

Pontiac, Mich.  
October 30, 1959

001879

works of Peace  
U.N. Agency

Exchange  
econ. aid  
Trade  
cultural Rel  
Food  
Health  
Educa

NUCLEAR TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS

Three  
Challenges

Normally at a political rally you might expect a good rousing party speech.

And frankly, I would like to perform a public autopsy on the record of this Republican Administration. I believe it serves a salutary purpose to bring this lesson home to the American people.

But tonight I am going to forego that pleasure because the issues are great and the time is short. We are confronted by a whole series of decisions which may well determine the future course of our lives, and of our children's lives and of our nation's future.

Public Autopsy  
NO GO, NOT NOW,  
Veto, Administ.

- (1) Actual full Econ Potential
- (2) Realization of Full Freedom, Justice, opportunity for all Americans
- (3) attainment of a just & Enduring Peace.

↳ The times call for serious thought  
and a very candid, hardheaded appraisal  
of our world situation.

↳ And so I am going to leave aside  
the story of Republican mistakes of the  
past. I will ask you to join me in  
examining one of the most important  
problems of our foreign policy.

out

There is no more fitting place to do  
this than at a Democratic party meeting.  
The Democratic Party has always taken its  
world responsibilities seriously. From  
James Monroe through Woodrow Wilson,  
Franklin Roosevelt, and Harry Truman,  
Democratic Presidents have set the course  
for American foreign policy. And the  
Democratic Party, in local communities

out

throughout the country, has not lagged  
behind its leaders in these matters - it  
has often been way ahead of them.

*out*

I want to discuss with you tonight  
the problem of disarmament - a subject  
which lies at the very heart of international  
relations and military policy.

A few months ago, a Congressional  
Committee was informed by <sup>*nuclear + military*</sup> experts that a  
surprise nuclear attack on the United  
States would last just a few hours, but  
would cost the lives of about 50,000,000  
people - <sup>*almost*</sup> ~~just about~~ one third of the  
population. *— and many more casualties!*

The large nations of the world have  
just about given up the old concepts of  
strategy - soldier against soldier, ship  
against ship, army against army.

Now our military calculations involve  
the bombing of cities, the destruction  
population centers, the elimination of  
production facilities. These measures  
mean death to millions of people at a  
time.

And the most frightening thing is  
that we have almost grown accustomed to it.

But it does no good to express horror  
or to display moral indignation.

The problem is also a practical one,  
and we must solve it practically. We must  
insist on a fair solution even as the  
loaded guns are pointed.

In his speech at the U.N., Mr. Khrushchev  
stated that the Russians want to reduce  
arms at the present time. *of true,* This is encouraging.

*Handwritten scribble*

But up to now, they have shown little  
willingness to allow international officials  
to inspect the Soviet Union to ascertain  
whether they are performing according to  
agreement.

The job of American diplomats is  
twofold; first to persuade the Russians  
to accept inspection, and second to be  
sure that our inspection demands are  
reasonable and necessary. <sup>and</sup> We must not  
yield on any essential, because an agreement  
without real <sup>effective</sup> inspection would be worthless.

But we must recognize that the Russians  
have a historic passion for secrecy. The  
thought of foreign inspectors travelling  
freely around <sup>the Soviet Union</sup> ~~the country~~ is repugnant to them.

*Nevertheless, any disarmament agreement  
without inspection within the USSR  
would be the height of folly &  
irresponsibility*

*But,*

*Proposals* 001884

We must make sure that our ~~words~~ <sup>*and description*</sup> entail  
the maximum in ~~control~~ <sup>*control*</sup> and the minimum in  
complexity.

This is the general task of American  
diplomats. Now I want to become more  
specific.

If the world is to witness any progress  
toward ending the arms race and toward  
reducing the burden of vast expenditures  
for defense, we must determine whether the  
Soviets mean it when they claim they are  
willing to accept controls. Our main, and  
at the moment, only opportunity to find  
out is through the nuclear ~~test ban~~ <sup>*bomb*</sup>  
negotiations now in progress at Geneva.

*ask  
SAC?*

I wish to discuss these negotiations  
with you tonight because they bear so  
directly on whether a breakthrough in the

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in the disarmament question is possible.

If these negotiations succeed, then

future arms control talks can be conducted

in a much more favorable atmosphere than

if they fail or become stalemated

indefinitely. The negotiations are a test

of Soviet willingness to accept controls

*workable disarmament*

My purpose tonight is to report

briefly the status of the negotiations and

also to share with you a specific proposal

for breaking what is fast becoming an

impasse in the test ban talks.

*out*

The three nuclear powers - the United

States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union -

have been negotiating for one year. Definite

progress has been made.

*I was there*

Yes, Soviet representatives are beginning  
 to accept some concepts of control to  
 police a nuclear weapons test ban.

*Inspected, begun*

*the Soviets*

They have indicated a willingness to

cooperate with us to send satellites into

space to detect nuclear tests hundreds *possible* *yes thousands*

of miles above the earth. *<* They have

agreed to establish within their borders

about twenty fixed control posts to *inspection and*

house a variety of instruments to record

signals of possible nuclear explosions.

And they have accepted the idea that on

a *inspected a few* "few" occasions a year an international

inspection team may go to the site of an

unidentified event registered at the control

posts to determine whether a nuclear

explosion took place.

*Here is  
the  
problem.*

Kept  
~~Set~~

For a country in which secrecy and suspicion are almost a cult, the willingness of the Soviets to accept <sup>even such limited</sup> ~~the above~~ controls is an advance over previous arms control negotiations. Never in thirteen years of talks on disarming have the Soviets come this close to accepting controls in specified treaty language.

However, the Soviet position on controls is still inadequate in three major respects.

First, the control posts should contain a higher proportion of foreigners than the Soviet Union has yet been willing to accept.

~~The United States has asked for a ratio of two foreigners to every national and the Soviet Union has yet been willing to accept.~~

The United States has asked for a ratio of two foreigners to every national and the Soviet position is the reverse -- two nationals

for every foreigner. I believe that if both sides wish to reach an agreement the difference between them on this point can be compromised.

The second criticism of the Soviet position concerns the budget. <sup>required for the control & inspection system.</sup> The

Soviet Union has tried to insist that the budget for the international control organization should be adopted unanimously.

Here is the veto problem back again. But the Soviet Union has not always demanded a veto in the adoption of budgets, to name for example, the International Atomic Energy Agency. So it is very conceivable that this obstacle need not remain one for long.

# Now I come to the third Soviet position on <sup>inspection and</sup> control which is inadequate. And this is the most important the most difficult question of all. On this point,

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the negotiations could fail or stalemate.

This question is the number of times that  
an international  
a mobile inspection team may travel to the  
site of an event which could be suspected  
of being a nuclear explosion. ~~As I have~~

~~said,~~ The Soviets maintain that this  
will be necessary "only a few times" each  
year.

The United States objects to the  
restriction of "a few." But on this

question the United States has no counterproposal

*figure* of its own. *of the* We object to "the few" sought  
by the Soviet Union but have nothing to  
offer in return.

except We say that the number of inspections

should be related to the number of unidentified

events which might be suspicious. — possible

*nuclear explosions in violation of an agreement*

United States scientists have attempted to estimate how many unidentified events there might be, particularly those

*Earthquakes, Explosions  
Earthquakes, Explosions*

underground. Their estimate is based on

calculating about how many earthquakes

there will be in the Soviet Union and of

these how many the control posts will be

able to assert are definitely earthquakes

and not nuclear explosions. Some of our

scientists calculate that the number of

events that could be subject to inspection

is a very large one. This figure, in fact,

is so large that our negotiators are quite

certain that the Soviet Union will never

accept mobile inspection teams investigating

the site of every one of hundreds of unidentified

earthquakes.

*Act  
Mr. Mayhew*

/ The big problem, then, is how many  
 of the hundreds of unidentified earthquakes  
 should be subject to inspection? How many  
 will give a high degree of assurance  
 that the Soviet Union is not able secretly  
 to conduct a militarily significant series  
 of nuclear weapons tests.

/ I have presented to you as objectively  
 and as briefly as I can the major issues  
 that are before the nuclear powers - as  
 they resume their negotiations at Geneva.

/ The unresolved issues on staffing and on  
 budget, I believe can probably be reconciled.

/ On the third issue, I am not so sure

a reconciliation is possible. I say this

because the Soviet Union gives little

indication that it will submit to a large

number of inspections. And the United States

*Central Post*

*of number of on-site inspections*

*Keep*

*[Handwritten signature]*

*Map*

*[Handwritten signature]*

is not even able to say how many inspections  
it thinks would be necessary. So you have

a situation in which the Soviet Union maintains

a position that is highly unsatisfactory to

us and in which the United States has no *definite*

position at all. Without a position on the

*[Handwritten scribble]*  
part of the United States it is difficult to

*[Handwritten scribble]*  
see how any compromise can be reached.

What is the answer to this apparent

impasse? I have urged the Administration

to reach some position on the question of

the number of inspections. Its answer is

that no position is possible until the Soviet

Union is willing to discuss the technical

complexities of the problem. The Soviet

Union, contending that it spent an entire

summer discussing the technical difficulties,

prefers to solve the problem by picking  
a number out of a hat, and a low number  
at that.

Many people, particularly those  
inside or close to the Atomic Energy  
Commission, would solve the impasse by  
advocating a nuclear weapons test ban  
that covers only atmospheric tests.  
They say that because atmospheric tests  
are so much more easily detected than  
those underground or at high altitudes,  
such a limited agreement would eliminate  
the necessity of any mobile inspection  
teams at all. The Soviet Union, thus far,  
has claimed that it wants a comprehensive  
agreement; that is, one that covers all  
nuclear weapons tests. It has rejected *just*  
an atmospheric ban.

I believe that an atmospheric ban  
is better than no agreement. ~~I believe~~

*But*

it is less desirable than a total  
ban because it would allow not only the  
United States, the United Kingdom, and  
the Soviet Union to continue <sup>Bomb</sup> testing,  
but it would also allow other countries  
such as Communist China and France and  
many others to become nuclear powers.

*thereby spreading  
the risk  
of nuclear  
Attack.*

Furthermore, if all our testing were  
done underground, I think this could  
result in an increase rather than a reduction  
of world tension. With all countries  
burrowing down into the ground to test  
their weapons each would have less knowledge  
of what the other was doing. Suspicion  
and distrust would be increased.

*#*

001895

↳ If the Soviet Union is unwilling to discuss the technical complications of a comprehensive agreement and if the United States is unwilling to reach a negotiating position regarding the number of annual inspections, then some other way out of the impasse must be found.

I do not pretend to have the perfect solution to this problem. But I offer here tonight one possibility for your consideration and discussion.

↳ For a comprehensive test ban our scientists believe that the number of unidentified events in the Soviet Union alone would number several hundred. Obviously, this is too many to inspect. However, this number drops drastically as the size of the nuclear explosion or earthquake increases. For example,

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if the control organization had to inspect only  
for explosions of approximately five  
kilotons or larger, the number of inspections  
needed in the Soviet Union, according to  
our scientists, would be somewhere in the  
range of twenty-five to fifty. <sup>agreed</sup> Such a  
range does not appear to me to be too  
high, from a practical point of view  
or from the viewpoint of the Soviet Union  
with its suspicious outlook toward any  
inspection or control.

My proposal, therefore, is as follows:

Point 1. Let the United States

extend its general moratorium on all  
nuclear tests now scheduled to end on  
December 31st for a maximum of one year.

This would give the nuclear powers <sup>001897</sup>

ample chance to reach agreement. <sup>But-</sup> I would

not extend this moratorium more than one

year. If the Soviets stall longer than

that, it is a sign they are trying to get

a test ban with no controls whatsoever.

~~I think~~ the United States must not allow

this to happen.

Point 2. We should offer to enter

into an agreement banning <sup>all</sup> nuclear weapons

tests equal to and above five kiloton

explosions. The agreement would specify

that all unidentified events equal to and

above a five kiloton explosion, would be

subject to inspection. The annual ceiling

on the number of mobile inspections in the

Soviet Union would be somewhere between

Slow!

twenty-five and fifty. In this way I believe we could arrive at a number of mobile inspections that would correspond to our present best educated guesses from a scientific point of view as to what is necessary.

a  
start -

Experienced  
in  
Inspection

Point 3. We should be prepared to join with the other countries for two years from the time the agreement goes into effect in a moratorium on all tests below five kilotons. At the end of that time we shall know two things: 1) whether the Soviet Union and other countries are cooperating in installing the control system and 2) whether by observation and further research the control posts can be improved to identify most of the unidentified events below a size of five kilotons.

Point 4. During the two year period  
 in which the control posts and inspection  
 system for the five kiloton threshold  
 agreement is being established we should  
conduct a comprehensive research program  
in cooperation with the Soviets, with the  
United Nations, and also by ourselves.

Such a program would be designed to find  
 ways of improving the control system so  
that all suspicious events would be subject  
to inspection within a reasonable ceiling.

Point 5. The agreement should specify  
that if the international control posts or  
our own detection system gave evidence  
that the Soviet Union was not cooperating  
in the moratorium on tests below five kilotons -  
 those not subject for two years to mobile

*For Minutes*  
*Lyons*  
*Proposal*  
 USA  
 UK  
 USSR  
 under U.N  
 Supervision  
 underground  
tests!

*or Call off the  
agreement!*

inspection - then we would be free ourselves

to test in this range. We would present

our evidence to the international control

commission to show that the moratorium

had been violated. And if the Soviets do

not agree to install appropriate and

reasonable controls for tests below five

kilotons we should be free to test in this

range if our defense requires it.

*could  
come  
out!*

~~My proposal is one I believe can be  
reached within a short time, given the sincere~~

~~desire to reach agreement on the part  
of the Soviet Union and the United States.~~

~~This is one that should be offered rather  
than have the negotiations fail or continue  
indefinitely as a stalemate. This proposal~~

*out*

covers the requirements of the United States,

namely that <sup>*inspector and*</sup> ~~an~~ control system should be based

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on what scientists estimate can be done.

It also covers the requirements of the

Soviet Union, that a control system must

not be confused with extreme complexity,

which to them looks like espionage. And

it is a proposal which gives considerable

assurance that we can have a total and

effective test ban agreement.

In advancing this proposal before you tonight ~~I believe~~ some important and related points should be stressed.

(1) A cessation of atomic tests is arms control, but it is not real disarmament.

It is only a first step toward disarmament.

We believe that disarmament is necessary,  
that it must eventually come, and that  
without it, the whole world is in danger.

We are willing to accept the kind of international inspection which alone can make disarmament effective and meaningful.

Well, then, why don't we say it? Why don't we identify our country with these goals? Why don't we let the peace loving people of the world understand that the United States is the leader in the great quest for peace?

Why do we leave it to Khrushchev to go before the United Nations General Assembly and proclaim the great goal of complete disarmament, as though he had invented it?

I think the present administration  
has been ~~extremely~~ negligent in allowing  
this idea to become associated, in the  
eyes of the world, with the Soviet Union,  
when in fact, it has been an American idea *since 1946!*

In addition to proclaiming our sincere  
and dedicated conviction to a system of  
comprehensive disarmament we must also  
be prepared with the necessary technical  
studies for control and inspection in each  
stage of disarmament. And we must also  
be prepared to change a vast segment of  
our production from arms manufacturing to  
peacetime pursuits.

There is no doubt in my mind that  
money saved on armaments will find other  
uses. It would make it possible to shift

emphasis to many urgent peacetime tasks.

If I listed the many opportunities that

we would have to make use of savings

from a reduction of defense expenditures

it would be another speech. I am certain

this audience will forgive me if I refrain

from giving you another speech this

evening.

↳ The big question is, will we find

these other uses quickly enough, and

will these other uses employ the very

people and the very facilities that

formerly were engaged in military production?

↳ It will take considerable planning to

make the transition smooth. ~~Healthy~~

reconversion is not just one big overall

problem. Rather, it consists of thousands

of specific problems, involving particular  
groups of employees. The fact that the  
general national level of prosperity will  
continue offers no reassurance to individual  
workers who would lose jobs.

Finally, I want to conclude by underlining  
the point that when I speak of disarmament,  
I mean mutual disarmament, under effective  
controls which will give assurance that all  
parties are living up to the agreement.

I do not mean unilateral disarmament.

Indeed, I strongly oppose the tendency  
of this Republican administration to reduce, *in the name*

*(economy)*

our armed power unilaterally, to try to  
rely solely on the massive nuclear deterrent,  
and to place the <sup>*fiscal*</sup> budget ahead of national  
security *and human needs.*

001906  
All of this is dangerous to our national defense. It encourages adventures on the part of the Communists which may lead to wars which otherwise might have been avoided. Weak defenses make disarmament more difficult. A nuclear war is horrible to contemplate. But also horrible is the prospect of a United States and a free world so weak that domination by the Soviet dictatorship becomes unavoidable.

Disarmament is at the very center of our foreign relations. I have stressed it tonight because I believe deeply that solutions can be found. They can be found if our leaders, the Soviet leaders, and the leaders of other

nations are convinced that large-scale  
devastating wars no longer can be made  
a substitute for resolving disputes in  
ways that are peaceful, equitable, and  
just.

World Weary of War  
Massive doses of  
Food, health, education,  
science, capital and  
Cooperation!!

People, Progress, & Peace!



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