating Divisions. War Room operations during the entire day were open to Reservists who were invited to drop by from Division assignments to observe.

#### Department of Defense

Department of the Army, Office of Civil Defense. This unit of the Executive Reserve had been thoroughly reorganized and reconstituted shortly before the conference and almost all of its members were either newly designated or still candidates. Therefore, the format of the training was essentially orientation.

The eighteen Reservists who attended were welcomed by Mr. Joseph Romm, Director of the Office of Civil Defense. Following his remarks, a team of top agency officials gave an excellent presentation of civil defense programs. All the programs were thoroughly covered but the national fallout shelter program was



emphasized with special attention given to shelter surveys, stocking, and management. Invited to pose questions at any point in the briefings, the Reservists participated enthusiastically -- inquiring about the shelter program, the long-range future of civil defense, and Congressional appropriations hearings.

The Reservists were advised that their emergency assignments would be at the Regional level and the focus of future training would center on the eight OCD Regional Directors with whom they would be working. It was indicated that the strength of the OCD Reserve unit would ultimately reach 140, with the following composition:

- 8 Executive Assistants (1 per Region)
- 16 Public Information Officers (2 per Region)
- 16 Technical Assistants (2 per Region)
- 100 State Liaison Officers (2 per State)

#### Department of the Interior

Office of Minerals and Solid Fuels (OMSF). On the first morning of the conference OMSF held an orientation session for the twenty-eight members of its Executive Reserve unit who attended. The session, chaired by Dr. William E. S. Flory, the Director of OMSF, featured a review of preparedness planning and the Reservists' role within the scope of that planning.

The entire second day of the conference was devoted to unit training. The Honorable J. Cordell Moore, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Mineral Resources, welcomed the Reservists and expressed his appreciation for their contribution to the Department's program for emergency planning. Following the welcoming remarks, the Reservists, who form the organizational core of two emergency agencies -- the Emergency Minerals Administration (EMA) and the Emergency Solid Fuels Administration (ESFA)-- met with staff members of the Office of Minerals and Solid Fuels, and with representatives of the Secretary's office, the Bureau of Mines, and the Geological Survey.

Dr. Flory discussed the functions of OMSF in emergency planning, the relationship of the EMA and the ESFA to other emergency organizations throughout the Government, the role of the EMA and ESFA in directing the Department of Interior emergency programs for minerals and solid fuels, and the role of the Bureau of Mines and Geological Survey in emergency planning and in providing support services to EMA and ESFA during an emergency. Tentative assignments were then made to the Reservists in the two emergency organizations to facilitate discussions of a recently developed Emergency Operations Handbook. The draft Handbook in

turn served as a basis for discussion of the National Office organizations of EMA and ESFA and their relationships with operations of the field offices and the Bureau of Mines and Geological Survey. The functions and responsibilities of these offices were also discussed.

Mr. William Hahman and Mr. John Shelton, OMSF, discussed the separate sections in the Emergency Operations Handbook on transportation, compliance, manpower, and statistics describing the functions and responsibilities of those assigned to these areas in the EMA and ESFA.

Dr. Flory, in discussing the Handbook in general, stated that it will consist of two Volumes. Volume I will cover the structure of the EMA and ESFA, the responsibilities of the staffs of each emergency organization in different types of emergency, and the operating instructions for carrying out their mobilization programs. Volume II will contain the authorities, orders, and references to supplement Volume I, as well as other materials pertinent to the needs of the Reservist or Interior staff members in fulfilling their responsibilities under emergency conditions.

Mrs. Laura Cook, OMSF, participated in the program, explaining a collection of input data on production, capacity and number of employees at facilities for which EMA and ESFA will be responsible under emergency conditions, the storage of the data in the National Resource Analysis Center computer, and retrieval of the data for making damage assessments in an emergency. The Reservists were shown maps on which the locations of these metal and mineral facilities were plotted. The input data and maps in the Washington Office are updated as new data becomes available and the maps in the Regional Offices are updated periodically.

Office of Oil and Gas. On the first morning of the NDER conference, the Honorable J. Cordell Moore, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Mineral Resources, welcomed three hundred and ten Executive Reservists of the Emergency Petroleum and Gas Administration (EPGA). The Assistant Secretary congratulated the EPGA unit on its excellent attendance and had warm praise for the industry's fine performance in the Viet Nam and Middle East crises. He went on to say that no one knows how long the Viet Nam struggle will last nor what levels of industry may yet be involved, but because of that uncertainty a high degree of readiness is essential -- the reason for the EPGA and its Executive Reservists. Comments and briefings were also given during the opening session by Mr. Theodore W. Nelson, Alternate EPGA Deputy Administrator and Chairman of EPGA's conference proceedings; Admiral O. P. Lattu, Director of the Office of Oil and Gas; and John Ricca and Marvin Case, members of Admiral Lattu's staff.

The EPGA unit training sessions on the second day of the conference were devoted mainly to testing and evaluating EPGA operating manuals. This was the first opportunity that Reservists had to work from the recently completed manuals. The manuals were enthusiastically received and formed the basis for a most successful training experience.

The unit training also featured headquarters staff sessions and regional meetings in which the Reservists discussed the major problems that would face an activated EPGA. Top headquarters staff led by Assistant Administrators Reid Brazell, E. Clyde McGraw and J. G. Wilson; General Counsel Elmer E. Batzell; and Director of the Foreign Refining Division, W. A. Arnold, met with Mr. Nelson from 3:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. to present reports on their deliberations during the day. The reports covered such areas as functions of regional staff and coordination between the Regions and National Headquarters, the EPGA organizational structure, communications, security, statistical data, and manpower problems. The training sessions closed with a general meeting for all Reservists in which Mr. Nelson called for reports on meetings held by regional EPGA staffs. All eight Regional Administrators (listed below) attended the conference, led the discussions during their regional meetings, and gave the summary reports at the general session. The typical problems reported were emergency assignments and the location of emergency regional operating sites, data and data flow, and relationships between the Regions and National Headquarters.

#### EPGA Regional Administrators

Region 1 H. J. Peckheiser	Region 5 Carroll M. Bennett
Region 2 Alex S. Chamberlain	Region 6 Patrick N. Griffin
Region 3 Emmett A. Vaughey	Region 7 D. N. Keaton, Jr.
Region 4 L. E. Kincannon	Region 8 Lowell E. Hunt

#### Department of Labor

An exceptionally fine turnout of seventy out of one hundred and one Executive Reservists of the Department of Labor heard the Deputy Under Secretary, Millard Cass, open the unit training sessions on the second day of the national conference. After expressing warm thanks for the excellent attendance and reviewing quickly the training plans for the day, Mr. Cass introduced the Honorable James J. Reynolds, Under Secretary of Labor. Under Secretary Reynolds welcomed the Reservists and expressed the Department's deep gratitude for their unselfish dedication to public service. The Under Secretary continued with an interesting and informative discussion of Departmental activities, concentrating on current work in the labor disputes area and the Reservists' role in that program in the event of an emergency.

Following the Under Secretary's remarks, Mr. Cass signaled the beginning of the training sessions. By prearrangement, each Reservist had been assigned to one of eight working groups: four in the manpower area and four in wage stabilization and labor disputes. Each group was supported by an advisor from the Department of Labor and resource experts from other Federal agencies. The working groups were chaired by the following Executive Reservists:

#### Manpower

Group No. 1  
John D. Stewart  
President  
The Bureau of National  
Affairs, Inc.

Group No. 2  
Lawrence C. Sullivan  
Executive Secretary-Treasurer  
Greater Boston Labor Council,  
AFL-CIO

Group No. 3  
Russell M. Stephens  
U. S. Civil Service  
Commission

Group No. 4  
Miss Lena E. Ebeling (Retired)  
Cleveland, Ohio

#### Wage Stabilization and Labor Disputes

Group No. 1  
Donald B. Straus  
President  
American Arbitration Association

Group No. 2  
Dr. Harold W. Davey  
Department of Economics  
and Sociology  
Iowa State University

Group No. 3  
John I. Rollings  
President  
Missouri State Labor Council,  
AFL-CIO

Group No. 4  
Dr. Byron R. Abernethy  
Arbitrator  
Lubbock, Texas

Prepositioned exercise materials were distributed to each working group and each was responsible for problem solutions which were critiqued in light of "school solutions" later in a general session. The exercise was generally limited war oriented, although the basic scenario used by all groups required some consideration of general war problems in a postattack environment. The Reservists' participation in the group activities was complete and enthusiastic, and the results of their work were excellent.

At 2:00 p.m. the Reservists reassembled to hear the Honorable W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor. The Secretary thanked the group for taking time to attend the sessions and assured them of his complete personal support and the support of the entire Department. Secretary Wirtz discussed the major problems that the



Department faces and the programs underway to overcome them. He emphasized departmental plans and programs and the role of labor and management in the manpower training and development areas.

After the Secretary's comments, the working group chairmen reported on their work sessions. Mr. Cass moderated a critique of each report and the problem solutions posed by the groups.

#### Transportation

Transportation units held a joint training exercise on the second day of the conference under the overall leadership and coordination of the Transportation Department's Office of Emergency Transportation. NDER units sponsored by the following agencies participated in the sessions:

Bureau of Public Roads  
Interstate Commerce Commission  
Maritime Administration  
Office of Emergency Transportation

The agencies listed below sent representatives:

Civil Aeronautics Board  
Federal Aviation Administration  
Office of Civil Defense  
Office of Emergency Planning

The Honorable Alan S. Boyd, Secretary of Transportation, addressed the group, ranging over the entire spectrum of emergency transportation programs. He emphasized the importance of attaining a high degree of readiness to meet any contingency. The timely movement of people, supplies, and equipment is so critically important to this Nation's economy and very existence that transportation blockages must be avoided or freed quickly, whether the contingency be a peacetime matter or faced in a post-nuclear attack environment -- this is the essence of emergency transportation preparedness. The Secretary complimented the Reservists on their dedication to national service and indicated that they have a key role in the emergency transportation capability which he described. As a manifestation of their complete support of the NDER program, top Federal transportation officials joined the Secretary as guests at the meeting and each was introduced to the Reservists:

Honorable Donald G. Agger, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, Department of Transportation  
Honorable J. W. Gulick, Administrator, Maritime Administration  
General William F. McKee, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration  
Honorable Charles S. Murphy, Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board  
Honorable William H. Tucker, Chairman, Interstate Commerce Commission  
Honorable Lowell K. Bridwell, Administrator, Federal Highway Administration  
Honorable A. Scheffer Lang, Administrator, Federal Railroad Administration  
Admiral Willard Smith, Commandant, United States Coast Guard

Mr. John L. McGruder, OET's Director, followed Secretary Boyd on the program and spoke of the specific goals in the transportation preparedness program and the means for their accomplishment, stressing the interrelationships and interdependence of the various modes.

The formal training centered on a hypothetical exercise appropriately titled Short Run. Introduced by Brigadier General A. W. Lyon, OET's Assistant Director for Operational Readiness, Short Run was specially prepared for transportation Reservists. It is one of a series of continuing exercises to better equip the Reservist for his emergency duties. Developed on a problem-solving theme, the exercise materials established interim national priorities, cited Federal and State transportation controls that could be imposed, if required, stated basic principles of transportation management (leaving operations in the hands of the industry), provided very useful charts and reference material, and laid out six sets of problems. The materials also included a questionnaire which each Reservist was requested to complete as his evaluation of the exercise.

The 288 Reservists and 70 members of the Association of State Highway Officials who attended were organized into working groups to consider the exercise problems. An excellent skit was used to add realism to the exercise. At 3:00 p.m. the working groups and Federal transportation officials who advised them assembled to critique the problem solutions.

#### Office of Emergency Planning

Economic Stabilization. An orientation session was held the first morning of the conference for newly designated Reservists. Following welcoming remarks by Mr. Leonard A. Skubal, Chief of OEP's Economic Stabilization Division, the Agency's Director of Administration, Mr. William B. Rice, presented a comprehensive

briefing on Non-Military Defense Preparedness and the related role of OEP. Mr. Skubal in turn discussed the responsibilities of the Economic Stabilization Division. Reservists were then given the opportunity to ask questions and discuss various aspects of the NDER program.

The entire second day of the conference was devoted to unit training, with two principal objectives in mind. These were (1) to ascertain how well the Reservists had been indoctrinated in economic stabilization by judging their reactions to a few problems they might face as Federal officials in an actual emergency, and (2) to determine how the overall economic stabilization program could be improved, both from a substantive and an administrative viewpoint.

Mr. Skubal and his staff presented, to the 76 Reservists who attended, a training program that brought them up to date on policies, plans, and the current status of programs that cover nuclear attack and non-nuclear type contingencies.

After a briefing on the non-nuclear program, conferees completed a questionnaire relating to the subject matter of the briefing. OEP staff intended that the completed forms constitute a test of the clarity and directness of the presentation and individual understanding thereof. Results of the test proved to be very helpful.

Training activity next focused on nuclear preparations. The Reservists, after being exposed collectively to an exercise situation, were divided into three groups: Price Stabilization, Rent Stabilization, and Consumer Rationing. Each group was co-chaired by two Executive Reservists, one having a National Headquarters assignment in the economic stabilization unit and the other a Regional Headquarters assignment. The groups were given a number of problems to consider and resolve in separate "workshop" sessions. The problems were developed on the basis of the exercise assumptions. Following the individual group discussions, all Reservists reconvened and the leaders reported on the problems. This provided all who attended an opportunity to hear each problem stated, to hear the solution proposed, and to ask questions. The participation was enthusiastic and the results were productive.

The meeting highlighted the need for a greater effort on the part of the Economic Stabilization Division to maintain greater communication and rapport with the Executive Reservists so as to better prepare them to carry out their emergency assignments. It also revealed a need for the Reservist to become more involved in and more conversant with the many interrelationships of emergency planning and postattack economic stabilization operations.

During the course of the second day's meeting the group was addressed by the following Office of Emergency Planning officials:

Honorable Charles S. Brewton, Assistant Director  
Honorable Endicott Peabody, Assistant Director  
Mr. William C. Truppner, Director, National Resource Analysis Center

Each of these officials reiterated, among other things, OEP's dependence upon, and appreciation of, the Reservists' support of non-military preparedness programs.

Office of Defense Resources (ODR). An orientation was also held for 30 new members of the ODR unit. Mr. Franklin M. Aaronson, Chief of OEP's Mobilization Plans Division, opened the session and introduced Assistant Director Brewton who welcomed the Reservists and expressed high praise for their dedicated service to the Nation. The Reservists were then briefed on OEP Organization, Functions, and Programs by Mr. Eugene J. Quindlen, the Agency's Director of Program Planning and Evaluation. The session closed with a spirited question and answer period.

The second day's training, with 84 Executive Reservists in attendance, offered a morning program that dealt with the underlying authorities of ODR and the details of its emergency operations. Mr. Truppner opened the program with general remarks on the current and long-range objectives of the National Resource Analysis Center. Governor Peabody dropped in on the session later in the day and extended his welcome to the group.

Mr. Aaronson, who directed the day's activities, followed Mr. Truppner with a presentation in three parts: the concept and basic principles of ODR, a general outline of the Resource Mobilization Plan for Limited War, and the role and functions of the Executive Reservist in the implementation of that Plan. Successive briefings were then made by OEP staff on emergency resource mobilization legislation and on the documents that would be required to implement the Plan. A general question and answer period closed the morning session.

The afternoon's activity consisted of problem play. The Reservists were assigned to four resource management working groups: Production, Transportation, Manpower, and Petroleum. The groups were provided with a hypothetical situation summary and an analysis of the national economic situation based on a hypothetical increased limited-war involvement.



The exercise problems dealt first with the emergency resource management contingency that might initially confront the Director of ODR -- when he is faced with defense expenditures amounting to almost 10% of GNP, and accelerating. The balance of the problems ranged through serious conditions in production and in each of the specific resource areas considered in the exercise.

The Reservists were well prepared to cope with the emergency posed for them. Their group discussions and their individual participation were enthusiastic and excellent. The report and critique period, which compared their deliberations with suggested school solutions to the problems, further demonstrated the Reservists' high degree of preparation and served as a fitting climax to the unit's training program.

## SECTION 4

### REGISTRATION REPORT

#### Summary of Registrations:

Executive Reservists	1432
Guests	604
Federal Officials	268
Total	2304*

#### Executive Reservist Registration by NDER Unit:

Department of Agriculture	38
Department of Commerce	
Office of the Secretary	7
Bureau of the Census	11
Bureau of International Commerce	25
BDSA	433
Maritime Administration	40
Department of Defense	
Office of Civil Defense	20
Department of the Interior	
Office of Minerals & Solid Fuels	32
Office of Oil & Gas (EPGA)	307
Department of Labor	75
Department of Transportation	
Bureau of Public Roads	95
Office of Emergency Transportation	95
Interstate Commerce Commission	62
Office of Emergency Planning	192
Total	1432

Allowance should be made for 78 cancellations.

ARRANGEMENT	COMMUNITY	SECTOR
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100	100	100

## SECTION 5

CONFERENCE OFFICIALS

AND

## SPONSORING AGENCIES



## OFFICERS

NATIONAL DEFENSE EXECUTIVE RESERVE  
CONFERENCE ASSOCIATION

**Theodore F. Koop**  
President and Chairman of the Board

**Herman B. Director**  
Vice President and Secretary

**Maxwell S. McKnight**  
Treasurer

## ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE

Chairman  
**Robert Y. Phillips**  
Office of Emergency Planning  
**I. Ralph Atticks**  
Office of Emergency Planning  
**Thomas J. Byrne**  
Interstate Commerce Commission  
**Francis X. Carney**  
Office of Emergency Planning  
**Bruce M. Easton**  
Department of Agriculture  
**Mrs. India Edwards**  
Office of Emergency Planning  
**Mrs. Betty English**  
At Your Service, Inc.  
**George E. Gorman**  
Sheraton-Park Hotel  
**Fred P. Hobart**  
Department of the Interior  
**Mrs. John G. Laferty**  
Department of Commerce  
**Mrs. Anamary Lantzy**  
Department of Labor  
**A. W. Lyon**  
Department of Transportation  
**John J. O'Neill**  
Office of Emergency Planning  
**Eugene J. Quindlen**  
Office of Emergency Planning  
**Louis J. Walter**  
Department of the Army  
Office of Civil Defense

## NDER SPONSORING AGENCIES

**Department of Agriculture**  
Agricultural Stabilization  
and Conservation Service  
Consumer and Marketing Service  
**Department of Commerce**  
Bureau of the Census  
Bureau of International Commerce  
Business and Defense Services  
Administration  
Maritime Administration  
Office of the Secretary  
**Department of Defense**  
Office of the Secretary  
Department of the Army,  
Office of Civil Defense  
**Department of the Interior**  
Office of Minerals  
and Solid Fuels  
Office of Oil and Gas  
**Department of Labor**  
**Department of Transportation**  
Bureau of Public Roads  
Office of Emergency  
Transportation  
**Interstate Commerce Commission**  
**Office of Emergency Planning**




**OFFICE OF  
EMERGENCY  
PLANNING**

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT



**Vice President  
Hubert Humphrey  
Reports On  
Southeast Asia**



A few days ago I returned from a mission, at the request of the President, to three nations of Southeast Asia. Today I wish to report to you the observations and conclusions which I bring home with me.

**First, and most importantly, I come home with a reinforced belief that the safety, security, and independence of the nations of Southeast Asia are critical to the safety, security and independence of the United States — and that this will be even more true in the years ahead.**

**Secondly, I am convinced that our present struggle in Vietnam is critical to the security of all of Southeast Asia.**

**Thirdly, I am heartened by the progress I saw.**

I visited three nations in Southeast Asia: South Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

Each of these nations has its own distinctive character. But all share two vital common denominators:

- past and present resistance to Asian Communist subversion and aggression;
- urgent and priority efforts toward constructive nation-building.

These are the tasks in which we are helping — the tasks of national security and of national development, neither one of which can exist without the other.

And these are the tasks in which we must persist — or run the risk of chaos, disorder and war in a vast and strategic crossroads of the world.



I had the privilege of representing our country at the Inauguration of President Thieu in the Republic of Vietnam.

The Republic of Vietnam has not created overnight a carbon copy of American representative government. Nor should we either expect or want it to do so.

**Our objective is not a Vietnam made by Americans and stamped made in U. S. A. It is a Vietnam, made by the Vietnamese for the Vietnamese.**

**It has succeeded in building for the first time in modern history — so far as I know — representative, civilian, constitutional government in the midst of war.**

This is no small achievement. Nor should it be taken for granted. It took place in the fact of calculated terrorism and disruption and amid warnings from a thousand directions that it could and would not happen.

A Constituent Assembly was freely elected.

A constitution was freely written.

Local, parliamentary and Presidential elections were freely held.


And a popularly elected government — elected in a voter turnout far higher than ours in the United States — was freely installed.

All these things were done despite widespread predictions that none of them could be done.

All these things were done by the Vietnamese themselves.

And today the Republic of Vietnam has something no Communist nation possesses: A government elected by the free votes of its people.

I met and talked with President Thieu, with Vice President Ky... with leaders of the government and of the newly-elected members of the Upper and Lower Houses. I met with non-governmental people, with students and labor leaders, with university



professors and military officers.

**It is clear that this new government will face massive problems. The war itself would be problem enough without the additional problems of young nationhood.**

**But I am encouraged by the determination and spirit of cooperation which I found among all these groups and people. And they deserve from all of us the benefit of the doubt — and should be judged not by our but by their own standards — as they try to create a responsive framework of self-government in their country.**

The next six months will be critical in this process — as a working relationship develops between the executive and legislative branches and as the Thieu-Ky government begins to follow-through on its plans and programs.

I had not been to Vietnam since early 1966 — some 20 months ago. The political progress and development since then were clear and encouraging.

**I was also encouraged by other progress in positive nation-building — specifically in the so-called Revolutionary Development program being carried on by the Vietnamese.**

**W**hen I was in Vietnam early last year this program had barely started. By the end of 1968, there will be 70 to 75 thousand Revolutionary Development cadre in Vietnamese hamlets.

This program recruits young men — most largely unschooled “countryboys” — and trains them for responsible leadership.

They return to their home provinces for four-year tours of duty. Their task: To build so-called “communities of responsibility” — communities with local self-government and initiative — which can develop in time into “communities of prosperity.”

Most of the present cadre are now serving in the northern provinces where the Viet Cong infrastructure has been entrenched for years. Their work is hard and demanding. They literally build communities with their hands. They are singled out by the Communists for abduction and assassination. But these young people are doing their job in face of Viet Cong terrorism and the long-established traditionalism and inertia of the old order.

I visited their training camp at Vung Tau. Major Be, who runs the training camp is a dedicated patriot. He is a former Viet Minh battalion commander who fought the French for six years and has fought communism for 16. The young people in training there are idealistic and highly-motivated.

Through this program, the Vietnamese are not only building secure and stable communities and localities. They are also training future political and civic leaders and setting the foundations for long-term political and social health.

**The Vietnamese economic situation has also stabilized over 20 months ago. The fires of inflation have been dampened — thanks in large part to massive importation of consumer and capital goods, strict U. S. and Vietnamese controls on spending, devalua-**

**tion of the piaster, and increased taxation.**

**I do not mean to overstate the progress made in these non-military areas. It is painstaking and slow, particularly to those of us possessing typical American impatience.**

**But there is progress — not marked from day-to-day or week-to-week, but clearly measurable over the course of months.**

**T**he greatest and most obvious progress of all is in the military effort.

We should remember that when our forces entered Vietnam in strength they were almost totally lacking in support facilities.

Today a full military infrastructure is nearly complete. A system of ports, airfields, communications and bases has been established.

With this infrastructure behind them, our troops have been able to concentrate over the past few months on fighting and defeating enemy main-force units.

**At the same time the South Vietnamese forces — both regular forces and regional and popular forces are growing more competent. During my stay in Vietnam they achieved several victories over both North Vietnamese regular and Viet Cong units.**

**We don't hear much about South Vietnamese military successes, because our reporters travel almost exclusively with American forces. But those successes are more and more frequent. And their American military advisers told me South Vietnamese units are gaining pride and professionalism, just as our Korean allies did 15 years ago.**

I think it should be remembered that, in the past six years the South Vietnamese army has lost 51 thousand men killed in action, 26 thousand missing in action and has had 109 thousand wounded in action. Since the first





of this year almost 9 thousand Army of Vietnam troops have been killed in action. This is in addition to countless Vietnamese civilians who have been victimized since this war began.

The South Vietnamese, in relation to the population, now have an army which would be comparable to one of 8 million in the United States.

We are now joined in Vietnam by more allied forces than joined us in Korea. The Koreans, Australians, New Zealanders and Thais have all performed well.

By all measures — roads opened, villages cleared, enemy casualties and desertions — we are winning militarily.

What about the bombing? This is a question regularly asked here at home, but almost never in Vietnam.

I visited our troops near the Demilitarized Zone. They told me that bombing was the single greatest factor enabling them to hold off the three North Vietnamese divisions now deployed in and behind the DMZ. I talked with our pilots. I also reviewed photos and charts which indicate that our bombing further North is not only accurate, but that it

has drastically slowed down the flow of Communist men and supplies in South Vietnam... and diverts hundreds of thousands of North Vietnamese to reconstruction and repair of facilities that support the aggression.

**If you have questions about the bombing, I suggest you ask any of the American boys dug in under artillery fire along the DMZ. I suggest you ask our troops in the Central Highlands and the Delta who face mortars and guns carried in from the North.**

**I went to our Riverine Forces operating in the Delta... to the Third Marine Amphibious Forces and Naval Support Hospital at Danang... to the American Division at Chu Lai.**

**W**herever I went I found the highest level of American morale and the highest order of dedication and leadership. I was quoted as saying that I hadn't heard one American complaint during the entire time I was in Vietnam. And it was true.

**T**here was one question I often heard from Americans in Vietnam, however. It was: "Why are we winning the war here and seem to be losing it at home?"

**That is a difficult question to answer, I can assure you.**

It is particularly difficult when you read, as I do, the statements and captured documents of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong leadership—statements and documents which indicate that they believe their only hope of winning is through division, despair and defeatism on the American home front.

It is particularly difficult when all evidence indicates that we are winning this struggle and that—if we persevere—Hanoi will eventually face a critical and inevitable decision: Whether to come to the conference table, or to de-escalate and withdraw.

**I told our Americans in Vietnam that the overwhelming majority of Americans at home do support them and what they are doing. I told them that their President, their Vice President, and their fellow citizens do have the determination to see it through.**

As a long-time dissenter myself, I ask no American who dissents in good conscience to still his voice. But I do ask all Americans, before they dissent, to search their hearts ... to examine the facts ... to know the effect of what they say on our civilians and soldiers in Vietnam—and on our adversaries as well.

**I ask them to face, before they raise their voices, the hard fact of cynical Communist-initiated aggression and terror and to offer workable alternatives to meeting it.**

**I ask them to recognize that we face in Vietnam no peaceful reformer seeking power through parliamentary means.**

We face not handbills, but hand grenades.

We face in Vietnam no indigenous movement of Robin Hoods, but one more Com-

munist apparatus trying to seize land and people by brute force.

And to those who deplore war and use of arms, as I do, I ask: What other course do you recommend in meeting this challenge? If you can find it, we will use it.

So that is the picture I bring back from Vietnam.

Political, economic, social progress: Steady but slow.

Military progress: Steady and gaining momentum.

National security and national development: Both proceeding.

The clear and present need: Support by the American people—support which can give a clear, unmistakable signal to our adversary and thereby shorten the war.

**F**or those who may lack patience today in Vietnam, I point to the example of the second country I visited: Malaysia.

Malaysia, with assistance from nations of the British Commonwealth, fought Communist terror and subversion within its borders for 12 almost-endless years.

**Today Malaysia stands independent and strong. It has a stable government which is meeting the needs of its people through an integrated, national industrial and rural development program including the essentials of education, health, land reform, public works and vocational agriculture.**

The Malaysians combined national development with national security, and they and their allies stayed with it against a strong and externally supported Communist insurgency—building their country, resisting force. And they won.

Today Malaysia not only earns its own way. It is a leader in the movement toward



Asian regionalism. It is an effective partner in Asian freedom and progress. And, during my visit, the Malaysian government — at its own initiative — indicated a willingness to send additional assistance to Vietnam.

Malaysians have no doubts about the danger of communist aggression and subversion. Malaysians openly support our course in Vietnam.

**M**y final stop was Indonesia.

I cannot over-emphasize the critical importance to Southeast Asia and to us of this potentially-rich, strategically-situated nation of more than 100 million people.

Here, too, a crude and brutal attempt at communist takeover had to be resisted and put down.

Here, too, the dual formula for eventual success is national security and national development.

**The Indonesian nation is struggling. It is the victim of 20 years of mismanagement and neglect, of corruption and subversion and exploitation.**

**But today Indonesia, under Acting President Suharto, has an honest government which is providing leadership, the right priorities, and determination and energy.**

Despite years of anti-American propaganda there, I was met in the poverty-stricken, former Communist belts of Bali and Central Java by literally hundreds of thousands of cheering people gathered along the roadsides.

They wore no shoes. Most of them were hungry. But they knew that new leadership in their country cared about them. And they knew that America cared and that America was there in their neighborhood of Southeast Asia as a friend.

They know America means hope.

They greeted me with one word: "Merdeka" . . . "Freedom."

**I** challenge any American who asks for withdrawal within a Fortress America . . . who denounces foreign aid, to make the same journey and travel those roads.

Indonesia needs help. I return home determined to do my utmost to stimulate that help — not only by our own nation, but by others in the world who bear responsibility to the less fortunate. Indonesia doesn't ask for billions — she seeks only modest assistance. She asks for a little of our surplus food, some long-term loans, a few of our able technicians, and above all, our friendship and faith.

Will Indonesia make it? Despite its new leadership, the problems are staggering, the solutions yet to come. If it does not make it, the failure of a nation potentially equal in importance to India or Japan could bring fearful consequences both to southeast Asia and the United States.

If there is doubt today about the rightness of our presence or our involvement in Southeast Asia, I point to what has happened over these past few months and years in that part of the world.

**Behind the shield of power both of ourselves and our allies, the independent nations of Southeast Asia have withstood Communist pressure, have joined together in new regional development, have moved forward to provide peace and security to their citizens. Behind that shield, in fact, nations across the whole, broad Asian-Pacific arc — from Australia and New Zealand to the Philippines, Indonesia and Taiwan; from Korea and Japan to Thailand, Laos, Malaysia and Vietnam; to India and Pakistan — are joining**

**together to provide both security and peaceful development to their peoples.**

Should that shield now be removed?

Should we withdraw from the work of national security and national development in an area inhabited by over half the world's people?

Should we instead concentrate our attentions only on those nations which share a common Western cultural heritage with us . . . where the names and skin colors are more like our own?

I believe that to do so would be both short-sighted and dangerous.

There is no question what the leaders of Asia — in Vietnam, in Malaysia, in Indonesia, in the other countries I have visited these past three years think would be the result.

Without exception, they have told me that their governments, and their people, would be brought under immediate pressure — direct and indirect — to come to terms with the virulent, expansionist militant Asian communism which each of them has had to resist.

**I believe, therefore, that we should apply in Asia the same formula which we have so successfully applied since World War II in Europe and other parts of the world: The dual formula of national security and national development which enables independent nations to stand on their own feet . . . which deters potential aggressors to more peaceful paths.**

I believe that, if we do, we can see in Asia precisely the same process of consolidation, of regionalism, of peaceful growth that took place in Europe after World War II.

I believe that through such a policy, malignant Asian communism can be contained until its leaders change or choose a more moderate path.

I believe that, through such a policy, the energies, the aspirations and talents of vital

**peoples and civilizations can be channeled constructively into nation-building rather than violence and disorder.**

East is East. And West is West. But, in this dangerous nuclear age, the twain have met. It is at our own peril that we ignore this fact.

We have no choice but to stand strong and last it out — with both power and compassion — not only for those who strive for freedom in Asia but for the futures of our own American children.

**T**homas Paine put it well: "Those who expect to reap the blessings of freedom, must, like men, undergo the fatigue of supporting it."

As I said earlier, our progress is such in Vietnam that our adversary sooner or later must surely see the inevitable necessity of negotiation or withdrawal.

In this light, I believe we must continue with ingenuity and imagination every possible effort to find a way to a just and honorable peace — through the United Nations, through third parties, through religious leaders, through whatever means can possibly be of use.

**We cannot afford to be bogged down in old channels. We must, and will, consider each new initiative a fresh start.**

If we do, and if we persist in the dual tasks of national security and national development in Vietnam, and in Southeast Asia, I am convinced that the time can come when nations can live together in Asia without regard for ideology, in peace and diversity.

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Speech by Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey  
New York, N.Y., November 13, 1967  
to the  
Grocery Manufacturers of America, Inc.

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Democratic National Committee  
2600 Virginia Ave., N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20037

**Address by**  
**Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey**  
**Vice President of the United States**  
**to Grocery Manufacturers of America, Inc.**  
**in New York, N. Y.**  
**November 13, 1967**







A few days ago I returned from a mission, at the request of the President, to three nations of Southeast Asia. Today I wish to report to you the observations and conclusions which I bring home with me.

First, and most importantly, I come home with a reinforced belief that the safety, security and independence of the nations of Southeast Asia are critical to the safety, security and independence of the United States — and that this will be even more true in the years ahead.



#### SOUTHEAST ASIA'S SECURITY

Secondly, I am convinced that our present struggle in Vietnam is critical to the security of all of Southeast Asia.

I visited three nations in Southeast Asia: South Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

Each of these nations has its own distinctive character. But all share two vital common denominators:

- past and present resistance to Asian Communist pressure;
- urgent and priority efforts toward constructive nation-building.

These are the tasks in which we are helping — the tasks of national security and of national development, neither one of which can exist without the other.

And these are the tasks in which we must persist — or run the risk of chaos, disorder and war in a vast and strategic crossroads of the world.

#### CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT

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The Republic of Vietnam has not created overnight a carbon copy of American representative government. Nor should we either expect or want it to do so.

But it has succeeded in building for the first time in modern history — so far as I know — representative, civilian, constitutional government in the midst of war.



For those who would take this achievement for granted, I must point out that it took place in the face of calculated terrorism and disruption and amid warnings from a thousand directions that it could and would not happen.

A Constituent Assembly was freely elected.

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And a popularly elected government—elected in a voter turnout far higher than ours in the United States—was freely installed.

All these things were done despite wide-spread predictions that none of them could be done.

All these things were done by the Vietnamese themselves.

And today the Republic of Vietnam has something no Communist nation possesses: A government elected by the free votes of its people.

I met and talked at great length with President Thieu, with Vice President Ky, with leaders of the government and of the newly-elected Upper and Lower Houses. I met with non-governmental people, with students and labor leaders, with university professors and military officers.

It is clear that this new government will face massive problems. The war itself would be problem enough without the additional problems of young nationhood.

But I am reasonably encouraged by the determination and spirit of cooperation which I found among all these groups and people. And I believe they



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The next six months will be critical in this process—as a working relationship develops between the executive and legislative branches and as the Thieu-Ky government begins to follow-through on its plans and programs.

#### PROGRESS IN NATION-BUILDING

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#### DEDICATED YOUNG LEADERS

This program recruits young men—most largely unschooled “countryboys”—and trains them for responsible leadership.

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Through this program, the Vietnamese are not only building secure and stable communities and localities. They are also training future political and civic leaders and setting the foundations for long-term political and social health.

#### PROGRESS DESPITE OBSTACLES

The Vietnamese economic situation has also stabilized over 20 months ago. Inflation is under greater control—thanks in large part to massive importation of consumer and capital goods, strict U. S. and Vietnamese controls on piaster spending, devaluation last year, and increased taxation.



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The greatest and most obvious progress of all is our military progress.

I think we should remember that when our forces entered Vietnam in strength they were almost totally lacking in support facilities.

Today a full military infrastructure is nearly complete. A system of ports, airfields, communications and bases has been established.

With this infrastructure behind them, our troops have been able to concentrate over the past few months on fighting and defeating North Vietnamese main-force units.

#### SOUTH VIETNAM'S MILITARY PROGRESS

At the same time the South Vietnamese forces—both regular forces and regional and popular forces—are growing more competent. During my stay in Vietnam they achieved several victories over both North Vietnamese regular and Viet Cong units.

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We are now joined in Vietnam by more allied forces than joined us in Korea. The Koreans, Australians, New Zealanders and Thais have all performed well.

By all measures—roads opened, villages cleared, enemy casualties and desertions—we are winning militarily.

#### BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

What about the bombing? This is a question regularly asked here at home, but almost never in Vietnam.

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#### OUR HOME FRONT

There was one question I often heard from Americans in Vietnam, however. It was: "Why are we winning the war here and seem to be losing it at home?"

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It is particularly difficult when you read, as I do, the statements and captured documents of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong leadership—statements and documents which indicate that they believe their *only* hope of winning is through division, despair and defeatism on the American home front.

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#### DISSENT AND RESPONSIBILITY

As a long-time dissenter myself, I ask no American who dissents in good conscience to still his voice. But I do ask all Americans, before they dissent, to search their hearts . . . to examine the facts . . . to know the effect of what they say on our civilians and soldiers in Vietnam—and on our adversaries as well.

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#### CHOICES IN VIETNAM

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#### MALAYSIA'S SIGNIFICANCE

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Today Malaysia stands independent and strong. It has a stable government which is meeting the needs of its people through an integrated, national rural development program including the essentials of education, health, land reform, public works and vocational agriculture.

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#### PROGRESS IN INDONESIA

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I cannot overemphasize the critical importance to Southeast Asia and to us of this potentially-rich, strategically-situated nation of more than 100 million people.

Here, too, a crude and brutal attempt at Communist takeover had to be resisted and put down.

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Indonesia needs help. I return home determined to do my utmost to stimulate that help—not only by our own rich nation but by others in the world who bear responsibility to the less fortunate.

Will Indonesia make it? Despite its new leadership, the issue is very much in doubt.

If it does not make it, I am sure that its failure—the failure of a nation potentially equal in importance to India or Japan—could bring fearful consequences both to Southeast Asia and the United States.

#### U.S. SHIELD FOR FREE ASIA

If there is doubt today about the rightness of our presence or our involvement in Southeast Asia, I point to what has happened over these past few months and years in that part of the world.

Behind the temporary shield of power both of ourselves and our allies, the



independent nations of Southeast Asia have withstood Communist pressure, have joined together in new regional development, have moved forward to provide peace and security to their citizens.

Should that shield now be removed?

Should we withdraw from the work of national security and national development in an area inhabited by almost half the world's people?

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I believe that to do so would be both shortsighted and dangerous.

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#### **FUTURE OF INDEPENDENCE**

Without exception, they have told me that their governments, and their people, would be brought under immediate pressure—direct and indirect—to come to terms with the virulent, expansionist Asian communism which each of them has had to resist.

I believe, therefore, that we should apply in Southeast Asia the same formula which we have so successfully applied since World War II in Europe and other parts of the world: The dual formula of national security and national development which enables independent nations to stand on their own feet . . . which deters potential aggressors to more peaceful paths.

I believe that, if we do, we can see in Southeast Asia precisely the same process of consolidation, of regionalism, of peaceful growth that took place in Europe after World War II.

I believe that through such a policy, malignant Asian communism can be contained until its leaders change or choose a more moderate path.

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#### **THE BURDEN WE FACE**

We have no choice but to dig in and last it out—with both power and compassion—not only for those who strive for freedom in Asia but for the futures of our own American children.

Thomas Paine put it well: "Those who expect to reap the blessings of freedom, must, like men, undergo the fatigue of supporting it."

It will be difficult. But I believe we can, and shall.







Grocery Manufacturers of America, Inc.  
205 East 42nd Street  
New York, N. Y. 10017

# BRIDGING THE GAP IN OUR INNER CITIES

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

*Vice President of the United States*



Excerpts from an address to the  
National Businessmen's Council in New York, N.Y.  
November 16, 1967

A community's progress depends on its planning—planning by its own deeply-interested citizens.

This deep interest brings personal involvement and pride—pride that sparks initiative, action, growth.

Pride and progress go hand in hand, for community pride does not even admit to the possibility of failure.


At the core of the ghetto problem lies the lack of a community plan. Without it there is little interest, little involvement, little progress, little hope.

It is inevitable, for how can there be more than emptiness when there is no plan, promise or blueprint of a brighter future?

When local citizens and community leaders devise their plans, with the aid and support of the private sector, SBA stands ready and willing to help.

*R. C. Moot*

ROBERT C. MOOT,  
Administrator  
SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION



*"The mood and the needs that characterize the American slums of today are similar to those we find in underdeveloped countries all over the post-colonial world of Asia, Africa and Latin America."*



## BRIDGING THE GAP IN OUR INNER CITIES

Poverty and blighted opportunity in America are no longer the special preserve of social reformers, the charitably inclined, and struggling government agencies. The challenge they offer our cherished democratic principles has been taken up by a broader section of this society, and particularly by the business community.

The Urban Coalition says, *"All representatives of the private sector in the Urban Coalition decisively commit themselves to assist the deprived among us to achieve full participation in the economy as self-supporting citizens."*

### Private Industry Interested

The life insurance companies of America pledge a billion dollars to build low cost housing and finance enterprises that will create jobs in city core areas.

A responsible savings and loan official urges his industry to invest sixty billion dollars over the next twelve years in rebuilding the inner city—and he has found an enthusiastic audience.

Companies all over the United States have expressed interest in hiring and training the hard-core unemployed. Some say they are ready to put new factories in the inner city areas.

How significant is this new upsurge of civic spirit?

Professor Galbraith is doubtful. He thinks the economic incentive will not be strong enough to elicit a meaningful contribution from the private sector. He may have a point.

Michael Harrington, one of the great social critics of our time, is fearful: *"When business methods are sincerely and honestly applied to urban problems, with very good intentions,"* he says, *"they still inevitably lead to antisocial results . . . . What the cities need are 'uneconomic' allocations of resources."* There is truth here too.

### Civic Pride Plus

Hubert Humphrey is hopeful — cautiously hopeful.

Having talked with businessmen in nearly every state during the last year, I am convinced that we are seeing something much deeper than an ephemeral display of civic virtue. I have found a hard-headed and pragmatic determination to make a business-like assault on slumism.

Businessmen I have talked to are counting on support from governments at all levels to make their contribution financially feasible and acceptable to their stockholders—a partnership with the public sector. But they are also willing to take some risks.

It is the risk-takers of our free enterprise system who have given most Americans unprecedented prosperity; and risk-taking will be a critical ingredient in any successful assault on the complex disabilities which still shackle a seventh of the American people to poverty.

The dollars, the momentum and, yes, the determination are there as never before—but now let me tell you why I am only cautiously hopeful:

Those resources may very well molder in the gilded treasury of the establishment unless they are offered on terms acceptable to the poor minority of America.



## Inner City Needs

I can tell you from my own experience during the last few months that inner city communities and the minority leaders in this country are developing a rather clear idea of what they want. They need help, want help, and will gratefully accept it—but only if it promises the kind of progress they can make for themselves.

The mood and the needs that characterize the American slums of today are similar to those we find in underdeveloped countries all over the post-colonial world of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

People who have long suffered oppression are now claiming their place in the sun.

After decades of being badly served by schools, businesses, and public services run by “outsiders,” they want their voice. They want—and they deserve—the right to determine their own destiny through their own efforts.

There is fierce cultural pride, there are high ideals, there are abundant energies which can either build or explode.


And there are crippling shortages of almost everything but expectations.

Decades of second-class citizenship have left a dearth of managerial skill and political experience. The means of production are lacking. Interest rates are exorbitant because capital is scarce.

There is the usual quotient of human misery—ill-clad children, illiterate adults, pestilential housing, the ravages of unnecessary disease.

But through it all there is the burning vision of a better life—not just a little better, but radically better. And there is a proud, sometimes arrogant, even militant, determination that things must improve—now.

That mood was at first a serious obstacle in our foreign assistance programs. We did not fully recognize it as a critical source of energy, and considered it an expression of ingratitude.



The recipient nations, for their part, considered the technical advice and suggestions which are part of any responsible aid program to be inhibiting and demeaning “strings.” Only slowly have we achieved enough mutual understanding and respect to sustain the kind of hard bargaining that makes for constructive and efficient aid programs.

I regret to say that the level of mutual understanding between the developed and underdeveloped parts of American society seems to be lower than between this country and many of its less developed neighbors.

## Higher Level Training

Most of us have been thinking far too small when we talk, for example, about providing jobs. We usually have in mind jobs that are only one step better than living on welfare.

Let me tell you that there are plenty of unemployed, unskilled high school dropouts in the inner city today who have the potential to be executives, entrepreneurs, police chiefs, military officers, pilots, bank clerks, hairdressers, dental technicians, or switchboard operators. They know it, and their leaders know it.

Those youngsters want and need real, marketable skills, not minimal training. Any training program calculated to make them successful janitors and housemaids for the rest of their lives is simply not going to be acceptable.

And their first jobs, no matter how lowly, have to visibly and actually represent the first rung on the ladder of advancement. Even if they never reach the top, I believe the clear prospect of future progress is the only thing that can make an unsatisfactory present bearable.

Let me emphasize that the need for advancement opportunities is just as critical for the vast majority of Negroes and others who already hold jobs—but jobs that are dead-end.

## Minimum Housing Inadequate

I am afraid we are thinking small on housing, too. We tend to think of **minimum** housing as **adequate**.

How do you describe an adequate house?—as a place free of rats, a place where there is no rubbish in the halls, where there is hot and cold running water?

I don't. I describe it as a place that has enough space to give a family some privacy, where children have access to a park with grass and trees in it, where there are modern plumbing facilities and some comfortable furniture. And it is in an integrated neighborhood.

That is what we have to build toward if we want to solve the problem of slum housing.

The same goes for schools. We are wasting our time if we mean to improve the educational opportunities available to inner city youngsters just enough to insure that they will form a pool of cheap labor for the rest of their lives.

The only test of an adequate education that any Negro, Spanish-American or Mexican-American parent will accept today—and the only test America should accept—is this: Does my child have the same chance in life as the child of the average middle-class American?





## Goal is Equality

Now I don't want the American business community to say, "*Humphrey is upping the ante before we even begin to play.*" But if the American private sector, along with government, is going into the business of wiping out poverty and slums, we had better be prepared to accept goals which the people we want to help consider realistic. And we have to be ready to deal with those people not as wards but as equals. The emerging minority leaders, for their part, are going to have to exhibit the most deft kind of statesmanship if they hope to take advantage of the money, skill and good will that are now available to them within the American private sector.



Like leaders all over the developing world, they must both speak for the needs and feelings of their followers, keeping alive the distant vision of a better future, and at the same time deal pragmatically and responsibly with the harsh realities of the present.

They are going to have to convert frustrations and impatience into energies for progress rather than turmoil.

The temptation to be demagogic and self-indulgent is an occupational hazard of leaders in their position. I have just seen the results of that kind of leadership in the potentially rich country of Indonesia where a new government is now struggling painfully to make a fresh start amidst the half-finished, decaying monuments to one man's ego.

Vision is the mother of accomplishment; and slogans have their place. But they are a weak substitute for solid achievement.

You and I have been through some tough liberal battles together, and I know of no group in the American business community better equipped in spirit and understanding to go out and deal man to man with the inner city leadership of America today.

I think you are prepared to accept and support their aspirations and I think you can elicit their cooperation.

## Challenge to Business

So I am now going to issue a very specific challenge for action: Can you set some promising Negroes and Puerto Ricans up in business in their own neighborhoods?

If you can, you will have gone a long way toward bridging the gap between the resources of prosperous America and the aspirations of our disadvantaged minorities.

I believe the entrepreneurial energies are there—but the skills are not. The financing is available—but the mechanism for successfully putting it to work in ghetto-owned enterprises is not.

I am asking you to use your entrepreneurial skills and experience to develop a package of know-how and financing that will prime the pump—that will build viable enterprises from the available ingredients.

How do you tap a stable market with potential for expansion that will sustain a new inner city enterprise?

— By establishing small industries to produce items for your own firms?

— By winning federal or state procurement contracts for your own companies and then breaking them into manageable subcontracts for new satellite firms?

I know of a large Baltimore firm that issues eight thousand subcontracts a year—and not one of them goes to a Negro-owned firm because they just don't exist.

Where will you find your proteges? Will you seek people with management experience in large firms? Will you try radically to upgrade existing minority-owned shops?

How will you extend the technical assistance upon which your success is obviously going to depend?

What kind of enterprise will have the greatest economic impact on the ghetto? I am not talking about a poverty program, but I nevertheless hope you will emphasize products that can be sold outside the ghetto. Restaurants and other establishments which serve only the depressed area itself will produce no new income for neighborhoods that desperately need it. Like developing countries, ghettos need export earnings.

Can you build some job-training provisions into your new enterprises?

## Help from Government

The federal government can give you some help.

The Small Business Administration operates an active lending program for central cities which includes Economic Opportunity Loans on liberal terms.

Under broadened legislation enacted by Congress and signed by the President just last month, the Small Business Administration is prepared to guarantee leases of small businessmen in depressed areas.

Within the last few days, the SBA has decided to allow local development companies to borrow up to 90 per cent of the construction costs for small business plants to be established in high unemployment areas.

It will run training workshops for prospective small business owners. It offers management counseling through SCORE, the Service Corps of Retired Executives, which now has almost 200 chapters and over 3200 participants.

The Department of Labor is ready to help finance any reasonable job training program.

Mr. William Zisch, now on loan to the Department of Commerce from Aerojet General, is prepared to call a meeting of all appropriate government agencies at your request, find out what kind of support you need to provide job opportunities, and issue tentative commitments on the spot.

## Can We Do More?

What more can you suggest? How can we better use the purchasing power of federal contracts to support new companies in depressed areas? How can we expand federal guarantees, which cost the government very little, to stimulate private financing of ghetto-based enterprises?



Would tax incentives provide an equitable and effective stimulus to the kind of projects we are talking about?

There is government-owned land standing idle in nearly every city in America. How can we make it a productive asset?

This nation must apply the same ingenuity and creative energy to the problem of putting the inner cities on their feet that it has applied to building a free enterprise system which serves the public interests—and we can afford even less trial and error.

Yours will not be an easy task. If you are going to win confidence, you will have to work from the very beginning as equal partners with people whose background is very different from yours.

You will not need to be charitable—the time for that has passed. You can be hard-nosed and realistic. You can be perfectly frank. Above all you must be infinitely creative.

## Good Citizenship, Good Economics

If you succeed, you will have done much more than provide new employment opportunities and new incomes—something you could have done by putting a plant of your own in a depressed neighborhood.

You will have developed a dramatic new formula for private sector participation in the War on Poverty—a formula which can serve as an example for hundreds of similar ventures throughout the country.

You will have given some individual Americans a full and equal chance, as well as the help they need, to reach the top; and through those leaders you will have served the aspirations of an entire community.

You will have proven that the American free enterprise system can produce not only plenty, but full and equal opportunity for all.

Real opportunity for every American, a stake in society—that is good public policy. As John Stuart Mill wrote, “*Let a man have nothing to do for his country and he will have no love for it.*”

It is good economics. Some 15 per cent of the American people today are neither adequate producers nor effective consumers. They are also poor taxpayers.

They need houses, furniture, clothes, food, and everything else the majority of American families consume every day. They are America's new economic frontier, if we can but tap their strength, and their creative energies.

And, finally, helping others to help themselves, sharing abundance with those who have too little—that is good morals.

In the words of Thomas Wolfe, “*To every man his chance, to every man, regardless of his birth, his shining, golden opportunity. To every man the right to live, to work, to be himself. And to become whatever things his manhood and his vision can combine to make him. This . . . is the promise of America.*”



## **Concluding remarks at the meeting by Eugene Lang, National Businessmen's Council:**

For the economically disenfranchised, we must supply opportunities that can permit an inherently able inner city resident to become the peer of any man in this room. More than that, we must provide the know-how, experience, and guidance, to help make these opportunities come alive. The immensity of the total problem may well intimidate any organization of government or industry, let alone individual businessmen, but Mr. Vice President, the National Businessmen's Council has resolved not to be intimidated. A democratic society and a free enterprise economy demand that we maintain faith in the capacity of the individual.

Each businessman in this room lives this truism. So, in facing the total inner city problem, in all of its immensity, I need but recall President Kennedy's restatement of a Chinese proverb: "That the voyage of a thousand miles starts with a single step."

Mr. Vice President, we accept your challenge and, enthused by your support, I can tell you that the National Businessmen's Council is ready to take that step now. In fact, we now pledge you at least three steps, a three-part program.

By June 30, 1968, the National Businessmen's Council will initiate and sponsor the creation of at least three new manufacturing enterprises in inner city areas of New York.

Each of these will be founded on a viable business concept, that will be developed with the technical and management guidance of NBMC members, and each will be owned by inner city residents, with the desire and the inherent ability to succeed as entrepreneurs. Each will start small, but each as a venture that will have the capacity for permanence and growth, along with the abilities of their indigenous owners. Second, by the end of 1968, the National Businessmen's Council will establish at least 50 manufacturing concepts that we consider workable in our inner city areas. With these concepts, we will try to bring together all of the facilities and advantages that you have set forth. We will try to bring together the technical know-how, the management ability, the capital and markets, all elements that together with local ambitions, can foster the export expansion

of our underprivileged communities. In this effort, we will seek help from our business world and from government at all levels.

And in this regard, I am happy to report that Mayor Lindsay has assured us that as part of his economic development program, we will receive the fullest cooperation of the city, and I would like at this point to read this telegram that I received earlier from the Mayor:

*"Because of a previous commitment, Commissioner Lewisohn and I regret that we will not be able to be with you at your luncheon on November 16th. I have asked Commissioner Ganz to represent the city."* Commissioner Ganz is the Manpower Commissioner.

*"New York City is vitally interested in the development of entrepreneurial talent in minority communities. The city's Department of Commerce and Industrial Development, under the leadership of Commissioner Lewisohn is planning a major program for promotion of local business ownerships. The proposed project of the National Businessmen's Council will help to provide the much-needed assistance of private industry, without which the city's efforts could not succeed. The City and the Council must continue to cooperate to make these programs effective. Please accept my congratulations and best wishes for success. John V. Lindsay, Mayor."*

Third, the National Businessmen's Council is setting up a Vice President's Committee for Community Export Expansion. This Committee will serve as a clearinghouse for businessmen who accept your challenge. It will cooperate with the agencies of government and with other business groups which wish to set up similar projects. In fact, in the same evangelical fervor that you have shown, I would like to start to do some recruiting right here and now.

I would ask that any businessman, all businessmen in this room, who would like to work with us on our Vice President's Committee or independently, to let us know.

We need your ideas and support, and I promise you a satisfactory and rewarding experience. Mr. Vice President, there is a time for surveys and broad-gauged planning, but the prospective entrepreneurs of the ghetto should not have to wait.

Each new entrepreneur is the yeast that will breed its own culture of economic development. There is a time for words of appreciation and thanks, and that time is now, except that we are giving you more than words. The National Businessmen's Council proposes action and results. We know that our program is not easy, and that we will surely stub our toes, many times, along the way.

If it becomes too painful, we will come to you, not to cry but to regenerate the enthusiastic sense of purpose that you have instilled in us today. Thank you, Mr. Vice President.

**SBA/OPI-44**



EXCERPTS FROM  
REMARKS AND A QUESTION PERIOD ON  
SOUTHEAST ASIA POLICY

HONORABLE HUBERT H. HUMPHREY  
VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

BEFORE THE  
STATE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

MINNESOTA DEMOCRATIC FARMER-LABOR PARTY

DECEMBER 9, 1967

I address myself to Democrats -- all kinds of Democrats, regular, irregular, liberal, conservative, dissenting and concerned.

Actually, most of our citizens are concerned. They are concerned about their country. They are concerned about this world. They are concerned about their jobs. And they are concerned about their health, and their community, and their farms, and about the directions in which we may be headed here at home and throughout the world. And most of them are concerned about the future and what lies ahead for their children.

Being concerned is not the special prerogative of any single party or any single group or any single individual. I believe that the word "concerned" however is an accurate description of the leadership of this country.

We've been concerned about the education of our children, particularly the deprived. And we have acted as never before in the history of this country.

We've been concerned about the health of our citizens, all of our citizens, young and old.

And we've been concerned about the environment that surrounds us, the poisonous and dangerous pollution of water and air. And we have acted.

We've been concerned about the steady economic growth of this Nation and the stability of the dollar. And we have acted.

We've been concerned about the plight of our cities, and we're taking action. We've been concerned about the difficulties facing our rural people, and we are acting.

And we've been concerned, above all, about discrimination and racial injustice, and we have acted.

We've been concerned about the protection of the consumer, and we have acted. And we've been concerned about the well-being of the underprivileged and the left-out, and the mentally retarded and the disturbed, and of all too many Americans who do not share in the blessings of this great country. And, my fellow Americans, we have taken action to do something about it.

There is no person in this room who believes that we have done enough. The story of our country is not its ultimate achievements but its glorious beginnings. Just remember the words of our great Presidents, men like Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who reminded us that all we had to fear was fear itself, and who asked us to stand up and put America on its feet once again.

And John Kennedy, who said, "Let's get this country moving again. Let us begin."

And Lyndon Johnson, who said to us, "Let us continue," and "build a Great Society."

Yes, this has been a time of great concern in America. But it has been equally a time of concern for our responsibilities to others in the world around us. Long ago we learned a lesson that you cannot live by yourself. Isolationism is not only politically disastrous, it is morally wrong. In this, the age of nuclear weapons, the option of "America first, and others take care of themselves" not only runs contrary to our principles of morality, but imperils our own security.

We do have world responsibilities. They are not to serve as self-appointed global policemen. They are not to impose our will in any and all situations across the map. They are not to remake the world in our image.

But our responsibilities are to use this gift of our wealth, our strength, our influence in those situations where we believe that world peace and security and our own vital interests are involved. The ultimate objective of this Nation is to secure a just and enduring peace, to help create those conditions in which peace can live.

In practical terms, it has meant NATO and SEATO. It has meant a full and unremitting commitment to the United Nations. It has meant our support for the political-economic union of Western Europe. It has meant our leadership in widening trade and economic growth around the world.

It has meant the Peace Corps, Food for Peace, the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, bridge-building with the nations of Eastern Europe, and peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union.

None of it came easily. All of it was bitterly opposed. It has meant, too, the necessity of firmness, even to the point of



nuclear danger, in Berlin, in military aid to Greece and Turkey, in the support of Iran when their independence was threatened, in resistance to open Communist aggression in Korea, and the decision that the Soviet Union could not place her nuclear missiles in the Western Hemisphere. Every one of these decisions was fraught with frightful danger. Any one could have exploded into tragic war; one actually resulted in one of the bloodiest wars of our history, in Korea.

These world responsibilities have meant, in other cases, peace-keeping and peace-making efforts, both on our own and with other nations in international organizations, in such places as Lebanon, in the Congo, the Dominican Republic, and now, in recent weeks, Cyprus where the danger of a major conflict that could have burst into World War III was averted by your President and his emissary.

In the past few months alone we've not only involved ourselves as peace-makers in Cyprus, but also in new efforts toward economic cooperation and integration in Africa, Asia and Latin America; in critical initiatives towards a nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and a slow-down of the arms race.

And then we have been involved in that drab, gray, but necessary work of world monetary reform; in the successful Kennedy Round trade negotiations, which we opened the way for a freer and faster growing world economy; in new outer space and consular treaties which have eased tensions among the super powers.

We have been involved, too, in that part of the world known as Southeast Asia and Vietnam.

As you know, I recently returned from a mission to three Southeast Asian countries -- Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam. This was my fifth journey, my fifth mission into Asia.

Each of these three nations has a distinctive character, but all share two common denominators. First ---- all have had first-hand, hard, not theoretical, experience, with Asian Communist subversion and aggression on a life or death basis.

Communist aggression is not a subject of academic discussion in Malaysia. They fought the Communists for twelve long years. Nor is it a subject of academic discussion in any part of Asia, where they face the constant threat of expansionist, militant Asian communism.

The second common denominator of these countries is that they have all launched urgent priority programs of peaceful development and constructive nation-building in their own countries.

And these are tasks in which we are helping, the task of national security and national development, neither of which can exist without the other. And I stress that it isn't good enough just to want to help build merely the military power of a country. It has to have a social and political and economic base. National security and national development -- one and inseparable.

Wherever I have been, without exception, free Asian leaders have made it clear that if we were to abandon our role in Asia, were we to pull back before they could fully stand on their own feet, they would be under immediate pressure to come to terms with the Asian communism which they have resisted for over twenty years. Every leader tells us this.

We are talking about the hard facts today, of communist aggression and subversion that threatens across a vast continent. And we are talking about a regime in mainland China which soon can be armed with nuclear weapons, which preaches and believes, regrettably, the dogma cynically misnamed, "war of national liberation."

What I do propose is that we follow in Asia the same course which we so successfully followed in Europe, a dual policy of firmness and a willingness to peacefully coexist. That is why I have talked of "containment without isolation" of Communist China. That is why our President has advocated reconciliation and peaceful development of an entire continent without regard to ideology.

And that is why we are in Vietnam, using our power with the utmost restraint for clear and limited goals. We are avoiding the easier, but I think the much more dangerous, options of either withdrawal or of using those weapons of mass destruction that could bring on the holocaust of World War III.

Now, let me make myself clear. This country and this political party are big enough for differences of opinion on Vietnam; big enough to accommodate different views on this issue.

Nor is our party a one-issue party, unless that issue is our uncompromising commitment to human rights, and to the idea that men should be free of all tyranny.

But we who bear the responsibility for decision must carefully examine the various policy options available in each situation, weigh the consequences of each possible course, none of which satisfies all of our requirements; and then decide, act, as painful as that decision and action may be.

You are members of the governing party in this country, my fellow Democrats. We're responsible in a large measure for the course of history of this country. And while it is entirely fitting and proper and, indeed essential, that there be discussion, dialogue and debate, there comes an hour when you must decide. And decision-making is the difficult assignment.

We must decide. We must choose the options. And we do the best that we know how.

It is especially important that those in our party who prize dissent, as I do, who properly defend each man's right to disagree, should, if they cannot agree with some aspect of a given policy, clearly detail and enunciate the alternative policy courses and actions which they favor.

For I believe that with each right comes a responsibility. The responsibility to come forth with positive constructive alternatives is the other side of the coin of disagreement.

Now there have been questions raised, even among those who acknowledge the critical importance of Southeast Asia, as to whether or not Vietnam is important in this larger scheme. Would the loss of Vietnam have any effect on the rest of Asia?

The leaders of free Asia believe that it would. For example, only recently the Prime Minister of Japan who, for a long period of time, had stood by, hands off, unqualifiedly stated at the National Press Club in Washington, that our presence in Vietnam was considered by the Asian leaders with whom he had visited to be vital to their security and independence.

Many of these nations have sent troops and non-military assistance to South Vietnam. And I might add, there are more troops and assistance from other nations in South Vietnam than were present in Korea.

Now, what about our own American leaders, men in whom we've placed our trust? President John Kennedy put it this way, in September, 1963, when interviewed by the NBC Commentator, David Brinkley:

Mr. Brinkley said: "Mr. President, have you any reason to doubt this so-called domino theory, that if South Vietnam falls, the rest of Southeast Asia will go behind it?"

Now I give you the exact words of President Kennedy:

"No, I believe it. I believe it. I think that the struggle is close enough. China is so large, looms so high, just



beyond the frontiers, that if South Vietnam went, it would not only give them an improved geographic position for a guerrilla assault on Malaya, but would also give the impression that the wave of the future in Southeast Asia was China and the Communists. So I believe it."

Adlai Stevenson sent Vice President Humphrey a note on November 31, 1964, enclosing a copy of an official memorandum to our government. Here are the exact words of Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson:

"The principal threat to world peace and world security in the foreseeable future will almost certainly be Communist China. It is arrogant, aggressive, resourceful and resolute. It is already stronger militarily than any other state in Asia except the Soviet Union. And its military strength, including its ability to make and deliver nuclear weapons, is likely to grow much faster than has been forecast. Politically, its prestige among the colored peoples as the most powerful and successful colored nation will prosper, and it will use that prestige and a disproportionate share of its resources to extend its influence and to create maximum disorder in Asia and Africa."

Neither President Kennedy nor Ambassador Stevenson was unconcerned about Vietnam and China. Both of them saw the threat.

And I wish to quote from one of our very distinguished Senators and fellow citizens, as he recently defined his goal of peace in Vietnam:

"I am for an honorable, rational political solution of this war, a solution which I believe would enhance our world position, encourage the respect of our allies and political adversaries, which will permit us to give the necessary attention to other commitments at home and abroad, military and non-military, and leave us with resources and moral energy to deal effectively with the pressing domestic problems of the United States, itself."

Ladies and gentlemen, that is also a good statement of the position of the Administration.

President Johnson, speaking of Vietnam, said that we are united in our determination that the South Vietnamese people shall not be conquered by aggressive force and shall enjoy the inherent right to choose their own way of life and their own form of government.

Then, he went on to state our objectives in Asia, and I think we need to understand what they are. "The peace we seek in Asia," said President Johnson, "is a peace of conciliation; between Communist states and non-Communist states and non-Communist neighbors; between rich nations and poor; between small nations and large; between men whose skins are brown and black and yellow and white; between Hindus and Moslems and Buddhists and Christians.

"It is a peace that can only be sustained through the durable bonds of peace; through international trade; through the free flow of people and ideas; through full participation by all nations in an international community under law; and through a common dedication to the great tasks of human progress and economic development."

That's the goal of your country. That's the commitment of this nation. We have sought ceaselessly to achieve that peace. On four separate occasions, as your Vice President, I went to leaders of Asia with this message; to the President of India, to the President of Pakistan, to country after country, seeking their good offices, only to be told again and again that there was no answer from Hanoi, that there was no response.

Thus far, our adversary has turned us down, as he has turned down everyone else -- the United Nations, the Pope, and third parties around the world. But we will not stop trying. We are going to pursue this noble goal of a just peace.

But as we persist diplomatically, we must also persist in turning back the aggression in South Vietnam. We cannot afford to regard the struggle in Vietnam as Neville Chamberlain regarded Hitler's conquest of Czechoslovakia, when he called it, "a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing."

Surely this party and this great country have learned the lessons of the thirties. Surely we have learned that the appetite of the aggressor is insatiable. Surely we have learned that appeasement does not bring peace. Surely we have learned that only by firmness and resolution can we walk forward in the path of peace.

Our nation has learned the cost of deferring manageable troubles until they become unmanageable. I am not one who believes that we ought to get Armageddon on the installment plan by backing up.

So I welcome questioning. I welcome discussion here as I have across this land. My only request is this: Let us be responsible citizens. Let our arguments be reasonable and

thoughtful and let us take into account the realities of what we face, that the stakes for our country are mighty high. We ought not to play loosely with the destiny of what Lincoln well called, and what we know to be, "This last best hope on earth."

I welcome your questions.

QUESTION: What are the vital interests of the United States that justify the presence of 500,000 troops in Vietnam and the expenditure of \$25 billion or more annually for the war in Vietnam?

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: Well, I believe that in part that question was answered in my prepared remarks. President Kennedy himself made it quite clear that we had a great vital interest in terms of our own national security in Vietnam, and Southeast Asia, because Southeast Asia is a very critical part of the world. It is an area of over 200 million people, with the fifth largest nation in the world in that area, Indonesia.

The leaders of countries like Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Laos -- all seem to feel, as Prime Minister Lee of Singapore said, that our presence in Vietnam gives free Asia time to remain free and to develop their own capacity to be free.

Now let me ask you to ponder this for a moment: What do you think would happen in this world if the United States of America, having made a solemn treaty commitment of mutual assistance, were to violate that treaty.

Just let me take you to another part of the world. What do you think would happen in Western Europe tomorrow if the United States publicly announced that our stand in Berlin wasn't worth it? And, by the way, Berlin is much more indefensible from our point of view, much more dangerous than Saigon. It is a hundred miles inside Communist territory. It is a divided city. And I have yet to hear a prominent American of either party say that the United States of America should not fulfill its commitment to Berlin.

One of the first acts of President Kennedy in 1961 was to call up 250,000 Reserves and to send 50,000 additional Americans to Europe for the defense of Berlin. And because he did it and did it promptly, and because the Soviet Union is a responsible power that recognizes our power and determination, the Soviet Union did not press its case.



But the day that we fail to fulfill our commitments, on that day the world has the signal that the aggressor has free hunting.

So I believe that our commitment in South Vietnam is vital to our national interests. I think it is vital to world peace. Our objective there is to find, to help build a world of peace. I think that South Vietnam has a strategic importance in Asia. And if you were in Australia and New Zealand, countries with which we have alliance; if you were in Malaysia or Indonesia, countries today that face Communist attack, you would readily understand the importance of our commitment of over 400,000 troops in Vietnam and an expenditure of around \$25 billion annually in that struggle.

The money is not the painful thing. What is really tragic is the loss of human life. That is what bothers us. This is a rich country, but a country is never rich enough to lose its men. It is necessary sometimes, but that is a tragic loss.

And may I say this to my fellow Democrats, if you want peace -- and I know you do -- just imagine how much your President wants it!

Just keep in mind that the President of the United States has to bear the awful burden of having committed men to battle.

The leader of our country wants peace more than any man that I can think of, and he will walk the extra mile to get it. But we think we have learned some lessons. We doubt that there would be peace if you simply gave up in Vietnam.

The Prime Minister of Malaysia said to me less than a month ago, "Mr. Vice President, I have but one question to ask you: Are you going to stay in Vietnam?" "Because," he said, "if you are not, then there is no hope for Malaysia. All of our effort goes for naught. For twelve long years, Mr. Vice President, we fought the Communists." And the Deputy Prime Minister pointed out into a field nearby and he said, "In that very field, Mr. Vice President, a member of my family was assassinated by the Communists." He said, "We know what it is. But if the United States of America is going to back away, if you are going to relax your resolve, then you can write off all of Southeast Asia."

What do you think that would mean to India? What do you think it would mean to the Philippines? What do you think it would mean to Australia?

And I must say that I was intrigued not long ago when a very fine American, a man whose friendship I have valued over the years, said that he thought that our defense line ought to be

in Australia. The Prime Minister of Australia said, "If you don't mind, I would like to pick the place where we do our fighting."

And I ask you: What is more moral about fighting in Australia than fighting in Vietnam?

I happen to think it is immoral to let the weak be overwhelmed by the brute.

QUESTION: Mr. Vice President, do our interests in Vietnam justify the diversion of resources and the attention of our national leaders from our most urgent domestic problems?

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: Our interests in Vietnam and our commitments there, under treaty, under the Charter of the United Nations, under SEATO, under our mutual assistance guarantees, do justify our position in Vietnam; that is number one.

I regret that we have to divert resources to any kind of military buildup. All of my life in public service I have worked for a sensible program of disarmament, as the author of the disarmament agency, and one of the co-authors of the nuclear test-ban treaty, for example. One of the tragedies of our time is the vast utilization of resources and men in weaponry.

But sometimes we are not given a choice. To look coldly at the dollar costs of Vietnam, we're spending about 9 percent of our gross national product today on our total defense bill. In 1958 we were spending 10 percent. So in terms of whether we can afford it monetarily, that is not the question. The question is do we have the will and the determination to see it through?

Now what about the domestic programs? I know the argument is made repeatedly, that if we weren't in Vietnam we would be doing so many other things. Well, I was in Congress when the war was over in Korea. And when that war was over, even with a Democratic Congress, we reduced the taxes. We had no war on poverty, we had no Medicare, we had no expanded education program -- in fact, what we did was cut back!

Now there were more poor in America in 1956 than there are in 1966 and 1967. There were old people in America who had poor health care in the 1950's. But they had no health program and they got no health program. Now what has this administration done?

This administration has increased our investments in federal aid to education, from 1960, where they stood at \$3 billion, to \$12.2 billion in 1967.

This administration has increased our investments in health care from 1963 from \$4.5 billion to over \$9 billion in 1967. I think that we have demonstrated that we are concerned about the needs on the home front.

And, let me remind you that, we're having a mighty difficult time getting as modest a proposal through the Congress right now as a \$40 million rent supplement bill. I doubt that rent supplement bill would slip through any easier if we had a smaller defense budget.

I will tell you what happened to the Congress; it isn't Vietnam. It is that we lost forty-seven seats in 1966. That is what happened to Congress.

So my answer is that while the resources we have to devote to our defense and to this struggle in Vietnam are substantial, we have also been able to mobilize resources in this country for some of the greatest social endeavors that America has ever known, opening doors of opportunity that have been locked shut for better than a century. We have made some substantial breakthroughs.

And here is what I want to ask this party: This war will be over, and, pray God, it will be over very, very soon...but I want to make this prediction to you: when this struggle is over, then the political struggle on the home front will be something to be concerned about. Because then there will be the cutback artists. Then there will be those who say, "Oh, you can't go too fast and too far." There will be those who say we ought not to spend for this and for that. As a matter of fact, you will have the fight of your life. And I hope when this struggle is over and I get my sign -- and I will be out here picketing a bit --

When I put my sign up and say, "Follow me for the doubling our federal aid to education, follow me for the doubling or more of our aid to our cities," I hope I have a party behind me that is united and that will win elections on these issues.

QUESTION: Mr. Vice President, is not the failure of the South Vietnamese to do more, in fact much more for themselves, including fighting in their own defense, evidence of the unpopularity of our cause in South Vietnam?

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: I want to refresh your memory for a minute. There are men in this room who were veterans of the Korean war. What did we say about the Korean army at that time? We weren't very complimentary and there was grave doubt expressed time after time in the American press through quotations of prominent American officials and others as to whether we ought



to even be in Korea. In fact, the Korean army was less than a good fighting force. The government was corrupt. There were many more than a half dozen military coups. And earlier in the war we were practically driven out. But we stayed, and today the Korean army is one of the most combat-effective military establishments in the world. Today, in Korea, there is a miracle of economic breakthrough. Today, in Korea, there is a greatly expanded program of education. Korea stands today as a monumental success.

But I venture to say, if you will go to your local library and take a look at the papers ten years ago, you will read the following: "Korea, America's massive mistake;" "Korea, a hopeless mess." 1957 headlines.

I attended the inaugural of President Park of Korea last year. I saw a nation on the move and I saw a nation that can give a good accounting of itself, which is taking leadership all over Asia, in regional, economic, and social development.

Now, let's take a look at Vietnam. Vietnam has suffered a thousand years of Mandarin Rule, and a hundred years of French colonialism -- which surely didn't help it.

Vietnam has had twenty-seven years of struggle since 1940. Since 1964, exclusive of the village chiefs and leaders who have been assassinated by the Viet Cong, 58,000 of their armed forces have died on the field of battle.

Now, if you translate that into proportionate terms relating to the American population, that is equivalent to 850,000 fatalities. We have presently lost 15,000. The number of wounded, seriously wounded -- but if translated into American terms in proportion to population, would be over two million.

South Vietnam has one out of every six male adults in its armed services, right now. It has a military establishment of over 700,000 men and is putting 65,000 more men in uniform January 1968. It has lowered the draft age to 18.

The desertion rate, which was high -- which is something that many of our critics talked about -- was very high. It has been cut in half. And during the last few months, under the guidance of General Abrams, one of our most capable military officers, an intensive program of training in guerrilla warfare has been instituted. And that army is doing a better job.

While I was in Saigon, the ARVN, (the Army of the Republic of Vietnam) gave smashing defeats on three occasions to North Vietnamese forces within twenty and thirty kilometers of Saigon. We intercepted documents from the North Vietnamese that called upon their forces and the Viet Cong to intensify their attacks, even suicidal attacks, starting with the inaugural of the President and Vice President of the Republic of Vietnam. I was within seventy-five yards of a mortar attack on the Presidential Palace on the night of the inaugural reception.

The Army of the Republic of Vietnam is good in some areas, poor in others. In the Demilitarized Zone, its battalions are fighting brilliantly. I awarded a Presidential Unit Citation to the officers of airborne ARVN battalion in the DMZ. General Walt, of the Marine Corps, the man who was in charge of the 1st Corps area in the Northern part of Vietnam, came back to the United States and said, "I couldn't believe what I was reading." He said, "Mr. Vice President, it is nothing short of a national tragedy that the facts are not being reported properly on the Army of South Vietnam."

So, let me just put it this way: There is much improvement needed yet in the ARVN, much, as there was in the armies of Korea. There is much improvement that yet needs to be taken in the government and in the pacification program. We have to be honest with each other.

But this is a country that has been terrorized for years, and let's look at its record:

Five elections, five free elections since September 1966, in a country torn by war. No other country involved in a war on its territory has held free elections. They have always had a sort of emergency period, with no elections. This government of South Vietnam, at our strong urging, held an election for a constituent assembly, to write a constitution. And the cynics said it never would happen. But it did.

And when the assembly was to be elected, they said that it would be a mouthpiece for Ky.

But it wasn't.

And they said if they wrote a constitution, the military directorate would never accept it.

But it did.

And then they said when they had written the constitution, and it was accepted, there would never be an election.

But there was.

Now, my fellow Americans, I am not here to tell you that those elections were simon pure. Obviously, there are discrepancies in elections even in the State of Minnesota.

But I will say this, that there have been more elections in South Vietnam than in North Vietnam.

And I will say this, we ought to encourage people who hold elections and we ought not to downgrade it.

Now what else? The pacification program. I was first in Vietnam in February 1966, and I would like to use that as a base point. In February 1966 they were talking about a pacification program. They were talking about revolutionary development. They were talking about training young people to go on out and rebuild their country -- talking about it.

I was there this year, in November 1967, and I went to their National Training Center at Vung Tau. There they have trained 30,000 revolutionary development "cadre" and sent them back into the villages and hamlets to help develop local self-government (which the French had destroyed) to help develop their economy, to rebuild and defend their villages. By the end of this coming year there will be 75,000 of them.

In the meantime the government of Vietnam has just ordered many of its military leaders to attend the same training school, so that they get a political indoctrination into the new purpose of Vietnam. They have ordered the hamlet chiefs and the province chiefs to go to this training school.



The South Vietnamese have kept their inflation under reasonable control. And there is tremendous development that has taken place in this country in the agricultural areas. 360-some cooperatives have been organized in the last two years in rural cooperatives. The first rural electric -- the first REA -- in Southeast Asia has been established in South Vietnam. Seven thousand new classrooms have been built. The enrollment of children in elementary and secondary education is up 300 per cent. For the first time, the children of South Vietnam have textbooks in their schools. And it has all been done under war-time conditions.

I wish more were done. I wish there were greater progress. I wish that it were all complete. I can only tell you this, that the best way to get it done is to encourage these people, to give them a pat on the back when they do a good job, and to demand of their government, as we are, that they rid their country as much as it is humanly possible of corruption, a very serious problem.

I might mention that most countries that have gone through a colonial experience do not come out of it very pure. All colonial powers did not develop a sense of civic responsibility among the people.

This country is beginning to see its way and, with our help and the help of others, I think it will find its way.

QUESTION: Mr. Vice President, is our current military strategy consistent with our aims in Vietnam; in particular, is it not apparent that our bombing of North Vietnam is no longer serving any useful purpose but may be hardening the resolve of North Vietnam against a negotiated settlement?

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: Those are very thoughtful questions.

What is our current military strategy? It is to assist the South Vietnamese to defend themselves against armed attack. That is number one, to meet and to destroy the main-line units of the enemy, of North Vietnam and the Viet Cong; that is number one.

Number two, our military strategy is to aid in securing the area, not only to search and destroy, but to take and hold. That is what we call pacification. That is a somewhat unfortunate word. There is nothing very "pacific" about pacification.

The Army of Vietnam, about half of which is now assigned to pacification, finds itself under constant and vicious attack. The task is security of the village, security of the countryside.

So we have two military objectives, to provide security in the countryside vital to the pacification process and to continue to drive the enemy main force units back out of the country or into the mountains and jungle regions. Now those are the two military objectives.

In 1965 I think it is fair to say that the tide of battle was incontrovertibly with the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese. Today the tide of battle is uncontestably with the allies, with South Vietnam, the United States and our allies. There isn't any doubt about it. North Vietnam and the Viet Cong have no chance of winning this war. They can't win militarily. But this is not just a military war. This is also a political struggle, and our military objectives are tailored to very specific commitments and political objectives -- to provide a secure base in South Vietnam for their own self-determination and their own social, economic and political development.

Now about the bombing, the most controversial matter of all. And may I say in all respect to those who have disagreed on the bombing -- there is honest argument on this bombing question. North Vietnam demands our unconditional, permanent cessation of the bombardment of the North with only possibly, only hopefully, maybe, they might then talk. No offers to stop shelling our troops, no reciprocity.

The bombing of North Vietnam has never been considered an alternative, or substitute for the war in the South. The use of air power in North Vietnam is two-fold: first, to slow down infiltration to the South of men and material; and, secondly, to make it clear to the Hanoi regime that they have to pay a price for their aggression upon the South.

Now has it had any effect? We think so. In the last Tet truce, (the Vietnamese New Year) when we halted bombing, more supplies were moved in the four days of that period than were moved in any two months prior. As a matter of fact, during that period of Tet, the North Vietnamese big guns which have since been bombarding South of the DMZ were moved into position. And enormous supplies of munitions were brought forward, free of air attack.

Now there are those who say that we believe the bombing will win the war. We have never made any such contention. But we do think that it is having an effect upon North Vietnam, compelling them to use large amounts of their manpower, some half million of their population to repair roads and bridges; it has slowed down their infiltration, and made it more costly and difficult for them.

And then I want to ask you the question: What is more immoral -- a bomb being dropped from a plane, or a gun shooting over a border in a large artillery barrage, or a Viet Cong mine or hand grenade or mortar attack near Saigon? It is all bombardment.

Finally, I think you ought to remember that your government has halted the bombing on six separate occasions. I have been in on those decisions. The last of those occasions lasted for thirty-seven days, and we didn't get a wiggle. We didn't get a nibble. We have never had a responsible response from any representative of North Vietnam or the Viet Cong during any of the six bombing pauses, despite all the headline stories to the contrary.

President Johnson said at San Antonio recently that we were prepared to stop the bombardment of the North if such will lead to "prompt and productive discussion," in other words, negotiations -- assuming that North Vietnam will not take military advantage of that bombing halt.

And what did North Vietnam reply? They said it was a farce, it was a trick; they rejected it out of hand. They've rejected the Holy Father by open letter. They rejected the President of the United States by open letter. They rejected Mr. Kosygin. They rejected President Radhakrishnan of India. They rejected the seventeen noncommitted nations.

Last February the United Nations Secretary General made his standdown proposal that all military forces stand down, that there be a reciprocal cease-fire. Your government accepted it. It was rejected by the enemy. They have rejected every single peace proposal that has been made.



Ladies and gentlemen, the roadblock to peace is not in Washington. The roadblock to peace is in Hanoi. And those who want peace, as I want it, ought to bring their moral pressure upon those who commit the immoral act of aggression from Hanoi. Then maybe we would get some peace.

QUESTION: Mr. Vice President, in the context of our full and unrelenting commitment to the United Nations, why have we continued our largely unilateral commitment in Vietnam without fervently seeking the full support and involvement of the United Nations?

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: Well, first of all, in the instance of the action of the Gulf of Tonkin we did go to the United Nations. Let's clear the record. In August, 1964, we went to the United Nations. And what happened? North Vietnam said that they did not consider the United Nations to have any jurisdiction in this matter at all and refused even to discuss it.

In February, last year, Ambassador Arthur Goldberg presented an American resolution to the U. N. Security Council, to involve the Security Council in peacemaking, in peace probing and peace finding in Vietnam. That resolution has never been acted upon, primarily because the Soviet Union has not wanted that kind of a debate in the Security Council. Mr. Goldberg renewed that resolution in September of this year.

More recently the United States Senate, by resolution, unanimously adopted, asked the President to find an appropriate time to take the issue of Vietnam to the Security Council of the United Nations. And your President has instructed his Ambassador, Mr. Goldberg to make again inquiry, to feel out the representatives of the Security Council, to see whether or not such a motion would be productive.

Quite frankly, we are not trying to exacerbate this struggle as respects the Soviet Union and others. The Soviet Union has some commitments in North Vietnam, just as we have commitments in South Vietnam, they are not of the same nature, but it is a Communist regime in North Vietnam and the Soviet Union is in a bitter contest with Communist China for leadership of the Communist movement throughout the world.

We have not thought that it would contribute to the overall peace of the world to bring about an open confrontation with the the Soviet Union, unless we thought there was some real possibility that it could lead to fruitful results.

Let me make it clear: we have asked the Soviet Union, in the person of Premier Kosygin, and we have asked Prime Minister Harold Wilson, to serve as co-chairmen and to reconvene the Geneva Conference. Your government has asked that several times. We have asked the Secretary General of the United Nations to use his good offices. We have gone to every capital in this world in an effort to find somebody that could bring the other party to the conference table. And we have walked that extra mile.

Under Article 32 of the United Nations Charter, by the way, it is possible, if the North Vietnamese and other parties are needed, that they can be brought to the Security Council for the specific discussion of the Vietnamese situation.

I, myself, went to several capitals, under the instruction of your government to seek help, as your Vice President.

Very frankly, my life has been dedicated to seeking peace, and I have tried to do something more about it than walking and talking about it. I've worked for it and I've carried the message for it.

QUESTION FROM FLOOR: Why are we killing so many innocent people in Vietnam?

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: Well, I receive that question in the spirit in which it was given. I shall try to give an answer. We fought Hitlerism and a lot of innocent people, I regret to say, were killed. War is a nasty business. The only man who ever really properly defined it was Sherman who said it was hell.

The City of Dresden, in Germany, was a defenseless city and it was bombed to smithereens -- over a hundred thousand people killed in one night. It was bombed into rubble during World War II by the allies.

FROM THE FLOOR: But I supported that war.

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: I like these value judgments about morality.

May I respond to the question again. The United States of America and her allies are seeking to defeat the enemy. And

the certain way to make sure that village life in South Vietnam is not disrupted and destroyed is for the aggressor to cease the attack and the aggression. That will end the bloodshed promptly. I think that is the real answer to that question.

In the meantime a nation has to defend itself, and we have had to help them defend themselves -- just as we had to help defend the Koreans, just as we have had to help many other nations defend themselves. Many an innocent person has been killed in war, tragically, regrettably. But when there is an attack against the safety and independence of a country, the only thing the defenders can do is to defend. And the answer to the lady's question is that if the North will cease its aggression, if the North will quit supplying men and ammunition to the Viet Cong, there will be no war and the American forces can be brought home.

FROM THE FLOOR: Do you anticipate any major step up in our manpower level in Vietnam in the near future?

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: I see no particular stepup unless the enemy steps it up. War is somewhat of a reaction. If the North Vietnamese put another two or three divisions into South Vietnam, I imagine there will have to be forces there to meet them. There are forces of other countries coming to the assistance of South Vietnam in substantial numbers. The Australians are doubling their number. The Thais are putting in an additional 12,000. The New Zealanders are increasing their numbers. The Filipinos have been increasing theirs. So have the Koreans. The Vietnamese have increased their armed forces recently by some 65,000.

And there is another factor which you ought to keep in mind. A year and a half ago, of every five Americans in Vietnam, when I was there in February of 1966, four were engaged in support and logistics, building roads, harbors, getting the infrastructure set. One was in combat.

Today out of every five only one man is for logistics and supply for every four available for combat, with very few more men. Now, you asked about the increase in the draft call. Now I am sure you know that draft calls vary month by month. Our men are in Vietnam one year and they are rotated out. That requires a large manpower pool. If the casualty rate is higher, not just fatalities but also severely wounded, there is an increase in the draft call.

Your government has no plans for invasion of the North. Your government has made that clear.



Your government has said repeatedly, we do not seek to destroy the regime in the North, much to the consternation of some of the hawks in this country.

Your government has said that if we can get peace in this area of the world, we are prepared to help both North and South Vietnam in peaceful reconstruction. There has never been a government that has offered such generous terms in order to bring a political settlement to a struggle.

We seek no territory.

Your President has said at Manila that six months after the violence ends, we will withdraw our men and close our bases and turn them over to the government of South Vietnam. Your government has said that we will accept any kind of a Vietnam that the people of Vietnam want. Your government has said that we will accept a unification or a neutralization.

The confusion is not from your government, it is from those who try to becloud the issue. Your government has made it clear that all that we ask for is a cessation of hostilities, a return to the situation prior to the war, the right of South Vietnam to self-determination, to build its own political institutions, the right of that area of the world to live in peace.

Now that is not a big demand to make. We're not imposing our will upon people. We're doing one thing: helping a free sovereign nation to defend itself against open aggression from the North. And if Americans don't see the danger of aggression, then I submit that there is something wrong in the thinking of this Nation. Because aggression is an evil. It is a danger to us and to others. It always has been and it always will be.

I submit that the action that we're taking is action that promotes the peace of the world, rather than endangers it.

QUESTION: Mr. Vice President, we understand that your time commitments are rather severe, and you have been with us for going on an hour and a half now. There are a couple of tough questions we'd like to get in.

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: What do you think you've been doing?

QUESTION: These questions have been raised and I will put both of them together. One is, newspaper reports recently, and some articles have reported that we have missed opportunities to negotiate in the past few years. Is there any justification for these reports?

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: Let me just take that first. There has not been a single legitimate, responsible peace offer made by any government to this government that we have rejected. As a matter of fact, your government has listed 29 separate peace proposals that have been made -- all 29 of which we have accepted. Your President has authorized his officers of government to say that if you can produce a responsible official or officer of the government of North Vietnam to sit at the conference table with us, we will have one of our negotiators there in twenty-four hours. We're prepared to accept a cease-fire. We're prepared to accept a stand-down. We're prepared to stop the bombardment of the North if it leads to prompt and productive discussions.

Can you get any such commitment out of the enemy? I haven't been able to. I know of nobody else that has been able to. Nobody wants peace in this government more than the Commander-in-Chief, unless it happens to be the Vice President of the United States.

QUESTION: Former Senator Goldwater has said that President Johnson is now pursuing the policy he would have pursued one month after the election. Would you comment, please?

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: Well, if Mr. Goldwater thinks that, he has had a good change of heart, and I want to welcome him into a more sane position than he held in 1964.

When we discussed this matter in 1964, the danger that we foresaw was the danger of the impetuous use of weapons of mass destruction that could lead to massive world-wide crisis. We have limited objectives in this struggle in Vietnam and that bothers many people. Those objectives are not the invasion of the North, not the destruction of a regime, not to have a permanent American presence in Southeast Asia, not to engage in conflict with Communist China.

Our objectives are to assist the South Vietnamese in resisting the aggression from the North and to assist in the development of political institutions in the South and of self-determination. Anybody can get this world of ours into a nuclear war. That doesn't take any real intelligence. But the restrained use of power, the limited application of our massive power for limited specific purposes, is the test of statesmanship. And that is exactly what your President and those associated with him have been doing. We have been trying to use only that amount of power which we have felt was necessary to prevent the success of the aggression without throwing this world of ours into nuclear confrontation.

That is why we haven't mined the harbors. That is why we haven't bombed Soviet ships. That is why we haven't done many things.

Anybody with nuclear power can destroy this world. But those who have this massive power have a moral obligation to restrain the use of power and we are. I don't think it does our country justice to accuse its leaders of recklessness and irresponsibility, of being murderers. The President of the United States, as Commander in Chief of the armed forces bears an awesome responsibility when he commits men to battle. He has heartache every day of his life over this war.

He does not want to see our troubles intensified. My, what a day it would be for him -- if you want to put it in the crudest terms -- if this war were over by July or August of 1968, you wouldn't need to have any DFL meetings, my dear friends about the 1968 national election. Mr. Johnson knows that this war is a political liability. But what do you think would have happened if Harry Truman had listened to all the popularity polls in 1950 and 1951? It wasn't popular for Mr. Truman to stand up against the Communists in Greece and Turkey in 1947 and 1948. You would think it was now, but it wasn't. Mr. Truman had to make some fateful decisions. Mr. Truman's Cabinet wasn't even for him when he decided to take a stand in Berlin. But he did.

The President of the United States doesn't make decisions on the basis of whether or not the next public opinion poll is going to look good.

And I might add, neither does the Vice President.

QUESTION: In the Korean War, were we not fighting under the U.N. flag? And haven't we lost most of our traditional allies by our policy in Vietnam?

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: All right. Let's go back to Korea. The reason that we operated under the auspices of the United Nations is that the Russians made the mistake in that instance of having walked out of the Security Council. They weren't there to veto it. That is the fact.

There were not very many members of the United Nations over in Korea. We Americans were over there in large numbers, 400,000 of them, almost 500,000 at the peak. 58,000 dead, 257,000 casualties, that is what we had in Korea.

Now what about our friends in Western Europe? I think they are getting a little of the same virus that seems to be affecting us. They're prosperous. They feel very independent now. But, oh, listen, the minute the Americans talk about



moving any troops from Europe, oh, that is a different story!

Why, when we talked about bringing home one brigade, there was an emergency meeting of NATO. They don't want our troops to come home.

No, they say, "You be there." Imagine what would happen this day if the President of the United States were to announce that we're going to cut our forces in half in NATO and bring them home, and that we feel that the danger in Berlin or a possible exacerbation of our relationships with the Communist world over Berlin would necessitate that we remove our commitment from Berlin. You would have a European political crisis of monumental proportions.

Now, our European friends don't quite see Asia as we see it. They lost it. Most of them were colonial powers. But none of the leaders of Asia, of Europe, none of the political leaders of the Western Alliance of Europe are opposed to our position in Vietnam, with one exception, Mr. de Gaulle. All but de Gaulle support our position in Vietnam. Now I know that there are many Europeans who do not support it, but the political leaders do, and they stand for election on it.

But let's go to Asia. What political leader in Asia in the non-Communist world opposes our presence in Vietnam? Not one. Even though many of them have their own political problems at home. Not one of them opposes our presence there. All of them support it. And I will tell you why: That is where the war is, that is where the trouble is.

And, interestingly enough, our friends in Africa, the African nations, the developing nations that have had some trouble with the Communists, they are for your President's policy.

And our friends in Latin America, with one exception (and that is not a friend over in Cuba), with one exception, support this government's policy in Southeast Asia. No, when our properous European friends criticize our stand in Vietnam, remember that the political parties, the Christian Democratic Party of Italy, and the coalition government of Italy, supports your government's presence and action in Vietnam.

And the government of Great Britain, the government of Belgium, the government of the Dutch, the West Germans, support your government.

Now the real problem is that most of the news we see indicates that that support isn't there. I know what makes news. And I know how to be very suddenly popular, you know, among some people.

If at this moment I should express an open disagreement with our President, it would seem I broke with him on Vietnam -- why, Hubert Humphrey would have every headline in the United States of America.

I want to make it clear: I don't disagree with the President. The President of the United States is doing what is right and I haven't been dragged in under compulsion. As a matter of fact, my position on Vietnam in 1967 is exactly what it was stated on in the floor of the Senate in 1956. I haven't changed one bit.

QUESTION: If the government in Saigon asked the United States to withdraw from Vietnam, would we do so?

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: I imagine so. I think at least that would be something that would pose a very serious problem to us. I can't foresee that. You know, these "iffy" questions, as Franklin Roosevelt used to say, they really don't always have much substance and they are very tricky and very dangerous.

I haven't found any responsible, non-Communist person in Vietnam who is asking the Americans to withdraw. Some ask us to do more; some wish we would do it a little differently. But I don't know of anyone who has said that we should withdraw. But I must point out that the United States of America feels that Southeast Asia is vital to our interests. If the Communists maintained their military and economic and political pressure, we would undoubtedly have to take our stand some place else.

QUESTION: Under the Geneva Protocols wasn't Vietnam to be a unified nation, and aren't we preventing that reunification? And supporting an illegal government?

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: First of all, the government of South Vietnam was recognized by a number of the governments of the world, some forty of them, as an independent sovereign nation. Our government has a treaty, what is called a protocol, with the government of South Vietnam.

Insofar as reunification is concerned, this government did not sign the Geneva Agreement, for one reason: the North Vietnamese refused to allow United States supervision of an election process of unification. A separate commission known as the International Control Commission, was set up. But North Vietnam refused to participate, to permit open campaigning in its area.

And, therefore, the government of South Vietnam said, "Why should we have freedom of the press, freedom of political participation in the South and no freedom of political participation in the North." And they refused to hold the election.

But the answer is not what the yesterdays were. The answer to it is that your government now, this government, this President -- not President Eisenhower, but President Johnson -- has asked the co-chairman of the Geneva Conference, Mr. Kosygin of the Soviet Union, and Mr. Wilson of the United Kingdom, to reconvene the Geneva Conference for the purpose of a settlement in Vietnam. That request has not been answered by Mr. Kosygin. And the reason Mr. Kosygin has not been able to reply affirmatively is that North Vietnam has refused to participate in such a discussion.

Now, one can go back say, well, if we had met Hitler when he reformed the Rhineland, it would have been different. And I think it might have been. But, as I said in my earlier remarks to you, you have to deal with the realities. One can talk about the unification of Germany, too. How do you get a free election in East Germany? How do you get a free election in North Korea? You can get one quite free in South Korea. You can get a real free election in Western Germany; but how do you get free elections in the Communist zones?

The truth is that until you can have genuine openness of society, freedom of speech and freedom of debate and freedom of dissent, until you can have freedom of political participation in political parties, you can't have a free election.

Your government has said that we will abide by any terms that the South Vietnamese and the North Vietnamese arrive at for the unification of their country. Now that is your government's position. Why try to becloud it?

QUESTION: Secretary of Defense McNamara has become the symbol of civilian control of the military. Would you reassure us that his departure does not mean increasing relinquishing of this civilian control to the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY: Well, the civilian control of the Department of Defense is in the hands of the President of the United States. He is Commander in Chief. That is where it starts. You know the President of the United States was accused, for many, many months of exercising too much control over the war. The main complaint against your President for months was that he had to put his okay on it. That was what they said first. They said President Johnson was so worried about the military that he took every bombing chart into his office, and he said that you can bomb this one and that one but not the other because we didn't want the military to get out of hand. That is what they used to say.



Now they say the President has gone way over to the generals. Of course, these are both unfounded statements. Secretary McNamara did a masterful job of organizing and reorganizing the Department of Defense. But that same Secretary has been under relentless attack, not only from the so-called hawks but from the doves.

For a long time Vietnam was called "McNamara's War." Then somebody remembered that he wasn't running for office, so they made it "Johnson's War."

The President of the United States will undoubtedly select as his next Secretary of Defense one who will follow in the tradition of complete civilian control of the Department of Defense. With the massive military apparatus of this country, it is imperative that the Secretary of Defense be one who is a civilian-oriented and has the complete confidence of the civilian Commander in Chief. I don't think there is any doubt but that the road that Mr. McNamara has charted will be followed and traveled.

I want to just leave you with these thoughts. Nothing has been more distressing to me in these months than the high degree of emotion that sometimes breaks into passionate bitterness over this struggle in Vietnam. I am hopeful that our people in this party will be sufficiently tolerant of one another to recognize that there are differences of view. It always has been thus. Every war this country has been in has had differences, starting with the Revolution. Less than half of the people were loyalists, about half of them. A third of them were Tories. Another substantial proportion were neutralists.

Poor old George Washington, when he was up there at Valley Forge couldn't even get the Continental Congress to send him food, much less ammunition. Time after time whole segments of the American forces would desert.

In the war of 1812 there were a number of our friends from the northeast who were on a march to Baltimore to demand the impeachment of James Madison, the father of the Constitution, for his immoral war against the British. They got as far as Baltimore and heard that Andrew Jackson had whipped the British. So they decided, instead of asking for his impeachment, to come to Washington and join in the party of celebration. (Applause)

Abraham Lincoln wasn't a very popular President. Abraham Lincoln didn't even get a majority vote at any time that he ran for the presidency. Eleven of our Presidents never received a majority vote--including Woodrow Wilson in 1912.

At the time of World War I, when Woodrow Wilson was asking this nation to make its commitment, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Majority Leader were all against him.

It is very, very interesting to note that some of the most bitter debates on American policy took place at that time, some right out here in Minnesota. I would remind this audience that in 1940, here in the Minneapolis Auditorium, there was an America First meeting right here in this city, in which 15,000 people were in attendance, and some very prominent Americans were there.

I would also remind you that our involvement in World War II did not come because Hitler had exterminated six million Jews and had run rampant over Europe. It came because we were attacked at Pearl Harbor. I remind you that Franklin Roosevelt stood at the bridge in Chicago and asked this nation to quarantine the aggressor. And he became the victim of unbelievable diatribe, a barrage of accusation, of bitter, bitter opposition.

Just before World War II, in the House of Representatives, just a few months before Pearl Harbor, the extension of the draft were by one vote, one vote.

So it has never been easy. When Mr. Truman was involved in Korea, his popularity sank to 26 per cent in the polls. But I can tell you something else, that if you walk out of this door today and stop the first ten people that you see on the street out there and ask them to name you five of the great Presidents, one of them will be Mr. Truman. (Applause)

And I will tell you why, because he was a courageous man, because he was a man who did what he thought he had to do when it had to be done, because he was a man who was willing to make the tough decisions. I don't know whether or not the American people will approve our policy in Vietnam. I think they will, because I think when the alternatives are outlined, they will find that what we are trying to do is to steer the difficult middle course.

I repeat: I know of no responsible leader in this country today who advocates withdrawal from Vietnam, none. (Applause)

And I hope there are no leaders who will get into a position of leadership who will advocate all-out weapons, all-out war at any cost, which could precipitate a major conflagration. (Applause)

So what we try to do is to steer that difficult middle course. It is always subject to interpretation, which is right and proper. People should be inquisitive and doubt and analyze. Remember that this is the first war in the history of your Nation that has been fought without censorship. This is the first war in the 20th Century that has been fought without controls. This is the first war that has been fought in your front room on the television. Every other war has had some actor, some even who are Governors now -- who were in those Hollywood films. And in those films, our side was the good guys and the other side was the bad guys, always. During World War II and the war in Korea, many films were shown on American theater screens. But those films were screened. Your government took a look at them first.

This war, ladies and gentlemen, has broadcasts like one I saw the other night, "Same Mud, Same Blood." That was an actual war. That wasn't Humphrey Bogart or Clark Gable. That was your sons out there in the battlefield. And I have had letters from mothers who have seen their sons wounded on the television screen and said, "I saw my boy shot down."

This war -- unlike all other wars -- has all of its ugliness portrayed to you, every day. And very little is portrayed of the good that comes out of the terrible effort that is being made to lift a people. Very little comes to your attention.

How many people really know of the great revolutionary development effort that is going on in Vietnam? How many of you know that 30,000 of these boys have been selected from all over that country, brought in on an intensive training program and sent



back out to the village to help establish self-government, to establish self-defense against the guerrillas, and to upgrade the educational, health and economic standards.

How many of you know that your government, in cooperation with others, has printed twelve million textbooks for the children of Vietnam, so that they could have an education? We have established a great university, started rural electrification lines, built over 300 farmers cooperatives, doubled the hog production, increased the rice production, expanded the training of doctors -- how many of us know that? That doesn't make real copy. I am not blaming anybody about it. It is just that war is a miserable, dirty, but dramatic business and it makes the copy.

And, may I say in all candor, that our American reporters, who are good reporters follow the American troops most of the time. That is where the news is, for them. The people who read their papers are Americans and the government of South Vietnam doesn't have a very good information service. And it has had no press censorship since July 1967, when it was lifted for the elections at that time.

I think this is a rather unusual development. I ask you to keep these things in perspective. And I venture to say, that five, ten years from now we will look back on this meeting and we will look back on Vietnam and say, "I never believed then that it would come out as well as it did."

Because, mark my words: the enemy will sooner or later either deescalate and move back into the jungles and across the boundaries or there will be a negotiated settlement. We're prepared for either.

We want -- I want and your President wants -- a political negotiated settlement of this war, but we're not willing to accept the salami tactic of cutting off one or two provinces in the name of peace, as Hitler took the Rhineland, then Austria, then Czechoslovakia. That didn't bring peace.

We are prepared, however, to sit at the conference table with any of the responsible representatives of any government, combatant or non-combatant, to bring this struggle to an honorable conclusion and then to continue in the process of nation-building and rebuilding, which is our real work.

I think it is tragic, my fellow Americans, that so many have forgotten what this country has been doing. I wonder why I haven't seen some parades over the fact that your President just saved the peace in the Middle East in the recent Cyprus situation, when two faithful allies were mobilized, when the ships were ready to sail and the planes were loaded and ready to go to war between Greece and Turkey. Your President, Lyndon Johnson, sent his special emissary, Mr. Vance. I was with Mr. Vance when he came back, and that man worked his heart out in the name of peace, under personal instructions, daily instructions and telephonic communication from your President. He saved the peace.

I have yet to see a picket sign that says, "Thank you, Mr. Johnson, for saving the peace in the Mediterranean!" (Applause)

And your President, as the leaders know on both sides, helped save the peace in the Middle East earlier. Indeed, I have in my very files a letter from one of the highest officials of one of the most important nations in the Middle East, making it clear that the firmness of the United States in standing up to the Soviet Union during those critical hours of the Middle East crisis in May and June of this year saved that part of the world from massive war.

These things aren't easy. Peace-making is not the business of children and it is not accomplished through emotion. The scriptures say, "Blessed are the peace makers" -- not talkers, walkers, or paraders, but "makers." (Applause)

My fellow Americans, we have been making peace a long time. We've fortified and strengthened the United Nations. We have been building block by block. John Kennedy said that peace is not neutral, peace is not weakness, and peace is not negative. Peace is strength and peace is positive. Peace is building.

Sometimes peace requires fighting.

We built the peace when we stood up against Japanese militarism and Nazi Hitlerism. We built the peace when we told Khrushchev that the danger of thermonuclear war was only minutes away, to get his missiles out of Cuba. We built for peace in Asia when we stood firm in Korea.

Peace is not for cowards. Peace requires courage. It tests the best in men.

Finally, I want to say, as an American, I am proud of my country. This country has been dedicated all of its life to peace-making and nation-building. We've never built an empire, we have sought no one else's territory. We have sought to conquer no one. And we don't seek to do so now.

And it is about time that my fellow Americans stood up proudly and proclaimed the historic mission of this Nation -- which is national security for ourselves and for others, and national development for ourselves and for others, protection of the weak; the use of our power, our influence and our wealth, not for our self-indulgence and luxury but for a better life for the less fortunate here, and for the less fortunate around the world.

My fellow Americans, if we can't do these things with what We have, who can? If we are unwilling to stand guard at the ramparts of freedom, if we are unwilling to take our stand when the brute moves across the field, who will? If we are unwilling to help the poor, who can? If we are unwilling to help those who want to help themselves, who do you think will or can?

I think it is, indeed, time for a moral rebirth in this country. And that moral rebirth will come when we realize that is is up to us either "to meanly lose or nobly save the last best hope on earth," and when we remember the words of the great emancipator: "with malice towards none, and with charity for all, but with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right." That should be our policy. That is our policy.

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
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The U. S. Jaycees  
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# ANNUAL CONGRESS of AMERICA'S TEN OUTSTANDING YOUNG MEN SAINT PAUL MINNESOTA JAN. 19-20, 1968 U.S. JAYCEE PROGRAM • HOSTED BY SAINT PAUL JAYCEES



Vice President Humphrey begins his challenging keynote address before a luncheon group attending the 30th Annual Congress of America's Ten Outstanding Young Men of 1967 in Saint Paul, Minnesota.



I'm very honored to be in this honorable company. I wish the time permitted today to say just a few words about each of America's Ten Outstanding Young Men. I didn't know some of them were so young; they've done so much, including my friends in the Congress.

I read a statement not long ago by an American philosopher who said: "Youth is not a time of life, it is a state of mind. We grow old only by deserting our ideals. You are as young as your faith, as old as your doubts, as young as your self confidence, as old as your fear, as young as your hope, as old as your despair."

In other words, youth is an attitude about life, and I would like to think that little paragraph I just read typifies the spirit not only of this organization but of our nation. I don't want to think of America as growing old because this whole world of ours is filled with young men and women who have great aspirations.



Your President was asking me just a moment ago where I had traveled within the last month, and I thought back to my visit to Africa. In Africa today, 75 percent of the people of the entire continent are under the age of 26. At least 50 percent are under the age of 14. It's a young population in an old, old continent. But the age doesn't mean as much as the spirit.

This world needs that kind of spirit because it's a world of change, which brings with it a lot of questioning, self-analysis, and even self-doubt. But I think we Americans are the kind of people who regard change not as an enemy but as an ally. There are those who look upon anything new as dangerous and forbidding, but I think the changes that are happening today are changes for the better.

Why do I believe this?

At a time when there is affluence for so many, I think that America has demonstrated the courage to struggle toward opportunity and justice for the few.

At a time when we have unparalleled power, we are called upon to restrain its use.

At a time when we could really just let ourselves go and have a sort of national lost weekend, we extend a helping hand through foreign aid, the Peace Corps, and Vista to needy people at home and abroad; we try to be helpful to others in defense of their freedoms.

We could be a very self-indulgent nation, and when I hear people condemn America as being immoral I resent it. If you are concerned about the poor and the weak in the midst of plenty, then you must have a sense of morality.

There are frustrating paradoxes that confront us. We have the technical ability to produce better material goods, to prevent disease, to educate our people, and to control our environment. We have the capacity. But, as the President said the other night, the question is, do we have the will? Do we have the moral substance, the ethical purpose to put these things to work?

The President quotes a passage from Dante's *Inferno* that should sound familiar

to many of us who live in American cities this winter: "Dirty water and black snow pouring forth from the dismal air to the putrid slush that waits for them below."

We have great programs of urban renewal that have produced sparkling new shopping centers, wonderful new office buildings — but within the shadow of those buildings exist ghettos and slums.

This is a paradox built on mortar and steel. There is also the painful paradox of discrimination and dashed human hopes.

Yet, with all this, we have seen a decade of amazing development, rapid progress in civil rights, desegregation, voter registration, people lifting themselves out of poverty. We have seen Supreme Court decisions that have changed the pattern of law in America, making inequality and discrimination illegal.

With all of this progress, many white Americans ask, what is it that Negro Americans want? What are they asking for?

A recent survey in *Fortune* magazine, in which three out of four Negro citizens said their condition today is better than it was three to five years ago, also shows that 97 percent of the urban Negro citizens interviewed want a better education for their children; 87 percent want a better job; 77 percent want some kind of special training; 69 percent want better police protection; 62 percent want more education for themselves; 60 percent want to make their own neighborhoods better places in which to live, and only 20 percent are anxious to move.

That's what the survey of the Negro American community reveals. Is that unusual? As a matter of fact, it's exactly what all of us want; no more, no less.

I believe all of us must keep our sense of balance lest we come to regard the hate-mongers, right or left, the racists, white or black, as the spokesmen for the poor. We must not be fooled. They are not the spokesmen for the Negro mother who simply wants her children to be able to walk safely to a decent school — or for the Negro father who wants nothing more than a chance to work and to provide for the needs of his family.

The agitator's voice is not the authentic voice of the poor, of our Negro fellow American, any more than it is the authentic voice of our society as a whole. The authentic voices of America are those thousands of community leaders of all races, creeds and nationalities — who are working quietly, constructively to build a better neighborhood, to build a better city, to improve the schools, to open up opportunity.

Those voices speak the conscience of this nation. And those voices can prevail, if we heed them and help them.

Don't wait for violence, for riots, for the agitator to frighten you into action. Take the action that needs to be taken when the voices of reason appeal to you. Our society has rejected so many of these voices of reason and moderation that now we are confronted with a terrible specter of violence and riots, hatred and bitterness. But time still gives us a chance to listen to the voices of common sense.

You may recall De Tocqueville's comment that: "The sufferings that are endured patiently as being inevitable become intolerable the moment that it appears there might be an escape. Reform then only serves to reveal more clearly what still remains oppressive and now all the more unbearable; the suffering, it is true, has been reduced, but one's sensitivity has become more acute!"

Today, we call that mood the revolution of rising expectations.

The truth is that the turbulence in our society today is a good indicator of its progress. We're moving out of one social system into another, just as an airplane flying out of one weather system into another goes through a period of turbulence.

Rising expectations are not something just in Asia or Africa or Latin America. They are here at home, too.


This quest for freedom from tyranny and freedom from want — for freedom to choose one's destiny — is the theme of human history everywhere in the last third of the 20th century.

Full opportunity, self-determination, economic development, security, education, the

laughter of healthy children . . . Let me tell you, the laughter of healthy children is really the most wonderful music in the world, and if we contribute to that, I think of what we have contributed to a peaceful world. This is what our forefathers meant by those wonderful words: "Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."

The question then is what's going to become of these rising expectations. Are we going to let them fester and boil over in

"Don't wait for violence, for riots, for the agitator to frighten you into action. Take the action that needs to be taken when the voices of reason appeal to you."





"This nation cannot and must not be cast into a downward spiral of violence, counter-violence and hatred by the criminal acts of a few — nor must we condemn any group for the violence of a few."

despair? Are we going to let violence be the pattern of our cities?

As for civil disorders, I think we know that you can't have national development, human development, in a society where there is violence, lawlessness and riot. There are fundamental rights, and the rights of every American to freedom from fear and freedom from intimidation must and will be protected against violent extremist of any persuasion. Local and state authorities responsible for maintaining law and order simply must receive your strongest support — public support. We must equip our law

enforcement agencies not just with machines but with the best of manpower.

Are you willing to pay the price for adequate law enforcement? Are you willing to modernize your state and local police authorities? Are you willing to dig into the social conditions of your community that are the breeding grounds of crime and violence?

This nation cannot and must not be cast into a downward spiral of violence, counter-violence and hatred by the criminal acts of a few — nor must we condemn any group for the violence of a few.

Don't lose your perspective. There are a lot of momentary frustrations, but the hopes of tomorrow are bright.

The President said in his State of the Union address that: "If ever there was a nation that was capable of solving its problems, it is this nation.

"If ever there was a time to know the pride and excitement and hope of being an American, it is this time."

There are hopeful signs:

The public opinion polls say a majority of Americans, regardless of political persuasion or area or region, do support national programs to stamp out hard-core unemployment and to rebuild our slums.

Businessmen are beginning to take the lead in community after community for programs of civic action. They are beginning to hire and train hard-core unemployed, and we are asking them in the coming months to hire thousands more of them. We are asking you in the 50 major cities in America to be the front line fighters in these programs.

We are going to have the biggest industrialists in America acting as if they are the greatest social workers in America. And why not? This is a free enterprise economy; the government shouldn't be doing all these things. We are not trying to build a welfare state, we are trying to build a state of opportunity in this country.

Private builders, church groups and community organizations are beginning at last to work in partnership with our government for low-income housing. So the dream of a greater housing program is not unrealistic.

The building trades are now beginning to open up their apprenticeship programs to the disadvantaged, and communities across this nation are pushing through open housing ordinances. Last year alone 47 communities passed open housing ordinances — as many as in the previous decade.

Take the language of your own Operation Opportunity proposal: Opportunity, self-help, self-reliance, aggressive leadership, mobilizing community resources, involving the disadvantaged."

Those are the words that are being heard throughout our society today, and they are

not words of a sick nation. They foretell a new era of social and economic progress.

We are witnessing a great urban coalition, not only at the national level but at the community level, and I want to call upon the Jaycees to see that in every community in America you pool the resources of your socially conscious, socially concerned people, public and private, church and non-church, labor and business. Call them "community councils for civic action." Don't depend on city hall alone. Don't depend on the legislature and governor alone. Surely don't depend on the Congress or the national government alone.

If you are to have better schools for your children — if this is to be a better America — it is going to be because you helped make it so where you live. If you are going to defeat hopelessness and despair, you have to start where you are. If you are going to provide jobs for the hard-core unemployed, it has to be in the factories where you live. Somebody in Washington can't do it, and even if he could, he shouldn't.

U. S. Jaycee President James B. Antell listens attentively as Vice President Humphrey calls for more of "the kind of daring and constructive leadership that 300,000 Jaycees can provide."





The late President John Kennedy said that he wanted to see a world that was safe for diversity. There is diversity in our society — differences. Let's maximize the good of those differences—not set them one against another but draw strength from them. The result can be a great partnership of all levels of government, a partnership that will depend heavily on the kind of daring and constructive leadership that 300,000 Jaycees can provide in 50 states.

As the chairman of the President's Council on Youth Opportunity, I have worked with your national officers. I have gone to you before and you have been helping us. You have also been helping in other things such as the program for mental retardation which Mrs. Humphrey is so keenly concerned about, and she is a member of your Mental Health and Mental Retardation Committee.

So I give you another challenge here today. Summer, 1968 is just 4 months away. And we have a job to do this summer, to see that our young people have a better chance this summer than they had last summer.

I want you to go home now and see your mayor and say to him, "Mr. Mayor, have you appointed a local Youth Opportunity Council in our city? Do we have a community coalition for civic progress in this city? Have you included Jaycees in your youth council? Have you brought in some of the poor and ethnic groups? Have you brought in the dissident and labor groups? Mr. Mayor, have we a program of action?"

And if you don't have one and he doesn't respond, run against him.

I want you to help us recruit inner-city youth leaders. I want you to help us in job training. I want you to help us in keeping schools open all year around.

I have been in communities where they have no swimming pools except in the schools and the schools are closed. I know it takes manpower to run a school. Help find it. Volunteer for it. I will tell you that it is money well invested and time well invested.

I don't say that hopeful signs mean an inevitable success. I know there are a lot of things that upset the best-made plans. There



Vice President Humphrey pauses before acknowledging a standing ovation at the conclusion of his keynote address.

are going to be disappointments. There is going to be some frustration, and we are going to go through more growing pains.

But this country is not tired and it is not sick. This is a vital country, vigorous, prosperous and strong, and it has reached a new jumping-off place in its forward voyage. It is impatiently — and a little anxiously perhaps — gathering its vast resources, its youthful vigor, to push on.


With your help, with your determination, with your enthusiasm, we will realize the full promise of America.


In the words of my favorite author, Thomas Wolfe: "To every man his chance, to every man, regardless of his birth, his shining, golden opportunity. To every man the right to live, to work, to be himself, and to become whatever things his manhood and his vision can combine to make him."

This is all the people want—their chance. We owe them no more than their chance, not merely charity and compassion but justice and opportunity, not merely a pat on the back but a helping hand, not merely a challenge but opening the door of opportunity for them.

The test before all of us today is to show that our free institutions can fully realize this promise for every American. I think we can do it.


Following the luncheon, Vice President Humphrey chats with America's Ten Outstanding Young Men for 1967 including (left) Nicholas Johnson, U. S. Federal Communications Commissioner, and (right) Hugh F. Downey, International Relations Humanitarian.





Printed by The United States Jaycees

## “The Role of American Universities in Today’s World”



**“The American university—not just this one, but every one—should be in microcosm what we would wish for American society: A free and open community filled with searching, thinking people—each seeking his own answers in his own way, yet extending full respect for the ideas and life styles of others. This is the meaning of a pluralistic free society.”**



Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey


75th Anniversary Convocation

The American University

Washington, D.C.

February 24, 1968





These are times of ferment and change . . . of doubt and exhilaration . . . of danger and opportunity in America.

Many of the things we Americans have always sought are now—really for the first time—within our sight.

But they are still, frustratingly, beyond our reach.

Progress itself has meant rising frustration for many Americans. As de Tocqueville said:

“The sufferings that are endured patiently as being inevitable, become intolerable the moment that it appears that there might be an escape. Reform then only serves to reveal more clearly what still remains oppressive and now all the more unbearable; the suffering, it is true, has been reduced, but one’s sensitivity has become more acute.”

Perhaps most difficult of all, there is no magic target date . . . no time when we can say: “This is the time when our work will be over. This is when war will end . . . when the tensions within our own society will abate.”

Once again we are being tested.

We are, as President Kennedy put it, “destined—all of us here today—to live out most if not all of our lives in uncertainty and challenge and peril.”

What is important is that each of us—and each of our democratic institutions—possess the strength, the vitality and the resilience to see through these uncertain times.

Among our citizens, and among our institutions, none must be stronger, more vital or resilient than those associated with the American university.

I want to do some plain talking about what I believe to be the responsibilities of American universities, their students and faculties, to provide both a forum for ferment and platform for progress.

## Free Speech and Dissent

It is easy to make the case that this generation of college students is the most responsible we have ever known . . . progress-oriented, concerned, actively involved in public affairs. In fact, I have often made that case.

I doubt that more than a pound or two of goldfish have been swallowed in the last five years. One student to a telephone booth seems to be the accepted standard. Panty raids, for whatever reason, seem to have lost their appeal.

There is the Peace Corps—now 13,000 strong, with over 16,000 alumni and applications coming in faster than ever.

There is VISTA and the Teacher Corps.

Public service announcements clutter dormitory bulletin boards once filled only with party plans.

There were the peaceful sit-ins and the freedom marches of the early 1960's—largely the work of young people.

There are well over 300,000 college students voluntarily helping the disadvantaged.

There are over 500,000 young Americans bravely and patiently serving our country today in Vietnam in a difficult foreign conflict.

There are another 3 million standing guard for our security.

All of that is true. But, in all candor, it is not what represents your generation in much of the public mind today.

The heckler, the rioter, the draft card burner, and the flower child are unfortunately obscuring the Peace Corps volunteer, the veteran, the community action worker and the hard-working student.

The peaceful freedom marcher on the dusty Southern road is being replaced on our livingroom televisions by the shouter of obscenity.

The negative acts of the few, — and I repeat, of the few — are driving out the positive acts of the many.

This new image does not accurately describe the majority of American students today—any more than the old one did.

But there is enough truth in it to tatter the banner under which your generation marches and to undermine the critical role of free universities in our free society.

I am worried about it, and I think it is something all of us ought to worry about.

Our universities should be citadels of our freedom—the guardians and nourishers of free inquiry and expression. For they are the custodians of our cultural heritage and the progenitors of a new day.

They should be the testing ground of any and *all* ideas, even the foolish ones. As Woodrow Wilson once said, “The wisest thing to do with a fool is to encourage him to hire a hall and discourse to his fellow citizens. Nothing chills nonsense like exposure to the air.”

**The American university—not just this one, but every one—should be in microcosm what we would wish for American society: A free and open community filled with searching, thinking people—each seeking his own answers in his own way, yet extending full respect for the ideas and life styles of others. This is the meaning of a pluralistic free society.**

I fear that, on many American campuses today, that ideal is being threatened.

I fear that freedom of inquiry and expression is being censored.

We should not forget that there are many kinds of censorship.

There is book-burning. Some of you may not remember that there was some of that in this country only 15 years ago.

There is outright proscription.

And there is another censorship—censorship by intimidation. That is the kind I see growing today.

When some Americans cannot visit a university campus in safety—much less make their views heard—censorship is at work.

You say it can't happen in America? It is happening.

I visited Stanford University a year ago for a question and answer session before a group of several thousand students. It was a vigorous give-and-take session. A few walked out at the beginning without listening—imposing self-censorship. The rest of us had a constructive exchange of views.

But as we left the hall, some of us who had been inside were rushed by several hundred who had not even tried to participate in the discussion. We faced a chanting, routing, baiting mob—on a college campus.

My party and I were able to return to our cars only under armed protection. The Secret Servicemen with me were the victims of abuse and had filth thrown on them.

Is that freedom? Is that what we mean by cultural enrichment?

The result was this: The benefits of our constructive dialogue were all but lost. What Americans saw instead on their television screens—and in their newspapers—was the spectacle of their Vice President (not me personally, but the holder of the office) under threat of bodily harm from university students, the favored few among young Americans.

The same kind of thing has happened to Secretary McNamara at Harvard.

Arthur Goldberg, a former Supreme Court Justice and now our Ambassador to the United Nations, has been bullied and harrassed on several campuses. What is his crime? He works for peace. How does he threaten young Americans? His life is a testimonial to peace and racial justice, from defense of the oppressed worker, if you please, to the great cause of the United Nations.

I am not making a special case for members of the Administration. I am talking, too, about the George Wallaces at Dartmouth. I am talking about all the citizens of our nation who have the basic right to be heard—not necessarily to be taken seriously, *but to be heard*.

I've heard the angry voices a thousand times:

"No freedom of speech for reactionaries" . . . "No freedom of speech for socialists" . . . "No freedom of speech for warmongers" . . . "No freedom of speech for peaceniks" it soon becomes "No freedom of speech for anyone."

The university that requires 100 armed policemen to escort a member of the President's cabinet, or anyone else, to and from the podium, has to ask itself some serious questions. (I didn't have to have that here today, and I am deeply grateful to this university for the example it sets.)

**If abuse, violence, obscenity, harrassment, and storm-trooper tactics have no place in our peaceful American society, they are dangerous in the extreme when they obscure and disrupt the purposes of a great university.**

Sit-ins are not nearly as impressive as think-ins, and walk-outs never equalled a good talk-it-out.

The rhythmic chant of a noisy claque is not dialogue and debate. Muscle cannot substitute for mind.

The law of the jungle and the school of law cannot coexist.

Fascists, Communists, racists . . . cross-burners, book-burners, flag-burners . . . all of them share a basic intolerance for the views of others.

The next step is intolerance for the *rights* of others.

**History is strewn with tangled wreckage left by militant minorities—each of which thought it had cornered the market in social justice and virtue, and had discovered the True Belief to the exclusion of all others.**

What can you do?

Reverse the trend . . . bring free speech to a new high, rather than a new low . . . guarantee safe conduct on your campuses for *every* idea and for everyone.

Tutor America in freedom and liberty, not bigotry and violence.

## The University and the Community

But the times demand even more of America's universities.

Free speech alone does not mean a free society.

Debate alone does not mean development.

Protest alone does not mean peace.

Study alone is not building.

**With all their resources of knowledge and vitality, America's universities must become community action centers for an assault on the practical inequities that still limit freedom in our society. "The great end of life is not knowledge," said Huxley, "but action."**

Freedom . . . human development and peace are the products of a lifetime—many lifetimes—of small and often obscure acts undertaken by people able to look beyond themselves.

Our most urgent domestic challenge today—to provide full and equal opportunity to *every* American—is *not* susceptible to dramatic or instant solution.

This is the time for Getting Down To It. We're past the time of the Grand and Dramatic Gesture—as noble as it may be.

Sit-ins are not going to produce job skills.

Banners and placards proclaiming justice are not going to unsnarl the tangled legacy of discrimination and second-class citizenship that is crushing millions of Americans today.



The solutions lie in long, hard, undramatic work—work which seldom puts your picture in the paper and won't get you a fifteen-second news clip on the seven o'clock news.

Project HEETH, is a good way to get started.

True, it is only a conference—although I hope it will be the first of many.

It is the beginning of a commitment by Washington's institutions of higher learning to help defeat the infection of blighted opportunity that besets our federal city.

I need not recite the considerable efforts of the past few years to come to grips with the crisis of urban America. Much has been done; far more needs to be done.

**The big lesson of our times is that the federal government alone, no matter how great its efforts, can't rebuild society—and it shouldn't. We're a free people. The rebuilding has to be done by the people themselves, by society itself, through an intimate partnership for progress consisting of government at every level, business, labor, private and community organizations, and especially our universities.**

And here I will engage in the plainest of talk:

I think the educational institution has to move back into the community. It must not be an ivory tower, but a tower of strength in the daily life of the people. Universities are not designed to be meadows of meditation alone.

I believe that each university which gains its support from either public or community sources—or from a private source on the basis of that university's contribution to the society as a whole—has an obligation to involve itself and its students, in its own time and place, for the practical betterment of that society.

Is this a new idea? Not at all.

The Land Grant colleges—one of America's noblest contributions to education—have improved the quality of life all over America. Public service is now a tradition in our great state universities as well.

Now, more than ever, we need a new affirmation of that tradition.

We have university participation in the War on Poverty, in creating Model Cities, in Community Action—but largely on the part of well-paid consultants. We need universities, students and faculty with their sleeves rolled up for practical engagement in the communities just outside their gates.

What does that mean?

—Twelve hours a week in the classroom and perhaps five in the "lab" of the ghetto youth center for student and faculty alike?

—Accepting those students not qualified under normal standards because their community needs them back as trained citizens?

—That the injunction to faculty members should be not "publish or perish" but "participate and perform?"

I believe so.

**America's communities need help with the mundane but vital work of revising city charters, reforming state legislatures, building new and equitable tax structures, creating regional or metropolitan political institutions—help which is available in some places only from university faculty members.**

The concerned professor who will spend even as little as an evening a week in an inner city neighborhood committee meeting can help people on the fringe of American society articulate their needs . . . and shape their own programs . . . when it comes to housing, job training and urban development.

As Chairman of the President's Council on Youth Opportunity, I can tell you we need the help of students and faculty alike to keep our schools open 12 months a year as beacons of hope for disadvantaged children.

We need your help to provide recreational and job opportunities for needy American youngsters in the summer of 1968.

And might I say to you what I've said to my own family. Every boy and girl, every man and woman, privileged to have a university education, owes half of his life at least to the rest of the community that made it possible.

No one ever paid his way through a university. Who can pay for the art treasures, the literature, the science, the accumulated knowledge of centuries? Those of us in this society who are privileged to have a university education are forever indebted to the multitude. Maybe if you live to be seventy-five, like this university, you will have paid the interest on the gift that was given to you—if you participate.

## Freedom and Responsibility

Last Sunday the *Washington Post* reported that the Association of American Colleges, the National Student Association and other

groups responsible for the quality of American universities had endorsed a "Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students."

Among those rights and freedoms were these:

— Students should be free to hear whatever speakers and form whatever organizations they wish.

— Students should participate in drafting rules of campus conduct. (And, I might add, they should participate in seeing that they are obeyed.)

— Colleges should clearly distinguish their own rules from city, state, and national laws and "Institutional authority should never be used merely to duplicate the function of general laws."

Yes, a Bill of Rights—a sound one, and familiar enough. It deserves support and acceptance.

But will it mean greater responsibility, greater freedom, greater service to society?

Or will it be a license to cheat when it comes to the tough business of democratic living?

Your answer will be a fateful one, for as Goethe said, "The destiny of any nation, at any given time, depends on the opinions of the young men (and young women, let me add) under five-and-twenty."

The beacon of your freedoms . . . or the contamination of your license . . . will extend far beyond your campuses—into American society and the world at large.

I think it is time, therefore, that we—all of us, students and non students alike—dedicate ourselves to a far wider Bill of Rights—a Bill of Rights, and consonant Responsibilities, for the 21st Century.

The right to peace—so that man may live and hope free from the threat of those who would march to power through brute force.

The right to justice—so that every man everywhere may stand before his peers with full and equal opportunity to achieve his highest humanity.

The right to free expression—so that man may speak and be heard without intimidation, unfettered and unthreatened by either majority or minority.

The right to education—so that no man may be another's slave through the denial of skills or knowledge.

The right to public accountability—so that man may remain the master of the state, rather than the state the master of man.

The right to full opportunity—so that man may lift himself to the limit of his ability, no matter what the color of his skin, the tenets of his religion, or his birth.

The right to public compassion—so that man may live with the knowledge that his health, his well-being, his old-age are the concern of his society.

The right to movement and free association—so that man may freely move and choose his friends without coercion.

The right to privacy—so that man may be free from the heavy hand of the snoopers, the watchers and the listeners.

The right to rest and recreation—so that the necessity of labor may not cripple human development and cultural attainment.

The right to a safe and wholesome environment—a decent home and neighborhood, clean air, and protection of the law.

Those are the rights we seek at home and in the world.

But they will not be achieved without the exercise of responsibilities:

The responsibility to participate, lest abstention leave the initiative to those who would exploit us.

The responsibility of public service—lest service be to self rather than to fellow man.

The responsibility to support the rule of law—lest the law of the jungle engulf us at home and abroad.

The responsibility to protect ideals in the face of force—lest vision be lost and expediency become a habit.

The responsibility to respect and defend the rights of others—lest freedom become license.

These are rights and responsibilities worthy of free people.

These are rights emanating from mankind's deepest human needs. These are responsibilities in keeping with man's highest capacities.

But neither these rights nor those responsibilities will be fully realized in America until we prove worthy of them.

I call on you as citizens of your university and of your country to make the image of your generation one of such clarity that there can be no misunderstanding of it.

— An image not of despair, but of hope;

— Not of selfishness, but of selflessness;

— Not of escapism but of open challenge to the hard realities of our time.

Never has a land had so much—powerful, rich, equipped with great capacity, tremendous ability, great universities with almost 7,000,000 of our young men and women now attending them. But as Thomas Huxley wrote when he visited America a century ago: "I cannot say that I am in the slightest degree impressed by your bigness or your material resources as such. Size is not grandeur and territory does not make a nation. The great issue about which hangs the terror of overhanging fate is what are you going to do with these things."

"Who shall speak for the people?" Carl Sandburg asked.


"Who has the answers?"

"Where is the sure interpreter?"

"Who knows what to say?"

More important, my young friends: Who can do what must be done . . . if this America of ours is to stand one day as the place where the rights of man were fully and finally achieved because the responsibilities of man were fully and freely exercised?

You are the ones; we are the ones. Together.









‘A decent home  
for every American’

Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey

NATIONAL HOUSING CONFERENCE  
WASHINGTON, D. C.  
MARCH 4, 1968





**"I don't believe you build a city, or save a city, or rescue a city. I think you build a neighborhood, save a neighborhood and rescue a neighborhood."**

Today, at noon, the Senate of the United States—in perhaps its most historic civil rights vote of the century—brought nearer to every American, President Truman's historic 1949 pledge of: "A decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family."

And today, two-thirds of the Members of the U. S. Senate said this pledge was not just for white American citizens, but would apply to *every* American citizen.

A decent home for every American is possible only with a national fair housing law.

We can win on this pledge made by President Johnson and we can carry out his housing program. The fight continues and it is still a hard road ahead, but I believe we can, and must prevail this year, this session, in this Congress. I think the time is at hand for that action.

The citizens of America found another message on their breakfast tables yesterday morning as they opened their Sunday newspapers.

That message read, "It is time to end the destruction and the violence, not only in the streets of the ghetto but in the lives of the people."

These words—from the President's Commission on Civil Disorders—challenged the very meaning of our free institutions . . . and the will of our free people.

I trust that every person in this audience will take the time to carefully study not only the recommendations of the Commission on Civil Disorder, but also the body of evidence on which those observations and recommendations are based.

There are some questions that we have to ask ourselves tonight, and in the days ahead . . .

Are our freely-elected city, state and federal governments capable of responding to the just aspirations of a minority too long denied full and equal opportunity?

Can the free enterprise system, which has given most of us so much, assure enough jobs, enough housing, enough income, for all?

And, as individuals, are we ready to practice freedom and equality as well as preach it? Or will the poison of discrimination—which

the Commission blames most for the syndrome of urban poverty and blighted opportunity—destroy this nation, which we have tried to build and strengthen for almost two centuries.

### 'A CHALLENGE TO THE NATION'

My friends, the "Crisis of the Cities," as the President called it in his recent message to Congress, is a challenge to the nation—not just to the federal government . . . not just to the governors and the mayors . . . but to every American citizen.

The Kerner Commission's report on the specific causes of urban disorders brought no surprises. But it did point directly and dramatically to what is wrong in the left-out, neglected neighborhoods of America:

—Inadequate service and protection by the law. The Commission cited one inner city neighborhood which had 35 times as many serious crimes against persons as occurred in a nearby high-income white district.

—Unemployment and underemployment rates as high as 35 per cent, with the heaviest burden falling on young men in the prime of life.

—Inadequate housing. As many as 40 per cent of all the people in your nation's capital, for example, live in inadequate dwellings or pay more than they can afford in rent.

—There are other causes, and this society has been aware of them for years . . . inadequate educational opportunity . . . lack of recreation . . . unresponsive local political structures . . . exploitation in the stores and at the credit desk . . . and, yes, public neglect.

But the real tragedy cannot be measured in statistics and generalities. It is measured in the loss of valuable human resources to our society, and in the frustration and heartbreak of real people—not story-book people—but real people.

Here are the words of one inner city mother—words I recently found amid the depersonalized data of a government report:

"When they have to get out on the street at 14 or 15 they consider themselves to be a man . . . and are going to take on some responsibility . . . because he is the only man in the house, and he has little brothers and sisters in the house and he sees his mother and brothers and sisters going hungry, half starving and trying to get the rent in.

"It is a bare house . . . it is a cold feeling even to be there, and you have to go out and on the street and become the subject of the

same thing out there. There has to be a breaking point."

We have known about those needs—that urgent crisis—for some time.

### 'WHY HAVEN'T WE DONE SOMETHING?'

Why haven't we *done* something?

The answer is that we *have* been doing something.

And, as we look ahead, it is important to recognize that we *do* now have a solid platform of laws, programs, and experience on which to build.

I think our efforts of these past few years should be seen in proper perspective—not as the final answer, not that they are enough, but that we have done something.

If we—as objective observers—saw that developed Country X, on another continent, had tripled its investment in health and education in the last four years . . . had increased the number of people in job-training programs tenfold . . . had established a new ministry of urban affairs . . . had passed sweeping new legislation to provide equal rights to all its citizens, I believe we would rightly conclude that Country X had dramatically committed itself to a radically improving the life of its citizens.

Our own country has done these things, and more.

And I think it is fair to say that *our* progress has been dramatic—because of legal breakthroughs . . . breakthroughs in old human attitudes . . . breakthroughs in our concept of the society we can expect to build in this country.

But breakthroughs and new commitments—such as the commitments represented by a Model Cities program or an Elementary and Secondary Education Act—which are impressive to the social scientist mean little if anything to the Negro father, or mother, who is still unable to buy decent shelter for his, or her, growing family.

Indeed the long-standing injustices of poverty and discrimination in a society that is rich and free are all the more magnified by the first scent, the first indication of progress.

"The sufferings that are endured patiently, as being inevitable," de Tocqueville wrote, "become intolerable the moment that it appears that there might be an escape. Reform then only serves to reveal more clearly what still remains oppressive and now all the more unbearable; the suffering it is true has been reduced, but one's sensitivity has become more acute."

There will continue to be progress. And, in spite of it—perhaps because of it—the sufferings that remain are going to continue to become all the more intolerable.



That need not and must not mean violence. But it does mean that it may be some years before the intensity of the urban crisis will subside.

### 'WHAT NOW?'


What now? What are the next constructive steps, steps to be taken not in despair, but to be taken in hope and in confidence.

President Johnson's message on the cities says in the most dramatic and clear terms that the time for planning, the time for experimenting, the time for demonstrating the rebuilding of cities, is over.

The President has now put before the nation the grand design for the rebuilding of the cities.

We know what works; we know how to finance and bring the vast power of the American economy to this job; we know how to build new communities. There need be no hesitancy that the job can be done. We know it can be done.

**"What now? What are the next constructive steps, steps to be taken not in despair, but to be taken in hope and in confidence."**



The commitment by the President, which he urges upon the nation in his special messages and his budget, is that we now perform and produce.

Among the next constructive steps are the President's new proposals to the Congress—proposals which would build on the already substantial urban and poverty efforts now under way:

—A national effort to replace 6 million substandard housing units in the next ten years—three times the present rate of construction. Moreover, for the first time in our history we have a specific goal when it comes to homes for all Americans—26 million in the next ten years. With the 1949 Housing Act this nation pledged a "decent home and a suitable environment for every American." Now we mean to fulfill that pledge for 20 million Americans still trapped in degrading, unhealthy, unnecessary tenements.

—A partnership between government and private industry to provide training and jobs by 1971 for 500 thousand hard-core unemployed workers—"the last in line and the hardest to reach."

—Full funding of the poverty program in the fiscal year ahead.

A comprehensive crime control program to provide Americans "the security that they demand and the justice they deserve." President Johnson has declared 1968 the year when "the forces of law and order must capture the initiative in the battle against crime."

Those are federal programs. Will they help? And how?

The other day a close friend of mine—a mayor of a large American city—called me. "Our problems are desperate. We need more federal help." I acknowledged that he undoubtedly did.

Yet, I could not help but be reminded that I had been mayor of a big city not too many years before, and that we had faced many of the same problems he confronts today. Only then there had been little if any federal aid.

The other day I read about an official in a major city who was so distressed about the chances of solving the city's problems that he quit his job and announced he was coming to Washington to lobby the Congress.

### 'WHERE RESPONSIBILITY LIES'

I think we must remember where responsibility lies—or how it is shared—in our federal system.

The Federal government is not a totalitarian central bureaucracy—the source of all funds, all decisions, all power... least of all, all wisdom.

When it comes to the kind of environment American cities offer

their people, the federal government can at best serve as a catalyst for action.

Under our system, federal funds cannot buy outright enough safe streets or clean water or new housing to go around.

What they *can* do is stimulate local and private investments and help mobilize the nation's resources through a multiplier effect.

That federal principle has been the explicit basis of nearly all the opportunity and urban redevelopment programs inaugurated during the last few years. All these programs depend on a partnership among governments at every level and private enterprise, organized labor, voluntary groups and individual citizens—the sinews of a free society pulling together.

Take the case of rent supplements, for which President Johnson has asked a six-fold increase in funding this year.

The rent supplement program is a multiplier. It multiplies the impact of public investment in housing by tapping the creativity, resources and efficiency of the private housing industry.

The result is that every tax dollar invested through rent supplements initially generates twelve times as much housing as it would if it were put into regular public housing projects.

The same formula is represented in the “turnkey” concepts developed during the last few years for public housing.

In the federal Model Cities program, local government—local political initiative—is the basic ingredient.

Federal funds available under Model Cities are meant to stimulate comprehensive local and regional planning, involvement of entire communities and private enterprise in the process of rescuing urban neighborhoods.

### ‘YOU BUILD A NEIGHBORHOOD’

Let me get in my little prejudice. I don't believe you build a city, or save a city, or rescue a city. I think you build a neighborhood, save a neighborhood and rescue a neighborhood. The modern American city is too big to be just a city governed by itself. It must become a cluster of neighborhoods, a kind of a confederation, or federalism of its own, within an area. That is what I think is really needed. The sense of pride of neighborhood, the feeling of intimacy of neighborhood, the competition between neighborhoods, a neighborhood that is big enough to be viable, and small enough to be meaningful, so that you feel an identity with it. That is what is needed in our cities.

Federal dollars will also buy some bricks and mortar. But I doubt that you will see many plaques in years to come saying “This community was rebuilt under Federal Program XYZ.”

That kind of program worked for schools and bridges back in the thirties, and the whole nation benefitted. But it won't work for entire communities in the complex 'sixties and 'seventies.

Part of the answer, I think, lies in this paragraph from the Kerner Commission's examination of the Detroit riot:

“As the riot alternately waxed and waned, one area of the ghetto remained insulated. On the northeast side the residents of some 150 square blocks inhabited by 21,000 persons had, in 1966, banded together in the Positive Neighborhoods Action Committee . . . organized block clubs and made plans for the improvement of the neighborhood.”

That neighborhood remained peaceful because its citizens had a *direct, personal* stake in it.

They had an investment to protect—an investment of sweat, of dollars, and of personal involvement.

And it is sweat, dollars, and involvement *at all levels* of our federal system—from White House to your house—that will be necessary if the urban crisis is to be overcome.

### ‘IT IS OPEN TO SOME CHALLENGE’

The Commission on Civil Disorders fears that “our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal.”

That assertion may be true, although it is open to some challenge.

But if the Kerner Commission's fear becomes a nightmare reality, it will not be so much because any specific government failed. It will be because our free society failed.

. . . because taxpayers waited for someone else to pay for community services;

. . . because Chamber of Commerce and union members in a thousand American cities did not throw open the doors of job opportunity;

. . . because government officials were more concerned with their precious jurisdictions than with the people living within them;

. . . because school boards and PTA's forgot the cost of ignorance in a free society;

. . . because builders, land developers, and real estate people failed to meet a national housing crisis;

... because a complacent or fearful majority ignored the long-deferred rights and aspirations of an increasingly impatient minority.

That is the only way that this Nation can become two Americas—the America of the rich and the poor, of the white and the black, separate and unequal. Yes, my fellow Americans, it could happen. There are signs of it.

### ‘BUT THERE ARE CONTRARY SIGNS’

But there are contrary signs as well.

As the President's liaison with the cities, and as Chairman of the President's Council on Youth Opportunity, I spend much of my time trying to activate the multiplier effect. Vice Presidents, as you know, don't have a lot of authority or resources at their disposal, so I work hard to multiply what I have.

I have called literally hundreds of businessmen and community leaders and others across the country within the last few weeks asking for help with our Summer Youth Opportunity Program for 1968.

The response has been amazing—even from quarters which have been considered citadels of conservatism.

If it has to do with jobs or recreation or training, or help for schools, or for funds to send young people to camp, the answer is almost always yes.

Businessmen across the country are showing a new willingness to provide job-training, jobs, housing and financial backing for inner city residents—and new imagination in discovering ways to make a profit while they're at it.

The building trade unions have promised to open up their apprenticeship training programs to disadvantaged young adults.

On college campuses across this country—once you tune out the angry shouts of a noisy few—you see an unprecedented sense of social responsibility and determination to see justice done.

There are unlimited resources in this country, to do whatever we need to do. What we must have is a clarion call to action, and a sense of vision that we can do anything we set our mind to.

We need to dream the impossible dream, and then fulfill it. That is what makes a great country, and a great people.

### ‘SO DON'T SELL AMERICA SHORT’

So don't sell America short. Not only do we have nearly half the world's GNP at our disposal and an unprecedented reserve of human and technological resources. I find a determination and a willingness



**“There are unlimited resources in this country, to do whatever we need to do. What we must have is a clarion call to action, and a sense of vision that we can do anything we set our mind to.”**

in all parts of our society to overcome what may be the last hurdle on the long path to full democracy.

Woodrow Wilson once said, “Democratic institutions are never done—they are, like the living tissue, always a-making. It is a strenuous thing, this, of living the life of a free people: and we cannot escape the burden of our inheritance.”

I had occasion recently to reread the words of a 19th century political philosopher who called on his followers to "support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order of things" and to "openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions."

We Americans, throughout our history, have always rejected appeals such as that of Karl Marx—appeals built not on reason but on raw emotion . . . appeals which reject the very idea that a diverse society of men can both provide justice and live at peace with itself.

Our American revolution has been a peaceful one—revolution according to Thomas Jefferson. It is not dead. It continues. And now is the time when we must most rededicate ourselves to it.

For if we fail, what hope may others have?

There need not be two Americas—one black, one white.

There need not be two Americas—one rich, one poor.

Not if we, all of us, reaffirm our commitment today to the task of building a free and open and living nation for all the world to see—"one nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."

That is the only America that I want, and the only America you want.





# SPACE EXPLORATION: A HIGHER VISION

*May 7, 1968*

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Remarks by  
Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey  
at the Collier Trophy  
presentation ceremony.

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These remarks were made by Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey in Washington, D. C., at the presentation of the Collier Trophy to Mr. Lawrence A. Hyland, Vice President and General Manager of the Hughes Aircraft Company, for the Surveyor program. The Surveyor spacecraft series yielded a wealth of photos and engineering and scientific data in support of selection of a manned Apollo landing site on the moon.

Mr. Hyland represented teams from the Hughes Aircraft Company, General Dynamics Corporation and Jet Propulsion Laboratory which were largely responsible for the Surveyor program.

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*"Our investment in space exploration is related to our national security and our national well-being. It is related to our common defense and our general welfare. It is related to the subject of excellence in performance, education, industry, and human behavior."*

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*"Our space program is one of the wisest investments this country has ever made. The techniques to put a man on the moon are exactly the techniques that we are going to need to clean up our cities. I refer to the management techniques that are involved, the coordination of government, business, the scientist, and the engineer. We are not going to make these cities over just by a speech, and we are not going to do it either just because somebody wants to put a hundred billion dollars into it. It takes more than money to do anything. It requires knowledge and planning. It requires the technology and the ability to get things done."*

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*"Our space program is a splendid challenge and it is a noble mission — one whose practical benefits for today are exceeded only by the promise of tomorrow. So I urge every American to support the future development of our space program. Don't come in second in a two-man race, because you are last."*

## SPACE EXPLORATION: A HIGHER VISION

By Hubert H. Humphrey  
*Vice President of the United States*

Why are Americans committed to reaching the moon and beyond? I think this is a most appropriate question to ask at this time when there are so many discussions and arguments over whether or not we are properly using our resources. This is not an easy question to answer. But I do think that it is a matter that deserves our most careful consideration and our most prudent judgment.

Why are we committed to reaching the moon and beyond when there is so much to do right here on earth?

Is it to enhance our national prestige? Just to make ourselves feel a little better?

Is it to satisfy our curiosity because the moon, like Mt. Everest, is there?

These factors have something to do with it. There isn't any doubt about that. We are a curious people, and I hope we always will be filled with inquisitiveness and curiosity. I hope that we always have a sense of pride, and that we have a love of nation that drives us to want to have national prestige.

A spirit of adventure and the urge to be first have a lot to do with the magnificent personal performances that are at the root of our successes in space. It is always good to be first in whatever you try to do, particularly when it comes to science and technology and other areas of human performance.

We have decided to commit our resources to venture into space for one primary reason: We believe that this mission to the far-out will produce many down-to-earth benefits for all men, and benefits not only for today but benefits for the future. It is my belief that the nation that is first in science and technology has a chance to be the first to overcome some of the perplexing problems that have beset mankind since the beginning of civilization.

The unknown potential of space alone would be enough to require an investment of energy and brain power and funds into its exploration. I happen to think that maybe one of these days we will get civilized enough on this earth to have our contests, not on the battlefield, but rather in the field of adventure in space and the exploration of the universe. It might very well be that space offers us the chance for peace.

We also knew when we began this great effort that the people who don't explore today find themselves without the ingredients of progress for tomorrow. This great economy of ours today is not the product of accident. The so-called technological gap, even between ourselves and other developed nations, is not just good luck on our part or bad luck on theirs. The investment that this nation has made, both public and private, in men and materials in the fields of science and technology, and particularly in all of the related fields that surround our space exploration, has contributed immensely to our technological and scientific successes. I would hate to think of what would be happening to our schools of science, technology, and engineering were it not for these investments that have been made.

Our investment in space exploration is related to our national security and our national well-being. It is related to our common defense and our general welfare. It is related to the subject of excellence in performance, education, industry and human behavior.

It has begun to produce meaningful and practical benefits right here on earth. Because some men will need to walk on the moon tomorrow, other men are able to walk on the earth today. Our work in the field of space exploration has made it possible for many who are handicapped physically to live a better life. For example, from the equipment that we have already designed for moving across the moon's surface, we have developed a walking chair for limbless and otherwise disabled persons. There is more human power ready to be put to work, productive power ready to be put to work amongst our handicapped than anyone could possibly fathom or imagine.

There is an adapted version of the miniaturized television camera developed for use in space capsules. It can be swallowed by patients to help doctors diagnose suspected ulcers and other physical disturbances. What a remarkable



advance! How do you judge the value of a life? If that one miniature television unit could save a life, who wants to put a price tag on it? The tiny electronic devices that are attached to each astronaut in flight in order to measure his blood pressure, metabolism and temperature can do the very same thing for patients in hospitals enabling one nurse manning a control board continuously to monitor the condition of more than a hundred patients. If we could apply that one principle to modern medicine and modern hospital care, we would save the cost of the entire space program because the cost of hospital and medical care is skyrocketing. The need of manpower in our healing arts is one of the pressing needs of the nation, and we are now beginning to learn something about how to give the best medical care without waste of manpower. This will enable us to have better manpower controls, equipment and diagnosis for prompt treatment. Much of this has come out of our work in space.

Those are just a few of the examples of the practical applications of space research to the very down-to-earth human problems of health. And space research has vastly expanded our capabilities in navigation, communication, and meteorology. I am also chairman of the Council on Marine Sciences, and I know there is a close interrelationship between oceanography and space research.

Space research has given us new products and processes in such fields as agriculture, photography, metallurgy, and oceanography. When I think of the earth resources satellite program, with its sensing devices, I realize that we can save hundreds of millions of dollars in crops by detecting diseases in plants. We will be able to detect underground supplies of water and only recently from a high flying airplane a gold mine was discovered. We have just begun to scratch the surface.

In the space program, we have developed all kinds of things that are even more down-to-earth. We have even developed new paints and coverings and new smoking pipes. We have developed new chemicals, plastics, and metal alloys, and many products and applications in the field of electronics.

There are those who say that we are wasting our money in the space program. Our space program is one of the widest investments this country has ever made. The techniques to put a man on the moon are exactly the techniques that we are going to need to clean up our cities.


I refer to the management techniques that are involved, the coordination of government, business, the scientist, and the engineer. We are not going to make these cities over just by a speech, and we are not going to do it either just because somebody wants to put a hundred billion dollars into it. It takes more than money to do anything. It requires knowledge and planning. It requires the technology and the ability to get things done.

There is no checkbook answer to the problems of America. There are some human answers, and the systems analysis approach that we've used in our space and aeronautics programs in the Department of Defense, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and other agencies. This is the approach that the modern city of America is going to need if it is going to become a livable, social institution. So maybe we've been pioneering in space only to save ourselves on earth. As a matter of fact, maybe the nation that puts a man on the moon is the nation that will put man on his feet first right here on earth.

We might have made some of these advances without ever landing a Surveyor on the moon or without ever probing out in space. We might have and we might not have. At least there are some people that say we would—if we had thought to try—but we didn't try until we got going on this great adventure into the unknown. Much of the progress comes unforeseen, and its achievement depends heavily on the broader objectives a nation set for itself. I think a certain extravagance of objectives—a will to push back the frontiers of the unknown—is the test of a free and vital society. It's the test of a nation that intends to meet the challenges of tomorrow with a running start.

Our space program is a splendid challenge and it is a noble mission—one whose practical benefits for today are exceeded only by the promise of tomorrow. So I urge every American to support the future development of our space program. Don't come in second in a two-man race, because you are last. Support this effort. I am proud to do so and I shall do it with pride and with vigor, and intend to carry the message of space accomplishment now and tomorrow.

The heavens are made for man, just as surely as the earth is, and if a man is going to have his feet on solid ground, he has to have his eyes on a higher vision in space and indeed even into eternity.




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1725 De Sales Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20036

# Pacific Partnership



Hubert H. Humphrey



Hubert H. Humphrey, former Vice President of the U.S., arrived in Tokyo on October 19th in the course of a twelve-day visit to Japan and Korea. Accompanied by Mrs. Humphrey, he conferred with a great many people in official life, as well as the business communities of both countries. Although the primary purpose of Mr. Humphrey's visit was to inspect Encyclopaedia Britannica's operations in both countries in his capacity as a director of EB, it was inevitable that he be repeatedly interviewed and questioned on political subjects—in particular, the matter of relations between both Japan and Korea and the U.S. For many years, date from his long service on the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate, Mr. Humphrey has had a strong interest in the East Asian countries. As Vice President, he performed official missions in this direction.

During this trip, the former Vice President made two major speeches in Tokyo and Seoul. In them he developed his idea of a Pacific partnership, to express the new relationship between the United States and the leading Asian nations. The speeches were given under the auspices, respectively, of the Asian Research Council in Tokyo on October 20 and the Dong-A Ilbo newspapers in Seoul on October 30, 1969. The text of both these speeches follows:

## PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP

A speech delivered by the Hon. Hubert H. Humphrey  
at the Asian Affairs Research Council  
in Tokyo on October 20, 1969



It is a particular honor that you have asked me to speak to you on this day, when we are commemorating the second anniversary of the death of Shigeru Yoshida, the Council's distinguished first and founding President. My subject is the Japanese-American Relationship. I believe that this was a favorite theme of Mr. Yoshida's. It was one to which he devoted many many years of time and energy—as Premier during the American occupation of Japan, and later, as the co-architect of Japan's treaty and, finally, when he set the course for Japan's present prosperity during his later administration.

We knew Mr. Yoshida as an able statesman and a skilled negotiator. We Americans would be the first to admit that, at times, we must have taxed his capacity for patience and encouraged his constant aptitude for frank and sharp criticism. But we remember him best as a good friend and a firm friend. The quality that we admired most in him was his ability to take the long view of things, to see past the daily twists and turnings of single events and look steadily towards the final goals, the long-range objectives on which the peace and prosperity of nations are truly based. That ability was never needed more than it is today.

Shortly before his death, Mr. Yoshida wrote a memorable article for the Encyclopaedia Britannica on Japan's Decisive Century, the hundred years of struggle and progress that began with the Meiji Era. In his comments on Japan's role in the modern world, he continually stressed that "the basic principle of Japanese policy" was and must continue to be "the maintenance of close and cordial political and economic ties alike with Great Britain and the United States." In particular, he emphasized the cooperative relationship that exists between Japan and the United States. In Premier Yoshida's view, this relationship was "natural and entirely consistent with the mutual and abiding interests of both countries."

I would like to address myself today, then, to that key word 'abiding' in Mr. Yoshida's statement about the relations between our two countries. Too many people, on both sides of the Pacific, are taking the short view of the Japanese-American relationship. Too many people are thinking of tomorrow's abiding policy only in the narrow and often deceptive terms of today's newspaper headlines. Too many people, in both our countries, are thinking of themselves as beneficiaries or even spectators of this relationship, instead of being vital participants in this relationship.

On the Japanese side, if you will permit me an observation, I find that the normal give-and-take of business competition is often seen as a one-sided American assault on Japan's 'sacred' economic soil.

And in the political area, some Japanese critics have chosen to view a broad-based American guarantee of military protection as a device of



Former U.S. Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey conferred with Japanese Premier Eisaku Sato at the latter's official residence in Tokyo on the 21 st of October.

so-called "imperialism."

Now, on the American side I find not so much what you could call hostility, as a disturbing myopia. In other words, as a people, we Americans do not see too well across the Pacific.

The American-Japanese partnership, nevertheless, has been one of the most successful and meaningful political relationships in recent history. Because it is based on mutual interest, as Premier Yoshida put it, it is worth any number of hastily drawn mutual aid pacts or area alliances or formal paper agreements. It holds within it the potential for fostering and assuring the peaceful development of the whole East Asia region. If Japan were never to contribute a single soldier to implement the present security pact, or what may follow it, the Japanese would nonetheless constitute the strongest friend the United States could have in this part of the world. This is true not merely because of your economic power and achievement, but more importantly, because of the striking abilities and energies of the Japanese people. It is true also, I think, because history has given Japan a unique ability to exert moral and political influence world-wide, if you want it, in the years ahead.

Yet despite what I have just said many Americans continue to see Japan as it was during the Occupation days. Although our newspapers

and our magazines write long stories about Japan's economic progress, most Americans, I regret to say, appreciate this only intellectually. Whereas American policy towards the countries of Europe, a culture that we seem to have understood a little better, can be, on occasion, quite intuitive, sensitive and thoughtful, we seem all too often to be dealing with Japan as if you were still the docile and spiritually confused occupied country of 25 years past.

Of course, that view of a great nation cannot help but make things more difficult. We have tended to cling to the letter of our pacts, while all too often neglecting their spirit. Now, I am sure that some of the more than 100 U.S. military installations on Japanese soil are of doubtful value. Only recently did we begin to comprehend the force and concern of Japanese public opinion on an issue like Okinawa. I might add that the United States has too many things to do and has many problems of its own at home. So it is no wonder that it is not always worldly wise on great international issues.

It has been widely written that the coming year, 1970, is a year of crisis in the American-Japanese relationship. This may be so, but if so, I believe that we have a crisis for the wrong reasons. There need be no crisis about the Security Treaty.

Thus far, it has served as a shield under which this great country has been able to build up its extraordinary economic prosperity in peace, and, frankly, able to observe with impunity the continual nuclear testing of its two large Communist neighbors.

Ultimately the Japanese must decide for themselves whether to continue this Treaty, with the relationships it implies, or to rearm themselves, with the expense and controversy this implies; or to choose for an unarmed neutrality, with the risk that this implies.

What I am saying is that the year of the Security Treaty need not in itself be the subject of 'crisis' reporting. It has become so because of other factors which have been made into crises when they deserved less. These other factors are, most obviously, the Okinawa question and the matter of trade liberalization. They really should be considered separately. But each should be considered in its true perspective.

For more than 20 years, the United States built up Okinawa as a military base, but regrettably did far too little about the political development or the ultimate future of Okinawa's million-odd population. Okinawa is a Japanese prefecture. It was inevitable that its inhabitants would insist on some kind of "reversion" to Japan. It was inevitable, too, that feeling would grow in Japan for the return of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty and administration.

The United States military administration of Okinawa failed to

recognize or respond to this feeling. And I regret to say that the government in Washington for far too long a time chose to go along with them.

Okinawa's reversion to Japan was always a legitimate concern to the Japanese people, which no American government can or should afford to ignore. If the United States government had in the past considered Okinawa as a political as well as a military method, the intensity of this issue would not now be so great. Americans must now face the fact that the compromise reversion timetables which might have worked in 1966 or 1967, may well not work today.

We should see to it, therefore, that Okinawa is returned to Japan as soon as possible and that any agreement on security matters be negotiated promptly. This will give the American military ample time to plan the de-emphasis of the present base structure. And it will afford both countries the opportunity to work out joint arrangements for Okinawa's defense.

The economic sector is another area where short-term gains should not be allowed to obscure the vision of mutual long-term trading prosperity. Yet my strong impression is that such a tendency is a danger in Japan.

Lately the world of international trade has witnessed a flurry of communiques and counter-communiques, on the subject of protectionism, between Japan and European countries and, notably, between Japan and the United States. Now, perhaps this was inevitable. But the fact that such intergovernment power plays are out of the conference room and into the newspaper headlines does not augur well for happy mutual trading relations for the immediate future. In other words, calling each other names is no way to promote constructive trade relations.

Japan is justly nervous about the threats of protectionism that it hears from across the Pacific, in my country. But American spokesmen are equally nervous about the fence of government restrictions which sometimes hinders the investment of new foreign capital in Japan or the extension of trade.

George Ball, the former United States Under-Secretary of State, was here in Tokyo the past summer. He spoke to many of you. I think he stated this problem of trade very well. I would like to quote him:

"Today," said Mr. Ball, "the Japanese are only beginning to explore the full implications of increasing economic preeminence. You are entering a period that compels a progressive adaptation of your thinking to the evolving realities of a wholly new age. This is never easy for any great nation . . .

But economic greatness carries responsibilities that transcend the homefront-responsibilities in areas of foreign trade and foreign assistance.

"Japan has a special responsibility in view of her giant strides to a top position among the world's industrial powers. Yet in my view, Japan has not yet adjusted its thinking to the full recognition of its own strength . . . I feel it only honest to say to you that unless Japan moves more rapidly toward trade and investment liberalization it may well find the gates to world markets shutting out its products; more than that it could trigger a chain reaction of protectionism that would be disastrous not only for its own industrial growth but for the whole world economy."

I believe Mr. Ball's warning was a sound one, even though a very stern one. It is my impression, however, that there is now a trend inside the Japanese government and business circles to allow increasingly more real liberalization. I would hope that this trend continues. We are both trading countries. It is necessary for both Japan and the United States because of our great reliance upon foreign trade to insist upon an open world market place.

Here, again, it would be a pity—in fact, it would be a tragedy—if we allowed momentary irritations or restrictions to blind us to our legitimate long-range mutual goals. In other words, what appear to be problems of the moment must not deny us some vision of the better days of the future.

Therefore, it is imperative that both government and business leaders act responsibly, knowing there is the world market of expanding opportunity. There is room for your goods and ours. Our task is to keep that world market open and to do so by setting an example.

There are two other areas which continue to strain the Japanese-American relationship: Viet Nam and China. In both of these areas, the policy of the United States has hardly been free of mistakes. I suppose we grossly underestimated the difficulties of the long-term commitment we were assuming in Southeast Asia and Viet Nam. We undertook that commitment without thoroughly analyzing all its implications or adequately explaining our reasons for undertaking it. I think you should know, however, that we are determined as a government and a country to pursue a course which will end this war as rapidly as possible. And that course is now under way.

Yet our involvement there was in response to a real danger, not a fancied one. And, if one looks at the countries of Southeast Asia today, they are seen to be healthier and more self-reliant than they stood five years ago. Regional cooperation, for the first time, has become a new

and active force. Old disputes between the nations of Southeast Asia that sapped their vitality and aroused their peoples are giving way to negotiation and cooperation.

The so-called 'domino' theory that we have heard so much about may or may not have been correct; we will leave that for historians to decide. But the fact remains that aggressive Communism no longer runs rampant in Asia. It has been contested. The non-communist nations are valiantly resisting both subversion and aggression. And I have reason to believe that they have taken heart from the fact that there was a power that would stand up and resist that aggression.

In China we too long neglected the simple fact that a government controlling a vast population existed, and, because it existed, had to be recognized and negotiated with, as other governments are. There are a great many systems existing in this world which Americans do not like and would not tolerate for ourselves. Yet we must learn to live with them. Our policy towards mainland China is one of patient bridge-building in the cultural, scientific and economic areas, which we hope can lead to peaceful and normal relations with our country and all countries. I happen to believe that a policy of deliberately isolating Communist China is both self defeating and dangerous.

For we must and we should trust that, in time, the example of free institutions and the efficiency of free peoples will exert its influence by example and performance on those who must still live under totalitarian regimes.

I don't believe this a naive or a vain hope. I think we have some evidence that proves the point. For this influence is already working its way in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. There is reason to believe that it will exert itself, ultimately, in China. I recognize that this will take time and that, of course, we may be wrong in our judgment. Yet this seems to me the most sensible course to pursue.

With all our defects, United States government policy remains essentially the creature of the democratic will—and never more than today. As the popular mood of Americans shifts and changes, the government of the people's elected representatives shifts with it. And so it should. No man in the White House can ignore the will of people. And in the case of both Viet Nam and our policy towards China, I believe that the world has been made aware of the American people's interests in finding a workable peace in Viet Nam as promptly as humanly possible—and the American people's concern for trying to build a world neighborhood in which nations, regardless of their differences—ideological, cultural or political—can at least live together in respect and self-restraint.



I cannot pretend to be an expert on Asia generally or Japan in particular, but I am quite sensitive to shifting opinions in the U.S. We Americans are now engaged in a period of debate and review about all our commitments and in particular our policy towards Asia. In this debate, the central issue before us is not whether we should turn our backs on Southeast Asia—or on other nations or peoples in less familiar parts of the world neighborhood. It is rather how we can best assess our own national interests and how carefully we can define our own goals and priorities in concert with others. It is not a question of withdrawing from a role in world affairs, but rather what kind of a role should we have.

We know that the United States is a Pacific power. We have interests there. But the United States is not in itself an Asian power. It is obvious that my country and people can reach sound decisions in relation to the nations of Asia only by a very high, intimate and continuing sensitivity to Asian views to the views of the people who live here and must live here. Whatever role we may have in Asia, therefore, must be based on a working partnership with Asian nations which would welcome our participation, and would be willing to join in a common effort, sharing responsibilities to achieve mutually agreed upon objectives—not just American objectives but objectives agreed upon in cooperation and concert with others.

The United States cannot play the role of a global policeman. The American people don't want it and the rest of the world won't accept it both of which are good. But the alternative to American peace keeping cannot be no peace keeping at all. There has to be some kind, and therefore, it must be peace keeping either by the United Nations itself or, even more likely, by regional agencies and instruments committed not merely to the defense of the areas but more positively to the steady development and reconstruction of those areas.

Selective American assistance to Asian countries and others must and will continue. But it is my view that it should continue on a basis of national self-help, or regional self-help. People must want to help themselves. Multi-lateral responsibility is the only way, as I see it, in which small and mediumsized nations can withstand the double pressure of internal subversion or direct or indirect aggression. Therefore, not only should we place high priority upon regional cooperation such as with the Asian Development Bank, for one example, and regional security organizations: but I happen to believe that my country should avoid unilateral involvement, either militarily or economically, wherever or whenever multilateral means are available.

In other words, the American policy for the future is not one of

providing a world umbrella—where everybody's business is our business or our business is everybody's business—but rather a selective interest primarily with those who are willing to protect themselves, work for themselves and engage in regional or multilateral cooperation for the purposes both of the development and security.

A total re-examination, therefore, is under way. It is long overdue and much needed. And this is why in the days ahead the relationship of the United States and Japan is so important. During this period we must learn to reason together, thinking in terms of mutual interest, rather than letting the passion or emotion of the moment—or the loudest noise of the most militant minority—determine the course of action for great peoples and great nations.

At the same time that I advocate a new international posture for the United States in Asia, I have the presumption, as your invited guest, to suggest a few thoughts to my hosts. I hope that, in the spirit of Mr. Yoshida, you will indulge my frankness.

The Japan that moves into the nineteen seventies is, as we know, a totally new kind of world power, a very unique world power—with only modest armed forces, without colonies or hinterlands or even significant raw material wealth. Devoted to free enterprise, you have still managed to retain many virtues of a national family society. You have managed and planned your business enterprises in the disciplined way that other nations have managed and organized their armies and technologies. And you have succeeded in vastly increasing your production, raising your standards of living, without forgetting the human factors on which production must be based. The world stands in admiration of your achievement. I know the American people do.

The American economist Peter Drucker, in his recent book, *The Age of Discontinuity*, noted the watchwords of those two great Japanese business pioneers of the Meiji period, Yataro Iwasaki and Eiichi Shibusawa. "Maximize profits," Mr. Iwasaki said. "Maximize talents," Mr. Shibusawa said. Both of them were right. Both of them, as Drucker said, worked not for a merely rich Japan, but for a strong and achieving Japan and the world of difference.

But Japan, as you know better than I, long ago ceased to be an island, isolated from the main stream of world events. You are a powerful force in a world needing and crying out for help and direction. You have at your doorstep the problem of what to do about the continuing political and economic rehabilitation of Southeast Asia. Quite frankly, it's my view that if there is going to be any hope of real peace or development in Southeast Asia, much of it will have to be realized because of your leadership, your cooperation and your



assistance.

You are facing the monumental task of treating with China and attempting to bring that huge and at times angry nation back into some responsible relationship with the community of nations. This is a very difficult job, and one that I suspect my country is not quite capable of meeting. It is my view that this can be one of your very greatest contributions to world peace.

You have a deep understanding of Chinese history, culture and life. We in our part of the world lack that. (And when one treats with the surface of the problems and fails to understand the whole structure of a society one seldom makes wise decisions.) So we must look to you.

I say this because Japan, not mainland China, is Asia's major power in the best sense of the word—because of your culture, your economy, your education, the strength and vitality of your people, and your government. But yours is a power not for war or aggression. You renounced that. Yours is a power for peace and cooperation. And all of Asia needs your help in the development of its physical and human resources.

Frankly, you have the resources, the talent, the leadership, the knowledge and technology to do more than has been done up to date. I believe that more than ever before in your history the Japanese people are facing outward towards new responsibilities within the international community. And throughout the world community, we must not forget that Japan's very abstention from the possession or use of nuclear weapons gives you a unique moral force. You can be a powerful peace force, and you come with a strong and mighty hand.

All of us in America, therefore, are hoping that the relationship between our two countries will be a help in assuming new responsibilities and in achieving our common goal of a peaceful and stable world order. We have so much at stake in that kind of world order. A peaceful world is our kind of world. Our future, therefore, must be one of true partners, equal partners, talking frankly with each other, respecting one another, understanding each other's limitations as well as our abilities; equal partners working together in mutual respect and trust and sharing in the responsibilities of helping the peoples of Asia achieve true peace and progress.

This nation, your nation, has experienced much in these past years.

This is my hope, my dream of a new day for a better world. The 20th Century is running out on us, soon to be ended. I believe this 20th Century which has witnessed too much war, far too much trouble, deserves the best of us. Our two nations have suffered together and now have had a chance to work together. It seems to me that we can set an example that the world desperately needs. Thank you.

## PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP

A speech delivered by  
the Hon. Hubert H. Humphrey  
at Citizen's Hall  
on October 30, 1969  
under the co-sponsorship of  
Encyclopaedia Britannica (Korea) Inc.  
and The Dong-A Ilbo

It is a particular pleasure for me to be here today and speak to a country and a people I admire and hold in deep affection. I came to discuss with you the Pacific Partnership, which I feel more than ever will become an essential of American foreign policy.

It is gratifying to appear under the joint auspices of Encyclopaedia Britannica and of this great newspaper which for 50 years has been a voice for freedom and independence for Korea.

I congratulate you on your coming Anniversary.

Our two nations have had a long history together or, to put it more accurately, we have packed a lot of history into the last 25 years. Our relationship has been extremely close and open. You are frank, outgoing people—and so are we. Our voices may sound different, but we talk the same language. We have both made mistakes in the course of this relationship and exchanged some harsh words, as well as congratulatory ones. This happens among the members of any family. And when an American visits Korea, he finds in many ways the warmth of a family relationship.

I speak to you today as a private citizen but also a concerned American citizen. For as an American, I am not merely a spectator of Korea's progress. I have shared in it.

This is my fourth visit to Korea. Two years ago I visited Korea as Vice President of the United States to attend the second inauguration of President Park. I was encouraged then by the progress you have made. Indeed, I was inspired by it. I helped in the beginnings of your new science and technology institute which was just dedicated this week. I saw the structure of this great city rising to the sky, growing and expanding and I found many friends.

Now, as I revisit Korea after little more than two years, I must confess I am almost astounded by the great strides and progress so evident. The city of Seoul is transformed. Where before I had seen only excavations, I now see finished highrise buildings. I can not recall any city in the world whose citizens have changed its skyline so rapidly. In the future, I think if I were asked to suggest experts for a superspeed construction job in the U.S., I might insist on Korean contractors.

But change and growth bring their own tensions and their own problems especially the staggering growth you have had here. In 1930, I believe, there were only 300,000 people in Seoul. Now there are more than 4,000,000. It is larger than Britannica's home city of Chicago. The number of your college students and universities has increased literally ten-fold since 1945. Your population has learned or relearned new crafts. Millions of your people have moved into the cities.

All this growth has brought its share of confusion and crowding. It has forced people to learn new things and think in new ways. But these are the challenges that a fast changing society faces and I'm proud to see that Korea is meeting them.

Your customs are changing, because they have to change. And it is your

job to see that what is good abides but what is not essential disappears. Korea is unique among world's developing countries in having had an extremely high standard of culture on the other hand, yet having suffered from an efficient but peculiar crippling form of colonialism on the other. That colonialism is long dead. I think you should know that in Japan today I found a tremendous respect for Korea's new achievements and an active interest in them. I hope, I know that the emerging cooperation between Korea and Japan can triumph over past scars and memories of injustices. Of course, I know you will remember in any case, that although Hideyoshi won the first battle Admiral Yi won the last.

Consider two Korean cities within a few miles of each other, Ulsan and Kyongju. They are classic contrasts. In one, you look forward in creating a massive new industry—steel, petro-chemicals and the like. In the other you look back to respect the traditions of many centuries past. Few cities in the world can equal the history which inheres in Kyongju's delicate eighth century temples and great stone monuments.

No country can live without the mixture of new abilities and old traditions which these two cities singify. I am glad that you express them so well here. For the present projects the past, but proceeds from it. And both build the future. For in the near future, your amazing growth will speed its benefits everywhere.

The late President John F. Kennedy liked to use the phrase "a rising tide lifts all the boats." As a maritime country—and incidentally a country with some of the highest tides in the world—you Koreans can appreciate the truth of this comment. The burdens of building any new economy are heavy. The cost in new buildings and new highways may seem excessive, but if we take the long view, we see in history how such benefits are distributed to all the people of a country.

Your tradition of democracy in Korea has roots deep in your history—the democracy of the village, of the soldier, and of a homogeneous people that lives together. It is no easy task to take these roots and make them flower into a new democracy, where guarantees which have been taught in the west for centuries must be learned in new forms and under new pressures. These forms will be in some ways distinctively Korean ones, for while you build the future you must not break faith with your country's distinguished past.

But it is heartening to see that the Korean people do understand democracy. They are insisting on such basic rights as free speech and a free press—and it is heartening to find that there is growing respect for such rights.

It is equally encouraging to see that the determination of the Korean people to secure for themselves the blessings of education. Your investments in all forms of education—from elementary schools to your great universities and institutes of science and technology—will pay rich dividends in a more prosperous, happier, and free Korea. It is education that gives your country

strength and wealth.

In the U.S. we are still going through the fires of change and growth. We have much in common with you. I would like to talk today about our common associations, our common partnership and the American view of an Asian policy, as one American sees it.

The makers of American foreign policy must now think of Asia with a long view. We must see Asia through the eyes of a developer, a planner, above all a partner. And we must look on the countries of East Asia not as self-contained sealed-off compartments, but as parts of a developing unit—a changing, growing region, but a region. From Japan in the north to Indonesia in the south, there is a chain of free countries, whose people are most actively engaged in promoting and achieving growth. The so-called revolution of rising expectations is not some far-off vision. It is here and now—and no one knows this better than the people of Korea.

Now there are two elements of basic importance to the man or the country who plans for the future: development and security. I put development first, because it deserves first priority. The most important weapon any country possesses in its arsenal are the weapons of peace—education, rising technology, new industry—and above all the will to grow and to increase one's own portion of the world's goods—and to share that portion with others. So development comes first. There are some Americans who put security first and then forget about development. That is wrong. The United States is not a world policeman. No American government, no American army alone can make a people secure, unless that people can develop an inner national strength, a strong economy, and a consciousness of who they are and where they want to go. Outside help to be effective must be based on self-help.

American policy for the future should be one of selective help, where help can be used and built upon. It should be on a regional basis. And we should encourage the countries of a region to help each other. What one lacks, the other may have. But the United States, through our technology, through our wealth, our industry, our experience, does have the means to inject into the planning and development of other nations, certain elements of assistance—in money, in technology, in goods, in the help of skilled people. This can often be the difference between a bare margin of existence and a promising future.

America does not have the wealth to scatter indiscriminately its resources. Events of recent years have made that clear to us. We have problems at home. We have our own under-privileged. We have urgent needs to educate our own people to help the revolution of rising expectations within the United States itself. Our own needs will never make us blind to our responsibilities as a world citizen, as a force for world peace. But they will and must make us think of American aid in a selective way—helping those who sacrifice to help themselves.

The American policy of aid and assistance was never thought of as a miracle, some magic ingredient that can supply a will to resist or an urge to strive further or a sense of political and social unity. When these elements are absent from any country, all the aid in the world will not save it.

But in Korea these elements are present. And they are present in an outstanding degree. That is why the partnership between the U.S. and Korea has proved so successful.

So if I were looking around the world for a country which has used American aid wisely and built well on its foundations, I would not have to look far. The record of growth in this country speaks convincingly. You have a record of achievement that speaks well of your efforts.

Imagine a country that exported only 32 million dollars worth of goods in 1960, but will export over 700 million dollars worth this year of 1969. A country whose economic growth rate now averages 13 percent and keeps going up, a country that could increase its industrial production by 321/2 percent in one year and that almost quadrupled its industrial production between 1961 and 1968. In merely two years, since I was here last in 1967, you have doubled your power capacity in kilowatt hours.

This is a great record, for any country. It is all the more significant because you have transformed your economy by careful planning. You are putting electric power resources where there was no power before. You are creating new industries. You are sending your products overseas at an amazing rate. Yet at the same time you are bringing your agricultural production up to a point of self-sufficiency. In many ways you are two years ahead of your own second five-year plan. I would like to see that record of yours compared with the real results of the so-called seven-year plan of the brutal communist regime in the north. There would be no comparison at all.

Western Europe had a similar recovery with the Marshall Plan. And you know the remarkable recovery of Japan after World War II. Yet both Japan and the western European countries had existing industries to build on and existing groups of skilled workers to depend on. Here in Korea you had to train the people and build the factories right from the ground up—and at the same time, which makes your achievement all the more remarkable.

For you started here with only one major resource—the determination and will of your people—the leaders they found and the traditions on which you could build.

U.S. economic aid in Korea has been selective and on the whole remarkably effective. We helped prime your industrial pump. Now you Koreans are working the pump yourselves, and what once was necessarily massive aid is being reduced to the level of technical assistance and development loans, more and more.

In turn you in Korea will gradually help others. Korean technicians are already appearing in many countries. This country knows the value of selective aid. And you will be able in the future to show others the way that you have



charted such a magnificent record of development.

But now let us come to the element of security. For although I put development first, I know the importance of security. It is the shield behind which the farmer grows his crops and the merchant sells his wares. And you face a great security problem in the outlaw regime in the north. As an American, I value the security of this country as I would my own. We have stood shoulder to shoulder with you in the past and we will in the future—should any threat come into being. The north is not so strong. It is your strength that makes the communist bosses angry and frustrated. But we are determined to see that they will never repeat their cruel invasion of almost 20 years ago. Never.

Now you know that we in the United States are re-examining our own security goals and our world-wide commitments. This does not mean we are abandoning them—in no sense of the word. When I talk about a systematic withdrawal in Viet Nam, I mean just that, a phased withdrawal, at a time of our own choosing, behind which the South Vietnamese can take up their own defense. We have been there for five years—and I must say that in that fight, we look with pride and a gratitude on the sacrifices of those great three Korean divisions who fought side by side with Americans and South Vietnamese against Communist aggression.

But because we are withdrawing our massive ground presence in Viet Nam, we are not abandoning security in East Asia. We have already checked the spread of Communism—all of us—throughout the past five years. And I can say to you that the free nations of this continent are in far better condition—they are stronger, they are bolder—than they were. They have the confidence of men who have looked the aggressor in the face and stood him off. This is true of Indonesia, of Malaysia, of Thailand. It is true in Laos and Formosa and the Philippines. And it is certainly true of the Republic of Korea. The Communists have not succeeded in their plans of subversion and aggression. It is they who have suffered defeat. It is the free Non-Communist Nations that stand stronger and freer today.

But to assure the security of this region, it must act as a region. You in Korea have understood the precious value of regional development, and regional security. You have been taking the lead in both. The meetings held in Seoul these past years to discuss collective security in the Asian and Pacific regions were historic ones. And they are bearing fruit.

Other people are aware of the Communist danger. The Japanese know about it. And the Japanese are as anxious as anybody else to preserve security in Asia. The mutual security treaty between the U.S. and Japan is not designed alone as a nuclear umbrella for Japan. It is just one in a series of plans to ensure the security of an entire region. It is clear, for example, that the American government will soon return both sovereignty and administration of Okinawa to Japan. We must. But that does not mean that Okinawa will be without defence or that American and joint security plans will be abandoned. It means that security responsibility must be shared.

We are a Pacific power, not an Asian power—I have said that before. But we have friends and partners in Asia and we will not desert those friends. All we ask is that the free countries of Asia do what must be done in the way of getting together and standing together for their own security, as well as development. You may and will meet with different degrees of enthusiasm among the Asian Nations. But you will find that the need for peace is very strong essential common denominator—and peace in Asia requires regional cooperation—regional development—regional security with which we in the U.S. can work.

That is why I have stressed the theme of partnership today. We have a joint venture—Koreans and Americans. Its goal is expanding prosperity and ultimate peace. Its risks are great—and ever present. But its guarantors are the strongest possible—the united wills and hearts of two great peoples.



Visiting former U.S. Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey exchanged views with President Park Chung Hee during a visit to the presidential residence in Seoul on the 29th of October.





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