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-1-

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It is increasingly evident that the international situation is growing more critical and dangerous. The possibilities of hostilities and open warfare in the Far East are unmistakably evident. Paradoxically, the Soviet Union has stepped up its propaganda for disarmament, while its senior partner, Communist China, mobilises for military action. Playing upon the fear of thermonuclear weapons, the Communist propaganda machine violates the secrecy rule of the United Nations disarmament conference, and leaks to the world its modified proposals for disarmament - proposals which if not carefully examined would indicate the Soviet's willingness to seriously enter upon negotiations for not only control of atomic and nuclear weapons but drastic reductions in conventional armaments and military manpower. The objectives of the Communist propaganda and the Soviet strategy is to prevent the rearmament of Western Germany and Germany's effective participation in NATO. The Soviet makes these overtures towards disarmament at a time when her military budget is at an all-time high, at a time when her senior partner, Communist China, is preparing for open aggression against Formosa and Chinese Nationalist positions. It should be clearly understood that the Soviet disarmament proposal is predicated upon a starting point of 1955 military forces in being. This means that the Soviet proposal would guarantee, during the extended period of negotiations, Soviet superiority in conventional arms, overwhelming Soviet superiority in combat effective manpower, and considerable Soviet strength in nuclear weapons. Moreover, it would mean a complete halt, in fact the forfeiting of German rearmament and inclusion in the NATO military forces. It would mean maintaining the Communist buildup in Korea, the Communist strength in Indochina, and the Communist

-2-

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massive forces in Red China. Make no mistake about it, the Soviet Union is on the diplomatic and political defensive. In a world that is hungry for peace, in a world that is fearful of nuclear warfare, the Soviet has maneuvered herself into a position of military strength on the one hand and a diplomatic and propaganda offensive on the other. Everything that has happened in these past few weeks in terms of Communist political propaganda must be carefully measured and considered in light of the belligerent and forceful speeches of Marshall Bulganin, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, and Soviet Dictator Khrushchev following the eclipse of Malenkov. Let us not forget that the position taken by Malenkov a year ago, namely, that a war involving atom hydrogen weapons might very well destroy civilization has been openly repudiated in the significant address of Molotov, the supreme Soviet, in early February, 1955. It was here that Molotov made it clear that from a Soviet point of view thermonuclear warfare did not mean the end of civilization; it meant only the extension of, as he put it, imperialistic, capitalistic culture. We must not discount Molotov's policy statement. It prepared the way for an intensive Communist propaganda drive to terrify the Western world with the threat of nuclear warfare, while at the same time the Soviet prepares the political scene for disarmament proposals relating to weapons of mass destruction, thereby leaving the Soviet and Red China with overwhelming superiority in manpower and the use of conventional weapons. All of this is directed towards dividing the allies wherein the United States places great reliance upon the superiority of atomic and nuclear weapons rather than manpower and our

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European allies who are fearful that an atomic and hydrogen war may well be fought in their homelands. Furthermore, the Soviet Union is fully aware that the one area of military supremacy held by the United States is her strategic Air Force. It is this arm of our military power that serves to check Soviet aggressive action. It is this constant threat of terrible retaliation that causes the men in the Kremlin to pause and think before they launch a military venture. It is crystal clear that the Soviet's political policy of today is directed towards four objectives: First, increase the tensions between the United States and her allies. (2) Accelerate and militantly forward political warfare through propaganda, playing upon the fear of nuclear weapons plus economic trade warfare to pull away our Western allies. (3) To seek through limited disarmament proposals concerning nuclear and atomic weapons to remove the one obstacle to Soviet aggression, now our superiority in these weapons, and our ability to deliver them by our strategic long-range Air Force. (4) Permitting, if not encouraging, limited and localized hostilities by Communist China, thereby involving United States military forces in a conflict where we may well be without allies due to political differences.

While all of these developments have been well under way and increasingly apparent to even the most casual observer, we have witnessed our own foreign policy become the victim of confusion, irresponsibility, and domestic political pressures. The publishing of the Yalta papers, particularly the incredible manner in which they were released, has aroused

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a storm of political controversy within our own nation and diplomatic embarrassment amongst our allies. Again we have proceeded without adequate coordination and understanding between ourselves and Great Britain. This unbelievably blunder and unexplainable action comes at a time when there are serious differences of policy between ourselves and the United Kingdom over the offshore islands off the coast of China. It happens at a time when the final stages of agreement for German rearmament are yet in the balance.

In recent days the objective of our international relations has been lost in the twisting and turning of Presidential and State Department pronouncements and action. It is time to reassess what we have been doing and where we are going. A clear-cut statement of our political, our military, and our economic policies is urgently needed. We must dramatically and extensively step up our own political warfare to combat and offset the Soviet tactics, first, by solidifying our position with our allies. Preparatory to any big conference with the Soviet leaders, there must be a complete meeting of the minds of the leaders of the Western powers so that no devious tactic of the Soviet can succeed. Any conference with Soviet leaders requires that we speak from a position of strength, that position of strength to include the final ratification of the Paris Agreements pertaining to German rearmament and German participation in NATO, a pledge on the part of ourselves and our allies to further strengthening of both the political and military goals of NATO, an agreement between ourselves and our European allies concerning the vital questions affecting our security in the Far East. These are the minimum essentials for successful and honorable participation in any form of conference with the Communist nations.

-5-
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Then too, we in the United States Congress must adopt the foreign trade program placed before us by the President. Foreign trade policy that binds the allies together is as important as military alliances. The two are inseparable. Our informational, educational, and political propaganda services need to be expanded and enlarged. The cold war is still a struggle for men's minds. We are losing this struggle not because we cannot win it but because we have not placed proper emphasis upon it. Our radio, television, library, newspaper, student exchange, and cultural programs, while good in quality, are far too limited in their coverage and in their intensity.

On the economic front we have wasted valuable time in meeting the challenge of Communist infiltration due to economic distress, particularly in Asia. It is in this area where our participation through the United Nations, in technical assistance, in health and education programs can check and push back the inroads of Communist political and economic aggression. Then too, we must more boldly and meaningfully outline to the Asians the extent and degree of our own economic assistance to them, with particular emphasis upon long-term loans at low rates of interest for capital improvement projects. The development of new instrumentalities of international financing is a challenge to our political and economic statesmanship.

Finally, it is imperative that we call upon the United Nations to challenge Red China's violation of the Korean truce agreement. The Communist forces in North Korea have openly violated the truce agreement as it relates to airfields and airpower. The Communist buildup in airpower

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is of such an extent that Communist China feels free to withdraw several divisions of her troops in order to deploy them in a position favorable for attack upon the offshore islands of Matsu and Quemoy and ultimately Formosa. Our concentrated attention on the Formosa problem without due regard to other areas of Asia has permitted the Chinese Communists to select the battleground and to favorably deploy our forces in an area which is advantageous to them.

ABSTRACT OF REMARKS BY
SENATOR ROBERT H. MURPHY
BEFORE
UNITED STATES APPEAL BANQUET
ATLANTIC CITY
MARCH 27, 1955

At a time when strength and unity of purpose is urgently needed, America's leadership in our critically troubled world is fumbling and faltering.

Webster's dictionary defines the word "foreign" as "alien in character, not pertinent, not congruous".

Synonyms are listed as "outlandish, alien, and exotic".

From a dictionary point of view, the Eisenhower Administration's foreign policy matches the definition.

Our foreign policy threatens to become "not pertinent" to our international responsibilities, and surely, at times, somewhat alien in character to the leadership of the Republican Party.

In recent weeks the objective of our international relations has been lost in the twisting and turning of

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Presidential and State Department pronouncements and
actions.

Let's look at the record:

Our ally on Formosa, Chiang Kai Shek insists we
are committed to the defense of the off-shore islands.

The Secretary of State, carrying out the policy of
the President, says maybe we are and maybe we are
not; possibly we will and possibly we will not. All
add to the general confusion in a time of crisis.

The President and the Secretary of State informed
us a week ago that we may very well use precision
atomic weapons if the Chinese Communists attack the
off-shore islands. But on Wednesday, March 23rd, the
President in his press conference states categorically
that atomic weapons will be used only incase of a major
war and not in police actions. Are we to interpret that
our plans and relations with Communist China involve a
major war?

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Would the defense of Formosa be classified as a war or a police action? American policy runs hot and cold, uncertain and confused. Surely if these policies are indefinite and uncertain to the American people, they must be even more so to our allies and enemies.

On Monday, March 14th, the official custodian of the Yalta papers in the State Department said their publication would adversely affect the nation's security and our relations with our allies. On Wednesday, the Secretary of State, after conferring with Senate Republican leaders, expressed his astonishment at the revelation that the Yalta documents were in the hands of one of America's leading newspapers. On Wednesday night the documents were ordered released to the nation's press. The White House expressed no knowledge of the release of the papers, and in fact the Presidential press secretary stated the President was not aware of their release.

-4-
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This series of events reveals an unbelievable lack of coordination between the President and the State Department, and a degree of irresponsibility that exposes our nation before the eyes of the world as erratic, unpredictable and politically immature. Regretfully, this same degree of uncertainty and confusion prevailed concerning the proposal of Senator George, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in suggesting a meeting of the heads of state of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France.

For at least two days the State Department clearly stated that Senator George's proposal was in line with the foreign policy of this nation. The President, at least through Monday and Tuesday of the past week, felt such a conference was pre-mature. On Wednesday, the White House and the Department of State double checked their signals, and came to the conclusion that in due time such

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a conference would be desirable.

These policy gyrations and conflicting statements can only add to the feeling of uncertainty and indecision as to American policy.

Perhaps we need a thoughtful reappraisal of what we are now doing -- and what we SHOULD be doing.

Instead of alienating our friends through diplomatic blunders geared to domestic political expediency, now more than ever we should be seeking to strengthen our ties of unity and solidarity with England and other allies, to maintain a common front for preservation of the free world.

Instead of Presidential appointees deliberately stirring up the fires of domestic political differences by providing fuel for attacks upon the Democratic Party, now more than ever they should be devoting their attention

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to achieving some semblance of unity within their own party on vital foreign policy issues that affect the destiny of our nation.

Instead of playing right into the hands of Red China's propaganda and helping turn Asiatics against America by publicly brandishing a big club in threats to use atomic warfare, now more than ever we should be bending every effort to convince Asia our purpose is peace, not war -- development, not exploitation.

Instead of letting the Communists choose their own grounds for a new international 'showdown' where we may be forced to stand alone, now more than ever we should be taking the initiative in diversionary moves of our own to put the Kremlin on the defensive and upset its carefully calculated timetable of Pacific strategy.

Expanding upon some of these issues, Senator Humphrey's comments included:

-7-
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About Yalta papers, internationally:

What kind of reckless diplomacy is it to needlessly insult your friends, when you have nothing to gain and everything to loose? What possible constructive purpose could release of these documents against the wishes of England have in the present tense state of international affairs? As a result of this collassal diplomatic blunder, the free world's efforts for peace have been given a distinct setback rather than been advanced. Hereafter, frankness and candor will be ruled out of international negotiations. Diplomats of friendly countries will be as cautious as diplomats from unfriendly countries in dealing with the United States -- and the cause of peace will suffer.

About Yalta papers, domestically:

Appeasement has never gained us any ground internationally,

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and it will not gain President Eisenhower or Secretary

Dulles any ground trying to appease opposition forces

within their own party. Trying to turn the clock back

ten years might divert America's needed attention from

problems and failures of today, but it can not divert

the consequences of those problems and failures. High

sounding comments of the President against political

exploitation of these documents can not erase the res-

ponsibility of his own cabinet appointee for releasing

them for no purpose other than political exploitation.

The President and his Secretary of State must accept

responsibility for an apparent willingness to toss

bipartisan foreign policy out the window, and risk

playing deliberate politics with our country's future

security.

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About A Bomb Threat:

Threats of A-bomb attacks might create caution in a country responsive to the fears and the will of its people, but have just the opposite effect on a country of a government holding human life cheap, unresponsive to any fears of its own people, and deliberately conniving to tag the label war-monger on the United States.

Nothing could serve the Kremlin better than to jockey the United States into a position of first using A-weapons against Asiatics,, so it can beat the drums of world opinion against us.

One American A-bomb dropped on Red China would do more to turn Asia solidly against us, than all the propaganda the Communists have been able to contrive, and to them be well worth the price in human life it might entail.

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We are nearing the date of one of the most significant conferences in the world's history -- the African-Asian Conference next month from which white people are excluded. Have we no better bid for support of this vital block of the world's people than the threat of atomic warfare? Where is any positive, constructive policy to be offered these people as evidences of our goodwill and peaceful intent, evidence of our understanding of their own aspirations and our willingness to cooperate in their own progress and development?

Let me advance a suggestion.

Let's get away from the negative, and move to the positive. Let's show the Asiatic peoples we recognize their importance under the sun, by taking the lead in proposing India for a seat on the permanent security council of the United Nations.

-11-
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Instead of just saying 'No' to Red China on

admission to the United Nations -- and it is a 'No' I
have always supported -- let us counter with a suggestion
of our own that would give recognition to Asia without
letting an unfriendly power blackmail its way into the
family of nations.

Such a bid to India -- even evidences of our interest
in creating such a bid -- could have a powerful impact in
our behalf at the African-Asian Conference.

Then let us send our friends into that Conference
backed with our assurances of a positive, constructive
development program for underprivileged nations -- assurances
of economic aid, technical assistance, an expanded exchange
program to better understand each others cultures.

And let's send them into that conference with assurances
to the now-neutral peoples of the world that this democracy

-12-
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will never START an atomic war --- but will stand firm
on our resolve to swiftly retaliate in force against a
nation that does risk starting one.

About choosing the grounds for a "showdown":

The time is long past when we can afford to back away
from threats of Red aggression. But the time and place of
any showdown need not be at Red choosing. It should be
obvious that Soviet strategy now calls for forcing our
hand at Matsu and Quemoy, in the hope of making us attack
the Chinese mainland -- a move which they could interpret
as intervening in a China Civil War, and a move which they
know we might be compelled to make without the support of
our allies.

That is to prevent us from taking the initiative
ourselves by shifting the scene of decision to Korea,
where international law is solidly on our side in view

-12-
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of Red China's violation of cease fire agreements? What is to prevent us from calling the Kremlin's hand on such violations by calling on our Korean allies, through the United Nations, to enforce the Korean truce? Is it not reasonable to assume that a sudden buildup of our forces in Korea would do more to upset Red China's calculations about Formosa than anything we do about Matsu or Quemoy? Moving of our bomber squadrons into Korea, where they would be in ready striking distance of both Red China and Moscow itself, would give the Kremlin more cause for concern than any threat to use A-weapons on the Chinese people.



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