


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On U. S. Foreign Policy

by
SENATOR HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

*(Excerpts from an address by Senator Humphrey at the
Overseas Press Club in New York City)*

We are almost at the end of the most momentous year since World War II. It has been a paradoxical year—one in which both the United States and the Soviet Union have suffered severe diplomatic defeats. The United States saw the North Atlantic alliance shaken to its roots when war broke out in the Middle East. And the Soviet Union lost its grip on the captive countries of Eastern Europe.

It is too soon to attempt to strike a balance as to who lost more. It is not too soon, however—indeed, we have waited too long already—to begin an urgent reappraisal, however agonizing it may be, of the world situation and of our own posture toward it.

Quite obviously, fundamental changes of enormous consequence have taken place. No man can foresee where they will end. The old, static condition has ended; conditions are more fluid than at any time since 1945. The cold war has changed from one of fixed positions to one of maneuver. This increases somewhat the dangers; but it also greatly increases the opportunities for statesmanship that is both wise and bold, imaginative and judicious.

Our first task is to assess the nature and implications of these changes that are taking place.

The first thing we must realize is that in today's world there can be no effective foreign policy without risks. There is no risk-proof insurance policy that will guarantee freedom and security in today's world.

One of the basic facts of our time is the spirit of nationalism which dominates the thinking of most of the underdeveloped areas of the world. We are all familiar with the manifestations of this force—the anti-Westernism throughout much of Asia and Africa and the irresponsible fashion in which the Soviet Union has tried to take advantage of this feeling and use it for its own ends. What we are now seeing is the re-emergence of this same spirit of nationalism in the Soviet countries of Eastern Europe.

Nationalism is challenging international communism on its home grounds, and the end is not yet. This points up, as clearly as anything possibly could, the truth of what many Americans have been saying for years—namely, that international communism is fundamentally inconsistent with nationalism and that it presents the most serious threat of all to the hard-won independence of the new states of Asia and Africa. . . .

One reason we need the U. N. is to provide a constructive focus for this tremendous force of nationalism which otherwise would be running wild. The U. N. does not control nationalism, but it does provide a framework in which nationalism can find its proper and responsible place in a world society that is becoming increasingly interdependent. The U. N. can likewise protect and encourage nationalism.

The problems we now face in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have little in common, but it can be said, I think, that the roots of the problems in both instances are nationalist in origin. The challenge, both before the U. N. and before our own government, is how we deal with these problems in a responsible manner calculated to promote the principles of the United Nations Charter, to advance the national interests of the United States, and to bring some greater measure of peace and freedom to the people of the areas concerned. . . .

The ferment in Eastern Europe obviously presents opportunities; but it also places a great obligation on us to act in a sober, responsible manner.

We should be prepared to discuss sympathetically economic aid with the independent governments of Eastern Europe, as, for example, Poland. . . .

Much can be done through other policies if we but have the wit to think of them. And we had better think of some pretty fast, because the manifestations of nationalism in Eastern Europe increase the urgency of finding some sort of security system that Europe can live with. In some respects, the obvious weaknesses of communism in the captive countries may well give the Soviets pause. But in other respects, this situation could trigger World War III—either as a Soviet tactic to re-establish control or as a consequence of some as yet more violent explosion in one of the satellites. . . .

We should continue, of course, to use every avenue available to put increasing pressure on the Soviets through the United Nations in regard to the Hungarian situation. By their arrogant defiance of the UN, they are increasingly isolating themselves from the rest of humanity.

The UN actions in regard to Hungary have not been as vigorous as I would have liked and the situation has dragged on longer than I would have liked, but by proceeding one step at a time we have been able to resolve some of the doubts that troubled many of the Asian-African states at the beginning.

It is my personal view, however, that the UN should go further in regard to Hungary. In commenting upon the UN action in regard to the Middle East, Vice President Nixon recently said that it upheld the rule of law—"the same law for the powerful and the strong as for the weak and the defenseless." What the UN must now do in regard to Hungary is to apply the same law to the scoundrels and aggressors as to the decent and honorable. . . .

Certainly the UN cannot content itself with condemnatory resolutions, no matter how strongly worded. We should not only take steps to insure against the return of the spurious Hungarian representatives who walked out of the UN last week; we should also give consideration to economic and

diplomatic sanctions against the Kadar regime in Hungary and against the Soviet Union itself.

As of now, the Soviet Union and her puppet regime in Budapest have refused to let U. N. observers come into Hungary. We must continue to press hard to demand that these observers be admitted.

Even without observers, the world has learned several things from these recent horrors in Hungary.

First, these uprisings show that there still exists in satellite lands the same love of freedom which is the natural heritage of man everywhere.

Second, we have learned how totally unrealistic it is to assume that the people of the satellite countries will automatically support Moscow. That is a very important lesson.

Third, we have learned that you cannot easily crunch the spirit of liberty. It keeps glowing in spite of years of totalitarian repression and in spite of foreign armies.

Fourth, we have learned that even the youth brought up during such periods of repression still desire liberty and are willing to fight for it. . . .

We have also learned that food is tremendously important as a weapon—both in a cold and in a hot war, and this has become something of a hot war.

Our policy with regard to food assistance has not been clear. It is disgraceful that we should receive dispatches about food shortages, even in Austria, when we have adequate supplies, including supplies of milk, that we could easily have sent. We should dramatize the airlift which we're using to bring in refugees, by sending every plane back on the return trip loaded to capacity with powdered milk and other food supplies, so that our response could be immediately seen and our aid would be dramatic, and inspiring to those who are fighting for freedom.

We should also extend the use of American food to any country that takes refugees and needs such aid, besides Austria. . . .

Revelation of the Soviet oppression in Hungary has had the most damaging effect on the Communist party of anything since the Stalin-Hitler pact of 1939. It has increased the chances of the breakdown of the Soviet empire and has contributed to the unrest of students and intellectuals in Russia itself. Now is the time when America should speak not only in terms of good-will, but in terms of definite actions—actions which may involve risks, but as I said before, there is no risk-proof insurance policy covering such things as freedom and security.

* * *

Turning now to the Middle East, we find an area where the problems are so many and so complex that one hardly knows where to start. It is now truly a power vacuum. Although Soviet influence has greatly increased, American prestige is also at a new high. As the Soviet threat makes solutions to the area's problems more urgent, so does the new American position, coupled with the new solidarity which has developed in the UN, offer hope of finding solutions.

The UN has an especially important role to play. It is dangerous for either the United States or the Soviet Union to try to be the dominant power in the Middle East; this is an area ready-made for the kind of international ministrations that the UN is peculiarly equipped to undertake.

As Germany is the key in Europe, so I think the Arab-Israeli conflict is the key in the Middle East. It is idle to expect peace ever to come to that unhappy area until some settlement of this conflict is reached.

It has been amply demonstrated that the UN will not tolerate aggression in the Middle East. It is also, I think becoming increasingly clear to the states of that area that it is not in their own interests to rely on the Soviet Union. What we must now do is to make it still more clear to the Arabs and Israelis alike that it is in their own interests to reach a settlement, that they hurt themselves more than anyone else by stubbornly insisting that the world has not moved since 1947. In the last analysis, this dispute can be settled only by the parties concerned, and we cannot expect them to do that until they realize that they will be better off with it settled than with it unsettled.

The United States and also the United Nations must be firm and just with both sides. As we acted to halt the invasion of Egypt, so we should now take steps to halt persecutions of Jews in Egypt. We can certainly not stand idly by in the face of increasing reports of anti-Semitism as an official policy of the Nasser government.

In the best of circumstances, it will take at least a generation for the hatreds of the Middle East to entirely abate. The more each side retaliates against the other, the longer it will take.

It is unrealistic to expect an Arab-Israeli settlement to spring fullblown from any single set of negotiations. A settlement in the Middle East must be pursued one step at a time.

The first step is obviously to bring about a complete with-



"WHAT'S IN YOUR BAG?"

(Justus in The Minneapolis Star)

drawal of foreign forces from the area, in prompt compliance with U. N. resolutions.

The second step is a settlement of the Suez Canal problem over and above the physical work of clearance. Here the six principles unanimously agreed to by the UN Security Council offer a good starting point for reaching an agreement on the Canal's operation.

With these immediate issues out of the way and with a groundwork of quiet, careful diplomatic preparation, we can approach negotiations for a general settlement. There are other things, however, that we can also be doing in the meantime. What the Middle East desperately needs is economic development—not simply for its own sake but as a constructive endeavor to occupy the minds and energies of the people and their leaders. We have furnished a considerable amount of economic and technical assistance to the area; yet, with a few exceptions, it has not been particularly effective. We have tried very hard, and have failed, to get agreements on regional projects, such as the Jordan River plan.

The time may now be more propitious for such undertakings, and we should vigorously renew our efforts, not only to get the Jordan River and similar projects underway but also to get some action on the refugee problem.

It might be useful, in this connection, to consider establishing, under United Nations auspices, a Middle East Development Authority. Most of the economic, as well as the other, problems of the area are international in their scope. Most of them also require outside assistance, either in the form of capital, of technical aid, or of good offices. Why not, then, have an international agency to deal with them? The kind of Middle East Development Authority that I have in mind would have, on its board of directors, representatives of all the states of the area as well as representatives of the states furnishing capital and technical assistance. Ample provision could be made to protect national sovereignties.

In any event, it appears obvious that we are going to have to extend more aid to the Middle East—and do it more effectively.

Perhaps the most unfortunate aspect of the whole Suez affair is that innocent bystanders, both in Europe and in the Middle East, are getting hurt. All of Western Europe is suffering from oil shortages along with Britain and France, though none of the other countries in Western Europe can be charged with any responsibility for their present troubles. And in the Middle East, the oil-producing states are suffering from lack of markets, though two of the states—Iraq and Iran—had nothing to do with the events which brought this situation about. . . .

To sum up:

In the Middle East we must insist that the Canal be opened and cleared. We must insist upon the use of British and French and any other available equipment in helping achieve a purpose that is vital to all of us.

We must keep U. N. forces in the Middle East large enough to cope with any danger in the area, and as long as is necessary, until a permanent settlement has been worked out.

That settlement must be one which opens the Suez Canal and guarantees that it will remain open, free and unfettered, for the safe conduct of the shipping of all the world, including Israeli ships. The question of national ownership is sec-

ondary—but the effectiveness and enforcibility of these guarantees must be absolute.

In the end, an Arab-Israeli settlement must be brought about in Palestine. While the Arabs refuse to recognize the existence of Israel such a settlement is impossible. We must use every device available to American diplomacy, operating through the United Nations and otherwise, to overcome this intransigence, to make it clear that we expect to see a settlement reached, and that we insist upon an ending of the interminable border raids from either direction. Meanwhile we must move forward with a bold regional plan for economic aid, such as I have already outlined.

Political factors must not be allowed to prevent settlement of the refugee problem. Wherever these refugees came from—and there are Jewish refugees from Arab countries as well as Arab refugees from Palestine—they are all of them people, and our first concern must be to get these human beings settled and re-integrated as part of the permanent economy of an area in the world that is easily able to support them, given some sensible economic plan and reasonable assistance.

Now to conclude, the year 1957, which is almost upon us, is likely to be even more crucial than 1956. We have got to be both steadfast in principle and flexible in tactics. Today I have had time only to scratch the surface of some of the problems we face. I have raised more questions than I have answered.

I think we can find the answers, but it will take more imagination and courage, fewer platitudes and less blinking at facts, than we have shown heretofore.

People who have experienced the rise and fall of Hitler and the growth of the Muscovite Empire, know that in President Nasser's Cairo, Soviet and Nazi technicians are once more cooperating with all the intimacy inspired by their dead leaders' 1939 pact. Hence few men and women of the Old World can grasp the Administration's masochistic solicitude for Egypt's ruler. Nor can they understand the heartlessness with which Washington has been trying to use oil-hungry Europe's dire need as a means of diplomatic pressure, and showing not the slightest concern for NATO members who have been hurt at least as hard as the so-called "aggressors" in London and Paris. Mr. Dulles, or his successor, will somehow have to restore an Allied unity that, cordial words notwithstanding, U. S. deeds have denied. If the Secretary of State has succeeded in temporarily buying the friendship of Messrs. Nasser, Nehru, Sokarno and Tito—rulers of nations that lack the rudiments of democracy—his job now is to regain friends who are far more essential to the U. S. and whom he has insulted, humiliated and harmed economically.

(Barron's, 12-3-56)

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ADDRESS OF SENATOR HUBERT H. HUMPHREY (D. Minn.)

OVERSEAS PRESS CLUB, New York, December 20, 1956,
12:30 p.m.

We are almost at the end of the most momentous year since World War II. It has been a paradoxical year--one in which both the United States and the Soviet Union have suffered severe diplomatic defeats. The United States saw the North Atlantic alliance shaken to its roots when war broke out in the Middle East. And the Soviet Union lost its grip on the captive countries of Eastern Europe.

It is too soon to attempt to strike a balance as to who lost more. It is not too soon, however--indeed, we have waited too long already--to begin an urgent reappraisal, however agonizing it may be, of the world situation and of our own posture toward it.

Quite obviously, fundamental changes of enormous consequence have taken place. No man can foresee where they will end. The old, static condition has ended; conditions are more fluid than at any time since 1945. The cold war has changed from one of fixed positions to one of maneuver. This increases somewhat the dangers; but it also greatly increases the opportunities for statesmanship that is both wise and bold, imaginative and judicious.

Our first task is to assess the nature and implications of these changes that are taking place.

The first thing we must realize is that in today's world there can be no effective foreign policy without risks. There is no risk-proof insurance policy that will guarantee freedom and security in today's world.

One of the basic facts of our time is the spirit of nationalism which dominates the thinking of most of the underdeveloped areas of the world. We are all familiar with the manifestations of this force--the anti-Westernism throughout much of Asia and Africa and the irresponsible fashion in which the Soviet Union has tried to take advantage of this feeling and use it for its own ends. What we are now seeing is the re-emergence of this same spirit of nationalism in the Soviet captive countries of Eastern Europe.

Nationalism is challenging international communism on its home grounds, and the end is not yet. This points up, as clearly as anything possibly could, the truth of what many Americans have been saying for years--namely, that international communism is fundamentally inconsistent with nationalism and that it presents the most serious threat of all to the hard-won independence of the new states of Asia and Africa.

The rise of nationalism throughout so much of the world presents a paradox in that it comes at the time when most of the more highly developed countries, such as the United States and the nations of Western Europe, are moving more and more toward forms of international organization which play down nationalism. It is both useless and wrong to try to oppose nationalism--useless because any such opposition would be foredoomed to failure; wrong because nationalism springs from basically good, patriotic feelings which are shared to some degree by all men everywhere. Of course, self-determination of national groups has been a keystone of American policy since the days of Woodrow Wilson -- so all this is nothing new to us.

One reason we need the U.N. is to provide a constructive focus for this tremendous force of nationalism which otherwise would be running wild. The U.N. does not control nationalism, but it does provide a framework in which nationalism can find its proper and responsible place in a world society

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that is becoming increasingly interdependent. The U.N. can likewise protect and encourage nationalism.

The problems we now face in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have little in common, but it can be said, I think, that the roots of the problems in both instances are nationalist in origin. The challenge, both before the U. N. and before our own government, is how we deal with these problems in a responsible manner calculated to promote the principles of the United Nations Charter, to advance the national interests of the United States, and to bring some greater measure of peace and freedom to the people of the areas concerned.

Before I come to some specific steps which I think we could well take to deal with this new world situation, let me emphasize two very important points which are often overlooked in discussions of American foreign policy and the United Nations. One is that our ability to control events beyond our own borders is sharply limited. There is available neither in the State Department nor Congress nor the United Nations a magic wand by which we can bring into being, at will, situations abroad precisely to our liking.

The other point is that the U. N. itself is only what its members make of it. It is a vehicle for its members--a mechanism for expressing their combined judgments. As a result of Soviet abuse of the veto, the Security Council has come to be considerably less important, and the General Assembly has come to be considerably more important, than the founders of the U. N. envisaged. The Assembly obviously cannot be controlled by any one power, but many members of the Assembly do look for leadership to states who are more vitally interested in specific questions. This makes it all the more important that the United States--as one of the members which must supply the leadership--have a clear, well-conceived policy.

I applaud the recently repeated statements by the President that some of these problems, such as those in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, must be dealt with by the U. N. But if that is to be our attitude, then it urgently behooves us to have some clear idea of what we think the U. N. ought to do. The U. N. does not act automatically; it is not a kind of international UNIVAC into which you can feed a problem and get an answer. So far, I regret to say, the United States has had only general objectives; it has not had clearly defined policies in regard to achieving those objectives.

There is a tendency among some people to pooh-poo the United Nations as a debating society which can do no more than adopt pious resolutions. What these people overlook, however, is that these resolutions express the collective conscience of mankind. Even the mighty Soviet Union is not wholly insulated from the force of world public opinion. It has taken a considerable beating because of its actions in Hungary. Increasingly, in United Nations votes on the Hungarian question more and more so-called neutralists have shifted from a position of abstention to a position of voting against the Soviets. Soviet fakery, double-dealing, and double-crossing has been clearly exposed. Not for a long time, if ever, can the Soviets count on the same kind of open-minded reception in many of the Asian-African states that they were receiving a year ago. The more we can keep the truth about the U.S.S.R. before the people of the world, the better off we will be.

The ferment in Eastern Europe obviously presents opportunities; but it also places a great obligation on us to act in a sober, responsible manner.

We should be prepared to discuss sympathetically economic aid with the independent governments of Eastern Europe, as, for example, Poland. But there is no occasion for us to rush forward with a massive aid program; among other things, such action on our part would probably tend to push the Poles, and others like them who might come along, back more completely under the Soviet thumb. In this connection--and it applies to our problems in

MORE

other parts of the world as well--there is altogether too great a tendency in the State Department to think of some form of assistance as the answer to every problem.

This is what my late colleague Brien McMahon of Connecticut once called the "checkbook reflex"--whenever a new world crisis occurs, there is a sort of reflex action in the State Department to reach for Uncle Sam's checkbook. Now, the checkbook is a very useful thing, and I have supported our aid programs generally; but too many people have the fallacious notion that aid is good for what ails you and that if you have aid, you don't need anything else.

Much can be done through other policies if we but have the wit to think of them. And we had better think of some pretty fast, because the manifestations of nationalism in Eastern Europe increase the urgency of finding some sort of security system that Europe can live with. In some respects, the obvious weaknesses of communism in the captive countries may well give the Soviets pause. But in other respects, this situation could trigger World War III--either as a Soviet tactic to re-establish control or as a consequence of some as yet more violent explosion in one of the satellites.

Germany is the crux of this matter. A revolt in East Germany in any way comparable to that which occurred in Hungary would have even more serious repercussions. It behooves us, therefore, constantly to seek new ways and means of achieving our objective of a reunified Germany. It might be worthwhile, for example, to consider a European security arrangement of which an important part might be an agreement whereby we would pull our troops out of West Germany if the Russians would pull their troops out of East Germany. If we could thereby achieve a free, united Germany, which would remain in NATO, I think we would have made a good bargain. Let me make emphatically clear that I am not proposing an American withdrawal from all of Western Europe, but only from Germany and only on condition of Soviet withdrawal from Germany and a free, united Germany as a NATO partner.

One of the important effects of such an agreement would be that the frontiers of freedom would be pushed right up to the Polish border. The Poles would inevitably feel, and benefit from, such a development. Their isolation would be reduced. Their contacts with the West would be increased. And the net result would be, I believe, more strain upon their ties with Moscow.

Now, this deal has so many dangers for the Soviets that they might very well reject it out of hand. But the Soviets are having their troubles in East Germany. And in any event, the more they refuse to agree to reasonable proposals, the more difficult their international position becomes.

We should continue, of course, to use every avenue available to put increasing pressure on the Soviets through the United Nations in regard to the Hungarian situation. By their arrogant defiance of the UN, they are increasingly isolating themselves from the rest of humanity.

The UN actions in regard to Hungary have not been as vigorous as I would have liked and the situation has dragged on longer than I would have liked, but by proceeding one step at a time we have been able to resolve some of the doubts that troubled many of the Asian-African states at the beginning.

It is my personal view, however, that the UN should go further in regard to Hungary. In commenting upon the UN action in regard to the Middle East, Vice President Nixon recently said that it upheld the rule of law--"the same law for the powerful and the strong as for the weak and the defenseless." What the UN must now do in regard to Hungary is to apply the same law to the scoundrels and aggressors as to the decent and honorable.

At the same time, we might as well recognize that, if the Soviets are determined to stay in Hungary, we can get them out only by force--and this would extend the danger of the use of force beyond Hungary. But we should certainly make it as expensive and uncomfortable for them as we possibly can. Certainly the UN cannot content itself with condemnatory resolutions, no matter how strongly worded. We should not only take steps to insure against the return of the spurious Hungarian representatives who walked out of the UN last week; we should also give consideration to economic and diplomatic sanctions against the Kadar regime in Hungary and against the Soviet Union itself.

As of now, the Soviet Union and her puppet regime in Budapest have refused to let U.N. observers come into Hungary. We must continue to press hard to demand that these observers be admitted.

Even without observers, the world has learned several things from these recent horrors in Hungary.

First, these uprisings show that there still exists in satellite lands the same love of freedom which is the natural heritage of man everywhere.

2nd, we have learned how totally unrealistic it is to assume that the people of the satellite countries will automatically support Moscow. That is a very important lesson.

3rd, we have learned that you cannot easily crush the spirit of liberty. It keeps glowing in spite of years of totalitarian repression and in spite of foreign armies.

4th, we have learned that even the youth brought up during such periods of repression still desire liberty and are willing to fight for it.

There are still other lessons that the United States, in particular, has learned from the Hungarian affair. We have learned that our immigration act and provisions for the reception of refugees need overhauling -- badly and urgently. Such basic overhauling should be one of the first jobs of the next Congress.

We have also learned that food is tremendously important as a weapon -- both in a cold and in a hot war, and this has become something of a hot war.

Our policy with regard to food assistance has not been clear. It is disgraceful that we should receive dispatches about food shortages, even in Austria, when we have adequate supplies, including supplies of milk, that we could easily have sent. We should dramatize the airlift which we're using to bring in refugees, by sending every plane back on the return trip loaded to capacity with powdered milk and other food supplies, so that our response could be immediately seen and our aid would be dramatic, and inspiring to those who are fighting for freedom.

We should also extend the use of American food to any country that takes refugees and needs such aid, besides Austria.

Finally, we must not treat these Hungarians who have come here just as another lot of refugees. We should be placing the technically-trained and skilled people at once, and advertising to the world that we have welcomed them as a permanent part of our free American economy. This is no time to sit around, feeling that we have done our good deeds, once we have brought a few of these people to our side of the ocean, and housed them in barracks here. That is only a start, which will do little good in this present situation unless we follow it up with other deeds.

Revelation of the Soviet oppression in Hungary has had the most damaging effect on the Communist party of anything since the Stalin-Hitler pact of 1939. It has increased the chances of the breakdown of the Soviet empire and has contributed to the unrest of students and intellectuals in

Russia itself. Now is the time when America should speak not only in terms of good-will, but in terms of definite actions-- actions which may involve risks, but as I said before, there is no risk-proof insurance policy covering such things as freedom and security.

Turning now to the Middle East, we find an area where the problems are so many and so complex that one hardly knows where to start. It is now truly a power vacuum. Although Soviet influence has greatly increased, American prestige is also at a new high. As the Soviet threat makes solutions to the area's problems more urgent, so does the new American position, coupled with the new solidarity which has developed in the UN, offer hope of finding solutions.

The UN has an especially important role to play. It is dangerous for either the United States or the Soviet Union to try to be the dominant power in the Middle East; this is an area ready-made for the kind of international ministrations that the UN is peculiarly equipped to undertake.

As Germany is the key in Europe, so I think the Arab-Israeli conflict is the key in the Middle East. It is idle to expect peace ever to come to that unhappy area until some settlement of this conflict is reached.

It has been amply demonstrated that the UN will not tolerate aggression in the Middle East. It is also, I think becoming increasingly clear to the states of that area that it is not in their own interests to rely on the Soviet Union. What we must now do is to make it still more clear to the Arabs and Israelis alike that it is in their own interests to reach a settlement, that they hurt themselves more than anyone else by stubbornly insisting that the world has not moved since 1947. In the last analysis, this dispute can be settled only by the parties concerned, and we cannot expect them to do that until they realize that they will be better off with it settled than with it unsettled.

The United States and also the United Nations must be firm and just with both sides. As we acted to halt the invasion of Egypt, so we should now take steps to halt persecutions of Jews in Egypt. We can certainly not stand idly by in the face of increasing reports of anti-Semitism as an official policy of the Nasser government.

In the best of circumstances, it will take at least a generation-- probably two or three--for the hatreds of the Middle East to entirely abate. The more each side retaliates against the other, the longer it will take.

It is unrealistic to expect an Arab-Israeli settlement to spring full-blown from any single set of negotiations. A settlement in the Middle East must be pursued one step at a time.

The first step is obviously to bring about a complete withdrawal of foreign forces from the area, in prompt compliance with U. N. resolutions.

The second step is a settlement of the Suez Canal problem over and above the physical work of clearance. Here the six principles unanimously agreed to by the UN Security Council offer a good starting point for reaching an agreement on the Canal's operation.

With these immediate issues out of the way and with a groundwork of quiet, careful diplomatic preparation, we can approach negotiations for a general settlement. There are other things, however, that we can also be doing in the meantime. What the Middle East desperately needs is economic development --not simply for its own sake but as a constructive endeavor to occupy the minds and energies of the people and their leaders. We have furnished a considerable amount of economic and technical assistance to the area; yet, with a few exceptions, it has not been particularly effective. We have tried very hard, and have failed, to get agreements on regional projects, such as the Jordan River plan.

The time may now be more propitious for such undertakings, and we should vigorously renew our efforts, not only to get the Jordan River and similar projects underway but also to get some action on the refugee problem.

It might be useful, in this connection, to consider establishing, under United Nations auspices, a Middle East Development Authority. Most of the economic, as well as the other, problems of the area are international in their scope. Most of them also require outside assistance, either in the form of capital, of technical aid, or of good offices. Why not, then, have an international agency to deal with them? The kind of Middle East Development Authority that I have in mind would have, on its board of directors, representatives of all the states of the area as well as representatives of the states furnishing capital and technical assistance. Ample provision could be made to protect national sovereignties.

In any event, it appears obvious that we are going to have to extend more aid to the Middle East--and do it more effectively.

Perhaps the most unfortunate aspect of the whole Suez affair is that innocent bystanders, both in Europe and in the Middle East, are getting hurt. All of Western Europe is suffering from oil shortages along with Britain and France, though none of the other countries in Western Europe can be charged with any responsibility for their present troubles. And in the Middle East, the oil-producing states are suffering from lack of markets, though two of those states--Iraq and Iran--had nothing to do with the events which brought this situation about.

And the poor old American taxpayer is left to pick up the check. I don't think there is anything else for him to do, however, in his own interests. After too long a delay, we properly began steps to relieve the Western European oil shortage. We had to do so; otherwise, the West European economy would be wrecked and we would lose our \$13 billion investment in the Marshall Plan. I think we should also take a look very soon at the economic effects of the Suez crisis in the Middle East.

To sum up:

In the Middle East we must insist that the Canal be opened and cleared. We must insist upon the use of British and French and any other available equipment in helping achieve a purpose that is vital to all of us. We must keep U. N. forces in the Middle East large enough to cope with any danger in the area, and as long as is necessary, until a permanent settlement has been worked out. That settlement must be one which opens the Suez Canal and guarantees that it will remain open, free and unfettered, for the safe conduct of the shipping of all the world, including Israeli ships. The question of national ownership is secondary -- but the effectiveness and enforceability of these guarantees must be absolute.

In the end, an Arab-Israeli settlement must be brought about in Palestine. While the Arabs refuse to recognize the existence of Israel such a settlement is impossible. We must use every device available to American diplomacy, operating through the United Nations and otherwise, to overcome this intransigence, to make it clear that we expect to see a settlement reached, and that we insist upon an ending of the interminable border raids from either direction. Meanwhile we must move forward with a bold regional plan for economic aid, such as I have already outlined.

Political factors must not be allowed to prevent settlement of the refugee problem. Wherever these refugees came from -- and there are Jewish refugees from Arab countries as well as Arab refugees from Palestine -- they are all of them people, and our first concern must be to get these human beings settled and re-integrated as part of the permanent economy of an area in the world that is easily able to support them, given some sensible economic plan and reasonable assistance.

Now to conclude, the year 1957, which is almost upon us, is likely to be even more crucial than 1956. We have got to be both steadfast in principle and flexible in tactics. Today I have had time only to scratch the surface of some of the problems we face. I have raised more questions than I have answered.

I think we can find the answers, but it will take more imagination and courage, fewer platitudes and less blinking at facts, than we have shown heretofore.

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