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National War College  
March 12, 1959

COMPARATIVE U.S. AND COMMUNIST POLICIES TOWARD THE UNCOMMITTED STATES

Outline of  
Address by  
Senator Hubert H. Humphrey

Introduction:

Our present world, like all Gaul, is divided into three parts. There is the Communist world which dominates the Eurasian land mass. There is the American-led Western coalition. Moscow and Washington are the two foci of our bipolarized world. And in between there are the uncommitted or neutral nations of Asia and Africa. I will confine my remarks to Asia and the Middle East and not deal with the uncommitted states like Switzerland and Yugoslavia.

We Must Take The Uncommitted States Seriously

↳ The "uncommitted" countries of the Middle East and Southeast Asia are politically, strategically and morally significant in the struggle between Communist tyranny and Western democracy, precisely because they are not committed.

1. The U.S.S.R. and Red China take Asia and Africa seriously -- witness their greatly increased economic offensive and their psychological political strategy as expressed at the Bandung and Cairo Conferences.

2. In contrast our Government has a weak and wobbly policy in Asia which does not come to grips fully with the revolutionary opportunities. We are in danger of being too late with too little. Time is running out. The destiny of Asia may determine the destiny of the world.

The Peoples of Asia, Africa and the Middle East  
Want Two Things

There are two overwhelming aspirations which the peoples of Southeast Asia as well as of Africa share; these aspirations are closely interrelated:

1. Political self-respect: They desire to stand

on their own feet, to sever colonial ties or any ties that imply political subordination to alien powers. They are not against all Western ties -- India and Pakistan, for example, are in the British Commonwealth.

2. Economic and Technological Development:

Asians know that genuine self-respect and independence are not possible without a higher living standard.

Prime Minister Nehru said on November 20, 1957, that

India must forge ahead with its second five-year plan to get out of the "cow dung age" and not be left behind in the "sputnik age."

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Time is Running Out

Asia is in a forced march toward its political and economic goals. The "revolution of rising expectations" cannot be halted. Red China has made its decision -- it has cast its lot with the Communist world. Important decisions lie ahead for India, Pakistan, Burma and other countries recently cut loose from Western colonial ties. The continuing economic and political crises in these areas present great dangers and opportunities for the United States.

1. One major opportunity is India's

projected five-year plan which calls for a total expenditure of \$15 billions. She needs to borrow \$1 billion from <sup>abroad</sup> ~~abroad~~ and hopes a total of \$500 million will be forthcoming from the U.S.

2. The Communist bloc has launched an intensified economic offensive in Asia in the form of long-term, low-interest loans and with "no political strings attached." Observers believe that the volume of this aid will increase in the immediate future and that, as in the past, economic assistance will be the prelude to political penetration, as it proved to be in Syria and Egypt.

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3. The Soviet sputniks and Lunik have introduced a new and potentially revolutionary element into the picture. Russia's startling scientific advances have proved to Asians that technological progress can be achieved without paying the price of genuine democracy. Hitherto technical advances were thought to depend upon political democracy (or sometimes "free enterprise"). The appeal of sputnik to the political leaders of largely feudal and agrarian societies should not be underestimated.

Elements in the Communist Strategy

1. The Communists have two objectives with respect to the uncommitted countries:

- Ultimately to win them over to Communism.
- Immediately to prevent these areas from being drawn into the Western coalition.

2. The Communists enjoy certain advantages in dealing with Asians.

Racial: The peoples of Asia and Africa are very sensitive on the race issue. They associate political domination and economic exploitation with the Western White man. The Communists have the advantage of being non-European. The

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Russians and the Red Chinese can say with some plausibility: "There's nobody here but us Asians!"

Political: The United States today is the target of much hostility that was previously directed toward France, Britain and other European colonial powers. The memory of subject status is all too fresh in the minds of many uncommitted peoples, and America is identified, because of her NATO alliance and her voting record in the

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United Nations, with the Western colonial powers. The Soviet Union and Red China suffer under no such handicap. I don't know how many Hungarys it will take before some of these people know where the real imperial threat is today.

Economic: The United States is identified with economic exploitation from the West, but the Soviet Union and Red China are not. Further, the Soviets can cite their remarkable economic and technological achievement from an underdeveloped state to a fairly highly developed economy in

three decades. Much faster than the  
United States.

Military: The Soviet Union has no  
military bases on the foreign soil of  
a non-Communist state. She poses as the  
champion of peace and constantly tells  
the world how she is trying to get rid  
of nuclear weapons. The United States,  
on the other hand, has a ring of bases  
around the Soviet-Chinese empire. We  
have dropped two atomic bombs on human  
beings, and Asians at that. These facts,  
apart from their deeper meaning, add one

more strike against us as we attempt to deal with Asians.

Cultural Empathy: For the reasons mentioned above, it appears easier for Russian or Chinese Communists to establish contact and achieve identification with Asians in their propoganda as well as in their face-to-face dealings.

The Ugly American and other studies indicate the ineptitude of many overseas Americans. Our high living standard,

our failure to learn foreign languages,  
and our attitudes of superiority make  
genuine identification very difficult.

3. Communist Tactics in Asia and the Middle East

The U.S.S.R. has employed a variety of means to  
achieve its immediate object of keeping the neutral  
nations out of the Western coalition and its ultimate  
objective of winning them to Communism.

Propaganda: Radio Moscow, cheap books and  
leaflets, and trained propagandists are the  
major instruments of Soviet persuasion. There

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is always a dual theme: the United States is bad, very bad, and the Soviet Union is good, very good. They exploit all our weaknesses and internal contradictions, especially as they relate to race and "peace". They cite Little Rock to accuse us of massive racism, and our military bases and bomb testing to accuse us of militarism and imperialism. They cite American movies and accuse us of cultural imperialism.

The Soviets even accuse us of materialism, and then turn around and try to be as much like us as they can.

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Economic Penetration: There are three major

instruments:

- 1) Technical assistance: Let me emphasize again that their technicians are more fluent at foreign languages than ours and their lower standards of living permits them to identify themselves with the local population.
- 2) Loans: Long-term, low-interest development credit.
- 3) Trade: Soviet trade missions are active in most countries of the world. They have been fairly effective, in part because they are

willing to barter, and even to dump goods  
or raw materials for political reasons.

It is important to remember that all these  
economic devices are instruments of the over-all  
Communist political strategy. They attempt to  
create economic dependence of a weaker state upon  
Soviet trade and credit. Then they can exploit this  
heavy dependence, as they did in Finland recently,  
and by economic threat upset a national government.  
Example: "If you don't turn out the present government,  
we will cancel our order for icebreakers!"

Political and Military Threats: In Iran recently the U.S.S.R. threatened the Government in sharp terms to frighten it from signing a mutual defense pact with the United States. Such an alliance, said Moscow, would make Iran a nuclear target. Iran was not frightened.

Outright Military Attack: This is the least likely contingency in Asia and the Middle East, but it can't be ruled out entirely.

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America's Policy Toward the Uncommitted Areas is Less  
Than Adequate

-- We have not fully understood the basic  
psychological and political aspirations of the Asian  
people. Our diplomacy has been singularly inept.  
The Secretary of State's uncalled for reference to  
Goa as a "province" is an example of this. Our  
informational program has been less than adequate.  
Asians are less interested in American bath tubs,  
and even in American democracy, than they are in  
American responsibility to her own ideals and her  
respect for the rights and interests of other  
countries.

-- We have misunderstood the positive role

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that genuine neutrality can play in free Asia. The Administration has pushed some Asian nations into the SEATO pact before the psychological and political preconditions for a viable alliance were present. SEATO does not have the support of India, Burma, Indonesia and Ceylon. Mr. Dulles has tended to see Asian countries more as potential military allies in the struggle with Communism than as new and proud nations which are suspicious of any Western ties past or future which imply political or psychological subordination.

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President Eisenhower (June 6, 1956) defended the right of nations to be neutral and said that a decision to remain aloof from military alliances under certain circumstances was natural and even prudent. On the other hand, Mr. Dulles, (June 9, 1956) declared that neutrality is "an obsolete conception and, except under very exceptional circumstances, is an immoral and short-sighted conception." This reveals confusion within the Administration. What we fail to see is that there is a good neutralism and a bad neutralism and that our foreign policy should be devoted to encouraging the good variety and discouraging the bad.

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Responsible neutralism, from the viewpoint of one who believes in democratic values, can be, and indeed is being, pursued by certain Asian countries like India. According to this brand of neutralism, or non-alignment as they prefer to call it, the neutral nation does not join with the military alliance structure of either side in the Cold War. It remains uncommitted in an explicit military sense, but at the same time it is not neutral as far as fundamental issues of tyranny and justice are concerned. A genuinely neutral and independent nation which is strong enough to resist the penetration of Communism is a far greater asset to the West than a subservient Asian country that has been prematurely pressed into a Western military pact. What we want is countries with

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enough political self-respect and economic strength to stand up and be counted when the chips are down.

Not all neutralism in Asia and the Middle East is responsible. There is a sham neutralism, bad from our point of view, which claims a false independence, but is in fact dependent upon the Soviet Union or Red China. There is a danger of this kind of "neutralism" in the United Arab Republic and perhaps even more so in Iraq. Sometime it is a case of whom you are neutral against!

-- We have failed to grasp the significance of economic development in Asia, although there is an

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increased awareness of the Soviet economic challenge. The Soviet bloc in the last three and one-half years promised a total of \$1.5 billions in credits to ten underdeveloped countries. Generally Soviet loans have carried an interest from 2 to  $2\frac{1}{2}$  percent. Our aid has also been substantial, but until recently we have usually charged from 3 to 6 percent, averaging about 5 percent. Until last year the Administration tried to write off Soviet economic penetration as inconsequential, but this is no longer possible. The Administration has called for a new appropriation of

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\$700 million for the new Development Loan Fund established by Congress two years ago. This is good, but it is not enough. ( I regret to say that a House Subcommittee last Monday cut down the Administration's request for \$225 million Supplemental appropriation for the Development Loan Fund. I will work to get this restored in the Senate.)

A Four-Point Program Toward Neutrals

On February 16, 1956, I called for a "reappraisal and analysis of our foreign policy" in Asia. I said then that we were on the defensive. If we were

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on the defensive then, we are even more so today.

A sobering assessment of where we stand in the eyes of Asians was revealed in a poll/<sup>reported</sup>~~report~~ a year ago (WASHINGTON POST)(January 9, 1958).

It was taken in ten of the world's principle cities.

In New Delhi 54 percent of the persons surveyed

believed that Russia was doing more to keep the

peace in the world than the West. Only 18 percent

believed the West was doing more and 28 percent had

no opinion. In the nine other world cities, none in

Asia, the great majority believed the West was doing

more for world peace than the USSR. Evidently we

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have failed to convince millions of Asians that we are genuinely dedicated to international peace.

The Administration has engaged in a reappraisal of our Asian policies, but the proposals emerging from this restudy have not been dynamic enough to meet the new challenges. Perhaps the recommendations of the Draper Committee will be bolder. We have taken steps in the right direction, but the escalator of history may be moving more rapidly in the opposite direction.

We need a new and more dynamic program for bolstering up the forces of freedom and responsibility in Asia and the Middle East.

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The heart of this program must be a ~~new~~ sense of urgency, a fresh understanding of the challenge, and a new sensitivity to the aspirations of the peoples in these areas. Only then can we hope to take the diplomatic, political and economic initiative that the situation demands. The following elements are fundamental to a policy worthy of our position in the world today:

1. Confidence in American diplomacy must be restored: In Asia the Goa statement and official statements implying that neutrals are "immoral" will

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not soon be forgotten. We must enlist our best diplomatic talent at every level from the Secretary of State and Ambassadors to the specialized personnel in our embassies, in the ICA and the USIA throughout Asia. In diplomacy it is not only what we do, but how we do it. Our policies will not always be approved, but if they are consistently pursued they will be respected.

2. We must adapt a more flexible policy toward Asia which takes fully into account the political and cultural diversity in that vast area. We must

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recognize that these nations are proud and have both a moral and political right to pursue their own policies in their own way, and that they do not want to be pushed prematurely into any ties with the West which imply an inferior or subordinate position. A genuinely independent country is a greater value than coerced ally.

3. We must increase our economic aid to free and independent Asian countries, mainly in the form of long-term low-interest loans under the new Development Loan Fund, the Import-Export Bank and other appropriate channels.

Aid of whatever amount should not be given in a mood of  
charity, but with a clear recognition that it

is in the mutual interest of our country and the receiving country. These less-developed areas will probably maintain their self-respect better through loans than through grants, but there are circumstances where outright grants may be to our mutual advantage. We cannot buy friends, but we can alienate peoples by unwise and unimaginative foreign trade and aid policies. We should seek to increase the flow of trade and private credit to these areas.

This whole problem of relating ourselves creatively to the uncommitted countries is dramatically illustrated in a current issue before the Congress and, indeed, before the American people. I refer to the opportunity presented to us by India's Second Five Year Development Plan. This plan is in great peril. It cannot succeed without substantial help from the United States. The Indian Government has twice cut

back the goals to the bone as a concession to economic realities over which they had no control. One problem was the serious drop in commodity prices which hurt India badly.

If the Second Five Year Plan fails, many people in Asia may lose their confidence in the democratic solution to political and economic problems. They will cite the startling economic and technical development of Red China as an example of how India and other Asian nations should organize themselves.

Both our tradition of humanitarian concern for needy peoples and our national self interest impel us to respond to this opportunity with generosity, realism, and speed.

Before I tell you what I think we ought to do, I want to remind you what we did to help make India's First Five Year Plan the great success it was. During the First Plan the United

States provided about \$300 million in aid in addition to the special wheat loan of \$190 million and World Bank loans totalling \$30 million.

I might say in passing that the Government of India never defaulted on a single loan.

Concerning the Second Development Plan we have **already** given some help, but not enough. Last fall the United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, Canada, Japan and the World Bank pledged \$350 million in loans. Subsequently we gave \$100 million from our newly created Development Loan Fund, and the World Bank, capitalized largely by American capital, provided \$100 million; The United Kingdom, \$108 million; West Germany, \$40 million; Canada, \$17 million; and Japan, \$10 million. The total amounted to \$375 million, \$25 million above the united pledge.

It is interesting to note that our two main antagonists in World War II are among those who are participating in this effort to build the economic foundation for the world's most

populous democracy. History has its ironies!

This same five-nation group is scheduled to convene this coming Monday to discuss India's request for additional loans totalling from \$650 to \$800 million, and the United States enters this meeting with good intention, but with empty hands.

With this important meeting just a few days off I regret that a subcommittee of the other House of Congress did not see fit to grant the full supplemental appropriation requested by the Administration for the Development Loan Fund. The Administration asked for a deficiency appropriation of \$225 million, and the subcommittee approved only \$100 million. By the way, that was 100% more than the same committee had voted a short 24 hours before!

The Development Loan Fund was established two years ago by Congress. To date it has been given a total of \$700 million. It needs more money than this. And it must be so financed that it can plan at least ten years in advance. You cannot develop private industries like steel or automobiles on a year-by-year basis. Even less ~~and~~ <sup>can</sup> you plan the economic and industrial country like India bit by bit. Capital funds are the life blood of economic development, and a pint at a time is not enough.

The United States should increase substantially the assets of the Development Loan Fund, not only to assist India in its hour of need, but for other worthy projects where long-term, low-interest loans might well make the difference between success and failure. The stakes are too high for dilly-dallying, for business as usual, and for a balance-the-budget-at-any-price mentality.

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4. To develop greater understanding between Asia and the United States we must embark upon a comprehensive program of cultural, scientific and educational exchange. Distinguished Americans like Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, former Ambassador Chester Bowles, Marian Anderson, Chief Justice Warren and Walter Reuther have done much to create understanding of American purposes in India and other Asian lands. Such visits should be increased. Through an expansion of the Fulbright Program we should increase the volume of Asian students who can study here and Americans who can study in Asian lands.

Finally, we must establish priorities in the pursuit of this four-point program. We do not have the resources to do everything that needs to be done. Many indications point to India as the key nation in Asia -- the nation upon whose destiny the destiny of all Asia and perhaps all the world may rest.

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Vi--

Here is the final edited version of  
The War College speech, which I think  
is an excellent one, one which could  
well provide the basis of further  
speeches and articles. I have a  
second copy here. Perhaps you will  
want to put this in your MS file.

Ernie

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POLICIES TOWARD THE UNCOMMITTED STATES

By

The Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey

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(12 March 1959)

GENERAL HARROLD: (Introduced the speaker).

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Thank you very much, General (Harrold).

Gentlemen, I consider it a rare privilege and a great honor to be invited to address this very unusual and distinguished gathering of public officials and public servants - officers of our Government.

It is my desire this morning not necessarily to lay before you a complete outline or discussion of U. S. and Communist policies in the so-called "uncommitted" countries, but to touch upon these policies, to open them up for discussion, because we have a question period, and possibly to provoke you into some rethinking of our own personal attitudes toward American policies and what you believe to be the best program for our nation and our allies in these great uncommitted areas of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.

Our present world, like Gaul back in Caesar's time, is divided into three parts. There is the Communist world, which dominates the Eurasian land mass. Then there is the American-led Western coalition. Moscow and Washington are the focal points of this bipolarized world. And in between there are the so-called "uncommitted" or "neutral" nations of Asia and Africa. I believe it might even be better if we would just call these the "new and rising" nations, because the positive approach to these people and these countries has a very decided beneficial effect.

I am going to confine my remarks primarily to Asia and the Middle East.

The first point that I should like to lay before you is that we must take these areas of the world very seriously. These are not just the great uncharted exotic areas of legendary fame. They are real power centers and they should be recognized as tremendously potential power centers.

The uncommitted countries of the Middle East and Southeast Asia are politically, strategically, and morally significant in the struggle against Communist tyranny and in our effort to promote and to protect what we call Western democracy precisely because they are uncommitted. We find the two countries of U.S.S.R. and Red China taking Asia and Africa very seriously. Witness their greatly increased economic offensive in these areas and their psychological-political strategy as expressed at the Bandung and Cairo conferences and recently at the conferences in Ankara in Central Africa.

I sometimes feel that we are the victims of a kind of timidity relating to Africa and Asia and the Middle East; we are always a little bit late with our response to their requests, particularly the requests for recognition. I am not talking about political recognition. I am talking about a kind of psychological recognition.

What is it that people really want in the world today more than anything else? We sometimes try to feel that they want prosperity, that they want economic productivity, or that they want economic well-being. I would respectfully suggest that what most of the people want

in these areas is acceptance; they want to be considered as equals. They do not want a spirit of noblesse oblige; they do not want a paternalistic spirit on our part; they do not want us to be their big brother or their little brother. They want us to be on an equal plain with them and they with us; they want us to treat them as individuals with dignity and stature. This is quite an assignment for a Caucasian people in the Western world, who have been brought up, either consciously or subconsciously, to look upon Asia and Africa as peculiar, unknown, and uncharted places where you get all sorts of fantastic legendary figures. It is rather hard for us to wake up to the fact that they are here, that their civilizations are old and mature, and that they must be reckoned with.

I repeat, the U.S.S.R. and Red China take these areas seriously. I think it will stand to the disfavor and to the eternal shame of the Government of the United States that we did not take, for example, the Bandung conference seriously enough really to do something about it. I know somebody will say: "Well, we weren't invited." May I add that the best times I have had were at places where I was never invited. And this is true of governments. If you are only going to wait until you are invited to do something you may be waiting a long time, particularly in politics; and this is politics in its highest dimension.

Now, in contrast to this seriousness of purpose on the part of the Soviets and the Red Chinese, our Government (and I say this most respectfully but I am going to put it on the line) has a weak and wobbly policy in Asia and Africa which does not come to grips fully

with the revolutionary opportunities. We are in danger of being a little too late with too little. Time is running out and the destiny of Asia may determine the destiny of the world.

When I came to the United States Senate in 1949 I determined to study about India, as I had before as a student and a teacher. I started making a few speeches in the Senate about India. One of my colleagues came up to me and said: "Why are you interested in India?" I said: "Well, if I didn't know one thing about India I could just take a look at the map of Asia and in five seconds determine that it is important just by the geopolitics of it, the geography of it. It is the underpinning of the whole Asian land mass. It juts up into the so-called 'belly' of the Soviet Union. It is important geographically. It is important culturally. Anyone who has studied the many cultures of Asia (and, by the way, that is an important thing for us to do, rather than just study the port cities or the products) knows that India has always been a leading power, and her importance in the scheme of things in the 20th century should never be underestimated." This was 1949.

Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois used to call me "the Senator from India" because I took a great interest in this country. I still do, not because I am pro-India, but because I am pro-America, and because as a man in public life I know that the first rule of politics is to be able to count - just count. And when you start making a head count in this world you will find out that we are running a little bit behind.

Another rule of politics is to know how to checkmate. That is a good one in chess too. Sometimes I am of the opinion that we are so cozy with our old friends that we hesitate to make any new ones. Might I also add that there are three simple rules in public life and political life which apply to international affairs and surely to the area where we are now directing some of our attention:-

1. Know yourself.

That sometimes is a rather ugly study but it is important; one has to know one's self.

2. Know your job.

Know what you are after. Know what your objectives are. Know what resources you have to obtain those objectives.

3. Know your opposition.

I frequently say that whenever I see anybody in Minnesota making too many speeches at men's clubs and the Kiwanis Clubs I have somebody look him up right away. I start building a file on that fellow before he gets started. I suggest that this is a mighty sound principle even in international affairs.

I am a politician and I think one learns something from it. I have seen entrenched groups toppled even as they thought they were at the pinnacle of their power because they spent their time talking to each other and they did not really understand the forces that were at work in their local community, their state, or their nation, and in our instance I must say of our world; nor did they understand the rising leaders - the new ones coming up. This is vital today, ladies and

gentlemen, absolutely vital, that we understand the people that are coming up the political ladder in Asia and Africa -- understand them as individuals, understand the political parties and forces with which they are associated.

I am going to make a statement here this morning that I do not think anyone can refute. I think there is a gross ignorance in the United States of America as relates to political parties, the political and economic forces that are organized and institutionalized that are at work in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. I am a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and have been for years. I am going to say here, without fear of contradiction, that if you poll the better than 530 members of Congress you won't find ten percent that are able to name you five political parties in all of Asia and Africa, what their names are, what they stand for, and who their leaders are. How are you going to deal with something if you do not know what it is, except through what somebody says in the New York Times or the Washington Post or some other fine newspaper? I suggest you need knowledge and greater depth.

There are two overwhelming aspirations which the peoples of Southeast Asia, as well as Africa, share, and these aspirations are closely related:-

1. Political self-respect.

They desire to stand on their own feet and to sever the colonial ties or any other ties that imply political subordination to alien powers. They are very sensitive about this - exceedingly sensitive;

and one thing that we ought to understand is sensitivity. We have been sensitive about the British in this country since 1776. We should be getting over it. But anti-British sentiment sometimes wins elections. Thirty years ago mayors of Chicago were running on the anti-British platform. And you can still get a good audience in many places, if you have enough Irish around, on an anti-British platform. Do not misunderstand me. I am very pro-Irish; I want to make that quite clear.

The point that I am trying to make is that new people -- that is, people who are just coming into their own, people who have been under what they feel was an oppressive system for a long time, people who have just broken their shackles and have come out into their own -- are very sensitive people, and you have to keep this constantly in mind. They are not against all Western ties; I think we should remember this. India and Pakistan, for example, are in the British Commonwealth. It is to the eternal credit of the British that they have left a very good feeling with their former colonies and they have done this because of their great political maturity and their sensitivity to the needs of the people.

## 2. Economic and social development.

Asians know that genuine self-respect and independence are not possible without a higher standard of living. Prime Minister Nehru said on November 20, 1957, as a characteristic phrase of what I am talking about, that India must forge ahead with its Second Five-Year Plan to get out of the cow-dung age and not be left behind in the Sputnik age. You see, a great leader understands the needs of his people.

I call your attention to the fact that time is running out. Asia is in a forced march towards its political and economic goals. The revolution of rising expectations, as stated so graphically and beautifully by Arnold Toynbee, cannot be halted. Red China has made its decision. It has cast its lot with the Communist world, and important decisions lie ahead in India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, and other countries recently cut loose from Western colonial ties. The continuing economic and political crises in these areas present great dangers and yet great opportunities for the United States.

I have been making a few talks around the country around three concepts of three words which I would like to share with you briefly this morning. These three words are people, progress, and peace.

These are three precious and vital words in the lexicon of democracy; yet these are the very three words which the policy of our Government underestimates and underemphasizes. I have not heard a real good, ringing, stirring speech about people from the leaders of this country for so long that it is almost beyond my memory -- people, just people -- not institutions -- not prosperity -- not all this generalized supermorality talk -- just people -- about people, their needs, their aspirations, their wants -- with feeling -- feeling deep in one's breast and soul.

Another thing is progress. Our Government constantly is reminding people these days that they may have to go a little slower. Well, I want to warn you -- there is a way to do that, but you don't say it directly. It is like dealing with your own teen-agers. When

you start to deal with your teen-agers (and I have a house full of them and so do some of you), the minute you start to tell them to slow down they walk right over you. You have other ways to divert some of their energies and you at least try to find ways to give them some understanding of how to direct their tremendous vitality and energy into constructive paths. That is our desire; that is our design. Sometimes we fail miserably, but that is our hope. There is one thing you can be sure of -- positively, unqualifiedly sure of -- the minute you tell that seventeen-year-old or eighteen-year-old or sixteen-year-old son of yours that he ought not to do it this way, that you never used to do it this way, and that he ought to learn a little bit, he ought to go slower, he calls you an old fogey.

Do you know what we have spent our time doing with people? We give them big lectures on budgets, on fiscal responsibility. This is all important; do not misunderstand me. But there is a way that you do this. What they really want to hear about is progress -- steel plants, agriculture, new hopes, new goals, new aspirations. They want to dream for a while. They have been in a nightmare, most of these people, for centuries. They would like a happy dream. And if we cannot understand the importance of dramatic expressions of the hopes and aspirations of men, then we are lost.

We did not win our own Revolution by people constantly telling us what we could not do. We won it with a Thomas Paine telling us what we could do, and a Samuel Adams, a John Adams, and a Thomas Jefferson. Alexander Hamilton came into his own as Secretary of the Treasury after

we had won the Revolution.

So I say there are two words that we have lost our hold on here somewhere; yet, they are our words -- people and progress.

The Communists go around the world today -- and they have the People's Republic of China, the People's Republic of Korea, the German Democratic Republic, which is neither democratic in spirit, nor republican in form, and I doubt if it is German -- and they use these words; they repeat them, repeat them, repeat them. They talk about the people's movement, always the people, the people.

Do you know what we talk about? The companies, the corporations, the institutions; and most of the other people of the world do not have these things. We are talking about things that they envy.

Now, what is the third word? Peace.

I was in the Soviet Union only recently. Many in this room have been there more times than I have and much longer. But I will say this, well recognizing that it could be misinterpreted, that there are more talk, more signs, more placards, more slogans about peace in the Soviet Union than in the United States. They make peace a political word. They talk peace and arm. We talk arms and work for peace. We underestimate the power of that wonderful, beautiful word peace, which, by the way, is not a word in the Communist vocabulary, not at all. It is hard to find the word peace in the Communist literature, that is, the Leninist-Stalinist-Marxist literature. You will find a lot about conflict, but not about peace. However, those fellows have learned how to use that word mir, which in the Russian language is peace, the

"peace dove", the "peace petitions" -- peace, peace, peace.

Do you know what our newspapers say every day? "Troops", "troops", "guns", "rockets", "missiles".

Teddy Roosevelt once said that we would all be better off if we would speak softly and carry a big stick. I am going to tell you what I think. I think we speak far too loudly and we have sawed off the stick. I am not happy with our military posture, and I might just as well tell my friends right down here in the military. I am not at all happy with it. I do not like to read in the papers that we cannot stand up against the enemy, because this is a sure sign for them to exploit us to the Nth degree in every weakness we have. If we cannot stand up against them, then we are out of the ball park.

Furthermore, there is a way, you know, of being strong on the one hand -- having a powerful military shield that is in fact and not in publicity -- and then going out here and doing something with the right hand of fellowship in the area of peace. They are not contradictory.

Not long ago I was at the Rochester Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota. I saw out there how the doctors apply radioactive cobalt to an area of malignancy. They have a tremendous laboratory facility there. There is a little room; the walls, made of concrete and lead, are about eighteen inches thick. In there they bring the patient and then they bring in the cobalt "bomb" and place that near the area of malignancy. But on the outside is the doctor with the shield between himself and the patient and with a mechanical hand and arm he applies gently and in

proper amounts the radioactive particles or isotopes. Without the shield the doctor would not live; therefore, the patient could not be helped, and without the cobalt the patient could not be cured or given a hope of life; it takes both.

There is nothing contradictory between the shield and the healing; both are needed. The only thing is that you very seldom read about the shield in medical science. You are not told about the great big eighteen-inch thick concrete leaded area. You are told about the healing that is going on, and rightly they should because it is the healing that is important.

What I am trying to say to you is that in this area of Asia and Africa you cannot terrorize these people anymore; they have had it; they have lived in terror and misery all their lives. And all that the talk about big weapons does is to make them dislike you a little more. But they are smart enough to know the importance of these weapons. Their leaders are very practical people, and they know that these weapons are vital to the security of the world, but they do not want them emphasized all the time. They do not want us washing our dirty military linen all the time in their front room, but they would like to hear about how we can build a better world.

Fellow Americans, when are we going to get on that theme of how we can build a better world? Right today we are on the theme of how we can destroy the one we have.

I am one of these people who believes there is an awful lot of work to do inside the world, and not only on the outside. I think

there is a little escapism in this business of getting into outer space. I am all for it; do not misunderstand me. I think we must explore outer space, but I would like to do a little work on inner space right now, because here is where we have the problems. By the way, if we could settle some of the problems of inner space we would not have to worry about outer space; we could work on that cooperatively. The problems that beset us now are right on this globe. Once we get those settled, we can work together outside.

I am talking this morning to the advocates of the greatest revolution that the world has ever known. We Americans are the real revolutionaries. The Communists are the counterrevolutionaries, and they have taken up our good word revolution and made it theirs. We are the revolutionaries; we are the people who believe in the government by the consent of the governed. We are the people who believe in human dignity. We are the people who even believe that if you put down ten dollars you ought to own a house.

How revolutionary can you get? There is no other place in the world where people are like that. We believe in consumer credit. We are the most revolutionary people on the face of the earth. We even let other people have our money and use it in our banks, stock companies, and corporations. Other people keep it in mattresses all over the world, or hidden under posts. We are the real revolutionaries and we are afraid to talk about it, because the minute anybody talks about being a revolutionist somehow or other he is branded as a dangerous fellow.

The only dangerous people today are the conservatives. They

are the real dangerous ones because they are going to try to preserve something that no one can preserve, namely, the status quo. The main thing now is whether or not you can manage the forces that are at work so that you do not have complete demoralization of the institutions that mean so much to us.

One major opportunity for us is India and its projected Five-Year Plan, which calls for a total expenditure of fifteen-billion dollars. She needs to borrow a billion dollars abroad and hopes a total of five-million dollars will be forthcoming from the United States. And we are arguing about this as if this was going to break us. The success of the Indian Five-Year Plan is as important to the welfare of the United States of America as the matter of our own fiscal solvency. We cannot afford to have that country fail. It is gifted with good leadership. It is privileged to have democratic institutions. It is putting up a hard battle to make those institutions work. Its problems are immense, almost insuperable. Be that as it may, it must succeed. If it does not succeed we become a second-rate power. The day that India goes Communist along with Red China and the Soviet Union we are on the way out.

There is only one way left for us and that will be the way of utter frustration and destruction -- thermonuclear war. And that is the thing that some of us worry about, that we may get ourselves into such a position where maybe there is nothing left for a nation to do but to strike or strike back. May the Lord prevent that day! The time to help India is before it is too late.

The problem of balancing our budget is important, but not as important as a balance of power in the world. And I am one of those who feels that if you need more taxes to do these things I am willing to pay them, and I am not afraid to say so here or publicly, and I am willing to vote for them too, because I happen to think that the American people are crying out for some leadership that will tell them the sad and mean facts of life and get on with the job of doing something about it. We do not need to be coddled around here; we can take it. But if everybody thinks it is all going to blow over, that somehow or other this is just a little spring squall, that if you just hang around and keep the radar out and miss the worst thunderheads, you will be all right -- if you think that is all there is to it, then I say we are in for serious trouble.

The Communist bloc has launched a very intensive program in Asia in the form of a long-term economic offensive. This is the real threat from the Soviets today. I doubt that they intend to blow this world to pieces. They know, their scientists know about the power of these new weapons that we have. They know we have overkill. They have it too. They can guarantee they will get you on the second round if they miss you the first round, and we can do the same. What they are working on now is the economic and political offensive -- not to blow the world to pieces, but to pick it up piece by piece -- Operation Nibble -- and they are busily engaged in it. They repress relentlessly any little area of weakness on the periphery of the world. They keep moving all over the world, and we are not given that happy choice of

just dealing with them here and there. You have to face this crowd all over, all at once, all the time. That is what totalitarian means. A totalitarian power faces you on every front all the time.

You cannot even afford to lose a hockey game, gentlemen; and if I had my way we wouldn't. I do not believe in losing to them in tiddly-winks. I think you have to face up to these people in every area of human effort -- science, education, production, industry, agriculture, politics, military -- all the time, because they are the totalitarians and they press you in a totality. They know the world is round and they are pressing on all parts of the world. We think it is flat. We say: Now they are going to work us over in Formosa; let's be interested there. And while we are getting over to Formosa they are back in Berlin. And mark my words -- while we are in Berlin they are going to be back in Formosa, and then in Iran. We are going to look like a one-armed wallpaper hanger going around here with the rolls out of control.

Their economic offensive is a serious threat to us. This economic offensive is taking place in the uncommitted markets, in the areas of the world where the future lies. Any businessman who has any gumption and any vision knows that at times you must take a loss in order to make a market. The Soviets and the Communists know that for a long period of time. They will deal in trade and economics in areas of the world at a loss in order to control the market.

Mikoyan told me at a reception in Moscow: "Senator, we Communists have the zeal of Bolsheviks and the practicability of capitalists

when it comes to trade."

Khrushchev said: "Trade is not for profit; it is for power."

We are dealing with a group of people who have put aside what we call "the profit motive" and the "free enterprise system", and they look upon trade and economics as a way of engendering power. They are perfectly willing to have ten, fifteen, and twenty years of losses in many areas of the world in order to (1) get those areas of the world oriented to the Soviet orbit; (2) get those areas of the world accustomed to Soviet production; (3) get those areas of the world dependent upon the Soviets for spare parts for capital goods; and (4) get those areas of the world committed to the Soviet economically in terms of loans and interest payments.

They understand the things that we ought to understand. They understand the importance of long-term low interest rates. We are committed back home and abroad to short-term high interest rates. I am against high interest rates at home and abroad.

Our country today is the world's greatest agricultural exporter. I predict that in five years we will be running a close race with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is going to move into our agricultural markets. They are going to do this because we are complaining about the fact that we do not know what to do with our surpluses in a world where fifty percent of the people are hungry. We are always worried about upsetting normal markets. I am going to let you in on a secret. There are very few of those left - normal in the sense that my father knew them.

The whole market area of the world is changing. The Soviets, the Chinese Reds, and many others are changing that market area of the world. When you remove from the normal markets of the world all of Eastern Europe, all of the Soviet Union and Siberia, and all of Red China, as well as vast other areas, what have you left that is normal?

Observers believe that the volume of Soviet aid will continue to increase. We woke up to the fact a while ago, and it all at once became a shocking thing to us.

The Soviet Sputniks and Lunik have introduced a new and potentially revolutionary element in the picture. Russia's startling scientific advances have proved to Asians that technological progress can be achieved without paying the price of genuine democracy. Hitherto, technical advances were thought to depend on political democracy, or, as we say, "free enterprise". The appeal of Sputnik to the political leaders of largely feudal and agrarian societies should not be underestimated.

What are the elements in this Communist strategy?

The Communists have two objectives with respect to the uncommitted countries -- ultimately to win them over to Communism, immediately to prevent these areas from being drawn into the Western coalition. The Communists enjoy certain advantages in dealing with Asians.

1. Racially.

The people of Asia and Africa are very sensitive on the race issue. They associate political domination and economic exploitation with the Western white man. The Communists have the advantage,

many of them being non-European. The Russians and the Red Chinese can say with some plausibility: "There is nobody here but us Asians."

2. Politically.

The United States today is the target of much hostility because of our close friendship and association with former colonial powers. The memory of the subject status is all too fresh in the minds of these uncommitted people, and now that we have become a world power they transfer some of that antagonism towards us.

3. Economically.

The United States is identified with economic exploitation from the West because, again, of some of this colonial affiliation; but the Soviet Union and Red China are not; they have not been great powers until the last few years. Further, the Soviets can cite their remarkable economic and technological achievements from an underdeveloped state to a fairly highly developed economy in four decades. This is what they say: "Look at what we did in forty years."

I suggest that we ought to have a mighty counteroffensive. Look what we have done in forty years! We ought to be telling our story in even more graphic terms, and we can do it. What is more, we ought to have some expressed goals.

When I was in the Soviet Union I saw thousands and thousands and thousands of Asians and Africans. When I got off that airplane at Moscow airport, four out of five people in that airport were Asians, Africans, and Arabs. There are thousands of students in Moscow University and in the technical schools in Moscow -- Asians and Africans

and Arabs -- and 95 percent of them have their stipends, their tuition, their living costs all paid by the Soviet Union. Of course, we are too hard up over here to compete with this.

I am fed up to the teeth with the talk that we cannot afford it. We can afford anything we want to do, and you know it. We spend a whole lot more money in this country on horse races than we do on the foreign aid program. Don't tell me we cannot afford it. We just have not made up our minds that we ought to do it. We somehow do not believe that it is really very important to conduct a massive international education program. We are dabbling in it.

I submit to you ladies and gentlemen that unless we take this thing seriously we are not going to have the race between the tortoise and the hare. It will be between two hares; one knows where it wants to go and the other one has just got its ears up.

The Soviets know where they want to go. Their Seven-Year Plan, whether we like it or not, is not merely an economic document; it is a psychological document.

What is our plan for the next seven years? What is our plan for the next two years? Even at home, what is our plan for the 4.7 million unemployed? What is our plan for Washington, D. C.? And do not tell me that it is not important to have these plans, because people need specifics to work for. We have been the victims of glittering glib generalities, and they have run out of meaning.

What is our plan of working with our South American neighbors? We had a great man here from El Salvador in the Congress of the United States yesterday. He appealed to us for some specifics. We have not

got around to making them yet.

I want to tell you that one of the parts of political genius and political dynamics is to have specifics -- a specific thing to do. We do not have it. We did once. We had a Marshall Plan; we knew what we wanted to do. We wanted to build a United Nations. We knew what we wanted to do; there was enthusiasm. But I repeat to you, and I say this not as a partisan; I am saying this as a distressed American: What is our plan for the future? What do we want to do? How many linguists do we need, for example?

I have three sons and a daughter. No one really tells them that maybe they are really needed by their country to learn certain languages. We are still talking about languages as if somehow or another there was a choice between hamburgers and hot dogs. I think we have to have a sense of urgency.

#### 4. Militarily.

On the military front the Soviet Union has no military bases on foreign soil of a non-Communist state. Very clever propaganda they have. They just take the whole country, you see. She poses as the champion of peace and constantly tells the world how she is trying to get rid of nuclear weapons. The United States, on the other hand, for our security and for the security of the others has a ring of bases around the Soviet-Chinese empire.

We have dropped two atomic bombs on human beings, and Asians at that.

These facts, apart from their deeper meaning, add one more

strike against us in our attempt to deal with Asians and we might just as well face it. I am not saying that we should not have dropped those bombs. I am just simply saying that we did and it poses grave psychological problems.

## 5. Cultural Empathy.

There is also what we call "cultural empathy". For reasons mentioned above it appears easier for Russians or Chinese Communists to establish contacts and achieve identification with Asians. May I add that the Communists have an advantage here. When they want a Communist to work in India he is an Indian Communist; when they want a Communist to work in Ceylon, he is a Ceylonese Communist. They have a world-wide network, a world-wide system of their coreligionists who are willing to do with zeal what the central system asks of them.

I want to mention one other suggestion.

There has been in our country an unfortunate attitude relating to the position of neutrals. I am afraid that we have misunderstood what some of the Asians and Africans mean by genuine neutrality.

There has been a tendency on our part to seek alliances with nations without the psychological and political preconditions for a viable alliance being present. SEATO does not have, for example, the support of India, Burma, Indonesia, and Ceylon. The Secretary of State and others who have been his advisers have been very much committed to potential military allies in the struggle with Communism. I believe that in some areas of the world we ought to be very careful as to whether or not a military alliance gains us strength or promotes enmity or doubt.

President Eisenhower on June 6, 1956, defended the rights of nations to be neutral in these words: "Nations can be neutral, and a decision to remain aloof from military alliances under certain circumstances is natural and prudent."

On the other hand, Mr. Dulles said on June 9, 1956, that neutrality "is an obsolete conception and that, except under very exceptional circumstances, is an immoral and shortsighted conception".

This reveals confusion within our Government.

What we fail to see is that there is both good neutralism and bad neutralism, and that our foreign policy should be devoted to encouraging the good variety and discouraging the bad.

Responsible neutralism from the viewpoint of one who believes in democratic values can be and indeed is being pursued by certain Asian and African countries. India is one. According to this brand of neutralism, or nonalignment as they prefer to call it, the neutral nation does not join with the military alliance structure of either in the cold war. It remains uncommitted in an explicit military sense, but at the same time it is not neutral as far as fundamental issues on tyranny and justice are concerned. A genuinely neutral and independent nation which is strong enough to resist the penetration of Communism is far greater asset to the West than a subservient Asian country that has been prematurely pressed into a Western military pact.

What we want, therefore, are the countries with enough political self-respect and economic strength to stand up and be counted as being for themselves. If we can have enough countries in this world

that are for themselves, and not a part of the Communist apparatus, we have won a singular victory.

On February 16, 1956, I called for a reappraisal and an analysis of our foreign policy in Asia. I said then, and I repeat now, that we are on the defensive. And if we were on the defensive then we are even more so today. A sobering assessment of where we stand in the eyes of Asians was revealed in a poll a year ago; it was published in the Washington Post on January 9. It was taken in ten of the world's principal cities. In New Delhi 54 percent of the persons surveyed believed that Russia was doing more to keep the peace in the world than was the West; only 18 percent believed the West was doing more; and 28 percent had no opinion. In nine of the other world cities, none in Asia, a great majority believed the West was doing more for the world peace than the U.S.S.R. I mention this to underscore what I said earlier about some of the things that were affecting us in the Asian areas and the southeast Asian parts of the world.

Now, here are certain elements in a policy worthy of our position in the world today that I think would be helpful:-

1. Confidence in American diplomacy must be restored.

This means that our diplomacy must identify itself with what I call these aspirations of people.

2. We must adapt a more flexible policy towards Asia which takes fully into account that political and cultural diversity of that vast area.

We must recognize that these nations are proud and have

both a moral and political right to pursue their own policies. A genuinely independent country is of greater value than a coerced or bought ally.

3. We must increase our economic aid to free and independent Asian countries.

This is in the form of long-term low-interest loans under the new Development Loan Fund (which has inadequate financial resources today), the Export-Import Bank, and other appropriate channels, including, of course, the World Bank. We need a good deal more of it. India is an example. If its Second Five-Year Plan fails I am afraid we are going to see the one great experiment in democracy in all of Asia go down the drain.

There is a grave need in America today in the highest echelons of our Government for a complete synthesis between military policy, economic policy, and political and psychological policy, or what we call "propaganda" policy. I know that we have made efforts to accomplish this, but I still think there is much to be found wanting.

The Soviets have by the very nature of their system, I suppose, understood this better. They know how to use the military as a powerful weapon, almost a blackmail, to attain their economic designs. They know how to use the economic facilities to buttress their political, psychological, and military designs. In other words, they move in phalanxes in solid formation.

I have a feeling that we tend to treat these subjects one at a time, for example.

What is our economic policy in relationship to the Soviet offensive? Do you really think that a private American company can stand up against the dumping operations of the Soviets? They are going to engage in more and more of it. We have tasted a little bit of it in tin, aluminum, and benzine. We are going to taste more of it.

What is the design of our plan? Are we going to rely entirely upon just free enterprise to meet the state monopolistic, state capitalistic-monopolistic system of the Soviets? I happen to think that General Motors is the greatest corporation in the world, but I do not think that General Motors can take on the Soviet Union alone, and I do not know why it should.

I think there is a need for some rethinking of American governmental policies relating to this economic struggle in which we are currently engaged. The truth is, the Soviet has its troops in the field and we have not even joined the battle. They are moving with determination; they are staking out areas of the world in which they intend to put their hooks, and we are still hoping that we can meet this by conventional methods. I submit that this is almost a reply in the economic scene of what happened in France in 1940.

The French Army was a grand army, as the Generals and Admirals here today know. The Maginot Line was impregnable. There was a great conflict in France as to what kind of a defense structure the French ought to have. But the old conservative forces won. They said: "We will stop the Germans by building a wall and we will have the old weapons, only they will be refined."

The Nazis came at them with flanking movements and Stuka dive bombers, infiltration, subversion, and a thousand-and-one other things. France crumbled. France was ready for the other war which never came.

I am a little bit worried that we are getting ready to fight the Soviets in the economic arena in a war that is nonexistent, because there is a new war on, a war of maneuver, a war of power, a war of economic penetration, and that what Khrushchev said is what they mean. He said: "Trade and aid is not for profit but for power." If we look upon trade and aid merely on the basis of a favorable balance in a set of books, we are going to get licked, because the nation that finally becomes dependent or the area of the world that becomes dependent upon the Soviet bloc for its goods, for its commerce, for its loans, for its investments, for its markets is going to be as much a captive nation of the Soviet as Romania, Poland, and Hungary are today. I am of the opinion that this is what the Soviets intend to do in Asia and Africa. They see there the balance of the world's population; they see there the great reservoirs, the great treasure house of raw materials.

Mr. Khrushchev said to me in the Kremlin: "Senator, your NATO is out of date." I said to him: "So is your Warsaw Pact." And he said: "You're right. Your NATO is out of date, Senator, because we are not going to attack you militarily. We are going to defeat you economically, and you don't have your NATO organized, Senator, to meet us economically." And he told me of how they tried to defend Kharkov against the Nazi onslaught and how the Nazis did not even come against their defenses but outflanked them and went around. He had been in

charge of that so-called defense which was a failure and he used it as an example. He said: "Senator, when the socialist states are finally able to bring the countries of Asia and Africa within our sphere your Western allies, who are practical men and industrialists, will know that if they want raw materials they will have to get them from us. If they want markets they will have to talk to our people. And if they want to use the trade lanes they will have to pass through our spheres of influence. When they find that out, Senator, they are not going to be your allies." He looked at me with steely cold eyes when he said it, and he meant it.

I do not think we ought to underestimate this man in Berlin or in Rangoon or in Cairo or any place else. These people are out for good and evil. They are out for their good and our bad, and if we are not prepared to meet them with the modern weapons of diplomacy, of proper politics, of economics, of propaganda, yes, and of military strength, we are going to be defeated.

But I can say to you optimistically, there is no need of that happening if we will just take the situation seriously long enough and go to work.

Thank you very much.



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