

PEOPLE, PEACE AND PROGRESS

Remarks by

Senator Hubert H. Humphrey

at Boston University

May 5, 1958

It is always a wonderful tonic for me to return, however, briefly, to a college or university campus. It makes me nostalgic. I was once a political science professor myself. I miss that kind of life more than I can say. And I like to return to it at least briefly. I feel at home here this noon.

The idea of a university, and the purpose of a university, are today more important than ever before. "Bigness" has become almost a universal trait of our society -- business is big, agriculture is big, labor unions are big, and our education is big. But regardless of the purposes of these other institutions, the purpose of education is not mass production. The purpose of education is still the individual -- his knowledge and his values. The bigger the rest of our civilization becomes, the more important it is for education to keep reminding us that we can lose something in this process if we are not careful. The bigger we get, the farther we remove ourselves from those personal contacts that are the most fertile seeds of human understanding and progress. We begin to get trapped by the complexities of our problems, and lose sight of the human beings and the human values involved in these problems.

What has happened in our business, our agriculture, and our labor unions has also happened in our government. With the expansion and growing complexity of the governmental process has come a depersonalization that often can have deplorable results. All too frequently the government, and I include Congress as well as the Executive in that term, has a tendency to deal with "problems" rather than with people.

A case of unemployment in Detroit, for instance, with all the heartbreak and the personal tragedy that is involved, manifests itself in Washington, not in all its human aspects, but as a statistic -- a figure that makes the bar on the graph grow a little taller or a little shorter as the case may be. Unfortunately, one of the basic deficiencies of the present Administration is its habit, born perhaps of long business experience of most of its members, of preoccupying itself with "problems" to the neglect of people -- and the hopes, aspirations, and needs of people.

Harsh and unsympathetic as this mistaken behavior can be and is on the domestic scene, it is positively calamitous when it infects our foreign policy.

To concentrate on the technicalities and abstractions of "problems" can become disastrous. Our message must be one of concern for and interest in people.

Ironically enough, the Soviet Union, where the basic political philosophy of the Communist rulers is glorification of the state and the suppression of individuality and personal rights, has grasped the fact more than we, that foreign policy affects and influences people. The barrage of letters and statements fired by Khrushchev into the world press and over the world airwaves shows that he understands all too well that there are people in the world and that their opinions are the key to the future course of affairs on our planet.

Unfortunately, in Washington, the capital of "government of the people, by the people and for the people", many in the Administration seem to be only dimly aware that we must live and work with live human beings, with impressionable minds and emotions, inhabiting the great wide world beyond our national borders.

At home and abroad there is a crying demand for peace. People are sick and tired of war and conflict, whether "dirty" or "clean", "hot" or "cold" or lukewarm. They want an end to struggles for power, for influence and advantage, among a few big nations.

In many parts of the world where poverty, illness, and misery have been the lot of the common people for countless centuries, people are astir with longing for some of the comforts and better things of life. Probably the most remarkable phenomenon of our age is the vast disparity between levels of technological progress in various countries -- some parts of the world rushing headlong into the atomic and space age, while others are still eking out a meager living with stick hoes and traveling in buffalo carts. This is a maladjustment that could be explosive if not corrected. Progress everywhere must be brought into closer harmony.

Peace and progress -- the achievement of one and the stimulation of the other -- are two of the prime obligations that we must meet if we are to be true to ourselves and just to all men. They are obligations of "people to people", and they must be comprehended as such, or we can badly miss our mark. To treat these aims of our policy as governmental problems, rather than as relationships of the most personal sort, is to invite continued failure and perhaps catastrophe. Yet sadly enough, there are few signs that our present errors are soon to be corrected.

PEACE

Let us first look at the question of peace -- more specifically, of disarmament. For the State Department; the Department of Defense, and the Atomic Energy Commission, this is a "problem". These agencies know that people around the globe are terribly interested in disarmament, but how to cope with this fact is, to them, only another phase of the "problem".

The Atomic Energy Commission and the Defense Department do really fine jobs in carrying out their technical responsibilities.

The AEC for instance, has done a competent job in the scientific and technological development of atomic energy and nuclear weapons, but it does not see these weapons clearly in their essentially human context. The AEC spokesmen want to develop so-called "clean" nuclear weapons in the interests of humanity. The AEC does not seem to realize that the felt needs of the people here and now, do not fall into the "clean weapons" category. It does not realize that, in the interests of people rather than of some remote, abstract humanity, it would be far better to formulate methods of controlling and inspecting atomic armaments now than it would be to clean them up, which in essence means only to focus their destructiveness and make them, as Secretary Dulles puts it, more "useful" militarily.

The Defense Department, too, is affected by the same limited perspective. It views modern weapons as problems in "military science and strategy", neglecting their impact on the delicate framework of human relationships. To be sure, the Pentagon's task is military defense. It wants to expand and improve armaments, not throw them into the scrap heap.

Even in the State Department, where one would expect a more profound appreciation of the political implications and desirability of formulating an effective disarmament policy, there has been a rigidity and a blindness that have throttled the initiative and vision required for a solution of the mounting arms crisis.

The paralysis of our disarmament policy is due in part to that bigness and complexity to which I referred earlier. Major disarmament policy decisions are made in the National Security Council, in which many agencies like State, Defense, and the AEC bring to a central point their often divergent and conflicting views. Disarmament policy, in other words, is the end product of a tortuous process that starts at numerous individual desks and winds its way painfully through a maze of bureaus, agencies, committees and departments until it emerges as a meaningless and inadequate compromise. It is subject to all the deadening apparatus that complicated government can bring to bear upon it.

Frankly, the only way to slash through this confusing machinery is by the exercise of inspired leadership at the top where the ultimate responsibility resides. But this kind of leadership has been woefully lacking. In its place have been complacency and inertia, with the result that disarmament has remained simply a technical or a legal problem, divorced from the human considerations which the situation demands.

As evolved by the tortuous apparatus of policy-making, our disarmament proposals have been masterpieces of complexity, obscurity, and rigidity. At London last year the United States proposed a complicated, interlocking disarmament package. All this was done on the pretext of safeguarding national security. The theory ran something like this.

If we gave up nuclear tests, then to be secure there had to be a ban on the manufacture of nuclear weapons and a reduction of nuclear weapons stockpiles. But if we did these things, then to add to our security, we had to have a reduction in armed forces and conventional weapons in which the Soviet Union had superiority. Then just to be doubly secure we had to have inspection on the ground and in the air specifically designed to warn of surprise attack. A couple of other proposals were thrown into the package just to round it out. All this was supposed to constitute a "first step" agreement which could lead the way to further disarmament steps later on. Obviously, if we had ever gotten agreement to such a first step, we would not have had to worry much about a second or third step, for the millenium of peace would have been near.

The futility of trying to negotiate such a complex package in the name of security is so obvious that I hesitate to draw it to your attention. By proposing such a package we were not advancing security, we were jeopardizing it. When nuclear bombs and missiles are dangling menacingly over our heads, the first step toward security has to be immediate and practical. The package was entirely too complicated.

Now the United States disarmament package was also intended to impress the world with the sincerity of our hopes for disarmament. But the gaps and obscurities in it were so prominent, that it had the opposite effect. For years the United States had hammered away at the theme that disarmament must be backed up by effective inspection, because of the risk that the Soviet Union would try to cheat. In view of the character of Communist ideology and the long record of broken pledges by the Kremlin, this was sound policy.

However, incredible as it might seem, the United States never evolved a practical plan of inspection for any of its London disarmament proposals, except possibly for its "open skies plan" of aerial inspection against surprise attack. We gave the impression that one of the main sticking points between us and the Russians was that we favored and demanded effective inspection whereas they really did not. Yet we never put on the table a specific plan of inspection or even a study proving that inspection was feasible. Here was another instance where we failed to understand that our policy must be directed at serving the needs of people, rather than at drafting theoretical blueprints in a political vacuum.

All around the globe, people want atomic tests to end. They want to put a stop to radioactive fallout which many believe can shorten their lives or deform their children. Above all they want to make some start toward eliminating nuclear arms from the arsenals of potential belligerents. They do not understand why we persist in refusing to break up our cumbersome disarmament package and commit ourselves to a simple proposal for suspending atomic tests.

The reasons we have given to justify our basic inflexibility have, paradoxically, been unusually flexible.

At one time we said it was because we could not act without the concurrence of our allies. Furthermore, it seems hard to imagine how, if the United States and the Soviet Union ever came

to a genuine agreement on an inspected test suspension, Britain, France, and other countries could long withhold their support and cooperation.

It is an open secret that a hot controversy is raging in the ranks of the Administration over whether inspection for a suspension of nuclear tests could be made really effective. To settle this quarrel the President called on Dr. James Killian and his assistants to study the technicalities and let him have a decision. Recently, Dr. Killian reported that an inspection system of reasonable reliability was technically feasible.

At this point the arguments against suspending tests went through another switch, this time heavily stressing the point that we had to develop small "clean" weapons, a process that would take several years at least.

The United States position has been made all the more embarrassing by the Soviet announcement a few weeks ago that it had unilaterally suspended atomic tests. I agree with the President and the Secretary of State that this Soviet maneuver was a fraud and a gimmick. On the very day of the Soviet announcement I denounced it on the floor of the Senate as meaningless except for propaganda purposes.

It made no provision for inspection to verify that it was actually going to be carried out, and, coming as it did after the most intensive series of experimental explosions in Soviet history, it was transparently timed to coincide with a natural break in Soviet testing.

But mere denunciation of Soviet propaganda maneuvers is not enough. Here again the United States has treated the disarmament questions as though it were a theoretical problem, and not a live question affecting thinking and breathing people. Having issued statements rebutting the Soviet announcement, the State Department then rested on its laurels. But we cannot make progress in this role of a perpetual rebutter. This negative attitude can get us nowhere. We must offer positive policies and put positive momentum into our endeavors for peace.

I propose that the United States move off dead center and inject fresh vigor into its disarmament policy by adoption of the following proposals:

1. We should immediately slash through all the red tape bogging down the present United States disarmament package and announce our willingness to enter into an agreement, verified by effective inspection, to suspend nuclear weapons tests for a temporary period of two or three years. This simple proposal will be a cogent demonstration of our desire and willingness to act on behalf of peace.
2. The United States should immediately make known the kind of inspection system it believes is necessary to backstop an international ban on atomic tests. There is no practical reason why this cannot now be done. Dr. Killian's report on an inspection system is now complete. Let's spread it out publicly in front of the Soviet Union and say, "This is where we stand. What about you?" This will call the Kremlin's bluff and the world will watch and judge what Khrushchev then does.
3. The proper locale for formal presentation of our proposal is the United Nations. According to the resolutions of the General Assembly at its last session, we and the other principal negotiating nations on disarmament have a responsibility to carry on arms limitation

talks within the UN Disarmament Commission. The Soviet Union has expressed its intention of boycotting the Commission. There is no valid reason why this should give us pause. Regardless of what Moscow does, we are still subject to the recommendations of the General Assembly, the collective voice of the nations of the world. The UN Disarmament Commission should meet and note the absence of the Soviets, etc. If the Disarmament Commission cannot carry on its work profitably because of the noncooperation of the Soviet Union, then we should take the arms limitation question to the UN Security Council. The Soviet Union cannot afford to cold-shoulder the Security Council. It tried that once before -- at the time of the Korean aggression -- and got badly jolted when the Council acted very effectively in its absence. In the Security Council the Soviet negotiators can be brought before the bar of world opinion. There they can be compelled to take a stand on our proposals, to vote either "Da" or "Nyet" to practical measures for peace. The world can then plainly see who is encouraging or blocking progress of the world toward more tranquil relations.

4. In the United Nations we should be flexibly ready to adapt our proposals to any reasonable conditions proposed by other countries. This is particularly true in regard to inspection. An international inspection system must be effective, but it does not necessarily have to follow every detail that we suggest. Among the first items of business, we should initiate a proposal for a United Nations commission on inspection to study our plan, the Soviet plan if it is presented, and any other plans brought forward by attendant nations.

This impartial study commission could then develop, through independent procedures, an inspection network adequate for assuring success of a test suspension.

5. We should take into account the fact that not all nuclear explosions are conducted for the purpose of perfecting weapons. This powerful blasting force has considerable potential for peaceful engineering operations, such as boring mines, digging channels and leveling mountains. The Soviet Union has recently announced its intent to conduct engineering operations with nuclear charges and our own Atomic Energy Commission has made public various kinds of projects in which nuclear blasting could be profitably carried on. Provisions for peaceful applications of nuclear explosions under appropriate United Nation's surveillance and inspection should be included in an international agreement terminating weapons tests.

The adoption of a dynamic and positive policy of disarmament is only part of the job of bringing lasting peace to the world. The proposals I have outlined will not provide a final and conclusive resolution of the conflict and tensions in the world. They constitute only a first step, but which, if adopted, could have immense political implications. They would be a major breakthrough the hard crust which the Soviet Union has constructed around itself to shut out the flow of thought and communication from the free world. If we penetrate the Iron Curtain with an inspection system for an effective ban on nuclear weapons tests, then the door would be thrown open for further measures to advance the cause of peace.

PROGRESS

But peace alone, essential though it is, is not our only goal. We must also think of progress. Maintaining peace should not mean maintaining the status quo. Attempts to keep the peace can be construed as such, if we do not have anything else to offer.

If we are to reach through to people effectively, we cannot afford to be cast in the role of supporting the status quo in the world. It just happens that hundreds of millions of people are not satisfied with things as they are. They have caught glimpses of a better life, and are determined to get it for their children. People in the under-developed two-thirds of the world have embraced and embarked upon a revolution -- what Toynbee calls a "revolution of rising expectations". For our part, we must not block these aspirations. If we do, we will earn and deserve the enmity that "have nots" feel toward the uncaring "well-to-do".

Americans, one would think, should be sympathetic toward this new revolution. Our own country was founded that way. For generations the American Revolution was held up as an example to all peoples dissatisfied with their status. For years, we encouraged and supported the aspirations of any people for national self-determination and economic independence. We justified our own revolution on the principle of the worth of the individual man. Our declared purposes were to insure his personal liberty and give him the opportunity to advance his welfare. When these same legitimate aims are sought in Asia and Africa we must not appear irritated and annoyed. Nor should we become the spokesmen for the status quo.

Instead, of course, we should join with the spirit of independent nationalism that grips the underdeveloped and under-privileged countries, reminding these people that we too are the children of self-determination, of revolution, and of a will to freedom and independence. These people will be a powerful force in decades to come, and we must help them prepare to use their strength in behalf of freedom.

We can aid them, if we will, to progress toward their two-fold revolutionary goal of economic development and advancement of human dignity goals upon which our own good life is based.

Now, such progress is not automatic. Liberty and democracy are not the inevitable results of full stomachs, as we sometimes have let ourselves believe. In the desperate drive to overcome centuries of colonialism and deprivation, newly independent peoples may rush into communism, or fall victim to the new economic imperialism of the Kremlin. The Soviet Union exerts a powerful gravitational pull over people who as yet are uncommitted to a modern way of life.

Moreover, Soviet policy is flexible. The Kremlin can throw a huge sum suddenly into Egypt or Indonesia, while we must await the slow procedures of the democratic process to institute new programs abroad.

The Soviets can concentrate their resources to buy or sell products in order to achieve political advantage abroad, while our own trade is subject to fluctuations of an uneven economy and a wavering international trade policy.

The Soviet Union can promise long-term loans at minimal interest and delayed repayment; our banking philosophy has usually insisted on higher interest and "normal" repayment. The Soviet Union through education and marshalling of all its resources has achieved a tremendous rate of growth in scientific and economic prowess; we have allowed a wastage of intellectual talent and a falling off of our rate of economic growth -- needlessly!

The Soviets now appear to have broken through in technology to a point where Khrushchev can proclaim -- as he did again after returning from Hungary -- "A war of consumer goods" with the United States.

The result of all this is that we have lost much of our leadership in the nearly world-wide revolt against slavery to nature and to human exploitation. We are allowing the Soviets to seize this leadership. In doing so, we risk the loss of the uncommitted nations to the cause of freedom in our time. If we lose them, there will pass into Soviet hands a preponderance of power that will eventually annihilate the peace we are trying so hard to preserve.

The only way out of this morass is for America to reassert its own leadership of the great forces of revolution toward the better life now stirring half the world. We must show these people how to achieve progress toward human betterment, and how to accomplish it without the violence of arms and without insidious capture by totalitarianism along the way.

Such progress can be had through intelligent action on the part of the United States. It will require a vigorous and imaginative foreign policy consisting of more than military pacts encircling the Soviet Union. Our policy must be based upon ideas of economic and political assistance to encircle ourselves with viable, prosperous, actively free peoples.

To embark upon a program of world progress that has some chance of success, we need a thorough going reorientation of our foreign aid program. It needs to be new, and it needs to look like a new program.

It is fair to say, I believe, that we have never really had a definite policy for speeding up the economic growth and development of friendly non-Communist countries. Whatever we have done along this line was basically only incidental to our military containment policy. Hence, the appropriateness of the term "defense support" for much of our development aid.

I believe the time has come to weave an over-all pattern for overseas aid -- "a grand design" bold enough to capture the imagination of the American people -- and of the world -- and clear enough to commend itself to men of good will everywhere as the sure way forward to economic progress plus -- rather than minus -- freedom. I should like to suggest several principles to guide our policy.

1. We should separate the economic assistance program of foreign aid from the military program. Once again this year, I am attempting within the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, to achieve this separation. Last year the President recommended a separation, which was accepted by the Senate, but turned down by the House of Representatives. For some reason this year the President has not seen fit to repeat this suggestion.

In continuing to associate these two very different types of support -- military aid and economic aid -- we have generated a confusion that is harmful both abroad and here at home. Overseas we have been tagged as warmongers -- of wishing only to buy minions to stand guard for us and of forcing a distortion in the economies of backward countries that cannot support heavy military budgets. Here at home the combination of military and economic aid has magnified out of all proportion, in the public mind, the percentage of money being spent abroad on non-military projects. And unfortunate results of certain programs undertaken for military expediency have cast discredit on all sound foreign economic endeavors. Hence separating these programs makes sense to me.

2. We should put our foreign aid on a long-term basis. We have insisted on annual appropriations and scathing reviews. This has led to restrictive, shortsighted arrangements that have benefited us neither economically nor from a propaganda standpoint. Our foreign aid officials need to be able to sit down with officials of other countries and make a realistic study of their needs and capacities over a period of years to plan out a program of sound growth. They need to be able to make long-term commitments and be able to revise programs as experience dictates. This way the programs with the greatest merit could be devised and followed through. This way, the full impact of our aid could be made apparent to the people concerned. We need to be realistic about loan rates and repayment schedules in order to make our offers usable and competitive.

3. We should greatly enlarge the scope of our program. Something on the order of \$3 billion a year would not be out of line. Last year the Committee for Economic Development suggested from \$500 million to \$1.5 billion in new capital each year, over and above the present flow. The most detailed estimate I have seen came up with a total cost of \$2.5 billion a year, of which some part would be borne by other industrialized countries, part could be financed with American farm surpluses, and the balance of about \$1.5 billion a year would be provided by American public funds. This represents a little less than we are now spending on so-called "economic aid", though of course under the MIT proposal this amount would go entirely for economic development, rather than military support.

We can easily afford this expense. Look at it this way. In the present recession we are allowing extensive resources to lie idle. In 1958 we have a surplus capacity of some 13%. For every million unemployed over the two million mark, the country is losing some \$600 million a month in national output. At the present level of unemployment, equivalent to some 6,500,000, we are losing--irretrievably--over \$2½ billion a month, or more than \$30 billion dollars a year, in goods and services. It is not even a "giveaway" since nobody is receiving it and nobody is benefiting from it. Our present rate of waste in terms of idle men and unused resources is far, far more than the rate of aid the people of all the underdeveloped countries could possibly use in helping them achieve improved living standards.

Anyway, the question has never been whether we can afford it, but whether our national interest will assign a sufficiently high priority to this foreign policy leadership to justify the use of our resources.

4. We need to increase the consumption level of the underdeveloped countries. We should not expect their peoples to wait for decades or even generations to reap some of the benefits of an industrializing society. England collected the capital for its industrial revolution at the cost of great misery on the part of its voteless proletariat. In the Soviet Union and in China, totalitarian governments can sweat the needed capital out of the skins of the peasants. Only in resource-rich United States could economic growth take place under more desirable conditions -- and we were substantially aided by huge foreign

investments and large numbers of mature, trained immigrants. The people of the new countries who have achieved political liberation should not be expected to await the economic millennium in an unforeseeable future.

Our immediate program to raise their consumer standards is through the use of our surplus resources of food and fiber. Besides raising living standards, increased supplies of vital commodities would enable these countries to start needed public works programs without the inflation of food costs such additional requirements would generate. From a domestic standpoint, nothing could be more sound than to restore economic stability and prosperity for some of our own farmers while dedicating our greatest unused productive capacity to advancement of our world policy aims. We have taken a step toward utilization of farm products in foreign programs through Public Law 480, which I have been proud to sponsor and to support. This program allows the sale abroad for foreign currencies of surplus agricultural products. While the Senate has approved an increase for this program for next year, we have not yet fully exploited the possibilities of this measure.

Permanent programs of raising consumption levels abroad depend upon large-scale investment in consumer goods industries by foreign capital. Our private corporations are willing to explore for oil and minerals and develop them abroad, but they have not been ready to produce clothing, shoes, and simple conveniences there. I believe the government could well guarantee a rate of return equal to the cost of the capital if American manufacturers would be willing to share their managerial skills and investment funds.

In addition, a way should be found to establish consumer credit in these countries so that the workers can partake in the fruits of their labors at once.

5. We need to have a sensible foreign trade policy in order that other countries in the world may prosper.

Obviously, the closer our economic relations with our allies the more stable our political and military ties will be; contrariwise, the weaker our economic relations, the less effective our political and military unity against Soviet imperialism.

The trade policy of the United States is clearly in serious trouble in the Congress. But in my opinion it is absolutely essential that the Reciprocal Trade extension be passed without crippling amendments. If we present to the world a mutilated trade program we will have taken a step to discourage free world unity at the very time when the Soviet Union is in the midst of a trade offensive.

6. We must see that our foreign aid program interlocks with other free world efforts. It can be designed to supplement the activities of United Nations groups such as FAO and the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED). We need to encourage regional development authorities, in the Middle East, for example. We can enlist the aid of our highly developed NATO friends in supplying technicians for the rest of the world.

7. All of these programs I have suggested so far have been programs aimed at economic development. We must not neglect the other facet of the world revolution -- the urge to achieve human dignity.

Overall we seem unaware that the problem we face is greater than a military one or an economic one or a technological one. It is also a matter of

the spirit, of our interest, either strong or weak, in freedom and justice in a climate of progress. I think that our foreign aid should be concentrated in those countries who are making a real effort toward the development of individual liberty. There has been no such necessary relationship hitherto.

I am a champion of economic assistance for underdeveloped nations when there is a realistic probability that this assistance will be used for economically and socially progressive results. In places like India, Burma, Pakistan, and Turkey -- nations where hopeful, democratically-oriented, welfare-conscious governments are in power -- the case for economic assistance is a strong and persuasive one. Yet since 1945 our total per capita economic assistance to each of the 392,000,000 natives of India has been about 90¢, while our total per capita economic assistance to each of the 10,000,000 residents of the strategically important island of Formosa has been over \$60 since 1950 alone, a period five years shorter.

Unfortunately, it also appears that the nations of the Middle East most likely to receive new financial benefits from the United States are those nations ruled by the most feudal and reactionary regimes.

8. To achieve the results we have every right to expect from our programs of foreign development, we should put in charge men who realize that our job abroad is to help direct a social revolution toward democratic goals instead of authoritarian goals, and who know what reform is and how to get it. For this task we should enlist the leaders of our democratic groups. It is not a job alone for bankers or businessmen and it is not at all a job for people who are lukewarm about democracy.

9. Finally we must set a good standard at home -- revise our immigration laws, set new standards of morality in government, business and labor. We must implement our new program of civil rights. A catastrophe like Little Rock can undermine our whole national image abroad.

At home, too, we must keep our economy fully employed and fully productive to support a rising standard of living as well as adequate programs of defense and foreign policy. We cannot advertise our economic system by displaying unwillingness to make it serve our needs.

This is no time for us to falter in our own efforts. With unwavering zeal, the Communists have preached their gospel and built their power until they are within sight of their goal of making the coming century the century of Communism.

Yet we still have the overwhelming predominance in industrial and economic power. If we use our power with anything like equal dedication and purpose, we can make this coming century -- first for the people of the underdeveloped areas of the world, ultimately even for the peoples behind the Iron Curtain -- the century of political - as well as economic - democracy.

In so doing, we would be fulfilling the highest destiny of our country, as Thomas Jefferson saw it 132 years ago, in the closing months of his life. He wrote:

"All eyes are opened, or are opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few, booted and spurred, ready to ride them..."

This is the vision we must cherish, and realize through bold and generous action, if we are to make the "revolution of rising expectations" through which the majority of mankind is passing our revolution, not the Kremlin's.

1776 came almost a century and a half before the October revolution of 1917. This is a very long head start -- and history will not readily absolve us if we fritter it away through apathy and fatigue. Let us, instead, move forward with full confidence and vigor into the great adventure of this century--the banishment of poverty and inequality from the face of the earth and from all the languages of man.

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FOR RELEASE.....Immediately

Senator Hubert Humphrey (D) of Minnesota yesterday afternoon (Monday, May 5) proposed that the United States go to the United Nations with a proposal for an "open skies aerial and ground inspection system in the Middle East" to counteract the Soviet obstruction of the Arctic open skies inspection plan.

Speaking at Boston University under the auspices of the Citizenship Project, Sen. Humphrey called the Middle East a "powder-keg" and said that, since no Soviet territory is involved in that section of the world, the Soviet Union would have to agree to the plan or show the rest of the world that it is unwilling to negotiate for the sake of peace.

"We are already at war," Sen. Humphrey said. "It is a different kind of a war," he added, a war of ideas, economics, ideologies, a war for men's minds. "We are being challenged across the board," the Senator said, describing what he called the true power relationship in the world today as "competitive co-existence." No one, he explained, can win the arms race; it is "a dead-end street." No one will dare to use nuclear arms "because to use them is to lose what you seek to protect," Sen. Humphrey said.

"Our policies, whatever they may be, domestic or foreign, must first have as their objective serving people rather than answering problems," the Minnesota Democrat continued. America needs "sensitivity to the needs of mankind." Weapons, he added, can at best only give us time to help find another answer.

Domestic policies on all levels, Sen. Humphrey said, are an important part of our foreign policy. Any evidence of bigotry or

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intolerance in this country is a defeat for us and a victory for totalitarianism, he added. Unemployment in the United States becomes international in its proportions; the current recession not only threatens the strength of our foreign policies but also threatens foreign aid and reciprocal trade. "The American economic system today is on part-time activity, but we are engaged in a full-time conflict," he said.

The government, "by being unwilling to bestir itself" to curb the recession, Sen. Humphrey charged, "is helping the Russian propaganda machine." Communism, he pointed out, has long been predicting the economic decline of capitalism. "The cost of the present recession to the American economy is roughly two years of foreign aid," he said.

Sen. Humphrey advanced some concrete suggestions to improve our foreign policy: "separate the economic assistance program of foreign aid from the military program; put our foreign aid on a long-term basis; greatly enlarge the scope of our program, something on the order of \$3 billion a year would not be out of line; and increase the consumption level of the underdeveloped countries through the use of our surplus resources of food and fiber."

Charging that the American people were misinformed about the state of American agriculture because agriculture in his opinion is the only segment of the country ready to go to war, Sen. Humphrey cited another example where he felt the American people were misinformed, this time consciously. The Central Intelligence Agency, he charged, knew in advance the date of both Sputniks' launchings, within a week. They were unable to tell this to the American people and thus prevent the launchings from coming as a shock, because, he explained, you cannot say one day that the Russian people are crude peasants and the next day tell the country that the Russians are about to launch the first outer space satellite. The Russian government, on the other hand, he said, told their people in advance about the launchings of Explorer I and II.

Domestic and foreign policies cannot be separated, Sen. Humphrey said; "You can't live two lives." In both areas, he continued, the

government would be well advised to "gear our activities and our policies for at least ten years, for the long run." In disarmament, he added, we should be willing to break up our nine-point package and negotiate on each point separately with the Russians. If the United States challenged the Soviet Union to negotiate disarmament in the forum of the United Nations, he pointed out, and the Soviet Union refused, we would at least have won a propaganda battle because we would then be able to show the rest of the world that we, not the Russians, were taking the initiative in trying to prevent a disastrous war.

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electricians should pay more for their loans and the Congress will decide whether the business will be turned over to private banking interests.

PEOPLE, PEACE, AND PROGRESS

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, on May 5, 1958, I had the opportunity to address the faculty and student body at Boston University on the subject of People, Peace, and Progress.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of my remarks be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PEOPLE, PEACE, AND PROGRESS

(Remarks by Senator HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, of Minnesota, at Boston University, May 5, 1958)

It is always a wonderful tonic for me to return, however, briefly, to a college or university campus. It makes me nostalgic. I was once a political science professor myself. I miss that kind of life more than I can say. And I like to return to it at least briefly. I feel at home here this noon.

The idea of a university, and the purpose of a university, are today more important than ever before. "Bigness" has become almost a universal trait of our society—business is big, agriculture is big, labor unions are big, and our education is big. But, regardless of the purposes of these other institutions, the purpose of education is not mass production. The purpose of education is still the individual—his knowledge and his values. The bigger the rest of our civilization becomes, the more important it is for education to keep reminding us that we can lose something in this process if we are not careful. The bigger we get, the farther we remove ourselves from those personal contacts that are the most fertile seeds of human understanding and progress. We begin to get trapped by the complexities of our problems, and lose sight of the human beings and the human values involved in these problems.

What has happened in our business, our agriculture, and our labor unions has also happened in our Government. With the expansion and growing complexity of the governmental process has come a depersonalization that often can have deplorable results. All too frequently the Government, and I include Congress as well as the Executive in that term, has a tendency to deal with problems rather than with people.

A case of unemployment in Detroit, for instance, with all the heartbreak and the personal tragedy that is involved, manifests itself in Washington, not in all its human aspects but as a statistic—a figure that makes the bar on the graph grow a little taller or a little shorter as the case may be. Unfortunately, one of the basic deficiencies of the present administration is its habit, born perhaps of long business experience of most of its members, of preoccupying itself with problems to the neglect of people—and the hopes, aspirations, and needs of people.

Harsh and unsympathetic as this mistaken behavior can be and is on the domestic scene, it is positively calamitous when it infects our foreign policy.

To concentrate on the technicalities and abstractions of problems can become disastrous. Our message must be one of concern for and interest in people.

Ironically enough, the Soviet Union, where the basic political philosophy of the Communist rulers is glorification of the state and the suppression of individuality and personal rights, has grasped the fact more than we, that foreign policy affects and influences people. The barrage of letters

and statements fired by Khrushchev into the world press and over the world airwaves shows that he understands all too well that there are people in the world and that their opinions are the key to the future course of affairs on our planet.

Unfortunately, in Washington, the capital of "government of the people, by the people and for the people," many in the administration seem to be only dimly aware that we must live and work with live human beings, with impressionable minds and emotions, inhabiting the great wide world beyond our national borders.

At home and abroad there is a crying demand for peace. People are sick and tired of war and conflict, whether "dirty" or "clean," "hot" or "cold" or lukewarm. They want an end to struggles for power, for influence and advantage, among a few big nations.

In many parts of the world where poverty, illness, and misery have been the lot of the common people for countless centuries, people are astir with longing for some of the comforts and better things of life. Probably the most remarkable phenomenon of our age is the vast disparity between levels of technological progress in various countries—some parts of the world rushing headlong into the atomic and space age, while others are still eking out a meager living with stick hoes and traveling in buffalo carts. This is a maladjustment that could be explosive if not corrected. Progress everywhere must be brought into closer harmony.

Peace and progress—the achievement of one and the stimulation of the other—are two of the prime obligations that we must meet if we are to be true to ourselves and just to all men. They are obligations of "people to people," and they must be comprehended as such, or we can badly miss our mark. To treat these aims of our policy as governmental problems, rather than as relationships of the most personal sort, is to invite continued failure and perhaps catastrophe. Yet sadly enough, there are few signs that our present errors are soon to be corrected.

PEACE

Let us first look at the question of peace—more specifically, of disarmament. For the State Department, the Department of Defense, and the Atomic Energy Commission, this is a problem. These agencies know that people around the globe are terribly interested in disarmament, but how to cope with this fact is, to them, only another phase of the problem.

The Atomic Energy Commission and the Defense Department do really fine jobs in carrying out their technical responsibilities.

The AEC for instance, has done a competent job in the scientific and technological development of atomic energy and nuclear weapons, but it does not see these weapons clearly in their essentially human context. The AEC spokesmen want to develop so-called clean nuclear weapons in the interests of humanity. The AEC does not seem to realize that the felt needs of the people here and now, do not fall into the clean weapons category. It does not realize that, in the interests of people rather than of some remote, abstract humanity, it would be far better to formulate methods of controlling and inspecting atomic armaments now than it would be to clean them up, which in essence means only to focus their destructiveness and make them, as Secretary Dulles puts it, more useful militarily.

The Defense Department, too, is affected by the same limited perspective. It views modern weapons as problems in military science and strategy, neglecting their impact on the delicate framework of human relationships. To be sure, the Pentagon's task is military defense. It wants to expand and improve armaments, not throw them into the scrap heap.

Even in the State Department, where one would expect a more profound appreciation of the political implications and desirability of formulating an effective disarmament policy, there has been a rigidity and a blindness that have throttled the initiative and vision required for a solution of the mounting arms crisis.

The paralysis of our disarmament policy is due in part to that bigness and complexity to which I referred earlier. Major disarmament policy decisions are made in the National Security Council, in which many agencies like State, Defense, and the AEC bring to a central point their often divergent and conflicting views. Disarmament policy, in other words, is the end product of a tortuous process that starts at numerous individual desks and winds its way painfully through a maze of bureaus, agencies, committees, and departments until it emerges as a meaningless and inadequate compromise. It is subject to all the deadening apparatus that complicated government can bring to bear upon it.

Frankly, the only way to slash through this confusing machinery is by the exercise of inspired leadership at the top where the ultimate responsibility resides. But this kind of leadership has been woefully lacking. In its place have been complacency and inertia, with the result that disarmament has remained simply a technical or a legal problem, divorced from the human considerations which the situation demands.

As evolved by the tortuous apparatus of policymaking, our disarmament proposals have been masterpieces of complexity, obscurity, and rigidity. At London last year the United States proposed a complicated, interlocking disarmament package. All this was done on the pretext of safeguarding national security. The theory ran something like this.

If we gave up nuclear tests, then to be secure there had to be a ban on the manufacture of nuclear weapons and a reduction of nuclear weapons stockpiles. But if we did these things, then to add to our security, we had to have a reduction in Armed Forces and conventional weapons in which the Soviet Union had superiority. Then just to be doubly secure we had to have inspection on the ground and in the air specifically designed to warn of surprise attack. A couple of other proposals were thrown into the package just to round it out. All this was supposed to constitute a first-step agreement which could lead the way to further disarmament steps later on. Obviously, if we had ever gotten agreement to such a first step, we would not have had to worry much about a second or third step, for the millennium of peace would have been near.

The futility of trying to negotiate such a complex package in the name of security is so obvious that I hesitate to draw it to your attention. By proposing such a package we were not advancing security, we were jeopardizing it. When nuclear bombs and missiles are dangling menacingly over our heads, the first step toward security has to be immediate and practical. The package was entirely too complicated.

Now the United States disarmament package was also intended to impress the world with the sincerity of our hopes for disarmament. But the gaps and obscurities in it were so prominent, that it had the opposite effect. For years the United States had hammered away at the theme that disarmament must be backed up by effective inspection, because of the risk that the Soviet Union would try to cheat. In view of the character of Communist ideology and the long record of broken pledges by the Kremlin, this was sound policy.

However, incredible as it might seem, the United States never evolved a practical plan of inspection for any of its London disarmament

ament proposals, except possibly for its open skies plan of aerial inspection against surprise attack. We gave the impression that one of the main sticking points between us and the Russians was that we favored and demanded effective inspection whereas they really did not. Yet we never put on the table a specific plan of inspection or even a study proving that inspection was feasible. Here was another instance where we failed to understand that our policy must be directed at serving the needs of people, rather than at drafting theoretical blueprints in a political vacuum.

All around the globe, people want atomic tests to end. They want to put a stop to radioactive fallout which many believe can shorten their lives or deform their children. Above all they want to make some start toward eliminating nuclear arms from the arsenals of potential belligerents. They do not understand why we persist in refusing to break up our cumbersome disarmament package and commit ourselves to a simple proposal for suspending atomic tests.

The reasons we have given to justify our basic inflexibility have, paradoxically, been unusually flexible.

At one time we said it was because we could not act without the concurrence of our allies. Furthermore, it seems hard to imagine how, if the United States and the Soviet Union ever came to a genuine agreement on an inspected test suspension, Britain, France, and other countries could long withhold their support and cooperation.

It is an open secret that a hot controversy is raging in the ranks of the administration over whether inspection for a suspension of nuclear tests could be made really effective. To settle this quarrel the President called on Dr. James Killian and his assistants to study the technicalities and let him have a decision. Recently, Dr. Killian reported that an inspection system of reasonable reliability was technically feasible.

At this point the arguments against suspending tests went through another switch, this time heavily stressing the point that we had to develop small clean weapons, a process that would take several years at least.

The United States position has been made all the more embarrassing by the Soviet announcement a few weeks ago that it had unilaterally suspended atomic tests. I agree with the President and the Secretary of State that this Soviet maneuver was a fraud and a gimmick. On the very day of the Soviet announcement I denounced it on the floor of the Senate as meaningless except for propaganda purposes.

It made no provision for inspection to verify that it was actually going to be carried out, and, coming as it did after the most intensive series of experimental explosions in Soviet history, it was transparently timed to coincide with a natural break in Soviet testing.

But mere denunciation of Soviet propaganda maneuvers is not enough. Here again the United States has treated the disarmament questions as though it were a theoretical problem and not a live question affecting thinking and breathing people. Having issued statements rebutting the Soviet announcement, the State Department then rested on its laurels. But we cannot make progress in this role of a perpetual rebutter. This negative attitude can get us nowhere. We must offer positive policies and put positive policies and put positive momentum into our endeavors for peace.

I propose that the United States move off dead center and inject fresh vigor into its disarmament policy by adoption of the following proposals:

1. We should immediately slash through all the red-tape bogging down the present United States disarmament package and announce our willingness to enter into an agreement, verified by effective inspection,

to suspend nuclear weapons tests for a temporary period of 2 or 3 years. This simple proposal will be a cogent demonstration of our desire and willingness to act on behalf of peace.

2. The United States should immediately make known the kind of inspection system it believes is necessary to backstop an international ban on atomic tests. There is no practical reason why this cannot now be done. Dr. Killian's report on an inspection system is now complete. Let's spread it out publicly in front of the Soviet Union and say, "This is where we stand. What about you?" This will call the Kremlin's bluff and the world will watch and judge what Khrushchev then does.

3. The proper locale for formal presentation of our proposal is the United Nations. According to the resolutions of the General Assembly at its last session, we and the other principal negotiating nations on disarmament have a responsibility to carry on arms limitation talks within the U. N. Disarmament Commission. The Soviet Union has expressed its intention of boycotting the Commission. There is no valid reason why this should give us pause. Regardless of what Moscow does, we are still subject to the recommendations of the General Assembly, the collective voice of the nations of the world. The U. N. Disarmament Commission should meet and note the absence of the Soviets, etc. If the Disarmament Commission cannot carry on its work profitably because of the noncooperation of the Soviet Union, then we should take the arms limitation question to the U. N. Security Council. The Soviet Union cannot afford to cold-shoulder the Security Council. It tried that once before—at the time of the Korean aggression—and got badly jolted when the Council acted very effectively in its absence. In the Security Council the Soviet negotiators can be brought before the bar of world opinion. There they can be compelled to take a stand on our proposals, to vote either "Da" or "Nyet" to practical measures for peace. The world can then plainly see who is encouraging or blocking progress of the world toward more tranquil relations.

4. In the United Nations we should be flexibly ready to adopt our proposals to any reasonable conditions proposed by other countries. This is particularly true in regard to inspection. An international inspection system must be effective, but it does not necessarily have to follow every detail that we suggest. Among the first items of business, we should initiate a proposal for a United Nations commission on inspection to study our plan, the Soviet plan if it is presented, and any other plans brought forward by attendant nations.

This impartial study commission could then develop, through independent procedures, an inspection network adequate for assuring success of a test suspension.

5. We should take into account the fact that not all nuclear explosions are conducted for the purpose of perfecting weapons. This powerful blasting force has considerable potential for peaceful engineering operations, such as boring mines, digging channels and leveling mountains. The Soviet Union has recently announced its intent to conduct engineering operations with nuclear charges and our own Atomic Energy Commission has made public various kinds of projects in which nuclear blasting could be profitably carried on. Provisions for peaceful applications of nuclear explosions under appropriate United Nations surveillance and inspection should be included in an international agreement terminating weapons tests.

The adoption of a dynamic and positive policy of disarmament is only part of the job of bringing lasting peace to the world. The proposals I have outlined will not provide a final and conclusive resolution of the conflict and tensions in the world. They consti-

tute only a first step, but which, if adopted, could have immense political implications. They would be a major break through the hard crust which the Soviet Union has constructed around itself to shut out the flow of thought and communication from the free world. If we penetrate the Iron Curtain with an inspection system for an effective ban on nuclear weapons tests, then the door would be thrown open for further measures to advance the cause of peace.

PROGRESS

But peace alone, essential though it is, is not our only goal. We must also think of progress. Maintaining peace should not mean maintaining the status quo. Attempts to keep the peace can be construed as such, if we do not have anything else to offer.

If we are to reach through to people effectively, we cannot afford to be cast in the role of supporting the status quo in the world. It just happens that hundreds of millions of people are not satisfied with things as they are. They have caught glimpses of a better life, and are determined to get it for their children. People in the underdeveloped two-thirds of the world have embraced and embarked upon a revolution—what Toynbee calls a revolution of rising expectations. For our part, we must not block these aspirations. If we do, we will earn and deserve the enmity that have-nots feel toward the uncaring well to do.

Americans, one would think, should be sympathetic toward this new revolution. Our own country was founded that way. For generations the American Revolution was held up as an example to all peoples dissatisfied with their status. For years, we encouraged and supported the aspirations of any people for national self-determination and economic independence. We justified our own Revolution on the principle of the worth of the individual man. Our declared purposes were to insure his personal liberty and give him the opportunity to advance his welfare. When these same legitimate aims are sought in Asia and Africa we must not appear irritated and annoyed. Nor should we become the spokesmen for the status quo.

Instead, of course, we should join with the spirit of independent nationalism that grips the underdeveloped and underprivileged countries, reminding these people that we too are the children of self-determination, of revolution, and of a will to freedom and independence. These people will be a powerful force in decades to come, and we must help them prepare to use their strength in behalf of freedom.

We can aid them, if we will, to progress toward their twofold revolutionary goal of economic development and advancement of human dignity goals upon which our own good life is based.

Now, such progress is not automatic. Liberty and democracy are not the inevitable results of full stomachs, as we sometimes have let ourselves believe. In the desperate drive to overcome centuries of colonialism and deprivation, newly independent peoples may rush into communism or fall victim to the new economic imperialism of the Kremlin. The Soviet Union exerts a powerful gravitational pull over people who as yet are uncommitted to a modern way of life.

Moreover, Soviet policy is flexible. The Kremlin can throw a huge sum suddenly into Egypt or Indonesia, while we must await the slow procedures of the democratic process to institute new programs abroad.

The Soviets can concentrate their resources to buy or sell products in order to achieve political advantage abroad, while our own trade is subject to fluctuations of an uneven economy and a wavering international trade policy.

The Soviet Union can promise long-term loans at minimal interest and delayed repayment; our banking philosophy has usually insisted on higher interest and normal repay-

ment. The Soviet Union, through education and marshaling of all its resources, has achieved a tremendous rate of growth in scientific and economic progress; we have allowed a wastage of intellectual talent and a falling off of our rate of economic growth—needlessly.

The Soviets now appear to have broken through in technology to a point where Khrushchev can proclaim—as he did again after returning from Hungary—"A war of consumer goods" with the United States.

The result of all this is that we have lost much of our leadership in the nearly world-wide revolt against slavery to nature and to human exploitation. We are allowing the Soviets to seize this leadership. In doing so, we risk the loss of the uncommitted nations to the cause of freedom in our time. If we lose them, there will pass into Soviet hands a preponderance of power that will eventually annihilate the peace we are trying so hard to preserve.

The only way out of this morass is for America to reassert its own leadership of the great forces of revolution toward the better life now stirring half the world. We must show these people how to achieve progress toward human betterment, and how to accomplish it without the violence of arms and without insidious capture by totalitarianism along the way.

Such progress can be had through intelligent action on the part of the United States. It will require a vigorous and imaginative foreign policy consisting of more than military pacts encircling the Soviet Union. Our policy must be based upon ideas of economic and political assistance to encircle ourselves with viable, prosperous, actively free peoples.

To embark upon a program of world progress that has some chance of success, we need a thoroughgoing reorientation of our foreign aid program. It needs to be new, and it needs to look like a new program.

It is fair to say, I believe, that we have never really had a definite policy for speeding up the economic growth and development of friendly non-Communist countries. Whatever we have done along this line was basically only incidental to our military containment policy. Hence, the appropriateness of the term "defense support" for much of our development aid.

I believe the time has come to weave an overall pattern for overseas aid—"a grand design" bold enough to capture the imagination of the American people—and of the world—and clear enough to commend itself to men of good will everywhere as the sure way forward to economic progress plus—rather than minus—freedom. I should like to suggest several principles to guide our policy.

1. We should separate the economic assistance program of foreign aid from the military program. Once again this year, I am attempting, within the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, to achieve this separation. Last year the President recommended a separation, which was accepted by the Senate, but turned down by the House of Representatives. For some reason this year the President has not seen fit to repeat this suggestion.

In continuing to associate these two very different types of support—military aid and economic aid—we have generated a confusion that is harmful both abroad and here at home. Overseas we have been tagged as warmongers—of wishing only to buy minions to stand guard for us and of forcing a distortion in the economies of backward countries that cannot support heavy military budgets. Here at home the combination of military and economic aid has magnified out of all proportion, in the public mind, the percentage of money being spent abroad on nonmilitary projects. And unfortunate results of certain programs undertaken for military expediency have cast discredit on all sound foreign economic en-

deavors. Hence separating these programs makes sense to me.

2. We should put our foreign aid on a long-term basis. We have insisted on annual appropriations and scathing reviews. This has led to restrictive, shortsighted arrangements that have benefited us neither economically nor from a propaganda standpoint. Our foreign aid officials need to be able to sit down with officials of other countries and make a realistic study of their needs and capacities over a period of years to plan out a program of sound growth. They need to be able to make long-term commitments and be able to revise programs as experience dictates. This way, the programs with the greatest merit could be devised and followed through. This way, the full impact of our aid could be made apparent to the people concerned. We need to be realistic about loan rates and repayment schedules in order to make our offers usable and competitive.

3. We should greatly enlarge the scope of our program. Something on the order of \$3 billion a year would not be out of line. Last year the Committee for Economic Development suggested from \$500 million to \$1.5 billion in new capital each year, over and above the present flow. The most detailed estimate I have seen came up with a total cost of \$2.5 billion a year, of which some part would be borne by other industrialized countries, part could be financed with American farm surpluses, and the balance of about \$1.5 billion a year would be provided by American public funds. This represents a little less than we are now spending on so-called economic aid, though, of course, under the MIT proposal this amount would go entirely for economic development, rather than military support.

We can easily afford this expense. Look at it this way. In the present recession we are allowing extensive resources to lie idle. In 1958 we have a surplus capacity of some 13 percent. For every million unemployed over the 2 million mark, the country is losing some \$600 million a month in national output. At the present level of unemployment, equivalent to some 6,500,000, we are losing—irretrievably—over \$2½ billion a month, or more than \$30 billion a year, in goods and services. It is not even a giveaway since nobody is receiving it and nobody is benefiting from it. Our present rate of waste in terms of idle men and unused resources is far, far more than the rate of aid the people of all the underdeveloped countries could possibly use in helping them achieve improved living standards.

Anyway, the question has never been whether we can afford it, but whether our national interest will assign a sufficiently high priority to this foreign policy leadership to justify the use of our resources.

4. We need to increase the consumption level of the underdeveloped countries. We should not expect their peoples to wait for decades or even generations to reap some of the benefits of an industrializing society. England collected the capital for its industrial revolution at the cost of great misery on the part of its voteless proletariat. In the Soviet Union and in China, totalitarian governments can sweat the needed capital out of the skins of the peasants. Only in resource-rich United States could economic growth take place under more desirable conditions—and we were substantially aided by huge foreign investments and large numbers of mature, trained immigrants. The people of the new countries who have achieved political liberation should not be expected to await the economic millennium in an unforeseeable future.

Our immediate program to raise their consumer standards is through the use of our surplus resources of food and fiber. Be-

sides raising living standards, increased supplies of vital commodities would enable these countries to start needed public works programs without the inflation of food costs such additional requirements would generate. From a domestic standpoint, nothing could be more sound than to restore economic stability and prosperity for some of our own farmers while dedicating our greatest unused productive capacity to advancement of our world policy aims. We have taken a step toward utilization of farm products in foreign programs through Public Law 480, which I have been proud to sponsor and to support. This program allows the sale abroad for foreign currencies of surplus agricultural products. While the Senate has approved an increase for this program for next year, we have not yet fully exploited the possibilities of this measure.

Permanent programs of raising consumption levels abroad depend upon large-scale investment in consumer goods industries by foreign capital. Our private corporations are willing to explore for oil and minerals and develop them abroad, but they have not been ready to produce clothing, shoes, and simple conveniences there. I believe the Government could well guarantee a rate of return equal to the cost of the capital if American manufacturers would be willing to share their managerial skills and investment funds.

In addition, a way should be found to establish consumer credit in these countries so that the workers can partake in the fruits of their labors at once.

5. We need to have a sensible foreign trade policy in order that other countries in the world may prosper.

Obviously, the closer our economic relations with our allies the more stable our political and military ties will be; contrariwise, the weaker our economic relations, the less effective our political and military unity against Soviet imperialism.

The trade policy of the United States is clearly in serious trouble in the Congress. But in my opinion is it absolutely essential that the Reciprocal Trade Extension be passed without crippling amendments. If we present to the world a mutilated trade program we will have taken a step to discourage free-world unity at the very time when the Soviet Union is in the midst of a trade offensive.

6. We must see that our foreign aid program interlocks with other free-world efforts. It can be designed to supplement the activities of United Nations groups such as FAO and the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED). We need to encourage regional development authorities, in the Middle East, for example. We can enlist the aid of our highly developed NATO friends in supplying technicians for the rest of the world.

7. All of these programs I have suggested so far have been programs aimed at economic development. We must not neglect the other facet of the world revolution—the urge to achieve human dignity.

Overall we seem unaware that the problem we face is greater than a military one or an economic one or a technological one. It is also a matter of the spirit, of our interest, either strong or weak, in freedom and justice in a climate of progress. I think that our foreign aid should be concentrated in those countries who are making a real effort toward the development of individual liberty. There has been no such necessary relationship hitherto.

I am a champion of economic assistance for underdeveloped nations when there is a realistic probability that this assistance will be used for economically and socially progressive results. In places like India, Burma, Pakistan, and Turkey—nations where hopeful, democratically oriented, welfare-conscious governments are in power—the case for economic assistance is a strong and persuasive one. Yet since 1945 our total per-

capita economic assistance to each of the 392 million natives of India has been about 90 cents, while our total per capita economic assistance to each of the 10 million residents of the strategically important island of Formosa has been over \$60 since 1950 alone, a period 5 years shorter.

Unfortunately, it also appears that the nations of the Middle East most likely to receive new financial benefits from the United States are those nations ruled by the most feudal and reactionary regimes.

8. To achieve the results we have every right to expect from our programs of foreign development, we should put in charge men who realize that our job abroad is to help direct a social revolution toward democratic goals instead of authoritarian goals, and who know what reform is and how to get it. For this task we should enlist the leaders of our democratic groups. It is not a job alone for bankers or businessmen and it is not at all a job for people who are lukewarm about democracy.

9. Finally we must set a good standard at home—revise our immigration laws, set new standards of morality in Government, business and labor. We must implement our new program of civil rights. A catastrophe like Little Rock can undermine our whole national image abroad.

At home, too, we must keep our economy fully employed and fully productive to support a rising standard of living as well as adequate programs of defense and foreign policy. We cannot advertise our economic system by displaying unwillingness to make it serve our needs.

This is no time for us to falter in our own efforts. With unwavering zeal, the Communists have preached their gospel and built their power until they are within sight of their goal of making the coming century the century of communism.

Yet we still have the overwhelming predominance in industrial and economic power. If we use our power with anything like equal dedication and purpose, we can make this coming century—first for the people of the underdeveloped areas of the world, ultimately even for the peoples behind the Iron Curtain—the century of political—as well as economic—democracy.

In so doing, we would be fulfilling the highest destiny of our country, as Thomas Jefferson saw it 132 years ago, in the closing months of his life. He wrote:

"All eyes are opened, or are opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few, booted and spurred, ready to ride them."

This is the vision we must cherish, and realize through bold and generous action, if we are to make the "revolution of rising expectations" through which the majority of mankind is passing our revolution, not the Kremlin's.

Seventeen hundred and seventy-six came almost a century and a half before the October revolution of 1917. This is a very long head start—and history will not readily absolve us if we fritter it away through apathy and fatigue. Let us, instead, move forward with full confidence and vigor into the great adventure of this century—the banishment of poverty and inequality from the face of the earth and from all the languages of man.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE— ENROLLED JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Bartlett, one of its reading clerks, announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the enrolled joint resolution (H. J. Res.

624) making additional supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year 1958, and for other purposes, and it was signed by the President pro tempore.

LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1958

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 3974) to provide for the reporting and disclosure of certain financial transactions and administrative practices of labor organizations and employers, to prevent abuses in the administration of trusteeships by labor organizations, to provide standards with respect to the election of officers of labor organizations, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado has the floor.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, with respect to this whole question, I should like to address myself primarily to the remarks of the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], who is absent momentarily from the floor, in an attempt to work out some language as an amendment. I think this matter should be discussed at this time, however.

Considerable reference has been made by the Senator from Oregon to subparagraph (b) on page 28 of the bill, which provides that—

No person who has been convicted of any violation of title I shall serve as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive committee, or similar governing body, business agent, international representative, manager, or paid organizer of a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce for a period of 5 years after such conviction.

I should like to point out—and this is very important—that the section refers back to section 109, on page 17, relating to false entry and destruction of records of labor organizations. For example, under this clause, if a man were convicted, he could appeal the case to a circuit court, and he could then appeal the conviction to the Supreme Court, which could take a period of 2 or 3 years. The original crime calls for imprisonment up to 1 year. So he could conceivably, at the end of that time, some time in the 5 years, stall it along, serve only 1 year, and immediately enter upon the service of the union as a trustee or officer the day he got out of the penitentiary.

This is not a proper section. It does not afford the protection which it is supposed to afford.

I shall offer an amendment later to take care of the situation.

If the Senator from Oregon is under the misapprehension that this language covers the situation, I point out that it does not.

I should like to read to the Senator from Kentucky, who is now present on the floor, the amendment which was offered by me in the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, and for which he voted:

Sec. 110. (a) No labor union engaged in an industry affecting commerce shall—

(1) be certified or recognized as the representative of any employees by the National Labor Relations Board, or

(2) be eligible to file an unfair labor practice charge under section 10 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, or

(3) be exempt from Federal income tax under section 501 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, if such labor union retains in office or in its employ any person (A) who, being required to sign, prepare, or file reports under section 101 or 102, willfully refuses to comply with any of the provisions of such section, or (B) who has been tried and finally convicted of a crime under any of the provisions of this act.

(b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall not be applicable to any labor union until the termination of 90 days from the date of such refusal to file or such final conviction. Any labor union to which the provisions of this section become applicable is empowered to remove from office or employment, any officer or employee referred to in subsection (a) notwithstanding any provision in its constitution, bylaws, or governing rules or regulations to the contrary.

I want to correct the statement I have just made. The amendment which we voted on in the committee did not contain the last sentence I have read relating to the empowering of unions to remove officers.

This involves the same principle which is involved in the amendment offered by the Senator from Kentucky as it would be amended by the amendment of the Senator from New York.

I should like to make a final remark. I believe the fifth amendment can be pleaded as to section 101, though the assertion was made on the floor that the fifth amendment could only be pleaded with respect to section 102, which is the conflict of interest section. Section 101 is the section which requires unions as such to report, which seems to have been overlooked. There is a requirement that financial officers report, and also a requirement that principal officers sign. Subsection (a) of section 101 says:

Every labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce shall file with the Secretary a copy of its constitution and bylaws and a report, signed by its president and secretary or other principal officers.

If the report contained information which would tend to incriminate a man, then if the fifth amendment is available to the man it is as much available under section 101 (a) as it is under section 102, the conflict of interest section.

In section 101 (b) there is a provision that every labor organization shall file a financial report signed by its chief financial officer. If the fifth amendment is available to a man as an excuse for not filing, it is as applicable in the case of section 101, in two instances, as it is applicable in the case of section 102. I simply wanted to correct the RECORD in this respect, because I believe there has been some confusion of thought.

If the Cooper amendment is agreed to—and I shall vote for it, with the hope that the Javits amendment will also be agreed to—it will be my hope we will put some of the burden upon the unions and also put in the hands of individual members of unions a method by which, when a union retains in its employ an officer who has violated the law or been convicted of a crime, the members will have some means of removing that officer. If the union should not remove the officer and violated the law by keeping him in office, in that case the union itself would suffer the sanctions imposed by the law.



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