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"RADIO LINK"

HOME SERVICE . 9.15 - 10.00 p.m. Thursday 5th February 1959

ANNOUNCER: We come now to our International programme 'Radio Link' in which the Chairman in London is Robert McKenzie.

CHAIRMAN: It's very good to be back again with Radio Link after six months in North America and especially to be back for this the third anniversary of Radio Link. Our principal guest, who is in Washington, D.C. is Senator Hubert Humphrey, a leading member of the Senate, who recently had an eight hour private conversation with Mr. Khrushchev in Moscow. Senator Humphrey will be answering questions about this and other matters which will be put by a team of five journalists who are in radio studios in as many different countries. To give listeners some idea of Senator Humphrey's role in American politics, I want to read this brief comment from a recent issue of 'NEWS WEEK' a leading American news magazine. "NEWSWEEK" wrote "To the handful of top ranking officials in Washington who make the real decisions of United States foreign policy, few voices in the United States Senate carry greater authority than that of Hubert Horatio Humphrey. He is in fact the member of the select inner group that really runs the Senate and when the professional Democrats talk about candidates for the Presidential nomination in nineteen sixty, Humphrey is one of the three or four possibilities they take seriously."

Well now, I might add to this that Senator Humphrey is now forty seven, he has been a University teacher and was Mayor of Minneapolis at thirty three. For the last ten years he's been a Democratic member of the Senate, where he's a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, and is Chairman of the Disarmament Sub-Committee.

Well, it's a great pleasure to welcome you to the programme Senator Humphrey in Washington.

HUMPHREY: Well, thank you very much Mr. McKenzie, it's a real privilege and pleasure to appear on this programme and particularly to appear at a time that you're celebrating your third anniversary of Radio Link. Let me also just say a word of friendly greetings to the people of Great Britain, the United Kingdom, where, we Americans feel mighty fortunate to have you as good friends and as partners in the effort to build a better, happier, more secure and free world.

CHAIRMAN: Well, thank you Senator. And now I'm going to invite your interrogators to introduce themselves. First, your nearest neighbour as it were, perhaps a thousand miles to the North in Ottawa.

FRASER: This is Blair Fraser of "Maclean's Magazine" in Ottawa.

CHAIRMAN: Thank you, and now at the other end of the spectrum, in Warsaw.

PODKOWYNSKI: This is Mr. Marian Podkowynski of "Tribuna Ludu".

CHAIRMAN: Thank you, and in Hamburg, Germany:

PACZENSKI: This is Gert von Paczenski, Foreign Editor of "Die Welt" in Hamburg.

CHAIRMAN: And down to Paris:

GORDEY: This is Michel Gordey, Chief Foreign correspondent of "France-Soir" Paris.

CHAIRMAN: And finally in the London Studio with me.

JE.

Radio Link
Feb 5
Speakers
File
RADIO

RADIO LINK:

2.

MIDGLEY: John Midgley, of 'The Economist' Good evening.

CHAINMAN: Well now, Midgley, would you like to open on perhaps something that's in the News at the moment.

MIDGLEY: Yes, well, Senator we've just been hearing that Mr. Macmillan's mission to Moscow for what he's called 'a reconnaissance' is definitely on, and...er naturally we're very interested to know what people think about it in Washington. We're also interested to know what you think as you're one of the last prominent men to talk to Mr. Khrushchev.

HUMPHREY: I'm very pleased to hear that Prime Minister Macmillan will be making this important journey. Of course there will be mixed reactions in the United States on a matter like this, as there would be anywhere, but in the main, I happen to feel that these contacts are valuable, and when Mr. Macmillan calls it a sort of reconnaissance, I think that's about what it will be. We need to know each other a little better and I have a feeling that your statesmen are good observers.

MIDGLEY: Yes, you've just had Mr. Mikoyan reconnoitering in Washington.

HUMPHREY: And elsewhere.

MIDGLEY: Yes, and elsewhere, I wonder whether you think Mr. Macmillan might find out anything new for us, and might somehow contribute to opening things up, loosening things up a bit, what do you think...

HUMPHREY: I don't know whether he'll find anything new or not but at least the chance is worthwhile, that is it's worthwhile taking this opportunity or this chance, also I don't think you can lose anything (No) you may gain something, and, furthermore, it's important to me to have the Soviets understand that we welcome the opportunity to work constructively to make a better world, and that we have nothing to fear.

MIDGLEY: Speaking of that Senator, Mr. Khrushchev himself was saying earlier only a few hours ago, that he'd welcome a visit from President Eisenhower. Is there really an invitation, and if so, would it really be considered?

HUMPHREY: I don't know whether it would be or not. I don't suppose one would call that an invitation, it was, ..it was stated quite informally. Generally, when Heads of State exchange visits, or when a Head of State makes a visit it's after very formal negotiations. (yes) I imagine the Soviets would participate the same way.

FRASER: Now this is Blair Fraser in Ottawa. If the President is invited, do you think he should go?

HUMPHREY: Well that's his decision to make. My personal feeling is that there is, or, there is good to be obtained out of meeting the adversary. There is good to be obtained if you have powers of observation and I think we all have, in seeing or.. where the other fellow lives, and seeing under what conditions they live and operate. and I, or.. Mr. Eisenhower was in Moscow I believe in nineteen forty five, as the General of the Armies, and if he prefers to go in nineteen hundred and fifty nine, he'll surely have my support.

FRASER: Does that mean if you were in his position Senator you would go?

JE.

HUMPHREY: Well, that's an iffy question. I prefer to answer it the way I did. I said that if Mr. Eisenhower is invited and he should accept that invitation, that he could expect to have from a member of the so-called opposition party my hearty good wishes and support.

FRASER: This is Fraser again, Senator. I understand your point about making contact with the enemy, but on the strength of your recent eight hour conversation with Mr. Khrushchev, do you personally feel that you learned something new of substance about Russian policy and intentions.

HUMPHREY: I'm not sure that I did. I know this however, that very few discoveries are made quickly, and international politics, like science, is the result of many explorings, much basic research, and a good deal of patient detailed examination. I happen to believe that it is absolutely essential for Western leaders and for Western nations to have a more complete and objective picture not only of the economy of the Soviet Union and its political structure, its cultural patterns, but also a better picture and understanding of the leaders of the Soviet Union and I prefer to get that by meeting and talking with them rather than by getting it from the headlines of the daily papers. So what I'm talking about is a kind of intelligence operation in a sense, of just adding more and more information to the general picture until one can see the outlines of what we're really dealing with.

CHAIRMAN:

Mr. von Paczenski, would you like to come in on any aspect of the conversation with Khrushchev that Senator Humphrey had?

VON PACZENSKI: Yes, Senator since you just had this very long discussion with Mr. Khrushchev, and also have seen quite a lot of Mikoyan have you got the impression from what you've heard and seen that the Kremlin seriously wants real negotiations with the West, and a settlement.

HUMPHREY: I hesitate to try to pose as a, as an informed person on that or an expert. I would only say this, that we have one or two choices in this world as I see it, we're either going to live with the Soviets or we can get ourselves and they ^{can} get themselves into a situation where we die together. I'm strong on living and I don't mean living by appeasement, or by backtracking, or by running away from difficult decisions. Therefore, I would say that we have no choice but what to negotiate. This doesn't mean that you just give in. My point of view is ^{that} negotiations to be successful must be mutually advantageous. It is ridiculous to assume that the Soviet is going to give up something that's ~~er..~~ detrimental to their, or that is not advantageous to them, and I would hope that we would be wise enough not to give up something that would be ~~er..er..~~ a help to us, in other words, what I mean is, we'd have to have mutually advantageous situations.

CHAIRMAN: Paczenski, could we perhaps now move to what surely must be the core of any such negotiations, that's the whole Berlin thing, and you probably are specially concerned with that.

VON PACZENSKI: Well, the most important question it seems to me is, Senator Humphrey, do you think after your conversations in Moscow, that the Berlin situation implies a risk of war, and if so, how can this be averted.

HUMPHREY: I think it does. (you do) Let me point out that we've been accused in this country at times, Mr. Dulles has been accused of 'brinkmanship' that is of going so close to the precipice, that it could lead to conflict. Some of our ~~er..~~ some of us have been critical of Secretary Dulles on this matter, I have, and some of our friends overseas have been critical. I think Mr. Khrushchev is now practising a kind of brinkmanship, I believe that the recent meeting of the Communist Party Congress indicates a kind of confidence that was

not evident before on the part of the Soviets. I think Khrushchev has literally overcommitted himself on Berlin and therefore the situation is fraught with danger. This leads me to one conclusion. I think he knows that he has committed himself very deeply, I think that our more objective people know that this has happened, so there is no choice but what to sit down and negotiate. Now the question is, how do you negotiate and on what.

CHAIRMAN: Podkowynski in Warsaw, would you like to come in on this?

PODKOWYNSKI: Yes, of course. Senator Humphrey, first I want to say that your name's well-known in Poland, and this is a very important thing for us, having you in the air. As a Polish correspondent you understand that I wanted to ask you a very specific question relating to my country. (yes) Don't you think Senator that in view of the West German armament and with modern arms at that, we, and other neighbours, I think of Germany, are entitled to mistrust the policy which you call Atlantic. We Poles have quite an experience with Western Germany militarism. You know Senator.

HUMPHREY: We've had quite a little experience with Western... with German militarism ourselves. (Yes I know) and I say that what... the answer to this problem it seems to me is, that if you want to have less arms, in the hands of Western nations, the best way to do it, is to engage sincerely in disarmament talks that, that or will be responsible and respected. This up to date has not been, has not been accomplished. I think it is rather, a... or well, I don't think that you can expect the Western nations to weaken their military position any more than it is, unless the Soviet bloc, the Warsaw Pact countries, are willing to sit down and sincerely negotiate a, or... a responsible and proportionate reduction of armed strength.

CHAIRMAN: Well, Warsaw again?

PODKOWYNSKI: Yes... Senator what was your feeling during your talks with Khrushchev on the German business?

HUMPHREY: Well, I... By the way I first of all want to say that a word of greeting to the Polish people. We have so many of these fine people in the United States, that we feel a very er... very strong note of friendship to them, and I really sincerely mean that and we want to express our warm regards and good fellowship and feelings to the Polish people. Now reference to Mr. Khrushchev's talk on Berlin and Germany. He was very firm in his position on Berlin, his position has been stated repeatedly, what he has said since December first he said to me on the occasion of my visit with him. In reference to Germany he spoke in terms of opposition to German rearmament, and particularly in terms, to any nuclear weapons in the hands of German forces. I had expected this, but may I say that there's an answer to all of it and the answer to it is for the Soviet Union to be willing to conscientiously and responsibly negotiate for German reunification and for the phased, possibly the phased withdrawal of troops in a very broad area in Central Europe. It's too, if you ask for the removal of foreign troops from Western Germany, it might seem desirable to ask for the removal of Soviet troops from Poland and East Germany and other parts of Central Europe.

CHAIRMAN: Gordey in Paris?

GORDEY: Senator I was with you in Geneva as you might remember in December and I think that through your talks with the Soviet delegation on disarmament there you got the stalemate on disarmament to move on, and this Disarmament Conference to get to a new start. How do you

think the disarmament talks are going now in the light of your talks with Khrushchev and of what happened later on?

HUMPHREY: Mr. Gordey, there were two or three points that seemed to block the disarmament discussions, that is the nuclear tests cessation discussions. First of all, the matter of whether it should be one.. the agreement should be in one Treaty. Soviets said no it should be in two, we said it should be in one. Finally the Soviets came around to the one. The other point, as you know was the matter of whether the reference to disarmament should be in the Treaty. We insisted it should, the Soviet insisted it shouldn't. I took the position that this was something we could compromise and give up on, and I'm happy to say that our Government did withdraw that particular stipulation. Now there are others relating to the peaceful use of atomic energy or some explosions for peaceful purposes. I think that that has been worked out, but the problem now is the Soviets insist on the veto of any inspection. This is most unfortunate and I hope that they will reconsider it. I was once optimistic about this Conference. I said then in November that I thought that by March there might be an agreement. Right now, I'm less than optimistic, I feel rather pessimistic because it appears that the Soviet Union is unwilling to accept the principle of international inspection as was designed and developed by the Conference of experts in Geneva last Summer. I hope that the Soviets will not insist upon the use of veto. The world expects us to agree; the world wants these tests stopped, and they want them stopped with safeguards and inspections that will prevent any cheating.

CHAIRMAN: Well now, in the written report of your visit to Moscow and conversations with Khrushchev, you said Senator Humphrey you thought, if I'm quoting you correctly, that he did seem to be sincere on this issue.

HUMPHREY: Yes, he did.

CHAIRMAN: Now, and not to ^{be} just playing a propaganda line. Well now, if that is so, and we are presumably sincere in the West, why on this issue, are we not getting headway, making headway?

HUMPHREY: Well, the Soviets have a way of being able to synchronize all of their diplomatic efforts or to be able to stop all of them whenever they want to. Now what I'm getting at is that I have a feeling that the Geneva talks at this time are also tied in with the broader negotiations and concern over Berlin and Central Europe. I didn't say Germany only, I say Central Europe, because I think that's where we have to talk about it. In other words it's possible that the Soviets are going to drag their feet on the disarmament discussions in Geneva simply to have another bargaining point when they come to sit down relating to the situation in Berlin.

GORDEY: This is Gordey in Paris. Senator, do you think that the Soviets now are tougher than Khrushchev was with you in December and, or the Soviet delegation in Geneva a few days before your visit to Moscow.

HUMPHREY: What was that word Mr. Gordey. Tougher?

GORDEY: Tougher, yes. Do you think that the Soviets are tougher now than in Moscow during your visit and in Geneva during your previous conversation.

HUMPHREY: I have a feeling so. Yes. Now I don't know whether that's due to the fact that Mr. Khrushchev has been addressing the Party Congress--sometimes when a man gets up to address a great conclave

he will make statements that seem a little tougher than they are basically intended to be. It's probable that this is part of the problem today, but there seems to have been a sort of stiffening of attitude which I deeply regret.

CHAIRMAN: Mr. Midgley in London.

MIDGLEY: Senator, Could we, if we could just come back to Berlin for a moment. You described how Mr. Khrushchev talked of Berlin as a bone in his throat.

HUMPHREY: Yes that's the exact phrase.

MIDGLEY: I wonder if you've any ideas you could offer us on how this bone might be taken out? Do you think for instance some kind of disengagement might start with Berlin or with the communications to Berlin?

HUMPHREY: I do not underestimate the complexity of this problem or the difficulties that we in the West are faced on it. First of all, as I've said, it was .. it is terribly important, very important that the four Western Powers: the Federal Republic, Great Britain, France and the United States, have a meeting of the minds, in other words, that there be a unity of position. That's where we are at this time. Khrushchev apparently wants to change the situation in Berlin, not because of any military threat that Western forces offer in Berlin, but primarily because of the political consequences of a free, or of a West Berlin that is a free city in the true sense. I mean after all look of the number of people that have come into Berlin, refugees, from behind the Iron Curtain. It stands there as a living testimonial to the difference between the West and the East. All you have to do is open your eyes and take a look. ..

MIDGLEY: Senator if I may say so, there's rather more than that about Berlin that worries him. If he wanted to stop the refugees he could just stop them.

HUMPHREY: Ah, yes, but I think what he has done is to utilise the Berlin crisis in an effort to either get a German Treaty that recognizes two Germanies (yes) force the hand, and I think that's his real objective. I think he would like to stabilize from their point of view, from the Soviets point of view, the entire Eastern European picture and I hope that we have the good statesmanship and judgment to look upon this Berlin crisis as an opportunity to open, wide open again, the entire picture of European security, and not merely to talk about the German problem. It isn't a German problem, it's a Soviet problem that we're dealing with. The Soviets can permit the reunification of Germany any minute, and therefore we ought to be talking in terms of a much broader Central European settlement that gives some hope to our friends in Poland for example, and to the peoples in the Eastern captive States, that they will have a greater degree of autonomy and independence without being under the musket, or under the bayonet of Soviet troops.

CHAIRMAN: Well perhaps we might have a question from one of what you described as the captive States. Warsaw, do you want to ...

PODKOWYNSKI: Yes, first Senator I wanted to tell you that I am not feeling being a captive in Poland (laughter) (well) that is the first thing. I am completely free in expressing the best thing is that I am talking with you on the air.

HUMPHREY: I appreciate this and may I say that you folks in Poland have given all of us many reasons to feel more cheerful.

JE.

POKROWYNSKI: Thank you Senator, but I wanted to ask you another question. Because of the troubles and the difficulties that you've had about Berlin, maybe you have now a new platform for a discussion about Germany, is the Peace Treaty or the draft of the Peace Treaty, which was proposed by the Soviets.

HUMPHREY: Well I would suggest that it might be a little better to go back to the Plan that was once proposed by Mr. Eden, which plan, which general outline was endorsed at the Geneva Conference in nineteen fifty five I recall, (yes) and subsequently was the matter of discussion with the Foreign Ministers at Geneva. It seems to me that this would give us the beginnings of where we might have some frank and productive negotiations.

CHAIRMAN: Are you prepared to move Senator toward disengagement in Central Europe and in Germany.

HUMPHREY: Well now my British friends use that term... term a little more than we do. We are realistic here I think in the United States..

CHAIRMAN: Meaning by contrast?

HUMPHREY: No, no you're very realistic too. I meant to say that we're getting almost as realistic as you are (laughter). We recognize that I speak now for myself at least, I recognize that the Soviet Union is not going to give up anything of major importance to it, particularly when it can hold on to it. Therefore, when you negotiate you will possibly have to negotiate very limited and piecemeal approaches to a broader context, in a broader context. Now let me see if I make myself clear. I don't think it's going to satisfy just to get an agreement on Berlin, because I think it will come back to plague us again. I think whatever agreement that we work out at this time must have broader.. must be in a broader framework. I think we must start for example to talk about a phased withdrawal possibly of opposing forces, maybe some kind of a de-nuclearised zone, maybe some kind of a limitation on armaments in the Central European area. I know that the Soviets frequently remind us in the West that we should get our troops out of Western Eu.... Germany. Well I might say with candour and with due respect that there's nothing, there's nothing that prevents Soviet troops from getting behind their boundaries. After all that would be a good way to set a good example. So these are some of the things that I think that we might start on. Now disengagement, envisages a neutral Germany as I recall it. I doubt that Germany will ever be neutral in a sense of neutrality that is imposed upon her. Germany will have to make up its mind in the years to come as she has now, as to where her trade will go and which direction her economy will go, whether to the West or the East; it may go both ways. Maybe that's the part of the answer, but what I'm getting at is, I don't think there's any quick, sudden settlement that anyone is going to get. I think we have to start to try to minimise the possibility of hostilities and outbreak of conflict.

CHAIRMAN: Before we leave Germany a final question from Hamburg?

VON. PACZENSKI; Yes, among the things Mr. Kennan has recommended as rest .. on concessions, was the security pact giving safeguards to Russia. (Yes). Well, what kind of safeguards should that be in your mind.

HUMPHREY: We had Mr. Kennan before the Sub-Committee on Disarmament here just the .. yesterday for an extended session. He gave a very fine bit of testimony. And under careful cross-examination. Well the kind of security pact would be where all the signatories to an all European Treaty would in fact guarantee each others boundaries against an attack from any source, and in the instance of Germany, it would be a pact in

which if there was any overt aggression, by any German force upon Soviet territory, that there would be restraint applied by all the members of the Pact upon Germany, and may I say with equal candour, that if there was any overt attack by the Soviet or any of its .. her allies, that there would be measures taken to promptly repel such attack. In other words this has to be one that is mutually advantageous, not just an .. a pact against Germany or against German aggression, which is what the Soviets continue to talk about, but a pact, or a treaty or an agreement against aggression from any source and whoever is the aggressor shall face the combined might of all of those who are a part of the pact.

CHAIRMAN: Do you support this Senator. From what you say you were impressed by Kennan's testimony. Do you support it, this plan?

HUMPHREY: I basically am in support of a type of European security system that would really apply sanctions to any one nation or group of nations that would be an aggressor.

CHAIRMAN: Senator .. (sorry)

HUMPHREY: Now I haven't thought out the details of this, what I am attempting to say on this broadcast is; I think we need, if not a new look, at the entire situation in Central Europe, ^{that} we need at least to carefully re-examine where we are now, how we got there, and what we may do to .. to alleviate some of these problems without sacrificing our basic concepts of national and .. or security.

CHAIRMAN: Paczenski?

VON PACZENSKI: Well, Senator, would you think that NATO would be decisively weakened if Germany would either pull out altogether or if Germany would renounce atomic armaments?

HUMPHREY: I think that when you talk about whether something would be decisively weakened, it is in relationship to what it is opposed to. Everything is in, .. or .. everything is relative. A NATO without Germany would not be weakened if it was a Soviet Union ^{may} I say without troops in Eastern Europe and without some of the powerful people that are presently associated with it. I personally feel that the situation is changed somewhat in the last few years, with the new type of weapons, intermediate range missiles, I.C.B.Ms and with the fact that Germany herself, I'm speaking of Western Germany, has a very substantial military force in being and a bigger one on the way, it is questionable whether the position of the West would be or .. substantially weakened if or .. if Germany ..

CHAIRMAN: Hello, Washington, we've lost the Senator's voice. Hello, Washington, can you hear us ... I'll just see who else has been disconnected by that. Hello, Paris.

GORDY: We are here.

CHAIRMAN: Yes. Hamburg.

VON PACZENSKI: We are here.

CHAIRMAN: Warsaw..

PODKOWYNSKI: I am here.

CHAIRMAN: Ottawa..

FRASER: Yes. Ottawa's in..

JE.

CHAIRMAN: Oh, well, I think the Senator's been momentarily lost to us, through perhaps technical difficulty...

FRASER: Perhaps he got the vote.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, that's a possibility, I believe that it's four o'clock in Washington and the Senate is sitting, so perhaps, unexpectedly, he's been called downstairs to vote. I believe they're broadcasting from the Studio right in the Senate Building, and I wonder Paczenski whether you feel that the line that the Senator has been taking on Germany is likely to be at all acceptable to the Adenauer Government.

VON PACZENSKI: Well, that, frankly I can't say. There are plenty of people in Germany who would agree with what the Senator says but I suppose the Government waits for the arrival of Mr. Dulles this weekend to fix any opinion they might announce afterwards. (and what) It doesn't sound as if it would be acceptable to them but, well just let's depend this or. on how well Mr. Dulles talks to Mr. Adenauer.

CHAIRMAN: Yes. And Warsaw what was your reaction, Podkowynski, to the line that the Senator was taking.

PODKOWYNSKI: I'll tell you something you know, it's, of course for us it's a very difficult line. Anyhow Senator Humphrey is a very experienced politician you know and he understands how to handle this thing, but it's a lot of things/especial what he told to the Poles you know some pleasant words which of course we appreciate very much you know he said.. and I hope, I wanted to ask him so/ questions, some more questions about the Rapacki Plan.

CHAIRMAN: Well, now it seemed to me, the line he was taking was coming fairly close to something like the Rapacki Plan was it not. (yes, yes) of course, :

MIDGLEY: Or Gaitskell Plan. (Yes indeed)

PODKOWYNSKI: Gaitskell, or Kennan Plan or other plans you know.

GORDEN? But it was disengagement.

FRASER: This is Blair Fraser in Ottawa (yes) One thing that is still not quite clear to me. I wasn't quite clear on what stipulations what prior conditions Senator Humphrey felt the Soviet Union would have to meet before this disengagement process would begin. It seems to me that over the last three or four years, it's become obvious that you can't even take a first step without some modification of the prior stipulations that were laid down in nineteen fifty five.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, well now we'll have to put to him when we get reconnected to Washington. I believe they're working on it technically now, I think that/question, because it was in my mind too, it was not clear from what was being said what the Soviets would have to do in order to, for us to be willing to make the concessions that he was suggesting might be made in the way of thinking out and so on.

VON PACZENSKI: Paczenski here. But it seems to me that he at least advocates some kind of Western initiative.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, quite, quite. I'll try now and see if we've got reconnected with Washington. Hello Washington.

HUMPHREY: Yes.

CHAIRMAN: Oh, you're back Senator.

RADIO LINK:

10.

HUMPHREY: I am thank you

CHAIRMAN: We thought perhaps you'd gone to vote.

HUMPHREY: Oh no, the line broke, there was some trouble.

CHAIRMAN: Well it proves then that this is a live programme.
anyway (laughter)

HUMPHREY: Indeed it does.

CHAIRMAN: Well now ^{just} one final point on this Central European thing
which is so ~~essential~~ to the whole business. We wanted to know

HUMPHREY: May I go back to the point that I was mentioning about
Germany and NATO.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, indeed.

HUMPHREY: I was trying to point out that, that this is all
relative, related, NATO strength is relative to the forces that it
opposes, that it is setup, against which it is making defence. (yes)
Of course NATO is better with Western Germany, and now we want to be
quite clear about it. We prefer to see Germany as a partner in NATO
and I personally prefer to see NATO not only as a military pact but
much more importantly to see it do work on the economic front in the
field of both political and economic er.. er.. helpfulness, not only
to the respective NATO members but other nations throughout the world.

CHAIRMAN: I know that Canada has been very keen on this too and
I'd like to bring in Blair Fraser.

FRASER: Yes, you mention this economic business. I'd like to
go on to another point that you and Mr. Khrushchev discussed in your
eight hour conversation (yes). Mr. Khrushchev, you reported, suggested
that we had to engage in economic competition and go all out. Now,
we of the West have been conducting an economic competition with the
Russians for the last ten years; you have; the British have, we in
Canada have. What do you think we should be doing that we haven't been
doing in the way of economic competition with the Russians.

HUMPHREY: Well, first of all, let me make it quite clear that
I believe there's a lot of things that we ought to be doing if the
Communist Party had never been heard of or if the Soviet Union had
never even become a state. I happen to be one of those that believe
that it is good and right for us to help other countries help themselves
to help them improve their economic productivity and their social
improvement, even if there were no cold war on. Now you ask, what
more could we do. Why much more. What we've been doing is all right
only we haven't been doing enough of it. For example, I think we
ought to be utilising the United Nations a great deal more in the area
of developing economic assistance thereby not promoting competition
between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. and the West, but promoting
co-operation. I think the West would do well to take the initiative
in the U.N. and propose for example that since the Soviet is so
interested in the Middle East, why don't they join with us and we'll
all put in to a U.N. Middle East Development - Economic Development
Agency - let's say a half a billion dollars, the West putting in let's
say three hundred and fifty million and the Soviet put in a hundred and
fifty million. We'll be generous with them. They have money to give
to others, why don't they work it through the U.N. and why don't we
take the initiative. There are other things that I think we might do.
Do more in terms of economic aid. I am advocating to my own country
as a member of the United States Senate, that we have a minimum five year

long-term economic aid programme of loans, at low rates of interest for at least a billion dollars a year ..

CHAIRMAN: That's a thousand million I think, billion is not used in the U.K.

HUMPHREY: Yes. A thousand million a year for the next, let's say the next five years, and to step up our programme of technical assistance. I believe there's much that we can do that, on the initiative, in the field of health, in the field of education. Oh, I got a lot of ideas....(laughter)

FRASER: Do you feel generally Senator, and I'm now speaking not only of the economic aid, but also of that.. what we were talking about before, Berlin, and Germany and Central Europe; Do you feel that in taking an initiative the West should offer a new set of conditions to the Soviet Union or should we fall back on the kind of prior stipulations that we've been accustomed to lay down until now; for example, the business, well we must have free elections in Germany before we do anything else.

HUMPHREY: Well, I think that our objective must be free Germany and where the German people themselves have an opportunity to decide their form of Government and how they will live and act. Now whether you can get free elections before you do anything else is highly improbable. I think we'd better start to do some of the other things and have as our objective the day that Germany can have free elections as I believe it is good for any Society to be able to choose its own rulers and to be able to choose and decide upon its own form of Government. No, I think some of the past stipulations may very well be a little too inflexible for the present power relation^{ship} in the world, and the fact that we need to make some improvements. However, I'm not so anxious to negotiate, that I'm willing to negotiate away what I believe are fundamental principles or rights. I think this is one of the dangers of er.. that faces Western countries, and Western leadership. We have public opinion to deal with, and a very live public opinion in every country, and there is a tendency on the part of the leaders of Western countries to want to negotiate just for the sake of negotiating and generally we find ourselves giving away rather than gaining, or even getting mutually advantageous positions. I believe in negotiation but I don't believe in coming in and letting somebody run off with what you've negotiated about.

FRASER: Do you feel we've done that up to now?

HUMPHREY: Not exactly. I would say in the Korean incident for example, we Americans learnt a little something over there, that I doubt that we got as good a settlement as the conditions should have necessitated.

CHAIRMAN: There's one other aspect of United States relations with Russia that we might want to touch on, I think, that's the significance involved in the visit of Mikoyan to America. (Yes) Gordey, you followed that very closely when you were in America didn't you?

GORDEY: Yes. I did. I covered the whole trip ...

CHAIRMAN: Yes. Would you like to raise some aspects of it with the Senator.

GORDEY: Well, Senator, do you think that this visit left er.. a very important impact on American public opinion, and on political opinion in Washington in particular?

JE.

HUMPHREY: Yes, I would say that at least right at the time of the visit, surely the American people were very keenly interested in Mr. Mikoyan as a man and as a representative of the Soviet. They...er. they surely looked upon his performance as one that was very able in terms of his interests. I really believe that possibly our leaders and our people were brought to realization quite graphically and dramatically, that these Soviets are tough; that they're smart, and that we have our work cut out for us but, may I add, I think Mr. Mikoyan found out that the United States wasn't about ready to collapse. I think he saw a strong America, economically; I think he saw an America that was peace-loving but not afraid; and I think he went home with a truer picture of both United States strength and United States intentions, and therefore I think the trip was worthwhile.

GORDEY: Senator, I agree with you, and I would like to ask if you think that all this has started a new phase in American-Soviet relations?

HUMPHREY: I think that it may very well have broken through some of the crust that had encased us. There was a tendency to confuse firmness with just standing still and being stubborn. I believe in firmness, in resoluteness. For example, I believe in being very firm in reference to Berlin, to the point at where we will stand no matter what the consequences, if it means just getting out and leaving these people to be slowly strangled to death by Soviet power. But I think that that isn't the answer. I think that firmness must include with it a kind of mobility and... and flexibility that seeks new answers to old complicated problems.

VON PACZENSKI: Paczenski in Hamburg (yes). We've been talking about the economical position between East and West in the world which is another way of saying that is supposed to be a political competition. I take it, (yes) one last Senator I'm afraid, how does in your opinion the Algerian war fit into that?

HUMPHREY: It's a tragedy, regrettably, the French have a problem there that their statesmanship thus far has not been able to solve. I'm sure that the leaders of France, responsible leaders themselves, know that this has sapped their vitality; has caused them serious trouble throughout the world, in terms of public opinion, and the solution is yet, undoubtedly, a long way off. However I do want to compliment and commend General de Gaulle for what I think has been a position of honour and integrity on this matter, and he's honestly seeking a solution that is fair.

CHAIRMAN: Senator, before the programme ends, I want to be sure we get at least some passing references to the immediate American scene, and I'm interested in one thing: you said to us that you are advocating a very much stepped-up American programme jointly with other countries; (yes) you are advocating greater flexibility, I think it's the phrase you used in our relationship with the Soviet Union. Now, are these....

HUMPHREY: I did... (yes)...maybe... not only flexibility which may indicate a flabbiness, because that isn't what I'm talking about - (no) I'm talking about agility (yes) and, where we probe and take the initiative and don't find ourselves sitting back waiting for the Soviet to pick the time and the place and the issue upon which negotiations ultimately have to start. I think it might not be a bad idea for us to have a set of propositions that we would like to talk about with the Soviet. For example, I can think of many of them relating to Eastern Europe as to their right of being more free and their economic deals; free of soviet troops; maybe we can talk about borders for example, between Poland and Germany, between Poland and the Soviet.

Union, lots of things.

CHAIRMAN: Now what I have in mind to put to you is this - that the picture one sometimes gets of your party's views on foreign affairs is provided to a considerable extent by Dean Acheson - (yes) this seems to be a rather rigid defence of the position of the Truman administration about eight years ago, and yet you're taking a rather different line. Now, are you at odds with that wing of your party.

HUMPHREY: There may be some minor differences between us, but let me state what is my position, I know that better than I know Mr. Acheson's. I know he's been very critical of Mr. Kennan - I'm not accepting all of what Mr. Kennan has said - I say this, that the first credential, the first requirement in this world today as we negotiate is to have sufficient strength so that you're respected and respectable. By that I mean we live in a world of suspicion and distrust, and everybody knows it, and ~~there's~~ no use of trying to pretend we don't. My regret is that our defence establishment is not even stronger, because I think that then once you have the shield of strength that the West really needs, we can sit down with the Soviet and they will understand that they are dealing with a tough adversary, tough in the sense of knowing what our power is, and we are then in a more free position to negotiate on the political issues. Now Mr. Acheson would agree to that, he doesn't agree on the question relating to Germany and my ideas on Central Europe. On that I think that he is defending a position which may have been valid eight years ago but has changed remarkably in the last few years.

FRASER: Well, Senator this is Fraser in Ottawa. How does that position you just outlined really differ from Secretary John Foster Dulles' position.

HUMPHREY: I think first of all it differs this way: number one, I don't think the administration has really pursued their policies of defence with sufficient vigour; I'm not happy about the Americans arguing whether or not our defence establishment is equal to the Soviets, that doesn't satisfy Hubert Humphrey. I think there ought to be no question about it, it ought to be superior. We can afford it and we ought to have it. The second point is that I don't believe we ought to wait for the Soviet to select the time and the place to discuss questions such as Berlin, or questions such as the future of Germany. The timing of negotiations sometimes, will sometimes condition the results, therefore I think that we ought to try to plan ahead a little bit. What is more, I believe that we ought to pursue much more vigorously our contacts particularly with the peoples in Poland, in Rumania, in Czecho-Slovakia, and other countries in an effort to let them know that there are friends in the West, that we'd like to see their trade and their commerce develop in contact with the West and that we look to the day when they will have a greater degree of independence and freedom of action.

CHAIRMAN: Senator, this final question requires only one word by you as answer. Are you a candidate for the Democratic nomination for Presidency.

HUMPHREY: This is a strange situation, you can't find a single candidate for that particular position. (laughter)

CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much indeed. It remains for me only to say Sir that it's been a firstclass and fascinating review of the world and we're most grateful to you for taking part.

JE.

HUMPHREY: Well, thank you very much

CHAIRMAN: And thank all the questioners in the five other capitals involved.

HUMPHREY: I'm very grateful for this privilege.

CHAIRMAN: Thank you. (Thank you)

ANNOUNCER: In the third anniversary edition of 'Radio Link' this evening the principal speaker was Senator Hubert H. Humphrey in Washington. Blair Fraser spoke from Ottawa; Michel Gerdey from Paris; Gert von Paczenski from Hamburg and Marian Podkowynski from Warsaw. John Midgley was with the Chairman, Robert McKenzie, in London. The next edition of Radio Link will be broadcast in the Home Service on Thursday night, the fifth of March, at the same time nine/fifteen to ten.



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